Wartime Statues: Instruments of Soviet Control


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Wartime Statues: Instruments of Soviet Control

Soviet military planning for conflict in Europe after World War II from the outset harnessed East European military capabilities to Soviet military purposes and assumed operational subordination of East European military formations to higher-level Soviet commands. A Polish command-staff exercise in 1950, for example, assumed subordination of a Polish Army (comprised of five divisions and other units) to a Soviet Maritime Front (tasked in the exercise with occupying Denmark).1 Following founding of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) in May 1955, a supreme Warsaw Pact military command was established in Moscow, but this institution existed largely on paper until the 1960’s.

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Wartime Statues: Instruments of Soviet Control

  1. 1. instruments of soviet control
  2. 2. Warsaw Pact Countries, 1955-91 (U) Warsaw Pact Barents Sea Albania* Hungary Bulgaria Poland Czechoslovakia Romania East Germany U.S.S.R. *Albania withheld support in Norwegian Sea 1961 over the China split and officially withdrew in 1968. U.S.S.R Moscow North Sea Baltic Sea Nor th A t l an t i c East Ocean Germany Poland Czecho- Caspian slovakia Sea Hungary Romania Black Sea Bulgaria Albania M e di t e r ra ne a n Se a 0 500 Kilometers 0 500 Miles Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.UNCLASSIFIED 793831AI (G00112) 3 -11 soviet union albania poland romania hungary east germany czechoslovakia bulgaria
  3. 3. table of contentsI. Sponsorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3II. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7IV. Essays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13V. Selected Declassified Intelligence Documents . . . . . . 19VI. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Electronic Reading Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36VII. Special Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392 wartime statutes
  4. 4. Sponsorship Historical Review ProgramInformation Management Services, Historical Collections Division (HCD), in partnership withthe Directorate Information Review Officers, is responsible for executing the Agency’s Histori-cal Review Program. This program seeks to identify and review for declassification collections ofdocuments that detail the Agency’s analysis and activities relating to historically significant topicsand events. HCD’s goals include increasing the usability and accessibility of historical collections.HCD also develops release events and partnerships to highlight each collection and make it avail-able to the broadest audience possible.HCD’s mission is to:• Promote an accurate, objective understanding of the information that has helped shape major US foreign policy decisions.• Broaden access to lessons-learned, presenting historical material that gives greater under- standing to the scope and context of past actions.• Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on the impacts and effects arising from past foreign policy decisions.• Showcase CIA’s contributions to national security and provide the American public with valu- able insight into the workings of its government.• Demonstrate the CIA’s commitment to the Open Government Initiative and its three core values: Transparency, Participation, and Collaboration.instruments of soviet control 3
  5. 5. 4 wartime statutes
  6. 6. overview soviet control of east It was only in 1969 that the Warsaw Pact adopted at Soviet insistence (along with the Committee ofeuropean military forces Defense Ministers and Military Council) a “Stat- ute on the Combined Armed Forces and Com-New Evidence on Imposition of the bined Command of the Warsaw Pact Member1980 “Wartime Statute” States (for Peacetime)” that created an elaborate Warsaw Pact military headquarters in Moscowby A. Ross Johnson with East European deputy defense ministersSenior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson designated as deputy Warsaw Pact commanders. 2International Center for Scholars These institutional changes gave the Warsaw Pact more semblance of a multinational military alli-Soviet military planning for conflict in Europe ance and granted to the East European militaryafter World War II from the outset harnessed establishments a greater consultative voice inEast European military capabilities to Soviet Warsaw Pact military matters, while streamliningmilitary purposes and assumed operational decision-making on training and armaments in asubordination of East European military for- manner serving Soviet interests.3mations to higher-level Soviet commands. APolish command-staff exercise in 1950, for Oddly for a military alliance, the 1969 militaryexample, assumed subordination of a Polish statute was silent on wartime command ar-Army (comprised of five divisions and other rangements and explicitly confined its purviewunits) to a Soviet Maritime Front (tasked in the to “peacetime,” notwithstanding the greaterexercise with occupying Denmark).1 Following importance that East European armed forces 1founding of the Warsaw Treaty Organization assumed in Soviet military planning in the(Warsaw Pact) in May 1955, a supreme War- 1960’s. As in World War II, Soviet coalitionsaw Pact military command was established in warfare doctrine of the 1960’s envisaged theMoscow, but this institution existed largely on controlled use of military allies of questionablepaper until the 1960’s. military efficiency and political reliability by1 Recollection of Colonel Michael Sadykiewicz, who participated in the exercise, letter to the author, March 8, 2010. In Sovietpractice, a theater headquarters commanded Fronts, comprised of Armies, which were in turn comprised of divisions and otherlarge military units. 