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Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity
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Conflicts resolution and leadership in the dynamics of ethnic identity

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  • 1. ... iEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions:Reconstructing Scenes In A Moving Asia (East And Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 2. ii ...Economic Prospects Cultural Encounters, and Political Decisions:Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows© Partner Institutions of the Asian Public Intellectuals Program: Research Center for Regional Resources,The Indonesian Institute of Science (PSDR-LIPI); Center For Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS),Kyoto University; Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia;School of Social Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University; Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University.First published 2005All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in anyinformation storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Nippon Foundation - Asian PublicIntellectuals Program, Tokyo.A PDF version of this book is also available online at http://www.api-fellowships.orgPrinted by:Sasyaz Holdings Sdn. Bhd., Kuala Lumpur, MalaysiaEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 3. ... iiiCONTENTSAbout the book viiAcknowledgements ixThe Contributors xMESSAGES A Challenge to Public Intellectuals vix EMIL SALIM Transnational Exchange and Learning xxiii YOSHEI SASAKAWAINTRODUCTION Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters, and Political Decisions: xxv Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) EDI SEDYAWATIPart I: STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Towards Transnational Dayak Identities? Changing Interconnectedness, 1 Identities and Nation States: A Case Study On Iban-Kenyah Relations in Sarawak, East Malaysia DAVE LUMENTA Voyages and Ethnicity Across Reordered Frontiers: 19 Conflict Resolution and Leadership in the Dynamics of Ethnic Identity Formation among the Sama Dilaut of Semporna WILFREDO M. TORRES III Conservation of Cultural Heritage and the Formation of Local Identity: 39 A Case in Northeast Thailand AKIKO TASHIRO Inter-Ethnic Relations in Ikan Bilis Fishery: Experiences of 50 Seberang Takir People in Terengganu, The Malay Peninsula MOTOKO KAWANO Towards Sustainable Urban Identities: A Comparative Study 67 of Johor Bahru, Malaysia and Fukuoka, Japan SLAMET TRISUTOMOPart II: THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF NORMS AND LEGALITY Prostitution: In Search of Cultural Concepts in Thai Contexts 78 APRILIA BUDI HENDRIJANI Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 4. iv ... A Comparative Study of Juvenile Justice Systems in Malaysia 90 and Japan: A Review of Policies, Approaches and Strategies ALLAN J. VILLARANTE A Zigzag Tour Across Ethnopolitical Borders in Southeast Asia 107 ARNOLD M. AZURIN A Comparative Study of Ethical Awareness Related to Information 118 and Communication Technology Security Issues Between Japanese and Thais PATEEP METHAKUNAVUDHI 1965: Indonesian Historical Memory – the Enforcement of Forget 134 NADIAH BAMADHAJPart III: ECONOMICS AND NON-MARKET FACTORS Alternatives to Consumerism: Study of Consumer Movements 143 in Malaysia and Japan VASANA CHINVARAKORN Adaptation Strategies of Small Enterprises of the Muslim Minority 158 in the Philippines During the Economic Crisis Era ANAS SAIDI The Impact of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct 174 Investment (FDI) Flows on the Globalisation Process in Selected Southeast Asian Economies JOSE M. GALANG JR.Part IV: CHANGING SOCIAL RELATIONS Decentralisation and Transformation of Local Politics in Thailand: 184 The Case of Lampang Province FUMIO NAGAI The Street Vendor Movement in Southeast Asian Cities: 197 Case Study of Street Vendor Organisations in Power Relations with the State in Metro Manila and Kuala Lumpur TATAK PRAPTI UJIYATI The Alternative Media and Democracy in a Globalised World 208 MUSTAFA K. ANUAREconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 5. ... v Unbounded Identities: Some Chinese Voices During the Indonesian Revolution 222 SUMIT K. MANDAL Putting the First Last – Networking NGOs in Indonesia 230 TETSUYA ARAKI Problems and Prospects of Industrial Relations: The Social and Economic 241 Dimensions of Foreign Workers in Fishing Enterprises in Sabah, East Malaysia MOHAMMAD ‘AZZAM MANAN Women’s Issues and Changing Roles of Women’s Organisations 256 in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) DARUNEE TANTIWIRAMANONDPart V: CREATIVITY, RELIGION AND SOCIETY Woman, Religion and Spirituality in Asia 273 SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN Localising the Global: Southeast Asian and Western Instrumental 281 Styles in the Contemporary Soundscapes of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia FRANCISCO A. ENGLIS To Compose as an Asian – The Relationship Between Traditional Music 297 and the Works of Contemporary Composers in the Philippines and Indonesia MOTOHIDE TAGUCHI Evaluating a New Possibility for Traditional Culture in International Aid 310 TOSHIAKI TAKASAGO The Declarations of Independence 316 ADELINE OOI YAH-CHINE Literary Culture for the Future: Looming Shapes in Japan 333 and the Malay Archipelago MUHAMMAD HAJI SALLEH The Contemporary Documentary in Japan 341 CHALIDA UABUMRUNGJIT Fostering Botanical Art Illustration Towards Plant Conservation 348 and Environmental Protection LALITA ROCHANAKORN Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 6. vi ...APPENDIXES Appendix 1: Workshop Schedule 354 Appendix 2: Workshop Outcomes 357 Appendix 3: Workshop Participants 366 Appendix 4: Abstracts of Papers 370Index 378Contact Details 394Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 7. ... viiABOUT THE BOOKAs Asia enters the 21st century, it faces political, economic, and social challenges that transcend nationalboundaries. To meet these challenges, the region needs a pool of intellectuals willing to be active in the publicsphere who can articulate common concerns and propose creative solutions. Recognising that opportunitiesfor intellectual exchange are currently limited by institutional, linguistic, and cultural parameters, The NipponFoundation launched the Asian Public Intellectual (API) Fellowships on 8 July 2000. The Fellowships’ primaryaims are to promote mutual learning among Asian public intellectuals and contribute to the growth of wider publicspaces in which effective responses to regional needs can be generated.Each year, the work of each group of Fellows is presented at a workshop and published in a book. This publication,Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions: Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast), is acollected work of the second group of Fellowship recipients. It comprises 28 papers of the projects undertaken bythe 2002/2003 Fellows, which cover several key areas: state boundaries and ethnic identity; the changing contextof norms and legality; economics and non-market factors; changing social relations; and creativity, religion andsociety.This, and all API publications can also be downloaded from the Program’s official website: http://www.api-fellowships.org.The FellowshipsThe Fellowship Program was launched on 8 July 2000 and comprises the API Senior Fellowship and the APIFellowship. The Fellowships are open to academics, media professionals, artists, non governmental organisation(NGO) activists, social workers, public servants and others with moral authority, who are working to shape publicopinion and influence policy in their societies. The objective of these Fellowships is to give these intellectualleaders the opportunity to learn what their counterparts are doing in different cultural and ethnic contexts, generatetheoretical ideas to cope with social and economic change, and build the intellectual networks of the future.The programme’s first five participating countries are Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan,with management of the programme entrusted on a rotation basis to the partner institution in each country. Thisarrangement holds for the first several years of the Fellowship’s existence, with a view to increasing the number ofparticipating countries in the future.Within broad themes for the intellectual, cultural, and professional projects determined by the API ExecutiveCommittee, Fellows are required to: • Propose and carry out a project of research and/or professional activities in a participating country or countries other than their native country or country of permanent residence; • Conduct research and/or professional activities in compliance with the schedule accepted by the International Selection Committee; • Attend the API Workshop to exchange results of their research and/or professional activities with other Fellows; • Disseminate their findings and results to a wider audience; and • Pursue a deeper knowledge of each other, and hence the region. Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 8. viii ...For the first three years of the Fellowships (2001-2004), the three main themes were: • Changing identities and their social, historical, and cultural contexts; • Reflections on the human condition and the quest for social justice; and • The current structure of globalisation and possible alternatives.An API Follow-up Grants programme was subsequently initiated in 2004-2005. This programme seeks to encourageAPI Fellows to further develop and enrich their activities as public intellectuals, particularly in collaborative work,and to identify individuals and organizations that have the potential of becoming extended members of the APICommunity and support their activities.The Nippon FoundationFounded in 1962, The Nippon Foundation is an independent, nonprofit, grant-making organisation based in Japan.The Foundation strives to address the myriad societal issues that fall outside of the scope of traditional sectorsby assisting the people who are living and working closest to the problem. To date, the Foundation has providedsupport for a wide range of projects administered by nonprofit organisations in over 90 countries, focusing primarilyon basic human needs, multilateral cooperation, and human resources development.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 9. ... ixACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS) of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, the APIRegional Coordinator, oversaw the publication of this second API book, and are most grateful to the following:• The API Fellows for writing their papers and revising them whenever necessary for content and technical purposes;• Edi Sedyawati, Workshop Director of the Bali Workshop in 2003, who oversaw the content editing of the papers for the workshop, and then for this publication; Tatsuya Tanami, Director, International Program Department of Nippon Foundation, and Ragayah Haji Mat Zin, Director of IKMAS, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia; the Program Directors and Coordinators of the API Program and the Program Assistants for their valuable input into publication matters;• The editors in Kuala Lumpur, Wong Siew Lyn and her team, who handled technical editing, indexing and the publication of the book; and Karen Freeman, who edited the papers for the Bali Workshop; and• The various Program staff for doing the behind-the-scenes legwork Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 10. x ...THE CONTRIBUTORS(in alphabetical order according to names as they are spelt)ADELINE OOI YAH-CHINE is an independent curator based in Kuala Lumpur and Manila. Trained at theCentral St. Martin’s School of Art and Design in London, she is researching and producing a documentary thatexamines the changing identities and roles of young artists in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia, as her APIFollow-up Grant project.AKIKO TASHIRO is a Ph.D. candidate at the Graduate Division of Foreign Studies at Sophia University. In herAPI Fellowship term, she was a research fellow at the Institute of Asian Cultures at Sophia University, and shelooked at how the conservation of cultural heritage influences local communities and their identities in Thailand.ALLAN J. VILLARANTE, a Senior Legislative Research Officer of the Philippine House of Representatives, didcomparative research on systems of juvenile justice in Japan and Malaysia, an endeavour which he believes wouldenrich the current Juvenile Justice Bill, pending before the Philippine Congress for more than a decade.ANAS SAIDI has spent the last decade researching culture and economic issues, which are his main area ofresearch. He is with the Center for Social and Cultural Studies (PMB-LIPI) in Indonesia. His study of the resilienceof Muslim minority small businesses in Manila in the face of national economic crisis, revealed some deep-rootedchallenges for the community.APRILIA BUDI HENDRIJANI is working as a Research Assistant at the Asia Pacific Studies Center inIndonesia’s Gadjah Mada University. She was deeply affected by what she saw as part of her work on prostitutionin Bangkok with scenes that were “perhaps, too many for only a pair of eyes”.ARNOLD M. AZURIN is the Vice President for External Affairs, Anthropological Association of the Philippines.It is his belief that instead of ignoring ethnic and linguistic diversities, it is more viable to try harmonising thesedifferences by rediscovering the politically submerged commonalities and kindredship in local and global heritage.CHALIDA UABUMRUNGJIT is the Project Director of the Thai Film Foundation, a non-profit organisationestablished by film activists to promote film culture in Thailand on the basis that cinema is an intellectual asset.Chalida is interested in pushing the use of cinematic power to make a difference in society.DARUNEE TANTIWIRAMANOND left an academic career to co-establish the Women’s Action and ResourceInitiative (WARI) to fulfil capacity building and gender sensitivity needs in Southeast Asia. WARI carries outresearch, education and training, working collaboratively with government and non government organisations.DAVE LUMENTA was a JSPS Visiting Researcher with the CORE Project on the Dynamics of Flows andMigrations in Southeast Asia, Center for Southeast Asian Studies - Kyoto University, when he worked on his APIFellowship paper on transnational Dayak identities. He is now a Doctoral Student at the Graduate School of Asianand African Area Studies - Kyoto University.EDI SEDYAWATI was the Director of the Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences at the Universityof Indonesia (1989-1993) and the Director-General for Culture, Department of Education and Culture (1989-1993).With doctorates in archaeology and art history, she has published, held key positions in academic and professionalorganisations, and won awards in various fields, including archaeology, art history, iconography, philology and dance.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 11. ... xiEMIL SALIM is the former State Minister for Population and Environment of Indonesia, and has held positionsin various international sustainable development related bodies and initiatives, including the United Nations HighLevel Advisory Board on Sustainable Development and the World Health Organization Commission on Healthand Environment.FRANCISCO A. ENGLIS is an ethnomusicologist and Professor VI at Mindanao State University-Iligan Instituteof Technology. He also sits on the National Commission for Culture and the Arts. He is founder and trainer ofleading Filipino regional choral group Octava Choral Society, and his ethnic-inspired choral compositions are inthe repertoires of top national choirs.FUMIO NAGAI is Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Law, Osaka City University. His research interestsrange from the topic of decentralisation in Thailand – with due attention to the process of policy formation incentral government – to the broader theme of local governments, public administration and international relationsin Southeast Asia.JOSE M. GALANG, JR. is one of the Philippines’ leading business and economics journalists, with a 35-yearcareer including stints as Editor-in-Chief of The Manila Times, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of The Manila Chronicle,and Managing Editor of BusinessWorld. He is on the Board of Advisers of the Philippine Centre for InvestigativeJournalism.LALITA ROCHANAKORN has been an artist for about 30 years, and is an advocate of botanical art illustrationas a potential discipline which could contribute towards nature conservation, especially of endangered plants. Shehas set up the Asian Botanical Art Guild in collaboration with artists from Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Thailandand the Philippines.SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, is the Prioress of the Missionary Benedictine Sisters in Manila and theExecutive Director of the Institute of Women’s Studies, St. Scholastica’s College, Manila. As Chairpersonof Gabriela, the biggest coalition of women in the Philippines, she managed and directed 288 organisations inexploring and reconciling women’s issues.MOHAMMAD ‘AZZAM MANAN is a Researcher with the Center for Social and Cultural Studies (PMB-LIPI)in Jakarta. In his Fellowship topic, he looked at the factors behind migrant labour in the fishery sector in Sabah,Malaysia, a labour force which is indispensable yet whose treatment remains unfair.MOTOHIDE TAGUCHI, a freelance composer, has been searching for a personal voice in music composition thatreflects the traditional music and culture of his country. His works have been played in several concerts and festivalsincluding the 16th Japan Society for Contemporary Music composition awards (nominee), 8th International YoungComposer’s Meeting in the Netherlands, and the 9th Yogyakarta Gamelan Festival.MOTOKO KAWANO is a Doctoral Student at the Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, KyotoUniversity. Her focus area is the unique tapestries of inter-ethnic relations. In the face of globalization, she sees theneed for cooperation among individuals, communities and for the state to come out with frameworks on how tolive together peacefully.MUHAMMAD HAJI SALLEH, Professor of Literature, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), and author, is devotedto the enhancement of knowledge of literature and the arts, particularly in Malaysia, where it is being increasinglymarginalised due to emphasis on science and technology. He believes comparative studies are key tools for effectiveresearch. Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 12. xii ...MUSTAFA K. ANUAR is Associate Professor at the School of Communications, Universiti Sains Malaysia(USM) in Penang. He is also the Assistant Secretary of ALIRAN, Malaysia’s oldest human rights group. Hefocuses on freedom and transparency in communication as being crucial to a people’s development, dignity, well-being and identity.NADIAH BAMADHAJ’s art work challenges official historical memory, both personal and political. A trainedsculptor, she has added video and digital photography to express her concerns in this field. Currently she isworking on a Malaysian project questioning the validity of contemporary architecture and public space as historicalsignifiers of our future.PATEEP METHAKUNAVUDHI is concerned about the ethical and legal aspects of information and com-munications technology. She is Professor in the Department of Educational Policy, Management and Leadership,Faculty of Education, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.SLAMET TRISUTOMO is with the Department of Architecture, Hasanuddin University, Indonesia, where heis also the Chairperson of the Postgraduate Programmes. In his Fellowship period, he looked at the problems in,and solutions to sustaining the urban identities of two key cities in, respectively, a developing country, Malaysia,and a developed country, Japan.SUMIT K. MANDAL is an historian at the Institute of Malaysian & International Studies (IKMAS) whoworks on cultural diversity and cultural politics in Southeast Asia, focusing on Muslim societies. He believes theFellowship has great potential in creating rich and unconventional knowledge networks across borders, groundedin the experience of individual communities. TATAK PRAPTI UJIYATI is interested in the ways disadvantaged groups are affected by different types of regimes and state policies. She is a researcher with the non-profit Indonesian Institute for Public Policy Research, which aims to improve the quality of public policies in Indonesia, and a senior researcher with consultant firm Institute for Political Preference Survey. TETSUYA ARAKI is developing a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) based networking model of non gov- ernmental organisations. His other specialty field is food engineering, especially the freeze drying of foods. He is an Assistant Professor in the Graduate School of Agricultural and Life Sciences, The University of Tokyo. TOSHIAKI TAKASAGO is a staff writer with Tokyo daily Sankei Shimbun. In the Fellowship period, he looked at how declining traditional culture in a developed country is revived as a form of aid to a developing country, by following the trail of a project using the abacus. VASANA CHINVARAKORN is a senior feature writer for the Outlook Section, Bangkok Post. She covers a wide range of issues, notably, education, consumer protection, environment, and spirituality. WILFREDO M. TORRES III spent the Fellowship period with a Bajau Laut family in Semporna while investigating ethnic identity formation. He is determined that while ethnicity makes us build walls and fences, our differences give us more reasons, to build bridges. He is currently the Program Officer of The Asia Foundation’s conflict management program.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 13. ... xiiiYOHEI SASAKAWA is the President of the Nippon Foundation, and World Health Organization SpecialAmbassador for the Elimination of Leprosy. Through the Foundation, he envisions a world in which humanshave transcended politics and ideology, and religion and race, in the effort to find solutions to poverty and humanmisery. Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 14. xiv ...MESSAGEA CHALLENGE TO PUBLIC INTELLECTUALSEMIL SALIMFormer State Minister for Population and Environment of IndonesiaSKELETON OF A CONTEMPORARY VILLAGE work of swinging the sickle to cut the rice stalks.A friend of mine just returned from her home villageafter spending her Idil Fitri celebration there. She was ‘Miracle rice’ also requires chemical fertilisers, pesticidesdismayed to watch the deterioration of her village. and irrigated water. To boost the production of this rice, the government has provided these materials at aShe remembered with fondness how she used to be subsidised price. Gone is the organic fertiliser, pushedwoken up early in the morning by the sound of the aside by cheaper chemical fertilisers. Production of ricewooden bells that hung around the necks of a herd of per acre of land has increased. But through time, thebuffaloes passing her home. amount of fertiliser needed to produce 4 tonnes per hectare, continues to increase. More and more chemicalNow it is all quiet. Tractors have replaced the buffaloes, fertilisers are required, reducing the organic fertility ofsince the government has introduced ‘miracle rice’. But the soil, until the soil can only support the productiontractors need diesel oil and proper maintenance. If these of rice with chemical fertilisers.are not forthcoming, then rice fields cannot be ploughed.The price of diesel oil and cost of maintenance have Pesticides are needed to cope with germs, bugs, andrisen sharply since the 1997 crisis has hit the economy. other harmful micro-organisms. But the more pesticideSince then, the farmers have not used the tractors, is sprayed, the more pesticide seems to be needed.while the buffaloes have already been sold. The rice Moreover, the rain washes leftover pesticides fromfields are barely being planted now due to rising costs in irrigation drains into rivers. The pesticide kills fish andtandem with meagre benefits. Furthermore, a lot of men other biological resources. As a small child, my friendhave left farming and have migrated to the cities to do used to use a bamboo basket to catch small fish for herodd jobs to earn money. own consumption. The river is now dead and has no fish any more.In the past, aunts, mothers, sisters, and nieces loved tocut rice stalks in the rice fields with a small wooden knife With subsidised inputs for rice, the whole rice foodcalled ani-ani. It was a work of joy, where everybody programme has evolved into a subsidy-dependenthelped everybody else. Mutual help and the spirit of pattern of production. This makes other agriculturalcooperation flourished and formed the basis for their products that are not subsidised unattractive; thesesocial relationships. include fruits, flowers, and non-rice food. The whole agricultural sector has grown along a distorted priceNow with the ‘miracle rice’ seed, rice plants are shorter. structure, with negative consequences on non-riceA sickle has replaced the ani-ani as a tool to cut rice production.more efficiently, but now it is used by men. The colourfulpicture of women dressed in their native kebaya working Meanwhile, by eroding the natural fertility of soil,in a sea of yellow rice fields has now been replaced by chemical fertilisers are gradually poisoning the soil. Inthe naked chests of men dripping with sweat due to the an experiment where volumes of chemical fertiliser wereEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 15. ... xvwashed away from the soil, a period of 10 years passed What the government initially conceived as a policybefore the soil could be used to grow fresh vegetables, for assuring decent incomes for the farmers, has becomefruits, and rice using organic fertilisers again. a vehicle for making quick money for those in charge through cooperation with the traditional moneylenders-Nonetheless, the Green Revolution has made a cum-rice-buyers.significant impact on the increase of rice productionin Indonesia. In the 1970s, Indonesia was importing When visiting her village, my friend was struck by theclose to 25 per cent of the global marketable surplus of fact that the most luxurious house in the village was therice. In the mid 1980s, it reached food self-sufficiency. personal property of the VUC manager.This increase of rice production has raised the incomeof farmers in the rural areas. It plays an important role Meanwhile, the village only has an elementary school.in reducing the percentage of those living below the Secondary high school is 15 kilometres from the village.poverty line. It has significantly altered the natural as Children have to walk and those who can afford to, gowell as social landscape of the country. by bicycle. What’s more, there are no health services in the village. Again, one has to walk kilometres to reachOn the other hand, it has destroyed the social and a health centre in the city. As for other facilities, thecultural fabric of the village society. Those who gained Rice Huller Company has bought the previous informalmost from this Green Revolution were the farmers market place under the banyan tree and this openwith large landholdings above one hectare. They could space has been transformed into a cemented yard to dryafford the use of modern tractors, irrigated rice fields, paddy.rice-hulls and dryers. The head of the village is a young man with high schoolBut the farmers with small land-holdings of below education. He has no aspirations to get the villagehalf a hectare are suffering badly. They usually end up moving ahead. His preoccupation is to move upwards,borrowing money by using their small land-holdings to get out of the village and to go to the city. To reachas collateral and becoming net rice buyers after their this goal, he feels obliged to serve his superiors at themeagre production of rice is exhausted. sub-district level and every dignitary who passes through his village by providing them with local fruits or freshThe government has set up a buffer-stock agency in vegetables, which he takes freely from the farmers.charge of keeping the price of rice stable at a profitablelevel for the farmers. If the price of rice dropped below This is not a unique skeleton of a contemporarythe floor price, the agency is entitled to buy rice from village in Java. It is rather a representative picture,the farmer. The agency is also entitled to sell the rice in with a much worse situation in the eastern part of thethe market when its price exceeds the predetermined Indonesian archipelago, which is suffering from irregularceiling price. The agency is working through the Village transportation and communication.Unit Cooperative (VUC) in every village to implementthis buffer-stock operation. Criticism of the Green Revolution is not new. What is surprising, however, is the fact that the aftermathUnfortunately, most of the VUC managers are of this revolution is so devastating. What is urgentlyinexperienced, so the scheme has failed to reach its needed now is to raise pertinent questions, such as whatobjective of assuring good incomes for the farmers. In went wrong? Why is this so? What can be done to getaddition, because of their inexperience, many VUC these villages out of the poverty trap? What changesmanagers are working with traditional rice buyers. These are required?are traditional creditors who have a debt relationshipwith the farmers, who use their credit limits to meet UNSUSTAINABLE GROWTHtheir needs in the off-harvest season. Debts are paid by The main lesson that can be drawn from the experiencesselling rice in advance of the harvest at a low price to of this village is that it suffers from a degradingthese creditors. development process at the micro level within an Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 16. xvi ...unsustainable development pattern at the macro level. cities dynamic growth centres with adequateThis is indicated by the following features: electricity, drinking water supply, housing, and• First, at the micro level, the agricultural transportation facilities which attract migrants. development that takes place is heavily subsidised Increased population in the cities raises the and promotes environment-unfriendly inputs demand for more investment in infrastructure that such as chemical fertilisers and pesticides. This further stimulates population inflow to the cities. subsidised system distorts market prices at the This, in turn, induces investment in education, expense of local environmental-friendly inputs, health, electricity, and housing development that such as organic fertilisers and local micro- increases the gap between urban and rural sectors, organisms. The most costly consequence of creating a brain drain from rural areas and the this approach is that it eliminates the organic loss of creative as well as productive people. This fertility of the soil and makes it too dependent perpetuates unequal growth between urban and on chemicals. This affects agricultural products rural areas. through increased contamination that, through consumption, negatively affects human health. • Fifth, the development process makes use of the financial markets, which are able to register• Second, the average farmer has no access to natural economic signals of change but fail to record social resources to raise production and income. There and environmental signals. The consequence is that is no access either to information about other cost structures take into account only economic opportunities for raising income. Nor is there any costs, but ignore social and environmental costs. access to participate in developmental decision- Environmental components exist mostly in making at the local level. There is no facility in the public domain and are hence accessible to the village for education, health, or capacity- everybody. Therefore, environmental costs are building to raise villagers’ productivity. In brief, usually treated as external factors outside a firm there are no facilities or services that allow the and are not internalised in conventional cost and poor to raise their capacity to alleviate poverty, so benefit accounting. Therefore, polluting companies the poor remain stuck in the poverty trap. are not paying environmental costs, which then become then the burden of the general public.