• Save
Boston University Talk 021110
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×
 

Like this? Share it with your network

Share

Boston University Talk 021110

on

  • 570 views

Melanie Kenderdine's February 2010 presentation.

Melanie Kenderdine's February 2010 presentation.

Statistics

Views

Total Views
570
Views on SlideShare
570
Embed Views
0

Actions

Likes
0
Downloads
0
Comments
0

0 Embeds 0

No embeds

Accessibility

Upload Details

Uploaded via as Microsoft PowerPoint

Usage Rights

© All Rights Reserved

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Processing…
Post Comment
Edit your comment
  • Slide number 3 I am going to start with a b rief over view of climate change, I am sure much of this you have heard before but it will provide some context for my discussion.
  • Slide number 9 Impacts of climate change The impacts of climate change vary widely based on the range of temperature increases. Also, there is significant uncertainty in these impacts, particularly with regard to weather patterns. There is however general agreement that we are already seeing the impacts of climate change and that major changes will occur with CLICK Suns/Temperature increases   Stern review indicates that even stabilization level at 450 ppm CO2e by mid-century (a level we have most likely already exceeded) will increase global temperatures by around 2 degrees Celsius and this will have significant impacts on the planet. Largest temperature changes are expected to occur on the continents but some will occur over oceans as well. Most of the impacts that are illustrated on this slide occur at 2-4 temperature increase.   CLICK Desertification will increase along with significant changes in water availability. According to the UN desertification puts at risk the health and well-being of 1.2 billion people in more than 100 countries. Switches off the CO2 sink qualities of soil. Uncertain but most models forecast increased aridity in these areas. Central Australia and US, Middle East, North Africa/southern Europe, Mediterranean, southern Africa, northwest China as well, not shown here. As a result of increased aridity, for example, water availability in southern Europe is expected to decline 20% with a 2-3 degree C increase in temperature. Declines in parts of Africa will be even more dramatic and put 250 million people at risk of water shortages. CLICK Fires: Climate change is also contributing to larger and more frequent fires which in turn burn off vegetation, further exacerbating warming. In 2009 Australia and the US saw much larger fires; in the western US fires burned six times the acreage in the previous two decades than in the 20 years before that. CLICK   Melting of glaciers: Many of the world’s small glaciers have already melted. In the Hindu Kish, high levels of discharge are typically between April and September and are now between April and May. Disappearance of glaciers will represent a serious water challenge to 1/6 th the world’s population. Also, South America gets a disproportionate share of its electricity from hydro, Paraguay virtually 100% for example. The melting of glaciers in the Andes threatens both the water and electricity supply for significant portions of the population in several South American countries. CLICK   Increased precipitation : There will be Increased precipitation in some regions – increasing precipitation expected in eastern US, south America, northern Europe, north central asia, parts of central eastern Africa although this too could be affected if temperatures continue to rise.   CLICK Increased weather related events: Weather related event severity-- Stern report indicates a 5 or 10% increase in hurricane wind speed will double annual damage costs in the US. Directly related to weather related event severity is …. CLICK   Flooding and here I mean flooding that is not related to rising sea levels – melting glaciers initially increase flood risk. Also flood risk from severe weather events, particularly hurricanes/typhoons/cyclones.   CLICK NOTE here that the cartoons are located in countries that are the top producers of those particular grains. The cereal to stocks ratio is already at its lowest in 30 years and in the developing world, if China and India are removed from the equation, food production has actually declined. Wheat – Wheat is quite sensitive to temperature increases and there could be major declines in production, particularly in South Asia. Corn – largest grain crop in the world. Largest corn production declines are expected to be seen in Southern Africa, were there are indications that the region, whose poor rely heavily on maize for their calories, could experience as much as a 30% decline in maize production. Rice - South Asian rice production is also particularly vulnerable to climate related production declines. According to researchers at Stanford, rice in this region has a 75% chance of significan declines over the next two decades. CLICK Sea Ice decline -- According to NOAA, Arctic sea ice cover 2002-2006 was 18% lower than pre 1980 cover. The Greenland ice sheet is also melting in a way that is creating feedbacks that could accelerate its melting. CLICK Sea level rise – Modeling suggests that by 2100 sea levels