Colaboración Juan Pablo Somiedo Foreknowledge issue3r


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La teoría del conocimiento y el Ciclo de Inteligencia

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Colaboración Juan Pablo Somiedo Foreknowledge issue3r

  1. 1. foreknowledge Toolbox: Red Hat analysis Make your message compelling! Should we kill the intelligence cycle? Essential Resources for Intelligence Analysts ISSN 2225-5613June 2012 Issue Three Text mining Bob Heibel - intelligence analysis education pioneer Analysis software that also cooks? Meet an FIU analyst Let’s reduce friction in Intelligence dissemination
  2. 2. 2 June 2012 • Foreknowledge Contents Editor: Dalene Duvenage Publisher: 4Knowledge Analysis Solutions PO Box 40467 Moreleta Park Pretoria 0044 South Africa Contributions and advertising enquiries: Views expressed in articles are not necessarily those of 4Knowledge Analysis Solutions cc or of any executive mem- ber or director of the endorsing professional organizations unless expressly so stated. Editorial submissions Authors contributing articles to Foreknowledge e-mag grant a licence to the publisher and its contractors from time to time to edit and publish the article electronically or by print or any other media. By contributing to the e-mag authors grant the publisher and its contractors from time to time an indemnity to the fullest extent permitted by law from all liability arising from their work. All authors are responsible for securing permission to use any copyrighted material, including graphics, quotations, and photographs, within their contributions. The publisher and its contractors from time to time disclaim any and all re- sponsibility for copyright violations and any other form of lia- bility arising from the content of the e-magazine or from any material linked to the e-magazine. Contributing authors will be notified immediately of any discovered copyright viola- tions so that such issues may be dealt with promptly. No responsibility or liability will be accepted by the publisher and its contractors from time to time or any associated per- sons or entities to advertisers for the publication of adver- tisements that may be inaccurate or found to be contrary to law. 4Knowledge Analysis Solutions CC (the “Publisher”) is the owner of all rights in terms of copyright related to any works embodied in this E-Magazine or its content, save for the works embodied in the advertisements and the literary works embodied in the contributions. No person may copy, reproduce, make an adaptation of, let, offer for sale or hire, import or export other than for private use, or distribute for purposes of trade the E-Magazine or any part thereof in any manner or form or cause or allow any person to commit any of the aforementioned acts in relation to the E-Magazine or any part thereof; without the express authorisation of the Publisher. The Publisher, Authors and Advertisers reserve their respec- tive rights in and to all works embodied in this E-Magazine. © 4Knowledge Analysis Solutions CC 2011 All rights reserved Disclaimer Endorsing organisations: Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts Association of Crime and Intelligence Analysts Australian Institute for Professional Intelligence Officers From the editor 3 Should we kill the intelligence cycle? 4 The UK MoD Core functions of intelligence paradigm El ciclo de intelligencia y la teoria del conocimiento Pulling the plug on the intelligence cycle - where is counterintelligence? Bob Heibel: pioneer of intelligence analysis 10 education Analysis software that also cooks? 11 Analyst toolbox 12 Red hat analysis Applying red hat analysis to radicalised individuals Make your message compelling! Intelligence analytics: Text mining The effective analyst: attitudes 17 Let’s reduce friction in intelligence 18 dissemination Psychology of intelligence analysis # 3 20 Meet a Financial Intelligence Unit analyst 22 Upcoming conferences 23 We’d love to serve u better - click here to take our anonymous survey!
  3. 3. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 3 Dalene Douglas Bernhardt is an author and visiting lecturer at various South African universities and Mercyhurst University in the US in Competitive Intelligence. Tony Nolan is a risk, intelli- gence and analysis officer in the Australian government. Georgia Holmer is acting direc- tor of the Washington DC based Forum Foundation for Analytic Excellence. Janet Evans is Associate Investigator, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australia Editor: Dalene Duvenage, Pretoria, South Africa When you read this 3rd edition of Foreknowledge, you would be one of thousands of analysts and managers across all the intelligence domains in 89 countries who have read our previous editions thus far. Thank you for your enthusiasm and support - we’ve heard from agencies that distrib- ute it to all units, universities that use the magazine in class exercise, while a Canadian inter agency group of analysts discusses the articles during their knowledge sharing sessions. In our 3rd edition we focus on the debate surrounding the intelligence cycle and discuss the different opinions and ask practi- tioners to join in. We also look at Red Hat Analysis in the Analyst Toolbox and look at distribution and for- matting of our intelligence reports. We meet Bob Heibel, the former FBI special agent who became a change agent when he pioneered the first intelligence analysis qualification in the world at Mercyhurst Col- lege 20 years ago. Is link software the sum total of your knowledge on software? We start with a series fo- cusing on intelligence software issues in laymen's terms in this issue. Remember to do our survey so that we can serve your needs better. Our contributors in this edition include intelligence professionals writing under pseudonyms as well these experts: From the editorFrom the editor Richards Heuer is a veteran intelligence scholar and ana- lyst. He has written numer- ous books and resides in Monterey, California, USA. He gave us permission to summarise his book, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Juan Pablo Somiedo is from Madrid, Spain where he is a strategic and competitive intelligence specialist .
  4. 4. 4 June 2012 • Foreknowledge need2share Should we kill the intelligence cycle? … and why should practitioners care? "When it came time to start writing about in- telligence, a practice I began in my later years at the CIA, I realized that there were serious problems with the intel- ligence cycle. It is really not a very good descrip- tion of the ways in which the intelligence process works." Arthur Hulnick, 2006 What's wrong with the Intelligence Cycle Many academia and only a few practitioners have written and de- bated about the (in)famous cycle, most of them agreeing that it doesn’t really reflect 21st century reality, and as such can not be seen as a model of the intelligence proc- ess or functions in our complex world. Kris Wheaton of Mercyhurst University definitely raised the stakes in the debate last year when he blogged that we should kill the intelligence cycle. In this edition we look at why such “murderous” terms have crept into the debate. The debate Philip Davis and Kristian Gustafson1 divide the discussants in the intelligence cycle debate in 2 groups: the conceptualists (those that see the intelligence cycle as a conceptual model of intelligence activities), while the proceduralists sees it as an attempt to map the processes in intelligence. Dalene Duvenage The first group view the intelli- gence cycle as a heuristic concept that describes the interaction be- tween different activities and does not fret a lot on whether this is a true reflection of reality, as it never was meant to be one. On the other hand, the procedural- ists absolutely hates the traditional cycle that was created in the 1940’s and have designed variants on the cycle or created new models based on systems and cybernetics theo- ries: nested cycles, cycles-within- cycles, sensemaking loops, feed- back loops, crisscrossing diagrams, web diagrams, models for positive intelligence, models for counterin- telligence, models for law enforce- ment intelligence, models based on work study practices… the list goes on.. But is this relevant to practition- ers? I know very few of the practition- ers reading this article really cares about the intelligence cycle and the debate on whether it is relevant or not. Because for you it is irrelevant. You’re too busy catching criminals, preventing terrorist attacks or out- witting your competitors. Most probably, the last time you saw and maybe thought about the intelligence cycle was during your intelligence training. You might dismiss the academic debate as eso- teric navel-gazing, far removed from your reality. But, you are dead wrong. The debate resonates with practi- tioner’s day-to-day frustrations - it reflects the dissonance you experi- ence with what “is supposed to be” and “what is” - between the out- dated intelligence functions, struc- tures and processes and the fast moving transnational threats and challenges we have to face and ana- lyse everyday. Intelligence, like so many other dis- ciplines, is in a precarious position: very little of what we know and have institutionalised the last 60 -70 years is still relevant today, or will be tomorrow. Quite a few classic tradecraft principles and practices will stay relevant, no matter in what age, government system or intelligence domain we operate. But most of what we do and why
  5. 5. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 5 need2share Few intelligence practitioners are aware or interested in the intensified debate among intelligence scholars on the intelligence cycle. For them, the cycle and the discussion about its future is irrelevant. But if practitioners are serious about the intelligence profession, they must be aware and become involved in the debate and recognise that the debate can improve intelligence practice. In this edition, we try to bridge this gap between academia and practitioners by highlighting some dimensions of this important debate. we do it, are, and will be challenged by our new realities. We have to relook, revisit, invent, innovate - and that is the task of practitioners and academia alike. The theoretical “kill the Intelligence cycle” debate has a practical grounding, and the outcome of the debate will in turn have implica- tions in the practitioner’s reality. What is the value of the debate? The debate is important because it forces us to re-examine what we are doing and why we are doing it when we are doing it. Will we ever find one model that satisfies every- one’s prescriptions and require- ments? Definitely not! But the debate makes us mindful and self-aware of what could go wrong in the interaction between planning, tasking, collection, analy- sis, and distribution. It helps us to seek for better strate- gies and processes to make intelli- gence more effective. It helps us to find a common vocab- ulary and understanding of the complexities of our cognitive proc- esses and organizational dynamics. The debate also strengthens the growth of the intelligence analysis discipline and its body of knowl- edge. Should we kill the intelligence cy- cle? This question is as loaded and mul- ti-faceted as the question “Should we have the death penalty?” Maybe the question here should rather be: “Can you contribute to the debate about the intelligence cycle , its use- fulness and relevancy?” In this, and following editions, we will introduce key aspects of the different viewpoints and models, hopefully challenging you to inves- tigate them and maybe come up with your own model or opinion. ● 1 The Intelligence Cycle is Dead, Long Live the Intelligence Cycle: Rethinking an Intelligence Fundamental for a New Intelligence Doctrine. ISA Conference paper. April 2012. Will we ever find one model that satisfies everyone’s prescriptions and require- ments? Definitely not!