2 CIA document FIR-DB 312/00538-78 dated March 21, 1978 (English translation from original Russian). A full Germantranslation from East German military archives was published on-line by the Parallel History Project (http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=21221&navinfo=15697)and a partial English text is published in Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of theWarsaw Pact, 1955-1991 (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2005), document 62. The 1969 militarystructures of the Warsaw Pact are described in A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, East European MilitaryEstablishments; The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier (New York: Crane Russak, 1980), Appendix A, pp.151-156.6 wartime statutes
  7. 7. subordinating East European military forma- unacceptable surrender of national sovereignty.tions to Soviet operational commands at the The Polish General Staff raised questions alongFront level or below. The respective Soviet similar lines. In the end, the Ceausescu regimecommands were in turn subordinated not to never signed or agreed to abide by the provisionsthe Warsaw Pact military headquarters but to of the wartime statute, while Polish Party chiefthe Soviet General Staff and High Command Edward Gierek did. Kuklinski argued that thein Moscow. As veteran British observer and Romanian example demonstrated it was pos-official Malcolm Macintosh observed at the sible for an East European country to resist So-time, the Warsaw Pact Combined Command viet pressure even within the Soviet-dominatedremained a peacetime structure, equivalent Warsaw Pact.7 While a different Polish leader-to a traditional European war office with ad- ship might have attempted a more autonomousministrative duties for training, mobilization, course, Poland was not Romania. Poland, partand armaments, but without responsibility for of the Warsaw Pact Northern Tier and with theconduct of military operations. 4 In Ryszard largest East European military force, was centralKuklinski’s words, “ the banner of the so-called to Soviet military planning for conflict in Eu-Combined Command of the Combined Armed rope; Romania was not. Soviet military forcesForces masked Soviet control.”5 had vacated Romania in 1958. Romania under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu hadIn the late 1970’s, the USSR sought to formal- for two decades pursued an independent foreign,ize these wartime Warsaw Pact command ar- military, and intelligence policy. Poland underrangements in a new “Statute on the Combined Wladyslaw Gomulka and Gierek had remainedArmed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member closely aligned with Moscow in all these areas.States and Their Command Organs for War- Poland was home to the Soviet Northern Grouptime,” adopted in March 1980. 6 This effort to of Forces, headquartered in Legnica, which 1 in 7fill the glaring gap highlighted by the “peacetime the 1980’s was also the location of the headquar-statute” was delayed by objections from Nicolae ters of the Western Theater of Military Opera-Ceausescu’s Romania, which viewed it as an tions (TVD), established as the forward Soviet3 Johnson, Dean, Alexiev, op. cit., p. 15. 4 Malcolm Macintosh, The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact, Adelphi Papers, No. 58, June 1969, pp. 11-15.5 Interview in Kultura, Paris, April 1987, p. 54.6 CIA document FIRDB-312/01995-80 dated July 25, 1980 (English translation from the original Russian). A full Germantranslation from East German military archives was published on-line by the Parallel History Project (http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=20408&navinfo=15697 ) and a partial English text is published in Mastny andByrne, op. cit, document 86. Detailed comparison of Warsaw Pact peacetime and wartime command structures is provided inMichael Sadykiewicz, The Warsaw Pact Command Structure in Peace and War (Santa Monica: R AND Corporation, 1988),Report 3558-RC.7 Kuklinski interview, op. cit, pp. 56-57.Instruments of soviet control 7