• Third, there are no organisations or institutional The same applies to social, cultural and political arrangements, including from the government, components that fall within the public domain, that deal with the misfortune of the villagers and such as social cohesion, cultural enhancement, and protect them from being overcharged, mishandled political stability. The market fails to give them or extorted by usurers. Government agencies that market value. Only the government can correct are supposed to assist the farmers to stabilise the this by interfering in the market through the use price of rice and to liberate them from usurers, of subsidies or taxation and internalise social and are part of the system that perpetuates their environmental externalities into the development suffering. Civil society is too weak at the village cost structure. level. There are no informal leaders with sufficient strength to protect the villagers. Meanwhile, the To meet these five challenges, it is important to move formal leaders are more concerned with their own away from a strict economic approach and also tackle personal interests, which lie outside the boundaries social and environmental issues. But this requires a of their villages. different approach of development that requires the full commitment of the government to merge economic,• Fourth, at the macro level, economic development social, and environmental components into the is supported by exports of goods and services mainstream of sustainable development. which are provided by the modern sector with capital, technology, and sophisticated skills. Conventional development takes labour, natural These activities take place in urban areas, making resources, capital, technology, and skills as individualEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 17. ... xviifactors of production. In sustainable development, this Renewable resources can be used up to the threshold ofview must changed. its restoration level. Beyond this, the resources cannot renew themselves. This is the reason why soil, fauna,Labour as a production factor is considered human flora, and fish must not be exploited beyond theircapital. Through education, capacity building, increased threshold of restoration levels, if they are to supporthealth, and improved nutrition intake, the productivity sustainable development.and quality of human capital can be increased. But natural resources exist within a network ofWhat is overlooked is the inter-relation and interaction ecological systems or ecosystems. There are marinebetween individuals that creates social capital. A ecosystems, coastal ecosystems, lowland ecosystems,more cohesive society can assure a better societal forest ecosystems, mountain ecosystems, and so on.environment that induces more sustainability compared Within the context of these various ecosystems, theseto a more loosely connected society. This is particularly natural resources develop the capacity to support life.true for Indonesia with its hundreds of ethnic groups, Development can only be sustainable if it maintains theraces, religions, and a geographic spread of islands over life support function of ecosystems.a distance equivalent to the distance from Londonto Cairo. In such a society, social cohesion must be The third factor of production is man-made capital.enhanced. And social investment is urgently required Through technology, man created industries,to develop social tranquillity. Spending on human infrastructure, and other capital products. Technologyresources development is hence of equal importance as itself is also man-made. But most of these technologiesspending on man-made capital. have been developed following the laws of nature. In a way, technology is man’s attempt to imitate nature in aNatural resources are the second significant factor of man-made environment.production. The value of natural resources dependson their scarcity. The greater the demand on a scarce There is, however, also financial capital that is basednatural resource, the higher its value and price. Natural on transactions in the market. Financial capital suchresources are not homogenous and can be distinguished as cash funds, investments, and other monetaryas: instruments lubricates the use of natural resources and• perpetual resources, such as direct solar energy, human resources to produce and consume goods and winds, tides, and flowing water; services.• renewable resources, such as soil, water, air, fauna, and flora; and These combined factors of production of labour, natural• non-renewable resources, such as metallic minerals resources, and man-made resources have given humans like copper and aluminium; non-metallic minerals the ability to produce, distribute, and consume goods like sand, clay, and phosphates; and fossil fuel like and services to satisfy human wants and needs within gasoline and gas. an economic system. In this economic system, it is the market that gives signals to consumers, producers andThese distinctions have different implications governments to make economic decisions on what,on sustainability in resource use. Non-renewable where, how, and how much to consume and produce.resources are depleted in the course of their use. Theirsustainability has a finite time horizon. To ensure The economic system is considered the overridingsustainable development, non-renewable resources must main system that dominates all other systems such asbe most efficiently managed, where possible, recycled, social and environmental systems, which are treated asand when fully depleted, substituted by other resources subordinate to the economic system.that can do the same function. Meanwhile, a depletionfund should be set up and invested in activities to In the economic system, the allocation of resources isperpetuate development when non-renewable resources dictated by the price mechanism of the market. Onlyare used up. market based economic decisions are taken, and other Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 18. xviii ...considerations that do not enter or are registered by the course of development, to move from conventional tomarket are disregarded. sustainable development.Social considerations, such as the inability of the poor, CHANGING PARADIGMScompared to the rich, to control natural and man-made With the increase in the population of the world fromproductive resources, are not revealed in the preference almost 4 billion people in 1972 when the first Unitedscale as captured by the market. As a consequence, ‘the Nations Conference on Human Environment washaves’ control more resources, and the rich get richer launched in Stockholm, Sweden, to almost double thatand the poor poorer, both individually and as a country – 8 billion by 2020, and combined with the increase incompared to other countries. income and consumption levels of people around the globe, the pressure on natural resources and ecosystemsEnvironmental considerations are also outside the scope will grow beyond their carrying capacities.of the market economy. Pollution, resource depletion,biodiversity erosion, environmental degradation, If all the 6.1 billion people of the world today wantedgreenhouse gas emissions leading towards global to have the same lifestyle and consumption level of thewarming, climate change and sea level rise – all of these 280 million people of the United States today, theyare ignored especially by those championing the free or would need a land area of three Earths combined.2 Thisliberal market because they are not registered in market is clearly not possible.prices. And because of this, the handling of theseenvironmental issues are not considered as important To cope with this challenge, the prevailing paradigmsas mainstream development issues, such as control of of conventional development must change to those ofinflation, employment, or terrorism and war. sustainable development. Development does not follow the single path of economy, but it must follow a mutuallyThis has led the President of the World Bank, James interactive economic, social and environmental pathWolfensohn, in a Board of Governors of the World of development that flows into the mainstream ofBank meeting, to state in his speech that, “Our planet sustainable development.is not balanced. Too few control too much, and toomany have too little to hope for – too much turmoil, It is in this context that the following considerationstoo many wars, too much suffering.” 1 must be met: • First, in recognition of its function as the humanThe current conventional type of development is life support system, the ecological system must beclearly not sustainable when economics is the major treated as the main system, while the economic anddominating system, while social and environmental social systems are subordinate subsystems. Naturalfactors are its sub-systems, and when the market resources and ecosystems become constraints thatregisters only economic preferences, and not social or set the boundaries within which development takesenvironmental preferences. It is also not beneficial for place. Economic and social development must nowthe poor, the vulnerable, and the socially weak, and not ensure that they do not exert negative impacts onsuitable to ensure the sustainability of ecosystems as life the ecological system. Realising that the marketsupport systems. does not identify these negative impacts on an ex ante basis, it is important that the governmentThe experience of the contemporary village above is corrects these market failures. This requires aa living demonstration of the failure of conventional paradigm shift of looking at development not fromdevelopment to recognise the principle of sustainability. the economic point of view, but from that of the ecological system’s sustainability.It is important that other villages need not experiencesimilar fates in the future. It is with this consideration • Second, the development process does notthat Indonesia, Asia, and the world must change their proceed on a unilateral line, emphasising onlyEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 19. ... xix economic development. Rather, it follows a The general targets are: multilateral line embracing the economic, social, 1. to integrate the principles of sustainable and environmental dimensions of development. development into country policies and programmes Sustainable development is conducted in an and reverse the losses of environmental resources; interdependent matrix relationship between 2. to halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without economic, social, and environmental factors sustainable access to safe drinking water; and of growth; there is an interactive relationship 3. to achieve by 2020, a significant improvement in between and among these three elements. All three the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers. factors must be in equilibrium when implementing sustainable development. To monitor the MDG the following nine indicators have been agreed:• Third, a triangular partnership among govern- • Proportion of land area covered by forest; ment, business, and civil society needs to imple- • Ration of area protected to maintain biological ment sustainable development together. The diversity to surface area; government is the overall agency responsible in a • Energy use (kilogramme oil equivalent) per $1 state and is usually concerned with upholding its Gross Domestic Product at Purchasing Power political power. Businesses are interested in devel- Parity; oping their economic power. Civil society focuses • Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita); on vulnerable groups whose interests are bypassed • Consumption of ozone depleting CFCs (ODP by the market and who obtain marginal attention tonnes); from other groups. Development usually takes • Proportion of population using solid fuels; place by governments in cooperation or sometimes • Proportion of population with sustainable assess to by cooptation by business and vice versa. Civil so- an improved water source, urban and rural; ciety is kept outside of economic decision-making. • Proportion of urban population with access to Democracy and sustainable development is only improved sanitation; and genuinely effective if this triangular partnership • Proportion of population with access to secure prevails. tenure (owned or rented).4• Fourth, the prevalence of good governance is a The merging of economic, social and environmental strategic prerequisite for the sound implementation factors into sustainable development can be monitored of sustainable development. Transparency, through these nine indicators, whose data are available. accountability, and participation must be the These indicators are supplementary to available global guiding rules of good governance in implementing indicators such as: sustainable development. Without these guiding • World Development Indicators by the World rules, development has proven to be a failure in Bank; assuring sustainability. Nigeria, Niger, Madagascar, • Human Development Index by the UN Develop- Zambia, Haiti, Venezuela were much better off 40 ment Program; years ago than today in spite of the availability of • Environmental Performance Measurement by the rich natural resources.3 World Economic Forum; • Global Competition Survey by the World Eco-On the basis of these four considerations, a set of nomic Forum; andsustainable development indicators have been selected • Corruption Perception Index published byby the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Transparency International.Development (OECD), that is derived from theMillennium Development Goals (MDG) as agreed by These indices give a comparative view on what can beHead of Member States of the United Nations in the achieved by other countries within a given time frame.year 2000. It also may serve as guidance as to which direction to go. Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 20. xx ...A VISION OF THE FUTURE the growth of industries to process extractive resources.Many of the Indonesian villages and rural sector are Domestic factors have been key elements in stagnatingsuffering serious setbacks. One reason is the neglect of development in the Indonesian rural and village sectorssocial and environmental development and a biased and development in general as well. But external factorsemphasis on an economic approach to development. are currently exerting an increasing obstructive role inThe growth in rice production depends more and getting development to take place and to pull the poormore on subsidised chemical fertilisers and pesticides out of their poverty trap. While domestic factors arewhile disregarding their negative impacts on the being handled, more and more attention is absorbed toenvironment. tackle external factors.When this subsidised system collapsed, the incentive to The world today is full with global challenges. In theproduce rice stopped. Prices of agricultural products were 1980s, the IMF, the World Bank and the US Treasurynot attractive compared to their costs of production. reached a consensus in Washington DC to meet these global challenges with a strategy of development onAs for other commodities, Indonesia was in the past a the basis named the Washington Consensus. The basicmajor producer of sugar. Developed countries, however, ideas are:are heavily subsidising sugar, inducing farmers fromrich countries to produce more, thus pushing the global • First, the role of government in the economysugar price down. This artificial low price of sugar has must be minimised. It reflects the spirit of thedestroyed Indonesia’s sugar sector. time when transition is taking place from a communist command economy to capitalistSubsidies in the US, for one, has hurt other sectors market economy. It gives rise to liberalisation andand countries. Subsidies for cotton in the US directly market fundamentalism with its zeal to free up thebenefits only 25,000 mostly very well-off US farmers, markets, including financial and capital markets;who account for a third of total global output. This is • Second, to promote privatisation of state-owneddespite the fact that US production costs are double the enterprises, to eliminate government regulationsinternational price. These US farmers have gained at and interventions in the economy, includingthe expense of 10 million poor African farmers. It is not removing subsidies. The private sector, especiallysurprising to find in Africa, countries that lose more in foreign companies, has better access to financialtrade than they gain in aid. Mali, for instance, received capital and technical experts and hence isUS$37 million in aid but lost $43 million from depressed considered to be in a better position to createprices due to subsidies by developed countries.5 employment; • Third, the government’s role is to assure macroIn terms of exports, the exports of garment and textiles stability with its emphasis on inflation control.into the US follows a quota system. The US has linked In this context promoting exports is preferred tothe increase of Indonesia’s quota in textile and garment removing impediments of imports. Participatingwith the opening up of Indonesia’s market for US in the export market is in line with globalisationchicken meat. This importing of US chicken meat is of the economy.also important to meet US standards as required byfranchise arrangements of US food chains operating in In implementing this doctrine, it soon became apparentIndonesia. that this could not be treated as a ‘one size fits all’ doctrine, but required modifications in its implementation. MostIndonesia is a mineral rich country and the mining worrying is the fact that this doctrine is applied in aindustry does play an important role in its economy. globe that suffers serious inequality between nations.However, the industry is limited to producing raw This inequality is strengthened and sustained by themining material only. High import duties on processed application of double standards perpetuated by themining products in developed countries are obstructing Washington Consensus in managing global challenges.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 21. ... xxiDeveloping countries are asked to remove subsidies contents of these policies, programmes and processesand open their markets in the global economy. But must be designed bottom up through a participatorysubsidies in developed countries still remain, especially process from the field among the participants ofin agriculture and processed mining products, where the triangular partnership of government, businessdeveloping countries have comparative advantages but companies and civil society.are hampered to make use of it. In global development index terms these objectivesDeveloping countries must apply a balanced budget to mean that most Asian countries must reach in 2020:control inflation, while developed countries are running • Middle income country level of below thedeficits in disregard of their impact on the global price US$5,000 per capita (constant value);level, especially negatively affecting basic necessities • Moderate level of Human Development Index;for the poor. • Low level of corruption perception index; • Medium-high competition index; andMacro economic stability is focused too much on • Moderate environmental performance measure-inflation control, but less on opening employment ment.opportunities in developing countries with highunemployment rates. Policy measures are promoting The Organisation for Economic Co-operation andforeign investment, while ignoring the need for an Development (OECD) in their projection on the worldequal playing field for local companies that have to face in 20206 has predicted that Big Five non-OECD majorfierce competition for which they are unprepared. players are those countries that have both populations in excess of 100 million and Gross Domestic ProductsBy applying the Washington Consensus, it is clear that above US$100 billion. They play important roles ininequality in the globe will prevail. The rich will get trade, investment, agriculture, energy, and the globalricher and the poor will get poorer. environment. Along with other countries, each of these Big Five countries plays a leadership role in theirWhat is wrong with the Washington Consensus respective regions and in international relations. Theseis that it follows a singular economic-only-tract of Big Five countries are Russia, China, India, Indonesiadevelopment. It ignores the social and environmental and Brazil.tracts. The Washington Consensus also relies solelyon the strength of private enterprises as engines of Of these Big Five countries, China, India and Indonesiadevelopment. It ignores the possible positive role of are in Asia. It is hence reasonable to assume that ingovernments and civil society. It forgets that without the first quarter of the twentieth-first century, globalchecks and balances among government, business and development will be influenced by Asian development.civil society in a participatory democracy, clean and And that Asian development will be pulled by thegood governance cannot be forthcoming. ‘locomotive’ of China, India and East Asia, in which ASEAN, with Indonesia, is part of it.The Washington consensus did not realise thatthe market is imperfect, especially in recording the The prevalence and effectiveness of sustainablepreference scales for social and environmental services. development in the globe will be determined by whatIt is clear that the Washington Consensus will bring us a extent Asian development will pursue the sustainablefuture that is totally not acceptable. We need therefore path. China is planning to aim for a ‘one-car-per-family-a vision for a new future: a future of Asia 2020 with: by-2020’. India has more or less the same ambition. The• Less poverty as its economic objective; crucial question is how these aspirations are being met.• More equity as its social objective; and If Asia is following a development path that is more or• Better quality as its environment objective. less similar to that of developed countries during their initial industrialization phase, which is not sustainable,This requires a pro-poor economic policy, pro-equity then sustainable development will not become a realitysocial policy and pro-quality environment policy. The within an Asian development model. Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 22. xxii ...The challenge now, however, is how to pursue a A public intellectual is more than a scholar withsustainable development model for Asia, which its knowledge, science and wisdom at his or her possession.billions of people. If development is to be sustainable, A public intellectual has also a moral obligation and ait clearly calls for a different approach in road, urban, conscientious responsibility to provide the way that istransportation, energy and industrial development. most fitting, especially to the general public, to meet theThe current model of development relies heavily on challenges of the future along the path of sustainablefossil fuels with their resulting carbon dioxide emissions development.and negative impacts on air pollution, global warming,climate change and sea level rises that will hit hardest In this Second Asian Public Intellectual Workshop, letdeveloping countries, especially those at the equator, us seize the opportunity to rise to the challenge for Asiarather then developed countries. And within these to lead the globe in its quest for development that iscountries, the poor will suffer most. sustainable and enables current and future generations to live a humane life with dignity and prosperity forGlobal warming will also increase the drying up of all.surface fresh water. With the reduction of forest areas,the capacity of ecosystems to conserve water will also Notesdrop. Fresh water supply will reduce while its demandwill go up due to population increase and developmental 1 James D. Wolfensohn, “A New Global Balance, theneeds. Likewise, land degradation and desertification Challenge of Leadership”, address of the President of thewill increase. World Bank Group to the Board of Governors in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 23 Sept. 2003, 13.While environmental challenges are increasing, the risein social challenges will make development much more 2 G. Tyler Miller, Jr, Sustaining the Earth, An Integratedcomplex. The growth in population, of which 65 per Approach, fifth edition, (N.p.: Wadsworth Group, 2002),cent of the total population is expected to concentrate 7.in urban area, means an increase in the struggle forland, water and space, which will raise potential social 3 The World Bank, World Development Report 2003,conflicts. If business-as-usual is pursued, the discrepancy Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World,Transformingbetween rich and poor will increase, and that will also lnstitutions, Growth and Quality of Life, (N.p.: The Worldraise potential social conflicts. Bank, 2003) 149.In brief, future challenges in the economic, social and 4 Lisa Segnestam, Indicators of Environment andenvironmental realms will be much more complex Sustainable Development, Theories and Practicalthan today. These challenges require different modes, Experience, Environment Department Papers, Theparadigms and models of development, incorporating World Bank (Jan. 2003) 27.all these three elements into a single flow of sustainabledevelopment moving with a clear vision towards a new 5 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties, (New York:future. W. W.Norton & Company, 2003) 207.It is in this context that history calls for the emergence 6 Organisation for Economic Cooperation andof Asian public intellectuals to provide intellectual and Development, The World in 2020, (Paris: OECD, 1997)moral leadership in this changing world, like lighthouses 13.providing guidance for ships that pass in the night.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 23. ... xxiiiMESSAGETRANSNATIONAL EXCHANGE AND LEARNINGYOHEI SASAKAWAThe Nippon FoundationI am delighted to have this opportunity to meet the clear that the people of Asia had little knowledgesecond group of Asian Public Intellectuals (API) about their Asian neighbours. We discovered that ourFellows, and join the workshop. I would like to express understanding of our neighbours was limited to whatmy heartfelt appreciation to His Excellency Emil we saw through the eyes of Western scholars. This wasSalim, Dr. Umar Anggara Jenie, Chairman of LIPI, a source of great concern to us. Further promotion ofDr. Taufik Abdullah, former Chairman of LIPI, and mutual knowledge and understanding, through directother esteemed guests, for taking time out from their exchange and dialogue, was urged.busy schedules to attend the opening ceremony of thesecond API workshop. One conclusion that we reached was that there was a strong need for a new framework that would provideIt has now been three years since the API Fellowship Asian people with as many opportunities as possibleProgram was started. I would like to express my sincere to engage in mutual exchange and cooperation. Atgratitude to the members of the Partner Institutions the same time, it became clear that Asian countrieswho have administered the Program from the beginning were facing an increasing number of problems thatwith such earnest effort and dedication. transcended national boundaries, for which Asia had to find its own solutions. This was complexly intertwinedI am also grateful to the members of the Domestic and with the wave of globalisation that had swept the world.International Selection Committees. These people, As a result, it was becoming increasingly difficult for awith their outstanding insight, have selected remarkable nation to solve problems by herself alone.Fellows. With these people’s support, the Program hasbeen a great success. Following the end of the Cold War, it was thought that the world would finally tread a path of peacefulFor this workshop, we have been blessed with the development. Instead, we have witnessed the rise ofwonderful support and cooperation of two organisations a range of complex issues that threaten human life,in particular: LIPI and IKMAS UKM. livelihood, and dignity, such as terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts, and the gap between the rich andFinally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the poor.each and every one of the people involved, for theirwonderful work. We tried to identify the root causes that led to this situation, and ways in which we could tackle theseIn the late 1990s, we, at The Nippon Foundation, had various issues. We asked ourselves who could identifybeen searching for ways in which Japan, as a member of and articulate these issues and bring together people’sAsian society, could participate in collaborative efforts knowledge and efforts to resolve them. We reached thefor the development of Asia. Through discussions with conclusion that Asia needed more publicly committedeminent Asian intellectuals at the time, it became intellectual leaders, or ‘public intellectuals’, with the Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 24. xxiv ...ability to tackle these issues. And to that end, we would However, in order to bring about change, this potentialidentify these public intellectuals and provide them must be realised and fully harnessed. API Fellows arewith opportunities for transnational exchange and expected to make use of their research findings andlearning. work, not only for the good of their own country and society, but to transcend national borders and fields ofThey would be given opportunities to engage in expertise. They are expected to work with each othercollaborative activities, so that they could bring together towards the resolution of common issues.their wisdom and knowledge, and articulate measuresfor resolving these problems. They would then need to In that sense, this workshop is a wonderful opportunitybe organised to implement the proposed solutions. to elevate the potentials of individuals to a greater collective potential, and identify ‘what we can achieveThe API Fellowship Program, for which we are gathered as a community’.here today, was established in response to such needs. Intellectuals are often criticised for only generatingThe API Community comprises a total of approximately new ideas, and not putting them into action. What120 fellows including the fourth group of Fellows that distinguishes the public intellectuals of the APIwas selected yesterday by the International Selection community is that they not only generate new ideas,Committee. but also devise ways of putting them to use.If we further add the people that support this API I hope that the participants of the workshop will shareFellowship Program in participating countries – the with each other their research results and their extensivemembers of Committees and Partner Institutions knowledge and experience, generating new and feasible– the API community expands to a group of about 200 ideas that will lead Asia to a better future.people. I sincerely hope that this workshop will be rememberedThis regional community, consisting of individuals who as a success, and I look forward to the future activitieshave significant social influence and are committed to of the API Fellows.the betterment of society, has strong potential to bringabout change.