will rise around two feet, without factoring in new data about the melting of the Greenland ice sheet. One of the most vulnerable countries will be Bangladesh (1.5 m rise would affect 22,000 square kilometres and 17M people), Caribbean, East and southeast Asia, parts of Africa, island nations, increased salinity of water supply, loss of coastal protections, decline of barrier reefs CLICK Significant change in trade/shipping patterns . I know this looks silly but the melting of the Arctic ice sheet raises some of the most significant geopolitical issues at the same time it represents the possibility of a “tipping point” event, meaning it could trigger cascading events that would be beyond human ability to react in a constructive manner. You may have noticed in the paper the other day that a ship made if from Siberia to Western Europe over the top, without encountering any ice. The captain was pretty astounded. This melting raises some fairly serious issues about territorial waters vs. internal waters of the nations with Arctic coasts as Russia claims that some of its island chains are in internal waters, a claim that the US disputes. Also, there are significant oil and gas resources in the Arctic which is currently an unregulated area. This poses perhaps the greatest opportunity for geopolitical conflict in this region and needs serious consideration by international bodies.  
  • Critical indicators, all percentages, dark green world population, light green world GDP, light blue, world CO2 emissions, dark blue, cumulative world CO2 emissions from 1890 I believe. All of these indicators illustrate the equity arguments coming from the developing world and why international climate negotiations are so complicated. Note: US 5 % population 28% of cumulative emissions, poster child for need to reduce per capita carbon emissions China, 11% of world GDP, 21% of world CO2 emissions, explains why they just made a commitment to reducing carbon intensity, relatively easier India, the flip side of the US 3% of world cumulative emissions, 17% of world population, illustrates why they are so focused on equity issues Finally, OME is “other major economies” of Russia, Brazil, South Africa. I have teased China out of this group. Disproportionate share of cumulative emissions compared to all other indicators. Equity arguments less compelling for these countries, need for major mitigation technologies
  • What I am going to show you on this slide is just a notional calculation to give you some idea of the magnitude of the reductions required in order to forestall some of the worst impacts of climate change that I identified earlier. The numbers are very rough approximations. THREE CLICKS Assume BAU in 2050 vis a vis carbon – this would mean there would be about 80 billion tonnes of CO2 emitted into the atmosphere. Assume we wanted a 90% reduction in that amount – Waxman Markey is 83-87% something like that off a 2005 baseline US for example. A 90% reduction would give us a CO2 allowance of around 8B tonnes. In 2050, the world is expected to have a population of 9 billion people. This would give us a CO2 budget of a little less than 1 ton per person.
  • Slide 17 Let’s look back at a previous slide, CO2 emissions per capita. What the US would have to do to achieve this carbon budget is to reduce its per capita emissions from its current level of around 19 tonnes per person to someone in the range of India’s. I would also remind you of the human development index and where India was on the graph. The point here is is that we are going to have to make dramatic changes in how we produce and consume energy if we are going to continue to live well on one tonne of CO2 per year.
  • Switch gears here from a climate overview to some near term policy options and turn to the role of the federal government in energy and climate policy. I am going to start with some cautionary tales about policy and program failures. The climate problem is so pressing and urgent and federal dollars are so scarce that it is now critical that we get it right. I have picked out four or five such failures and all I had to do was to go to search news headlines to illustrate the rise and fall of some highly touted policies and programs that have sent us veering off in some questionable directions, delayed our progress or consumed scarce resources, starving the alternatives.
  •   Slide 22 NOW let’s look at the US and China and see what we are doing about coal emissions. For the US it’s important to remember this data point. EIA says that 92% of US coal fired power generation capacity in 2030 is in existence today. In other words, if we don’t address the carbon from existing coal plants we are definitely violating the Willie Sutton approach. Read There is today no credible pathway towards stringent GHG stabilization targets without CO2 emissions reduction from existing coal power plants A carbon price signal is essential for making technology choices to mitigate carbon emissions from existing coal plants “ Real world” retrofit decisions will be taken only after evaluation of numerous site and plant-specific factors. These include: --Age, size , efficiency of plant --Proximity to CO2 off-take --Available space- Access to increased water supply --Existence of FGD and SCR capability --Practicalities of heat and power integration --Implication of a retrofit for dispatch  