  6. 6. 6 June 2012 • Foreknowledge In practical terms, the core func- tions communicated back and forth and across the ‘cycle’ rather than steps in a sequence, the rela- tionships between the various principal intelligence activities were best visualised as a network of dialogues and sometimes short- circuits across the whole intelli- gence framework. Any two, three or even all four functions could be ‘wired together’ in different, often spontaneous ways. The final visual representation of the core functions paradigm pre- sented in the final doctrine docu- ment was essentially that the enhanced core functions topology that is, with the ‘latent’, traditional intelligence cycle marked out sep- arately and the newer core func- tions topology inscribed within the cycle. The only notable altera- tion to the network topology was superimposition of the Jack Re- port’s continuous review process At the recent International Studies Association conference in San Di- ego, Prof Philip Davies of the Brunel University’s Centre for In- telligence and Security Studies de- scribed the process of developing a new Joint military doctrine for the UK MOD in 2010 and 2011, in which the debate surrounding the intelligence cycle led the task team to propose a new heuristic or con- ceptual representation of the intel- ligence functions and not processes. He stressed the point that no dia- gram can effectively depict the in- telligence processes, but that it is possible to attempt to draw a func- tional model. Their task team agreed that the core functions paradigm was more than a cycle, and that the tradi- tional intelligence cycle could be subsumed by it. Therefore, the next question was how to most usefully represent the ‘logical inter-relationships’ be- tween direction, collection, processing and dissemination. It was concluded that what was re- quired was an alternative topology, and that the most useful topologi- cal representation was as an all- channel network. While the intelligence cycle out- wardly appears a simple process, in reality it is a complex set of ac- tivities. It is a continuous process comprising many cycles operating at different levels and speeds. Al- though the 4 individual tasks are discrete, as information flows and is processed and disseminated as intelligence, the tasks overlap and coincide so that they are often con- ducted concurrently, rather than sequentially. The UK Ministry of Defence’s “Core functions of intelligence paradigm” From the conceptual school of thought by scholars over the horizontal and vertical cross-connections in the centre of the diagram. It is a logical and methodical process intended to get the best available intelligence to the commander, but it should not be seen as prescriptive. It will always be imperfect, but decision-making has risks and the imperfect nature of the intelli- gence product must be factored in. Davies concluded that the new model satisfied the ‘old guard’ in- telligence cycle advocates while also meeting the concerns of ‘radi- cal’ critics by making the differ- ence between principle (concepts) and practice (process) explicit, and providing for separate articulation of procedural specifics at a differ- ent (and more appropriate) doctri- nal level. ● Become an ISA member to access Davies and Gustafson’s paper. need2share
  7. 7. 7 June 2012 • Foreknowledge need2share En la actualidad el ciclo de inteligencia pensado por “Sher”, como le llamaban sus colegas más cercanos, está siendo puesto en duda. Algunos analistas dudan de su utilidad en un mundo que ha ev- olucionado hacia notas y caracterís- ticas muy diferentes de las que pudo ver aquél profesor. Cierta- mente desde el punto de vista de Kent, el ciclo de inteligencia es, a priori, un enfoque convencional de resolución de problemas, es decir, opera desde la pregunta (problema) hacia la respuesta (solución). El flu- jo que establece es lineal y resoluble y esto no se corresponde con los procesos cognitivos que ocurren en el razonamiento humano ni con una visión compleja de la realidad que, desde luego, es no lineal y no resol- uble. En el intento de linealizar problemas no lineales a través del ciclo de inteligencia están muchas de las carencias que plantea la disci- plina. Muchas veces, es el analista quien debe buscar el problema para, en un momento posterior, encontrar la solución. Los decisores no siempre saben cuáles son los problemas re- ales a los que se tienen que enfren- tar. Como Donald Rumsfeld, afirmó en una entrevista: “We don´t know what we don´t know”. De esta for- ma, frecuentemente son los analis- tas de inteligencia quienes tienen que asesorar a los decisores sobre dónde deberían centrar su atención. Henry Kissinger decía que desconocía qué productos de la in- teligencia necesitaba, pero que los reconocía cuando los veía en la me- sa de su despacho. En la película clásica “El hombre invisible” de James Whale, basada en la novela de H.G. Wells, el pro- tagonista descubre un método para volverse invisible (que lo convierte en asesino). Al final, la policía lo descubre por las pisadas que deja sobre la nieve. Esta analogía puede servirnos para intentar explicar parte del trabajo de un analista. A falta de contar con otra cosa, el analista se ve obligado a buscar las “huellas en la nieve”. Así se dedica a buscar las llamadas “weak signals” o señales débiles, que se definen co- mo “a development about which on- ly partial information is available at the moment when response must be launched, if it is to be completed be- fore the development impacts on the firm”. Es decir, las señales débiles son elementos que pueden incitar, en el analista atento y sensible a el- las, una sensación de que algo im- portante pudiera estar iniciándose o pudiera ocurrir en un futuro. La idea es que la identificación de las señales débiles permiten a una organización la detección de una amenaza u oportunidad incipiente y, por tanto, reaccionar con mayor rap- idez y eficacia. Posteriormente, algu- nas de esas “weak signals” se convierten en indicadores que pasan a ser monotorizados para su posteri- or seguimiento. Un ejemplo aplicado El Ciclo de Inteligencia y la Teoría Del Conocimiento Juan Pablo Somiedo al mundo de la inteligencia contra- terrorista es el movimiento de los terroristas de una célula a otra. Nor- malmente se interpretan esos mov- imientos como “weak signals” o señales débiles que pueden indicar la preparación de un próximo aten- tado terrorista. El problema es que la experiencia nos demuestra que si queremos ser efectivos no basta con adoptar una actitud pasiva de seguimiento de las mismas variables todo el tiempo. Cada cierto tiempo debemos formu- lar hipótesis de trabajo que nos con- duzcan a establecer nuevas variables de cuyo seguimiento podemos obtener nuevas señales débiles útiles para la organización. Y esto obliga al analista a un continuo trabajo de ac- tualización. Conviene aclarar que lo que se pone en duda no es la arquitectura del cic- lo de inteligencia, que puede ser más o menos viable como marco estruc- tural, sino su rigidez a la hora de lid- iar con determinados problemas. En esta línea estoy de acuerdo con Rob- ert M. Clark cuando afirma que “el ciclo de inteligencia puede describir la estructura y la función de in- teligencia pero no describe el proceso de inteligencia en sí mis- mo.” ●