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 25. ... xxvINTRODUCTIONECONOMIC PROSPECTS, CULTURAL ENCOUNTERS, AND POLITICAL DECISIONS:SCENES IN A MOVING ASIA (EAST AND SOUTHEAST)EDI SEDYAWATIResearch Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, University of IndonesiaOVERVIEW 2. A regional scope, such as the European UnionEconomic prospects, cultural encounters, and political and the Association of Southeast Asian Nationsdecisions are inter-related in a mutual cause-effect (ASEAN); andrelationship. Multinational enterprises have expanded 3. The ‘special interest’ or advocacy multilateraltheir operations and now cover ‘the whole world’. organisations such as the Non-Aligned MovementAccordingly, they recruit staff from any country that (NAM) and the Organisation of the Islamicsuits their demands for efficient expertise. The staff Conference (OIC).are fully aware of how to cope with multiculturalsituations. The second largest scope of decision-making is that of the state as a whole, represented by governments andRecent listings of qualifications required for recruitment other national agencies. Of lesser dimensions are thoseor even in-house training include an aptitude to deal of local administrative units, within which there are awith cross-cultural problems. In a positive way, this number of layers.can be regarded as a concrete implementation of theideal demand of the world today: that there be a mutual The smallest unit of decision-making is that of theappreciation among cultures. community.However, since the ultimate goal of corporations It goes without saying that noise may intervene in theis always to make as much profit as possible, the communication of political decisions from the largest toemployment of individuals with cross-cultural aptitudes the smallest dimension or scope, and vice versa.is directed more towards ‘conquering’ the targetedculture bearers. A position of advocacy, on the contrary, Cultural encounters often happen as the outcomes ofeither taken by governments or by non governmental activities are primarily directed at economic prospects.organisations (NGOs), is normally more directed Alternatively, they can be the result of some politicaltowards strengthening the dignified existence of every decision on any level. An example of a culturalliving culture. encounter aimed at economic prospects is trade, while that related to a transmigration project is an example ofLooking at ‘politics’ in a broad perspective, we have to the result of a political decision.note that scope of political decision-making is varied. The relationship between two parties can either beThe largest dimension is represented by international symmetrical or asymmetrical, in terms of educationalor multilateral organisations, either state-based or level, the possession of the means of production, theotherwise. They can be classified as having: command of certain religious teachings, priorities in1. A worldwide scope, therefore claiming or expecting political networking, etc. Encounters of peoples of to aspire to universal values, such as the United different ethnicities within one territory used to be Nations and the World Trade Organisation; classified as resulting in either assimilation, the making Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 26. xxvi ...of a ‘melting pot’, or an acceptance of plurality. and promoted intensively. However, some parts of those ‘gains’ were originally owned by certain otherThe overbearing terms or phrases that appear daily in nations or ethnic groups. Some protection and legalthe press the world over reverberate with the words of schemes regarding cultural rights are in favour of thepolitical figures, such as, “democratisation”, “human industrialists, to the effect that the original traditionalrights”, “free markets”, and even, “towards a stateless owners are left without a stake. A case in point is thesociety”, or “we are now living in a global village”. legal registration of traditional designs by foreigners.Those terms and phrases, however, are often used indiscourse that implies a compulsion to be absolutely Industrialisation implies the creation of new needsbelieved. among consumers. Many of these new needs are indeed beneficial since they may enrich one’s life by enlargingIt is only in some scientific articles and research reports the spectrum of experience, or ease the difficulties of life.that a specific situation (in a specific society with a Products of the cultural industry are the most influentialspecific culture) is dealt with scrupulously, thus bringing since they may transform, or even alter people’s tastes,the understanding that a sense of democracy, for preferences, and thinking.instance, could be present without having the outwardappearance of a democratic system like that found in In the beginning, it was the book that constituted the‘another country’. most important product of the cultural industry, in terms of its capacity to influence people’s minds. Next, it wasThe term ‘tradition’ is also often misunderstood. the influence of the technology of sound recording andAlthough the rise of modernism was initially a reaction then the music record industry. The contents wereagainst tradition, it should by no means mean that initially of European culture and its offshoots in thetraditions should be totally wiped out to give way to United States. Not to be missed out is the film industrymodernisation. Modernity and tradition should not which began in the US as a successfully marketedbe seen as encoded in complementary forms, and thus business.absolutely opposed to each other. Modern thinkingand conservation of tradition should be allocated their Since the products of those cultural industries have beenrespective fields for application, and hence the two can disseminated widely throughout the world, includingbe integrated within the life of a person, a community, countries outside their origins, cultural influences haveor a nation. been the natural consequence, including the best and the worst of its influences. Alas, an overwhelmingA PROBLEM OF EXPOSURE AND influence in ‘targeting other countries’ may also resultRECOGNITION in the alienation of the people of those ‘other countries’Many writers have acknowledged the fact that as a from their own traditional cultures.result of previous colonisation processes as well asso-called ‘globalisation’, there is an imbalance of Through the products of the Western cultural industrychoices and political power (backed up by military and (often paralleled with modern educational systemseconomic powers) between the rich industrial countries based on Western models) the minds of those ‘target’and the poor ‘developing’ countries. The so-called people become more or less ‘Westernised’, to a levelsecond revolution in human civilisation, which was that they consider the Western model the only properindustrialisation, had made its initiators leaders in ever- and legitimate one in the world. The worst effect is thatexpanding market creation. All the rest of the world everything in accordance with the Western model istends to be seen as potential markets and sources of raw regarded with high esteem, while the cultural heritagematerials. of a people’s own country is looked down upon.Meanwhile, instruments for the protection of their At this point we can no more speak of a freedomgains, resulting from exploration, exploitation, as well as of choice, since the choice has been dictated bydata organisation and innovation, have been designed aggressive promotion and advertising, which are partEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 27. ... xxviiof the strategies of the cultural industry. The culturally be addressed immediately is that of the provision ofcounterproductive effect is the fact that the dominating, capital. It is understood that for developing countrieseasy-to-access cultural merchandise is that of the this problem is a dilemma, since primary livingpopular genre. As a consequence of the inundation necessities should also be prioritised. It is only a systemof foreign cultural goods from highly industrialised of incentives that may provide the most direct solution,countries, the cultures of developing countries mostly apart from the allocation of funds from the governmentsuffer from a problem of lack of exposure, and hence a itself.problem of recognition. FREE MARKET MEANS CULTURALTheir own traditional cultural expressions, such as in DOMINATIONliterature, the visual and performing arts, including The cultural industry tends to grow in an unlimitedarchitecture, become rarely exposed in comparison with fashion, ever searching for markets for its products. Asthe flood of the so-called ‘modern’ culture. Knowledge a source of economic growth, industrial and tradingand appreciation of the fruits of traditional culture companies have made themselves more and more solidbecome scarce and tend to be regarded as unimportant, and powerful, more so when they embark upon theor even irrelevant and disreputable. establishment of multinational corporations.Moreover, their own new cultural industries may have These economic agents need a free market to developbeen developed according to the dictates of the low- their ingenuity. This expression of need is an economicbrow popular tastes cultivated by the originally Western standpoint that has become a political ideology,mass art such as is the case of certain kinds of movies championed persistently by governments of countriesand popular songs, resulting in imitative products. having great economic power.A PROBLEM OF CAPITAL The importing of products of the cultural industry hasThe cultural heritage as well as historical awareness of been in some ways detrimental to many local cultures.a people constitute the basic ingredients for an identity. Local cultures have been pushed to the margin to giveIt is therefore a compelling necessity that advocacy free way to products of the cultural industry that claimshould be given to the resurgence and the strengthening to be the embodiments of a ‘destined global culture’. Inof a people’s cultural and historical awareness. This fact, the contents of mass products are mostly of Westernadvocacy can only succeed if it is backed up by a strong origin, and of the low- and mid-brow category.visionary cultural industry in its widest sense. From a local culture’s point of view, the more pressingThis industry should consist of not only the production situation is the fact that the ideology of free markets goesof tangible cultural products such as books, records, films, hand-in-hand with that of ‘a free flow of information’.and all other forms of tangible media, but also a system Again, the leading party within this sphere of theof production of events for direct cultural encounters, ‘third revolution in human civilisation’, that issuch as performances, exhibitions, workshops, seminars, information systems and technology (IT), is mainly theetc. representative of Western culture.Political decision-makers should recognise that the The abundance of cultural goods facilitated by freecultural industry does have a deep impact on the mental market principles is encouraging cultural domination.and spiritual life of a people. It should not be disregarded Non-Western potentials that have risen to theand overshadowed by the calculations of material and challenge are still limited, coming mainly from Chinesephysical gains only within a development programme. and Japanese cultural backgrounds. Indian intellectuals have indeed contributed their share in the developmentOnce a decision has been wisely made to support cultural of IT as well as theoretical thinking on ‘global’ issues,and historical awareness towards the enhancement of but in terms of the content of the cultural industry, theira nation’s pride and dignity, the practical problem to contribution is not significantly influential yet. Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 28. xxviii ...Most Southeast Asian nations have yet to embark on is where the life of culture is. And the media shouldraising the awareness of the population and capacity- serve as a means of disseminating understanding, ofbuilding among industrial professionals on this issue. sharing values, and thus supporting culture as a vesselThese industrial professional workers should speed up of creativity, as a code of identity.in developing their expertise in working with all kindsof media. They should also be well-versed in their own 1. State Boundaries and Ethnic Identityculture, be it part of the national heritage or the free Aside from their present conditions, the problem of staterein of contemporary works. boundaries should also be given a historical perspective. With that perspective, historical awareness could beCREATIVITY WITHIN TRADITION raised and traditions of connectivity along an extendedVS. ACCELERATED INFORMATION time line between people and between countries couldDOMINATION be better understood. Shared heritage of cultures amongThe technology and dissemination systems of existing nations should be understood in terms of theirinformation are indeed developing at an incredible possible common roots. Ancient relations may stillspeed. They have to be mastered, not just be an imitation reverberate in today’s practices and attitudes.of what stronger parties have created in advance. Theyhave to be used creatively: to discover new formats It is therefore always beneficial to learn about pastand technical possibilities, as well as to promote a relationships among peoples or ethnic groups, amongpeople’s own culture. The unique cultural content countries or kingdoms. Power relations might also beof each country should be used and manipulated as a different from era to era. Present attitudes towards thecomparative advantage. The quality of work, of course, past may vary. Stereotyping and ethnocentrism mayshould be competitively viable. develop as a frozen reminiscence of past relations. Research on some details of that process may enlightenThe media in all its forms and formats, has become us to find solutions to potential conflicts.a dominant source of information. In particular, theInternet gives freedom to users to roam at a high speed In present-day Southeast Asia, several ethnic groups liveof access. The urgent need now is to empower users to in a traditional ‘roaming area’ that is now consideredbe able and wise enough to make good choices. On crossing of borders between states. This fact maythe other hand, it is a challenge for culture experts to pose problems of legality, although in terms of ethnicconvert all their selected, beneficial, and high quality identity there should not be a problem, except in theinformation into electronic media quickly. Countries co-adoption of a (slightly) different ‘national culture’.need a national drive for it, lest they lose the battle fornational identity. The following Fellows have looked at these issues from these perspectives:As a closing note, I would like to stress the urgent need • Dave Lumenta, Towards Transnational Dayakto improve our understanding of traditional cultures. Identities? Changing Interconnectedness, IdentitiesTraditions should not be understood as something static and Nation States – A Case Study on Iban-Kenyahor stagnant. Cultural historical facts have shown us that Relations in Sarawak, East Malaysia;traditions do evolve from time to time, in a varying pace • Wilfredo M. Torres III, Voyages and Ethnicityat different places and in different eras. across Reordered Frontiers: Conflict Resolution and Leadership in the Dynamics of Ethnic IdentityThe last 50 years of development in the arts of Java and Formation among the Sama Dilaut of Semporna;Bali, by way of example, has shown many new creations: • Akiko Tashiro, Conservation of Cultural Heritagenot only individual works of art, but also new genres of and the Formation of Local Identity - A Case inart forms, both in the visual and the performing arts. Northeast Thailand;There is indeed creativity within tradition. To flourish, • Motoko Kawano, Inter-ethnic Relations in ‘Ikanit needs a healthy and honourable forum that is nurtured Bilis’ Fishery: Experiences of Seberang Takir People inby myriad face-to-face encounters between people. That Terengganu, the Malay Peninsula; andEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 29. ... xxix• Slamet Trisutomo, Towards Sustainable Urban To understand these factors, the following studies were Identities: A Comparative Study of Johor Bahru and done: Fukuoka. • Vasana Chinvarakorn, Alternatives to Consumerism: Study of Consumer Movements in Malaysia and2. The Changing Context of Norms and Legality Japan;Any legal apparatus that man can come across may • Anas Saidi, Adaptation Strategies of Small Enterpriseshave different scopes in terms of its binding force. of the Muslim Minority in the Philippines during theOne that every citizen has to observe is national law. Economic Crisis Era; andInternational conventions as well as local traditional • Jose M. Galang Jr., The Impact of Officialcustomary laws might be binding for one person or a Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Directcategory of persons, but not for others. Nevertheless, Investment (FDI) Flows on the Globalisation Processsince change may happen in the structure of a society, in Selected Southeast Asian Economies.the relevance of a legal product may also change inrelation to a certain group of people. 4. Changing Social Relations Social categories may undergo a change in either theirThe vulnerability of a group of people, the disadvantaged, names or in the understanding about them. Thosecould be examined in detail so as to be able to advocate processes of discontinuation can happen because ofjustice for the group. Cultural values and related many factors, among them being: communicationnorms, are also likely to change with the advance in handicaps, the rise of new powers within a society, thesocial-economic environments that tend to be more influence of a ‘dominant discourse’ in the ‘mainstream’materialistic and individualistic in character. channels of communication, the emergence of new economic ‘tyrants’, the poverty pressure, and a myriadThe following Fellows have looked at these issues from of petty things which might change the course of athese perspectives: person’s life.• Aprilia Budi Hendrijani, Prostitution: In Search of Cultural Concepts in Thai Contexts; New institutional establishments like NGOs, or new• Alan J. Villarante, A Comparative Study of Juvenile ideas of social roles, such as that of women as leaders, Justice Systems in Malaysia and Japan: A Review of may assume new social relations not known before. The Policies, Approaches and Strategies; presence of foreign workers, or conversely, the sending• Arnold M. Azurin, A Zigzag Tour Across of (female) workers abroad, also necessitates specific Ethnopolitical Borders in Southeast Asia; and kinds of social relations previously unknown. The• Pateep Methakunavudhi, A Comparative Study features of an urban settlement may change in relation of Ethical Awareness Related to Information and to changing social demands, and hence might effect Communication Technology Security Issues Between social relations. Japanese and Thais; and• Nadiah Bamadhaj, 1965: Indonesian Historical The following studies can enlighten us all of such Memory — the Enforcement of Forget. processes of changes that actually happen: • Fumio Nagai, Decentralisation and Transformation3. Economics and Non-Market Factors of Local Politics in Thailand: The Case of LampangThe non-market factors that can influence the market Province;comprise, among others, the social awareness of • Tatak Prapti Ujiyati, The Street Vendor Movementconsumers about their rights to control the quality in Southeast Asian Cities: Case Study of Street Vendorof products. Cultural values and group solidarity may Organisations in Power Relations with the State inalso be instrumental in promoting as well as seeing Metro Manila and Kuala Lumpur;the ‘suspension’ of certain kinds of products. Those • Mustafa K. Anuar, The Alternative Media andvalues and types of solidarity could also be a vehicle Democracy in a Globalised World;to overcome crisis. Policies are another factor that may • Sumit K. Mandal, Unbounded Identities: Somehelp or hamper economic development. Chinese Voices During the Indonesian Revolution; Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 30. xxx ...• Tetsuya Araki, Putting the First Last – Networking as well as through the playing back of recordings, both NGOs in Indonesia; auditive and audio-visual. The following studies were• Mohammad ‘Azzam Manan, Problems and Prospects done: of Industrial Relations: The Social and Economic • Sr. Mary John Mananzan, Woman, Religion and Dimensions of Foreign Workers in Fishing Enterprises Spirituality in Asia; in Sabah, East Malaysia; and • Francisco A. Englis, Localising the Global: Southeast• Darunee Tantiwiramanond, Women’s Issues and Asian and Western Instrumental Styles in the Changing Roles of Women’s Organisations in Southeast Contemporary Soundscapes of Thailand, Malaysia Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines). and Indonesia; • Motohide Taguchi, To Compose as an Asian – The5. Creativity, Religion and Society Relationship Between Traditional Music and theThe picture of a society may have a specific tinge because Works of Contemporary Composers in the Philippinesof salient expositions of works of art as well as of religious and Indonesia;teachings found within it. The actual expressions can • Toshiaki Takasago, Evaluating A New Possibility forderive from various kinds of procedures, namely: (1) Traditional Culture in International Aid;enhancement of age-old traditions; (2) adoption of • Adeline Ooi Yah-Chine, The Declarations of‘Western’ popular culture but giving a superficial touch Independence;of localness; (3) transplanting an element taken from • Muhammad Haji Salleh, Literary Culture for thetraditional culture to be used in modern environment; Future: Looming Shapes in Japan and the Malayand (4) using traditional elements for contemporary Archipelago;works. • Chalida Uabumrungjit, The Contemporary Documentary in Japan; andArt as a field par excellence for the exercise of expressive • Lalita Rochanakorn, Fostering Botanical Artcreativity is scrutinised in these papers. It is also posed to Illustration Towards Plant Conservation andtest the historical memory of people. Some results of the Environmental Protection.studies were demonstrated through a photo exhibitionEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 31. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 1TOWARDS TRANSNATIONAL DAYAK IDENTITIES? CHANGING INTERCONNECTEDNESS,IDENTITIES AND NATION STATES – A CASE STUDY ON IBAN-KENYAH RELATIONSIN SARAWAK, EAST MALAYSIADAVE LUMENTAIndonesian Doctoral Student, Kyoto UniversityINTRODUCTION dangerous ‘Other’, or vice versa).The history of Borneo’s native communities, contraryto dominant views which often construct these Movements and journeys by native communitiescommunities as isolated, static and passive, is very suddenly became problems in the new nation-statemuch characterised by intensive processes of flows, realms and therefore considered incompatible withmigrations, trade, and cultural interactions which have nation-state ideals of sovereignty, identity and loyalty,been ongoing for centuries. For example, complex trade especially since most of these movements werenetworks spanning from the innermost nomadic hunter- undocumented. This became especially alarming forgathering Punan tribes closest to forest resources to Malaysia during Sarawak’s second timber boom aftermajor Southeast Asian trade hubs already existed before 1974.Western colonial powers consolidated their power overthe island. Map 1: Sarawak in Its Geopolitical SettingThe situation became more complicated after thecolonial powers left. New nation states emerged withnew styles of ruling. Although colonial powers triedhard to contain inter-tribal warfare, cross-border raidingand headhunting (before 1924, inter-tribal raids withinBorneo were still common), they evidently applied aloose approach towards cross-border flows.1 The colonialera has left behind a Borneo compartmentalised intothree different nation-states: Indonesia (the Kalimantanprovinces previously known as Dutch Borneo), Malaysia(the former British colonies of Sarawak and Sabah) andBrunei Darussalam. Local native communities are collectively known as Dayaks, a generic umbrella label for all non-MuslimTo native communities, the existence of these native communities in Borneo (King “Question”),borders became more explicitly implanted after the such as the Iban, Jagoi, Bidayuh, Kayan, Kenyah,Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia from Punan, Lundayeh, Saben and Muruts. Today, they are1963 to 1966, partly because most military activities distributed on both sides of the Malaysian-Indonesiantook place on the Sarawak-Kalimantan borderlands. borderlands.Subsequent Indo-Malay border issues such as communistinsurgencies, the increase of smuggling and the influx Cross-border movement and migration by theseof illegal labour since the late 1960s, intensified the communities have been longstanding and continuedemarcation process between these two nation-states today. Labour flows of ‘Indonesian’ Dayaks from(i.e. Indonesia being somewhat constructed as the Kalimantan into Sarawak territory has a long history Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 32. 2 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYpreceding recent labour migration flows in the wake pre-existing patterns of spatial movements, socialof Malaysia’s successful post-New Economic Policy relations and identities that existed before the colonial(NEP) economic growth after 1969, which prompted period.a large influx of Indonesian workers into Malaysia.Some of these movements have their origins in trading Macro-level transformations in Borneo very often hadexpeditions. impacts that transcended boundaries initially created by colonial powers. Hence the increased interdependenciesNumerous case studies during fieldwork in Sarawak show among communities has very often been multi-that the local population has a tolerant attitude towards directional and thus not only aligned along nation-statethe presence of Indonesian workers in general. However, identities. The case study in this paper would suggestthis tolerance is not free from ethnic prejudice. While that the acceptance of certain labels of identificationcertain ethnic groups from Indonesia are negatively is pretty much the result of local dynamics such aslabelled, this does not apply to those ethnic groups inter-ethnic relations among native communities, thenative to Kalimantan. Most native host communities transnational mobility created by global economicin Sarawak are protecting, if not welcoming, of the systems and the narrative stereotyping by others (e.g.sustained presence of undocumented Indonesian Dayak nation-states).workers in rural sites, despite state efforts to end thepresence of undocumented Indonesians. The Kenyah and Iban communities, two distinct Dayak groups, were selected for this case-study asIt would be easy to assume that native communities their transnational distribution along the Indonesian-would ‘naturally’ protect Indonesians of the same Malaysian borders in Borneo as well as their highethnic stock. Interestingly, this protection is not only mobility are fitting representations for examiningextended within homogeneous communities that are transnational interdependencies, relations which aretransnationally distributed. A case from the Kapit still to some extent maintained today. Another reasonDivision in Sarawak shows that native Sarawakian is their close identification with the Dayak identity.Ibans are protective of and welcoming to IndonesianKenyah workers, despite the fact that both ethnic THE KENYAH AND THE IBANgroups were staunch adversaries in the past. One reason Common features among Dayaks in Borneo are thatoften given by native Sarawakian Iban workers is that they settle along upriver banks, as well as depend onthe Indonesian Kenyah were ‘also Dayaks’. This case subsistence swidden agriculture or sago cultivation,study reveals that there is a transformation of localised supplemented by hunting and trade activities. Migrationidentities (such as riverine, dialect or sub-groupings) has been quite common among swidden agriculturalistsinto broader inclusive categories of identification. to adapt to poor soil conditions, population growth and warfare. Both the Kenyah and Iban in the past used toAlthough there are many examples of different cases live in longhouses, a single structure on stilts, clusteringthroughout Borneo of how localised identities are a number of related or unrelated families. Longhousetransformed into convergent wider inclusive identities as populations would migrate whenever overpopulationa result of increased political mobilisation or economic or land shortages occurred, or when inner conflictsintegration of these communities into nation-states prompted them to split. 2(Sillander 69-195; Tan 441-480), most conclusionsare drawn from case studies located or bounded within Warfare with other communities was often waged tosingle states. secure control over the most fertile lands. Another common feature was the culturally ‘institutionalised’This paper puts forward a phenomenon that has travel for men in order to gain social standing throughtransnational dimensions, based on a hypothesis that headhunting raids, scouting missions or tradingcommunities are not solely subscribing themselves to expeditions. The latter was essential to obtain locallynew nation-state identities or interacting within the unavailable goods such as salt, metal, tobacco, beads,delineation of nation-states, but are also maintaining and much later, shotguns, chainsaws, boat engines andEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 33. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 3fuel to add to their subsistence economies. Trading Over-population, the search for new arable land andactivities were undertaken with downriver Muslim the new developing oil industries in Miri during thesultanates, Chinese traders and later, with bazaar towns first half of the 20th century prompted waves of Ibanthat emerged alongside outstation government posts. labour migration from the Kapit area towards the north. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed Iban migration, bothA majority of Kenyah sub-groups (both in Indonesia permanent and temporary, to the new urban centresand Sarawak) view the Usun Apau plateau in Sarawak around Sibu (Morrison 127-136; Soda 139-164).as their place of origin.3 Around the beginning of the18th century, warfare and population pressures prompted CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKemigration from Usun Apau and the dispersal of many This case study is first approached by briefly examiningKenyah groups into the Apo Da’a plateau and later into the historical background of the colonial Brooke andthe Apokayan plateau and Bahau watersheds in eastern British periods which brought about improved relationsKalimantan, and subsequent immigration back into and increasing interdependencies between the ‘Sarawak’Sarawak. Ibans and the ‘Dutch’ Kenyah in the Kapit area. This historical context of increased interdependencies, toImmigration in the 20th century into Sarawak was mainly some extent, might provide one form of explanationprompted by geographic isolation in East Kalimantan on how the basis for a common and inclusive identity(by the then Dutch Borneo) which hindered these emerged.communities from obtaining necessary goods by trade.Trading expeditions to Sarawak evolved into labour The post-colonial period in Sarawak is marked by thejourneys by the late 1930s during the beginning of increased incorporation of Sarawak into the Malaysiancoastal timber (kayu paya) felling in the lower Baram. nation-state project, a vast process that had not only implications for the increased compartmentalisationLabour journey destinations expanded during the 1950s, process of Borneo’s borders, relegating Indonesianwhich then included the coastal areas near Sibuti, Kenyahs to unwanted status as illegals, but alsoBintulu, Binatang (Bintangor) and major sawmills on positioned many native communities of Sarawak intothe Batang Rajang. Increased raiding operations on a self-perceived ‘second-class’ constituency within theillegal workers during the mid 1980s shifted Kenyah nation. This was exacerbated by increasing competitionlabour destinations away from coastal and urban areas over natural resources between these communities andto upriver logging camps, which coincidentally moved the State, as well as increasing economic disparitiesinland, closer to the border areas. 4 between the peninsular and Bornean states.The Iban on the other hand, including those forming A brief background on these processes is provided toa majority in Sarawak, refer to the Kapuas watershed contextualise the rise of ‘Dayakism’ in Sarawak on localin West Kalimantan as their place of origin. The Iban levels, and to help examine why Malaysian Ibans aremigrated to Sarawak during the 18th century and settled still protecting Indonesian Kenyahs under the umbrellaalong the main rivers in the Batang Lupar, Saribas and narrative of Dayakism. This brings into question themiddle Rajang watersheds, causing major clashes with historical relationship between these two communities,existing communities in those areas (Sandin; Pringle; staunch adversaries in the past, and the relationshipFreeman). between the Malaysian nation-state and identity formation among its constituencies.Both James Brooke and Charles Brooke, the first twoWhite Rajahs of Sarawak, were pre-occupied with Here, the approach is to undertake ‘readings’ ofcurbing further Iban expansion to pacify Sarawak’s statements by Iban informants regarding the presenceinterior. Iban immigration into Batang Baleh during the of Indonesian Kenyahs where questions of identity1870s greatly undermined Brooke pacification efforts, can be examined as a narrative process. Thus ratherforcing the administration to set up a fort at Kapit in than viewing identities in the essentialist tradition as1879 to halt further Iban expansion (Pringle). ‘categories’ that should be ‘valid representations’ of Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 34. 4 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYany given social group, this approach emphasises the has been widely adopted in Indonesian Kalimantan,relationality of circumstances through which certain whereas its acceptance as a generic label in Sarawaklayers of subjective identities emerge. has been quite a recent phenomenon. The case study in this paper would suggest that the acceptance ofETHNIC IDENTITY IN THE BORNEO certain labels of identification is pretty much the resultCONTEXT of local dynamics such as inter-ethnic relations amongIt has become axiomatic today, owing to Fredrik Barth’s native communities, the transnational mobility createdseminal social constructionist framework for examining by global economic systems and reaction towards theethnic identity formation, to view the process of narrative stereotyping by others (e.g. nation-states).identity construction as being contingent, dynamic,responsive, permutable, and constantly reconstructed GEOGRAPHY AT WORK: THE INVENTIONor reinvented (Barth; Clifford; Gupta and Ferguson; OF MINORITIES IN THE POST-COLONIALJenkins). In addition, it is axiomatic to view the process STATEof identity construction in webs of subjectivities and What are the narratives that strengthen the emergencenarrative processes where it is assumed that “social of this Dayak identity, and to what narratives doesaction can only be intelligible if we recognize that this Dayak identity negotiate itself in the context ofpeople are guided to act by the relationships in which Sarawak? This must first be examined by looking atthey are embedded” (Somers and Gibson). how the State works in the Malaysian context. The nation-state is one form of how a certain communityPrior to the arrival of colonial powers in Borneo, native is imagined, “an imagined political community – andcommunities throughout Borneo were politically imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”fragmented, and largely at war with each other, although (Anderson 5-6).extensive networks of economic interconnectednessexisted (Sellato). Social groupings were pretty much The creation of borders on maps, identity cards and birthlocalised according to spatial settlements such as certificates are new forms of narratives through whichriverines, longhouse settlements, common origins or communities are constructed, imagined and boundeddialect similarities. Almost all ethnic labels used in within geographical categories, enabling the reigningBorneo today are exonyms which underwent numerous in of the visual powers of inclusions and exclusions,transformations. 5 the clear demarcation between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the distinction between the ’wanted’ and ‘unwanted’.Numerous processes did influence these identificationtransformations and its internalisations, ranging from Although the State possesses a wide range of visualthe local formation of ethnic alliances (as would be the ‘pan-optic’ instruments of surveillance (Foucault)7 orcase for the Kenyah), colonial naming practices, census means to disseminate state ideologies by more subtlecategorisations and religious proselytisation to political and non-repressive means (Althusser), it appears thatmobilisations. The emergence of a common Dayak the powers of nation-states in the sphere of ‘national’identity label is inseparable from earlier processes of identity construction is sometimes overrated (Postill 95-categorisation and attribution of ethnic identities by 127). National identity is probably the most ambiguousthe old colonial and subsequent independent states, territory for nation-state domination because identityalthough its emergence is historically different in construction is intertwined in a complex set of localcolonial Brooke-ruled Sarawak compared to the term’s experiences, narratives and historical contingencies,usage in Dutch Borneo. 6 hence the effects of ‘national penetration’ into local identities might be more divergent than anticipated.However, it would be an over-simplification to suggestthat the recent emergence of a general Dayak identity is This is especially true for Southeast Asia wherestrictly a result of political mobilisation by elites, or that territory and its arbitrary borders were inherited mostlypeople simply adopt identities because of government from colonial inventions, often displacing and dividingtaxonomies. As an umbrella term, the Dayak identity single communities into different national subjects.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 35. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 5One unique feature that colonial powers and subsequent distinct from Indonesia, the transnational narrative ofnation-states ‘accidentally’ or intentionally created was the Iban identity has prevailed in Iban oral histories. Itthe visual construction of ‘majorities’ and ‘minorities’ is common for Sarawak Ibans to acknowledge that, “Ourthrough the census instrument (Anderson). This ancestors came from the Kapuas in Indonesia.” Likewise,created privileges and disadvantages, forms of ethnic Indonesian Kenyahs still acknowledge the Usun Apaudomination, the monopoly of identification and the plateau ‘in Malaysia’ as their place of origin.