Upcoming SlideShare
×

# Micro ch10-presentation

3,317 views

Published on

Published in: Education
8 Likes
Statistics
Notes
• Full Name
Comment goes here.

Are you sure you want to Yes No
• Be the first to comment

Views
Total views
3,317
On SlideShare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
3
Actions
Shares
0
358
0
Likes
8
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide
• This chapter is slightly below average in length, and, for most students, in difficulty. For variety, this PowerPoint presentation uses different examples from the textbook in its analysis of externalities.
• For many students, the concepts are easier to learn in the context of a specific example with numerical values. Note that maximizing consumer + producer surplus is NOT the same as maximizing TOTAL surplus when the trades impose external costs (or benefits) on bystanders.
• “ At any Q &lt; 20, value of additional gas exceeds social cost.” For example, at Q = 10, the value to buyers of an additional gallon equals \$4, while the social cost is only \$2. Therefore, total surplus (society’s well-being) would increase with a larger quantity of gas. “ At any Q &gt; 20, social cost of the last gallon is greater than its value.” For example, at Q = 25 - the market equilibrium - the last gallon cost \$3.50 (including the external cost) but the value of it to buyers was only \$2.50. Hence, total surplus would be higher if Q were lower. Only at Q = 20 is society’s welfare maximized.
• The parenthetical remark at the bottom of the slide follows from a lesson in Chapter 6: tax incidence and the allocation of resources is the same whether a tax is imposed on buyers or sellers.
• The textbook explains that a better educated population makes more informed voting decisions and elects higher quality lawmakers and leaders.
• Since you have just walked students through the analysis of a negative externality, let’s see if they can do the analysis of a positive externality. This slide provides the introductory information they will need to do the analysis. The following slide provides the exercise.
• Greg Mankiw’s blog (http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com) has semi-regular posts on Pigou taxes, some of which are worth using in class (either as assigned or recommended reading or fodder for class discussion). On the main page, look under “A Few Timeless Posts” for “the Pigou Club Manifesto.” In the textbook, a new “In the News” box includes Mankiw’s 2007 New York Times piece arguing for carbon taxes to fight global warming. The piece contrasts corrective taxes with regulations and with cap-and-trade systems.
• Some of your students may not know that pollution “abatement” simply means taking measures to cut pollution. Regarding the last bullet point: If all firms must reduce emissions by a fixed amount (or fixed percentage), then abatement is NOT concentrated among firms with the lowest abatement costs, and so the total cost of abatement will be higher.
• Again, see Mankiw’s blog for more well-argued opinion pieces by him and others in favor of gas or carbon taxes. http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com.
• This first exercise is simple.
• Nitrogen oxides increase ground-level ozone, which has adverse health effects. For more information, see http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ For information about Europe’s new carbon emissions trading program, see the Financial Times article featured in this chapter’s new “In the News” box. You can also find lots of good articles on this program at the website of the Financial Times, www.ft.com. Under Obama’s cap-and-trade proposal, permits will be auctioned to polluters. As Mankiw notes in his New York Times piece reprinted in the textbook, such a system is equivalent to a tax. In contrast, under McCain’s proposed cap-and-trade system, “permits will eventually be auctioned…” (my emphasis).
• The textbook gives a nice example of a contract in which a beekeeper and apple orchard manager each agree to boost production, as each producer’s activity confers an external benefit on the other.
• Both Jane and Dick are better off. (What about Spot? Doesn’t anyone care about Spot???)
• Have students work together – in small groups, or as a class (with you as moderator). If working in groups, allow 5 minutes, then solicit responses from the class. If you wish, insert a blank slide after this one and use it to type students’ responses as they share them. Most students should find part A very straight-forward. A good Coasian solution would be for each of the 1000 residents to chip in \$75, so the town can offer \$75,000 to the factory to stop polluting. The second part involves brainstorming: students try to come up with a list of reasons why it might be difficult to implement Coase-like solutions in the real world. Brainstorming engages students and is shown to increase learning outcomes and student satisfaction. And it provides a break from what otherwise would be a long stretch of lecture. I have not provided a slide with answers. Instead, the following slide lists the reasons why private solutions don’t always work, and the “notes” section (what you’re reading right now) gives some examples of each in the context of this scenario.