  8. 8. 8 June 2012 • Foreknowledge Pulling the Plug on the Intelligence Cycle - where Is Counterintelligence? Author: B (practitioner & scholar) In previewing this edition, the April issue of Foreknowledge posed the question “Should we kill the intelli- gence cycle?” From a counterintelli- gence perspective, we may just as well switch off the life support. The cycle, you see, has actually been terminally ill for some time. Its priesthood must now account for a cardinal sin committed in the roughly sixty years of its existence. They persisted in trying to convert- ing us in believing the cycle offers an explanation of intelligence proc- ess. The truth is out – it never ex- plained counterintelligence. If it does not explain counterintelli- gence, it does not explain intelli- gence generally. Attempts to add a few years of artificial life through endless qualifications and cosmetic modifications will not save this pa- tient. Do we have any choice but to pull the plug, do the autopsy, and intensify the quest for alternatives? This, the first of a three-part series, briefly examines a two-fold problem statement. Firstly, what is the intelli- gence cycle and what is expected from it? Secondly, how is the cycle measuring up against this expecta- tion? What is expected from the intelli- gence cycle? The intelligence cycle is a theoretical construct within the process model ‘family’. A model should be an ide- alised, simplified and preferably vi- sual representation of the range of activities that is, applied to this con- text, collectively referred to as the intelligence process. The importance of process models can hardly be over emphasized. These concepts are indispensable in structuring our thinking on intelli- gence. They also condition the way we execute the business of intelli- gence. The following quote from the 2005 WMD report, illustrates this point and summarises what is prob- ably the predominant thinking in intelligence services and agencies internationally: "The process of tasking, collecting, processing, ana- lysing, and disseminating intelli- gence is called the intelligence cycle. The intelligence cycle drives the day-to-day activities of the In- telligence Community". Beautiful oversimplification As is clear from the quote, in its ‘purist’ form the traditional intelli- gence cycle has a beautiful simplici- ty. It comprises of a circular, self-repeating process of the five ‘steps’ cited above. However, from especially the 1990s onwards, pioneering voices in the U.S.A. raised the alarm - something is not quite right. The cycle’s sim- plicity is an oversimplification. It is an oversimplification to the degree that there are disconcerting fissures between theory (the cycle) and practice (the actual way in which intelligence is done). Cycle does not address counterin- telligence Most of these deficiencies have been well documented and are discussed in other contributions to this edition of Foreknowledge. With some excep- tions – notably Hulnick’s (2007) must-read “What’s wrong with the intelligence cycle?” – critiques of the intelligence cycle underplay a The Austrian Armed Forces’ Intelligence Cycle “ Do we have any choice but to pull the plug, do the autopsy, and intensify the quest for alternatives? ” need2share
  9. 9. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 9 fundamental question, namely: Where is counterintelligence in the intelligence cycle? Intelligence is after all seen as com- prising of four major ‘elements’ (al- so referred to as ‘functions’ and ‘disciplines’), namely collection, analysis, covert action and counter- intelligence. Of these collection and analysis feature in the traditional cycle. Counterintelligence, with covert action, are conspicuously ab- sent. If the intelligence cycle does not explain counterintelligence it cannot hold as an intelligence proc- esses model. CI throughout the cycle? To officers starting out their careers – be careful when raising such a point during training. The standard, indignant arrogant response might well be that counterintelligence is performed throughout the cycle. You might be told that counterintel- ligence mirrors the flow of the intel- ligence cycle. Really? No example could be found within consulted Intelligence Stud- ies' literature of an endeavour that feasibly demonstrates the conceptu- al moulding of counterintelligence dynamics with the traditional intel- ligence cycle. Duvenage & Hough (2011) mention attending numerous elaborate pres- entations and lectures on how this ‘counterintelligence-throughout-the- cycle’ concept works. Well, from a counterintelligence perspective, it does not work. Such presentations score high marks for demonstrating Power Point so- phistication and graphic illustra- tions, but fail to convincingly demonstrate the working of the nebulous ‘throughout’/mirror con- cept. Conceptual quagmires They are conceptual quagmires en- deavouring to artificially hammer a square peg (counterintelligence) in- to a round/cyclic hole (intelligence cycle). Omissions, tacit assump- tions, vague references and elabo- rate explanations of counterintelligence fitting in some- where in an (added) exploitation’ phase, being performed throughout the intelligence cycle and/or mirror- ing the intelligence cycle should be seen for what they are. They are all symptomatic fruits of an inability to conceptually inte- grate the fiddly counterintelligence discipline with the intelligence process'. Should we kill the intelligence cycle? The cycle, you see, has actually been terminally ill for some time. From a counterintelligence perspective, we may just as well switch off the life support. Attempts to add a few years of artificial life through endless qualifications and cosmetic modifications will not save this patient. The intelligence cycle is a beautiful oversimplification that has no bearing on reality Take the trouble and study the ori- gin and history of the traditional intelligence cycle. You will be re- warded by seeing the intelligence cycle for what it is and was intend- ed to be - a model explaining the positive intelligence process. By the look of the deficiencies listed in lit- erature, it is no longer particularly successful in this either. It does, in short, not meet that what is expect- ed from such a model. In the forthcoming edition of Fore- knowledge, some ideas will be raised on alternatives. ● Article based on Duvenage, BPC & Hough, M 2011, The conceptual structuring of the intel- ligence and counterintelligence processes : endur- ing holy grails or crumbling axioms - quo vadis, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 29-77. Download here (10MB pdf) need2share
  10. 10. 10 June 2012 • Foreknowledge Share with us your journey to es- tablish intelligence analyst educa- tion in the US. After retirement from the FBI in 1987, an experienced college profes- sor friend and I designed a four- year undergraduate program built on a Liberal Arts foundation that could be initiated using existing courses and thereafter built on with the intelligence topics. After being rejected by three different institu- tions, including my alma mater, I approached Mercyhurst College (now Mercyhurst University) a four-year Liberal Arts Catholic school in Erie, in late 1991. My concept was to create an intelli- gence concentration in Mercyhurst’s history program that would pro- duce graduates who were entry-lev- el qualified as intelligence analysts for government and the private sec- tor. The stars were in alignment. The president of the college, Dr. William P. Garvey, was a true entre- preneur willing to take a chance if the cost was reasonable. After a short study on market potential, he gave the go ahead. We partnered with the history department and by fall term 1992 had recruited 14 stu- dents. Our intelligence studies effort re- mained in the history department until 2004, during