“folklorisation (of ethnic minorities) in the space ofthe nation-state and constructed as inferior races” KENYAH WORKERS IN SARAWAK’S KAPIT(Horstmann 12-29). AREA: A BRIEF HISTORY The Kapit area today remains an important destinationForms of ‘folklorisations’ very often emerge from for undocumented Kenyah workers coming from thecultural biases inherent to western colonisation (e.g. Apokayan highlands in Indonesian Kalimantan. Theorientalism) or developmentalism (e.g. modernity 39,400-square-kilometre Kapit Division (previouslyversus tradition). These are contexts wherein the known as the Third Division), with a low populationpolitics of ethnic identities on part of the minorities of 124,000 (2000) is largely covered by lowlandcome into play, which basically involves ongoing dipterocarp forests and comprises the entire upperprocesses of rejection, incorporation or negotiation Batang Rajang watershed, which has its waters flowingbetween internal and external definitions related to from three major sources: the Batang Baleh, the Baluione’s group identity. and the Belaga rivers.Despite constituting a significant portion of Borneo’s Map 2: The Kapit Division and thedemographics, the Dayaks increasingly became Adjoining Apokayan Plateauminorities at the peripheral in the new delineation ofindependent post-colonial states, where political as wellas cultural policies are formulated in the new ‘centres’of the Malay or Javanese ‘majorities’ far away.It is now commonly regarded that ‘Dayakism’, as aninternalised label both in Sarawak and Kalimantan, hasgained currency over the years in conjunction with theperceived increase of economic disparity and politicalinequality endured by native communities, and thegeneral demographical shift (as would be the case forKalimantan) caused by transmigration (Davidson; VanKlinken; Jawan). The forestry and agricultural sectors have been the Division’s major source of income for the last threeDespite the fact that most communities now firmly decades coinciding with Sarawak’s second timber boom,acknowledge their subscription into citizenships (e.g. replacing the traditional cash crops of para-rubber,Malaysian or Indonesian), the degree of identification gutta-percha and engkabang (illipe nuts) cultivated sincewith nation-states is firmly shaped by local narratives the last century. The Iban form the dominant ethnicand contexts. The idea of ‘Malaysia’ among elder majority in the Division, occupying rural longhouseborderland Iban or Kenyah in Sarawak was first villages along the Rajang and Baleh rivers, followedrepresented through military presence in Sarawak by the Kayan, Kenyah, Penan, Kajang, Kejaman andduring the Confrontation. Sambop ethnic groups, collectively known as the Orang Ulu along the upper Rajang, Belaga and BaluiDespite inroads made by education and the more recent rivers. Chinese and Malay traders occupy the importanteconomic disparity between the two nations that administrative and bazaar centres, such as Kapit, Songfurther promote Malaysia as an imagined community and Belaga. Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 36. 6 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYSarawak’s so-called ‘second timber boom’ (Kaur The para-rubber boom, followed by rising values of117-147) has attracted a large influx of Indonesian jungle products such as gutta percha, jelutong (wildworkers.8 Indonesian Dayaks such as the Kenyahs and rubber) and engkabang since 1870 encouraged manyKayans are mainly employed in upriver timber camps native Ibans to engage in small-holders’ cash croppingas chainsaw operators, surveyors, debarkers or camp during the early half of the 20th century.janitors. A small number of Indonesian Ibans fromWest Kalimantan, having the ability to blend in within Kapit suffered an acute labour shortage in the laternative Sarawak Iban majorities, prefer to seek work in half of the 20th century when many Iban men went onurban (e.g. Sibu, Bintulu) and transitional urban (e.g. their Bejalai journeys12 to the oil industries in Miri andKapit) areas as construction workers, shop assistants Brunei, and others registered themselves as Sarawakor seasonal plantation workers. With the exception of Rangers to fight communism in Malaya. A Kapitsawmill and (in some cases) plantation workers, the District report from 1957 reported that the absence ofmajority of Indonesian workers in other sectors are Iban male labour rose from 5 per cent in 1940 to 40largely undocumented. per cent in 1957 from the total Iban male population (Sarawak Gazette [SG] 31 Mar. 1958).As the majority of documented workers enter Sarawakthrough the official Tebedu immigration checkpoint The earliest migrant labourers reported in the Kapitnear Kuching, the undocumented enter the division area were Indonesian Kenyahs and Penihings (thethrough various back routes. Indonesian Kenyahs latter coming from the Upper Mahakam), who hadusually enter Sarawak through the hinterlands from been passing frequently through the area to trade sinceLong Nawang in the Apokayan. Other undocumented 1924 (SG, 1 Oct. 1941).workers trickle in from the Bintulu or Miri Divisions,or from Sabah to the north after dropping out from The Indonesian Kenyah labour presence in Sarawaklower-paid plantation jobs.9 Police raiding activities had mostly been vaguely documented, although it hadrarely reach upriver logging camps, and if they do, camp been semi-officially recognised and permitted during themanagers usually co-operate with local villagers to offer Brooke and British colonial periods.13 Other Sarawakundocumented workers temporary protection.10 Gazette editions reported several cases of permanent settlement by Indonesian natives in Sarawak during theThe large presence of Indonesian migrant workers might 1950s, with permission from native host communitiesbe explained by examining Sarawak’s longstanding appearing to have been sufficient basis for officialhistory of acute labour shortage in the rural sectors, a emigration approval.phenomenon typical to the predominantly rural KapitDivision. The Sarawak Statistics Department reported A BRIEF HISTORY OF IBAN-KENYAHin 1999 that 26.6 per cent (or 15,882 vacancies) of RELATIONS IN THE PASTtotal job vacancies in the State were in the rural sectors The Kenyah and Iban had been largely at war with each(agricultural, plantation and forestry). 11 other until the early 1920s. Numerous headhunting raids were conducted by Iban parties from Sarawak inThe colonial Brooke government was in fact, plagued traditional Kenyah territory in the Apokayan highlands,by this problem in the 19th century, which forced the then part of Dutch Borneo. Major incidents occurred inregime to import Chinese and Javanese labour from 1892 which resulted in 25 Kenyahs from the Apokayanoutside Sarawak in order to develop the mining sector region being slaughtered by the Ibans in the Batangand to expand commercial agriculture, mainly in Baleh,14 and in 1921 when 15 Ibans from the Rajangdownriver coastal areas. The area now comprising the were killed in the Apokayan by Kenyahs.Kapit Division has largely been declared by the Brookesas Native Lands. Thus the presence of these early labour The magnitude of Iban-Kenyah conflicts was severeimports was minimal as the Brookes tried to demarcate enough to required large scale intervention by colonialcommercial lands from lands under native subsistence powers. A transnational settlement was arranged bycultivation. both Vyner Brooke, the White Rajah of Sarawak,Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 37. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 7and Dutch Colonial officials for a large peacemaking Since the Apokayan remains geographically isolatedceremony at Kapit on 24 November 1924, attended by from other parts of Dutch Borneo, trading expeditionsa total of 4,200 Sarawak Ibans, Kayans, Dutch Borneo were more intensively oriented towards the Balui andKenyahs and colonial officers from both sides of the Upper Rajang rivers in Sarawak, particularly Belagaborder, including Vyner Brooke himself who led the which emerged around 1883 as an important bazaarceremony (SG 1 Oct. 1924:324-325; 1 Dec. 1924:371- centre after pacification efforts by Sarawak’s Brooke372). government secured conducive conditions for trade (Maxwell). The Belaga bazaar could be reached in ten Map 3: Orientation of Kenyah Trading Expeditions Before 1924 days in favourable river conditions, a much shorter journey compared to journeys to trading centres in Dutch Borneo such as Tanjung Selor and Long Iram, which required at least two months to undertake. The Kapit bazaar, beyond the reach of Kenyah trading expeditions before 1924 due to Iban hostility, was slowly becoming an important destination for Kenyah trading expeditions. The peacemaking at Kapit also opened up a new shortcut from the Apokayan to Kapit through the Merirai river. It was important for Kenyah trading expeditions to identify ‘friendly’ routes where they would be able to secure food provisions along riverside villages for the long journeys. The Balui route to Belaga was previously the only safe way to a bazaar, as most villages along the Balui river were less hostile Kayan and Kenyah villages. The opening of the Merirai-Baleh route to Kapit throughIban-Kenyah relations gradually improved, and Iban territory enabled the establishment of friendlysubsequent movement into each other’s territories relations with Iban villages along the Baleh river. Oneincreased. By 1939, it was common for Sarawak Ibans common practice was for Kenyah men to stop at Ibanfrom the Kapit area to work in Dutch Borneo by villages (such as Nanga Entawau, Nanga Gaat, Nangapermission (SG, 2 Sept. 1940:260; 2 Jan. 1941:16) or Merirai) and exchange their labour for rice provisions.venture into Kenyah territory in the Apokayan to tapgutta percha.15 This peaceful situation also prompted Meanwhile, the Apokayan plateau remainedthe increase of Kenyah trading expeditions from the geographically and economically isolated from theApokayan into Sarawak. other parts of Indonesia. Coastal logging during the later Brooke period at Kuala Baram also intensifiedCHANGING ECONOMIES AND IBAN- Kenyah expeditions into the Baram river (Telang Usan)KENYAH RELATIONS IN THE KAPIT AREA through the Iwan-Adan-Danum-Selio route.Trading expeditions (peselai) among the isolated Kenyahresiding in the Apokayan highlands became necessary Meanwhile, prices for basic commodities in thein order to obtain locally unavailable commodities (i.e. Apokayan remained high during the post-war yearssalt, tobacco, belacu cloth, sugar) at the nearest bazaar despite heavy government subsidies which started sincecentres in exchange for much-valued jungle products. 1969. The Kenyah population in the Apokayan becameOrientation of trading expeditions from the Apokayan increasingly dependent on wages earned in Sarawaktowards Sarawak since the 1880s was also due to hostile and remittances sent by working relatives. Much of therelations with the Kutai sultanate in the lower Mahakam basic commodities were obtained from Sarawak logging(Whittier). camps, which moved inland, closer to the border, during Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 38. 8 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYthe 1980s. It would not be an overstatement to say that solved when approximately 500 Kenyahs from thethe Apokayan has long been integrated into Sarawak’s Apokayan arrived in Belaga to fill the gap, and anothereconomy. 100 Kenyahs arrived at Nanga Merirai by the invitation of Temenggong Jugah16 to collect building materials and Map 4: Kenyah Trading and Labour Journeys help weed while waiting for the engkabang harvest (SG into the Kapit Area After 1924 31 May 1959:112-113). The Kapit Resident officially reported that the presence of such a large Kenyah workforce among the Iban population was welcomed, and inter-ethnic relations were very good. His report even expressed gratitude to these Kenyahs (SG 31 May 1959:114). A veteran Kenyah worker claimed during a recent interview that Temenggong Jugah, then the Paramount Chief of the Iban, together with Penghulu Jinggut, a local Iban leader on the Baleh, personally invited his party, which at that time was still busy working on the Belaga airstrip, to help harvest rubber and engkabang at Nanga Merirai in the Batang Baleh. Both Temenggong Jugah and Penghulu Jinggut during that time reminded themThe rising importance of new cash-crops and jungle about the importance to uphold vows made in the Kapitproducts such as para-rubber, jelutong, engkabang and oil agreement of 1924.as important export commodities for Sarawak’s economysince the 1920s had a significant impact on local Iban The Kenyah workers were welcomed in Iban longhouses,communities in the Batang Rajang and Baleh area and celebrations were held in their honour. Both(Ooi). Labour migrations by Iban men to work at the Temenggong Jugah and Penghulu Jinggut are currentlyoilfields in Miri and Seria to the north became common. well-remembered by many veteran Kenyah workers nowIban and Kenyah relations improved significantly after living in the Apokayan, and they played a significantthe war, and many Kenyah were granted permission by role in the late 1960s and early 1970s in assistinglocal Iban leaders to harvest engkabang along the Batang Kenyah men who went to seek work at timber campsBaleh river on a profit-sharing basis. during Sarawak’s exploding timber boom. Many Ibans acted as contact persons to help Indonesian KenyahsThe new plantation economy created mutual dependent entering labour networks in Sarawak.17relations among both groups since the increased quantityof rubber and engkabang planting in Iban areas along the Since the 1980s, the labour shortage in the Kapit areaBatang Rajang and Baleh had caused a significant labour might be attributed to new trends of rural depopulationshortage on the part of the Iban. This was especially due to the new growth of Sarawak’s urban centresalarming in 1958, during the British rule of Sarawak, around Kuching, Sibu and Miri (Morrison 127-136).when Iban villages along the Batang Rajang and Batang Soda argued that rural depopulation in the Iban areasBaleh enjoyed a simultaneous harvest of rice, engkabang might not signify a net rural-urban migration becauseand para-rubber. This became more complicated when of a general tendency for urban squatters to return tothe government needed additional labour to construct their longhouses (139-164). However, this indicatesthe new Belaga airstrip. that the mainstream of Iban labour force was spending its productive years outside rural areas. The importanceAs many Iban men were already on labour journeys in of wage jobs in surrounding timber industries and thethe oilfields far to the north, and others recruited into urban informal sectors, as well the decline of small-the Sarawak Rangers to fight communism during the holder plantations had transformed some characteristicsMalayan Emergency, this acute labour shortage was of these inter-relationships.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 39. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 9As Kenyahs are now no longer selling their labour There were approximately 150 undocumented Kenyahdirectly to Ibans, many of the inter-personal workers in the camp in February 2003 who came fromrelationships which thrived during the 1950s to 1970s various Kenyah settlements within Indonesia, with ahave declined. Kenyah-Iban interactions today mostly majority coming from the Apokayan plateau.take place on work sites where the tribes are placed indifferent hierarchical positions. The wage scale and The Kenyah occupy lower ranked jobs in the camp,their illegal status place Kenyahs at the lowest ranks such as chainsaw operators, survey assistants, scalers andin timber camps, and this makes nation-state identities debarkers. The rest of the workforce is divided accordingmore visible, e.g. ‘higher ranks for Malaysians, lower to the following ethnic lines: managerial levels (campranks for Indonesians’. managers to supervisors) are filled by Foochow Chinese; drivers, mechanics and foremen positions are held byThe increased presence of other ethnic groups in the both Chinese and Sarawakian Ibans, whereas the entireKapit area (i.e. Chinese, Malays and other Indonesians) survey team consists of Catholic Dalat Melanaus.and the changing political setting in Sarawak (i.e. theperceived marginalisation of Dayaks in general) has The living quarters are divided according to workbrought Kenyah-Iban relationships to other dimensions. divisions. Hence workers live mostly with their ownAlthough the Petutung Kapit (the Kenyah term for the ethnic groups (i.e. ‘the Iban lodge’, ‘the Chinese1924 Peacemaking agreement) remains a strong part of quarters’ and ‘the Kenyah lodge’). As the majority oforal Kenyah history, and is widely known among the workers are Christians, sermons are organised accordingIndonesian Apokayan Kenyah until today, I found less to denominations of each ethnic group: there is aromanticisation of the Bebancak Kapit (the Iban term) Methodist church for the Chinese and Iban, weeklyamong Iban informants. prayer sessions are held for Kenyah Christians, and occasional sermons are held for Melanau Catholics andThe Sarawak Ibans talked more about Temenggong Ibans.Jugah’s role in inviting Kenyah labour from Kalimantan,but they nevertheless admitted that Kenyahs share Map 5: The Location of Camp Z in the Kapit Divisionmany similarities with the Sarawak Ibans, such ascommon histories, culture (as swidden cultivationists,‘headhunters’, ‘pork-eaters’) and religion (in this caseChristianity). There is much more cultural affinityshared among the Sarawak Iban with the Kenyahscompared to fellow Malaysians like the Chinese orMalays.The shortcut phrase, “They’re also Dayak,” surfacedfrequently, and this proves that personal and mutualrelationships which appear to be the basis for inter-ethnic Iban-Kenyah relations in the past, are nowbeing replaced by the projection of these affinities intoa general Dayak identity. A case study of a logging campillustrates this.CAMP Z IN THE UPPER BALUICamp Z is a logging camp under the Rimbunan Hijauconcession, located on the Upper Balui river. By road, The argument behind the employment of manythe camp’s location is approximately 65 kilometres from Indonesian Kenyahs, according to one Iban supervisor,the Indonesian border adjoining the Apokayan plateau, is that there is a significant lack of local Sarawakiansand approximately 170 kilometres from Kapit town. who are willing to do high-risk labour (i.e. chainsaw Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 40. 10 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYoperators) or take lower paid jobs, owing to unsatisfactory period. Wages are paid every three months in the formcompensation regulations in Sarawak. These people of paycheques that should ideally be cashed at banksprefer to work as drivers, surveyors or foremen. In in Kapit or Sibu, but since travelling to cities is mostlyaddition, it is generally perceived that there are better out of the question for an undocumented worker, campjob opportunities for Sarawakians in urban centres. canteens provide the cashing service at a 5 per cent charge.According to a Chinese manager, the Kenyah arepreferred because they possess comparatively advanced Those who do not want their salaries deducted very oftenskills and knowledge in timber felling techniques turn to their fellow Sarawak Ibans for help. Saving moneyon particularly steep slopes.18 “That’s why we avoid is a major problem for young unmarried men who oftenemploying other Indonesians,” he claimed. spend excessively on alcohol. Since free food rations are no longer provided by camps, many Indonesian KenyahsIn addition, numerous criminal cases involving Buginese are trapped in debt cycles to camp canteens.workers during the last five years drove the camp to stoprecruiting other ethnic groups. An Indonesian Kenyah Only on very special occasions do the Kapit police visitseeking work in the camp would only need to bring his upriver logging camps to check on the legal status ofIndonesian identity card (KTP), his own chainsaw and workers. However, camp managers are usually the first toa guarantee letter from the village head (tua kampong) know when raids will occur, very often based on insiderof Long Busang, a nearby Kenyah village that moved information from the police themselves. During suchfrom Indonesia to Sarawak in 1969. Since many raids, undocumented Indonesians are usually hidden ininhabitants of Long Busang are still related to those the logging site blocks deep in the forest, where theyliving in Indonesia, this would not be difficult to obtain, would spend the night, or inside nearby longhouses inand it also implies that Long Busang’s close affinity with Long Busang.the Apokayan area serves as a means for social controlover the workers. Occasionally these Indonesians would venture downriver to Kapit to find entertainment at the localMiddle-aged Kenyah men prefer to work for short karaoke bars after payday, very often accompanied byepisodes, ranging from six months to one year, partly fellow Sarawakians. A journey down to Kapit is alwaysbecause they will return to the Apokayan during considered a great risk, although the following caseimportant stages of the planting cycle, which usually study reveals that Indonesian Kenyahs can overcomefalls in June for the opening of new rice plots and the risks through their ‘Dayakness’.January for harvesting. These men would sometimesbring their wives to help wash, cook and do laundry WHY THE KENYAH ARE NOT STRICTLYto earn extra money, or to plant vegetables and fruits ‘INDONS’19: DAYAK IDENTITIES AT WORKwhich they can sell to the camp’s canteen or to the IN THE KAPIT AREAChinese and Iban workers. Young unmarried workersprefer to stay longer as they have justification for not I think that many Indonesian workers, like thereturning home immediately. (ethnic) Buginese and Floresians should be kicked out from Sarawak. They are known for startingDiscounting the risks and low compensation, Kenyah fights in karaoke bars. A Bugis worker had robbedworkers perceive that wages in Sarawak are far better my camp manager last year and killed a fellowcompared to similar jobs in Kalimantan. In Camp worker while on the run. These Indon workers areZ, a chainsaw operator is paid RM12.00 / tan (1 tan looking for trouble. They always make cases (sic)[hoppus ton] = 1.8 m3), whereas a chainsaw operator around here. But that would not be the case forfor helicopter felling might be paid up to RM17.00 / Indon Ibans and Kenyahs. They are OK and wetan (as it involves greater walking distances). In very should help them. They’re also Dayak like us.active logging periods, a Kenyah worker might receive - A Sarawakian Iban logging driver,between RM2,000 and 3,000 for a three-month work Camp Z in the Upper Balui, February 2003Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 41. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 11 All our wealth is being drained to Semenanjung leave (Indonesian) Kenyahs or Ibans alone, and (Peninsular Malaysia). I think the case would be never have we arrested an Indonesian Dayak on the same in Indon. Doesn’t every bit of wealth in the premise of his haram (illegal) status. Only Kalimantan get drained to Jakarta? Indon Dayaks Semenanjung (Peninsular) Malays would do such have every right to secure a living (cari makan) over things. Only once did we arrest an Indonesian here. That was promised by our forefathers during Kenyah at a bar. He went out drinking stout with the Bebancak Kapit ceremony, and it happened his Sarawakian Iban friend, supposedly on the even before Borneo became part of Malaysia. Iban’s treat. The Iban guy, heavily drunk, collapsed, - A Sarawakian Iban logging supervisor, and it turned out that he had forgotten where he Kapit, February 2003 had left his wallet. We arrested the Kenyah, who turned out to not have any papers at all except anThese opinions sufficiently illustrate the ambiguity on Indon identity card. But we released the Kenyahthe part of the native Sarawak Iban when it comes to guy the next day after we found out that he was aassessing the presence of undocumented Indonesian relative of Long Busang’s tua kampung. If he wasworkers. The first opinion bluntly illustrates that ethnic not a Kenyah, we surely would have deported himidentity rather than nationality is more relevant when through Kuching.it comes to categorising people, and the second reveals asentiment expressing the conceived status of Dayaks as On a journey down to Kapit with two undocumentedpolitically marginalised peoples, as well as the historical Kenyahs and accompanying Iban workers from thefact that Kenyah presence in the Kapit area preceded camp, we went for a drink at a local coffee shop, joinedthe establishment of nation-states which in his view by local Kapit Ibans who turned out to be relatives. Thepresented a hindrance. conversation went through numerous topics, and the ‘illegal Indonesians’ issue was brought up after an IbanThese statements, representing numerous similar policeman approached our table to greet the Ibans herecorded opinions during the course of the fieldwork, knew. The atmosphere was quite relaxed, even for thewere expressed in relation to the presence of two Kenyahs. Soon the Ibans went through numerousundocumented Indonesian Kenyah workers in their comparisons between Sarawak and Peninsularlogging camps. Malaysia.There is a cheap lodging house in Kapit specially “The Semenanjung is very different,” one claimed.build to accommodate upriver Ibans and Kenyahs “There, Indonesians are treated as animals.” He wentcoming to town to shop. The Rumah Temuai, as it is on to say that Sarawak would not survive if it were notknown, is divided into two: the Iban and the Kayan- for the thousands of Indonesians living in Sarawak.Kenyah wings. It is generally known around Kapit Another joined in saying that as long as Indonesiansthat the Rumah Temuai often hosts undocumented did not involve themselves in criminal cases, he wouldIndonesian Kenyahs, and there is a general tendency protect them.among policemen, many who happen to be Iban, toignore these ‘illegals’. An informal interview with an The deeper the conversations went, the moreIban policeman at a Kapit coffee shop reveals that he ‘undercurrent’ views came to the surface that areaccepts the fact that, “these Indonesians are just trying considered politically ‘taboo’ in Malaysia. Theseto make a living (cari makan).” However, he also makes undercurrent views present their marginalisation as athe following distinctions: result of Federal domination and negative prejudices upheld among Peninsular Malays towards the natives When we see dark-skinned Indonesians that we of Sarawak and Sabah. One argued that the State is suspect to be a Bugis, Timorese or Javanese, we deliberately undermining native interests through the will very often check them out. The Bugis are usurpation of land for private interests, neatly disguised often involved in small quarrels that often turn under pembangunan (development) virtues. This Iban, into serous criminal offences. But we usually coming from Kaong near Lubok Antu and claiming Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 42. 12 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYto be a victim of the Batang Ai resettlement scheme, has a large non-Malay percentage within the nativeeven said that local leaders are “selling Sarawak to a constituency and a Christian majority by a smallfew rich.” margin.These conversations further went on to ‘sensitive’ The political mobilisation of the Dayak category amonghistorical questions regarding Sarawak’s incorporation a few educated Iban elites first emerged surroundinginto Malaysia, blaming the late Temenggong Jugah’s Sarawak’s cession to Britain in 1946 where it was fearedilliteracy for his indiscreet decision to sign the that Chinese and Malay domination, previously heldincorporation.20 Some even hinted at an idea of an in check by the Brookes, would thrive under Britishindependent Dayak nation uniting both Malaysian and rule (Reece). This shows that the ethnic categorisationIndonesian Dayaks. created by the colonial rulers have facilitated the longstanding differences between politically andAll these reveal the relationship between personal, local economically dominant Muslim Malays or Chinese andexperiences, and state narratives and may be perceived the non-Muslim upriver communities.as one expression of marginalisation. Moreover, thelarger narrative of Sarawak’s political history, which Table 1: Breakdown of Ethnic Composition in Sarawakis reinterpreted through individual experiences Race Category Numbers Percentage of totaland is dominated with themes on ‘Iban political (Mid-2000) population in Sarawakmarginalisation’, ‘Ibans lagging behind in development’, Iban (Bumiputera) 584,500 28.3and ‘Ibans unable to compete for jobs in towns’, has Chinese 551,500 26.7become part of contemporary Iban oral history today to Malay (Bumiputera) 444,600 21.5explain their perceived marginal condition. Bidayuh (Bumiputera) 167,500 8.1 Other Bumiputera* 119,100 5.7From this story, it might be concluded that the Dayak Melanau (Bumiputera) 114,700 5.5identity serves to strengthen the indigeneity of the Others 19,000 0.9Iban, and as an argument to reassert their rights as Non-Malaysian Citizens 63,900 3natives, a status rapidly lost in Malaysia’s drive towards Total Sarawak Population 2,064,900modernisation. The presence of Indonesian Kenyahs * Orang Ulu and others.and the projection of them as fellow Dayaks instead of - Source: Buku Tahunan Perangkaan Sarawak 2000,‘Indonesian foreigners’ does signify on the part of the Jabatan Perangkaan MalaysiaIban, a strongly felt need to broaden their argument Cawangan Sarawak (October 2000)and justifications for a wider alliance. As most of theseopinions to some extent blamed the ‘Malaysian’ state fortheir conditions, the following section briefly examines Table 2: A Comparative Population Breakdown bythe emergence of Dayakism in the narrative context of Religion in Malaysia and Sarawak (2000)the Malaysian nation-state. RELIGION MALAYSIA SARAWAK (%) (%)DAYAKISM IN SARAWAK Islam 60.4 31.3Sarawak has a historical, demographical and cultural Christianity 9.1 42.6setting which is uniquely different from other states Hinduism 6.3 0.1within the Malaysian Federation. Unlike other states, Buddhism 19.2 12.0Sarawak has never been a sultanate, nor has it ever Confucianism/Taoism, etc. 2.6 2.6existed as a sovereign political entity (in a western Tribal / Folk Religion 0.8 5.2sense) before colonisation, though it has been claimed Others 0.4 1.3by the Brunei sultanate. Prior to the arrival of the No Religion 0.8 3.9White Rajahs, the area consisted of various politically Unknown 0.3 0.9fragmented ethnic groups who were largely at war with - Source: Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristics Reporteach other. Demographically and culturally, Sarawak (Press Statement), Department of Statistics Malaysia (2000)Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 43. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 13Sarawak’s 1963 integration into the Malaysian formed in 1983) during the 1987 turbulent politicalFederation became a cultural dilemma for non-Muslim climate in Sarawak.Sarawakians, particularly the Ibans. The Federal decisionto sanction Islam and Bahasa Melayu as the official state The rise of the PBDS marked the Dayak identity’sreligion and national language prompted native Dayak transformation from an exclusive Iban-based label intoleaders to design safeguarding amendments to ensure a more inclusive category, encompassing a majoritythe protection of their distinct cultural identity, such of non-Muslim native communities throughoutas ensuring the equal status of the Iban language and Sarawak.24 The PBDS capitalised on the Dayak’sreligious freedom. Discontentment remained throughout general dissatisfaction with Sarawak’s inequitablesubsequent years.21 The post-1966 era marked a decline wealth redistribution and the urban-rural economicof Iban influence over Sarawak politics and gradually, disparities. It is worth mentioning that the PBDSFederal preference shifted towards the small Sarawakian Manifesto implicitly voiced concerns regarding identityMuslim-Melanau elite constituency.22 issues, notably language, religious freedom, and native land ownership and compensation issues.Federal pro-Malay policies became more defined afterthe implementation of the New Economic Policy The degree of acceptance of the Dayak label may vary(NEP) from 1969 to 1990, and the developmental drive among other native communities, partly because it istowards modernity so vigorously pursued by Malaysia viewed as being overtly Iban-centric, but the fact thathas unavoidably resulted in forms of ‘folklorisations’ PBDS won 68 per cent of all Dayak voter constituenciesof native non-Malay communities such as the Orang in 1987 may prove that the issues PBDS was capitalisingAsli in Peninsular Malaysia (Zawawi 1996), and native on did hit a mark.communities in Sarawak. It has also relegated thesecommunities to ‘second class’ Bumiputeras (sons of the The conversion of native communities tosoil) partly because the traditional subsistence lifestyles Christianity increasingly enhanced the Malay-Dayakof most natives are viewed as incompatible with dichotomisation as a religious-based category in somemodernisation and development, and partly because of cases, as the Malaysian constitution itself uses Islam asthe growing economic disparities between Peninsular one criterion for defining Malay ethnicity (Gabriel).Malaysia and the Borneo States (King “Why”; Wee). Although the resentment I found among Iban informants is more towards Semenanjung dominationThis development drive has very often placed State rather than Malays or Islam; it is Federal state policyinterests in direct contestations with native interests that potentially exacerbates primordial differences.over natural resources, notably lands and forests (Majid One case worth mentioning is the short-lived ban onCooke). In Sarawak, numerous development projects the Iban language Bible (Bup Kudus) in April 2003 bywere designed to eradicate rural poverty by introducing the Federal government which came as a major blow forresettlement schemes for commercial agricultural Christian Ibans.25projects to Iban communities in order to replacetraditional subsistence farming systems. The larger CONCLUDING NOTEobjectives, however, were agrarian reform, security and An important feature of Borneo was the complexhydropower (Dimbab).23 interconnectedness and widespread spatial mobility among its communities. The demarcation of Borneo’sThe lack of open resistance towards government policies borders was still in its infancy during colonial rule,in certain cases results primarily from fears of being and the pacification policies which coincided with thelabelled ‘anti-government’ (Dimbab), or because there globalisation of the colonial economy facilitated theis a widespread opinion that conditions in Sarawak for expansion of cross-border economic interconnectivity,native communities are comparatively better compared interdependency and human mobility among variousto Sabah (Khoo 2004). These native issues, among regions in Borneo, marked by the influx of Kenyahothers, were then capitalised on by the Parti Bangsa labour from Dutch Borneo into Sarawak. ImprovedDayak Sarawak (PBDS or the Sarawak Dayak Party, Iban-Kenyah relations in the Kapit area during the Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 44. 