  • According to IEA, by 2030, coal fired power generation will account for 34% of global CO2 emissions. Next highest is oil for transport at 31% of total CO2 emissions Slide 20 This slide depicts 2010 emissions from coal. Why coal? Because in 2010 43% of emissions will be from coal and this number is forecast to increase substantially. CLICK China will sources of 45% of global CO2 emissions fro coal in 2010. CLICK China, the US and India account for 68% of global CO2 emissions from coal combustion next year.
  • Slide 21 The US domestic analog of the global Willie Sutton strategy is best illustrated by this slide. It was done by Purdue University which picked a point in time in 2007, estimated the CO2 emissions from US coal plants at that point in time, and made those emissions visible through a computer model. Not only can we see where the heaviest emissions are coming from, we can also understand why it is so difficult to get meaningful climate legislation through the Senate! Enough said.  
  •   NETL electricity $82 INEL $10 M elec PNNL Buildings $28
  • Switch gears here from a climate overview to some near term policy options and turn to the role of the federal government in energy and climate policy. I am going to start with some cautionary tales about policy and program failures. The climate problem is so pressing and urgent and federal dollars are so scarce that it is now critical that we get it right. I have picked out four or five such failures and all I had to do was to go to search news headlines to illustrate the rise and fall of some highly touted policies and programs that have sent us veering off in some questionable directions, delayed our progress or consumed scarce resources, starving the alternatives.
  • Slide 13 ron prinn 100 years with and without policy The new projections, published this month in the American Meteorological Society's Journal of Climate, indicate a median probability of surface warming of 5.2 degrees Celsius by 2100, with a 90% probability range of 3.5 to 7.4 degrees. This can be compared to a median projected increase in the 2003 study of just 2.4 degrees. The difference is caused by several factors rather than any single big change. Among these are improved economic modeling and newer economic data showing less chance of low emissions than had been projected in the earlier scenarios. Other changes include accounting for the past masking of underlying warming by the cooling induced by 20th century volcanoes, and for emissions of soot, which can add to the warming effect. In addition, measurements of deep ocean temperature rises, which enable estimates of how fast heat and carbon dioxide are removed from the atmosphere and transferred to the ocean depths, imply lower transfer rates than previously estimated SLIDE 25 Takes me back to what I started – with a discussion of urgency. Since these warnings in 2004, increased understanding of global systems, more sophisticated modeling of changes in atmospheric and ocean currents, feedback loops, etc. has set off new alarms. This slide shows the climate change roulette wheel developed by Professor Ron Prinn and others at MIT. The roulette wheel is a cartoon showing the probability of temperature rises by 2100 – I know, I know, long time frame talk but it’s necessary at this point -- with and without policy intervention. The bad news is that the new projections that served as the foundation for the wheel indicate a median probability of surface warming of 5.2 degrees Celsius by 2100, with a 90% probability range of 3.5 to 7.4 degrees. This can be compared to a median projected increase in the 2003 study of just 2.4 degrees. The good news is that relatively modest interventions can have a major impact on temperature increases, keeping them within the 2-3 degree range you see here on the right. What can we do in the near term?
  • Turn to distributed generation, more specically CHP For industry and buildings, gas is primary fuel for CHP This slide depicts CHP as a percentage of total power generation in select countries, US way to the left with around 9% compared to Denmark with over 50% IEA estimates that FIFTEEN % of European GHG emissions reductions shares between 1990 and 2005 are attributable to CHP. Going forward, IEA estimates that CHP could reduce carbon emissions from new generation 4% by 2015 and 10% by 2030 (950 mt per year,) The US needs to take advantage of these potential emissions savings and support POR, regulatory policies and technology investments that make this possible
  • Slide 27 I recognize that nuclear is very problematic in the US. Like CCS or renewables, domestic nuclear market share is going to grow very slowly. This is not the case globally however. There are 44 nuclear power plants under construction worldwide in these locations and in these numbers. CLICK Not surprisingly, the Chinese are leading the pack with 11, followed by the Russians and Indians, two of the largest CO2 emitters.