  8. 8. command for military operations in Europe. concepts first advocated by Marshal NikolaiIn 1980-1981, with the emergence of the Soli- Ogarkov. In the course of the 1980’s, mountingdarity trade union and preparations for Soviet economic problems and social unrest in Easternintervention and martial law, the Soviet high Europe and weariness of its ruling elites madecommand demonstrated that it could operate East European armed forces a less attractiveindependently in Poland, ignoring the Polish even junior partner to the Soviet military. 8 Themilitary whenever it wished. paradox of the Warsaw Pact military statute was illustrated by the 1988 Warsaw Pact Shchit-88The Warsaw Pact wartime statute adopted in pre-war mobilization exercise.9 That exerciseMarch 1980 formalized Soviet wartime control assumed subordination of Polish forces (in thisover East European military forces that had been case the Eighth Army) to a Soviet-dominatedassumed since the 1950’s. It demonstrated that Front (which would have been subordinated inthe Warsaw Pact military Combined Command turn to the Western TVD headquarters andin Moscow was irrelevant for a Soviet Union at the Soviet High Command). Yet unlike earlierwar in Europe. It made clear that in marshalling Warsaw Pact exercises through the early 1980’s,military forces for imminent conflict as well as which assumed rapid offensive operations intoin conducting combat operations, Soviet gener- Western Europe, Shchit-88 utilized an (initially)als would bypass East European political and defensive and essentially defeatist scenario thatmilitary leaders and command East European can be read as striking acknowledgment of thegenerals directly. degree of demoralization of Polish forces and limitations on Soviet use of the Polish army byIf the Warsaw Pact wartime statute served Soviet that time.purposes in formalizing and rationalizing Sovi-et wartime control over East European military These observations provide context for the 22forces, it was adopted just as those forces were documents on the Warsaw Pact in this CIAbecoming relatively less important in Soviet release. 17 of the documents are English trans-military planning. By the early 1980’s, “coalition lations of key original Warsaw Pact militarywarfare” terminology had almost disappeared documents obtained clandestinely at the timefrom Soviet military writings. This was only one and now declassified. Three of the documents,of a number of indicators of reduced reliance in issued after 1981, offer insightful observationsSoviet military planning on East European forc- by an informed military insider. They cover aes. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces lacked the range of issues discussed publicly by and attrib-operational capabilities of Soviet forces for rapid uted to Ryszard Kuklinski.10 One document isadvances with high-technology conventional a 1983 CIA Directorate of Intelligence analysisweaponry on the modern battlefield under new that drew on these Warsaw Pact documents, 18 A. Ross Johnson, East European Armed Forces and Soviet Military Planning: Factors of Change (Santa Monica: R ANDCorporation, 1989), Note N-2856-AF, declassified and released November 2006.9 Documentation of and commentary on Shchit-88 are posted on the Woodrow Wilson Center Cold War InternationalHistory Project web site at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&doc_id=600908&group_id=13349.8 wartime statutes
  9. 9. and other clandestine materials, to provide a German versions on the PHP web site. Otherdetailed picture of “Soviet Control of Warsaw documents in the CIA release and all originalPact Forces.” A final document, released ear- Russian texts have yet to be located in Eastlier, is the 1983 National Intelligence Estimate European archives. The documents released byon East European military reliability. Both the CIA serve historians today not only as usefulCIA analysis and the Estimate stand the test translations but as valuable source material. Asof time, indicating that the intelligence reports such they complement previous CIA releases ofreleased here, and other materials, allowed U.S. classified Military Thought articles, classifiedofficials to accurately appraise Soviet-dominat- Soviet military academy course materials, anded mechanisms of the Warsaw Pact at the time. Polish military plans for martial law.11It is noteworthy how quickly some of thesehighly sensitive Warsaw Pact documents be-came available in Washington. The final war-time statute and ratification documents weredated March 18, 1980 and April 30, 1980; theywere issued as a translated CIA intelligence re-port on July 25, 1980.Following collapse of Communist regimesin Eastern Europe, dissolution of the USSR,and abolition of the Warsaw Pact, many origi-nal Warsaw Pact and East European militarydocuments have become available in a numberof archives, especially the German Military Ar-chive in Freiburg (incorporating East Germanmilitary archives), the Polish Institute of Na-tional Remembrance, and the Czech militaryarchive. Many such documents were obtainedand posted on-line by the Parallel History Proj-ect (http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/) and somewere translated for the PHP book, A Card-board Castle? Some documents related to theWarsaw Pact military statute released by CIAin English translation can be found in (East) 110 Kuklinski interview, op.cit; Benjamin Weiser, A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paidto Save His Country (Public Affairs: New York, 2004); Benjamin B. Fischer, “Entangled in History: The Vilification and Vindi-cation of Colonel Kuklinski,” Studies in Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000), pp. 19-34. Weiser’s book is based in part on interviewswith Kuklinski and on CIA reports from Kuklinski (“750 pages of notes and raw files”) that have not otherwise been released(Weiser, op. cit., pp. xi-xiii).11 Available in the CIA on-line Special Collections Archive, http://www.foia.cia.gov/special_collections_archive.asp.Instruments of soviet control 9
