Countering insider threat attacks - CDE themed call launch 14 May 2013

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Presentations from CDE themed call launch event on 14 May 2013 - for full details of this call for proposals see: http://www.science.mod.uk/events/event_detail.aspx?eventid=264

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Countering insider threat attacks - CDE themed call launch 14 May 2013

  1. 1. Countering Insider ThreatAttacksCentre for Defence Enterprise (CDE)
  2. 2. Rapid technological change
  3. 3. © Crown Copyright MOD 2011The aim of CDE
  4. 4. © Crown Copyright MOD 2011Prove the value of novel, high-risk,high-potential-benefit research
  5. 5. © Crown Copyright MOD 2011To enable development of cost-effective military capability advantage
  6. 6. 13 May 2013Five key operating principlesunderpin the CDE model
  7. 7. Engaging innovators
  8. 8. 13 May 2013Accessible opportunity
  9. 9. Sustaining incentives
  10. 10. Minimising participation costs
  11. 11. Compliance
  12. 12. Intellectual property
  13. 13. Two routes to funding
  14. 14. Online bid submission
  15. 15. Themed calls
  16. 16. CDE themed call programmePrecision timing Call closes 6 Jun 2013(at 1700 hrs)Countering insider threat attacks Call closes 27 Jun 2013(at 1700 hrs)Secure communications Call launch 18 Jun 2013Innovation in drug developmentprocessesCall launch 25 Jun 2013Enhancing military medical trainingand support for the medicCall launch 16 Jul 2013UK Biological EngagementProgrammeCall launch 17 Sept 2013Register and further details at www.science.mod.uk under ‘Events and Calls’
  17. 17. Defence Open Call
  18. 18. Seeking the exceptional
  19. 19. Challenging conventions
  20. 20. 4355proposals received
  21. 21. 17%proposals funded
  22. 22. £39Mcontracts awarded
  23. 23. Making an impact
  24. 24. Exemplar project
  25. 25. Fuel efficiency
  26. 26. ‘Micro generators’
  27. 27. © Crown Copyright MOD 2011Effective proposals
  28. 28. Challenge, pace & exploitation
  29. 29. The future of CDE
  30. 30. Introduction to CDE 1030Programme overview 1050Military context 1100Current research 1120Technical challenges 1140Ethics 1230Submitting a CDE proposal 1240Q&A 1250Networking lunch (booksurgery appointments)1300Surgery sessions 1400Event close 1600Agenda
  31. 31. Context of today’s call
  32. 32. Network and question
  33. 33. Centre for Defence Enterprise01235 438445cde@dstl.gov.ukwww.science.mod.uk/enterprise
  34. 34. Introduction to CDE 1030Programme overview 1050Military context 1100Current research 1120Technical challenges 1140Ethics 1230Submitting a CDE proposal 1240Q&A 1250Networking lunch (booksurgery appointments)1300Surgery sessions 1400Event close 1600Agenda
  35. 35. Countering the Insider Threat -CDE Themed CallDstl Support to Operations OverviewDSTL/PUB72551UNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  36. 36. © Crown Copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013Dstl Support to Ops• Dstl– Science and Technology (S&T) agency ofMinistry of Defence (MOD)– Maximise impact of S&T on UK defenceand security• Support to Operations (S2O)– MOD main effort– Provision of appropriate deployed S&Tsupport– Oversight of cross-domain S2O research– Responsive approach to short-termpriorities• Insider ThreatUNCLASSIFIED
  37. 37. Insider Threat• The Insider Threat is a real threat for UK Forces operating inAfghanistan• The term ‘Insider Attack’ is used when a member of the AfghanNational Security Forces (ANSF) attacks members of theInternational Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), of which the UKis a part• The name of these incidents recognises that ANSF as well as ISAFare targets of these attacks• The subset terms “Green on Blue”, “Green on Green” and “Greenon Brown (contractors)” are still used to distinguish between theintended targets of attacksUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  38. 38. S&T response to Insider Threat• Increasing numbers of incidents through 2012• Dstl Insider Threat ‘Challenge’ Autumn12– What more can S&T do?• Dstl Support to Ops:– Took forward proposals from the challenge– Created Project MORPHEUS– Pull together S&T in this area• Coordinated with wider MOD effort– Direction from MOD customers– Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and Ops Directorate (Afghanistan)UNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  39. 39. Project MORPHEUS• Portfolio of work items– Delivery by early 2014, largely soft science– Causes, capability gaps– Exploitable solutionsUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  40. 40. What do we want from you?• Research proposals to help counter the Insider Threat• Rapidly exploitable solutions– Main focus is current operations– Exploitation by January 2014– Some interest in longer term• Ensure no stone is left unturnedUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  41. 41. What will you hear today?• Operational context• Current research• Areas of interest• Assumptions and constraints• How to get involved• Answers to your questions– Surgery sessions this afternoonUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  42. 42. Introduction to CDE 1030Programme overview 1050Military context 1100Current research 1120Technical challenges 1140Ethics 1230Submitting a CDE proposal 1240Q&A 1250Networking lunch (booksurgery appointments)1300Surgery sessions 1400Event close 1600Agenda