• An example for each bullet point in the context of the brainstorming activity on the previous slide: 1. Transactions costs: Suppose lawyers charge \$60,000 to represent the two parties and draw up a contract that is enforceable in a court. Then it will be impossible for both parties to come to a mutually beneficial agreement, and the factory will continue polluting the lake. 2. Stubbornness: Suppose the town offers \$55,000 to the factory. The factory would be better off taking this offer than nothing at all, but the factory may counter with a \$95,000 price. Both parties hold out in hopes that the other will cede, but neither does. The factory keeps polluting, and the residents of Green Valley continue to be denied the joy of swimming in the lake. 3. Coordination problems: Getting all 1000 residents to agree to a specific offer will be difficult. Moreover, each resident has an incentive to free-ride off his neighbors.
• ### Micro ch10-presentation

1. 1. CHAPTER 10 Externalities Microeonomics PRINCIPLES OF N. Gregory Mankiw N. Gregory Mankiw Premium PowerPoint Slides by Ron Cronovich © 2009 South-Western, a part of Cengage Learning, all rights reserved
2. 2. In this chapter,look for the answers to these questions: What is an externality? Why do externalities make market outcomes inefficient? What public policies aim to solve the problem of externalities? How can people sometimes solve the problem of externalities on their own? Why do such private solutions not always work? 2
3. 3. Introduction One of the principles from Chapter 1: Markets are usually a good way to organize economy activity. In absence of market failures, the competitive market outcome is efficient, maximizes total surplus. One type of market failure: externality, the uncompensated impact of one person’s actions on the well-being of a bystander. Externalities can be negative or positive, depending on whether impact on bystander is adverse or beneficial.EXTERNALITIES 3
4. 4. Introduction Self-interested buyers and sellers neglect the external costs or benefits of their actions, so the market outcome is not efficient. Another principle from Chapter 1: Governments can sometimes improve market outcomes. In presence of externalities, public policy can improve efficiency.EXTERNALITIES 4
5. 5. Examples of Negative Externalities Air pollution from a factory The neighbor’s barking dog Late-night stereo blasting from the dorm room next to yours Noise pollution from construction projects Health risk to others from second-hand smoke Talking on cell phone while driving makes the roads less safe for othersEXTERNALITIES 5
6. 6. Recap of Welfare Economics P The market for gasoline \$5 The market eq’m maximizes consumer + producer surplus. 4 Supply curve shows 3 private cost, the costs\$2.50 directly incurred by sellers. 2 Demand curve shows private value, the value 1 to buyers (the prices they are willing to pay). 0 0 10 20 25 30 Q (gallons) EXTERNALITIES 6
7. 7. Analysis of a Negative Externality P The market for gasoline \$5 Social cost = private + external cost 4 external Supply (private cost) cost 3 External cost = value of the 2 negative impact on bystanders 1 = \$1 per gallon (value of harm 0 from smog, 0 10 20 30 Q greenhouse gases) (gallons)EXTERNALITIES 7
8. 8. Analysis of a Negative Externality P The market for gasoline The socially The socially \$5 Social optimal quantity optimal quantity cost is 20 gallons. is 20 gallons. 4 S 3 At any Q < 20, At any Q < 20, value of additional gas value of additional gas 2 exceeds social cost. exceeds social cost. At any Q > 20, At any Q > 20, D social cost of the social cost of the 1 last gallon is last gallon is greater than its value greater than its value 0 to society. to society. 0 10 20 25 30 Q (gallons)EXTERNALITIES 8
9. 9. Analysis of a Negative Externality P The market for gasoline \$5 Social Market eq’m cost (Q = 25) 4 S is greater than social optimum 3 (Q = 20). 2 One solution: D tax sellers 1 \$1/gallon, would shift 0 S curve up \$1. 0 10 20 25 30 Q (gallons)EXTERNALITIES 9
