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Colaboración para la revista internacional de analistas Foreknowledge

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  • foreknowledge Essential Resources for Intelligence Analysts Issue Six December 2012 www.foreknowledge.info ISSN 2225-5613 Intelligence planning: finding your way through a sea of puzzle pieces Intelligence analyst recruitment woes Intelligence analysis research 2013 intelligence conferences A cool tool for your Xmas stocking Necesidades informativas en la planeficación: KIT’s and PIR’s
  • Contents Editor: Dalene Duvenage From the editor 3 Intelligence planning: finding your way through a sea of puzzles 4 Publisher: 4Knowledge Analysis Solutions PO Box 40467 Know your client Moreleta Park Getting started checklist Pretoria Customer checklist 0044 Concept maps South Africa Problem restatement and redefinition Contributions and advertising enquiries: Necesidades informativas en la planeficación: KIT’s and PIR’s editor@foreknowledge.info Terms of reference Role of analysis in criminal investigations: the preliminary information assessment 10 A cool tool for your Xmas stocking! 11 Teaching intelligence analysts critical thinking skills with learning agents 12 Meet Irene Bashabe from Uganda 13 Intelligence analyst recruitment woes 14 Psychology of intelligence analysis # 6 16 Recent published research in intelligence analysis 18 News 20 Upcoming events 22 What does 2013 hold for Foreknowledge? 23 Advertise in Foreknowledge 24 All photo’s from Shutterstock Disclaimer Views expressed in articles are not necessarily those of 4Knowledge Analysis Solutions cc or of any executive member or director of the endorsing professional organizations unless expressly so stated. Editorial submissions Authors contributing articles to Foreknowledge e-mag grant a licence to the publisher and its contractors from time to time to edit and publish the article electronically or by print or any other media. By contributing to the e-mag authors grant the publisher and its contractors from time to time an indemnity to the fullest extent permitted by law from all liability arising from their work. All authors are responsible for securing permission to use any copyrighted material, including graphics, quotations, and photographs, within their contributions. The publisher and its contractors from time to time disclaim any and all responsibility for copyright violations and any other form of liability arising from the content of the e-magazine or from any material linked to the e-magazine. Contributing authors will be notified immediately of any discovered copyright violations so that such issues may be dealt with promptly. Endorsing organisations: Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts 2 No responsibility or liability will be accepted by the publisher and its contractors from time to time or any associated persons or entities to advertisers for the publication of advertisements that may be inaccurate or found to be contrary to law. 4Knowledge Analysis Solutions CC (the “Publisher”) is the owner of all rights in terms of copyright related to any works embodied in this E-Magazine or its content, save for the works embodied in the advertisements and the literary works embodied in the contributions. Association of Crime and Intelligence Analysts Australian Institute for Professional Intelligence Officers No person may copy, reproduce, make an adaptation of, let, offer for sale or hire, import or export other than for private use, or distribute for purposes of trade the E-Magazine or any part thereof in any manner or form or cause or allow any person to commit any of the aforementioned acts in relation to the E-Magazine or any part thereof; without the express authorisation of the Publisher. The Publisher, Authors and Advertisers reserve their respective rights in and to all works embodied in this E-Magazine. © 4Knowledge Analysis Solutions CC 2011 Cover: Shutterstock All rights reserved December 2012 • Foreknowledge
  • from the editor Editor: Dalene Duvenage, Pretoria, South Africa A wonderful and blessed Festive Season to all our readers! I hope that 2013 will be a prosperous and healthy year for you and your family and that you will achieve many good and worthy things. In our last edition of this year, we share some tools and best practice on how to frame our understanding of an intelligence problem as part of the planning or direction phase of the intelligence process. We also have contributions on the recruitment of intelligence analysts, some IT tools, recent research in intelligence analysis and a section on news and upcoming events. We have published 6 editions of Foreknowledge this year and are grateful for the many well wishes and positive feedback we receive. We would like to continue providing you with an excellent magazine and other resources that serve the needs of intelligence professionals worldwide. We have many more ideas to make this project the go-to for practitioners and scholars alike. Although we would have liked to keep distributing the e-magazine for free, this business model is just not sustainable anymore. We are investigating various possibilities of future funding including subscriptions, donations and crowd funding. If you like what we are doing for the intelligence profes- sion, and have an opinion about funding, please fill in this anonymous, 3 minute survey before 31 January 2013. You can access the survey at https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/foreknowledge. You are also welcome to email me to make suggestions on how we can take Foreknowledge to new heights. Dalene Our contributors in this edition include intelligence professionals writing under pseudonyms as well these experts: Richards Heuer is a veteran intelligence scholar and analyst. He has written numerous books and resides in Monterey, California, USA. He gave us permission to summarise his book, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. December 2012 • Foreknowledge Mario Eybers is a mortgage fraud analyst at First National Bank, Johannesburg, South Africa. He has extensive experience as a crime intelligence analyst both in the private and public sector. Don McDowell (SCCA) received awards for his book Strategic Intelligence: a handbook for practitioners, managers and users, teaches intelligence analysis throughout the world, has a private intelligence distance learning college and is a founding member and fellow of AIPIO. He is from Pambula, NSW, Australia. Juan Pablo Somiedo is from Madrid, Spain where he is a strategic and competitive intelligence specialist. He runs a Spanish blog, on intelligence related issues, Intel Times here. 3
  • planning Intelligence Planning: Finding Your Way through a Sea of Puzzle Pieces Dalene Duvenage Foreknowledge Editor Many intelligence professionals will agree that we do not spend enough time on the starting phase of our intelligence task. The reasons for this are manifold: time pressures, an impatient client, intellectual laziness or arrogance or too many conflicting priorities and pressures on our limited resources etc. The essentials of the first phase of the intelligence “cycle” or process, whether we call it “direction”, “planning” or “tasking”, remain the same: determining who the client/s are and their expectations, understanding the intelligence problem, knowing what we know and don’t know, and frame all these in time, cost and output terms. One step in the planning phase is to understand the nature and extent of the intelligence problem. The puzzle metaphor1 is useful to reflect on what intelligence analysts experience every day. I’ve tweaked and use it extensively in training and consulting to illustrate the cognitive and organisational 4 processes involved in identifying and solving an intelligence problem. A simple problem: finding the missing puzzle piece You’re working on an intelligence problem of when and how many calls your suspects made to each other prior and after the crime. It’s like building a puzzle, either a small and easy or a large and difficult one. You’re working with knowables: planning and collecting information that have discernible clues - you only need to know where to find the missing pieces and then fit them into each other until the image is complete. Even if you don’t cheat with a sampler Pretoria, South Africa of the final picture, you can still get most the pieces and get a pretty good idea of what happened and what the image might mean. When planning with “puzzle” intelligence problems, one should be cautious not to fall in the “more information is better” trap. Due to time constraints, the intelligence analyst should set a strict timeframe to make a judgement call, even if all the puzzle pieces are not yet collected and fitted. Mysteries: a sea of puzzle pieces You’ve been tasked to analyse the impact of youth unemployment on a fragile country’s political, military, economic and social stability in the next 20 years. It’s like rowing in a sea of millions of puzzle pieces in different sizes, colours and shapes, much like the large ocean plastic pollution patches. You have no idea where land is, how far the puzzles pieces stretch, what lies beneath the December 2012 • Foreknowledge