14 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYpost-1924 period shows that economic interdependency Dayaks as minorities or ‘second class’ Bumiputeras).facilitated the first steps towards converging cultural Extending protection to Indonesian Kenyahs, or ratheridentities. the rejection to ‘foreignise’ Indonesian Dayaks, might be seen as one form to contest the nation-state on aThe post-colonial period marked the increased safer battleground.demarcation of Borneo’s borders. Nation-satesinvented new definitions of territories and the fluid This paper is based on fieldwork conducted in Sarawak,interconnectivity between Kalimantan and Sarawak Malaysia as part of the API Fellowship Program funded bywas subjected to nation-state disciplining practices. The Nippon Foundation under the auspices of the SarawakTraditional transnational mobility was redefined as illegal State Planning Unit. Additional library research for thisentry, and Kenyah workers were granted the new status paper was conducted at the Centre for Southeast Asianof ‘illegal labour’. Nation-sates constructed devaluated Studies (CSEAS) Kyoto University library, funded undernotions of space as fixed and dead spaces, undermining the JSPS CORE University Exchange Program. The authorthe longstanding traditions of transnational mobility of wishes to thank Prof. Dr. Dimbab Ngidang, Acting Dean atnative communities. the Fakulti Sains Sosial Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (FSS UNIMAS), and Dr. Noboru Ishikawa, Associate ProfessorHowever, the persisting flow of illegal labour from at CSEAS Kyoto University.Kalimantan into Sarawak’s labour markets provesthat the longstanding economic interconnectedness Notesin Borneo prevails, contesting nation-state efforts todemarcate national borders. Another implication of this 1 One prominent feature of the Sarawak Gazette (SG),bounded territoriality was the construction of native first published in 1879 as a semi-official governmentIbans as ‘minorities’, subject to nation-state identities publication, is its inclusion of Resident reports fromand ideals of development. the various districts throughout Sarawak, providing an interesting insight to a wide range of local issues andThe increasing incorporation of Sarawak Ibans into the concerns. Numerous reports on cross-border migrationMalaysian national subculture, however, simultaneously can be found in numerous SG issues. It is evidentcreated the awareness of Borneo’s exploitation as an from various SG issues, for example, that immigrationimportant revenue earner within the ‘new’ nation-state. concerns during British rule (1946-63) was dominatedDayakism in Sarawak continues to function as a tool for by efforts to contain Chinese emigration from mainlandpolitical mobilisation in responding to inequality and China.dispossession induced by the increasing influence of theMalaysian nation-state. 2 Among the Kenyah, village splits in the past were usually attributed to feuds or disagreementsThe inclusion of Kenyah workers as Dayak rather than on agricultural or migration decisions among theIndonesian leads us to two conclusions. Although aristocratic class (paren) leaders within a single orthe economic interdependency between Ibans and several longhouses. One recent example from 1952 isIndonesian Kenyahs has declined, new contexts in the establishment of Nawang Baru in the Apokayan,Sarawak are taking over the narrative role in which which resulted from longhouse splits in Long Nawangthese past relationships are reconstructed into this new due to disagreements on the issue of converting toDayak identity. Christianity (personal interview in Nawang Baru, May 2000; see also Whittier; Jessup). Another case isOn the part of the Sarawak Iban, this strengthening of the 1969 split of Long Betaoh village in the Apokayan‘indigenousness’ is not anti-Malaysia per se in principle, where several longhouses decided to move to Sarawakbut it rather signifies a rejection of the devaluation of for economic reasons. Longhouses among the Iban arespaces and identities created by the inherent character usually loose associations of autonomous (and oftenof nation-states (i.e. Sarawak as a revenue earner, unrelated) households, hence longhouse splits mayEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 45. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 15result from individual or group decisions for various question in such expressions. A critique could be carriedreasons (personal observation in Benua Sadap, June out of this devaluation of space that has prevailed for2002; see also Freeman). generations...Space was treated as the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile” (69-71).3 There are over 30 Kenyah sub-groups throughoutBorneo with a majority in Kalimantan which is 8 Their distribution today throughout the Divisionestimated at 35,000 in East Kalimantan (interview with are spread into the following sectors: the Javanese,the East Kalimantan Development Planning Agency Flores, Sambas Malays, West Timorese, Torajans and[BAPPEDA], January 2002) and 5,000 to 7,000 in Buginese at major timber sawmills (i.e. those ownedSarawak. by the Rimbunan Hijau or Shin Yang concessions), with smaller numbers working at the emerging oil palm4 Based on interviews with labour veterans, Nawang plantations.Baru, February 2003. 9 It is a common practice for most Indonesians to5 For example, it has been suggested that the ‘Iban’ enter Sarawak legally through the plantation sector,label has been used recently among the Iban (see King and drop out intentionally to find better-paid jobs as“Question”). The term ‘Iban’ itself is suggested to construction workers or timber camp workers. Thehave Kayan origins (‘Hivan’). The Kenyah formerly usual practice for plantation managers is to withholdidentified themselves according to sub-groupings based passports of drop-outs, transforming documentedon longhouse origins or settlement origins and it has workers into undocumented ones. This is particularlybeen suggested that the Kayans first started to cluster widespread among the Indonesian Timorese, Buginesethese groups together as ‘Kenyah’. and Torajans (based on field interviews, 2002).6 While in Dutch Borneo, identity formation has been 11 Department of Statistics (Sarawak Branch), Yearbookwidely a result of straightforward dichotomisation by of Statistics Sarawak 2000 (Kuching: Department ofthe Dutch rulers between Muslim communities and Statistics, Sarawak Branch, October 2000).numerous non-Muslim upriver communities (the word‘Dayak’ itself is an exonym initially introduced by 12 Bejalai is a cultural custom among Iban men toMuslim downriver people, meaning ‘upriver people’), undertake a journey in order to acquire material wealth.the Dayak category in Sarawak (spelled Dyak in the Bejalai in itself has been transformed from headhuntingBrooke categorisation) was earlier attributed by the raids in the past into today’s labour journeys (Kedit).Brooke Rajahs exclusively to the Iban and Bidayuhcommunities. The Brookes misleadingly called the 13 The only required document for Indonesian KenyahsIban Sea Dyaks, as opposed to the Bidayuh which entering Sarawak was an accompanying pass issuedthe administration called Land Dyaks. It used the by an Indonesian Wedana (Sub-District Head), orterm Orang Ulu to cluster other native non-Muslim letter issued by a village chief (SG, 31 May 1959:113).communities, such as the Kenyahs, Kayans, and Penans, The permissive approach towards native cross-borderamong others. movements, including permanent settlement, by colonial powers in Sarawak might be attributed to7 Michel Foucault offered the following critique to the fact that immigration services were far beyond thegeographical metaphors such as ‘territory’, ‘field’, reach of native communities, and perhaps a leftover‘domain’, ‘displacement’: “Once knowledge can be from Brooke policies which tend to leave most nativeanalysed in terms of region, domain, implantation, affairs to the natives themselves.displacement, transposition, one is able to capturethe process by which knowledge functions as a form 14 See Ritchie 23, 32, 69.of power and disseminates the effects of power…Itis indeed, war, administration, the implantation or 15 Interview with PeLencau Bilung, Nawang Baru,management of some form of power which are in February 2003. Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 46. 16 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY16 Temenggong Jugah was already an important political Melayu as the official language in Sarawak until 1973figure in Sarawak during the 1950s. He attended the and the guarantee of religious freedom (Sutlive 179-1924 Kapit Peacemaking ceremony as one of the 180). The Sarawak Gazette issue of May 1966 ran severalyoungest Iban Penghulu (chief of several longhouses). articles written by worried Iban writers on the languageIn 1955 he was appointed the post of Temenggong (the problem.Paramount Chief of the Iban). His approval of theMalaysian Federation concept was crucial in 1963, after 22 The first Sarawak government since incorporationwhich he became the Federal Minister for Sarawak reflected the state’s ethnic majority where twoAffairs. In August 1966, he represented Sarawak respective Iban Chief Ministers, Stephen Kalongduring the Malaysian-Indonesian peace negotiations in Ningkan and Tawi Sli held the positions from 1963 toBangkok and Jakarta. Posthumously he is known as Tun 1970. However, Federal interference started to pressureJugah (Sutlive). the ‘hard-headed’ Ningkan government in 1965 until he was removed (see also Roff; Jawan; Leigh).17 Interview with Ubang Ding, Long Nawang, January2003. 23 Hydropower projects were particularly controversial as they were very unpopular among affected rural18 Needless to say, undocumented workers are not communities. The Batang Ai hydropower projecteligible to minimum wage and insurance rights, resulting initiated in 1984 in the Sri Aman division displacedin more profitability for employers. approximately 26 Iban longhouses. The Bakun hydrodam, still under construction, displaced 52 Kayan,19 ‘Indon’ is conceived by many in Malaysia as a Punan and Kenyah longhouses. Many communitiespejorative term for ‘unwanted’ Indonesians (e.g. viewed that they received unjust compensationdomestic maids, sexual workers, border trespassers and from the government, and that their conditions inillegal workers). resettlement areas were far worse than expected (Survival International 88-93). Complaints about such20 Many Ibans that I interviewed expressed regret development issues also surfaced continuously duringthat he approved the incorporation of Sarawak into my interviews with Iban informants, most of whomthe Malaysian Federation. Instead, they romanticise came from such resettlement sites themselves.another Iban politician, Datuk Stephen KalongNingkan, Sarawak’s first Chief Minister, as the ‘rightful’ 24 The rise of the PBDS is itself a reaction towards theSarawakian hero. Ningkan once threatened Sarawak’s exclusive domination of a small Federal-supportedsecession following Singapore if the Federal government Muslim-Melanau elite over Sarawak politics (seekept meddling closely with local Sarawak affairs. For Jawan).many Ibans, Ningkan’s removal by Federal pressuresymbolises the marginalisation of Ibans from Sarawak 25 The ban initially imposed by the Ministry of Homepolitics. I recorded similar opinions from Kenyahs in Affairs was lifted after two weeks following mass appealsthe Upper Baram. by Iban and Christian leaders communities in Sarawak (see Sarawak Tribune, 11 Apr. 2003; New Straits Times,21 These amendments included Sarawak’s autonomy 26 Apr. 2003).over immigration laws, the postponement of BahasaEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 47. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 17REFERENCES the Poetics of Orang Asli Dispossession and Identity”. Southeast Asian Studies 34.3 (Dec. 1996): 568-597.Althusser, Louis. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays.London: New Left Books, 1971. Jawan, Jayum. Iban Politics and Economic Development: Their Patterns and Change. Bangi: Penerbit UKM,Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections 1994.on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: VersoEdition, 1983. Jenkins, Richard. Rethinking Ethnicity. London: Sage, 1997.Barth, Fredrik. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: TheSocial Organization of Culture Difference. Oslo: Jessup, T.C. “Why Do Apo Kayan Shifting CultivatorsUniversitetsforlaget, 1969. Move?” Borneo Research Bulletin 13. 1 (1981): 16-32.Clifford, James. The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth- Kaur, Amarjit. “A History of Forestry in Sarawak.”Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art. Cambridge Modern Asian Studies 32.1 (1998): 117-147.and London: Harvard University Press, 1988. Kedit, Peter M. Iban Bejalai. Kuala Lumpur: AmpangDavidson, Jamie S. “Primitive’ Politics: The Rise and Press, 1993.Fall of the Dayak Unity Party in West Kalimantan,Indonesia.” ARI Working Paper 1 (June 2003). King, Victor T. “Question of Identity: Names, Societies, and Ethnic Groups in Interior Kalimantan and BruneiDimbab Ngidang. “Contradictions in Land Development Darussalam.” Sojourn 16.1 (Apr. 2001): 1-36.Schemes: The Case of Joint Ventures in Sarawak,Malaysia.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 43.2 (Aug. 2002). ---. “Why is Sarawak Peripheral?” Margins and Minorities: The Peripheral Areas and Peoples of East Malaysia. Ed.Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews V.T. King and J.G. Parnwell. Hull: Hull Universityand Other Writings 1972 – 1977. Ed. Colin Gordon. Press, 1990.New York: Pantheon, 1980. Leigh, Michael Beckett. The Rising Moon: PoliticalFreeman, Derek. Report On The Iban. London: The Change in Sarawak. Sydney: Sydney University Press.Athlone Press, 1970. Majid Cooke, Fadzilah. The Challenge of SustainableGabriel, Theodore. Christian-Muslim Relations: A Case Forests: Forest Resource Policy in Malaysia, 1970-1995.Study of Sarawak, East Malaysia. Aldershot: Avebury, St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1999.1996. Maxwell, Allen R. “Balui Reconnaissances: Notes onGupta, A. and J. Ferguson. “Beyond ‘Culture’: the Oral History of the Belaga Malay Community andSpace, Identity, and the Politics of Difference.” The Early Belaga.” Sarawak Museum Journal LIV.79 (Dec.Anthropology of Globalization: A Reader. Ed. J.X. Inda 1999): 143-181.and R. Rosaldo. Oxford: Blackwell Press, 2002. Morrison, Philip S. “Urbanisation and RuralHorstmann, Alexander. “Incorporation and Resistance: Depopulation in Sarawak.” Borneo Research Bulletin 27Border-Crossings and Social Transformation in (1996): 127-136.Southeast Asia.” Antropologi Indonesia 67 (2002): 12-29. Ooi, Keat Gin. Of Free Trade and Native Interests: The Brooks and the Economic Development of Sarawak 1841-Ibrahim, Zawawi. “The Making of a Subaltern Discourse 1941. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997.in the Malaysian Nation-State: New Subjectivities and Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 48. 18 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYPostill, John R. “Little by Little, a National Subculture Soda, Ryoji. “Living Strategies of the Urban Pooris Made: The Role of Modern Media in the Institutional in a Local Town in Sarawak, Malaysia: PopulationTransformations of Iban Society.” Borneo Research Mobility of the Iban between Urban and Rural Areas.”Bulletin 29 (1998): 95-127. Geographical Review of Japan 73.B.2 (2000): 139-164.Pringle, Robert. Rajahs and Rebels: The Ibans of Somers, M.R. and G.D. Gibson. “Reclaiming theSarawak under Brooke Rule 1841-1941. Ithaca: Cornell Epistemological ‘Other’: Narrative and the SocialUniversity Press, 1970. Construction of Identity.” Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. Ed. C. Calhoun. Oxford: Blackwell Press,Reece, Robert W.H. The Name of Brooke: The End of 1994.White Rajah Rule in Sarawak. Kuala Lumpur: AmpangPress, 1993. Survival International. “Drowning the Longhouses.” Logging Against the Natives of Sarawak. Ed. K.S. Jomo,Roff, Margaret Clark. The Politics of Belonging: Political et.al. Kuala Lumpur: Insan, 1994.Change in Sabah and Sarawak. Kuala Lumpur: OxfordUniversity Press, 1974. Sutlive, Vinson H. Tun Jugah of Sarawak: Colonialism and Iban Response. Kuala Lumpur: Fajar Bakti, 1992.Sandin, B. “Sources of Iban Traditional History.” TheSarawak Museum Journal, Special Monograph No. 7 Tan, Chee-Beng. “Ethnic Identities and NationalXLVI.67 (1994). Identities: Some Examples from Malaysia.” Identities 6.4 (2002): 441-480.Sellato, B. Nomads of the Borneo Rainforest: TheEconomics, Politics and Ideology of Settling Down. Wee, Chong Hui. Sabah and Sarawak in the MalaysianHonolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994. Economy. Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed & Co., 1995.Sillander, Kenneth. “Local Identity and RegionalVariation: Notes on the Lack of Significance of Ethnicity Whittier, Herbert L. “Social Organization and SymbolsAmong the Luangan and the Bentian.” Borneo Research of Social Differentiation: An Ethnographic Study ofBulletin 26 (1995): 69-195. the Kenyah Dayak of Kalimantan (Borneo).” Diss. Michigan State University, 1973.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 49. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 19VOYAGES AND ETHNICITY ACROSS REORDERED FRONTIERS: CONFLICT RESOLUTION ANDLEADERSHIP IN THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY FORMATION AMONG THE SAMADILAUT OF SEMPORNA1WILFREDO MAGNO TORRES IIIThe Asia Foundation, Philippines “Pagka aku yukna, ‘bai ilagaran, Anagna na kita magdundang. Yuk Tuhan, ‘Sinagan, katauhan nu dundangan?’ Yuk na ‘aho katauhan ko dundangan’. Yuk na ‘ahap na sinulayan dundangan’ yukna, ‘manga nabi’. Bang ilu sakatan bi, subay a’a asutsi Babag na kayu Shunti.” [“Since you have been waiting for me, we shall now start to swing.” God said to Sinagan, “Do you know what is a swing?” She replied, “Yes, I know what is a swing.” God said, “It is good that we try the swing of the prophets. If you ride the swing, you should be a person who is pure, on the cradle made from the tree Shunti.”] - Buwahan Sinagan2 by Kalamat Garani, a Sama Dilaut DjinINTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND In a rapidly changing world, many indigenous groupsSETTING like the Sama Dilaut are beset by problems of grindingThis verse was recited by Kalamat Garani, a respected poverty, poor health conditions and governmentdjin, who belongs to a dying generation of Sama Dilaut neglect. In the Sulu zone, these problems are furtherwho were formerly boat-dwelling. This beautiful verse exacerbated by the violence experienced by the Samais said to be a dialogue between mbo’3 Sinagan and as seen in the piratical attacks against them, feudingGod, and tells about the purity of one’s heart and the political clans, encroachment of their traditional seaimportance of moral uprightness — a prevalent theme territories, war and the military campaigns againstin the life of the Sama Dilaut. terrorism.The verse points to an earlier time in Sama history, and It is interesting to find out how the Sama cope withreflects the ethos, the world-view, the values and ideals the rapid changes around them, and how they reshapeof an older generation. These personal and collective and reinvent their ethnic identities in different socialmemories, drawn from experiences throughout their contexts. This paper investigates the dynamics of ethnichistory as a people, constitute their culture. And culture identity formation and identity renegotiation amongis what gives content and meaning to the Sama Dilaut’s the Sama Dilaut of Semporna, as these are articulatedperception of their ethnic identity. and reproduced in their leadership structure and in the process of conflict resolution within the context of a Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 50. 20 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYrapidly changing environment and dynamic interaction of origin, many Sama Dilaut families have increasinglywith neighbouring peoples. migrated to urban centres.Specifically, it asks the following questions: Interethnic Relations in the Sulu Archipelago and1. How do the Sama Dilaut conceptualise their ethnic Semporna identity? What are the historical determinants To have a clearer understanding of the circumstances in the development of their identity? What is the surrounding the Sama Dilaut, a brief statement must be significance of Sama ethnic identity for the Sama made on their relationship with neighbouring groups in Dilaut? Are there variations in conceptions of ethnic Sulu and in Semporna, Sabah. identity in terms of gender, age, social status?2 How is Sama Dilaut identity shaped and reinvented The Sama of the Sulu Archipelago share the islands in conflict situations and in the process of conflict with the Tausug. Though more recent arrivals to resolution? What are the conflict resolution Sulu compared to the Sama,4 the Tausug have clearly mechanisms inherent within Sama culture that become the more dominant group - socially, politically encourage dialogue and promote the peaceful and economically (Stone; Arce; Nimmo “Social”, resolution of conflict? What particular aspects of “Reflections”; Kiefer). The Sama generally assume a Sama culture contribute to the peaceful resolution subordinate status to the Tausug, while the more sea- of conflict? oriented Sama or the Sama Dilaut occupy a much lower3. What is the role of Sama leadership in forming and social standing compared to the more sedentary Sama. sustaining Sama Dilaut identity? How do Sama concepts of leadership and authority contribute to Because of their low position in society, the Sama ethnic identity formation? Dilaut is considered the most socially, economically and4. What theoretical significance on ethnic identity politically deprived group. This can be discerned from formation can be drawn from this research? the derogatory names ascribed to them by outsiders. Examples are: luwaan which means ‘to spit out orA Brief Background of the Sama Dilaut vomit’; pala’u, which refer to the house boat; and theThe Sama Dilaut (sea-oriented Sama) belong to a wider term samal, which has been unfortunately established insea-nomadic boat culture found throughout Southeast text books to distinguish them from the boat-dwellingAsia. The members of this widely distributed population Sama. The Sama of course, consider these outsideinclude maritime or strand-oriented communities and ascriptions degrading. In Sulu and in Tawi-Tawi, theya small number of boat nomads. The Sama Dilaut can prefer to be known as Bangsa Sama,5 Sama Dilaut (sea-be found scattered from south-central Philippines, oriented Sama), or simply Sama.throughout eastern Borneo and Sulawesi, in the islandsof eastern Indonesia, and in many small islands in the The various Sama groups in Sulu have established aCelebes Sea. The Sama Dilaut are typically subsistence clientage relationship with the Tausug. Kiefer explainedfishermen and aquatic foragers residing in pile-houses clientage as “a servile relationship in which one wholefound in the fringes of urban areas, near coastlines, on group is subservient to another in varying ways, quiteislands and coral islets. often the status of a pariah group: a group which has been expropriated from its land by another ethnic groupIn Malaysia, the Sama Dilaut are popularly known as and stays on as ‘guests’ of the dominant group, beingBajau Laut (Sea Bajau) to distinguish them from the reduced to some form of economic dependence” (22).more dominant land Bajau. The Bajau Laut are foundin the Semporna district of Sabah where they are Thus, he observed that “the boat-dwelling Samal Laudnumerically dominant. In the Philippines, the more or Luwaan, who live almost their entire lives on thesedentary Sama are referred to as ‘Samal’ especially by water, are a pariah group in the sense that they do notthe neighbouring Tausug, while the more sea-oriented control any territorial base necessary for their socialSama, or Sama Dilaut are generally referred to as ‘Bajau’. order; rather, they are ultimately dependent on theAt present, because of many problems in their places Tausug for certain material goods as well as protection,Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 51. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 21at least in those areas where Tausug are numerically Semporna is part of this zone (see Map 1). Located ondominant.” the southeastern edge of Sabah, the district is comprised of a narrow, mountainous peninsula, dotted with islandsAt present, this ‘outcast view’ toward the Sama Dilaut extending up to the border of the Sulu Archipelago.in Sulu is changing as there is an increasing awareness The bridging peninsula breaks off into a string of smalleramong the Sama of their rights, an increasing pool offshore islands like scattered gems at sea. Semporna isof professionals among the Sama, and an increasing a Malay name meaning ‘place of peace or rest’.involvement of government, non governmentalorganisations (NGOs), and educational institutions, in Often forgotten or ignored, Semporna boasts of a richtheir plight. history that highlights an important link between the Philippines and Malaysia. Since pre-colonialMeanwhile in Semporna, Malaysia, the Sama or times, Semporna’s strategic location between theBajau Laut live side-by-side with the more numerous Sulu Archipelago and eastern Borneo has made it anBajau Kubang.6 The Bajau Kubang is the largest and important arena for trade, marine procurement, piracypolitically the most dominant subgroup in Semporna. and cultural convergence.Considered the earlier inhabitants of the area, they arefound in numerous islands, but primarily in Omadal and For the purpose of this study, two research sitespredominantly in communities around Bum-Bum Island were selected in the Semporna District. One is thelike Larapan, Hampalan, Sulabayan and Nusalalu. community of Kampung7 Bangau-Bangau near the Semporna peninsula, north of the town centre.Different degrees of clientage relations also exist The other site is in Danawan Island, located fartherbetween the Sama and the Bajau Kubang groups. The offshore near the boundaries of Malaysia and southernmost recent type of clientage relationship documented Philippines. There are two communities in Danawanin this study is the jaminan (guaranteed) status of the Island – Kampung Danawan proper which is comprisedSama Dilaut by other local Bajau. While the ethnic of local Kubangs and mostly Sama from Manubal andsocial stratification in Semporna is not as severe as Musu; and Kampung Halo which is mostly comprised ofin Sulu, the Bajau Kubang are still considered more Sama Sitangkay and Tawi-Tawi. Both of these researchdominant ethnic group. sites are fishing communities. Semporna was selected for this study because it has historical ties with the SuluThe Setting: The Sulu Zone and the Semporna archipelago and it is the place where Bajaus form anDistrict absolute majority.This research was conducted in a region that JamesFrancis Warren (“The Sulu Zone”) calls The Sulu ‘MARGINAL’ HISTORIES AND INTREPIDZone. This zone, which became important at the end VOYAGESof the 18th century, is an economic region centred An understanding of Sama ethnicity entails a studymainly on the Sulu Archipelago of the Philippines and of the events in their history that have often beennetworks into Malaysia and Indonesia. It is a region smothered by the more dominant narratives of nation-with a multi-ethnic pre-colonial Malaya-Muslim state building. This section focuses on the Sama Dilaut clansand an ethnically heterogeneous set of societies with or kinship groups at the turn of the 20th century thatdiverse political backgrounds and alignments (Warren now constitute the present day communities of Bangau-“Iranun” 29). Bangau and Danawan Island.Warren adds that “these diverse ethnic groups could The Bangau-Bangau Kinship Groupsbe set within a strategic hierarchy of kinship-oriented In his recent book on the Bajau Laut, Clifford Satherstateless societies, maritime, nomadic fishers, and forest provided an extensive history of the Bajau in Semporna,dwellers.” The Sulu Zone is an invaluable framework and in the process provided an interesting history of theused by Warren to analyse the socio-historical processes Semporna District itself. According to Sather, therein the region. were scattered anchorage groups in Semporna during Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 52. 22 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYthe founding of the Semporna station in 1887 (64). Sama Dilaut was near an islet named Samal-Samal,By the 1930s, he says, only three anchorage groups are very close to the much bigger Bum-Bum Island. Samal-said to have remained, all within three kilometres of Samal was such a well-known Sama anchorage thatSemporna town. it was named after them. During this time, the Sama did not have any leader with the stature of panglima,Two moorage groups were located along the narrow although they had their matto’a and djins, who guidedstraits south of Semporna – one on the side of Bum-Bum their families. Hamjatul also recalls that during thatIsland, beside the present-day village of Balembang, time, the Sama did not use a lepa. She said that theand the other, on the peninsula side, at Samar-Samar barutu or kubu-kubu was their primary bayanan.12(or Samal-Samal). The third group was located at thenortheastern entrance to the straits near the site of From Samal-Samal, the families gradually moved topresent day Labuan Haji. Balembang or Balembang Sama, beside Bum-Bum and just across the straits from Samal-Samal. These familiesUsing this valuable information as a launching point, engaged in farming. Sama elders recall that the Kubang,the researcher was able to probe deeper into the histories who were the natives in the area, lived in harmony withof the Sama Dilaut bands. One informant interviewed the Sama back then. It was at this time that the Sama infor this study is mbo’ Hamjatul, an elderly matriarch of Balembang started to recognise a man named BungangBangau-Bangau, and the wife of Panglima Tiring, the as their panglima. The present leaders of Labuan Hajilongest serving panglima (headman) of their kinship are his descendants.group. These elders offer a glimpse into Sama familyhistories and provide an interesting perspective of the For some time, the Sama lived in relative peace inSama Dilaut’s recent past. Balembang until they were forced to flee back to Samal- Samal, thoroughly frightened, when one villager,Mbo’ Hamjatul was born in a bayanan8 in the area around Malakdunda (sister of Hamjatul), was found in theBalembang. Her father Mogong, is a Suluk (Tausug) interior, allegedly beheaded by a Sagai’.13from Parang, who became a slave captive of the a’aSikubung.9 However, Mogong escaped from his captors As a people whose lives are interconnected with sea,and fled to Banaran before reaching Sitangkay. While their intimate knowledge of fishing areas and sea spacesin Banaran, Mogong was adopted by the Sama Dilaut is not surprising. Sama elders easily recall the earlyin the area. Later, he married Hamjatul’s mother, mbo’ names of places they utilise and the history behindKabi, who was Sama Banaran10 and had 11 children. these territories. Places that are historically significance for the Sama are Pamandalatan (now called TebbaAccording to oral histories, during the time they were Lampu); Sibalanay (now Tebba Gusungan); Sahasahanboat-dwelling bands, the Sama Dilaut revolved around (now Tebba Mangira); Balembang Sama (now Tanjunga number of permanent anchorage sites. Baru); Tubing, Sipalihi, and Legetan.The sites regularly mentioned were: (1) Samal- When the Second World War reached Sabah in 1942,Samal; (2) Balembang; (3) Bubul (near the present the Sama Dilaut bands in Semporna attempting to fleeday Kampung Salamat); (4) Teba-Teba; (5) Bangau- the war scattered to different islands. Most of the familiesBangau; and (6) somewhere near Kampung Simunul. evacuated to the neighbouring Sitangkay-Sibutu areaAccording to the Sama, the a’a Simunul (people from in Tawi-Tawi where most of them share kinship ties,Simunul island) already lived in the area for a long but the war also reached that area. Meanwhile becausetime, which was why the area was named as such. In of the confusion, many people from Sitangkay also fledaddition, Simunul Dap-Dap is the location of one of the to Semporna.oldest communities in Semporna. Sitangkay is one of the largest Sama Dilaut settlements.Long before the Second World War when the British The recognised Sama leaders of Sitangkay at that timewere still in Sabah,11 the primary moorage site of the were Panglima Alari and his sons Amalawi and Buhali.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 53. