Historical Collections Division   01                 Introduction     02    THE CAESAR, POLO, AND ESAU              PAPERS...
HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISIONThe Historical Collections Division (HCD) of CIA’s         The mission of HCD is to:Informa...
introductionThis collection of declassified analytic monographsand reference aids, designated within the CentralIntelligen...
THE CAESAR, POLO, AND ESAU PAPERSCold War Era Hard Target                               hensive knowledge base on select p...
other community agencies, some of whom, such                           The first leader of this research effort, and its  ...
Objectives of the Series                                             building blocks to enhance future strategic analysis ...
Reorganization of the Mission                                      Eventually, in 1973 the DDI Research Staff was         ...
General Hayden’s Remarksat the SHAFR annual meetingRemarks of Central Intelligence Agency                 As a secret orga...
Of course, we cannot tell the American people            the rural pacification program in South Vietnam.                 ...
system to additional federal records deposito-            series.  CIA understands the importance of thisries. To date, mo...
That’s a few months down the road, though.            Before too long, the collection will be avail-                      ...
warning and signaling opportunity. That ties us            the previous structure, where greater authorityclosely to polic...
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                      Accompanying DVD contains all documents listed in the bibliogr...
apparently determined to prevent the assump-            15.  “Factionalism in the Hungariantion of Stalin’s power by any o...
“Khrushchev’s increasing role in Soviet policy            their resolute and protracted feat of resistance,               ...
30.  “Soviet Strategic Doctrine for the Start of War,”   and to probe their possible consequences for3 July 1962. 44 pages...
39.  “Warsaw Pact Military Strategy:                 44.  “Politics in the Soviet Politburo and the                       ...
future depends to a decisive degree, of course,         to reject the ‘peaceful transformation’ of capi-on his having deve...
9.  “The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section 3:          14.  “Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’: Origin and                    ...
19.  “Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel                 available a vast amount of new information con-Organizations in Co...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 195...
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The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 1953-1973

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This collection of declassified analytic monographs and reference aids, designated as the CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU series, was originally released in 2007. The documents reflect the views of seasoned analysts who often engaged in heated debate. The 147 documents in this collection, over 11,000 pages of analysis, were written between 1953 and 1973. In contrast to the intelligence community’s streams of formal assessments on the Soviet Union and China, the less formal and uncoordinated CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU studies were not intended as "finished" intelligence products. Rather, the authors sought to develop a comprehensive knowledge base on select political issues that could contribute to analytic capital for specialists throughout the community. The intent of the collection is to provide insight into some aspects of CIA analytic thinking of the period and to make the documents more readily accessible to the general public.

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The Caesar, Polo, and Esau Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 1953-1973

  1. 1. Historical Collections Division 01 Introduction 02 THE CAESAR, POLO, AND ESAU PAPERS Overview 03 General Hayden’s Remarks at SHAFR Conference 07ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: CAESAR 12 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: POLO 17 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: ESAU 21
  2. 2. HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISIONThe Historical Collections Division (HCD) of CIA’s The mission of HCD is to:Information Management Services is responsible forexecuting the Agency’s Historical Review Program. ■ P romote an accurate, objective under-This program seeks to identify and declassify standing of the information and intel-collections of documents that detail the Agency’s ligence that has helped shape the foun-analysis and activities relating to historically dation of major US policy decisions.significant topics and events. HCD’s goals includeincreasing the usability and accessibility of historical ■ B roaden access to lessons learned, pre-collections primarily by developing release events senting historical material to emphasizeand partnerships to highlight each collection the scope and context of past actions.and make it available to the broadest audience ■ Improve current decision-making and analy-possible. sis by facilitating reflection on the impacts and effects arising from past decisions. ■ Showcase CIA’s contributions to national security and provide the American public with valuable insight into the workings of its government. ■ D emonstrate the CIA’s commitment to the Open Government Initiative and its three core values: Transparency, Participation, and Collaboration. HISTORICAL POLO, and ESAU Papers The CAESAR,COLLECTIONS DIVISION 1
  3. 3. introductionThis collection of declassified analytic monographsand reference aids, designated within the CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Intelli-gence (DI) as the CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU series, was originally released on 26 June 2007. The continuing sensitivity of some documents in the series requires that they be withheld from de- classification. No additional documents have been declassified since the 2007 release. This booklet includes an annotated bibliography and DVD containing the document collection.
  4. 4. THE CAESAR, POLO, AND ESAU PAPERSCold War Era Hard Target hensive knowledge base on select political issues that could contribute to building analytic capitalAnalysis of Soviet and Chinese for intelligence specialists throughout the commu-Policy and Decision Making, nity. Consequently, the intent of the collection is to provide insight into some aspects of CIA analytic1953-1973 thinking of the period and to make the documentsThis collection of declassified analytic mono- more readily accessible to the general public.graphs and reference aids, designated within the Two former senior officers in the Directorate ofCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Intelligence--Tom Elmore, former Director of theIntelligence (DI) as the CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Office of East Asian Analysis, and James Noren,series, was originally released on 26 June 2007 at a Soviet economics expert compiled this collec-the annual meeting of the Society for Historians of tion with assistance from Martha Lutz, InformationAmerican Foreign Relations (SHAFR). The docu- Review Officer for the Director of CIA and membersments reflect the views of seasoned analysts who of the Historical Collections Division of IMS. Ahad followed closely their special areas of research third former senior officer, Harry Gelman, formerand whose views were shaped in often heated Chief of the Soviet Division of the Office of Re-debate. Continuing public interest in the series, as gional and Political Analysis, has contributed to thisreflected in numerous requests through Freedom foreword drawing on his many years of membershipof Information and Executive Order channels, led in the staff that produced most of these studies.CIA’s Office of Information Management Services(IMS) to conduct a search of ‘Directorate of Intel-ligence record systems for documents in this series History of the Researchand then undertake a declassification review ofall the documents we located. The 147 docu- The genesis of CIA’S research efforts on the So-ments in this collection, amounting to over 11,000 viet Union and Communist China stemmed frompages of analysis, were written between 1953 and growing concern in the intelligence community1973. The collection includes a large number of during the early 1950s over the limited cover-newly declassified monographs as well as some age and resources being devoted to international The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papersstudies that have been previously declassified and communism as a movement. The Director of CIAreleased to individual requesters. The continuing (DCI) initially responded by assigning a few ana-sensitivity of some documents in the series re- lysts in the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) inquired that they be withheld from declassification. CIA’S DI to establish Project CAESAR in 1952.In contrast to the streams of formal assessments The purpose of the CAESAR project was to studyand reports on all aspects of the Soviet Union and all available information on the members of, andChina prepared by the intelligence community, the events affecting, the Soviet leadership hier- the less formal and uncoordinated CAESAR, archy. The vehicles used by the analysts involved ESAU, and POLO studies were not intended were a series of so-called “working papers,” the as “finished” intelligence products primarily first of which was “The Doctors’ Plot,” issued in aimed at informing policymakers. Rather, July 1953. The intended customers were other the authors sought to develop a compre- analysts and operations officers in CIA along with 3