  • planning obvious or whether anyone else is also in the same boat as you. Even worse, some of the “debris” are not puzzle pieces at all, but some other form that you have never seen before. The easy way out is to say that this is too difficult and capitulate by not planning at all, hoping that your client forgets this instruction or that other more urgent or operational needs overtake its importance. Another way of dealing with this type of problem is to become fascinated with the waves of data, often playing around with fantastic big data software tools. You can become overwhelmed with the information overload, and never move beyond your paralysis to proper analysis. Mysteries have no easy answers - if at all. There are just too many unknowable variables and contingent “unintended consequences”. Sometimes what is missing is not even in the form of a puzzle piece but something totally different! The intelligence analyst needs to sense and project into the future to frame the possibilities and December 2012 • Foreknowledge Planning for puzzle mysteries is complex it requires a balance between structured planning, intuitive prodding to sense patterns and collaboration across boundaries uncertainties. Our work is to try and identify those critical variables, explain the dynamic interactions and define future possibilities. In planning for mysteries, we have to remember that we are working with ambiguity and uncertainty. Collecting more information is not going to solve this problem but confound it! Planning for puzzle mysteries is complex. It requires a balance between structured planning and intuitive prodding to sense patterns. It also requires collaboration between experts and other role players and stake holders. We need to tap other people’s lenses and approaches to work through the visible pieces, and looking for those that are beneath the surface. In the following few pages, we offer a few tools and approaches that might assist you in planning more effectively. • Gregory Treverton coined the puzzle and mystery metaphors in 2001 in Rethinking Ntaional Intelligence for an Age of Information in our bookstore here. Other articles on the topic are here and here. 1 5
  • planning Planning is an ongoing process because we adapt our frames as we learn and understand new information. Intelligence products are snapshots of our understanding of the problem at a specific time. It is never the whole truth. Engaging your client in the intelligence process makes sense. Know your client 1 Be aware of his context What are the political and business pressures he has to manage everyday? Which stakeholders and role players demand his energy and attention? Who are waiting in the wings in case he fails to deliver on his mandate? Getting started checklist Richards Heuer and Randolph Pherson From Structured Analytical Techniques for Intelligence Analysis (2011) Available here 2 3 4 5 6 What keeps your client awake at night? What are those issues and priorities that worry him? Make that your focus! Speak to those fears and put it into forewarning context. Everyone wants to look good This does not mean that you should pamper your client and keep bad news away from him. Provide explanations and options or solutions. He would like to present these to his client and look good. Know his preferences Provide your products in the packaging and format that he prefers. Regard every client differently and market your products accordingly. Yes, some of them hate reading! Educate your client Your client needs to know what the limitations of intelligence is and what to expect. Don’t under or overestimate his understanding of the problem. ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● What has prompted the need for the analysis? For example: was it a news report, new intelligence report, or a customer request? What is the key intelligence question that needs to be answered? Why is this issue important and how can analysis make a difference? Has your organization ever answered this question or a similar question before, and what was said? To whom was this analysis delivered, and what has changed since that time? Who is the principal customer? Are this customer’s needs well understood? If not, try to gain a better understanding of the customer’s needs and the style of reporting the customer likes. Are there other stakeholders who would have an interest in the answer to this question? Who might see the issue from a different perspective and prefer that a different question be answered? Consider meeting with others who see the question from a different perspective. Based on first impressions, what are all the possible answers to this question? For example, what alternative explanations or outcomes should be considered before making an analytic judgment on the issue? Based on responses to the previous questions, consider rewording the key intelligence question. Consider adding subordinate or supplemental questions. Generate a list of potential sources or streams of reporting to be explored Reach out and tap the experience and expertise of analysts in other offices or organizations – both within and outside the government – who are knowledgeable on this topic. For example, call a meeting or conduct a virtual meeting to brainstorm relevant evidence and to develop a list of alternative hypotheses, driving forces, key indicators, or important players. December 2012 • Foreknowledge
  • planning CUSTOMER CHECKLIST This checklist helps an analyst tailor the analytic product to the needs of the principal customer. When used appropriately, it ensures that the product is of maximum possible value to this customer. Richards Heuer and Randolph Pherson From Structured Analytical Techniques for Intelligence Analysis (2011) Available here ● Who is the key person for whom the paper is being written? ● ● Will this paper answer the question the customer asked or the question the customer should be asking? If necessary, clarify this before proceeding. What is the customer’s level of tolerance for technical language? How much detail would the customer expect? Can the details be provided in appendices or backup papers? ● Has any structured analytic technique been used? If so, how has it been flagged in the paper? In a footnote? In an appendix? ● Would the customer expect the analyst to reach out to other experts within or outside the Intelligence Community to tap their expertise in drafting this paper? If this has been done, how has their contribution been flagged in the paper? In a footnote? In an appendix? ● To whom or to what source might the customer turn for alternative views on this topic? What data or analysis might others provide that could influence how the customer reacts to what is being prepared in this paper? ● What is the most important message to give this customer? ● How is the customer expected to use this information? ● How much time does the customer have to read this product? How long should the paper be? ● Is it possible to capture the essence of this paper in a few key graphics? ● What format would convey the information most effectively? ● What classification is most appropriate for this paper? Is it necessary to consider publishing the paper at more than one classification level? New! CONCEPT MAPS Concept map of the question: “What is the nature and threat of the use of YouTube by jihadists? and assess counter measures.” Mercyhurst University project here, here and here Katherine Hibbs Pherson | Randolph H. Pherson This user-friendly handbook outlines 20 key questions that all analysts must ask themselves as they prepare to conduct research, generate hypotheses, evaluate information, draft papers, and present analysis. More info at: www.pherson.org Available now on: BUY NOW! December 2012 • Foreknowledge Conceptual modelling, mindmaps, brainstorming, starbursting etc are all related and share one goal: to externalise our thinking on all aspects, issues, factors that relate to the intelligence problem. Once the concept map is drawn, it is easier to identify assumptions, connecting issues ,information gaps and to prioritise. 7