  43. 43. Joint Warfare DirectorateCountering Insider ThreatAttacks: Military ContextA View from Joint Warfare
  44. 44. Joint Warfare DirectorateCurrent situation Not classified until 2008? Peak in 2012 for UK? It is an issue for Coalition and Afghan National Security Forces Others are also examining this in detail
  45. 45. Joint Warfare DirectorateWhat has the military done? Training Equipment Personnel Information Doctrine Infrastructure
  46. 46. Joint Warfare DirectorateWhere should the military looknext? Afghanistan Increase awareness of other cultures/religions? Sharing intelligence with host nation & allies? Ensure that the military reads and understandsdoctrine/history?
  47. 47. Introduction to CDE 1030Programme overview 1050Military context 1100Current research 1120Technical challenges 1140Ethics 1230Submitting a CDE proposal 1240Q&A 1250Networking lunch (booksurgery appointments)1300Surgery sessions 1400Event close 1600Agenda
  48. 48. Project MORPHEUSCountering the Insider ThreatUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013DSTL/PUB72551
  49. 49. Overview of Current WorkUNCLASSIFIED• The Insider Attacks are likely to be underpinned by a number ofdifferent factors• This is reflected by the multifaceted programme• A number of work strands have been undertaken over the last 6months:– Operational Analysis– Selection of Mentors– Cultural Training– Training Review– Information Dissemination Review– Intent Detection System Evaluation– Protected Living Spaces© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  50. 50. Operational Analysis• Objectives:– To collate all available data into a classified database and conduct analysison Insider Threat attacks to identify any common factors and trends overtime• Previous operations• Analogous attacks– To conduct interviews with members of the Afghan National Security Forcesto better understand their concerns / motivations / drivers• Benefits:– A greater understanding of the threat will mean that appropriate mitigationmeasures can be implemented– Work strands within the programme are evidence basedUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  51. 51. Selection of Mentors• Objectives:– To provide guidance on the knowledge, skills and experience required inorder to operate successfully in the mentor role. Mentors and mentoringteams are there to provide training and support to both develop knowledgeand improve the skills required to enhance their performance during militaryand policing operations• Benefits:– Ensure that the most appropriate individuals deployin the mentor role• Eg Those who can build productive relationships andbe culturally sensitiveUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  52. 52. Cultural Training• Objectives:– To provide guidance on how to improve the pre-deployment cultural trainingreceived by all troops• To improve the methods of delivery• To ensure that the ‘so what’ is included• Benefits:– Ensure that troops are culturally sensitive and will not cause offenceUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  53. 53. Training Review• Objectives:– To identify and review current training cross government that will be relevantfor dealing with the Insider Threat on current and future operations• Behavioural analysis/ anomaly detection• De-escalation training• Cultural training• Benefits:– Identify relevant training material and methods which could be incorporatedinto a specific Insider Threat training course if required– Provide recommendations for how ‘soft skills’ training could be incorporatedinto basic trainingUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  54. 54. Information Dissemination• Objectives:– To review existing Insider Threat newsletters/ doctrine notes• To propose revised content• To provide options for effective future communication of latest Insider Threatfindings• Benefits:– Improved dissemination of information to target audienceUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  55. 55. Intent Detection Systems• Objectives:– To consider whether Intent Detection Systems could have utility for theInsider Threat• Assess whether systems could detect the intent to commit an insider attack• Evaluate the practicalities of using Intent Detection Systems on current operations• Benefits:– A better understanding of the capabilityUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  56. 