  5. 5. other community agencies, some of whom, such The first leader of this research effort, and its as the Department of State and the National heart and soul as the staff’s name and its bureau- Security Agency, also contributed to the proj- cratic status evolved over the years, was Walter P. ect. In effect, Project CAESAR represented the (Bud) Southard, a senior intelligence officer who DI’s first all-source, in-depth research endeavor. had had unique experience in China as a naval intelligence officer dealing with senior Chinese In September 1956, Ray Cline, then-Director of Communist liaison in the years immediately after OCI, decided to establish a small new research World War II. In its first years, the staff was quite staff designated as the Sino-Soviet Studies Group small, comprising three or four senior specialists (SSSG) within OCI. The SSSG was to continue the on China and the Soviet Union. Among its initial CAESAR project while initiating two new research members were Southard, Philip Bridgham, and endeavors: POLO, instituted in 1956 to study Donald Zagoria; after 1961, the core group became the Chinese Communist hierarchy,’1 and ESAU, Southard, Bridgham, Harry Gelman and Arthur C. launched in 1959 to examine the Sino-Soviet Cohen. In later years, the size of the staff grew relationship. Cline declared that he intended to approximately eight as younger officers were these analysts to have a “detailed familiarity with added. As the staff grew over the years it sought Soviet political leaders, doctrine, and daily policy to provide both global coverage on Communism pronouncements,” and to work with analysts and important non-communist issues not be- with similar expertise on Communist China. ing researched elsewhere, but its principal focus remained on the Soviet Union and Communist Subsequently, the SSSG was slightly expanded, China and the relationship between the two. renamed, and changed in status. In 1963, after Cline had become Deputy Director for Intelligence As working papers, the studies produced by the (DDI), he decided to transfer this staff from the OCI staff did not require formal coordination with and attach it to his own office as the DDI Special other components of CIA or other agencies in the Research Staff (later, merely “Research Staff”). intelligence community. They were deemed to Cline took this step largely because of his high represent only the views of their authors rather opinion of the role the staff’s analysts had played than an official DDI position on an intelligence in providing evidence of the reality of Sino-Soviet issue. The staff studies also differed from OCI dispute against “furious” opposition elsewhere in reports in having no set format, tone, or con- CIA and the intelligence community and despite tent. Ray Cline, the official who established great skepticism among policymakers.’2 For the the framework for the staff’s work--first as next decade, this structural shift served to give this long-term research program a somewhat stronger Director of OCI and then as DDI--was clearly deter-The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers / and more central position in the organization. mined to free the staff’s analysts not only from the constraints of current production deadlines but also from any restrictive review process that might have inhibited the fullest examination of a given issue. 1 Although begun in 1956, no recoverable monographs in the POLO series have been located in CIA’S document records prior to 1961. The titles of two of the earliest POLO mono- graphs, however, have been identified as “Evolution of the Central Organs of the Chinese Communist Party (1921-1958)” and “Chinese Communist Party and the Intellectuals.” 2 “This staff [OCI’s SSSG] compiled the data that permitted CIA to lead the way--against furious opposition elsewhere-in chart- ing the strategic conflict between Soviet and Chinese styles of dictatorship and doctrine that was basic to the definitive split in 1960.” Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington, DC. Acropolis Books, Ltd., 1976). p. 151. 4
  6. 6. Objectives of the Series building blocks to enhance future strategic analysis was considered valid by OCI and DDI leadership.The goal of the Research Staff was to explorein depth the politics of the communist world Although current intelligence remained pri-in order to develop a foundation of intellec- marily the responsibility of others, particularlytual capital for the intelligence community. analysts in OCI--the Research Staff produced a number of studies providing useful backgroundUltimately, this comprehensive research on selected for understanding shorter-term issues. For ex-issues improved intelligence assessments of the ample, the POLO series devoted considerablefuture direction the Soviet and Chinese leaderships effort from the mid-1960s to 1973 to examiningwere likely to take in domestic and foreign policy. all facets of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, thereby demonstrating the staff’s capacity to provide aThe staff itself mainly originated the research comprehensive framework for a dynamic and stilltopics. Some questions were returned to again unfolding current intelligence issue. Some ofand again, such as the status of the Sino-Soviet the monographs on the Cultural Revolution alsodispute and leadership positions and maneu- sought to stimulate analysis by offering alternativevering in the USSR and China. Other topics interpretations of a developing phenomenon.were taken up in response to the internal argu-ments over issues with other parts of the CIA, OCI management, for its part, recognized theor in support of the DI’s research program. difficulties that would ‘arise if analysts responsible for current intelligence also sought to performThe staff thus did not act in isolation but ben- long-term research. Even though many of OCI’sefited greatly from the creative tension that de- current intelligence memoranda did, in fact, requireveloped with other components of the Agency, considerable research by their authors, the finalOCI analysts, and with staff members of the Office products required a current focus and short-termof National Estimates (ONE), with officers of the analytic judgments, and did not seek to build aDirectorate of Plans, and with the analytical divi- bank of knowledge. Therefore, the SRS studiession of CIA’S Foreign Broadcasting Information were a unique product, born of a belief that ana-Service (FBIS). The staff’s analysts also sought lysts skilled in the requirements of deeper researchto consult as widely as possible with qualified should be housed in a separate structure that wasexperts outside CIA--both elsewhere in the Intel- freed from the ever-evolving and growing demandsligence Community and throughout academia.3 for current intelligence support to the policymakers.The existence of the staff also benefited those in Most fundamentally, while the staff existed,CIA with whom they interacted. The staff’s prod- The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers its presence as a source of an alternative pointucts served to develop a framework to help both of view also served to help diminish the risknew and experienced analysts better understand posed by the development of “groupthink”key issues, such as political motivations and the ob- in the production of finished intelligence.4jectives sought in foreign policymaking, the role ofthe military in politics, or the ideological underpin-nings of the Communist regimes. Whether OCI an-alysts agreed or disagreed with conclusions of anygiven study, the overall goal of developing solid 4 Mention must also be made of the stimulating contribution to CIA analysis furnished in the 1950s and 1960s by the ana-3 For a number of years, the Special Research Staff was CIA’S lytical component of FBIS, despite the fact that this componentprimary representative interacting with the academic world. Some throughout the years of its existence was obliged to use onlymembers or former members of the Staff (Zagoria, Bridgham, unclassified rather than all-source evidence. In addition, theCohen, and Gelman) published books or articles in academic FBIS analytical group served as a valuable training ground forjournals on matters concerning the Chinese and Soviet leaderships. analysts who later worked in OCI or the Research Staff. 5