  • planning Problem restatement & redefinition I don’t know what intelligence I want, but I’ll know when I see it! HENRY KISSINGER All of us h a v e e x p e rie n c e o f a c lie n t w h o h e a rd s omet hing , s o m e w h e re a n d is not s u re e x a c t ly w h a t int elligen c e h e w a n t s . A v ague req u ire m e n t is g iv e n , and t y pic a lly , y o u d o n o t hav e ac c e s s t o c la rif y t h e int ellig e n c e n e e d . Problem re s t a t e m e n t is a us ef ul t o o l t o f o c u s t h e int elligen c e o p e ra t io n a n d narrow do w n a ll is s u e s t o t he c rux o f t h e m a t t e r what t he c lie n t n e e d t o know now. From Richards Heuer and Randolph Pherson Structured Analytical Techniques for Intelligence Analysis (2011) and Morgan D Jones The Thinker’s Toolkit (1998) Available here and here Initial question Is China selling ballistic missiles to Iran? Paraphrase without losing the original meaning. It might provide a better foundation for research and Is Iran buying ballistic missiles from China? analysis to get the best answers to the question. Ask “Why”? Or “How?” Until the real issue has surfaced. Why would China sell ballistic missiles to Iran? Because China seeks influence with Iran. Why does China want influence with Iran? Because China wants to reduce US influence in the Persian Gulf region. Why does China want to reduce US influence in the Persian Gulf region? Because China wants to reduce the US influence throughout the world? Final Question: Is China’s sale of military equipment to the Middle East as part of a worldwide strategy to reduce US influence? Broaden the focus: what other issues might be at play here? To what is this connected? Narrow the focus: break down the issue further into component parts. Redirect the focus: Shouldn’t we rather focus on something else ? Turn 180 degrees: Turn the issue on its head and ask the opposite. Is there a partnership between China and Iran? What kinds of ballistic missiles are being sold by China to Iran? Why would Iran want Chinese missiles? How is Iran going to pay for any purchased missiles? Is China buying ballistic missiles from Iran? Misconception: The key part of the intelligence process is the analysis of a specific set of data. Reality: The process of “constructing a frame” is more important. VAST2011 STUDY Assess nee ds of th e In te llig ence Commun ity Id entif y p rob le m are as Steps in the problem definition phase Defining the problem is the 1st phase in the planning process. Throughout the conduct of the overall project, the original problem may be further refined and delineated. Problem definition involves 2 major functions: defining the problem and determining the feasibility of the proposed approach for attackint the problem. Select ten ta tive top ics De lin eate scop e-state: Te rms of ref eren ce, o peration al d ef initions, a ssump tio ns, coord in ation req uired , etc. Ye s No Ye s No No Are there suf ficient resourc es a vailable ? Ye s No 8 Is th ere suf ficient manpower a vailable ? Ye s Jerome Clauser : An Introduction to Intelligence Research and Analysis (2008) BUY NOW! Can th e prop osed ef fo rt be completed in the ti me a vailable ? Are suf ficien t funds a vailable ? Yes Is the p ropo sed e ff ort within the capabi lit ies o f the research er? Y es Sch ed ule su bseq uen t eve nts Download PDF here December 2012 • Foreknowledge
  • planning Necesidades Informativas en la Planificación: KIT’s and PIR’s Juan Pablo Somiedo La fase de dirección y planeamiento es la más importante del ciclo de inteligencia, pues configura todas las demás fases. Las áreas estratégicas se fijan de modo conjunto por los responsables del servicio de inteligencia y de los órganos políticos. Se asesora así a los decisores políticos a la hora de establecer las áreas estratégicas ayudándoles en las lagunas y las incertidumbres que puedan tener. El secretario de defensa de los Estados Unidos durante la administración de George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, reflejó bien esta incertidumbre cuando dijo en una entrevista: “We don´t know what we don´t know”. Por eso la interacción entre el usuario y el director de inteligencia es sumamente importante pero igualmente difícil por razones de tiempo, distancia, dificultades burocráticas y disparidad de rango y funciones. Terms of Reference La definición de las necesidades de información es la parte más importante del proceso y, a menudo, no es tan simple como pudiera parecer. Las KIT,s o necesidades críticas de información suelen formularse en forma de pregunta y podrán variar conforme el decidor va perfilando su plan. A partir de estas necesidades críticas, el personal de inteligencia desarrolla las necesi- dades prioritarias de información o PIR,s. Una vez seleccionadas las PIR,s se procede a asignar personal y recursos a cada una y a establecer un calendario y un orden de prioridad con los plazos de entrega. Se elabora el ICP o Intelligence Collection Plan, que es un plan para recopilar información de todas las fuentes disponibles para dar respuesta a las necesidades mediante la transformación de dichas necesidades en peticiones a los órganos y medios de obtención de información adecuados. Finalmente, el documento que contiene todos los aspectos mencionados relativos al planeamiento de inteligencia es el Plan de Inteligencia o PLINT. En él vienen referidos la evaluación de la situación, la lista de las PIR,s, su delimitación espacial o temática y la estructura y arquitectura de inteligencia. Juan Pablo Somiedo is from Madrid, Spain. He is strategic and competitive intelligence specialist. He runs a Spanish blog, Intel Times here When embarking on a comprehensive intelligence operation, it is always useful to compile a Terms of Reference (ToR). It defines the boundaries of the scope. Include the following: ● State the problem and aim ● State the assumptions/background relating to the subject matter ● State the hypotheses ● Formulate operational definitions where necessary ● Propose a title ● Describe briefly the methodology to be used in collection and analysis ● Describe sources of information ● Indicate time frames ● Indicate resource allocation ● Indicate stake holders and clients of the study Mercyhurst University Wiki projects ToR samples here December 2012 • Foreknowledge 9