which time it grew steadily. Of course, what changed the perception - acceptance Bob Heibel Pioneer of intelligence analysis education of intelligence studies and the de- mand for its graduates - were the events of 9/11. A U.S. Department of Education FIPSE grant of $250,000 in 2004 ena- bled the creation of the Institute for Intelligence Studies at Mercyhurst. The department consisted of an un- dergraduate BA in Intelligence Studies, a Master of Science in Ap- plied Intelligence (approved in 2004), and a series of graduate cer- tificate programs tailored for corpo- rate and government clients. Over the past 20 years the Mercyhurst program has grown to approximate- ly 350 students at the university and another 100-plus online and in Washington, D.C. These resultant skills are recognized by potential employers and allow us to place 90 percent of graduates in a short peri- od of time. Does intelligence analysis educa- tion have a future? I have no doubt that the Mercyhurst intelligence studies model has clear- ly proven that academia has the po- tential to provide qualified entry-level intelligence analysts to government and the private sector. As veteran intelligence professional, Bob Heibel realised the need for an education program that could deliver well-trained analysts to the intelligence community. In 1992, he started the Research/Intelligence Analyst Program (RI/AP) at the Mercyhurst College in Erie, Pennsylvania which has grown into a fully fledged Institute for Intelligence Studies. Twenty years later, the MCIIS’s will celebrate its 20th anniversary this July with a solid reputation and hundreds of graduates employed in law enforcement, national security as well as business/competitive intelligence. What advice would you give to in- telligence analysts regarding pro- fessional development opportunities? They must find some way to main- tain and enhance their skills. Ideally this should be enabled by their em- ployer through a combination of in- house and external training, profes- sional organizations and academic programs. Academia’s role in this will eventually include an ultimate intelligence studies degree and the development of true intelligence re- search institutes, which currently do not exist. ● This model differs from the historic intelligence community approach. Traditionally the IC has sought sub- ject matter experts with advanced degrees and after hiring trained them to be intelligence analysts. The Mercyhurst model challenges that by providing a “generalist” as early as 21 years of age who enters the job market with proven applied skills that allow them to immediate- ly contribute to their employer’s mission. They can then become sub- ject-matter experts as appropriate. There should be room for both ap- proaches. In my opinion, graduat- ing students with proven applied intelligence-related skills are the key to the success of future academ- ic programs. people
  11. 11. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 11 Get used to it as this phenomenon is likely to flare up in the months ahead with software vendors vying for new business opportunities - also in intelligence. Of course you know software cannot cook, neither can it analyse. It requires a mindful human that understands the con- text of the information and the abil- ities of the software to visualise analytical hypotheses. A new vendor landscape Now that a consolidation has taken place in the content management /document management and Busi- ness Intelligence space, vendors will start looking for new growth areas -including intelligence. Big Data is currently a hot topic in the IT world and data warehousing / business intelligence suppliers have realized that this includes not only quantitative or structured but also unstructured and text based data. Some vendors have been quick on the proverbial draw and taken steps to shore up on this front. It may be old news, but IBM has purchased Analysts Notebook (I2), SAP is partnering with Palantir and SAS has settled on Memex. This pro- vides them with opportunities in non-traditional areas. IBM has in- teresting plans for integrating I2 in- to its wider architectural framework. Similarly, Visual Ana- lytics has opened up a new vista for traditional Business Intelligence and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software vendors. Visual analytics and reasoning In a sense, this is good news for in- telligence analysts. Why you ask? The concept of Visual Analytics places you as the analyst in a piv- otal role in the process of making sense of large data sets. This is not to say that software ven- dors necessarily understand the concept of Visual Analytics, which is the science of analytical reason- ing facilitated by highly interactive graphical interfaces. This implies a ) the capability of supporting hy- pothesis driven and exploratory analysis, b) granular drill down ca- pability and, c) does not take days to change or code what you want to see. With Visual Analytics you have to wield the analytical Excalibur – not the software coder or vendor’s pro- fessional service team slaving in the back office. OSINT software OSINT has also sprouted a myriad of software vendors vying for a space at the barbeque. A broad comparison between Visual Analyt- ical and OSINT software systems reveals that they share various processes such as 1) collection, har- vesting and retrieval, 2) data aug- mentation, entity extraction, fusion 3) marshalling and modelling, and 4) visualization in some form of portal, dashboard or graphical rep- resentation. The onus on analysts When using software applications of this nature it is important to real- ize that the efficacy of any tool is negated unless data is pre-analysed in some way - more so if it is un- structured data. This in a sense places the onus on modern analysts to have a good understanding of data structures and working with .CSV and other files types and ap- plications like Excel. I have met too many analysts who are weak in this area and shy away from it as far possible. But most analyst centric software tools re- quire the analyst to import and ma- nipulate the data prior to utilizing analytical functionality. Poor ap- preciation of specifics and intrica- cies relating to importing data into an application will have a profound effect on the presentation thereof which can lead to skewed analysis. Analysts generally want instantane- ous results when working with soft- ware applications. In some cases, this is possible, however, there’s no such thing as a free barbeque. If analysts want to exploit the full capabilities of the new generation of analytical software tools, they will need to be trained in data man- agement, in addition to their usual analytical skill sets. Ok…I’m off to that barbeque. Until the next Foreknowledge! ● This column provides you with news and information of the software and technol- ogy available to help you with your ana- lytical tasks. This includes topic areas such as geo-spatial analysis, link-analysis, social network analysis, intelligence manage- ment systems, tools available to support various structured analytical techniques, crowd sourcing tools, tips and snippets for the preparation of datasets, and infor- mation to help you dealing with IT staff in your organizations and make better deci- sions when buying software. If there are specific topics you want us to cover, you are welcome to forward requests to Ever walked out of a software sales presentation with the distinct impression that the offering can barbeque your steak too? RJG tech … intel software that also cooks?