  7. 7. Reorganization of the Mission Eventually, in 1973 the DDI Research Staff was abolished and its analysts were absorbed into a small new Office of Political Research (OPR). OPR was expected to do in-depth analysis, on a broader geographic basis, about political and interdisciplin- ary topics of long-range concern to US decision makers. Then, in a further restructuring in 1976, OPR was incorporated into the Office of Regional and Political Analysis (ORPA) whose divisions were charged with experimenting with fresh approaches, emphasizing interdisciplinary analysis and produc- ing longer-range papers. In 1981 the functional-of- fice structure was abandoned in favor of a combi- nation of regional and functional offices to produce multidisciplinary analyses across the directorate. In retrospect, the products produced by the Special Research Staff remain an exceptional endeavor in CIA’s analytic history. Nevertheless, the concept remains a benchmark for any future effort to develop another entity whose mis- sion aims primarily at building intellectual capi- tal for analysts in the intelligence community.The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers / 6
  8. 8. General Hayden’s Remarksat the SHAFR annual meetingRemarks of Central Intelligence Agency As a secret organization serving an open andDirector Gen. Michael V. Hayden at free society, CIA has been granted an enor- mous public trust. That’s what secrecy is in athe Society for Historians of American democracy. Not a grant of power, but a grant ofForeign Relations Conference trust.  Each day, we have to earn that trust—as(as prepared for delivery) our democratic system demands—by acting as our fellow citizens expect us to: Skillfully, boldly, and always in keeping with the laws and valuesJune 21, 2007  of our Republic. That’s our social contract.Thank you very much. As a lifelong student of Here’s an informal yardstick I use: If I could tell myhistory, I not only respect the work you do, I enjoy brother back in Pittsburgh or my sister in Steuben-it. So I was especially pleased to accept the in- ville what CIA has done and why, would it makevitation to meet with this distinguished group. sense to them? Would they accept it as reasonable?Last month, I had the privilege to be the com-mencement speaker at my alma mater, DuquesneUniversity. I told the Class of 2007 that theeducation I received there taught me at leastthree great truths, the first of which is “ev-erything is connected to everything else.”That’s the historian in me.  What we do todayinevitably has its roots in the past. And when youchoose the Air Force and intelligence, you choose aprofession in which history is a strong component.Now, if you want to know the other great truthsfrom Duquesne, you’ll have to read the speech,and for that one, you won’t even need a FOIArequest. Today’s topic is a different truth—CIA’s GENERAL HAYDEN’S REMARKSsocial contract with the American people. Morespecifically, how that contract guides CIA aswe balance two crucial obligations: our need toprotect information that helps us protect Ameri-cans and our need to inform the public—as bestwe can—about the work we do on their behalf. General Michael Hayden - Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 2006-200 9.Let me explain what I mean by the social con-tract. I talked about it when I was up for con-firmation just over a year ago, and I’ve empha-sized it inside and outside CIA ever since. It isa first principle for us—central to all we do.  7
  9. 9. Of course, we cannot tell the American people the rural pacification program in South Vietnam. everything we do to protect them without dam- aging our ability to protect them. When it comes These projects even have impact beyond our to secret intelligence, public sovereignty and shores. The collection of China estimates, Track- oversight reside in the Congress. But there is ing the Dragon, is on the shelves of a number of another window into our activities that’s avail- Chinese scholars, and the Yugoslavia collection is able to the 300 million Americans we serve. It used in at least one graduate course in Serbia. can be found in the documents we release and Our FOIA program is also very successful.  In each the work that you and your colleagues do to of the last nine years, CIA has reduced its back- place that material in a fair and accurate context. log—even as we receive about 3,000 new requests That’s why declassification is so important to us. annually. This record is unsurpassed in the federal The Agency officers who do that work wrestle government, and we are making a concerted effort constantly with the twin imperatives of essential to close old cases, most of which are very com- openness and essential secrecy. They carry a plex and involve large numbers of documents. huge responsibility. Simply put, they must de- In that context, we have completed our declassifi- cide when a secret is no longer a secret. cation review and are preparing to release most of You can imagine the tension involved in making the so-called “Family Jewels,” a very famous set of that determination. We must balance our respon- documents written over three decades ago, when sibility to the public, and to history, to explain our Director Schlesinger asked employees to report actions and their impact, with our obligation to activities they thought might be inconsistent with protect sources, methods, and ongoing intelligence the Agency’s charter. Much of it has been in the relationships. These are not simple, cut-and-dried press before, and most of it is unflattering, but it is issues. They spark vigorous internal debates that CIA’s history. The documents provide a glimpse of ultimately require informed, yet subjective, judg- a very different time and a very different Agency. ments. We have those debates and make those When we release these declassified documents, judgments knowing that mistakes can jeopardize we will put them on our public Web site, just as American security, and, in some cases, place we have with many others, ensuring easy access. lives at risk. An intelligence organization that fails Under the program that reviews records 25 or to protect those who work with it—foreign in- more years old, CIA has reviewed and released tel services and individuals—will eventually see 31 million pages of previously classified records. sources dry up and cooperation diminish. So, as One third of those can be full-text searched you can see, this is an existential question for us. at the National Archives’ College Park facil-The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers / Despite these complexities, CIA recognizes the ity using CREST, our records search tool. real benefits that flow from greater public un- Just last month, CIA made its latest delivery derstanding of our work and mission. That is of declassified electronic records to the Ar- not a boast: No other intelligence agency in the chives—420,000 pages. These documents, like world rivals our record on declassification. the nine previous deliveries, cover the full range From the millions of pages of OSS documents of our work: Finished intelligence, operations released in the 1980s, to extensive documenta- reports from the 1940s and 50s, research and tion of America’s early imagery satellites, the development files from the DST, and policy Cuban missile crisis, the U-2 program, and large files and memos from the leadership level. collections of National Estimates on the Soviet Keep in mind, we not only make these records Union, China, Vietnam and Yugoslavia, CIA declas- available, we make them easily accessible, through sification has contributed greatly to the historical CREST and our Web site. We are very proud of record. Just last year we added to that record that and are actively exploring ways to do more, with the declassification of volumes on the fa- including possible deployment of the CREST mous Berlin Tunnel operation and CIA’s role in 8