  • need2share The role of analysis in criminal investigations Part 3: the Preliminary Information Assessment Mario Eybers I n the previous two articles’ we focused on the role of analysis in criminal investigations. We looked at some characteristics of criminal investigations and projects that are not truly intelligence driven and also discussed those factors that contribute to a successful intelligence or analytical driven investigation. There was also some discussion around score card measuring to evaluate the effectiveness of the information analysis approach during an investigation. In this article we will be focusing on Preliminary Information Assessments and the importance of conducting an initial assessment of information before project kickoff. Prior to any formal investigation or project meetings, the analyst should be given the opportunity to assess all available information. Potential participants in the investigation should also be afforded the opportunity to supply available information to the analyst. Such an assessment would: • assist with the scope and demarcation of the problem; • identify potential information gaps; 10 • afford everybody an opportunity to review available information; The table below provides more detail that can be considered for each of these focus areas. • serve as a departure point for discussion and investigation planning; and The initial assessment of information needs to be documented, preferably in the form of a presentation by the analyst utilising supporting material such as the criminal value chains and scenarios. • assist in structuring subsequent intelligence and investigation activities. This initial assessment should focus on one or more of the following items: 1) Available information, 2) overview of the threat, 3) any information gaps that might exist, 4) criminal cases registered 5) applicable legislation that can be considered by the investigative team and 6) available resources. Note that this initial assessment of information generally does not include any form of analysis and provides only for a general overview of the status quo. Specific analytical products for the project or investigation will be developed once the analytical and investigation plans are approved by the investigating officer or project team. Focus Areas for the Information Assessment Available information Overview of the threat ● A description of available information ● Sources and suppliers of information ● Types of information such as incident type information, confessions, as well as the format in which this information was supplied ● Information that is available but not yet collected for assessment ● Extent of the problem or threat at hand ● Probable risk and exposure to the public and private sector ● Reported and perceived modus operandi ● Geographical location of threat ● List of potential targets and groups where applicable Criminal cases Legislation ● Overview of criminal cases already opened ● Investigation and prosecution status of the criminal cases ● Potential targets identified ● Lists of individuals arrested Information gaps ● List of information gaps identified ● Potential sources of information Resources ● Applicable legislation available to prosecution ● Criminal charges which may be considered at a later stage ● Potential jurisdictional issues. ● List of units or investigating officers currently dealing with the threat ● List of prosecutors currently prosecuting on the threat ● List of private sector organisations and individuals December 2012 • Foreknowledge
  • IT tools A cool tool for your Xmas stocking! Visual Understanding Environment RJG I was staring out of my office window yesterday in wonder of the slopes of Table Mountain, silently contemplating another hot and sunny not-so-white Christmas… Dean Martin melodiously blaring ”Rudolph the Red Nosed Reindeer” out of my iPod…..wondering what old Santa has in store for my old stocking this year. My daydreaming was rudely interrupted by some of the analyst staff debating…or shall I say partaking in heated analytical discourse regarding the benefits of tools for mapping out one’s thoughts or externalizing complex questions. The discussion reminded me of an eggnog procession deliberating the benefits of free range organic eggs together with bourbon, cognac or brandy. In the spirit of the approaching festive season, the editor, fully aware of my propensity for daydreaming to the tunes of Messrs Davis Jnr, Martin and Sinatra (“The Lady is a Tramp” humming in the background), sent me a URL to an interesting website….check it out here! Visual Understanding Environment or VUE for short. It is available for Windows, Linux and Mac operating systems……and…in the spirit December 2012 • Foreknowledge of the festive season…decidedly open source! At first I was expecting a piece of software similar to most mind or concept mapping software. As luck would have it, I was pleasantly surprised – no garden gnomes or trolls here! It was pure witchcraft and a good sprinkle of good old black magic!! ● RSS feeds may be imported and visualized ● CVS files can be imported and joined allowing for semi-automatic linking and clustering of data ● Seasr content analysis within VUE ● Search functionality allows for querying nodes and links and results can be highlighted, hidden or filtered. ● VUE allows dynamic addition and searching of repositories such as Fedora, Flickr, JStor, Museum of Fine Arts Boston, PubMed (NCBI), Sakai, and Wikipedia to name a few Apart from obvious mapping functionality the following additional tools are available within the software: ● VUE allows for the construction of interactive presentations with the ability to zoom any node to full screen mode ● Dynamic Content Mapping which facilitates adding content to maps that aid discovery and understanding via annotation of information So…When You're smiling….VUE in addition is OKI (Open Knowledge Initiative) compliant allowing for the above mentioned searching of digital repositories. It also utilizes the open Calais web service for entity extraction of information in nodes….now Ain’t That A Kick In The Head! Well what do you know…before the moon hits your eye like a big pizza pie it’ll be 2013. Peace and joy to you all over the festive season. Volare! • 11
  • IT tools Teaching Intelligence Analysts Critical Thinking Skills with learning agents Juan Pablo Somiedo E l método LTA es un método creado a propósito para el análisis de inteligencia. Recoge y sintetiza aportaciones de la inteligencia artificial, del jurista John Wigmore, el filosofo de la ciencia Stephen Toulmin y el profesor David Schum. Se aproxima a la resolución de problemas mediante la doble díada ProblemaReducción/ Solución-Síntesis, que es un aterrizaje de las representaciones de Inteligencia Artificial. Hasta ahora reemplazar la experiencia analítica acumulada por los analistas senior una vez que éstos dejaban su puesto o se retiraban era dificultoso, largo y muy costoso. El método LTA intenta ser una ayuda para que los analistas Junior se adapten más deprisa. El método se utilizó con éxito en la Escuela Superior de Guerra de los EE.UU y en varios experimentos con analistas. El mismo nombre del método (Disciple se traduce por Discípulo) sugiere que el analista junior aprende sobre análisis a través de su interacción con la experiencia de otro analista. Y esto es, en efecto, lo que hace LTA. Trata de poner a disposición del analista junior la experiencia directa de los analistas expertos. Disciple-LTA es la base de un agente de software innovador para la enseñanza de los analistas de inteligencia. Este agente, llamado TIACRITIS (Teaching Intelligence Analysts Critical Thinking Skills) contiene estudios de casos y una enorme cantidad de conocimiento sobre evidencias, argumentos y sus propiedades. Es un agente que ayuda a los analistas junior a adquirir los conocimientos, destrezas y habilidades propias de su profesión. Los analistas practican y aprenden a vincular las eviden- cias con las hipótesis a través del razonamiento abductivo, deductivo e inductivo y a establecer las credenciales básicas de la evidencia como son credibilidad y relevancia. El uso de TIACRITIS en los cursos de análisis de inteligencia se hace con el apoyo de un libro de texto que incluye una amplia gama de ejemplos de la utilización del software y ejercicios prácticos de análisis. En la actualidad el profesor Mihai Boicu de la George Mason University es considerado una autoridad en este método e imparte clases de Disciple LTA dentro del Curso de "Aplicaciones Militares de Inteligencia Artificial". También lo es el profesor David Schum, que de igual forma imparte clases en la misma universidad y es un experto en lógica y probabilidad aplicadas al análisis en inteligencia. • George Mason University developed the TIACRITIS web agent and textbook for teaching intelligence analysts the critical thinking skills needed to perform evidence-based reasoning. They are based on a computational theory which views Intelligence Analysis as ceaseless discovery of evidence, hypotheses, and arguments, in a complex world that is changing all the time. TIACRITIS helps students learn about the properties, uses, and marshalling of evidence upon which all analyses rest, through regular practice involving analyses of evidence in both hypothetical and real situations. Read more here, here and here 12 December 2012 • Foreknowledge