  • SLIDE 29 Turn now to the other pachyderm, natural gas. As I noted earlier, the amount of coal fired power generation capacity that is capable of being retrofit for CCS is well below 50%. What should we do with those coal units that cannot be retrofit? This slide depicts the CO2 impacts if we were to repower some of those coal plants with natural gas. The X axis is GW of displaced coal capacity far right is 100 GW or around 1/3 of our total coal capacity. The y axis is additional volumes of gas required to meet that incremental demand and the Z axis is the CO2 reductions that would result. Bottom line: for an additional 5 tcf of gas (around 25% more which is a lot but, given the new shale plays, quite possible), could displace 30% of coal capacity that has no carbon lowering options, and reduce overall CO2 emissions in the US by 9%, a very significant number. The Waxman Markey target and President Obama’s CO2 reductions target going into Copenhagen is a 17% overall reduction by 2020 off a 2005 baseline. We could meet over half of this target simply by repowering 30% of our coal capacity with natural gas.
  • Switch gears here from a climate overview to some near term policy options and turn to the role of the federal government in energy and climate policy. I am going to start with some cautionary tales about policy and program failures. The climate problem is so pressing and urgent and federal dollars are so scarce that it is now critical that we get it right. I have picked out four or five such failures and all I had to do was to go to search news headlines to illustrate the rise and fall of some highly touted policies and programs that have sent us veering off in some questionable directions, delayed our progress or consumed scarce resources, starving the alternatives.
  •   I spent 8 years at DOE and most of my professional life in the energy policy world. My first admonition is about the technology du jour syndrome, illustrated by a fairly brief and expensive love affair with hydrogen. In his State of the Union address in 2003, President Bush announced a $1.2 billion Freedom Fuel initiative to reverse America’s growing dependence on foreign oil by developing the technology for commercially viable hydrogen-powered fuel cells to power cars, trucks, homes and businesses with no pollution or greenhouse gases. Combined with the FreedomCAR initiative, President Bush proposed a total of $1.7 billion over the next five years to develop hydrogen-powered fuel cells, hydrogen infrastructure and advanced automotive technologies. At the time, many serious technologist were skeptical citing energy density and infrastructure issues, as well as the fact that hydrogen was basically an energy storage technology and like electricity had to be produced from a primary fuel source. The headlines tell the story.  
  •   Another cautionary tale about the unintended consequences of policy decisions, the danger of policy making by mandate, with a little technology du jour syndrome thrown in as well. The 2005 energy bill included an ethanol standard, mandating X on top of the existing $.51 per gallon subsidy on ethanol, already one of the largest energy subsidies in the federal repertoire. In December 2007, the Congress expanded the renewable fuel standard (RFS), which requires rising use of ethanol and other biofuels, from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion gallons in 2022. This enhanced RFS focused on cellulosic ethanol as well as corn ethanol. Read about its tortured history.
  •   FutureGen is a government project announced by President Bush n 2003 . its initial plan involved the construction of a near zero-emissions coal-fueled power plant to produce both hydrogen and electricity while using carbon capture and storage. The Obama administration is working to restructure the program but it was flawed from the start, in large part for a very mundane reason. At DOE, a demonstration program requires higher industry cost share than a research project. In spite of the authority of the Secretary to waive the match requirements, the department elected to proceed with FutureGen, calling it a research project, attaching numerous, ultimately distracting bells and whistles to the project rather than simply getting on with it, building the IGCC plant in order to see if it could work, capturing the carbon and then sequestering it. This complex project sought to tie together essentially mismatched players in the energy space – utilities, essentially refiners, and reservoir managers – over long periods of time, with substantial industry cost share. It is little wonder it has had problems. Also, recall the earlier discussion about the high priority for retrofitting existing plants to mitigate climate change. FutureGen is demonstration of a new coal plant which may be useful in the very long term but it will do nothing to reduce emissions from existing plants.
  •  
  •   This last story is so old I could not find headlines on the internet so I had to make them up. You will see that there are professionals in the news business that are far better at headlines than I am! Nevertheless my poor substitutes tell a story about the long term impacts of policy decisions. This warning is about ………
  • .
  •    
  •   NETL electricity $82 INEL $10 M elec PNNL Buildings $28
  •   $466 Hubs $457 EFRCs $700 M ARPA e. 1583 Almost $400 m/year
  •  
  •  
  •    
  •    