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 23According to Hamjatul, the panglima of the Semporna Haji kinship groups was unfolding, another story wasbands during the war was Kuraani, a son of Panglima taking place several kilometres away on the island ofBungang. But when Kuraani and his family fled to Danawan. Danawan is located on the Ligitan reefSitangkay, he was not recognized as panglima anymore, complex, a very rich fishing area for the people ofbecause the territory belonged to Panglima Alari. Semporna.16 The present panglima of Danawan says that the Sama Dilaut have been fishing in the area forAt that time, Panglima Alari had a timbalan or umbol as long as he can remember. Even Sama Dilaut old-duwa (assistant or Number Two) by the name of Hawani. timers from Bangau-Bangau recall that during fishingA cousin of Panglima Alari, Hawani was appointed trips, they would anchor in Danawan as well as in thetimbalan because he was known to be bahani (brave) nearby island of Ligitan. On these islands, they wouldand was said to be kobolan (invulnerable).14 Hawani get firewood and water, pay tribute to the spirits, andeventually became a patriarch of the Bangau-Bangau celebrate their rituals.17families. While the dominant families of Danawan considerAfter the Second World War, some Sama families themselves natives and Kubang, they do not denyreturned to Semporna. These included the families their ancestral ties to Sulu and Indonesia (especiallyof Kuraani, and Panglima Alari’s timbalan, Hawani. Dalawan or Derawan). The people of Danawan in fact,There, the leadership passed on to Kuraani’s brother acknowledge that some of their ancestors were SamaTanjilul. This event was memorable, because it was to’ongan (genuine Sama) or Sama Dilaut. The presentthen that the Sama bands started to branch out. The panglima of Danawan, who is Kubang, speaks highly offamilies of Tanjilul resettled in the area known today as the Sama Dilaut, whom he said have long coexistedKampung Labuan Haji. peacefully with the people of the seashore.Meanwhile, Hawani’s family and the other families with However, in a region blessed with rich marine resources,his band also separated from the Labuan Haji kinship the islands of Semporna were often stages for conflictgroup to form another community. After the war, they and struggles for control and ownership. Alliances weresettled in one of their earlier moorage sites called Bubul. constantly formed and shifted depending on ethnicity,At the time they separated from Tanjilul’s family group, kinship, and the interests of the people. In fact, thethey had no panglima again. struggle for the control of Danawan has a long history. However, during the interviews, the oral historiesNot long after, through influence from politicians, by elders only go back as far as the British CharteredHawani’s group was convinced to resettle in an area Company Rule and into the Second World War. Storiesknown to the Sama as teba-teba, near the Semporna of these struggles are also primarily centred on themarket. During this time, an influential family member important ancestors (mbo’) of the dominant familiesnamed Atani bin Damsid became the first government- who presently reside on the island.appointed panglima of this kinship group. MeanwhileHawani’s son, Tiring became the umbol duwa of Atani. According to oral history, the ancestors of the present Danawan families, Panglima Goni and his son Abusari,After a piratical attack on a police station near the fought many people for control over the island. In oneSama moorage around 1954, the Sama in teba-teba were confrontation, they fought against another island peopletransferred by local officials to their present location at nearer to mainland Semporna, called the a’a TetaganBangau-Bangau.15 Panglima Atani died shortly after (people of Tetagan). The people there are also Bajau, andthis transfer. In 1955, Tiring became the panglima until are said to be saga a’a.18 In a decisive battle, Panglima1979. The population of Bangau-Bangau has grown Goni, and Abusari, together with their tindug (followerssince then. or supporters) were able to gain control of the island.The Danawan Kinship Groups During these skirmishes, Panglima Goni was aided byWhile the story of the Bangau-Bangau and Labuan his network of kinship alliances from other islands and Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 54. 24 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYlocales. These kinsmen were from Omadal, Sulabayan, Angkan na ‘sab aku buwatinaan ni, untukMenampilik, Tongkalloh, Hampalan, Tando Bulung, and panghatahauan bi, tatap ma Danawan ole karnaPanisil Kubang. However, it is also interesting to note mengikut sejara bai mbo’ Panglima Abusari. Karnathat after the hostilities, Panglima Ismail emphasised mbal aniya’ saga kampuhan na. Anungguan baithat the warring groups eventually reconciled. paninggalan na. Dangan-dangan ku lah. [That is why today, so that you will know, I will never leaveIt was during the conflict with the a’a Tetagan that Danawan. I can never forget the history of our mbo’Goni’s son, Abusari, proved himself a brave warrior and Panglima Abusari. Our grandchildren today do nota capable leader. In battle, Abusari was said to be bahani like to live anymore in Danawan. I am the only(brave) and kobolan (invulnerable). When Panglima one who remains to watch over the resting placeGoni died, family members from the islands of Omadal, of Abusari.]Menampilik, Sulabayan and Hampalan assembled andselected Abusari as the next panglima. The Moro Uprising and the Story of Sama Refugees Several years after the Philippines’ consolidationDuring Abusari’s time, there were several other as republic in 1946, there was already a growingskirmishes with outsiders such as the Sagai’, the Suluk dissatisfaction among the Muslim population in(Tausug), and the a’a Simunul.19 Some of these skirmishes Mindanao over the central administration duealso concerned the neighbouring islands of Legetan and to increasing poverty, government neglect andSipadan. The island yet to be called Sipadan then, was discrimination. Already there was a brewing conflictallegedly under the control of Abusari’s family and was between government-sponsored Christian settlers andregularly utilised by the families in Danawan. Abusari’s the Moros who felt deprived from their own lands infamily once gathered turtle eggs and farmed panggi kayu Mindanao. The Jabiddah Massacre of 1968 was the spark(cassava), seloka’ (coconut), and gandung (corn)20 in that ignited a Moro uprising and led to an escalationSipadan. of hostilities between Muslims and Christians in the region by 1971.Like his father, Panglima Abusari also depended on hisnetwork of alliances. A formidable ally was Maharaja The declaration of Martial Law in 1972 only added fuelMahamud. Originally from Danawan, Mahamud lived for to this volatile situation. As Che Man points out: “Inmany years in Dalawan, Indonesia. When he came back 1972, the atmosphere in Mindanao was tense as sporadicto Danawan, he became a tindug or bataan of Abusari. clashes between Ilagas and Philippine Armed Forces, onMahamud eventually married Salama, Abusari’s sister. the one hand, and Barracudas and Blackshirts, on theBecause Mahamud proved to be a dependable tindug, he other, occurred here and there” (76).was accorded the title Maharaja, and given charge of anarea of Danawan known as Lumping. Later, because of In this atmosphere, the Sama from Siasi became caughtland disputes with other family members in Danawan, in war between the Philippine government and theMahamud was sent to Sipadan and given stewardship ‘war of liberation’ by the Moro forces. Too often in thisof the island. dark page of Mindanao’s history, perspectives of the war come from the government and the armed forces, orLike so many communities in Semporna, when from the Moro insurgent fighters. Aside from statisticsthe Second World War erupted, the community of on casualties, rarely is the perspective of the civilianDanawan was thrown into chaos. Many residents left population taken into account. Even rarer are storiesfor the safety of the outlying islands when the Japanese from indigenous cultural communities like the Samamade a garrison in the neighbouring island of Si Amil. who were very much affected by the war.But others like the family of Abusari did not leave. Thefamilies who stayed in Danawan eventually coexisted At this time of escalating hostilities and sporadicwith the Japanese troops until the end of the war. As clashes in the region, the Sama of Manubal (Manubul)Panglima Ismail explained: and Musu in the municipality of Siasi, Sulu, wereEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 55. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 25already experiencing difficulties due to the failing Ethnic Labelling and Differing Perspectiveseconomy in the south, the increasing piracy at sea, and The problem with the early literature on the Bajau orthe regular extortion by armed groups. The Sama began Sama is that it often used the etic ascription in referringto be visited by revolutionary Moro fighters who called to these groups. Etic ascription is the designation madethemselves Tausug, and who were gathering resources by outsiders following their native tongues’ spellingfor the impending war in Mindanao. practices. This is opposed to emic ascription, which is the designation of scholars and researchers followingBecause of the constant predation by armed groups in the ascription of the culture being studied.the area, and the hardships of the impending war, theSama in Manubal and Musu started an exodus towards In the Philippines, the term ‘Bajau’ is commonlyDanawan. There, they were taken in by the panglima, reserved for the boat-nomadic Sama and those whoPanglima Nujum. Many of them remember that 77 have recently abandoned boat-dwelling. Meanwhile thefamilies arrived on Danawan in one day. More families term ‘Samal’ is used to refer to the relatively sedentaryarrived in 1971, 1972, and 1973. However, in 1974, Sama, and those who have adopted Islam. Accordingrefugees of the war in Sulu were sent to other islands. to Akamine, this classification was first used by Helen Follett in 1945 to distinguish between the Bajau andElsewhere in Sabah, there was a similar influx of refugees. the Samal. He adds that this same classification basedWhen the war in Sulu erupted in 1974, hundreds of on religion became popular in later articles such as thefamilies from Sulu and Tawi-Tawi became refugees in works of Stone.Sabah. In Semporna, many Tausug refugees where givenshelter in Sebangkat Island, while the Sama families Curiously in Malaysia, there is no distinction betweenfrom Sitangkay and Sibutu sought shelter with their kin ‘Bajau’ and ‘Samal’.21 The term ‘Bajau’ is used by thein Bangau-Bangau and Labuan Haji. After more than Malays to refer to sea-oriented peoples or communities30 years, many of the displaced families from the war in in Sabah. The ethnonym ‘Sama’ is not commonly usedSulu are permanently established in Semporna. except by the Sama themselves.UNRAVELLING THE KNOTS OF SAMA The absence of the term Samal as a category in MalaysiaETHNICITY and Indonesia prompted Akamine to speculate that theEarly literature on the peoples of the Sulu Archipelago distinction between Sama and Bajau was created in thecommonly divided the inhabitants of the islands into Philippines (11). However, Akamine admits that hethree distinct ethnolinguistic groups, namely Tausug, was still in the process of tracing the origins of theseSamal and Bajau (Stone; Arce; Nimmo “Social”). While distinctions.the Tausug are clearly a distinct people, much confusionexists in identifying the differences between the Samal The Philippine Perspective: A Confusion in theand Bajau. Saleeby, for instance, interchanges the terms Designations ‘Samal’ and ‘Bajau’Samal and Bajau (33, 40). This interchanging of terms Taking off from Akamine’s work, this paper offers anwas also observed by earlier researchers on the subject alternative explanation for the origins of the terms(Arce 3; Akamine 9). Samal and Bajau in the Philippines. In Sulu, the dominant Tausug refer to the Sama by a number ofHowever, Nimmo (“Reflections”) believes that it derogatory names, one of which is Samal. The termis misleading to regard the Bajau and the Samal as Samal may have been derived from the religious notionbelonging to two distinct ethnic groups since both of them of sammal which means ‘dirty’ or ‘a state of becomingspeak dialects of the Samal language, view themselves as out of grace’. 22Samal, and are identified as a group of Samal by otherpeople of Sulu (35). This seems to be supported by According to Maulurana,23 the term sammal islinguistic studies done by Pallesen and Akamine. Hence, commonly used when the ablutions conducted beforefrom a linguistic point of view, the Samal and the Bajau prayers are not properly done. This leaves the personbelong to the same ethnolinguistic group. in a state of ‘uncleanliness’ or having ‘fallen out of Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 56. 26 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYgrace’. The term can also be applied in magic, as when same people.a person’s power has worn off (na sammal) because ofthe improper use of his powers. Furthermore, some Sama may have realised the negative connotations of the term Samal and consequently haveI hypothesise that the term sammal became associated chosen to be called Bajau, which has no pejorativewith Sama because of the coincidental closeness in the meaning in Malay. In the meantime, the sedentaryspelling and pronunciation of the two words, and more Sama who had resided for a long time alongside theimportantly because of the low regard for the Sama in Tausug and may not have been easily distinguishableSulu society. Since the Tausug tend to look down on from their neighbours became the lost voices in thisthe Sama, the term sammal became associated with discourse. All of these probably created the confusionthe group along with other degrading labels ascribed to in the classification exercise.them by the Tausug. Stone – who probably set the stereotype of the socialHistorically, sea peoples like the Sama Dilaut formed hierarchy in Sulu – and the early works of Nimmo,trading networks that connected them to Sulu and may have further popularised the distinctions of theeastern Borneo. The unique marine specialisation of Bajau and Samal in the Philippines. These researchthe Sama allowed them to extract marine resources that materials permeated Philippine awareness throughwere valuable trading commodities. Because they formed education, classroom textbooks and other publications,part of these networks and exploited cyclical fishing museums, and even movies. Moreover, in recent years,seasons, the Sama who frequently voyaged around the international concern for the welfare of the Bajau,Sulu-Borneo area often had outside ascriptions from further established its use among local NGOs in Sulucommunities they encountered.24 and Tawi-Tawi and among local and international donor agencies.The terms Sama, Sama Dilaut, Bangsa Sama, and Samatoongan are the self-ascriptions commonly preferred As a result, the present generation of Sama, especiallyby the group.25 To a lesser extent, ‘Bajau’ is used.26 those who underwent formal education, now accept theHowever, when the Sama journeyed to other locales, distinctions between the Samal and Bajau, and eventheir ethnonyms tended to change. sometimes use the term Samal to refer to their ethnic group.On the one hand, when the Sama migrate from theirhomelands in Sitangkay and Sibutu to the Sulu islands The Malaysian Perspectiveand establish communities near the Tausug, they are In Malaysia, the term Bajau is used to refer to bothreferred to as ‘Samals’ by the neighbouring Tausug. On sea-oriented and land-oriented communities includingthe other hand, when the Sama from Sitangkay cross the agricultural communities that have a history ofborders and migrate to Sabah, they are called ‘Bajau’ by seafaring such as the Bajau Kota Belud and in somethe Malays. Interestingly, when the Sama from Sabah instances, the Tausug. This is similar to the termscrosses the borders back again into the Philippines, they Kadazan and Kadazandusun which were recent labelscarry with them their Malay ascription of Bajau.27 used to designate the numerous communities living in Sabah that were originally known by the names of theirWhen early researchers studied the people of Sulu, they locales.encountered the more sea-oriented Sama that regularlyvoyaged to Sabah, who called themselves Bajau after While blanketed under one term, in reality, the Bajau inthe Malay designation. At the same time, they met Sabah are comprised of numerous subgroups that tracethe more sedentary Sama who had been residing near their origins to particular islands or cluster groups.28the Tausug who referred to them as Samals. Hence, In the Semporna district of Sabah, there are Bajauearly researchers saw two categories — the Samal and Kubang, Bajau Omadal, Bajau Sibutu, Bajau Simunul,the Bajau — which were actually different outside Bajau Laut etc. However, the Bajaus in Semporna areascriptions used by the Tausug and the Malay for the generally viewed as belonging to two groups — theEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 57. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 27Bajau Kubang and the Bajau Laut.29 ‘them,’ ‘they,’ ‘there is a person,’ or ‘the people there’. This is an obvious geographic reference by the SamaThis statement does not intend to generalise however, to spatially locate the Kubang who live in the islandsbecause it is always subject to contestation by other local whom they consider earlier inhabitants in the area.groups. For instance, there are some Bajau groups whoalso consider themselves indigenous to the area but do Through time, the meanings of these terms changed.not identify themselves as Kubang.30 In addition, many Because of education, socio-economic improvements,Sama Dilaut detest being considered and treated as and conversion to Islam, new tastes and standardsoutsiders, newcomers or pelarian (refugees). Apparently, developed. Hence, the present generation of Samabecause of the war in the 1970s and the exodus from and Kubang found the terms pejorative, as it has beenthe Philippines, the Sama communities sadly became associated with a less glamorous past.associated with the pelarian status. Present Notions of Being Sama or Bajau LautBut as the brief history presented in this paper proves, At this point, it is appropriate to give a generalgenerations of Sama already lived in the region even description of Sama Dilaut ethnic identity as viewedbefore the formation of Malaysia. Historical accounts by the Sama themselves through a series of informanteven go back further in time and prove that eastern interviews, focus-group discussions, and informalBorneo and the Sulu areas were already part of the Sama conversations.Dilaut’s home range. Hence, because of generations oflong-term residence in the area, the Bajau Laut or Sama The Sama Dilaut describe their bangsa (race or nation)Dilaut also consider themselves natives in the area. For as peace-loving and humble, one whose lives andthe Sama Dilaut of Semporna, the islands, islets and the livelihoods are interconnected with the sea. Whilesea spaces that make up their territory are considered many Sama have long lived in houses and worked onthe home of their ancestors (mbo’). land, they still have strong associations with the sea, which they describe as one of their tanda (sign or ethnicThe ‘Pala’u’ and the ‘Saga a’a’: An Evolution of marker).MeaningsIn Semporna, nothing would insult a Sama more than to They believe that the beauty of their bangsa is theirbe called pala’u. For them, the term has connotations of peaceful nature, submissiveness, and avoidance of warbeing dirty, uneducated, materially poor and pagan — a and violence. In addition, they characterise themselvesdescription which was unfortunately established by the as a people who love to go together (magbeya-beya’)early literature on the Bajau.31 Similarly, for the local and who readily help and cooperate with one anotherBajau Kubang, being called saga a’a is considered an (magluruk-lurukan).insult. However, elders recall that the use of such termsin the olden days did not carry pejorative meanings. In Unlike other groups, the Sama believe that their bangsathe past, the Sama were regularly addressed as pala’u by do not give the government any major problems.their neighbours, the Chinese and the Bajau Kubang, They help out in their own way, by helping police andin the same way that the Bajau Kubang were also government officials at sea. For them, the governmentcommonly addressed as saga a’a by the Sama. and tourists mostly recognise them for their arts, music, dances, and symbols, which they say are frequently usedSome informants reveal that the term pala’u is actually in programmes and local events like the annual Regattaa corruption of the Malay word parahu which means Lepa.‘boat’. Instead of names, the term parahu was used byoutsiders to summon or call out the boat-dwelling Sama, The Sama sometimes still refer to the stereotypedwhich was actually in reference to their boats.32 Because ethnic markers such as house-type, language, andof the idiosyncrasies in pronunciation it became parahu. religion to distinguish their group, though these haveIn the same manner, the Sama use the terms saga a’a changed through the years. The Sama in Sempornaor siga-e to refer to the Kubang which actually means generally consider themselves Muslims, but the Islam Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 58. 28 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYthey practice is unique in the sense that many of interests of their followers (Sather 203). Each localisedthem practice ntan kaomboan (religion or beliefs of the kindred recognises a headman called panglima who isancestors). also considered a matto’a (Nimmo “Social” 436). The panglima is expected to be a man of good sense andThe ntan kaomboan includes various beliefs and practices experience and is not chosen formally, but emergesinvolving ancestral spirits, the elements of which are naturally because of his innate personal qualitiesthe djin, the pagmbo’ (ceremony for ancestors), the (Sather 204; Nimmo “Religious” 9). The chief dutieskanduli or igal (ritual dances), and the janji’ or tantu of a panglima are arbitration and sometimes ritual(ritual promises). It is important to note that the ntan leadership (Nimmo “Social” 436).kaomboan play a vital role in conflict resolution. Whilethese beliefs are sometimes ridiculed by more orthodox From the earlier studies of Nimmo and Sather, one ofMuslims, for the Sama, there is no conflict between the most important functions of leaders is to resolvetheir belief in Islam and their belief in their ancestral conflicts. Their studies have documented practicesspirits.33 For their belief and practices related to the like magselassai, kipalat selamat, diat, and bangun as thentan kaomboan are ways of remembering, respecting and common processes and rituals that facilitate conflictloving their ancestors. resolution among the Sama. In addition, Nimmo (“MAGOSAHA” 184-186, 205) has documentedIf there is one thing that the Sama share, it is their certain types of songs and dances that provide theexperience of poverty, discrimination, clientage and a means for the Sama to manage potential conflict orlife full of hardship. Like the perception of outsiders, tensions. According to Nimmo, songs like the binuathe Sama also tend to consider themselves a bangsa (lullabies) and lia-lia (spite songs/anger songs), and thewithout a permanent place (halam aniya’’ lahat). Wars, fight dances like the kuntal and silat, serve to channelfeuds and government policies have caused them to live repressed feelings, facilitate social control and evenin a perpetual diaspora. resolve conflicts in a culturally sanctioned way.LEADERSHIP AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION Elsewhere, Hadji Musa Malabong, in a recentTraditional Concepts of Sama Dilaut Leadership and unpublished paper, classifies Sama leaders into twoConflict Resolution categories: the spiritual leaders who are the possessorMuch of the existing literature on Bajau social of the djin and those leaders who are responsible for theorganisation is based on anthropological research economic activities of the people whom he calls nakura’conducted in the 1960s and the early 1970s by two (1).prominent scholars in the field of Bajau studies — HarryArlo Nimmo, who based his research among the Sama Current Concepts of Sama Dilaut Leadership andDilaut of the Tawi-Tawi Province in the Philippines, Conflict Resolutionand Clifford Sather, who did research among the Bajau Presently, leaders or the concept of leadership amongLaut of the Semporna District, Sabah, Malaysia. the Sama are variously termed nakura, panglima, pagnakura, pagnakokan and pagbeybeyaan. Not muchThese two scholars had the privilege of documenting has changed among the Sama Dilaut where leadershipthe way of life of the Bajau during a critical transition is concerned. The qualities admired in leaders andperiod that includes the shift from a boat-nomadic to the conflict resolution mechanisms are still essentiallya more sedentary lifestyle. This transition period has the same. Much of the authority of the leaders at thecertain implications on the Bajau’s social organisation kampung level still rests mainly on localized kindredand leadership structure. support. Until now, Bajau leaders are chosen or emerge because of their personal abilities, skills and charisma.Both studies generally agree that the Bajau Lautleadership rested chiefly on a group of elders called the Vital among these qualities is the concept of abontol ormatto’a who are primarily responsible for mediating abontol atai which means straight, true, clean, sinceredisputes, safeguarding the addat, and protecting the or pure hearted. Leaders are expected to have a heartEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 59. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 29for the people. Recognition or acceptance of the leader Djins are primarily obliged to serve by communingby the community is still considered important, and with the spirits to diagnose illness and causes of death,leadership in the service of the Sama community itself help the community safeguard against calamities, andis still the primary responsibility expected of a good acquire blessings for safe and successful fishing trips.leader. In Semporna, the functions of a djin are very similar toThere are different types of leaders in Semporna. There those described by Malabong in Sitangkay. However, Iare formally-elected leaders and government-appointed would like to emphasise the significant role of the djin inleaders who represent the powerful formal structures of conflict resolution. Djins act as mediums that diagnosethe government. There are also the traditional leaders illnesses caused by conflicts such as family disputes, findwho are more kinship-based. These include the matto’a ways to appease the spirits causing the illnesses, andin the community, the djins and the more localised reconcile disputing families.36 Djins function as witnesseshouse group leaders whose scope of responsibility can (saksi) to rites of forgiveness and reconciliation amonglie in the political, economic and spiritual realms.34 feuding individuals and families.Formally-elected and government-appointed political It is to the djin that promises of repentance andleaders are more aware of government rules and forgiveness are made by feuding parties. Making suchregulations and are more conscious of implementing promises is in effect a sanction that would preventthese rules in the daily affairs of the community. people from breaking their vows, as this would causeWhere religion is involved, formal leaders seem to be anger and reprisal from the ancestral spirits. Thesemore orthodox in their use of Islam compared to the functions clearly show that the djin plays a unique roletraditional leaders. in re-establishing damaged ties among feuding families in a community and eventually restoring harmony toDespite these differences, all these leaders are the community itself.caught in a web of varying degrees of patronage andcomplementing roles. In the research sites of Bangau- It must be noted that the djin and their specialBangau and Danawan, government-appointed political abilities go hand in hand with the sacred places of theleaders rely mostly on the traditional leaders’ network ancestral spirits (tempat). One of the most sacred sitesof kin relations to administer specific house groups in for the Sama of Sibutu-Sitangkay-Semporna areas is athe community. In turn, the traditional leaders largely large tree called Dangkan on the island of Sikulan independ on the government-appointed political leaders Sitangkay. Sama villagers go to Sikulan together withas a bridge to the wider political world, and to protect the djins to fulfill promises to the spirits for favours suchthe interests of the locals. All the leaders interviewed as the healing of the sick or the formal ending of familyagree that their most important function is to maintain disputes. However, once a year, during the season of thepeace in their respective communities. new rice (pai baha’u), all the Sama djins and kinsmen from the various islands in Sitangkay, Sibutu, and SempornaThe Sama Djin (Spirit-Bearer/ Spirit Mediums) gather in Sikulan to pay homage to the ancestral spirits.Among the traditional leaders of the Sama, this paperplaces special emphasis on the djin, as they play a Djins commune with the spirits in a trance (patakka).special role in restoring damaged relationships among During the pagmbo’ pai baha’u (new rice ceremony forconflicting families.35 According to Malabong who has the ancestors), the djins go into a trance and confer withdone research in Sitangkay, the possessor of the djin the spirits regarding the everyday problems of the Samais a senior member of the community who possesses villagers.37 The djin first communicates to the spirits indecorum, good values, and knowledge of the culture of hilling saitan (language of the spirits), and then translatesthe ancestors and concerns himself/herself with natural their conversation to the villagers in an intelligiblecalamities, epidemics, illness, and the religious practices language. Surprisingly, while in a state of trance, theof the community. djin usually translates to the people using hilling Tausug (Tausug language). Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 60. 30 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYThis phenomenon is truly remarkable considering the to be caught]);existing ethnic tensions, competition and violence 4. people versus spirits (i.e. Mag atu maka saitanbetween the Sama and the Tausug in the Sulu area. [contend with the saitan]); andIt is possible that since the pagmbo’ pai baha’u is a 5. as a state of health (i.e. angatuan ma tambal saki [thepublic event, the Sama djins may purposely translate in illness is countering the medicine]).Tausug language for the Tausug in their community tounderstand. This ritual could be a way for the Sama to Integral to the resolution of conflict is the concept ofassert themselves, express resentment, present solutions sulut, magsulut, or pagsulutun. This means reconciliationand diffuse potential conflict situations with their or mutual agreement. The terms also mean ‘to reconcile’,Tausug neighbours. This situation is worth exploring in ‘to reunite’, and ‘to repair damaged relationships’.future studies as it certainly points to something deeper Reconciliation is the goal of every conflict resolutionin Sama and Tausug ethnic relations. process. It is in this process that the various elements of the ntan kaomboan (religion or beliefs of the ancestors)Conflict Resolution Mechanisms come into play.Understanding the Sama Dilaut’s concept of conflict isnecessary to understand conflict resolution mechanisms. The elements of the ntan kaomboan such as the djin, theConflict situations among the Sama are generally termed pagmbo’, the kanduli or igal, and the janji’ or tantu are‘bono’ or lengog. Of the two, lengog seems to be the more actually interrelated conflict resolution mechanisms thatgeneral term as it can encompass conflict situations that also pervade other Sama rituals and practices in peace-do not involve fighting. An example of this is when making. But the extent of the use of these mechanismsthere is a problem, a disturbance or a misfortune in depends on the context of the conflict situation, and onthe community such as a fire, a death, or even a police the Sama families’ degree of inclination towards Islamoperation. Lengog can also refer to a state of mind such or towards ntan kaomboan.as confusion (alengog kok) or worry (asusa). The various conflict resolution mechanismsUnder the ambit of bono’ and lengog are the more documented in the two research sites are as follows: (1)specific types of conflict: magbanta, magsagga’, magluray, hearings (pagselasai, paghukum, magparkallah, magsara’);maglembo, magsuntuk, angatu, and magpasanggup. It is (2) peace-making ceremonies (kipalat, laksi, taubat);interesting to note that terms for conflict can vary (3) indemnification (diat and bangun); (4) ritual vowsaccording to the environment in which the conflict or promises (janji’/ tantu and sapa); and (5) facilitatingtook place. For instance, the term maglembo only refers values such as pareyo’/ areyo’, and pagampun/ ampun.to conflict that happens when people are fightingat sea, or when they are trying to drown each other. In Bangau-Bangau and Danawan, the common sourcesThere are also conflict terms that apply to a specific of conflict documented among the community membersgender or children. For instance, the terms magsuntuk are utang (unresolved debts), amole’ / magpole’ / alahi (tois more applicable to males, and magluray, to females elope), tangkaw (stealing), magbutas (divorce), kacauand children. perempuan (molesting or disturbing a girl), and the unfair division of earnings from a fishing trip. However,Conflict situations for the Sama can occur on the senior members of the two communities contend thatfollowing instances: transgressions such as stealing and unsettled debts were1. people against people; very rare in the past. For instance, stealing in Bangau-2. people against nature (i.e. magbono’ maka goyak Bangau was unheard of until 1966. [fighting the waves]; angatu ma baliu [opposing or overcoming the wind]; bono’ maka baliu [fight A perusal of conflict cases in the Semporna District against the wind]; magatu maka hunus [to meet or Office from 1994 to 2001 reveals that most complaints defy the typhoon]); filed by the people of Bangau-Bangau and Danawan3. people versus animals (i.e. magbono’ maka raing, Island were caused by unresolved debts. Judging from mbal na pahelak [to fight with fish that does not want the frequency of these complaints since 1994 and fromEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 61. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 31interviews with district officials and ketua kampung Changing Regimes, Dominant Narratives, and(community leaders) from the two areas, it seems that Reorderingconflict cases are resolved by the leaders at the kampung The Sulu zone is like a stage. It is a region where nomadiclevel almost all of the time. bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and states have played out the drama of survival, conquest, trade, diplomacy, piracyThis means that leaders and subgroup leaders at the and cultural convergence in a constantly shifting arenakampung level, which includes the panglima, the of waning and waxing powers since the pre-colonialJKKK,38 the traditional leaders, and the more localised times. In the face of this, the lives of the people in thefamily leaders are effective at resolving conflict. This region were constantly re-ordered to serve the purposessuccess may be attributed to the interplay between the of the different regimes.long-established indigenous and religious institutionsof the Sama and the more recent institutions of the When trade between the Sulu zone and outside statesgovernment. began to flourish, land-based trading communities in the zone evolved into powerful maritime states like theSYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION Sulu Sultanate. These groups became more dominantThis paper investigated Sama Dilaut ethnicity and how and started to differentiate themselves from the sea-it is articulated, shaped and reinvented in the social oriented peoples to support the specialisation-dependentorganisation of leadership and in the process of conflict procurement economy in the region. Occupationalresolution. This study first attempted to locate Sama specialisation, religion, competition, and other factorsethnicity in time and space, and then examined how the contributed to this differentiation.Sama conceptualise their ethnic identity from a moregeneral level to the more specific level of individuals Along with this emerging distinctions came newand their families. narratives that served to justify these differences and legitimise the high status of the more dominant groupsLocal Histories and Home Waters and the inferior status of sea peoples like the SamaThe study of Sama ethnicity was done within the Dilaut. Examples of these narratives can be seen in thecontext of the broader history and social dynamics of origin myths of the Sama/Bajau as found in the Suluthe region, while also delving into the local histories of tarsilas (genealogies). 39families and the experiences of individuals. Prominentin their histories were the wars, the local feuds and the During the colonial period, another restructuringemergence of leaders, their trade and kin relations, their occurred as the British North Borneo Charteredseasonal fishing cycles, and their life-cycle rituals. Company (1881 – 1946) tried to control trade in the region and prevent the flow of trade into theAlong with these events, the sea spaces that make up Sulu polities. New regulations were promulgated tothe Sama Dilaut’s home waters also played a significant facilitate the trade interests of the Company. Amongrole in locating Sama ethnic identity. As illustrated by others, these policies included new taxes, compulsorytheir local histories, Sama Dilaut communities exploited boat registrations, new immigration policies and newa traditional home range throughout the Sulu zone that zones for the establishment of settlements. Under theincludes parts of Sabah and the Sulu areas. Company, all Sama (Sinama) speaking populations were formally labelled ‘Bajau’ (Akamine 8).Their intimate knowledge of the islands, the fishingzones in Semporna, and the presence of ritual sites The legacy of colonialism is that it redefined the social,within this region, all vital aspects of their culture political and cultural landscapes as new distinctionsand identity, can only be the product of generations of were created among the indigenous people of the Suluresidence in the area. zone, and new territories were delineated for the benefit of colonial rule. By the end of the colonial era, all of these rearrangements were inherited by the emerging nations of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 62. 32 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYThe Rise of Nations: New Problems, New Meanings In addition, interviews reveal that members ofand Old Institutions Sama families who grew up in Sabah are sometimesColonisation and state formation defined and indiscriminately shipped out of the country only toconsolidated the boundaries of Malaysia and the find themselves lost and sick in the Philippines with noPhilippines. Along with the formation of these nations relatives to turn to, and no livelihoods.across a multi-ethnic spectrum, emerged new problemslike disputing claims to territories, wars, insurgencies, The cultural and religious practices of the Sama havedisplacement and poverty. To secure and maintain also been affected. Strict border security between thethe territorial integrity of the respective nations, two countries and piratical attacks by armed groups ingovernments implemented various policies that tended Sulu have prevented the Sama djins and their kin fromto limit the historical linkages and the traditional life- travelling to their places of worship like the Dangkan ingiving networks of maritime communities like the Sikulan island in Sitangkay.Sama. These problems are in stark contrast to the colourful andAgain, new narratives of ‘othering’ emerged to lively cultural events that showcase Bajau culture andsupport the policies, to legitimise claims to territories promote tourism, like the Regatta Lepa41 in Semporna,and to differentiate the outsiders from the locals, the and similar cultural festivals in Sulu, Zamboanganewcomers from the natives. and Manila. Behind the scintillating colours of these festivals, the lively music and dances, and the smilingThese schemes have caused problems like the faces of the performers is the dark and embarrassingSabah dispute; the wars in Mindanao and Sulu in reality of Sama families hiding in mangroves to escapethe Philippines; the influx of displaced families to deportation, and others dying from disease, starvationneighbouring Malaysia; the illegal migrant problem; and piracy.and the deportation issues. All this reordering onlyserved to further marginalise indigenous communities Ethnicity and Practice: Shaping a Negotiated Viewlike the Sama, and have implications on the way of life of the Worldof the Sama and their identity. Despite all these problems, the Sama Dilaut should not be viewed as helpless victims. They are not passiveIn the Philippines, reactive policies by government tend social actors but are actually reflexive and active agentsto be blind to the real needs of the Sama communities capable of taking action.42 The Sama possess the powerin southwestern Mindanao. For instance, many Sama or the ability to make a difference in the social world.43families who have migrated to urban centres to escape To better their situation in life the Sama have provenpoverty and violence, are constantly being herded by successful in strategising in education, livelihood,the government back to Sulu and Basilan to again politics, media,44 and particularly in the area offace abuse and slaughter at the hands of pirates, ethnicity.political clans and the Abu Sayyaf. Moreover, the ill-planned development programmes of the government In defining and maintaining their ethnic boundaries,are unfortunately ethnically tone-deaf, and end up the Sama are able to secure their way of life and drawbenefiting the corrupt politicians and officials who upon aspects of their culture such as the time-testedbelong to the dominant ethnic group. institutions of the ntan kaomboan (religion of the ancestors). It is in this aspect that the djin and otherIn Malaysia, the various reordering schemes have resulted traditional leaders play an important role as guardiansto the unfair labelling of the Sama as pelarian (refugees), of the addat, and as a collective wellspring of wisdomand has painfully stigmatised their communities as and knowledge of the ancestors.pendatang haram (illegal immigrants) and tempatanharam (illegal place or settlements). Moreover, some This study has specifically shown that the Sama djinscorrupt officials in Sabah take advantage of the Sama play a vital role not only for the practical purposes ofby issuing fake identity cards in exchange for money.40 healing illness, but also in bridging the spirit world toEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 63. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 33settle disputes, repair damaged relationships, reconcile governments is that they have the power to protect thefamilies, and restore harmony in the Sama community. way of life of indigenous peoples. In the end, it is the nation that will benefit from the uniqueness of eachBut as times change, the emergence of new perspectives, culture they protect, for perhaps profound answers canlaws and leaders challenge the time-tested institutions also be found in the treasure chest of knowledge andof the Sama. Once again, rather than helplessly drift wisdom that each culture holds.in the tides of change, the Sama Dilaut strategise totransform their situation. This leads us back again to the verse Buwahan Sinagan (cradle of light) at the beginning of this paper:We see again the skilful use of ethnicity in the conflictresolution practices of the communities of Bangau- “…Yuk na,‘ahap na sinulayan dundangan’ yukna, ‘Bangau and Danawan. The success of the local leaders manga nabi’.in resolving conflict and maintaining peace in their Bang ilu sakatan bi, subay a’a asutsirespective villages, dwells on the precarious balance Babag na kayu Shunti.”of, on the one hand, using traditional methods based […God said: “It is good that we try the swing ofon kinship ties and the respect for the ancestral spirits, the prophets.”and on the other, of using the newer laws and formal “If you ride the swing, you should be a person whoprocesses of the government. is pure, on the cradle made from the tree Shunti.]Here we see ethnic boundaries shifting to accommodate This verse from a dying generation of Sama Dilaut,new methods that work and methods that complement teaches us the importance of a pure heart — honesty,with tradition — eventually strengthening and even sincerity, and the pureness of one’s intentions. In arejuvenating old institutions. world drenched in blood from war and ethnic strife, these values help us go a long way in the process ofHence, while wars, local feuds and the emergence of dialogue and healing. While our ethnicity makes usleaders were prominent in their history, it is the peace- build walls and fences, our differences do not intend tomaking and the constant search for compromise and divide us. On the contrary, our differences as a peoplereconciliation that have more importantly defined give us more reason to open up our doors and buildthem as a people, along with their trade and kin bridges that we may reach out to understand and sharerelations, seasonal fishing cycles, life-cycle rituals, and each other’s gifts.sea territories. Map 1: Research Sites - Semporna District, Sabah, MalaysiaDrawing from the lessons of this study, the challengesthat now lie before us are how to recognize andeffectively utilise indigenous institutions; to balancethese time-tested institutions with the relatively newinstitutions of government and laws; and to reach acompromise between the larger development goals ofnations and the significant needs of indigenous culturalcommunities like the Sama Dilaut.In addressing these challenges, more relevant policy-oriented research is necessary to bridge our knowledgegaps of indigenous cultures, to help us understand thembetter and to allow us to help governments formulatebetter policies and better programmes in the serviceof the people. The beauty of formal structures like Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 64. 34 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYNotes leaders and political parties are used such as: time of Panglima Atani or Tiring; or time USNO (1967-76);1 This is a shortened version of the paper which was time Berjaya (1976-85); time PBS (1985-1994); andpresented at the Second Asian Public Intellectuals time UMNO (BN, 1994 to present).Workshop, Denpasar, Bali, 8-12 December 2003. 12 The barutu or kubu-kubu, and the lepa are some of the2 Buwahan means “cradle”. The term can also mean different types of boats used by the Sama. Among these,dundangan, which is a Sama word for ‘swing’. Sinagan the lepa has been popularly associated with the Sama.is an ancestor of the Sama whose name means ‘light’.Taken together, the words Buwahan Sinagan mean ‘the 13 The Sagai’ are a people from Indonesia known to becradle of light’. The swing that hangs from a tree has a fierce warriors.special significance in Sama Dilaut culture. 14 The term kobolan or invulnerability especially against3 Mbo’ is a Sama word which means ‘ancestor or bladed weapons is a common concept in the area andgrandparent’. is similarly found among the peoples of Sulu and Tawi- Tawi provinces.4 See Pallesen; Warren “The Sulu Zone”; and Scott. 15 The area of Bangau-Bangau has long been associated5 The term bangsa means people, race, or nation. with the Sama Dilaut. It is where the old Sama gravesite is located.6 The term kubang is used by the Sama to refer tothe various Bajau groups who live on land (a’a reya) 16 The Ligitan reef complex and Danawan were vitalin Semporna. According to Sather, the kubang derive fishing grounds for the procurement economy duringtheir name from the region in which the oldest of these the Sulu Sultanate.settlements are concentrated (31). 17 Danawan is known for its abundant supply of fresh7 Kampung means village. water, while Legetan is a staging area of the Sama for their fishing trips and aquatic foraging. Both areas have8 Bayanan is a generic term used by the Sama to refer to tempats which are sites said to be inhabited by spirits.boats or sea vessels. 18 The term saga a’a is an old label used by the Sama in9 The a’a Sikubung were people from the island calling the Bajau Kubang. The Kubang are consideredof Sikubung in Tawi-Tawi adjacent to the Banaran to be the natives of Semporna. However the term sagamunicipality. a’a is now considered derogatory by the Kubang.10 The Sama Banaran trace their origin to Banaran 19 The brother of Abusari, Ibnohali, was notorious inIsland in Tawi-Tawi. Interestingly, according to Sather, the area as a firebrand and fierce warrior. When hethe Sama Banaran had a history of slave raiding during sailed to Sulu with his tindug, bad weather forced himthe pre-Company period (Sather 1997:33). to land in Simunul Island where he had rivals. While in Simunul his rivals saw an opportunity to murder him.11 The common time markers used by the people Some of Ibnohali’s tindug escaped to tell the story.interviewed were: time British (Chartered CompanyRule, 1881-1946); Bono Jipon (Japanese Occupation, 20 This jives with what Sather said that Danawan1942-45); Bono Activist (1971-74 war in the leaders were responsible in the past for overseeing thePhilippines); and the period before and after Merdeka collection and trade in sea turtle eggs from Sipadan(Malaysian Independence, 1963). Frequently, the Island (33).administration period of certain local and communityEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 65. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 3521 Akamine Jun has the same observation. In addition, 31 The early descriptions of Sixto Y Orosa are full ofhe relates that in Indonesian East Kalimantan, there is discrimination (Akamine); See also the descriptions ofonly orang Bajau or suku Bajau, and that they have not the Bajau in the Sulu tarsilas (Saleeby).heard of the term Samal. 32 This is the same as calling out the hawkers by the22 The researcher is greatly indebted to Jangson items they sell instead of the name of the hawkers, e.g.Maulurana and Sitti Lukaiya Usih of the Community calling out, “Fish!” in reference to the hawker sellingExtension Service of Notre Dame, for explaining to fish.me the religious notion of the term sammal and forenlightening me on its possible connections to the 33 I personally observe that the Sama in Sitangkay-ethnic designation Samal. Sibutu areas and in Semporna readily identify themselves as Muslims, and that they see no conflict23 Personal conversation with Jangson Maulurana. between ancestral beliefs and Islam. This is in sharp contrast with the Sama in Sulu and in some areas in24 Aurora Roxas-Lim notes that the Bajau are known by Bongao who do not like to be identified as Muslims.various names depending on the islands they frequent.She also adds that several different names are applied 34 Traditional leaders can also be government-to the same people not only in the ethnographic appointed.literature but even in the way they identify and refer tothemselves. 35 The djin is sometimes called djin saitan. For the Sama, the term saitan does not have negative connotations25 The ethnonym Sama is also used in conjunction with like those of saitan in Islam.toponymic modifiers to indicate their island of originor the island cluster with which they are affiliated, e.g. Please refer to the description of conflict resolution 36Sama Sibutu or Sama from Sibutu Island. mechanisms in the appendix. See kipalat and janji’.26 Even the Sama communities that I worked with in 37 While in a trance, the djins say they cannot rememberSulu wonder how they came to be called Bajau when anything that takes place around him.they actually call themselves Sama. 38 JKKK means village development and security27 This also applies to generations of Sama who have committee.been residing in Sabah ever since and are used to being 39 The Sulu tarsilas interestingly seems to parallel thecalled ‘Bajau’ by the Malays. narratives of the Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals). See Saleeby; O.W. Wolters; C.C. Brown and R. Roolvink.28 It must be noted that the more popular and broaderclassification of Bajaus in Sabah is between the Bajau 40 Some local people angrily refer to these fake identityDarat (Land Bajau), which usually refers to the Bajau cards as ‘toilet paper’.Kota Belud, and the Bajau Laut (Sea Bajau), whichis used in general to classify the Bajau residing in the 41 A Regatta Lepa is an annual fluvial parade of thecoastal areas of eastern Sabah. Bajau using local boats called lepa, richly decorated with ornamental carvings and colorful sails and flags.29 Sullivan and Regis 564. Reflexivity involves constantly examining and 4230 There are some Bajau groups that I encountered in reforming social practices in the light of incomingSemporna that trace ancestry from the Suluk. These information about those very practices, and thusgroups do not like to be classified as Kubang. eventually altering their character. Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 66. 36 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY43 See Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu for a more In Semporna, some educated Sama have alreadythorough discussion of structure-agency integration. I resorted to media to appeal their case of being brandedam very grateful to Roy Dimayuga for enlightening me as illegal migrants and deported. See Utusan Malaysiaon this framework. His study on the Iraya Mangyan’s (1 July 2003).changing ethnic markers provides an excellent exampleof this framework. Also see Bentley.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 67. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 37REFERENCES ---. “Reflections on Bajau History.” Philippine Studies 16 (1968a): 32-59.Akamine, Jun. “A Grammatical Analysis of Manuk-Mangkaw Sinama.” Diss. University of the Philippines, ---. “Social Organization of the Tawi-Tawi Badjaw.”Diliman, Quezon City, 1996. Ethnology 4.4 (1965): 421-439.Arce, Wilfredo F. “Social Organization of the Muslim Pallesen, Kemp. “Culture Contact and LanguagePeoples of Sulu.” Sulu’s People and Their Art (IPC Papers Convergence.” Linguistic Society of the Philippines,No. 3). Ed. Frank Lynch. Quezon City: Ateneo de Monograph Series, No. 24 (1985).Manila University Press, 1963. 1-25. Roxas-Lim, Aurora. “Marine Adaptations andAwang Damit, Ahmat Daud bin. “Nasib Bajau Laut di Ecological Transformation: The Case of the Bajau andDaerah Semporna, Sabah: Harapan dan Masa Depan. Samalan Communities.” Unpublished paper presentedWajarkah Mereka Menjadi Pelarian di Negara Sendiri?” during the National Conference on the Culture and HistoryUtusan Malaysia 1 July 2003. of the Bajau at the Ateneo de Zamboanga, 26-27 Feb. 2001.Brown, C.C. and R. Roolvink. Sejarah Melayu or MalayAnnals. Ed. John Bastin and D.C. Twitchett. Kuala Saleeby, Najeeb. The History of Sulu. Manila: PhilippineLumpur: Oxford University Press, 1970. Bureau of Sciences, 1908.Che Man, W.K. Muslim Separatism: The Moros of the Sather, Clifford. The Bajau Laut: Adaptation, History,Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand. and Fate in a Maritime Fishing Society of South-easternQuezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1990. Sabah. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997.Dimayuga, Roy. “Changing Ethnic Markers Among Scott, William Henry. Barangay: Sixteenth CenturyIraya Mangyans in Baclayan, Puerto Galera.” MA Philippine Culture and Society. Quezon City: Ateneo dethesis. Ateneo de Manila University, 1999. Manila University Press, 1994.Kiefer, Thomas M. The Tausug: Violence and Law in a Stone, Richard L. “Intergroup Relations among thePhilippine Moslem Society. New York: Holt, Rinehart Taosug, Samal and Badjaw of Sulu.” Philippine Sociologicaland Winston, Inc., 1972. Review 10.3-4 (1962): 107-133.Malabong, Hadji Musa. “Leadership Concepts and Sullivan, Anwar and Patricia Regis. “Demography.”Changing Tradition of the Sama Dilaut.” Unpublished Commemorative History of Sabah 1881-1981. Ed. Anwarpaper presented during the National Conference on Sullivan and Cecilia Leong. Kota Kinabalu: Sabahthe Culture and History of the Bajau at the Ateneo de State Government, 1981.Zamboanga, 26-27 Feb. 2001. Torres, Wilfredo III M. “The Bajau of Jolo: TheMaulurana, Jangson and Sitti Lukaiya Usih. Personal Cultural Context of Leadership.” Building Bridges:interviews. 9 May 2003. The Development of A Leadership Training Program For Indigenous Youth. N.p.: Children and Youth FoundationNimmo, Harry Arlo. MAGOSAHA: An Ethnography of the Philippines, 2002.of the Tawi-Tawi Sama Dilaut. Quezon City: Ateneo deManila University and H. Arlo Nimmo, 2001. ---. “Household Strategies and Sea Tenure: A Study of a Sama Dilaut Community in Kabuukan Island, Sulu.”---. “Religious Beliefs of the Tawi-Tawi Bajau. Philippine MA thesis. Ateneo de Manila University, 1999.Studies 38 (1990): 3-27. Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 68. 38 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYWarren, James Francis. The Sulu Zone 1768-1898: TheDynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity inthe Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State.Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1985.---. Iranun and Balangingi: Globalization, MaritimeRaiding and the Birth of Ethnicity. Singapore: NationalUniversity of Singapore, 2002.Wolters, O.W. The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History.London: Lund Humphries Publishers Limited, 1970.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 69. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 39CONSERVATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE FORMATION OF LOCAL IDENTITY: A CASE INNORTHEAST THAILANDAKIKO TASHIROSophia University, JapanINTRODUCTION umbrella of ‘Thai’ heritage and its associated policies;On 29 January 2003, television stations in Thailand how local communities accept monuments as theirbroadcast shocking news from Phnom Penh. Cambodian own cultural heritage although the monuments do notrioters had attacked the Royal Thai Embassy in Phnom originate from their ethnic heritage;1 and how thesePenh and had burned the Thai flag and the embassy two factors relate to each other.building. The incident aggravated tensions betweenthe two countries, and the Thai government closed the Field research was conducted at three Khmer monumentsCambodian border for some time. in Northeast Thailand, namely Phimai, Muang Tam and Phnom Rung. Phimai is characteristically urban,The incident provoked a great deal of controversy in and inhabited mainly by Thai-speaking people. On theThailand and stimulated discussions of property rights other hand, the areas of Muang Tam and Phnom Rungto Khmer monuments located near the border, like in Buriram province retain their rural character. TheseSdok Kok Thom and Ta Muang Thom. The topic was two monuments are surrounded by the Thai-Khmerbrought to the forefront by news reports that a Thai and Thai-Lao speaking people. Interviews and a reviewactress, Suwanna Khongying, had triggered the riot by of relevant literature and documents in the areas ofclaiming that Thailand had rights to Angkor Wat. conservation policy were done at national, regional and local levels.After Cambodia achieved independence, Cambodiaand Thailand took their competing claims to the CONSERVATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGEPreah Vihear (Kao Preah Vihan) shrine, located on the IN THAILANDDangrek mountain border, to the International Court ‘Cultural heritage’ and ‘conservation’ are modernof Justice in The Hague. The decision in 1962 to award concepts that have become widespread in recent times,the shrine to Cambodia came as a huge shock to the spreading through Southeast Asia with colonisationThai people. The hard lessons learned from the Preah during the 20th century. For example, Raffles, whoVihear episode made the Thai government sensitive to explored Java, ‘rediscovered’ Borobudur in Central Java;matters concerning Khmer monument conservation and French academic teams were sent to the Angkor areanear the border. to research its heritage. These conservation activities were deeply connected to colonial policies, andAn example of this concern is the use of the labels implemented by colonial governments (Anderson).‘Lopburi style’ or ‘influenced by Khmer style’ forheritage sites, which show an attempt to identify the Similarly, conservation in Thailand was stimulated bymonuments as Thai rather than as Khmer. Western countries, and it developed along with modern political reform even though Thailand had never beenThis paper addresses the following questions: how the colonised by Western powers.Thai government brings Khmer monuments under the Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 70. 40 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYHistory of the Fine Arts Department and Other under the auspices of the Ministry of Education.Government Organisations Regulations concerning ancient monuments andThe Fine Arts Department (FAD) is the largest and sites were based on the Act on Ancient Monuments,most powerful government organisation in the area Antiques, Objects of Art and National Museums ofof the preservation, conservation, revival, promotion, 1961. The 1961 regulation was revised in 1985 and increation, and dissemination of the knowledge, wisdom 1992 to become the current Regulation for Monumentand culture of the nation. Today, there are at least 7,000 Conservation.monuments in Thailand, and the Fine Arts Departmentmaintains around 100 concurrent projects in a given Recently, the bureaucratic Restructuring Bill wasmonth. enacted in October 2002. It establishes six new ministries within the Thai government, including theAccording to a 1998 report issued by the FAD, the Ministry of Culture. The FAD was also realigned underdepartment began as the “artisans of ten groups” that the Ministry of Culture, and any new policies andwere established by King Rama I (1782-1809). Rama regulations will be issued under the new minister. InV (1868-1910), King Chulalongkorn, incorporated the fact, the minister has urged local administrative bodiesartisans’ groups into the Ministry of Public Works as the to play a more active role in conserving ancient ruins in‘Department for Artisans’ under his new bureaucracy their areas. Since 1997, this kind of local participationand democratic reform movement. in activities involving the preservation of regional culture has become an important issue.King Rama VI (1910-1925) regarded art and culture asthe root of the Thai people and their kingdom. During The new constitution of 1997 mentions “local culture”his reign, the FAD was officially founded by the Royal and stipulates that local governments are required toCommand of 27 March 1911, and was entrusted with participate in community efforts to protect culturalthe cultural affairs of the Thai nation. assets. FAD is therefore responsible for educating Tambon (sub-district) level administrative staff inWhile the FAD had its roots in earlier groups, the methods of preserving cultural assets in temples andadministration system of the FAD was established in ruins across the country (Nagashima). Under the newthis era. King Rama VI passed legislation known as the constitution, the government is assigned the duty oflaw for the “protection for the survey and protection conserving, creating, promoting, and developing localof ancient objects.” This involved appointing the and national culture as central to the developmentVajirayana Library committee to oversee, search for, of human life, by means of decentralisation andand maintain the care of culturally important objects in empowering local authorities.Thailand. In addition, King Rama VI declared the areaof Ayutthaya City to be an area preserved for study. Since the promulgation of the new constitution in 1997, the structure of the system and the relationship betweenIn the reign of King Rama VII (1925-1935), the land central and local authorities have experienced majorwas maintained as a preserve of the king and was not changes. It is important to note how decentralisationopened for private ownership. In 1926, the FAD was is having a significant effect on the field of culturalunable to allocate sufficient funds for cultural affairs heritage preservation.because of the world economic crisis. However, the FADwas reinstated by an Act in 1933. Two years later, on 9 The FAD is not the only administrative body involvedMarch 1935, the first official list of ancient monuments with cultural heritage management in Thailand. Forwas compiled. Listed on it are Khmer monuments like instance, the Office of Environmental Planning andPhnom Rung, Muang Tam and Phimai. Policy (OEPP) was established to protect, preserve, conserve, and rehabilitate the natural environmentThe government reforms of 1959 abolished the Ministry and cultural environment to maintain the natural andof Culture and established the Ministry of Development. cultural heritage of the country. The office is responsibleCultural policies and cultural conservation were moved for the large scale historic environment, and also worksEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 71. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 41for the National Committee of World Heritage in Cœdès stayed in Bangkok for 11 years until he returnedThailand. to France in 1929.2 Unquestionably, Cœdès’ works influenced the development of the historical picture ofAs we can see in many countries, the conservation Thailand, and they may have had an impact on Princeof cultural heritage and tourism are deeply related. Damrong’s interests. Prince Damrong presented theTourism is one method of preserving monuments. Prime theory that identified King Si Intharathit, father ofMinister Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat established the King Ram Khamheng, as the “first king of Syam” (SyamTourist Organisation of Thailand (TOT) on 18 March Prathet Pathomkasat).1960. After 19 years, the TOT was transformed into theTourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) by the TAT Act. The second influential royal family member, M.C.B.E.2522. TAT and the FAD have maintained a close Sudhadradis Diskul, was born in Bangkok in 1923 torelationship since TAT was established, mainly in the Prince Damrong. He earned the title ‘Father of Thaiarea of conservation. History’. He became the first professor of archaeology in Thailand after he completed his studies at the EcoleTypical of this cooperation is for TAT to decide to du Louvre in Paris under Professor Philippe Stern. Indevelop an area as a tourist destination, and ask the 1987, he became the first director of the South EastFAD to excavate and conserve monuments as one of Asian Ministers of Education Organization Project forthe tourist attractions. Complementing this are areas Archaeology and Fine Arts (SPAFA) in Bangkok. Heexcavated by the FAD for academic purposes and then also served as an Honorary Vice-President of the Siampromoted by TAT as a part of a later development plan. Society, and as chairman of the Historical Society ofAdditionally, TAT organises cultural performances like Thailand.the Sound & Light Show in historic sites such as Phimaiand Sukhothai with the cooperation of the FAD. His efforts on behalf of the movement to return the Vishnu Lintel to Phnom Rung in the 1980s (discussedThe Royal Family and Conservation of Khmer below) influenced the conservation of KhmerMonuments in Thailand monuments in the Northeast. Professor Diskul wasWhile a few Khmer monuments were listed as ‘Thai’ the first person to recognise the monuments in theheritage sites in 1935, their restoration was not started Northeast as ‘Khmer monuments’.until the late 1960s. The Thai royal family, threemembers in particular, had a significant influence on The third royal family member discussed here, Princessthe conservation of Khmer monuments. Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, is the second daughter of King Rama IX (1946-present), and studied historyPrince Damrong Rajanubhab, son of King Rama IV at Chulalongkorn University. Her master’s thesis at(1851-1868), visited ancient monuments all over Sirapakhorn University was about Khmer inscriptionsThailand including Isan, the northeastern part of the at Phnom Rung. She studied history with Professorcountry. He visited Angkor in 1924 and wrote of his Diskul and Khmer inscription with Dr. Claude Jacques,experiences in Journey to Angkor (Keyes). He was a a member of the Ecole Française d’Extreme-OrientSupreme Counsellor of State and President of the (EFEO).Royal Council, in charge of all art and culture in thekingdom. Throughout his career, he advanced the Because of her academic background, her birthday, 2creation of a new awareness of Thai identity, not only April, was declared the National Day for Conservationthrough administrative reform, but through his concern of Cultural Heritage in Thailand. Princess Sirindhorn’sfor education, research work, and the national museum profound interest in Khmer monuments led to theand library. He played an important role in conservation opening of the Phnom Rung and Phimai Historicalin Thailand and in Thai history itself. Park in 1988.George Cœdès, an eminent scholar of Khmer An important point is that the royal family membersinscription, was invited to Thailand by Prince Damrong. who played central roles in the academic development Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 72. 