  • people Meet Irene Bashabe Manager: Intelligence, Tax Investigations Department, Uganda Revenue Authority What is the role and function of intelligence analysts in the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA)? The Intelligence division aims at proactively deterring tax crime whilst supporting the internal as well as external stakeholders, focusing on an intelligence led Tax compliance approach. The role and function of the intelligence analyst in URA is; ● Develop an understanding of a problem or threat at hand; ● Select appropriate analytic techniques such as link analysis, flow analysis, financial record analysis, telephone toll analysis among others; ● Analyse (process; correlate, select, evaluate and restructure) information gathered from multiple sources, including tax criminal related information; ● Prepare reports detailing intelligence findings and disseminate to clients appropriately. Who are your clients and what type of products do you provide to them? Our intelligence products are disseminated to either the customers who initiated the intelligence requirement or any other stakeholder for whom intelligence has been proactively generated. The clients are both Internal (within the organisation) and external (Outside the organization) including Uganda Revenue Authority Management and staff, other government agencies as well as other tax and revenue agencies. Our products are: ● Target Profiles; ● Strategic Briefs; ● Current Intelligence; ● Management Executive Committee Briefs; ● Commissioner’s Briefs; ● Manager’s briefs ● Threat Analysis; ● Problem Profiles Ivory confiscated by URA in June 2012 ● Derive insights and provide estimates; ● Identify intelligence gaps & threats; ● Maintain analysis systems necessary to review, store, collate, retrieve and disseminate revenue intelligence; December 2012 • Foreknowledge What is your specialist area and what do you do to stay informed and abreast of new developments? ● Collection and analysis of tax related information with a criminal bias ● Training and subscribing to professional bodies in the intelligence field. ● Holding stakeholder engagements/partnerships with organisations, bodies and persons related to intelligence. Cigarette smuggling is the URA’s main tax evasion problem. What are the greatest challenges you face as an intelligence analyst and how do you overcome them? We face several challenges as law enforcement Intelligence analysts and among these are; ● Putting into place a proactive based intelligence collection and analysis functionality; ● Integrity of the information collected from both internal and external sources; ● The application of intelligence analysis techniques in the course of our work ● Effectively managing required Intelligence tasks given limited human resources at hand. What can intelligence analysts do to promote our profession? ● Development of an Intelligence Analyst Curriculum which we have commenced. ● Keeping abreast of the best practices and developments in the intelligence field. • 13
  • opinion Intelligence analyst recruitment woes Don McDowell Managers should take ownership of the recruitment process T here was a time when, as the senior manager of a large intelligence unit, I really looked forward to the recruitment exercises we ran regularly, both for analysts and intelligence officers/collectors. I say this in the past tense simply because I don’t have much enthusiasm or even optimism for intelligence staff recruitment activity these days. Now, I am not a senior manager any more; I have become a global consultant who advises agencies on several continents on everything and anything to do with intelligence and risk analysis practice. And to watch them – sometimes – bumble around with a lack of clarity and purpose de- spite the plethora of new-age recruitment guidelines, is a sight not to enjoy. Recruitment is a serious business with laudable goals. We can usually agree on why we need new people: for replacement or further development of our resource pool of analysts and collectors. But it has become increasingly more difficult to engage managers and supervisors globally in meaningful dialogue about exactly what they’re looking for. Much is written in intelligence literature on the criteria, traits and qualities, education and knowledge, that might or should be applicable. No shortage there. However, getting those in powerful positions to be able to articulate the nexus between one or more such criteria and how they impact on expected job performance, is far more difficult. The exercise should in fact be easy and, in essence, it is: use the same suite of approaches applied in any “needs survey” activity. Shutterstock 14 Shutterstock Don McDowell has nearly 50 years experience in military, national security and law enforcement intelligence. He is the author of the award-winning Strategic Intelligence: a handbook for practitioners, managers and users, a Fellow of AIPIO, former Presdient of AIPIO and former International Director of IAFIE. He runs a private intelligence distance learning college and training consultancy from Pambula, NSW, Australia. See more here and here Identify what you expect of your analysts – not in vague, generic, comfort-zone terms, but in finite detail – based on an expert understanding of precisely what it is that analysts and collectors actually do. Then, and only then, determine what qualities the new recruit needs to bring to the job or, conversely, what skills and techniques could actually be taught to them once in the job. The added cost of this latter approach is twofold: firstly, develop selection criteria that imply an December 2012 • Foreknowledge
  • opinion ability to learn new competencies; secondly, accept your organisation’s responsibility to provide the learning environment and opportunities for the new recruits. Where we seem to start to go wrong or, at least “under-achieve” in the recruitment activity cycle, is to increasingly rely on Human Resource specialists within or outside of the organisation to cull applicants, pre-select those for further consideration, and even conduct the short-list interview. Having spent much of my life becoming and then applying skills in interviewing and interrogation techniques, one lesson remains dominant in my recollection. The interviewer (whoever it is) cannot rely solely on skills as an interviewer … these must, without any doubt, be back up by solid knowledge of the field for which one is interviewing. Frankly, I have only occasionally met HR specialists Shutterstock Very few HR recruitment personnel really understand the requirements of intelligence analysis who know much, if anything, about the life and routines that face analysts and collectors. It is increasingly commonplace in a difficult world economic environment for jobs in intelligence and risk analysis to attract hundreds or even thousands of applicants. This phenomenon is in part fed by the plethora of developing academic courses and technical programs available for career path development in several continents, though not all. Good though this may be, it does regularly provide an increasing pool of people “trained” (though not necessarily tested or experienced) in intelligence-related functions, all eventually hoping to gain a paid position. Recognising