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  11. 11. essays origins and significance rank and acquired more responsibilities, my ex- posure to the special reporting from this sourceof the warsaw pact wartime continued, but were less frequent. For example, while commanding a psychological operationsstatute documents (PSYOP) battalion at Fort Bragg in the early 1980’s, I occasionally was called upon by thePersonal Recollections and Comments Army Staff to provide my views on some of thisby Les Griggs reporting. From my position at the time, I not- ed –but was not overly surprised by-- the series of reports dealing with the drafting and ratifi-As a serving intelligence officer and foreign cation of a new wartime statute by the Warsawarea specialist (Poland and Czechoslovakia) in Pact. To me, the reporting served mainly tothe United States Army from 1959 until 1986, confirm the view that the Soviets dominatedI was exposed to special human intelligence the Warsaw Pact and could have their way on(HUMINT) reporting concerning Eastern any issue, great or small.Europe as required from time to time. In 1974,when one of my tasks on the Army Staff in the In 1981 I returned to the Army Staff in thePentagon was to screen such reporting and brief Pentagon to work for General Bill Odom in theit to my superiors, I noticed reporting from office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intel-what appeared to be new special source(s), Over ligence. He immediately ordered me to workthe following years, as an Army General Staff full-time on this source’s materials, and theofficer and in other assignments, I noted the wartime statute issue moved up on my list ofwide range of topics reported on by what clearly priorities. I soon discovered that US Army in-were the same source(s)… information on such telligence analysts and Army strategic plannerssubjects as current and future weapons systems, found the wartime statute issue to be intrigu-war plans, exercises, etc. of direct interest and ing, but difficult to apply as actionable intel-value to the Army and other elements of the ligence. It was hard to quantify the materialsDepartment of Defense. in the preferred way –placing a dollar and cents savings tag on the information (E.g., this in-We gradually discerned that the materials formation saved us $XXXXX on the design ofprobably were from one source. As I rose in 1 1 Source protection was the prime consideration throughout the HUMINT operation, as it should be in any HUMINT case; however, it often limited use of the information. For example, only a handful of principals received the reports from CIA, and copying as well as dissemination of the reports beyond the Washington area was prohibited. In particular, these rules hand- cuffed the US Army Missile Intelligence Agency (Alabama) and US Army Foreign Science and Technology (Charlottesville, VA), at the time two of the Army Staff ’s most important intelligence-producing field agencies12 wartime statutes
  12. 12. our new tank). Even so, the information about ligence cycle and the challenges of “making ofthe statute and its implementing structure the intelligence stew.” In my view, however,(new headquarters, communications systems, the heart of the collection consists of the op-etc.) was of value to war planners, war gamers, erational field reporting by one special humantargeteers and even PSYOP strategists, who intelligence source…the one discussed above.could hope to take advantage of the surrender His reports are filled with facts and his fieldof national sovereignty issue during crisis or analysis, even while conveying the frustrationswar. In fact, some high officials in the Office and emotions you might expect from this patri-of the Secretary of Defense pushed for making otic officer. We owe him a lot for his courage.the statute reporting public immediately as apublic diplomacy weapon against the USSR;however, this notion reportedly was vetoed bythe DCI for source-protection reasons.1A few high-level US military and civilian lead-ers also saw this intelligence as an early “war-winner,” offering NATO an opportunity todestroy or disable the Warsaw Pact commandand control system at the Theater of MilitaryOperations (TVD) level almost immediatelyupon the outbreak of hostilities. Accordingly,driven largely by the statute reporting, appro-priate modifications and reprioritizations re-portedly were made to target lists. Thankfully,the Warsaw Pact collapsed before target strikesbecame necessary.The collection of wartime statute documentsreleased here by the Central Intelligence Agen-cy and Wilson Center is concise and to thetopic yet rich with substance, and should be ofenormous use to historians of the period. Thedocuments provided from the Wilson Centerand elsewhere provide a fulsome backgroundand context for the issues, while the finishedintelligence documents –the national estimateand particularly the incisive CIA analytic pa-per—afford the reader a glimpse of the intel-instruments of soviet control 13