10. 10. “Internalizing the Externality” Internalizing the externality: altering incentives so that people take account of the external effects of their actions In our example, the \$1/gallon tax on sellers makes sellers’ costs = social costs. When market participants must pay social costs, market eq’m = social optimum. (Imposing the tax on buyers would achieve the same outcome; market Q would equal optimal Q.)EXTERNALITIES 10
11. 11. Examples of Positive Externalities  Being vaccinated against contagious diseases protects not only you, but people who visit the salad bar or produce section after you.  R&D creates knowledge others can use.  People going to college raise Thank you for the population’s education not contaminating level, which reduces crime the fruit supply! and improves government.EXTERNALITIES 11
12. 12. Positive Externalities  In the presence of a positive externality, the social value of a good includes  private value – the direct value to buyers  external benefit – the value of the positive impact on bystanders  The socially optimal Q maximizes welfare:  At any lower Q, the social value of additional units exceeds their cost.  At any higher Q, the cost of the last unit exceeds its social value.EXTERNALITIES 12
13. 13. ACTIVE LEARNING 1Analysis of a positive externality P The market for flu shots External benefit\$50 = \$10/shot 40  Draw the social value curve. S 30  Find the socially optimal Q. 20  What policy would internalize this 10 externality? D 0 Q 0 10 20 30 13
14. 14. ACTIVE LEARNING 1Answers Socially optimal Q P The market for flu shots = 25 shots.\$50 external To internalize the 40 benefit externality, use subsidy = \$10/shot. S 30 Social value 20 = private value + \$10 external benefit 10 D 0 Q 0 10 20 25 30 14
15. 15. Effects of Externalities: Summary If negative externality If negative externality  market quantity larger than socially desirable  market quantity larger than socially desirable If positive externality If positive externality  market quantity smaller than socially desirable  market quantity smaller than socially desirable To remedy the problem, To remedy the problem, “internalize the externality” “internalize the externality”  tax goods with negative externalities  tax goods with negative externalities  subsidize goods with positive externalities  subsidize goods with positive externalitiesEXTERNALITIES 15
16. 16. Public Policies Toward ExternalitiesTwo approaches: Command-and-control policies regulate behavior directly. Examples:  limits on quantity of pollution emitted  requirements that firms adopt a particular technology to reduce emissions Market-based policies provide incentives so that private decision-makers will choose to solve the problem on their own. Examples:  corrective taxes and subsidies  tradable pollution permitsEXTERNALITIES 16
17. 17. Corrective Taxes & Subsidies Corrective tax: a tax designed to induce private decision-makers to take account of the social costs that arise from a negative externality Also called Pigouvian taxes after Arthur Pigou (1877-1959). The ideal corrective tax = external cost For activities with positive externalities, ideal corrective subsidy = external benefitEXTERNALITIES 17
18. 18. Corrective Taxes & Subsidies Other taxes and subsidies distort incentives and move economy away from the social optimum. Corrective taxes & subsidies  align private incentives with society’s interests  make private decision-makers take into account the external costs and benefits of their actions  move economy toward a more efficient allocation of resources.EXTERNALITIES 18
19. 19. Corrective Taxes vs. Regulations  Different firms have different costs of pollution abatement.  Efficient outcome: Firms with the lowest abatement costs reduce pollution the most.  A pollution tax is efficient:  Firms with low abatement costs will reduce pollution to reduce their tax burden.  Firms with high abatement costs have greater willingness to pay tax.  In contrast, a regulation requiring all firms to reduce pollution by a specific amount not efficient.EXTERNALITIES 19
20. 20. Corrective Taxes vs. RegulationsCorrective taxes are better for the environment: The corrective tax gives firms incentive to continue reducing pollution as long as the cost of doing so is less than the tax. If a cleaner technology becomes available, the tax gives firms an incentive to adopt it. In contrast, firms have no incentive for further reduction beyond the level specified in a regulation.EXTERNALITIES 20