  12. 12. 12 June 2012 • Foreknowledge toolbox Red Hat Analysis From Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analy- sis by Richards J. Heuer Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson. 2010. experts to put themselves in the adversary’s shoes and sim- ulate how the adversary or group would respond. 3. Emphasize the need to avoid mirror imaging. The question is not “What would you do if you were in their shoes?” but “How would this person or group most likely think/behave/respond to the stimulus?” 4. Individual experts can be as- signed to role-play a specific counterpart in that group, or experts can be tasked with en- suring that all the relevant in- formation relating to each of their areas of responsibility is put on the table. 5. Capture the most likely outcome by: a) making a list of actions the person or group is most likely to take b) describing a conversation where the target or individual talks in the first person or c) drafting a document (set of in- structions, military orders, poli- cy paper, or directives) that the adversary would likely gener- ate. 6. The best outcomes are those that most accurately replicate the actual decision-making process. ● When to Use It Red Hat Analysis works best when trying to predict the behav- iour of a specific person who has the authority to make decisions. Authoritarian leaders as well as small, cohesive groups, such as terrorist cells, are obvious candi- dates. It is much less effective when dealing with a leader who is constrained by a legislature or influenced by conflicting interest groups Value Added Red Hat Analysis is a technique that can 1) help anticipate the de- cision-making of an individual that is difficult to understand or observe; 2) help avoid ethnocen- trism and provide needed cultur- al context; and 3) encourage insights into personal motivations underlying decision-making of an individual. Method 1. Gather a group of experts with in-depth knowledge of the tar- get country, company or group, operating environment, and the senior decisionmaker’s personality, motives, and style of thinking. 2. Present the experts with a situ- ation or a stimulus and ask the Red Hat Analysis falls under the re- framing category of structured ana- lytical techniques. An individual or group can change their mindset or mental model of how things normally work and challenge their own think- ing about the problem, simply by changing the questions it asks or changing the perspective from which it asks them. Red Hat Analysis was designed to help intelligence analysts anticipate the behaviour of an adversary by putting oneself “in their shoes” or putting on “their hat.” To do this ef- fectively, without mirror imaging, requires substantial area and cultural expertise. A person who brings this type of cultural expertise to a group or project is known as a red hatter. Related to this technique are Red Cell and Red Team analysis in which a group “plays the enemy” in an ef- fort to gain strategic insight. A Red Cell is a unit that plays the adversary role in testing the effectiveness of their own government or company’s tactics or personnel in a military ex- ercise or war game. A Red Team is an organizational element comprised of trained and educated members that provide an independent capabili- ty to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations from the per- spective of adversaries and others. A good example of the latter is Helene Lavoix’s Red Team Analysis blog Analyst toolbox
  13. 13. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 13 Applying Red Hat Analysis to understand the radicalisation of individuals Georgia Holmer is acting director of the Forum Foundation for Analytic Excellence, whose mission is to promote the effective use of critical thinking skills and structured analytic techniques by teaching, certifying, and applying these skills and techniques to a broad range of enduring and emerging issues. This is a redacted version of a paper she presented at the 2012 ISA conference on how she applied Red Hat Analysis to understand the radicalisation of individuals. There exists some dissonance be- tween the accepted purpose and method of this analytic technique. Although the method tries to pre- vent mirror imaging, during role play, one has tap into individual experiential knowledge and em- pathy. Its value is therefor rooted in gazing directly into a mirror - an effective combination of cogni- tion and empathy. Red Hat Analysis could be viewed as a unique employment of both critical and creative facul- ties; a technique that provides in- sight into both those motivational factors that are contextually or culturally determined and the more universal psychological drivers that can be discovered through the process of identifying or relating to another’s experi- ence. Red Hat Analysis is to help un- derstand individual trajectories of radicalization and involvement in terrorist activity. Red Hat Analy- sis has been used with some fre- quency in the Intelligence Community to help predict the decisions and choices of a terrorist group or cell leader. However, the nature of terrorism has changed substantially over the past decade with the emergence of loosely af- filiated networks of self-radical- ized individuals. These new models of terrorism lack the tradi- tional organizational structure that involves a centralized leader- ship or more formal group affilia- tion. Georgia tweaked the methodology to apply it here as well. 1. Re-define the target. Expand the target application of Red Hat Analysis to reflect modern ter- rorist activity, and specifically include those individuals who are self-radicalized and carry out attacks independent of formal group affiliation or di- rection. 2. Require a specific set of experts. Gather analysts to participate in the exercise that include ex- perts on terrorism, individuals with significant cultural and regional experience, specialists in specific radical ideologies, and those with knowledge of the psychological processes of radicalization. 3. Identify a spectrum of scenarios. Ask analysts to generate a range or spectrum of possible trajectories an individual might follow, from disengage- ment and/or de-radicalization to direct involvement in vio- lent acts. 4. Require a thorough engagement in role play. Construct a role play exercise that involves a specific trigger or catalyst could lead to a change in the status quo. Have each partici- pant engage in the role play, taking turns as the target, and expanding the list of scenarios or possible trajectories. Con- sider using the first rule of im- provisational theater in which all possibilities are allowed and affirmed during this crea- tive and exploratory stage. In- sist that analysts use the first person in their expression. 5. Examine all outcomes. Collect all identified scenarios, collec- tively consider the likelihood of each, and select those that are most deserving of atten- tion. The goal is to expand an understanding of the possibili- ties using a structured tech- nique. The hope is that a sufficiently robust number of outcomes have been generated to gain a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon and avoid future surprise. ●
  14. 14. 14 June 2012 • Foreknowledge One of the toughest facts that any Intelligence prac- titioner must accept is that a first-class intelligence deliverable, regardless of the depth of findings and analysis that may underpin it, will often fail to achieve its principle objec- tive; that is, to provide decision- makers with product that they find both compelling and relevant to their individual and collective concerns. There are a number of explanations for this, one of which is often overlooked; the ‘packag- ing’ of intelligence. Typically, when finished intelli- gence products are distributed to management consumers they of- ten amount to dry, colourless epis- tles of mainly regurgitated facts and news. They are, in effect, little more than stirred (not shaken!) cocktails of open source based in- formation. It is also apparent that in many instances the very person- alities of analysts charged with de- livering, or presenting product will fall short of anything that might be deemed inspiring; they’re simply not skilled in ‘sell- ing’, or persuading. More emphasis on past than fu- ture Perhaps more importantly, future- oriented analysis (e.g. alternative futures analysis or analysis of competing hypotheses) that should spring from company-wide coordination led by the CI depart- ment is seldom on offer. The result is that an analysis of “what happened”–standard fare in CI reporting–simply does not reso- nate with, and is therefore not use- ful to, corporate decision-makers. What decision-makers want What they need are judgments fo- cusing on what could, or is likely, to happen, with explanations of why analysts think so. Managers also appreciate a strong HUMINT component in an intelligence deliv- erable; knowing the thinking and intentions of target sources is as, if not more, important than knowing their organisations’ capabilities. Otherwise, senior executives in particular may just as well search for the insight and ‘enlightenment’ they want from the raft of mind- numbing analysts’ reports pub- lished by major investment banks, from their trusted personal advi- sors and friends (who usually have their own agendas), or, for a quick ‘news fix’, from CNN, Bloomberg, or BBC News. Think: when was the last time that the intelligence you delivered caused your company’s manage- ment to modify their behaviour, their strategy, or their plans? There is considerable scope for im- provement in the ‘packaging’ of intelligence products in private sector organisations. We believe, for example, that there are impor- tant lessons that can be learned from advertising and from story- telling. Lessons from advertising Consider some of the key princi- ples of advertising: ● the ability to capture the “buyer’s” attention. ● the ability to sustain their at- tention. ● the ability to transmit the message clearly within a very limited time span. ● the ability to convince the consumer to accept the mes- sage of the ad, and the ad brand (say, for example, the competitive intelligence func- tion itself). Are these the principles which un- derpin the delivery of your ‘prod- ucts’? Lessons from storytelling Storytelling, too, is a powerful art form that is often overlooked. Robert McKee, a highly regarded screenwriting lecturer, argues that although “Persuasion is the centre- piece of business activity … de- spite the critical importance of Make your message compelling! Douglas Bernhardt toolbox Although Douglas wrote this article from a competitive intelligence perspective , the problems and principles he addresses are relevant to all intelligence domains When was the last time your intelligence report caused the decision-makers to modify their plans and strategies?