this reality, many HR and similar recruitment specialist agencies find it easy to identify possession of an academic qualification in analysis, criminology, criminal justice or the like, as a convenient threshold for weeding out a large proportion of would-be recruits. It is clearly shown by assessing vacancy notices that many agencies prefer to set the bar high, perhaps at a Master’s Degree level A post graduate degree does not equate intelligence analysis proficiency. or even higher, with the expectation that the short-list numbers will drop to a manageable level, and that all applicants will quite possibly be of a high quality in view of their qualifications. All this, without any demonstrably rigorous examination of the various curricula, the quality of the applicants’ awards, the realism of their assignment challenges, nor of their individual results when seen against the expectations of a future job. My advice? Return back to basics and conduct for yourself a proper Needs Survey. Who do you need? To do what? Which skills, techniques and competencies rank as essential, should-haves and couldhaves? What can be taught inhouse as opposed to hoping to buy in everything you need? Get this right first and, only then, consider how to match your needs in finite detail against what the employment market can offer. Short-listing for the sake of having a limited number to finally consider for selection is understandable. But doing so using the artifice of pre-qualification – unless it is in and of itself absolutely essential – is delusional. You may well have cut out of the mix people who have lots to offer. Conversely, you may well include in the short-list mix those who are good students, perhaps excellent, but who have not yet demonstrated any ability to take their place in your workforce. Think it over carefully ! • December 2012 • Foreknowledge 15
  • thinking Psychology of intelligence analysis Richards Heuer There are still thousands of intelligence analysts and their managers who have not yet read the seminal Psychology of Intelligence Analysis by Richards Heuer. We will carry excerpts from the book’s chapters in each edition of Foreknowledge. This is an excerpt of chapter 4 on Strategies for Analytical Judgment - comparing with historic situations. You can also download the entire book here. Comparison with Historical Situations A third approach for going beyond the available information is comparison. An analyst seeks understanding of current events by comparing them with historical precedents in the same country, or with similar events in other countries. Analogy is one form of comparison. When an historical situation is deemed comparable to current circumstances, analysts use their understanding of the historical precedent to fill gaps in their understanding of the current situation. Unknown elements of the present are assumed to be the same as known elements of the historical precedent. Thus, analysts reason that the same forces are at work, that the outcome of the present 16 situation is likely to be similar to the outcome of the historical situation, or that a certain policy is required in order to avoid the same outcome as in the past. Comparison differs from situational logic in that the present situation is interpreted in the light of a more or less explicit conceptual model that is created by looking at similar situations in other times or places. It differs from theoretical analysis in that this conceptual model is based on a single case or only a few cases, rather than on many similar cases. Comparison may also be used to generate theory, but this is a more narrow kind of theorizing that cannot be validated nearly as well as generalizations inferred from many comparable cases. Reasoning by comparison is a convenient shortcut, one chosen when neither data nor theory are available for the other analytical strategies, or simply because it is easier and less time-consuming than a more detailed analysis. A careful comparative analysis starts by specifying key elements of the present situation. The analyst then seeks out one or more historical precedents that may shed light on the present. Frequently, however, a historical precedent may be so vivid and powerful that it imposes itself upon a person's thinking from the outset, conditioning them to perceive the present primarily in terms of its similarity to the past. This is reasoning by analogy. As Robert Jervis noted, "historical analogies often precede, rather December 2012 • Foreknowledge
  • thinking than follow, a careful analysis of a situation." The tendency to relate contemporary events to earlier events as a guide to understanding is a powerful one. Comparison helps achieve understanding by reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar. In the absence of data required for a full understanding of the current situation, reasoning by comparison may be the only alternative. Anyone taking this approach, however, should be aware of the significant potential for error. This course is an implicit admission of the lack of sufficient information to understand the present situation in its own right, and lack of relevant theory to relate the Comparison helps achieve understanding by reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar present situation to many other comparable situations The difficulty, of course, is in being certain that two situations are truly comparable. Because they are equivalent in some respects, there is a tendency to reason as though they were equivalent in all respects, and to assume that the current situation will have the same or similar outcome as the historical situation. This is a valid assumption only when based on in-depth analysis of both the current situation and the historical precedent to ensure that they are actually comparable in all relevant respects. Ernest May found that because of reasoning by analogy, US policymakers tend to be one generation December 2012 • Foreknowledge behind, determined to avoid the mistakes of the previous generation. They pursue the policies that would have been most appropriate in the historical situation but are not necessarily well adapted to the current one. Policymakers in the 1930s, for instance, viewed the international situation as analogous to that before World War I. Consequently, they followed a policy of isolation that would have been appropriate for preventing American involvement in the first World War but failed to prevent the second. Communist aggression after World War II was seen as analogous to Nazi aggression, leading to a policy of containment that could have prevented World War II. More recently, the Vietnam analogy has been used repeatedly over many years to argue against an activist US foreign policy. For example, some used the Vietnam analogy to argue against US participation in the Gulf War - a flawed analogy because the operating terrain over which battles were fought was completely different in Kuwait/Iraq and much more in our favor there as compared with Vietnam. May argues that policymakers often perceive problems in terms of analogies with the past, but that they ordinarily use history badly: “When resorting to an analogy, they tend to seize upon the first that comes to mind. They do not research more widely. Nor do they pause to analyze the case, test its fitness, or even ask in what ways it might be misleading.”1 As compared with policymakers, intelligence analysts have more time available to "analyze rather than analogize." Intelligence analysts tend to be good historians, with a large number of historical precedents available for recall. The greater the number of potential analogues an analyst has at his or her disposal, the greater the likelihood of selecting an appropriate one. The greater the depth of an analyst's knowledge, the greater the chances the analyst will perceive the differences as well as the similarities between two situations. Even under the best of circumstances, however, inferences based on comparison with a single analogous situation probably are more prone to error than most other forms of inference. The most productive uses of comparative analysis are to suggest The most productive uses of comparative analysis are to suggest hypotheses and to highlight differences, not to draw conclusions. hypotheses and to highlight differences, not to draw conclusions. Comparison can suggest the presence or the influence of variables that are not readily apparent in the current situation, or stimulate the imagination to conceive explanations or possible outcomes that might not otherwise occur to the analyst. In short, comparison can generate hypotheses that then guide the search for additional information to confirm or refute these hypotheses. It should not, however, form the basis for conclusions unless thorough analysis of both situations has confirmed they are indeed comparable. Ernest May, `Lessons' of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). 1 17