Boston University Talk 021110 Presentation Transcript

  • 1. MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i
      • Melanie Kenderdine
      • Executive Director, MITEI
      • Presidential Lecture
      • Boston University
      • February 10, 2010
    Meeting the Climate Challenge: Are We Up to the Job?
  • 2. MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i
      • Climate Change Overview
  • 3. MIT Energy Initiative MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i Global CO 2 Emissions, 2010/2030 (million metric tons ) EIA 2009 IAEO
  • 4. MIT Energy Initiative MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i Late Summer Arctic Sea Ice Decline Sea level rise Impacts of Anthropogenic Climate Change
  • 5. MIT Energy Initiative MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i % world population % world GDP % world C02 emissions % cumulative emissions Some Critical Indicators
  • 6. MIT Energy Initiative MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i
    • BAU emissions in 2050: about 80 B tonnes CO 2
    • 90% reduction: 8 B tonnes
    • Population, 2050: 9 B
    • Per capita CO 2 budget:
    • Roughly one
    • tonne per person 
    Magnitude of CO 2 Reductions Required
  • 7. MIT Energy Initiative MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i Challenge: Living Well on a One Tonne Per Year
  • 8. MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i
    • Lowering the Cost of Low Carbon Technologies
  • 9. Uprising Against the Ethanol Mandate MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i Lowering the Cost of the Alternatives: Levelized Electricity Costs (cents/kwh) Baseload Intermittents National Academy, America’s Energy Future, 2009 9-15 5-9 7-10 4-7 6-13 10 8-10 8-20 14-30 4-10 5-18
  • 10. MIT Energy Initiative MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i CO 2 Emissions from Coal, 2010 EIA 2009 IAEO
  • 11. MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i In the US, This is Where the “Money” Is!
  • 12. MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i CCS for US Coal Plants Retrofitting Coal Plants for CO2 Emissions Reductions, MITEI, 2009 v
  • 13. MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i
    • Early Action is Essential
  • 14. MIT Energy Initiative MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i Without Policy With Policy Analysis of Climate Policy Targets Under Uncertainty, Prinn, et al 2009 It’s later – and more serious -- than we think
  • 15. MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i CHP as % of Total National Power Production
  • 16. MIT Energy Initiative MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i The Nuclear Power Option 44 plants under construction China (11), Russia (8), India (6), Japan (2), Argentina (1), Finland (1) France (1), Korea (5), Bulgaria (2), Taiwan(2), Ukraine (2), Iran (1), Pakistan (1), United States (1). Nuclear Fuel Study Update, MIT, 2009
  • 17. MIT Energy Initiative CO 2 Impacts: Substitution of Natural Gas for Coal-fired Power Generation 25 50 75 100 125 150 100 200 300 400 500 20 40 60 80 100 0 0 Coal power generation displaced by gas (GW capacity) Additional volumes of gas consumed (bcm/year) CO2 reduction (million tonnes per year) MIT e i Source: IPIECA Report, Workshop Summary, Natural Gas as a Climate Change Solution, 09/2006 Obama Administration/Waxman-Markey CO2 emissions reduction target for 2020: 17% off 2005 baseline Over 50% of this target could be met by re-powering 30% of our existing coal capacity with natural gas
  • 18. MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i 13 71 1,135 2005 130 1,711 2006 414 7 309 3,087 2007 681 772 512 2001 10 5 894 2002 3 17 904 2003 13 51 2004 215 967 Pre 00 2000 13 13 217 Fayetteville 2009-YTD 192 Woodford 140 Haynesville 2008 3,737 Barnett 440 815 63 Growth in US Shale Gas Wells