  15. 15. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 15 toolbox persuasion, most executives [and, we would add, analysts] struggle to communicate, let alone inspire.” He believes that listeners can be engaged “on a whole new level if [we] toss [our] PowerPoint slides and learn to tell good stories in- stead.” What can a story do? Again ac- cording to McKee, “Essentially, a story expresses how and why life changes.” A good story will incite interest, excitement and emotions on the part of the listener in a way that static graphs, spreadsheets, tables, and lists of data simply can’t. When was the last time you promised yourself a good ‘bedtime read’ of a Credit Suisse, JP Morgan Chase, or Goldman Sachs research report? Appeal to the soul and not intel- lect When trying to persuade, logic and reason are not enough; they appeal to the intellect, not the soul. Consider: why did Mr Bush and Dr Rice not respond to the PDB of 6th August 2001–less than six weeks prior to the attacks of 11th September 2001 on the Pentagon and New York’s World Trade Cen- tre–with the urgency that one might reasonably expect from sen- ior political leaders? The docu- ment’s headline alone should have been sufficient to elicit a strong re- action– followed by effective action!–on their part. Remember, the PDB did judge that Bin Ladin was “determined to strike”, not that he might have been thinking Finished intelligence products distributed to management consumers often amount to dry, colourless epistles of mainly regurgitated facts and news. They are, in effect, little more than stirred (not shaken!) cocktails of open source based information. about it. How often have your firm’s decision-makers discounted or ignored intelligence because they did not regard it as compel- ling, or possibly because it did not conform to their personal agendas or organisational policies? Using film or video to get your message across A good story can also leverage film or video to considerable ad- vantage. We show our MBA stu- dents clips from documentaries and Hollywood productions to support specific lessons. Because it does so within the context of cine- ma, it becomes an almost irresisti- ble story and students are left in no doubt about the intelligence principles we wanted to bring home. Although exploring the many ele- ments of a good story are well be- yond the scope of this article, we do suggest that for a brief over- view you may wish to start with Robert McKee’s article “Storytell- ing That Moves People” in Harvard Business Review (2003, Vol. 81, No 6). If a central aim of intelligence is to support the making of smarter strategic choices, doesn’t it make sense to do what is necessary to ensure that in each and every case its presentation matches the quali- ty, and reinforces the urgency, of the analysis? Analysts must therefore be compe- tent in presenting analysis, both orally and in writing. Ultimately, sculpting the product is only the first step; ensuring that it is ‘well received’ by the consumer is the second. ● Douglas can be reached at President Barack Obama receives the Presidential Daily Briefing from Robert Cardillo, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration, in the Oval Office, Jan. 31, 2012. Part of the briefing was done using an iPad. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)
  16. 16. 16 June 2012 • Foreknowledge analytics Intelligence Tony Nolan Text mining For this edition’s column, I would like to talk about how the intelligence process can be used for both research and also sending out a message. Analytics is not just about numbers alone. Text mining is the analytical proc- ess of understanding words, lan- guage, information and knowledge. While the majority of Intelligence work is about the words and language, very little analysis is conducted on text, as the equivalent of numbers, where you can look for patterns. The rest of this article is written on the as- sumption that you have legal au- thority and permission to conduct the following activities. Text mining applies linguistic rules and statistical methods to automatically analyse electronic text and helps you discover in- sights that are often buried in large amounts of unstructured text data – such as email, social media content, blogs and other online media sources. Text min- ing, when combined with meta- data (extra information about the dataset provided from outside of the dataset), gives a powerful view of the person’s language, their intent, knowledge about the topic, and their intended message. I bet you thought there is no room for human understanding in text mining, but there is. The Intelli- gence Officer is still needed to make sense of the high frequency words and concepts derived by nearest neighbour groupings to track the information behaviour of the targets. You can text mine emails, text files, word documents, pdf’s, and even webpages. There are com- puter programs like web spiders, web scrapers, etc, where you can put in the desired words your’e interested in text mining, and they go off and use the search engines to locate those relevant webpages, and then save them in a corpus ready for text mining. There is also free text mining software such as R available. Basically any one can use open source software for free, to locate a piece of text, or convert a pdf file to text, or download a webpage, and then process them into a dic- tionary, examine frequency counts, and look at the correlation between words, and have concept maps, link charts and word clouds. All you need is an internet connection, a Linux emulator, and the R console software. I will re- visit R software in future articles. Now for a real world example. The NSW Police Force in Australia has developed a project called Eyewatch. Basically, project Eye- watch is about communicating with the people of NSW using Fa- cebook to gather Intelligence, and also to provide information back to the general population, but more specifically the local popu- lation of each Local Area Com- mand. This type of project lends itself to text mining. Once the text is cap- tured from both the Facebook posts and virtual neighbourhood watch meetings, then many dif- ferent pieces of analysis are avail- able. For instance once the data is loaded, you can compare sets of posts from different times, loca- tions, sexes, communities, etc and examine if there are any highest frequency words, as well as outli- er words, specific to each commu- nity. You can also examine the lan- guage and the syntax between the datasets. Finally it also becomes possible to geocode the locations mentioned, and integrate it into your crime or marketing analysis. Of course you can also produce word clouds and link charts based on word frequency and nearest neighbour. ● Risk,IntelligenceandAnalyticsOfficer,AustralianGovernment toolbox
  17. 17. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 17 The effective analyst Part 3: Attitude Janet Evans Associate Investigator, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australia In this issue I will continue to talk about the findings of the effective an- alyst study focus- ing on attitudinal factors that indi- cate an effective analyst and since this issue is focused on the intelli- gence cycle I will also describe how the findings from our study tie into the intelligence cycle. First and foremost: A do-er While attitudinal factors have been considered in previous research the importance of attitude has been un- derestimated. The want or desire to be in intelligence has not been rec- ognised previously and factors like being a do-er, being intelligent, mo- tivated, independent and being a decision maker in their own right is largely ignored. In our study attitu- dinal factors incorporated com- ments that describe the analysts disposition to intelligence work and analysis. The most frequently sighted attitudinal factor is what we called the do-er. A do-er is some- one who is energetic, willing, proactive, achievement oriented and accomplishes a lot. Second: passion for intelligence Another important factor that de- scribes an effective analyst is a per- son who has a passion for intelligence and has chosen to be there. Many who participated in our study reported that having staff that are in intelligence positions for the ‘wrong’ reasons has a negative impact on their peers and analysts described being demoralised by those that showed no interest in in- telligence work. Decision-makers felt that analysts in intelligence for the ‘wrong’ rea- sons tainted the whole of intelli- gence analysis with a poor work ethic. The examples included peo- ple placed in Analysis because they could not cope in other areas. In this 3rd article in a series of four articles, Janet takes us through the findings of research by her and Mark Kebbell on what makes intelligence analysts effective. career Attitude is a little thing that makes a big difference. Winston Churchill The intelligence cycle and the ef- fective analyst study The ‘intelligence cycle’ has four dis- tinct areas and in our study, only two of those (analysis and dissemi- nation) were raised by the partici- pants as relating to analyst effectiveness. Interestingly, they do not deem skills in data collection/collation or direct in- volvement in the direction phase of the intelligence cycle necessary for the analyst’s effectiveness. Rather, it seems as though analysts view the amount of time spent on collecting and collating data as “dead time” which does not con- tribute to their effectiveness. Many of the analysts interviewed sees col- lection as the responsibility for oth- ers in the unit, rather than themselves. The absence of the analyst from the direction phase of the intelligence cycle may be negligible in opera- tional and tactical analysis because the analyst works within the intelli- gence unit or the operational team and has regular contact with man- agement. However, the absence of the analyst from the direction phase of the in- telligence cycle when considering strategic intelligence would be very problematic. In strategic analysis the analyst also manages strategic product and would need to negoti- ate the terms of reference for the analysis directly with the client who in most cases would not be their line manager. The role of the analyst in the direction phase of the intelligence cycle needs further con- sideration. ●  ​