  13. 13. a journey of rediscovery own people was characterized by moral capitula- tion; like the imposition of Polish martial law or the slaughter of Czechs and Hungarians.by Aris PappasRetired CIA Officer, Senior Director of the These documents were not widely distributed,Microsoft Institute for Advanced Technology but they did provide context to importantin Government decision-makers who were afforded the oppor- tunity to understand better the nature of their opposition. To see the pressures and tensionsA journey of rediscovery. That’s the feeling I working internally to tear the Warsaw Pacthave as I review the material that serves as the apart, but also to recognize the great dangercore of this event. While involved daily with represented by such unalloyed power.professional responsibilities, there is very little Such differences between appearance and real-time for quiet retrospectives. Life is evolution- ity remain pertinent, and the need for deep un-ary, and the job of intelligence is focused on the derstanding by intelligence agencies is no lessfuture. But now, thanks in no small measure to significant today.the heroic efforts of the people who combinedtheir skills and, literally, risked their lives to Thankfully, the Wartime Statute was neverobtain this mate¬rial, we have the golden op- invoked. We never had to test the reliabilityportunity to look back. of the Soviet “allies.” An essentially unnatural and flawed system proved simply too difficultIt’s not really a pretty sight. These papers docu- to sustain and finally collapsed.ment a record of oppression and outright bully- History tends to record great victories by refer-ing that, although commonly understood, was ence to battles won and lost. These documents,rarely so painfully visible – even in the stark however, offer a small insight to a Cold Warreality of the world of intelligence. Clearly, victory where measured, though never perfect,the sovereignty of the Soviet Union’s East Eu- understanding helped us avoid pitched battle.ropean “allies,” was a chimera; a status to be I consider myself fortunate to have played evenrevered in diplomatic venues, but never allowed a minor role in that great effort.to interfere with the needs of Soviet security.Repetition even affected the lazy and gulliblein the West because public pronouncements, bymaster and servants alike, allowed all-too-easyand facile comparisons between the Warsaw Pactand NATO. But the reality was far different.Indeed, reading through these records, it’s hardto avoid pity for the vassals who paid a heavyprice in terms of their own integrity to protecttheir benefits. They were both beholden to andthreatened by their Soviet rulers. A friendlesssituation in which power was derived from obei-sance to a cruel master, while their ties to their14 wartime statutes
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  35. 35. freedom of information act (foia)electronic reading room The CIA has established this site to provide The Warsaw Pact: Treaty of Friendship, the public with an overview of access to CIA Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance information, including electronic access to pre- viously released documents. Because of CIA’s A collection of sensitive Soviet and Warsaw need to comply with the national security laws Pact military journals from 1961 to 1984 that of the United States, some documents or parts provide a view into Warsaw Pact military strat- of documents cannot be released to the public. egy. New information was added to this site in In particular, the CIA, like other U.S. intelli- January 2010. gence agencies, has the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods from disclo- Air America: Upholding the Airmen’s Bond sure. However, a substantial amount of CIA information has been and/or can be released A fascinating assembly of documents revealing following review. See “Your Rights” for further the role that Air America, the Agency’s propri- details on the various methods of obtaining etary airline, played in the search and rescue of this information. pilots and personnel during the Vietnam War. The collection has personal accounts by the rescued pilots and thank you letters as well as special collections commendations from various officials. Additional document collections released by Preparing for Martial Law: Through the Eyes the Historical Collection Division can be of Col. Ryszard Kuklinski found on the FOIA Electronic Reading Room and include: A captivating collection of over 75 documents concerning the planning and implementation Strategic Warning and the Role of Intelli- of martial law in Poland from mid-1980 to late gence: Lessons Learned From the 1968 Soviet 1981. Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, a member of Invasion of Czechoslovakia the Polish Army General Staff and the source of the documents, provided information and This collection consists of DI intelligence mem- personal commentary that gave intelligence orandums, various estimates and memos written analysts and US policy makers invaluable in- by the Office of National Estimates (ONE), ar- sight into the crisis. ticles from the Central Intelligence Bulletin (a current intelligence daily publication), Weekly Baptism by Fire: CIA Analysis of the Summaries, Intelligence Information Cables, Korean War. and Situation Reports, which were published up to three times a day during the crisis when ten- This collection includes more than 1,200 docu- sions flared. ments consisting of national estimates, intelli- gence memos, daily updates, and summaries of36 wartime statutes