  10. 10. system to additional federal records deposito- series.  CIA understands the importance of thisries. To date, more than 650,000 pages have official documentary history. We know the valuebeen printed from CREST, and the documents of conveying a complete and accurate picture ofavailable through that user-friendly system are our nation’s foreign policy decisions. I’m actuallyincreasingly cited in academic publications. one of the many who has used FRUS, and I can’t imagine writing my graduate thesis on the MarshallAnd remember that nothing about intelligence and Plan without it. But again, this is about more thandeclassification happens without human interven- students and researchers. This is about telling thetion. We do not—we cannot—just kick these things American people what we have done in their name.out the door. We have to examine each and everypage through the real-world security prism I men- As you know, the biggest challenge here for CIAtioned. It takes time. It takes care.  It takes talent. is determining the extent to which covert ac- tions can be declassified to present a full pictureNow, this may be a conference of histori- of foreign policy. On that front, we are workingans, but all of us work in the present, so let hard to draw a smaller circle around what mustme give you a sense of where we’re headed be kept secret. The bottom line: We strive toand what our declassification priorities are. release as much as we can without endanger- ing ongoing relationships with foreign partners.I should say right up front that resources fordeclassification programs are increasingly con- A second priority is reviewing records awaitingstrained. This is a function of the unprecedented release in the presidential libraries. Because we be-demands placed on our core mission areas. lieve those records are relatively more valuable toThere simply has never been greater demand those who write history, we want to devote relative-from policymakers for quality intelligence—it ly more resources to them in our 25-year program.is at the center of every national security chal-lenge facing the United States today: terrorism, Thirdly, we plan to continue working with theweapons proliferation, Iran, Iraq, and North Ko- NIC, which is now part of the Office of the Di-rea, to name just a few. The ops tempo we have rector of National Intelligence, to declassify col-maintained since 9/11—and must continue to lections of National Intelligence Estimates. maintain—is unmatched in our Agency’s history. And fourth, we will continue to focus on dis-The good news here is that we’re producing great cretionary releases of Cold War documents.stuff for future historians. The challenge today is We have in the pipeline a comprehensivethat declassification is getting squeezed. We must collection of reporting and analysis of War-use the money and manpower devoted to these saw Pact military programs, for example. efforts more smartly than ever. Certain things arerequired by law, but we want to do even more. Dis- And, in collaboration with the Air Force and the Na-cretionary projects—like the release of more than tional Reconnaissance Office, CIA later this year will release hundreds of pages on the development and300 NIEs in partnership with the National Intelli-gence Council, and the declassification of hundreds deployment of the A-12 OXCART. The supersonic GENERAL HAYDEN’S REMARKSof articles from Studies in Intelligence—give us reconnaissance aircraft, which was developed withthe opportunity to present a more complete story, Lockheed as a successor to the U-2, flew missionsoften with the expert help of CIA’s own historians. over North Vietnam and North Korea in 1967-68. The intelligence it gathered helped save AmericanSo what are the Agency’s current declas- lives by identifying missile sites that our pilots couldsification priorities beyond our FOIA then avoid. It also located the USS Pueblo, a SIGINTand 25-year review obligations? collection ship that the North Koreans had seized. The release of the records will come in conjunctionFirst, continuing support to the State Depart- with our 60th anniversary celebration in September. ment’s Foreign Relations of the United States 9
  11. 11. That’s a few months down the road, though. Before too long, the collection will be avail- Today, I want to tell you about another collec- able on the CIA web site—in our FOIA Elec- tion. Known inside CIA as the “CAESAR-POLO- tronic Reading Room. But for now, this confer- ESAU papers,” it is a compilation of in-depth ence is the only place you can get it. So take a research and analysis on Soviet and Chinese copy with you, and after you’ve had a chance internal politics and Sino-Soviet relations. to look at it, let us know what you think. The collection is available to each of I mentioned earlier that CIA recognizes the very real you today—147 documents amount- benefits that flow from greater public understand- ing to more than 11,000 pages of analy- ing of our work. I want to expand on that, because sis done between 1953 and 1973. it really is crucial to our success as an organization. What is unusual about this release is that the Greater openness does several things for us. documents were not intended as finished intel- ligence products to inform policy. Rather, the First, it helps the public, Congress, and the execu- authors aimed to create a broad base of knowl- tive branch appreciate the courage and integ- edge on which analysts throughout the Intelli- rity of CIA officers. I’ve known the Agency over gence Community could draw. In doing so, they the years through my other assignments, but relied heavily on consultations not only within the the last year has taught me a lot about the men Directorate of Intelligence, but also with op- and women who serve there. They are among erations officers, the analytic division of the the most dedicated, talented people I have Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (now ever had the good fortune of working with. known as the Open Source Center), and with a Also, releasing records that no longer need wide range of experts throughout academia.   to be protected helps people understand the The CAESAR and POLO papers, which studied limits of our craft. Americans realize the vi- the Soviet and Chinese leadership hierarchies, tal importance of intelligence, especially since respectively, helped prepare case officers work- 9/11. That’s a good thing. But it’s equally im- ing in the field against Communist targets. And portant for people to understand the inher- many documents in the ESAU series were used ent uncertainties of intelligence work.  essentially as working papers to inform analysts CIA officers deal in unknowns and unpredictables. writing current intelligence on the same sub- The problems we face are complex and, more often ject—formal DI assessments on Sino-Soviet re- than not, influenced by human behavior, which itself lations that were delivered to policymakers. is complex and difficult to predict. We endeavor toThe CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers / The experts who put this collection together point reveal what others want to keep hidden, which adds out that many of the papers rely heavily on clan- another layer of difficulty to our mission. So even destine collection and other sensitive intelligence when we are at the top of our game, it’s very, very methods, information not usually available to rare that we can give certitude to policymakers. researchers outside the Intelligence Community. Openness, particularly declassification of histori- The judgments in the papers are supported by cal records, also exposes the public to one of the a great deal of information from diverse sources. challenges CIA faces every day. Our Agency, and Finally, we believe the documents will be of inter- particularly our analysts, are at the nexus between est to academics, and ultimately, to the public, the world as it is, and the world as we wish it to be.  because they reflect the views of seasoned ana- lysts who followed closely their special areas of Our job is to understand and explain the world research and whose views were shaped in the as it is. The policymaker, though, has to make often-heated internal debates of the Cold War. decisions or take action. We are expected to inform those decisions and actions by providing 10