56. Protected Living Spaces• Objectives:– To provide advice on materials/technologies that are available to protectliving accommodation in Afghanistan• Benefits:– Improved understanding of the options available to mitigate against thevulnerabilities within living accommodationUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  57. 57. Summary• These work strands give a flavour of the types of activities currentlybeing undertaken in this area• Programme already established and benefits are being realised• What else could you do?UNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  58. 58. Introduction to CDE 1030Programme overview 1050Military context 1100Current research 1120Technical challenges 1140Ethics 1230Submitting a CDE proposal 1240Q&A 1250Networking lunch (booksurgery appointments)1300Surgery sessions 1400Event close 1600Agenda
  59. 59. Countering InsiderThreat Attacks:CDE Themed CallOverviewUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  60. 60. Scope• Open to new approaches and solutions• Current and possible future operations• Not limited to current situation and assumptions• Push boundaries, however unusual or radical• Thinking differentlyUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  61. 61. Scope• Continue partnering with host nation’s forces andpopulation• Human dimension:– Insider Threat: Underlying causes? Influence over others? Opportunity?Ability? Timing? Location? Outcome?– UK forces: Awareness? Response? Training? Influence?• Technology:– Detect intent? Share situational awareness? Building layout to minimiseeffects? Weapon suppressors?UNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  62. 62. What’s required• Research proposals for new solutions and technology to help mitigatethe Insider Threat• New ways of countering attacks• Re-use old ideas from a related world• Social and behavioural sciences– Training, tools, planning aids• Proof-of-concept technology• ‘Doing things differently’UNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  63. 63. What’s not requiredUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013• Long-term social and behavioural science studies• Incremental improvements• Ideas with no realistic probability of exploitation
  64. 64. Call challenges• Call divided into four challenges:1. Dissuade Improving the effects of influence2. Detect Improving the identification of intent3. Prepare Improving the effectiveness of training4. Protect Improving Force ProtectionUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  65. 65. Call challengesUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013IncreaseunderstandingIdentify theunderlyingcausesReduce probabilityof situationescalatingInfluenceDissuadeProtectPrepareDetect Understandhuman behaviourTrainingForce Protection/equipment
  66. 66. Next steps• Proposals are sought to address one or more of thesechallenges• Current and possible future operations• Short-term studies for delivery by end January 2014• Proposals involving human participants will require MOD ethicsapprovalUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  67. 67. Exploitation• Current work often exploited rapidly through changes to pre-deployment training• Technical Partner will be assigned to each successful proposal– Provide interface with MOD– Assist with exploitation• Stakeholder Day will be held on completion of all successfulproposalsUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  68. 68. Timescales, funding• 21 May 2013 Webcast published• 27 June 2013 Call closes 1700 hrs• £400k available for this CDE themed callUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  69. 69. Background information• Proposed work must be unclassified• Data sources– Open sources– BBC3 Our War– Online– Analogous communities– MOD website• Operations & Deployments• Thinking differently…UNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  70. 70. Challenge 1Dissuade –Improving the effects of InfluenceDSTL/PUB72551UNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  71. 71. Improving the effects of Influence‘How can people be dissuaded from undertakinginsider attacks, both before and during anincident?’UNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  72. 72. Improving the effects of InfluenceUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013IncreaseunderstandingIdentify theunderlyingcausesReduce probabilityof situationescalatingInfluenceDissuadeProtectPrepareDetect UnderstandHuman behaviourTrainingForce Protection/equipment