  18. 18. 18 June 2012 • Foreknowledge The April 2012 issue of Scientific American contains an article by David Pogue titled Technology's Friction Problem. In it, he argues that 'friction' (extra steps or gener- al hassle between a potential cus- tomer and something they want) is an unnecessary drag on all sorts of transactions from commerce to voting. There are at least three problems when it comes to disseminating intelligence products: 1) Getting the right product to the right person(s), 2) getting it to them at the right time and 3) getting that right person to actually read (and apply) the product. The problem with distribution lists Generally, I've been less than im- pressed with common delivery methods for intelligence products which seem to revolve around email distribution lists or through access to otherwise restricted 'por- tals'. These produce two signifi- cant problems: 1. The law of good intentions: You set up a distribution list for (let's say) WMD informa- tion. Pretty soon you come across information that has nothing to do with WMD but someone thinks it'd be a good idea to disseminate. So, they hijack the list and send it out. Soon, the list becomes a catch- all vehicle for sending out eve- ry piece of informational flot- sam and jetsam that floats through the drain. 2. As brilliant as you think your list or portal is, everyone else has the same idea. What you end up with is multiple lists that recycle the same informa- tion. That, in turn, interferes with processing that informa- tion (collation in some ver- sions of the intelligence cycle) and making sure it gets to peo- ple who actually need it. Per- haps this is due to an institutional desire to appear relevant and “plant the organi- zational flag” in as many in- boxes as possible or originates from a misplaced belief that more is always better. In any case, it's rarely helpful. This is a throwback to when the limited amount of information available could be handled by rel- atively small staffs. Instead of col- lating information and managing its flow, we rely on a “more is bet- ter” philosophy that passes it all through in bulk. Today, with the overwhelming quantity of information available, we still have not devoted suffi- cient time or resources to the less Let’s reduce friction in intelligence dissemination! T.W. Shiloh is a pseudonym for a an intelligence analyst with 20 years experience in military and law enforce- ment intelligence analysis. To fit with our theme for this issue he addresses the less popular aspects of the intelligence cycle: collation and dissemination. A version of this article appeared in his personal blog, Travels with Shiloh T.W. Shiloh opinion
  19. 19. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 19 sexy components of intelligence analysis. Friction There are, however, better ways to sort through that mountain of information and get what you want. But, the problem is friction. Here's the equation from Pogue's article which I think can also ap- ply to intelligence products. PB+D>C ● P is the probability that the intelligence product will be relevant to the customer. ● B is the benefit to the custom- er from the product if they receive it and apply it. ● C is friction - the hassle of having to identify the source of the information, make whatever contacts needed to get access to the document, the cost in time and resourc- es to wade through the irrele- vant stuff that comes your way during your search, etc. ● D, in the original equation, is the benefit or the gratifica- tion the user gets from mak- ing the transaction. In the intelligence field, this may manifest in the satisfaction of receiving the information in a timely manner or the in- creased sense of credibility gained in knowing that you've searched all available sources. We raise the C quotient to new heights! What have we done about reduc- ing friction? Well, just about eve- ry agency has its own 'portal' now and the (maligned) opportunities to sign up for email distribution but that moves from boon to bane when everyone has it. What was intended to reduce friction is now a main contributor to it. Lack of information has turned into a del- uge of it and old information silos have simply been replaced by new ones. All of this raises the C quo- tient to new heights. How can we reduce friction? It's certainly not an easy task and relies on improvements with both the intelligence consumer and generator. On the side of those generating intelligence products, we can begin by reducing the number of outlets one has to go to for similar information. This would involve changing the re- ward structure of agencies so they act less like news organizations, always trying to scoop their com- petitors in order to get more fund- ing or resources, and emphasize complementary efforts. Additionally, we should also move away from a 'push' system where producers determine what customers should get or just re- lease products without any effort to match them with customers who may need them. In ex- change, we need a system which allows customers to 'pull' infor- mation that's relevant to their needs. With the ability to embed metadata into information it be- comes easier for people to identi- fy, search, retrieve or subscribe to information that they want. This may require establishing net- works of information collators or 'sifters' (similar to reference librar- ians) who can point consumers in their direction of interest. Contra- ry to conventional wisdom, the information age may require more people to conduct the collation function rather than less. Current efforts to automate that function have not proven to be adequate. One final way to reduce friction is thinking about how products are delivered. Current thinking con- tinues to maintain that the aver- age intelligence consumer can't be expected to handle anything more than a few pages of information...preferably in Power- Point slide bullets. Yet, whether talking about terrorism, organized criminal organizations or emerg- ing threats, very rarely can context and critical nuance be conveyed in such small spaces. While “audience analysis” is still considered an exotic concept for many intelligence shops, its con- sideration during the production and dissemination portions of the intelligence cycle can help over- come these challenges. Different types of information will lend themselves to different formats. If PowerPoint is insufficient and lengthy documents make brains hurt, aren't there other alterna- tives available for consideration? There's no reason why analysis can't be delivered graphically, in an audio format or using any of a number of social media tools that are emerging as the primary means of communications for mil- lions of people. While collation and dissemination are often regarded at the least ex- citing aspects of analytical work they can mean the difference be- tween a product being useful and getting lost in the maelstrom of information that bombards us everyday. ● Friction The hassle of having to identify the source of the information, make whatever contacts needed to get access, the cost in time and resources to wade through the irrelevant stuff etc opinion
  20. 20. 20 June 2012 • Foreknowledge thinking Richards Heuer There are still thousands of intelligence analysts and their managers who have not yet read the seminal Psychology of Intelligence Analysis by Richards Heuer. We will carry excerpts from the book’s chapters in each edition of Foreknowledge. This is an excerpt of chapter 3 on Memory. You can also download the entire book here. An analyst's memory provides con- tinuous input into the analytical process. This input is of two types-- 1) additional factual information on historical background and context, and 2) schemata the analyst uses to determine the meaning of newly acquired information. Information from memory may force itself on the analyst's awareness without any deliberate effort by the analyst to remember; or, recall of the informa- tion may require considerable time and strain. In either case, anything that influences what information is remembered or retrieved from memory also influences intelligence analysis. Judgment is the joint product of the available information and what the analyst brings to the analysis of this information. Substantive knowledge and analyti- cal experience determine the store of memories and schemata the ana- lyst draws upon to generate and evaluate hypotheses. The key is not a simple ability to recall facts, but the ability to recall patterns that re- late facts to each other and to broader concepts--and to employ procedures that facilitate this proc- ess. Stretching the Limits of Working Memory Limited information is available on what is commonly thought of as "working memory"--the collection of information that an analyst holds in the forefront of the mind as he or she does analysis. The gen- eral concept of working memory seems clear from personal intro- spection. In writing this chapter, I am very conscious of the con- straints on my ability to keep many pieces of information in mind while experimenting with ways to organ- ize this information and seeking words to express my thoughts. To help offset these limits on my working memory, I have accumu- lated a large number of written notes containing ideas and half- written paragraphs. Only by using such external memory aids am I able to cope with the volume and complexity of the information I want to use. A well-known article written over 40 years ago, titled "The Magic Number Seven--Plus or Minus Two," contends that seven--plus or minus two--is the number of things people can keep in their head all at once. That limitation on working memory is the source of many problems. People have difficulty grasping a problem in all its com- plexity. This is why we sometimes have trouble making up our minds. For example, we think first about the arguments in favor, and then about the arguments against, and we can't keep all those pros and cons in our head at the same time to get an overview of how they bal- ance off against each other. The recommended technique for coping with this limitation of work- ing memory is called externalizing Psychology of intelligence analysis