  12. 12. warning and signaling opportunity. That ties us the previous structure, where greater authorityclosely to policymakers. They demand that we rested with the Directorates, decisions too oftenbe relevant, and our craft demands that we be were opaque, inconsistent, and subject to lengthy,objective. Sitting in that nexus between reality unproductive disputes. The new approach givesand aspiration is never easy, and I think histori- our Chief of Information Management Servicescal studies of foreign policy and the role of intel- a stronger hand to ensure that adequate recordligence in shaping it, makes that point clear. searches are undertaken and appropriate de- cisions are made. We want decisions that areA final reason why declassification, when pos- reasonable, timely, transparent, and credible.sible, is in CIA’s interest: We want our history andour role in key decisions to be written accurately I firmly believe this approach will improveand fairly. Very often, we simply cannot cor- CIA’s standing with key partners inside andrect misinformation in the press—history’s first outside government, including people likedraft—without revealing information that would you. It also will strengthen our ability to edu-undermine ongoing intelligence operations. And, cate the public about our unique work andunfortunately, there seems to be an instinct among our vital contributions to national security.some in the media today to take a few pieces ofinformation, which may or may not be accurate, and I hope you’ll see good results from these steps. Inrun with them to the darkest corner of the room.  our robust democracy, people want and deserve to know more about the government agenciesWith the passage of time, declassified historical re- they pay for and that exist to serve them, even thecords can give the full, accurate picture—the good secret ones. We work for and serve the interestsand the bad, along with the necessary context. So of the American people. When the protection ofeventually, the academic community and the public information is no longer required, we owe it towe ultimately serve together can arrive at informed our fellow citizens to disclose that information.judgments about CIA’s work and effectiveness. Thank you again for the opportunityA few months after I arrived at CIA last year, to be here. It’s been a pleasure.I met with the Publications Review Board—asmall, dedicated group that reviews books andother writings by current and former officers.I told them a few things that apply not only totheir work, but also to information review andrelease more broadly. I said I expected CIA tobuild up a body of knowledge that is declas-sified, and to use decisions made in particularcases as precedent to guide future decisions.I also told them that we need to draw hard lines toprotect that which is truly secret, but warned that GENERAL HAYDEN’S REMARKSif we’re drawing them on the margins, we’re doingourselves a disservice. I know it’s a lot easier to say, About SHAFR“no” than to say, “let me think about that,” but thelatter is where we should be. The best decisions, The Society for Historians of American Foreignlike the best intelligence, rarely come from the Relations (SHAFR) is dedicated to the scholarlyeasiest road, especially on the toughest issues.  study of the history of American foreign relations. As such, it promotes the “the study, advancementA few months after that meeting, CIA centralized and dissemination of a knowledge of Americanall declassification review and release programs Foreign Relations” through the sponsorship ofat the corporate level. We concluded that under research, annual meetings, and publications. 11
  13. 13. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY Accompanying DVD contains all documents listed in the bibliography. Documents can also be ac- cessed from CIA’s FOIA Electronic Reading room at www.foia.cia.gov/cpe.asp. CAESAR political conflict for Stalin’s favor and for con- trol over the Soviet Communist Party....Many 1.  “The Doctors’ Plot,” 15 July 1953. 17 pages. observers profess to see in this conflict and its outcome an explanation for many of the prob- On 15 January 1953, Pravda accused “nine doc- lems of Soviet policy in the post-war years.” tors—most of them Jewish” of spying on the USSR and murdering “A.S. Shcherbakov and A.A. 7.  “The Balance of Power: August 1948 to Zhdanov.” The doctors were also “accused of at- October 1950,” 5 August 1953. 20 pages. tempting to murder five military figures: Marshals Vasilevski, Konev and Govorov, General Shtemenko “Following the death of Andrei Zhdanov, Malen- and Admiral Levchenko.” These accusations “repre- kov rapidly reoccupied a prominent position in the sented a new stage in the fierce propaganda war” Soviet hierarchy and apparently was allowed to re- and “brought proof of US hostility...by proving that establish control over the Party apparatus by carry- this country had many agents inside the USSR.” ing out a purge of important Zhdanov adherents.” 2.  “Death of Stalin,” 16 July 1953. 24 pages. 8. “Indecision and Stress: 1950-1952,” 21 August 1953. 25 pages. This paper reviews Soviet news bul- letins on Stalin’s final days and specu- “Following the failure of the North Korean attack on lates on succession after his death. South Korea and the failure of the Chinese Commu- nists to drive UN forces from Korea, Soviet leaders 3.  “The Reversal of the Doctors’ Plot and its grew increasingly concerned about US rearmament Immediate Aftermath,” 16 July 1953. 14 pages. and US-inspired integration of Western defense efforts. They apparently became particularly con- “On 4 April, the much publicized doctor’s plot cerned about the establishment of US bases in vari- was repudiated in a startling public reversal.” ous peripheral areas of the USSR. In spite of this, 4.  “Germany,” 16 July 1953. 6 pages. Soviet policy remained sterile and provocative.” “Outside the Soviet Union, the situation in Ger- 9.  “Politics and the Soviet Army: Developments many was to provide the clearest indication of since October 1952 relating to the political status of the problems faced by the new Soviet leadershipThe CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers / the Soviet armed forces,” 12 March 1954. 54 pages. and the difficulty which it had in handling them.” “This study of the post-Stalin period is undertaken 5.  “Melnikov’s Removal in the Ukraine,” to discover what effects recent political changes 17 July 1973. 6 pages. have had on the armed forces as a whole and on individuals or groups among the high-ranking “Ukrainian personnel shifts following the death military leaders, and what influence these military of Stalin culminated in the purge of L.G. Melnikov leaders have exerted within the government.” from his position as first secretary of the Ukrainian party on 12 June....The most important Soviet lead- 10.  “Purge of L.P. Beria,” 17 August 1954. 39 pages. er to have been removed since the death of Stalin.” “Beria’s star, which had been declining since 6.  “The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship,” mid-1951, rose to an extraordinary height follow- 29 July 1953. 17 pages. ing Stalin’s death.... Realizing that unquestioned supremacy for any one of their number would “The hypothesis is frequently advanced that soon lead to the liquidation of at least some of Zhdanov and Malenkov engaged in a bitter the remainder as potential rivals, the ruling group 12
  14. 14. apparently determined to prevent the assump- 15.  “Factionalism in the Hungariantion of Stalin’s power by any one individual. It must Workers (Communist) Party (1945-1956),”have appeared to the other leaders that Beria was 28 January 1957. 94 pages.making his bid for this power; or possibly, someone This paper “attempts to discover and analyzewas able to convince the others that this was so.” the major cliques, factions, and alignments in the10-A.  “Summarization of Reports Preceding Hungarian Workers (Communist) party since 1945Beria Purge,” 17 August 1954. 20 pages. in terms of changing Soviet policy demands and the resultant conflict of interest with the needs11.  “Resignation of Malenkov,” of local leaders and the country as a whole.”12 September 1955. 66 pages.  16.  “Soviet Economic Policy: December“A number of differing interpretations have been 1956-May 1957,” 8 July 1957. 51 pages.advanced to explain the demotion of G.M. Malen-kov in February 1955 from his position as chairman This study attempts to “pull together avail-of the USSR Council of Ministers.... The following able factual information and to draw specula-paper assembles and re-examines the princi- tive conclusions on the meaning of the shiftspal evidence believed pertinent to the leader- in Soviet economic policy and on the in-ship problem in the USSR. The re-examination sights these shifts provide into the problemswas directed at ascertaining the validity of vari- of the Soviet leaders during this period.”ous causal elements in Malenkov’s upset.” 