  73. 73. Background• Identify underlying causes of Insider Attacks– Understand Afghan National Security Forces troops– Understand the Afghan people– Wider applicability to other crises• Social sciences disciplines– Anthropology, Psychology, Law History,International Relations, Economics, Theology• Output– Operations: eg Cultural Specialists, Human Terrain Teams– Education: HQ, unit and individual trainingUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  74. 74. De-escalation• De-escalation (Dissuasion)– Reduce underlying grievances– Broader, longer-term, higher-level issues• De-escalation (Detection, Prevention, Protection)– Defuse confrontation– Local, immediate, tactical-level issues– Often language constrained• Social science can inform both categoriesUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  75. 75. Potential avenues of research• Novel ways to understand Afghan culture• Novel tools to help understand what might influence someone• Novel methods to understand someone’s level of discontent• Novel methods to disseminate information to Afghansparticularly if they can’t read• Afghan cultural awareness of ISAF• Afghan personnel selection• Afghan sentiment• Building rapport• Afghan mediaUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  76. 76. Challenge 2Detecting DeceptionSpecifically the deception associated with an insider attackUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  77. 77. Detecting deceptionUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013IncreaseunderstandingIdentify theunderlyingcausesReduce probabilityof situationescalatingInfluenceDissuadeProtectPrepareDetectTrainingForce Protection/equipmentUnderstand humanbehaviour
  78. 78. Detecting deceptionUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013IncreaseunderstandingIdentify theunderlyingcausesReduce probabilityof situationescalatingInfluenceDissuadeProtectPrepareDetectTrainingForce Protection/equipmentUnderstand humanbehaviours
  79. 79. Behavioural detection• Person or vehicle-borne IEDs or intention of firing into a crowd– No reliable generic indicators for suspicious intent– Post hoc analysis is potentially problematic– Different motivations manifest in different indicators– Suicide bombers psychologically different to criminals– No evidence that guilt or stress are reliable indicators of suspiciousintent– Cultural differencesUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  80. 80. What affects behavioural cues?• Variety of motivations– Personal grievance– Planned insurgent activities– Medical issues– Instant emotional reaction to a particular event• Variety of emotional states– Calm– Angry– Fearful– ElatedUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  81. 81. Pattern of life recognition• Expectancy Violations Theory– Establish baseline behaviour for context– Identify behaviour that deviates from this baseline within this context• Skills required– Perception– Question– ActUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  82. 82. Feedback from the front line• BBC3 Our War– This was deemed to be very useful prior to deployment because itprovided head cam footage of real life in theatre• Development of:– Empirically underpinned synthetic environments?– Empirically underpinned interactive skills training?UNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  83. 83. How you can help• Tools or techniques to enhance awareness of behaviour thatviolates the relevant pattern of life• These must be:– Validated– Mobile– Easy to use– Based on current scientific evidenceUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  84. 84. Challenge 3Prepare –Training solutionsUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  85. 85. Prepare – Training solutionsUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013IncreaseunderstandingIdentify theunderlyingcausesReduce probabilityof situationescalatingInfluenceDissuadeProtectPrepareDetect Understand humanbehaviourTrainingForce Protection/equipment
  86. 86. The problem• We do not know why insiderattacks occur– Infiltration by the enemy– Poor relations– Attackers feel insulted– Revenge– Stress• Hence, providing a training solution will be difficult andchallengingUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  87. 87. Insider Threat training• Currently– All personnel receive initial Insider Threat awareness training– Specialist training to select high-risk groupsUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  88. 88. Insider Threat training• Can training– Improve relationships?– Enhance the ability of a person to perceive the Insider Threat?– Improve the “course of action” decision?– Optimise that course of action?UNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  89. 89. Improve relationships• Enhance cultural understanding– How is your wife?– Passing in front of you when praying• Active listening skills• Enhancing empathyUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  90. 90. Enhance ability to perceive InsiderThreat• Can you perceive insider attack behavioural cues– Months before– Days before– Imminently• What are the cues? Do they exist?