  • Research RECENT PUBLISHED RESEARCH IN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS Organisational culture and intelligence analysis Nicolas Paul Hare and Paul Collinson, (2012), Organisational culture and intelligence analysis: A perspective from senior managers in the Defence Intelligence Assessments Staff in Public Policy and Administration 31 October, 2012 $ here We highlight some key elements of the organisational culture of structures engaged in all-source intelligence analysis and draw on a preliminary survey of a small cadre of senior managers in the Defence Intelligence Assessments Staff (DIAS). This suggests that DIAS has a strong identity and value system, and that it is introspective and somewhat averse to change. Physical and demographic isolation, and intrinsic factors such as the nature of the job and the personalities attracted to it also play a part. The continued impetus towards a more customer-facing culture appears to carry both costs and benefits in terms of the kinds of tasks at which the organisation is likely to excel. • 18 Structuring intelligence organisations Extended participation in intelligence production Andrew D. Brunatti, (2012), The architecture of community: Intelligence community management in Australia, Canada and New Zealand in Public Policy and Administration 26 November 31, 2012 $ here Kira Vrist Rønn (2012), Democratizing Strategic Intelligence? On the feasibility of an objective, decision-making framework when assessing threats and harms of organized crime in Policing 23 November 2012 $ here The study of the interdepartmental architecture that is meant to coordinate intelligence communities has been peripheral at best. This is especially true in the case of smaller states, such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Examination of the development of intelligence community management architecture in these countries reveals that actors in all three communities recognise networks of interdependency between them. However the extent to which they are able to exploit these interdependencies is dependent on larger dynamics in government, supporting the idea that intelligence communities can only be as cohesive as the governments they serve allow them to be. • In this article, I focus on methodologies used for threat and harm assessments of organized crime. I present three general and interrelated objections concerning this endeavour: (1) conceptual vagueness, (2) inherent subjectivity, and (3) incommensurability. I introduce two types of suggestions for how to overcome these objections: categorical and conditional suggestions. I argue that a participatory approach to the methodology of threat and harm assessments, via inclusion of interests and values from an extended peer-community, e.g. when designing methodologies, may render strategic intelligence more reliable. • December 2012 • Foreknowledge
  • Research What is published in intelligence? Miron Varouhakis (2013), What is Being Published in Intelligence? A Study of Two Scholarly Journals in International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Volume 26, Issue 1, 2013 here A total of 924 articles that were published since 1992 in the CIA’s unclassified Studies in Intelligence and the International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence were reviewed to map out a geography of knowledge gaps and identify underdeveloped research areas that are fertile for growth. The study shows how slow and difficult it has been to bring scholastic study of intelligence into the public domain. One finding was that the two journals only published 59 articles (6.4%) with an intelligence analysis focus. • Please assist with my research! Jean Perois, CPP, PSP writes: Assessing Uncertainty in Intelligence I am currently enrolled in a PhD programme with the University of Leicester (UK) in Political Science/ International Relations. The title of my thesis is: What realism from which future? A search for an international security forecasting model. Phong H. Nguyen, Supporting Analytical Reasoning and Presentation with Analytic Provenance. Middlesex University. Paper here Analytic provenance research tries to understand a user’s reasoning process by examining their interactions with a visual analytic system. Visual analytics is the science of analytical reasoning facilitated by interactive visual interfaces. Besides understanding the user’s reasoning process, many benefits can also be gained from analytic provenance such as recalling the analysis process, reusing performed analyses, supporting evidence in constructing the reasoning process, and facilitating I test the capacity of Realism – the oldest and most prominent theoretical paradigm in international relations – to provide the best framework for international affairs forecasting. This article addresses the challenge of managing uncertainty when producing estimative intelligence. Much of the theory and practice of estimative intelligence aims to eliminate or reduce uncertainty, but this is often impossible or infeasible. This article instead argues that the goal of estimative intelligence should be to assess uncertainty. Supporting Analytical Reasoning Jeffrey A. Friedman and Richard Zeckhauser (2012), Assessing Uncertainty in Intelligence, HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP12-027, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University here ● How forecasting practitioners perceive the constraints surrounding the search for an international security forecasting model, By drawing on a body of nearly 400 declassified National Intelligence Estimates as well as prominent texts on analytic tradecraft, this article argues that current tradecraft methods attempt to eliminate uncertainty in ways that can impede the accuracy, clarity, and utility of estimative intelligence. By contrast, a focus on assessing uncertainty suggests solutions to these problems and provides a promising analytic framework for thinking about estimative intelligence in general. • I would like Foreknowledge readers to contribute to my thesis by completing the anonymous 20 minute survey here to answer the following questions: ● The nature of the forces and variables acting on the model and how to weigh them, ● The importance of personal biases and assumptions in simulated interactions, and ● Whether analysts/ forecasters think that such a model is achievable or simply too complex to envision. The survey can be accessed on https://www.surveymonkey.co m/s/Forecasters. All participants will be entitled to a copy of the results, so you might also benefit from it! Thank you in advance for your participation. collaboration between colleagues including dissemination, discussion and presentation. • December 2012 • Foreknowledge 19