17.  “Differences in Temperament Among12.  “Recent Developments in Political Status of So- Soviet Leaders as Shown by their Approach toviet Armed Forces,” 20 September 1955. 68 pages. Policy Issues,” 30 October 1957. 42 pages.“It is the purpose of this paper to summarize all “This working paper is an attempt to determineavailable information which would update the the personal predictions and policy leanings ofexamination of the role of the Soviet military in top-level Soviet leaders by analysis of the partpolitics and place in perspective the position of the they played in various postwar policy disputes.”military within the context of Soviet leadership.” The policy preferences of Zhdanov, Voznesensky, Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Kaganovich, Khrush-13.  “Soviet Views on Capitalism,” chev, Mikoyan, and Zhukov are examined though30 January 1956. 70 pages.  their responses to disputes in the Kremlin on a variety of topics including nuclear warfare, China,“The purpose of the present study is to examine the 20th Party Congress and anti-Semitism.the elements of continuity and change and the indi-cations of uncertainty and conflict in postwar Soviet 18.  “From the January Plenum to the July Plenumviews of capitalism, and to attempt to determine ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: CAESAR (1955)—Antecedents and Aftermath of Malenkov’sthe implications of those views on Soviet policies.” Resignation from the Premiership,” 12 March 1958. 57 pages.14.  “The Suez Crisis—A Test for the USSR’s MiddleEastern Policy,” 3 January 1957.  18 pages. The author reviews the events leading up to and after Malenkov’s resignation, “in order to introduce“The Middle East crisis precipitated by Nasr’s information relating to Malenkov’s demotion ob-nationalization of the Suez Canal Company which tained only subsequently, and in order to provideculminated in the Israeli and Anglo-French attack some perspective for a discussion of policy chang-on Egypt confronted the Soviet leaders with the es undertaken in the months after February 1955.”choice of accepting the incalculable risks of directSoviet intervention on Egypt’s side or acquiescing 19.  “From the July Plenum (1955) to the 20th Partyin the rapid destruction of the Soviet-equipped Congress—Antecedents and Aftermath ofEgyptian armed forces and the Nasser regime.” Malenkov’s Resignation from the Premiership,” 19 June 1958. 69 pages. 13
  15. 15. “Khrushchev’s increasing role in Soviet policy their resolute and protracted feat of resistance, formulation and implementation and the conse- Soviet writers have demonstrated a measure quent loss of influence by Malenkov and Molotov of personal integrity and unity of purpose un- meant essentially that the circle of top leaders had matched by any other segment of Soviet society.” been reduced, and it was doubtful if the addition of Kirichenko and Suslov to the presidium by the 24.  “The Soviet History of World War II,” July plenum would serve to enlarge that circle.” 28 October 1959. 61 pages.  “This paper seeks to answer questions posed by 20.  “The Tie That Binds—Soviet Intrabloc the recent increased attention to the history of Relations: Feb 1956 to Dec 1957,” the war in the Soviet Union. Why is the regime 29 July 1958. 55 pages. now encouraging historical writing on the war? “The USSR’s post-Stalin policy thus was designed What interpretation is being promoted? What so as to transform its slaves into willing allies, and, are the political and military implications?” coincidentally, to render international communism more palatable to the non-Communist world.” 25.  “Khrushchev on Nuclear Strategy,” 19 January 1960. 41 pages. 21.  “The Failure of the Soviet-Yugoslav This paper analyzes “statements on war that Rapprochement,” 3 November 1958. 26 pages. Khrushchev has made in public speeches and in “If Moscow had been content to accept Yu- interviews from spring 1957 through his report goslavia as an independent neutral, and the to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960.” Yugoslavs had refrained from meddling too actively in satellite affairs, Belgrade’s demon- 26.  “The Succession to Khrushchev,” strated willingness to pursue a foreign policy 4 March 1960. 14 pages. close to that of the USSR would have precluded “This paper seeks to identify the principals in serious conflicts between the two states.” the anticipated competition and to assess their various prospects as heirs to Khrushchev.” 22.  “Party-Military Relations in the USSR and the Fall of Marshal Zhukov,” 8 June 1959. 41 pages.  27.  “Soviet Policy Toward the Underdeveloped “The announcement of Zhukov’s release as de- Countries,” 28 April 1961. 122 pages. fense minister was terse and gave no clue as to This working paper, “traces chronologically the his future. Observers in Moscow differed as to development of aspects of Soviet policy to- whether he would be promoted to minister with- ward colonial areas and the countries regarded out portfolio, ‘kicked upstairs’ to some honorific by Moscow as having achieved various de-The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers / post, or demoted. The last was proved correct.” grees of independence from ‘imperialism.’ “ 23.  “The Soviet Writer and Soviet Cultural Policy,” 28.  “Soviet Military Thought on Future War,” 15 September 1959. 57 pages. 3 April 1962. 63 pages.  “The pressure of greater creative freedom, ap- “This paper is based entirely on open So- pearing initially in 1953 as cautious protests by viet materials, principally the theoretical mili- veteran writers against the standards of the Stalin tary journals and textbooks on military science era and developing later into headlong assaults by addressed to audiences of professionals.” both old and young writers, was officially con- doned until it came into open conflict with the 29.  “Khrushchev and the anti-party group,” dictates of political orthodoxy. When the official 27 April 1962. 28 pages.  brakes and the pressure for retrenchment were “This is a working paper, a reconstruction of the applied, in early 1954 and again in late 1956, it was challenge to Khrushchev by the ‘anti-party group’ expected that literature would return to its tradi- led by Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich.” tional position as the handmaiden of politics.... In 14
  16. 16. 30.  “Soviet Strategic Doctrine for the Start of War,” and to probe their possible consequences for3 July 1962. 44 pages. Soviet military policy, or foreign policy as it re-“Both classified and open Soviet military sources lates to the management of local crises.”indicate that the USSR has added to its strategic 35.  “The Soviet Missile Base Venture in Cuba,”concepts the doctrine of pre-emptive attack.” 17 February 1964. 141 pages.31.  “Soviet Military Problem and the Chinese “The conception of the missile base venture, in ourProblem,” 26 April 1963. 32 pages. view, was radically defective, and the execution“Having failed in the 1950s to integrate Chi- of it was in some respects astonishingly inept. Wenese military power into a Moscow-controlled have tried above all to discover why Khrushchevbloc-wide military entity, the Soviets have believed—throughout the course of the venture,tended since to exclude China and her follow- from conception to retraction—that his conducters from major Soviet military planning and was rational, i.e., why he concluded at least un-bloc military and economic organizations.” til September that the United States would very probably acquiesce, why he concluded until late32.  “Khrushchev’s Role in the Current October that the venture could be managed toControversy Over Soviet Defense Policy,” his profit even if the United States did not acqui-17 June 1963. 28 pages. esce, and why he managed the venture as he did during the week of the crisis in late October.”“In the process of tracing developments in theSoviet economic-defense sphere since the Cuban 36.  “The Soviet Strategic Interest in Limitedcrisis, we have sought to discover Khrushchev’s ob- Disarmament,” 6 March 1964. 49 pages.jectives and scheme of political maneuver, and togauge his progress in putting his program across.” “In this exercise, the question of disarmament is discussed in terms of Soviet strategic thought, plan-33.  “Unorthodox Ideas in the U.S.S.R.,” ning, and goals.... This paper is concerned largely27 June 1963. 46 pages. with the hard gains—in Soviet military strength relative to that of the U.S.