• Behavioural science• Cultural understanding• Observation skillsUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  91. 91. Improve decisions about InsiderThreat• Decision making under pressure• High-risk decision making• Enable or enhance heuristics– Mental short cuts to aid decision makingUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  92. 92. Optimise response• De-escalation (physical/verbal)• Tactical communication skills• Physical unarmed combat skills• Close quarter armed combat skillsUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  93. 93. Possible avenues• Training Needs Analysis for specific and generalist roles• Observation skills training• Sound decision making• De-escalate (tactical verbal communication/physicalintervention)• Close quarter combat with firearms• Provision of realistic training scenarios (tabletop/role play)UNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  94. 94. Challenge 4Protect -Force ProtectionUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  95. 95. Force ProtectionUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013IncreaseunderstandingIdentify theunderlyingcausesReduce probabilityof situationescalatingInfluenceDissuadeProtectPrepareDetect Understand humanbehaviourTrainingForce Protection/equipment
  96. 96. Introduction• What is Force Protection?• Outline of threat• Prevention• Options• ConsiderationsUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  97. 97. What is Force Protection?• "It is easier and more effective to destroy the enemys aerialpower by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than tohunt his flying birds in the air." - General Giulio Douhet (1869-1930) Italian army air officer known as the father of strategic airpower.• In simple terms, Force Protection is preventive measures takento mitigate hostile actions in specific areas or against a specificpopulationUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  98. 98. Outline of threat• Good range of Force Protection at ground level– Barriers– Partitions– Manned/Gated entrances• Elevated positions pose more of a threat– Building roofs– Sangars/Watchtowers• However solutions enhancingground protection should notbe discountedUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  99. 99. Prevention• Defeat of the Insider Threat could be achieved throughaddressing three separate topics– Countering the initial Insider Threat– Prevent the Insider Threat from locating or engaging targets– Prevent injury to Insider Threat targetsUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  100. 100. Option 1 – Countering the initialInsider Threat• Ensure day to day activities are not denied– 360 degree coverage on sentry duty within Sangar– Normal activities at checkpoints• Could also include early detection of a possible eventUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  101. 101. Option 2 – Prevent the Insider Threatfrom locating or engaging targets• Masking the locations of individuals– Screened areas• Hanging screens• Walls• Prevention of munitions reaching the target– Barriers– Concrete walls– Detonation screensUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  102. 102. Option 2 – Continued• Need to be considerate of potential threat directions– Where is the Insider Threat likely to come from?– Can whatever measures be orientated to the likely threatdirection?– Multiple directions eg Sangars in camps– Specific directions eg CheckpointsUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  103. 103. Option 3 – Prevent injury to InsiderThreat targets• Elimination or reduction of injury causing threat from– Small arms fire– Rocket-propelled grenades– Other fragmenting devices• Increased personal or area protectionUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  104. 104. Considerations• Need to avoid any potential of alienation• May help to harbour any perceived culture clash• Solutions should make the maximum use ofmaterials that are readily available to forces onoperationsUNCLASSIFIED© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl13 May 2013
  105. 105. Introduction to CDE 1030Programme overview 1050Military context 1100Current research 1120Technical challenges 1140Ethics 1230Submitting a CDE proposal 1240Q&A 1250Networking lunch (booksurgery appointments)1300Surgery sessions 1400Event close 1600Agenda
  106. 106. Ethics approval• Some of the proposals may require ethics approval– Any research involving human participants in MOD research, both clinicaland non-clinical requires ethics committee approval13 May 2013© Crown copyright 2013 DstlUNCLASSIFIED• Conduct research upon the human participant, including (but not limited to)administering substances, taking blood or urine samples, removing biologicaltissue, radiological investigations, or obtaining responses to an imposed stress orexperimental situationClinical• Conduct research to collect data on an identifiable individual’s behaviour,either directly or indirectly (such as by questionnaire or observation)Non-Clinical