21. 21. Example of a Corrective Tax: The Gas Tax The gas tax targets three negative externalities:  Congestion The more you drive, the more you contribute to congestion.  Accidents Larger vehicles cause more damage in an accident.  Pollution Burning fossil fuels produces greenhouse gases.EXTERNALITIES 21
22. 22. ACTIVE LEARNING 2A. Regulating lower SO2 emissions Acme and US Electric run coal-burning power plants. Each emits 40 tons of sulfur dioxide per month, total emissions = 80 tons/month. Goal: Reduce SO2 emissions 25%, to 60 tons/month Cost of reducing emissions: \$100/ton for Acme, \$200/ton for USEPolicy option 1: Regulation Every firm must cut its emissions 25% (10 tons).Your task: Compute the cost to each firm and total cost of achieving goal using this policy. 22
23. 23. ACTIVE LEARNING 2A. Answers Each firm must reduce emissions by 10 tons. Cost of reducing emissions: \$100/ton for Acme, \$200/ton for USE. Compute cost of achieving goal with this policy: Cost to Acme: (10 tons) x (\$100/ton) = \$1000 Cost to USE: (10 tons) x (\$200/ton) = \$2000 Total cost of achieving goal = \$3000 23
24. 24. ACTIVE LEARNING 2B. Tradable pollution permits Initially, Acme and USE each emit 40 tons SO2/month. Goal: reduce SO2 emissions to 60 tons/month total.Policy option 2: Tradable pollution permits Issue 60 permits, each allows one ton SO2 emissions. Give 30 permits to each firm. Establish market for trading permits. Each firm may use all its permits to emit 30 tons, may emit < 30 tons and sell leftover permits, or may purchase extra permits to emit > 30 tons.Your task: Compute cost of achieving goal if Acme uses 20 permits and sells 10 to USE for \$150 each. 24
25. 25. ACTIVE LEARNING 2B. Answers Goal: reduce emissions from 80 to 60 tons Cost of reducing emissions: \$100/ton for Acme, \$200/ton for USE.Compute cost of achieving goal: Acme  sells 10 permits to USE for \$150 each, gets \$1500  uses 20 permits, emits 20 tons SO2  spends \$2000 to reduce emissions by 20 tons  net cost to Acme: \$2000 - \$1500 = \$500 continued… 25
26. 26. ACTIVE LEARNING 2B. Answers, continued Goal: reduce emissions from 80 to 60 tons Cost of reducing emissions: \$100/ton for Acme, \$200/ton for USE. USE  buys 10 permits from Acme, spends \$1500  uses these 10 plus original 30 permits, emits 40 tons  spends nothing on abatement  net cost to USE = \$1500 Total cost of achieving goal = \$500 + \$1500 = \$2000 Using tradable permits, goal is achieved at lower total cost and lower cost to each firm than using regulation. 26
27. 27. Tradable Pollution Permits A tradable pollution permits system reduces pollution at lower cost than regulation.  Firms with low cost of reducing pollution sell whatever permits they can.  Firms with high cost of reducing pollution buy permits. Result: Pollution reduction is concentrated among those firms with lowest costs.EXTERNALITIES 27
28. 28. Tradable Pollution Permits in the Real World  SO2 permits traded in the U.S. since 1995.  Nitrogen oxide permits traded in the northeastern U.S. since 1999.  Carbon emissions permits traded in Europe since January 1, 2005.  As of June 2008, Barack Obama and John McCain each propose “cap and trade” systems to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.EXTERNALITIES 28
29. 29. Corrective Taxes vs. Tradable Pollution Permits  Like most demand curves, firms’ demand for the ability to pollute is a downward-sloping function of the “price” of polluting.  A corrective tax raises this price and thus reduces the quantity of pollution firms demand.  A tradable permits system restricts the supply of pollution rights, has the same effect as the tax.  When policymakers do not know the position of this demand curve, the permits system achieves pollution reduction targets more precisely.EXTERNALITIES 29