—which the USSR may“This survey represents the first systematic attempt hope to make through the conclusion of agree-to deal with a growing volume of classified reports ments on limited measures of arms control.”on attitudes and views expressed by younger Sovi-et citizens in conversations with Western nationals.” 37.  “The Higher Military Council of the USSR,”Subjects include: the goal of communism, pres- 20 July 1964. 42 pages.ent socialist system of the USSR, religion, Sovieteconomic system, Soviet foreign policy, socialist “We examine here the Higher Military Coun-brotherhood, Marxist-Leninist doctrine, member- cil and offer tentative conclusions about the ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: CAESARship in the Communist Party, membership in Kom- use of this institution by Khrushchev andsomol, regime deceit, collective guilt for Stalin’s the military for their various purposes.” crimes, attitude towards the regime, capitalism and 38.  “The Military and the Succession Problemthe West, concepts of freedom and democracy. in the USSR,” 5 November 1964. 46 pages.34.  “Trends in Soviet Thought on Limited Warfare,” “The first part of the paper surveys in a general16 December 1963. 40 pages.  way the army-party relationship since Stalin’s death“This is a working paper, prepared in sup- in 1953. The second, conjectural part exploresport of NIE 11-14-63, ‘Capabilities of the Soviet the possible actions of the army in any struggleGeneral Purpose Forces, 1963-1969.’ Primarily to settle the present succession problem.”on the basis of open Soviet military and politi-cal writings, this report attempts to identify newtrends in Soviet thinking on limited warfare 15
  17. 17. 39.  “Warsaw Pact Military Strategy: 44.  “Politics in the Soviet Politburo and the A Compromise in Soviet Strategic Thinking,” Czech Crisis,” 28 October 1968. 19 pages. 7 June 1965. 34 pages. “The essay focuses primarily on the conflicting “The thesis of this study is that the internal policy tendencies within the Soviet leadership Soviet debate on the nature of a war in Eu- as symbolized by Kosygin and by Brezhnev.” rope has had a significant effect on the de- velopment of the missions and force struc- 45.  “Institute for the USA: The Kremlin’s ture of the East European armies.” New Approach to America-Watching,” 7 October 1969. 44 pages. 40.  “The New Soviet Constitution and the “American Kremlinologists viewing the So- Party-State Issue in CPSU Politics, 1956-1966,” viet scene through the cracks in the Kremlin 21 July 1966. 113 pages. wall sometimes have the feeling that someone “This working paper...examines the ten year is looking back at them. They are correct.” dispute, which continues, within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) over the ques- 46.  “Leonid Brezhnev: The Man and His Power,” tion of the correct role of the Communist party in 5 December 1969. 43 pages.  the modern Russian state. It examines the intense “After the pyrotechnic Khrushchev, most any- party-state dispute...primarily through posi- one to become ‘number one’ in the Soviet tions taken in the party and juridical media.” Union was likely to appear grey. Brezhnev, the careful, efficient and ruthless bureaucrat who 41.  “Strains in Soviet-East German Relations: succeeded him, is not completely lacking in 1962-1967,” 24 February 1967. 115 pages. imagination, color or style—but almost so.” “The East Germans have shown concern that, if a rapprochement develops between West Ger- 47.  “Brezhnev’s Struggle for Dominance: many on the one hand and the Soviet Union Annex to Leonid Brezhnev: The Man and His and its Eastern European allies on the other, Power,” 12 December 1969. 44 pages. then the East German state will first be weak- 48.  “Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War,” ened by that accommodation and then eventu- 16 March 1970. 71 pages. ally fall victim to a policy of reunification.” “In the period before the Six-Day War in 1967, 42.  “Policy and Politics in CPSU Politburo: Soviet policy shifted from support of moderate October 1964 to September 1967. Arab policy to espousal of the radical Arab line, 31 August 1967. 103 pages. thereby encouraging a sequence of events thatThe CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers / “Brezhnev...aimed at (1) removing the U.S. pres- Moscow could not control. After the defeat of the ence from Western Europe, (2) fragmenting Arabs, Soviet policy shifted back again to support NATO, (3) strengthening the Soviet position of moderate Arab policies. But current trends in and influence in the Warsaw Pact, and (4) ex- Soviet policy are again toward support of Arab panding CPSU influence through the agency radicalism, despite the seeming likelihood of a of local parties in West European politics.” new war in the Middle East and the possibility of another Arab defeat. These policy shifts reveal how 43.  “The Stalin Issue and the Soviet Leadership resistant Moscow is to any fundamental departure Struggle,” 5 July 1968. 18 pages. from its instinctive tendency to support militant “Brezhnev and Shelepin have attempted to Arab nationalism in hopes of Soviet political gains gain the support of the old-guard party ap- and/or Western political losses in the Middle East.” paratchiks by espousing orthodox policies.” 49.  “Andrey Kirilenko and the Soviet Political 43-A.  “Annex: The Stalin Issue and the Soviet Succession,” 15 March 1971. 12 pages. Leadership Struggle,” 17 July 1968. 146 pages. “The possibility of Kirilenko’s actually succeeding Brezhnev in the top Party post sometime in the 16
  18. 18. future depends to a decisive degree, of course, to reject the ‘peaceful transformation’ of capi-on his having developed and maintained sufficient talists, Mao was able to work out the detailssupport among the regime’s leading oligarchs.” and put into practice the Marx-Engels-Lenin theory of ‘buying out’ the capitalists dur-50.  “Portrait of a Neo-Stalinist: Annex to ing a period of gradual transformation.”CAESAR XXXIX (Andrey Kirilenko and the SovietPolitical Succession),” 1 June 1971. 91 pages. 4.  “Mao Tse-tung and Historical Materialism, III: ‘Contradictions’ in a ‘Socialist’ Society,”51.  “The Politburo and Soviet Decision-Making,” 20 October 1961. 25 pages.1 April 1972. 96 pages. “Neither Stalin nor Mao did anything more than“This study examines the processes of the Polit- to assert that contradictions of this kind [in so-buro: the function of its internal parts, the cycle cialist society] ‘cannot’ be antagonistic.”of its operations, and the support of its auxiliaryagencies. The picture which emerges is of decision- 5.  “The Chinese Communist Leadership,makers who are neither infallible giants nor glori- 1958-1961,” 28 November 1961. 126 pages.fied clerks, but hard-driving, able politicians.” “We have thought it useful to make this assess- ment in the context (a) of the development of the Sino-Soviet dispute and (b) of the erraticPOLO course of Chinese domestic policy in the period1.  “Mao Tse-tung and Historical Materialism, I: 1958-1961—particularly because, in our view, aRevolution,” 10 April 1961. 32 pages. further deterioration in the Sino-Soviet relation- ship and in the regime’s economic position may“Chinese Communist spokesmen acknowledge that well force a crisis in the Chinese leadership.”Mao’s early analysis of the Chinese revolution owesa general debt to Lenin and Stalin, but they mini- 6.  “The Decline of Mao Tse-tung,”mize that debt, and they conceal the importance 9 April 1962. 32 pages.of Comintern directives in Mao’s early thinking.” This paper “recapitulates the evidence for the prob-2.  “Mao Tse-tung and Historical Materialism, ability that Mao Tse-tung has been deteriorating inII: The State Form,” 29 June 1961. 25 pages. recent years, and for the possibility that he is suf- fering from a serious medical disorder which could“Chinese Communist theorists claim that Mao soon lead to his death or retirement or overthrow.”Tse-tung has contributed to the Marxist-Leninisttheory of the state with his concept of the ‘people’s 7.  “The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section 1:democratic dictatorship.’ This particular claim 1950-59,” 2 March 1963. 54 pages.for Mao appears to be valid. Whereas Marx has “This paper traces the political factorsenvisaged a dictatorship simply of the proletariat, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: POLO which led initially to the dispute and laterLenin had proposed adding—for a time—the to the attack of 20 October 1962.”peasants. Mao originally accepted Lenin’s view,but in the late 1930s he began to add to the se- 8.  “The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section 2:lect circle another class—the middle or ‘national’ 1959-61,” 19 August 1963. 92 pages.bourgeoisie. Mao regarded this class as having “By fall 1959 the Chinese leaders were con-the essential characteristic of anti-imperialism.” vinced of the need for negotiations with Ne-3.  “Mao Tse-tung and Historical Materialism, hru in order to prevent their internationalIV: The ‘Transition to Socialism,’ prestige—including their position in the world9 October 1961. 34 pages. Communist movement—from deteriorating.”“Whereas Eastern European leaders after1948, following Soviet practices, felt obliged 17