  107. 107. Ethics approval• All proposals should declare if there are potential ethical hurdles toaddress• A proposal must, in the first instance, be scientifically robust in order forit to be, prima facie, ethical• If the proposal may require ethics approval, please make a three-partproposal– Milestone 1: Produce research protocols– Milestone 2: Obtaining ethics approval for the project– Milestone 3: Proposed research (subject to ethics approval)• More information– http://www.science.mod.uk/engagement/modrec/modrec.aspx13 May 2013© Crown copyright 2013 DstlUNCLASSIFIED
  108. 108. Introduction to CDE 1030Programme overview 1050Military context 1100Current research 1120Technical challenges 1140Ethics 1230Submitting a CDE proposal 1240Q&A 1250Networking lunch (booksurgery appointments)1300Surgery sessions 1400Event close 1600Agenda
  109. 109. Crown Copyright (c) 2012Centre for Defence Enterprisewww.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.ukUNCLASSIFIED / FOR PUBLIC RELEASECentre for Defence EnterpriseSubmitting a Successful ProposalCentre for Defence Enterprise (CDE)
  110. 110. Maximising your chances
  111. 111. Dstl is part of theMinistry of DefenceUNCLASSIFIED / For Public ReleaseCentre for Defence Enterprisewww.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.ukCrown Copyright Dstl 2012Know what is available
  112. 112. Dstl is part of theMinistry of DefenceUNCLASSIFIED / For Public ReleaseCentre for Defence Enterprisewww.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.ukCrown Copyright Dstl 2012Know what is available
  113. 113. Dstl is part of theMinistry of DefenceUNCLASSIFIED / For Public ReleaseCentre for Defence Enterprisewww.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.ukCrown Copyright Dstl 2012Know what is available
  114. 114. Dstl is part of theMinistry of DefenceUNCLASSIFIED / For Public ReleaseCentre for Defence Enterprisewww.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.ukCrown Copyright Dstl 2012Read availableinformationStart with –Quick Start Guideplus other CDE manuals –Account Manual, UserManual, TechnologyApplication ManualKnow what is available
  115. 115. Dstl is part of theMinistry of DefenceUNCLASSIFIED / For Public ReleaseCentre for Defence Enterprisewww.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.ukCrown Copyright Dstl 2012Know what is available
  116. 116. Dstl is part of theMinistry of DefenceUNCLASSIFIED / For Public ReleaseCentre for Defence Enterprisewww.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.ukCrown Copyright Dstl 2012Developing a CDE proposal
  117. 117. Crown Copyright (c) 2012Centre for Defence Enterprisewww.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.ukUNCLASSIFIED / FOR PUBLIC RELEASEProposal health check
  118. 118. Claim of future benefit
  119. 119. Contribution to future benefit
  120. 120. Logical programme of work
  121. 121. Generation of evidence
  122. 122. Demonstration of progress
  123. 123. The essentials
  124. 124. Description
  125. 125. minsAssessment
  126. 126. Not an exam
  127. 127. MOD Performance Assessment FrameworkFive criteria:Operational relevanceLikelihood of exploitationBuilds critical S&T capability to meet UKneedsScientific quality/innovationScience, innovation and technology risk
  128. 128. Commercial tab
  129. 129. Dstl is part of theMinistry of DefenceUNCLASSIFIED / For Public ReleaseCentre for Defence Enterprisewww.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.ukCrown Copyright Dstl 2012Government-furnished X
  130. 130. Health and safety
  131. 131. Ethics
  132. 132. Unclassified
  133. 133. Early birds
  134. 134. Dstl is part of theMinistry of DefenceUNCLASSIFIED / For Public ReleaseCentre for Defence Enterprisewww.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.ukCrown Copyright Dstl 2012This call closes:17:00 hrs onThursday 27 June 2013Deadline
  135. 135. Crown Copyright (c) 2012Centre for Defence Enterprisewww.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.ukUNCLASSIFIED / FOR PUBLIC RELEASEcde@dstl.gov.ukCall process queries
  136. 136. Dstl is part of theMinistry of DefenceUNCLASSIFIED / For Public ReleaseCentre for Defence Enterprisewww.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.ukCrown Copyright Dstl 2012support-to-ops-CDE@dstl.gov.ukCall technical queries
  137. 137. Dstl is part of theMinistry of DefenceUNCLASSIFIED / For Public ReleaseCentre for Defence Enterprisewww.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.ukCrown Copyright Dstl 2012www.science.mod.ukEvents and Calls > Current callsfor proposals > Countering InsiderThreat AttacksFurther information

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