  • nice2know Pentagon’s mobile intel centre The US Defense Department’s Domestic Mobile Integrated GeospatialIntelligence System (DMIGS), is a 44foot long vehicle shaped a bit like a fire truck. It carries generators and a 2.4meter wide satellite dish antenna and has room for up to six analysts to work. They can update the Homeland Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP), a common operational baseline of geospatial data, with the data coming in for people on-site. This information is then sent out to the mobile devices of emergency response teams so they can have a clearer picture of what challenges lie ahead of them. It was used during the recent Hurricane Sandy. Mercyhurst’s Kris Wheaton designs game to mitigate cognitive biases Kristan Wheaton, associate professor of intelligence studies at Mercyhurst University designed a tabletop game which identifies and mitigates the six biases that he considers the “worst” for intelligence analysts. In “The Mind’s Lie,” players examine a scenario and then participate in one or more rounds of voting in order to determine the bias most clearly present in the scenario. We will keep you updated on the marketing of the game. More here. International award to UK intelligence analyst The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency’s intelligence analysts and their technical specialists provided most of the support to civil authorities during the recent Hurricane Sandy disaster. They took photos, infrared and other data from satellites and air planes and built them into remarkably detailed and accurate maps. The maps also mean that police and firemen know what they are likely to encounter when they arrive on the scene, whether it's simple flooding, damaged buildings and ruined or blocked roads. Read more here 20 Amy Parsons, an intelligence analyst with the Major Investigation Department of Staffordshire Police, UK, received an award from the International Association of Women Police (IAWP) this year for her excellent work in contributing to securing guilty convictions. Her comprehensive storybook that brought together all the strands of evidence into a shooting case was lauded by High Court Judge, Sir Timothy Holroyd as “the best that I have ever seen in my many years as a judge”. See more here and here. Read the US National Intelligence Council’s 2030 Global Trends Report here that provides a conceptual framework to look at the future and what this might mean for the intelligence community. They identify 4 megatrends, 6 game changers and 4 future worlds or possible scenarios. Might assist you with your strategic analysis! December 2012 • Foreknowledge
  • nice2know The 7 Habits of Highly Successful Intelligence Analysts From Digimind.com Be Organized and Disciplined Today, we still live largely in the world where intelligence is defined as “secrets;” tomorrow, we will either embrace a new understanding of intelligence and knowledge, or risk marginalizing analysts from this century’s knowledge revolution and hence fail to serve policy makers as effectively as possible. Intelligence and National Security Alliance Rebalance Taskforce Report October 2012 here Great analysts must have the discipline to approach each task in an orderly and scientific manner so they can reproduce the results and show what led them to their conclusions. Communicate with Confidence, Clarity and Credibility Present thoughts or ideas in a clear and concise manner so that the untrained can understand what is being presented. Find Meaningful Patterns in Meaningless Noise Project the patterns that emerge forward and predict, within a reasonable accuracy, what will happen next or at some time in the future. Adopt a Patient, Methodical Approach 1 2 3 4 Have the vision to see patterns develop early in the process and wait until the pattern becomes clear before announcing it. See the Bigger Picture Climate change as an intelligence priority Despite “climate change” being identified as one of the main future intelligence threats in the next decade (here), the CIA closed its Center on Climate Change and National Security in November 2012. The CIA stated that “work continues to be performed by a dedicated team in a new office that looks at economic and energy matters affecting America’s national security.” The CIA relies mainly on scientists such as the Board on Environmental Change and Society to assist in this task. See their report here They are not afraid to stick by their convictions when the odd outlying data point seems to throw the pattern off. They recognize it for what it is and factor it into the overall picture. Be Flexible and Responsive to Change 5 6 They can recognize when they are headed down the wrong path and have the foresight to change direction when the pattern deviates from what is expected due to unforeseen forces or events. Learn from Mistakes They recognize when they have erred and are free to admit they got it wrong. They learn from experience and experience is what you get when you don’t get it right the first time. 7 Intel analysis chief accused of subversion The Gambian National Intelligence Agency’s Analysis Director Ousman Bojang has been detained for several months and is accused of agreeing to provide a sketch plan of pres Jammeh’s residences to Gambian dissidents. Jammeh is accused of fabricating coup stories against members of the security forces to sow seeds of discord amongst service chiefs for his own political survival. See more here December 2012 • Foreknowledge 21
  • events April 2013 January 2013 Brunel University Seminar: International Studies Association Annual Convention Intelligence and the cyber environment 2-6 April 2013 San Francisco, US 25-26 January 2013 Uxbridge, England Information here Information here IALEIA/LEIU Annual Training Conference 8-12 April 2013 Chicago, US Information here discuss May 2013 share Aberystwyth University CIISS Conference Past, present and future of Intelligence collabo rate July 2 013 23-25 May 2013 Gregynog Hall, Wales, UK Information here International Association for Intelligence Education Conference Deadline for submissions 15 February 2013 Australian Institute for Professional Intelligence Officers (AIPIO) 24-26 July 2013 Canberra, Australia Information here 20-23 May 2013 El Paso, Texas, US Information here 22 December 2012 • Foreknowledge
  • WHAT DOES 2013 HOLD FOR FOREKNOWLEDGE? Do our survey! WE WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE THE E-MAGAZINE AND EVEN EXTEND OUR OFFERINGS ON THE WEBSITE.. Foreknowledge e-magazine has established itself the last year as the essential resource for intelligence analysts over the world. However, we need an annual operating budget of at least US$30,000 to continue and embark on new initiatives to make this truly the hub of all things related to intelligence analysis. Please take the time to do our anonymous online survey by 31 January 2013. The results will assist us to strategise the way forward. Any suggestions? Contact editor here! December 2012 • Foreknowledge Do our survey here! 23
  • Advertise in Foreknowledge! Intelligence research and analysis services on Africa’s political, economic and criminal threats Reach your target market of 1000’s intelligence professionals throughout the world! *** Publishers of Foreknowledge magazine *** Assistance with establishing intelligence units *** Intelligence information management and systems *** Intelligence training & curriculum development to more than 70 military, intelligence, security, law enforcement, compliance and risk clients in Africa Circulation Our 4 editions already had thousands of readers reached through the following marketing streams: ● As a PDF to our existing database of 1500 intelligence professionals, managers, scholars, students etc all over the world who distribute it further in their agencies and companies, running the readership into tens of thousands. ● Our website: 11,500 visits from 106 countries since 1 February 2012 ● 23,000 readers of the Flash version of the emagazine. ● Our endorsing professional organizations’ members-only list serves and communication channels. ● The Pass-On Rate from these contact persons within agencies to their colleagues runs into the tens of thousands. Due to our profession’s secrecy protocols, it is impossible to gauge the exact number of readers. Rates from $1000 for full page to $200 for smalls! Get our media pack here Contact Dalene Duvenage at editor@foreknowledge.info www.4knowledge.co.za 24 December 2012 • Foreknowledge