  21. 21. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 21 the problem--getting it out of one's head and down on paper in some simplified form that shows the main elements of the problem and how they relate to each other. Ways of doing this involve breaking down a problem into its component parts and then preparing a simple "mod- el" that shows how the parts relate to the whole. When working on a small part of the problem, the model keeps one from losing sight of the whole. A simple model of an analytical problem facilitates the assimilation of new information into long-term memory; it provides a structure to which bits and pieces of information can be related. The model defines the categories for filing information in memory and retrieving it on de- mand. In other words, it serves as a mnemonic device that provides the hooks on which to hang information so that it can be found when need- ed. The model is initially an artificial construct. With usage, however, it rapidly becomes an integral part of one's conceptual structure--the set of schemata used in processing infor- mation. At this point, remembering new information occurs by assimila- tion rather than by mnemonics. This enhances the ability to recall and make inferences from a larger vol- ume of information in a greater vari- ety of ways than would otherwise be possible. Hardening of the Categories Memory processes tend to work with generalized categories. If peo- ple do not have an appropriate cate- gory for something, they are unlikely to perceive it, store it in memory, or be able to retrieve it from memory later. If categories are drawn incorrectly, people are likely to perceive and remember things inaccurately. When information about phenome- na that are different in important respects nonetheless gets stored in memory under a single concept, er- rors of analysis may result. "Hardening of the categories" is a common analytical weakness. Fine distinctions among categories and tolerance for ambiguity contribute to more effective analysis. Things That Influence What Is Re- membered Factors that influence how informa- tion is stored in memory and that affect future retrievability include: 1) being the first-stored information on a given topic, 2) the amount of attention focused on the informa- tion, 3) the credibility of the infor- mation, and 4) the importance attributed to the information at the moment of storage. By influencing the content of memory, all of these factors also influence the outcome of intelligence analysis. Memory Rarely Changes Retroac- tively Analysts often receive new informa- tion that should, logically, cause them to reevaluate the credibility or significance of previous informa- tion. Ideally, the earlier information should then become either more sa- lient and readily available in memo- ry, or less so. But it does not work that way. Unfortunately, memories are sel- dom reassessed or reorganized ret- roactively in response to new information. For example, informa- tion that is dismissed as unimpor- tant or irrelevant because it did not fit an analyst's expectations does not become more memorable even if the analyst changes his or her thinking to the point where the same infor- mation, received today, would be recognized as very significant. Memory Can Handicap as Well as Help Understanding how memory works provides some insight into the na- ture of creativity, openness to new information, and breaking mind- sets. All involve spinning new links in the spider web of memory--links among facts, concepts, and schemata that previously were not connected or only weakly connected. Training courses for intelligence an- alysts sometimes focus on trying to open up an analyst's established mind-set, to get him or her to see problems from different perspec- tives in order to give a fairer shake to alternative explanations. More often than not, the reaction of expe- rienced analysts is that they have devoted 20 years to developing their present mind-set, that it has served them well, and that they see no need to change it. Such analysts view themselves, often accurately, as comparable to the chess masters. There is, however, a crucial differ- ence between the chess master and the master intelligence analyst. Al- though the chess master faces a dif- ferent opponent in each match, the environment in which each contest takes place remains stable and un- changing: the permissible moves of the diverse pieces are rigidly deter- mined, and the rules cannot be changed without the master's knowledge. Once the chess master develops an accurate schema, there is no need to change it. The intelligence analyst, however, must cope with a rapidly changing world. Schemata that were valid yesterday may no longer be func- tional tomorrow. Learning new schemata often re- quires the unlearning of existing ones, and this is exceedingly diffi- cult. It is always easier to learn a new habit than to unlearn an old one. Schemata in long-term memory that are so essential to effective anal- ysis are also the principal source of inertia in recognizing and adapting to a changing environment. ● thinking
  22. 22. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 22 Meet a Financial Intelligence Unit Analyst AR - analyst with an African FIU What is the role and function of intelligence analysts in your agency? The provision of financial intelligence for the purpose of initiating investigations or supporting investigations to law enforcement agencies and for regulatory bodies and other government agencies for the purpose of policy fomulation. What is your specialist area and what do you do to stay informed and abreast of new de- velopments? My area of specialty is in the area of Anti Money Laundering /Com- batting the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) I stay informed about my field through conferences, seminars, workshops relevant to my field and subscribing to professional bodies such: ACAMS, CFE, IACA and the IALEIA, etc. Who are your clients and what types of intelligence products do you provide to them? Our clients are the relevant stake- holders in the AML/CFT regime, which comprise of the Law en- forcement agencies, the regulatory agencies, the policy makers in gov- ernment etc. The product dissemi- nated to the above relevant agencies is financial intelligence which could be operational, tactical or strategic in nature. What are your greatest chal- lenges you face as an intel- ligence analyst and how do you overcome them? ● Inaccessibility to other law en- forcement agencies databases ● Lack of cooperation on the part of some law enforcement agencies in information shar- ing ● Untimely response to request made to reporting entities ● Poor quality of data from re- porting entities. Overcoming these issues is done through the constant engagement of these agencies by providing them with spontaneous Intelli- gence products that borders on their operations. This helps is building trust and confidence and in turn creates room for joint oper- ations. For the reporting entities, education on the ills of money laundering, fraud and terror fi- nancing has gone a long way in improving relations, so does the provision of immunity to report- ing persons within institutions. What can intelligence ana- lysts do to promote our profession? By networking and forming a for- midable group or association where ideas, experiences, chal- lenges and other issues could be shared. ● Intelligence research and analysis services on Africa’s political, economic and criminal threats *** Due diligence and background reports on Persons and Companies of Interest throughout Africa *** Setting up of intelligence units *** Intelligence information management and systems *** Intelligence training curriculum development *** Customised OSINT reports Over the past years, specialized governmental agencies, “financial intelligence units” or “FIUs have been created as jurisdictions develop systems to deal with the problem of money laundering and other financial crimes. Many FIUs have analysis units that determine money laundering trends and patterns for use by law enforcement, provide feedback to the reporting institutions and do proactive targeting. Analysts have bank- ing, intelligence and law enforcement experience. people
  23. 23. 23 June 2012 • Foreknowledge June 2012 International BISA-ISA conference 20-22 June 2012 : Edinburgh, Scotland British International Studies Association and the International Studies Association Joint For conference information click here July 2012 24th - 26th July 2012 Sydney, Australia For more information: Click here Intelligence 2012: Anticipating Risk & Influencing Action The Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers (AIPIO) Annual conference collaborate share discuss events Brunel University seminar 8 June 2012: London, UK Intelligence analysis learning from journalism For conference information click here Brunel University seminar 13 July 2012: London, UK Intelligence analysis learning from other disciplines For conference information click here International terrorism and organised crime conference 6-10 August 2012 Anaheim, CA Information here Innovation in border control workshop 21 - 22 August 2012 Odense, Denmark Information here OSINT & web miningsymposium 21 - 22 August 2012 Odense, Denmark Information here OSINT & security informatics symposium 27 & 28 August 2012 Istanbul, Turkey Information here Geospatial Defence & intelligence Asia 11-14 September 2012 Thailand Information here September 2012 ACFEA Globalintelligence forum21 - 22 September 2012Brussels, BelgiumInformation here Intelligence in the knowledge society 219 October 2012 Bucharest, Romania Information here Need to know conference 16-17 October 2012 Odense, Denmark Information here October 2012 August 2012