  19. 19. 9.  “The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section 3: 14.  “Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’: Origin and 1961-62,” 5 May 1964. 91 pages. Development,” 6 October 1967. 124 pages. “Chinese policy toward India in 1961 oper- “The ‘cultural revolution’ must be traced to ated on contradictory assumptions, namely, the ‘three years of economic hardships’ from that it was necessary to ‘unite’ with Nehru and 1959-1962 when large numbers of Chinese simultaneously to ‘struggle’ against him.” Communist party, government, and military leaders became disillusioned with Mao’s leader- 10.  “Communist China’s Domestic Crisis: ship following the collapse of his radical ‘great The Road to 1964,” 31 July 1964. 200 pages. leap forward’ and commune programs.” “A crucial question in assessing the future course of domestic policy in Communist China is the 15.  “The P.L.A. and the ‘Cultural Revolution,’ “ extent to which Mao Tse-tung and his lieutenants 28 October 1967. 198 pages. have learned the lessons of the failure of their ‘leap “The present study...deals mainly with Mao’s forward’ approach to economic development.” conduct of the ‘revolution’ in the P.L.A. (that is, the purge and reorganization of the military apparatus), 11.  “The Sino-Vietnamese Effort to Limit with Mao’s use of the P.L.A. as an instrument for American Actions in the Vietnam War,” conducting the ‘revolution’ as a whole, and with 9 June 1965. 37 pages. the relationship between these two concerns.” “By February-March 1965, their failure to prevent strikes against the North forced them to recognize 16.  “Ten Years of Chinese Communist Foreign that Mao was wrong in thinking that small wars Policy, Section 1: Policy Toward the U.S. and could be fought with only slight risks to the base the Diplomatic Isolation of Taipei,” 54 pages. areas and to the security of other bloc countries.” Chapters: “Military Conquest of Taiwan Con- verted to Political Struggle,” “The Issue of UN 12.  “Political Problems in Communist China,” Entry,” and “Diplomatic Isolation of Taipei.” 19 July 1965. 35 pages. “The inadequacy of Mao Tse-tung’s prescription 17.  “Ten Years of Chinese Communist for achieving the good society (featuring class Foreign Policy: South and Southeast Asia,” struggle, heroic poverty, and collective enthusiasm) 4 April 1968. 24 pages. had become increasingly apparent to China’s intel- “Beginning in 1966, Mao Tse-tung gradually shifted lectuals, educated youth, and a seemingly large his foreign policy toward some countries in the area number of middle and lower level party cadres.” from diplomacy directed at neutralization to the open encouragement of rural-based insurrection.”The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers / 13.  “Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’: Its Leadership, Its Strategy, Its Instruments, and Its Casualties,” 17-A.  “Annex to ‘Ten Years of Chinese Communist 18 February 1967. 218 pages. Foreign Policy, Section 2: South and Southeast “(a) Mao has taken the initiative at each stage, (b) Asia,’ “ 9 April 1968. 184 pages. he has been conducting a massive ‘test’ of party 18.  “Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’ in 1967: The leaders and the party apparatus, (c) changes in Struggle to ‘Seize Power,’ “ 24 May 1968. 49 pages. the leadership have represented primarily a purge directed by Mao and only secondarily a ‘power “Mao was not forced, the paper argues, to reverse struggle,’ (d) the entire effort has developed his revolutionary policy by pressure from a ‘mod- coherently, given its irrational base in dogma, and erate’ faction, nor did the period of moderation (e) Mao is now carrying out methodically and in which followed his August decisions mean that general successfully a scheme for the reorganiza- the ‘Cultural Revolution’ was over; rather it was a tion of the party which he outlined last autumn.” pause, a temporary shift in emphasis from revo- lution from below to revolution from above.” 18
  20. 20. 19.  “Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel available a vast amount of new information con-Organizations in Communist China (A Re- cerning earlier factional struggles within thesearch Aid),” 28 May 1968. 71 pages. Chinese Communist Party. Making use of Red“An attempt has been made to identify the Guard materials and other new information...thismajor Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel Intelligence Report re-examines these earlier fac-groups in each province, autonomous region, tional struggles and concludes that Mao’s Culturaland major city, to list the opponents as well Revolution is a direct descendant of party conflictsas the allies of these groups, to note shifts in and policy differences of nearly 20 years duration.”these alliances over time, and to provide a brief 23.  “The Role of the Red Guards andchronology (where possible) of the varying for- Revolutionary Rebels in Mao’s Cultural Revolution,”tunes of these organizations as of May 1968.” November 1968. 192 pages.20.  “Mao’s Red Guard Diplomacy: 1967,” “It is the purpose of this report to describe the21 June 1968. 37 pages. origins of these groups, the range of their activities,“The aberrations which appeared in Peking’s for- the role they have played at various stages in theeign policy tactics in 1967 reflected Mao’s desire to cultural revolution, and the organizational struc-project his will to pragmatic subordinates in order ture which was intended to hold them together asto make them revolutionary diplomats.... Beyond unique extra-Party instruments of Mao’s purge.”Mao’s special view, however, this diplomacy was in 24.  “The Role of the Red Guards andfact illogical and irrational. The beatings of dip- Revolutionary Rebels in Mao’s Cultural Revolution,”lomats, invasion of embassy grounds, and export December 1968. 17 pages.of Mao’s cult aroused nationalistic sensitivitiesabroad, and the adverse international reaction has Briefer version of the previous study publishedbeen as harmful to Peking’s foreign policy as Mao’s at a lower classification.1958 blunders had been to domestic policy.” 25.  “The Cultural Revolution and Education in21.  “Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’ III. The Purge Communist China,” 23 May 1969. 97 pages.of the P.L.A. and the Stardom of Madame “The findings of this study, in broad terms,Mao,” June 1968. 83 pages. are that ‘educational revolution’ is basically“The present study traces the story to June 1968. a function of Mao’s distrust of the intellec-It finds Mao to be still the central and dominant tual and his desire to create a New Chinesefigure, but it devotes special attention to the way Man. This new man, the ‘revolutionary succes-in which Mao’s treatment of the P.L.A. has seemed sor,’ is primarily a product of his education.”to work against his ends by provoking resentment 26.  “The Cultural Revolution and the Ninthamong those upon whom his position directly Party Congress,” 1 October 1969. 40 pages. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: POLOdepends, by narrowing his base of support tofanatics and opportunists, and by putting his own “For those who looked to the Ninth Party Congressposition in danger. These trends are highlighted to provide answers to basic questions about theby the activities and status of Madame Mao, who future of Communist China, this first national con-has become one of the principal leaders and has gress of the Chinese Communist Party to be held inplayed the starring role in purging the P.L.A.” eleven years was a major disappointment. Whether viewed in terms of the new Party leadership, the22.  “Factionalism in the Central Committee: new Party structure, or the course of future politicalMao’s Opposition Since 1949,” and economic policy, the published record of the19 September 1968. 38 pages. Congress was generally vague and contradictory.”“As the drama of Mao’s Cultural Revolution hasunfolded, Communist China’s leaders have made 19

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