  • 19. MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i
    • Cautionary Tales
  • 20. Uprising Against the Ethanol Mandate MIT Energy Initiative Beware the “Technology Du Jour” Syndrome MIT e i
  • 21. Uprising Against the Ethanol Mandate MIT Energy Initiative Beware the Unintended Consequences of Mandates MIT e i Ethanol industry balks at legislative mandate to boost production Renewable Fuels Assn., Dec 08, 2009
  • 22. Uprising Against the Ethanol Mandate MIT Energy Initiative Beware of Poorly Designed Programs MIT e i DOE Officially Launches FutureGen Green Car Congress, December 6, 2005 Futuregen Clean Coal Plant Loses 2 Financial Backers Huffington Post, June 25 , 2009
  • 23. Uprising Against the Ethanol Mandate MIT Energy Initiative Beware of the “Herd Mentality” MIT e i Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan Declares Impending Natural Gas Crisis Fox News, June 23, 2003
  • 24. MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i Beware the Long-term Impacts of Policy Decisions on Energy Infrastructure/Mix Use of Petroleum/Natural Gas in Power Generation Hotly Debated Post-OPEC Oil Embargo Debate has Chilling Effect on New Gas Plant Construction US Congress, 1975-1977 Number & Type of Fossil Fuel Power Units Built Since 1987
  • 25. MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i
      • Are We Up to the Challenge?
  • 26. Uprising Against the Ethanol Mandate MIT Energy Initiative Current DOE Organization of Energy Programs MIT e i
  • 27. MIT Energy Initiative DOE Budget Summary, FY2011 Renewables: $876 M Biomass 25% Solar 34% Fuel Cells 16% Wind 14% Geothermal 6% Water 4% Fossil Fuels: $404 M Coal 100% Nuclear: $364 M Electricity: $144 M Efficiency: $682 M Vehicles 48% Industry 15% Buildings 37% ARPA-E: $300 M DOE Energy R&D: FY 11 Request MIT e i Office of Science: $4.2 B Basic Energy Sciences: 44% Biological/Env. Rsrch: 15% Fusion: 9% High Energy Physics: 20% Nuclear Physics: 13%
  • 28. MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i NETL ORNL NREL Sandia Los Alamos LBNL Argonne INL PNNL The DOE Laboratory System Renewables 242 DOE Preliminary Lab Tables, 2010 v
  • 29. Energy Frontiers Research Centers
      • Energy Frontiers Research Centers
      • Energy Frontiers Research Centers
    MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i University National lab Other DOE Press Release EFRC Awardees Academic institutions: 67% National labs: 26% Other: 6%
  • 30. MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i University Technology Company Private Laboratory National Laboratory ARPA-E Lead Awardees DOE Press Release ARPA E Lead Awardees Small businesses: 43% Educational institutions: 35% Large businesses: 19%
  • 31. MIT Energy Initiative MIT e i New structures for $1.6 billion in energy research over the next five years The Changing DOE Innovation Ecosystem
  • 32. Uprising Against the Ethanol Mandate MIT Energy Initiative Current DOE Organization of Energy Programs MIT e i Relationship of electricity to fuel sources? Is there an organizational home to migrate basic science discoveries to technology solutions? Why is efficiency in the renewables office? Is there any significant relationship between vehicle, building, industrial efficiency technologies? Where does transportation fit? What about transportation fuels? Where would you put an energy and water program? Which office is responsible for distributed generation? If a fuel meets environmental specifications do we care which fuel we use? Can we develop a comprehensive research/policy portfolio when offices are organized around fuels?
  • 33. Uprising Against the Ethanol Mandate MIT Energy Initiative A Different Structure: A Portfolio Approach MIT e i End use model Functional model