30. 30. Objections to the Economic Analysis of Pollution  Some politicians, many environmentalists argue that no one should be able to “buy” the right to pollute, cannot put a price on the environment.  However, people face tradeoffs. The value of clean air & water must be compared to their cost.  The market-based approach reduces the cost of environmental protection, so it should increase the public’s demand for a clean environment.EXTERNALITIES 30
31. 31. Private Solutions to ExternalitiesTypes of private solutions: Moral codes and social sanctions, e.g., the “Golden Rule” Charities, e.g., the Sierra Club Contracts between market participants and the affected bystandersEXTERNALITIES 31
32. 32. Private Solutions to Externalities The Coase theorem: If private parties can costlessly bargain over the allocation of resources, they can solve the externalities problem on their own.EXTERNALITIES 32
33. 33. The Coase Theorem: An ExampleDick owns a dog named Spot.Negative externality:Spot’s barking disturbs Jane,Dick’s neighbor.The socially efficient outcomemaximizes Dick’s + Jane’s well-being.  If Dick values having Spot more See Spot bark. than Jane values peace & quiet, the dog should stay.Coase theorem: The private market will reach theefficient outcome on its own…EXTERNALITIES 33
34. 34. The Coase Theorem: An Example  CASE 1: Dick has the right to keep Spot. Benefit to Dick of having Spot = \$500 Cost to Jane of Spot’s barking = \$800  Socially efficient outcome: Spot goes bye-bye.  Private outcome: Jane pays Dick \$600 to get rid of Spot, both Jane and Dick are better off.  Private outcome = efficient outcome.EXTERNALITIES 34
35. 35. The Coase Theorem: An Example  CASE 2: Dick has the right to keep Spot. Benefit to Dick of having Spot = \$1000 Cost to Jane of Spot’s barking = \$800  Socially efficient outcome: See Spot stay.  Private outcome: Jane not willing to pay more than \$800, Dick not willing to accept less than \$1000, so Spot stays.  Private outcome = efficient outcome.EXTERNALITIES 35
36. 36. The Coase Theorem: An Example  CASE 3: Jane has the legal right to peace & quiet. Benefit to Dick of having Spot = \$800 Cost to Jane of Spot’s barking = \$500  Socially efficient outcome: Dick keeps Spot.  Private outcome: Dick pays Jane \$600 to put up with Spot’s barking.  Private outcome = efficient outcome. The private market achieves the efficient outcome The private market achieves the efficient outcome regardless of the initial distribution of rights. regardless of the initial distribution of rights.EXTERNALITIES 36
37. 37. ACTIVE LEARNING 3Applying CoaseCollectively, the 1000 residents of Green Valleyvalue swimming in Blue Lake at \$100,000.A nearby factory pollutes the lake water, andwould have to pay \$50,000 for non-pollutingequipment.A. Describe a Coase-like private solution.B. Can you think of any reasons why this solution might not work in the real world? 37
38. 38. Why Private Solutions Do Not Always Work 1. Transaction costs: The costs parties incur in the process of agreeing to and following through on a bargain. These costs may make it impossible to reach a mutually beneficial agreement. 2. Stubbornness: Even if a beneficial agreement is possible, each party may hold out for a better deal. 3. Coordination problems: If # of parties is very large, coordinating them may be costly, difficult, or impossible.EXTERNALITIES 38
39. 39. CHAPTER SUMMARY An externality occurs when a market transaction affects a third party. If the transaction yields negative externalities (e.g., pollution), the market quantity exceeds the socially optimal quantity. If the externality is positive (e.g., technology spillovers), the market quantity falls short of the social optimum. 39
40. 40. CHAPTER SUMMARY Sometimes, people can solve externalities on their own. The Coase theorem states that the private market can reach the socially optimal allocation of resources as long as people can bargain without cost. In practice, bargaining is often costly or difficult, and the Coase theorem does not apply. 40
41. 41. CHAPTER SUMMARY The government can attempt to remedy the problem. It can internalize the externality using corrective taxes. It can issue permits to polluters and establish a market where permits can be traded. Such policies often protect the environment at a lower cost to society than direct regulation. 41