  36. 36. foreign media concerning developments on the largest single release of Helms-related informa-Korean Peninsula during 1947-1954. This col- tion to date. The documents, historical workslection, coinciding with the 60th anniversary and essays offer an unprecedented, wide-rangingof the start of the war, is the largest collection look at the man and his career as the Unitedof CIA documents on this issue ever released. States’ top intelligence official and one of itsHCD and the Harry S. Truman Presidential most important diplomats during a crucial de-Library co-hosted a conference entitled “New cade of the Cold War. From mid-1966, whenDocuments and New Histories”: Twenty-first he became DCI, to late 1976, when he left Iran,Century Perspectives on the Korean War” that Helms dealt directly with numerous eventshighlighted the document collection. whose impact remains evident today and which are covered in the release.Creating Global Intelligence A-12 OXCART ReconnaissanceDiscover the back story of the US intelligence Aircraft Documentationcommunity by exploring this collection of morethan 800 documents from the late 1940’s to the This release, containing approximately 1,500early 1950’s that pertain to the establishment of pages of material, consisting of about 350 docu-the Central Intelligence Agency. The collection ments, maps, diagrams, and photographs willprovides perspective on the complex issues that provide researchers on aviation and intelligencesenior US government officials grappled with as with significant additional detail about the de-they considered how to establish an enduring sign and development of the A-12.national intelligence capability.The Original Wizards of Langley: Overviewof the Office of Scientific IntelligenceThis overview and collection of documents andother material related to the Office of ScientificIntelligence (OSI) offer a glimpse of CIA’s con-tribution to the analysis of Soviet capabilities inscience and technology during the Cold War.A Life in Intelligence—The RichardHelms CollectionThis collection of material by and about Rich-ard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence(DCI) and Ambassador to Iran comprises theinstruments of soviet control 37
  37. 37. about this publication Since the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in DVD Document Collection—This collection in 1955, the anticipated reliability of Non-Soviet the Warsaw Pact series features a wealth of newly de- Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces in the event of classified Central Intelligence Agency documents. a crisis was a topic of intense interest for the United States and its NATO allies as well as Warsaw Pact: Wartime Statutes—Instruments for the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union en- of Soviet Control explores evolving U.S. views gaged in successive efforts from the late 1960’s on the relationship between the Soviet Union onwards to codify its command and control and its Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies. arrangements over the armed forces of its East European allies—first through a peacetime and The companion DVD will work on most com- later a wartime statute—the U.S. Intelligence puters and the documents are in .PDF format. Community’s collection and analytic efforts on the subject were ongoing. DISCLAIMER: All statements of fact, opinion, or analy- sis expressed in this booklet are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorse- ment of an article’s statements or interpretations.38 wartime statutes
  38. 38. special acknowledgementsThe Historical Review Program, part of the CIA Information Management Services, identifies,collects and produces historically relevant collections of declassified documents.These collections, centered on a theme or event and with supporting analysis, essays, video, audio,and photographs, are showcased in a booklet and DVD that are available to the academic realmand the public.All of our Historical Collections are available in the Freedom of Information Act Elec-tronic Reading Room. Go to w w w.foia.cia.gov and click on Special Collections or contactus at HistoricalCollections@UCIA.gov.Thanks to the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) for hostingand co-organizing this important event and for contributing images as well as documents fromtheir own collection of non-US sources for the publication.instruments of soviet control 39
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