42 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYof Thai history, studied with and were influenced by The population of the Phimai district is 129,227 (1996three famous French experts – George Cœdès, Philippe data). It ranks third in terms of population among theStern and Claude Jacques – all specialists in Angkor 32 districts in Nakhon Rachashima province. Whenhistory. Aymonier visited the site in 1897, he estimated a population of 80 households (Aymonier). However, itThe next section examines how conservation policy had already reached 2,600 by 1947, and 6,000 by 1967.was implemented at local levels, and how it had an The population inside the city wall was 19,650 as ofimpact in the areas where it was implemented. 1997.PHIMAI Phimai is a centre of economics, politics and religion.The Phimai historical park is located in Khorat, 60 The city serves over 300 villages in the region. Mostkilometres (km) from the provincial capital, Nakhon of the goods required by city people and villagers canRachashima, a three-and-a-half-hour drive from be purchased within Phimai, although a few items areBangkok. Phimai is a large, rectangular ancient city only available in Khorat. Political and governmentalsurrounded on all sides by moats and boundary walls functions in Phimai include the FAD regional office,(Map 1). Its principal tower, Prasat Phimai, is situated an experimental rice station, a hospital, and the busin the centre of the city. terminal, which provides transit to major cities like Bangkok and Ubon Rachatani.The Mun River passes on the northern and easternsides, and the Khem Stream borders the southern side. The Phimai district also plays a role as religious centre.Boat races are traditionally held in the Mun River, east There are five temples in Phimai. Three are locatedof the Prasat, and now, that festival has been combined inside the city wall, and the others are outside it. Watwith the Phimai Festival Sound and Light Show, which Deam, located on the north side of the Prasat Phimai,is held at the Prasat Phimai every November. is the biggest and oldest temple in the town. There is a school at temple, and about 300 monks, from the ages Map 1: Phimai City (OEPP 1998) of 13 to 18, study there. Students come not only from Phimai district but also from districts around Phimai. Wat Deam has two old Buddha statues in its central sanctuary which was previously kept in the goupra or east entrance pavilion of the Prasat Phimai. The statues were worshiped by local people before they were moved from the Prasat Phimai to Wat Deam during restoration work in the 1960s. Historical Background According to excavation results, Phimai’s history dates back to 1000-500 BC,3 before the Khorat plateau was under the control of the Khmer Kings Rajendravarman (944-968) and Suryavarman I (1007-1050), to name a few (Welch). Among the Khmer Kings, Suryavarman II (1113?-1150?) and Jayavarman VI (1181-1219?) maintained strong control over the area and built several important temples. During the Ayutthaya period and the reign of King Narai (1656-1688), five cities fell under the control of Khorat: Phimai, Chan Tuk, Chaiyaphum, Nang Rong, and Buriram.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 73. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 43After Ayutthaya fell to the Burmese in 1767, Prince the project’s objectives, because water management wasThip Phipit escaped to Phimai and came to rule the necessary to increase agricultural production.Khorat area. King Taksin soon defeated him and tookcontrol of the entire Khorat Plateau. The city of Khorat In Phimai, there are two small baray and a largehas been the major administrative and economic centre uncompleted one located outside the city wall. Thereof the Khorat plateau since the nineteenth century. are also two ancient sah located inside the city wall and another two outside. The baray and sah did not functionFAD Regional Office in Phimai and Conservation until restored by the Green Project, and now they areProjects used as reservoirs during the dry season.As central government power became stronger, mostministries established regional offices. Although most The Green Project budget not only funded environ-of these offices, like those of TAT and OEPP, are located mental improvements, but also provided resources forin Khorat, the FAD regional office was established in urban development. Population control and transitPhimai because of the major Prasat Phimai restoration were managed by the FAD because people lived on andproject that began in 1964. There are more than around the monument site. As the economic role of600 ancient sites in the area for which the office is the city had grown, more people gathered around it asresponsible.4 a market centre and overpopulation near heritage sites began to have negative repercussions on the monu-Major changes began in the 1960s that affected the ments. To mitigate the threat of overpopulation, roadsconservation of Khmer monuments, especially Prasat were improved and a market inside the city wall wasPhimai. Although restoration works on Prasat Phimai moved outside to restrict the population.were started by FAD in 1954, the complete restorationproject did not take place until 1964. Professor Prince The construction of the new market helped develop aYachai Chitrapong and French experts Bernard Philippe new area for the Phimai district.6 As part of the project,Groslier and Pierre Pichard conducted restoration work a new bus terminal was built in the area in cooperationfrom 1964 to 1969 using the anastylosis method,5 where with the local government. Highway bus servicesexisting parts were reassembled. After this restoration providing transportation to major cities like Bangkokproject, most Khmer monuments in Isan were restored and Ubon Rachatani existed for the first time in theusing this methodology. region. In addition to those efforts, another 40 million baht was allocated to develop the Phimai NationalThe second major change happened from 1990 to 1992. Museum.King Rama IX decided to implement the Green Project(Isan Kiaw) in Northeast Thailand, the poorest and The projects had significant influence on the localleast arable region of the country. As part of the Green community around the site. Some of the merchantsProject, the FAD ran 37 projects and received one- did not support the new market project and triedtenth of the budget, 1 billion baht, for the restoration unsuccessfully to construct another new market byand preservation of monuments maintained by the themselves just outside the city wall. On the otherFAD and TAT. Before the Green Project funds became hand, infrastructure improvements gave rise to gradualavailable, the FAD regional office budget was only economic independence from Khorat. Merchants500,000 baht per year. in Phimai, mainly Chinese, gained more control as they relied less on Khorat. This led to the emergenceThe FAD supervised many projects under the Green of autonomous local associations that began to getProject because of the characteristics of Khmer involved with the local tourism industry.monuments. Angkor period monuments containirrigation systems like baray (dams), sah (reservoirs), Local Community and Prasat Phimaiand moats around the monuments. The FAD focused Fieldwork for this study revealed that there is new localon these and restored monuments to provide new participation in the effort to preserve and conserveirrigation systems for Isan agriculture. This strategy met the site as a tourist location. There are three local Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 74. 44 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYassociations recognised in Phimai (EVDS 702 Group): influenced other sites like Baan Prasat8, to sponsorThe Chinese Merchants Association, Traditional similar endeavours.Knowledge Society and a new local merchant associationcalled the Local Trade and Tourism Club. One of the characteristic of the Youth Guide Project is that the guides’ explanations come from the perspectiveThe Local Trade and Tourism Club was established in of local residents. For example, their description of the2002 and its activities played an important role in the Prasat not only covers archaeological and architecturalPhimai Festival, held from 7 to 10 November 2002. The aspects, but also includes local beliefs and superstitions.Club consists of 44 members involved with the tourism Visitors learn details about local beliefs and history notindustry and includes proprietors of hotels, guesthouses, available in books, like local folklore about scary placesrestaurants, and souvenir shops. Club members meet at the Prasat.9once a month and discuss their activities. The purposeof the meetings is to maintain connections with each Phimai Festival: Sound & Light Showother. According to an interview with a restaurant The most popular activity for overseas and domesticowner7, the members cooperate with each other to tourists has typically been to visit heritage sites. Butprovide information and services to tourists. recently, the largest cultural and tourist event at Prasat Phimai has been the Phimai Festival, particularly theIn November 2002, the club participated in the Phimai Sound & Light Show, entitled ‘Wimaya Nattakan:Festival for the first time. They set up an exhibition in Episode of the Creation on the Moon River’. The Soundfront of the Prasat about the history of Phimai and their & Light Show begins with the story of Ramayana (Ramaactivities. Although the panels they exhibited were Kian). The next scene describes the construction of theborrowed from the TAT office in Khorat, the members Prasat and ancient life in Phimai. A local dance follows,themselves arranged most of the exhibition of old and then the scene moves to a myth that relates to thephotographs. Prasat — The Churning of the Milk Ocean.10 The festival reaches its climax with the Apsara Dance, and a paradeThe Youth Guide Project is another club that represents of important Buddha statues, Garbhagraha, takes centrelocal participation in conservation activities. The stage under a sky lit up with fireworks.project started in 1991 as one of club activities atPhimai Witthaya School (Phimai junior and senior high The festival held on November 2002 was the 14thschool). Project participants are student volunteers who festival since the TAT started the project in 1988. Inoffer free guided tours of the Prasat on weekends or after 1989, the Phimai historical park was officially opened.school. The number of youth guides has reached 105 Traditionally, only boat races were held by localstudents, and about 10 students are available as English community members. The TAT decided to create a newlanguage guides. festival at the Prasat as a tourist attraction. The boat racing festival itself became bigger than before and nowThe students are motivated to participate as guides more than 20 teams participate from all over Thailand.because they enjoy telling tourists about their townand its history. In addition, they say that they are proud The Sound & Light Show has become an effective siteto be able to teach their family and friends history. preservation method. This approach is popular not onlyStudents who join the Youth Guide are expected to in Thailand but also ancient sites in other countries liketake extra classes in English and History. The classes are Greece. In recent years, there are five sites where thetaught by the FAD and local people involved with the TAT has sponsored Sound & Light Shows: Sukhothai,tourism sector. For example, the English class is taught Ayutthaya, Lopburi, Phimai and Phnom Rung.by the person who manages the youth hostel in Phimai,and a member of the Local Trade and Tourism Club. An interesting aspect of the show is that the text ofWhile the TAT had helped launch the Youth Guide the performance is written by writers in Bangkok, andProject, now the club is managed by the school itself. professional dancers, or sometimes, students from danceThe success of this first Youth Guide Project in Phimai schools, are invited from outside the region. In the caseEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 75. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 45of Phimai, the dancers came from Khorat. They can An 11th century temple is located below Phnom Rung,perform not only Khmer-style dances, but also various and it is called Muang Tam (Lower City). After Princedances from the Northern, Southern, and Eastern parts Damrong Rachanuphap visited Prasat Muang Tam inof Thailand. 1929, the temple was registered on the official list of 1935. Restoration and excavations began in 1968 andAccording to an interview with a TAT representative in were completed in 1996. Muang Tam is situated in aBangkok11, local-level or Tambon level administrations local village and most of the residents are farmers.have noted the success of TAT’s Sound & LightShow and expressed an interest in hosting their own. The area comprises Thai-speaking, Thai-Lao-speakingHowever, the TAT has not granted permission because and Thai-Khmer-speaking people. The socio-culturalthe organisation wants to preserve the quality of the environment of the area, distinct from that of Phimai,show as a national brand. Lately, though the TAT has shows us different examples of the relationshiploosened this restriction and entrusted Mini Sound between cultural heritage preservation and the local& Light12 shows to be held by local communities like community.Phimai. Phnom Rung and Vishnu LintelIn Phimai, the Mini Sound & Light Show is held once In the case of Phnom Rung, the process by which ita month, usually on the last Saturday of the month. became a Thai national heritage site in the late 1980sThe scenes are largely the same as those in the Phimai is clearly attributed to the Vishnu Lintel. The VishnuFestival, but the scope of the large-scale scenes are Lintel, which is on the east side of the central towerabbreviated. The dance performances are by students at Phnom Rung temple, has become the most famousfrom the Phimai Witthaya School. Selected local food Khmer Lintel in Thailand. Most tourists, especiallyshops or restaurants are invited to serve guests, as the Thai people, take photographs of the Lintel when theyticket price includes a buffet dinner. Tourists experience visit the temple.specialties of Phimai city like grilled duck and phat Thai(fried noodles). Youth guides help at the Mini Sound & The Lintel was photographed by the FAD in the PhnomLight shows as attendants Rung in 1960-61, but it disappeared in the early or mid- 1960s. It then reappeared in 1967 at the Art Institute ofNow, the Mini Sound & Light shows in Phimai are Chicago Museum in the United States when Chicagomanaged by the local community. TAT staff is not philanthropist Mr. James Alsdorf presented it on loandesignated to coordinate the show, and the FAD acts to the institute. The Lintel was identified at the Artonly as an observer to verify that sensitive areas of the Institute of Chicago Museum by Professor Diskul in 1972.monument are protected. It is interesting that the FAD, Then followed a movement petitioning for the returnwho is held responsible for the historical park, maintains of the Lintel to Thailand, which gained momentum inits position as an observer not only for the Mini Sound the late 1980s (Keyes; Kono; Nagashima).& Light but also during the Phimai Festival. Meanwhile, restoration work in Phnom Rung startedPHNOM RUNG AND MUANG TAM in 1972, and the site was opened as a historical parkPhnom Rung, whose existing buildings date from the in 1989. The opening ceremony was planned for theearly 10th to the late 12th centuries, is located in Buriram day when the Lintel was returned to the site,13 andProvince. The site is on the top of a volcano and it finally arrived in Bangkok on 10 November 1988.villages surround the hill. After the Phimai restoration Scholars examined the Lintel upon its return and somewas completed, work began at Phnom Rung in 1972 complained that it was a counterfeit. In response to thisand was completed much later in 1988. Since the park claim, the FAD conducted a scientific examination andwas opened, the Division of Phnom Rung and Muang published a report which proved the authenticity of theTam National Historical Park, under the FAD regional Lintel.office in Phimai, has managed the site and is locatedinside the park. Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 76. 46 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYA notable characteristic of this matter is the emergence who lived there when they arrived at Muang Tam. Theyof a Thai national movement to return the Khmer decided to live around the site because it contained aLintel from the US (Keyes). About 30,000 people in baray as an irrigation system and the land was adequatethe Buriram province participated in demonstrations for agriculture.against the US government, which shows that concernfor the Vishnu Lintel had spread throughout the The monument itself had been completely abandonedcountry, especially in the area of its origin. for a long time, and the residents built a modern Hinayana Buddhism temple and school near the site.Karabao, a popular Thai band, wrote a song urging the Over the last 10 years, the population of the villagereturn of the Lintel, and demonstrations were held increased and immigrants came from northern parts ofin not only in Thailand but also in the US by Thai Isan, like Khon Khen. The village was separated intoresidents. Intellectuals paid attention to this matter four villages, each with about 600 residents.and it was debated at several seminars, like one that washeld at Tamasaat University on 20 May 1988 (Kono). The conservation project in the late 1980s moved the modern temple and school from inside the park areaAfter the Vishnu Lintel was returned to the site, it to a site located nearby. Now the monument existsbecame a tourist attraction for visitors. But this does not as a symbol of the village, and many villagers work atmean that it holds religious significance for them. While the park area as souvenir sellers to generate a secondthe site has lost almost all of its religious significance income.as a Hindu temple, the place itself is still regarded as asanctuary by the local community. For example, Phnom An interesting folk story about the area came up duringRung Wat Kao Phnom Rung is located next to the interviews with local residents. The story, entitledPhnom Rung Historical Park and was built during King Omrapim, tells the story of a beautiful lady, Omrapim,Rama IV’s period. and a Khmer king. The Khmer king came to the area to search for a bride, and at Muang Tam, he encounteredTourists, mostly Thai people, who visit the site also go to Omrapim, who was famous for her beauty. The kingWat Kao Phnom Rung if they want to do tambun.14 There fell in love with Omrapim, but she fled from him withare 13 monks at the temple and they have been given another regional king whom she loved. They ran awaypermission by the FAD to hold religious ceremonies on from Muang Tam to Phnom Rung, then Nan Rong,the site in accordance with tradition or upon request. Phimai and finally reached Lopburi. All those placesThe traditional festival of the local people occurs in are linked to the Khmer monuments which still remainApril, but its substance has been changed dramatically in Thailand.because the TAT has transformed it into a Sound &Light Show. Although some local people, mainly Thai- This folk story is told not only in Muang Tam, but alsoKhmer speaking groups, complained about the changes in Phnom Rung and Phimai. However, the substanceto the festival, the community on the whole appreciates of the story changes in several areas. For example, inthe economic benefits brought by the increased number Muang Tam, Omrapim was born inside the monumentof tourists. and ran away from the Khmer king. In the Phimai version though, Omrapim married the Khmer king andMuang Tam Folklore and Local Community they ran away from a regional king.In contrast, Muang Tam is a small monument which issometimes subordinate to Phnom Rung. In the 1950s, Distinct variations of the story even exist at the localthere was a natural disaster around the Ubonratchatani community level. In Muang Tam, Thai-Khmer speakersarea, and people left their hometown to seek other and Thai-Lao speakers tell different versions of thelands to cultivate. At first, about 50 families built a story. While the Thai-Lao speakers who live aroundvillage around Muang Tam, and it consisted mainly of the site give details of the story in a certain order, theThai-Lao speaking people. According to the chief of story told by Thai-Khmer speakers is not structured.the village , there were a few Khmer speaking people This is because most residents who emigrated fromEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 77. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 47Ubonrachatani adopted the folktale as recorded by the their pride. The Youth Guide Project promotes PhimaiFAD, and this explains why their story telling is well- identity through heritage tourism.structured. This study concludes with the proposal that attentionCONCLUSION be paid to further city planning for the future of theThe cases presented in this research show that conservation of Phimai city. Phimai city retains theconservation policies, implemented by the government characteristics of an ancient Khmer city, a rectangularat local and national levels, have impinged on local city surrounded on all sides by moats and boundarycommunities in several areas. walls. The magnificent central tower of the monument appears above the roofs of old wooden houses whichIn Phimai, two principal events affected the development enclose the site, giving it a calm appearance.of preservation policy. The first was the restorationefforts led by the FAD and French experts in the 1960s. In the past, monuments in Phimai were strictlyThe second was the Green Project, enacted after the controlled by the FAD as a historical protection area.construction of the historical park in 1988. The Green However, the conservation then was limited to theProject established plans for both the development and ancient monuments and did not include the historicalpreservation of the area. It is particularly evident that environment around the site.this project had a significant influence on the localcommunity, both materially and more intangibly. The OEPP arranged for a research team to survey the situation of Phimai city in 1998 (OEPP). SuggestionsExamples are the construction of the new market and arising from this effort call for integrated city planningbus terminal outside of the historic district; and the that include not only the archaeological site but alsolaunch of the Youth Guide Project and transformation the broader landscape. These suggestions are difficultof the Phimai festival, all of which had an impact on to realise, and impediments include bureaucraticthe local community. sectionalism, lack of understanding of the concept of ‘city planning’, and the strong antipathy held by theSince restoration work on the monument was completed, local community towards the central government.it has often been used as a symbol for the city, and itplays an important role in the local tourism industry. Local participation is essential for the conservationAlthough the rise of the Local Trade and Tourism Club of the historical environment. Unfortunately, localin Phimai was fuelled by a national policy enacted by participation in an organisation like the Local Trade andthe TAT and not simply by regional pride, it will be Tourism Club and the Youth Guide Project is currentlyinteresting to observe how these local activities develop limited to activities focused on the central monument.in the future. Local awareness of the need to conserve the historical environment beyond monuments is a prerequisite forIf we focus on the Youth Guide Project, one of its the city’s future.characteristics is the use of local students as guides. Inthe course of their contact with tourists, mainly domestic In the case of Phnom Rung and Muang Tam, thereones, the students tend to create a unique history for the were few clear-cut influences on the local communities,heritage site that is not based on textbook learning. The because the residential areas were not as close to thestudents add local beliefs and folktales about the site to protected monument as Phimai. On the other hand, themake the guided tour more interesting for tourists. matter of the Vishnu Lintel in the 1980s made the site famous and drew many Thai tourists. In Muang Tam,Additionally, they do not refer to the monuments as we see how local people ‘tell’ their history by recountingKhmer, but instead refer to the site as the ‘Phimai a local folktale connected to the monument, which ismonument’. When the students speak of the monument their community symbol. However, more folkloric andas ‘a model for Angkor Wat’, we can observe that they sociological studies will be needed to understand theidentify themselves as Phimai people (Khon Phimai) and historical background of the folktale. This researcher Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 78. 48 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYplans to conduct further study on how Thailand 6 Local people call it Muang May (New City) and it iseducates its citizens about local history. a contrast to Muang Gao (Old City) which is the area inside of the city wall.Many cultural heritage studies encompass the study ofmonuments and information relating to people who 7 Wengrukut, personal interview, 17 Jan. 2003.constructed them, including their society, religion, senseof values, politics, economy, education, technology and 8 Baan Prasat is a pre-historical site which is locatednatural surroundings. However, few studies focus on about 20 km southwest of Phimai city. The sitehow to use the heritage sites in the present day, and how management is overseen by the local community itself.to plan for their future. The notion of cultural heritage TAT Khorat office recognised the success of the Youthcontinues to grow more varied, and consequently Guides in Phimai, this is why they adapted this guidecultural heritage management studies and methodology system in Baan Prasat. In an interview with FAD inshould be more varied. Bangkok and the TAT Khorat office, an officer pointed out that Baan Prasat was a “good management exampleNotes in Northeast.”1 In this project, ‘Cultural Heritage’ covers irreplaceable 9 Students learn these kinds of stories from rumours.monuments and tangible sites which are protected and Sometimes there is no historical evidence at all.declared as ‘heritage’ by national or local law, or byrecognised agencies, like UNESCO, World Monuments 10 The Churning of the Milk Ocean is the episode forFund and so on. the founding of the world from the Adiparva, the first book of the Mahabharata in India. The episode was2 During his period in Thailand, Cœdès had contributed transformed into the Khmer myths and was drawn onpapers like Notes critiques sur l’inscription de Rama the relief at Angkor Wat.Khamheng, and L’inscription de Nagara Jum. 11 Rumphaipun, personal interview, 15 Jan. 2003.3 Welch called the period the ‘Phimai Period’. 12 The places for Mini Sound & Light Show are as4 FAD 9 regional office is responsible for eight th follows in the year 2002: Sukhothai, Kanchanaburi,provinces: Nakhon Ratchasima, Buriram, Surin, Si Lopburi, Ayuttaya, Phimai, Sisaket and Wat Arung inSaket, Ubon Ratchathani, Yasothon, Roi-et and Bangkok.Chiyaphum. 13 The Nation, 8 Feb. 1988; Bangkok Post, 23 May 1988.5 A Greek method of fitting masonry without mortarby carefully dressing the contact edges of the blocks, 14 Buddhist word, a meaning for ‘make a merit’.leaving the centre rough and slightly recessed. 15 Weeweng, personal interview, 1 Feb. 2003.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 79. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 49REFERENCES Kono, Yasushi. Bunkaisan no Hozon to Bunka Kyoryoku. (Conservation of Cultural Heritage and InternationalAnderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections Cooperation). Tokyo: Fukyo-sha, 1995.on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Rev. ed. London:Verso, 1991. Musigakama, Nikom and Weeranuj Polnikorn Maithai. Development of Thai Culture. Bangkok: Fine ArtsArghiros, Daniel. Democracy, Development and Department, 1999.Decentralization in Provincial Thailand. Curzon: n.p.,2001. Nagashima, Masayuki. The Lost Heritage: The Reality of Artifact Smuggling in Southeast Asia. Bangkok: BangkokAymonier, Etienne. Khmer Heritage in Thailand. Post, 2002.Bangkok: White Lotus, 1999. Thailand. Office of Environmental Planning and PolicyCharoenwongsa, Pisit. “Rediscovery of the Stolen (Samnakgan Nayobaay lee Pheen Sigweetloom). PheenLintel.” The Nation 6 Nov. 1988. Catkaan Anurak lee Prapprug Saphaapweetloom (City Planning and Environmental Conservation in Phimai City).Diskul, M.C. Subhadradis. “Stolen Art Objects Returned Bangkok: OEPP, 1998.to Thailand”. SPAFA Digest XI.2 (1989): 8-12. Thailand. Tourism Authority of Thailand. 36thEVDS 702 Group. Situational Analyses: Chaojed, Anniversary of the Tourism Authority of Thailand,Sakhlee, Phimai, Klong Khwang. Bangkok: Canadian Bangkok: Tourism Authority of Thailand, 1996.Universities, 1998. Welch, David. “Preliminary Report on ArchaeologicalFine Arts Department. Muang Phimai(Phimai City). Survey and Excavations in the Phimai Region,Bangkok: Fine Arts Department, 1989. Northeast Thailand.” Prepared for Thailand National Research Council, Thailand Fine Arts Department,Fine Arts Department. Cultural System for Quality National Science Foundation(USA), 1981.Management. Bangkok: Fine Arts Department, 1993. ---. “Adaptation to Environmental Unpredistavility:Fine Arts Department. The 87th Anniversary of the Fine Agricultural Intensification and Regional ExchangeArts Department. Bangkok: Fine Arts Department, at Late Prehistoric Centers in the Phimai region,1998. 261-291. Thailand.” Diss., University of Hawaii, 1985.Keyes, Charles. “The Case of the Purloined Lintel: The Woragamvijva, Sorajet. The Sanctuary Phanomrong.Politics of a Khmer Shrine as a Thai National Treasure.” Buriram: Buriram Culture Centre, 1987.National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand, 1939-1989.Ed. Craig J. Reynolds. Chiangmai: Silkworm Books,1991. Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 80. 50 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYINTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS IN IKAN BILIS FISHERY: EXPERIENCES OF SEBERANG TAKIR PEOPLE INTERENGGANU, THE MALAY PENINSULAMOTOKO KAWANOKyoto University, JapanINTRODUCTION Previous studies have given a great deal of attention toFishery has been relegated into a minor industry in the themes of inter-ethnic issues in relation to politicalMalaysia as the country’s development programme conflicts, religious differences, and identities. Whathas shifted to expanding to more profitable economic seems to be lacking is a consideration of these issuesactivities like oil palm plantations and industrialisation. based on a careful historical study of the transformationFishery, however, continues to play an important role of inter-ethnic relations from the viewpoint of socialin the Malaysian economy, mainly as source of food, interactions and transactions in the production,employment and – to a certain extent – as a secondary distribution and consumption of concrete material suchforeign exchange earner. The Malaysian government is as daily commodities.cognisant of the continuing importance of the fishingindustry and had made an effort to advance productive Although there has been a number of excellentfisheries in Southeast Asian countries early on. studies on fisheries and fishermen in the context of developments and changes in fishing technology, fishingThis modernisation of fishery, however, came at a not grounds and economic activities (Firth, Raymond; Hajiso inconspicuous time. By the time the programme was Omar; Shari; Mohd. Ariff; Ooi), no study has yet beenlaunched, Malaysia was already experiencing problems made on the history of social relations of fishermenthat ranged from a crisis of overexploitation of marine and fishing villages based on transactions of concreteresources to monopoly of offshore sea fishing by the commodities.1 This is the context in which I conductedChinese and coastal fishing by the Malays, conflict this study.between foreign trawl fishermen and Malaysian coastalfishermen and market control by the Chinese (Jomo; Malaysia is often called a ‘plural society’ since itsYamamoto). population consists of three major ethnic groups: Malay, Chinese and Indian, each assumed to formAs globalisation expands, some of these problems separate social structures, without sharing commonassume multi-ethnic forms and do not only affect ideas about community or nation across ethnicMalaysia but also other Southeast Asian countries boundaries. In reality, however, these ethnic groupsas well. It is therefore imperative that we understand have interconnections; some of these related to thethe development of inter-ethnic social relations under production and consumption of daily commodities.such circumstances in order to improve the actualconditions of the communities involved. But we also I intend to explore how these production- andneed to expand our concerns beyond the individual consumption-based relationships developed amongand community to include thinking about the political, Malays and Chinese in relation to the consumption ofeconomic and social frameworks suited to maintaining ikan bilis (anchovy). I likewise intend to investigate thesmooth inter-ethnic relationships. issue from the viewpoint of everyday life instead of from a purely ethnic perspective.Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 81. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 51My study will focus on the historical transformation of Indian oceans (Saikliang). In Malaysia, there are nineinter-ethnic relations between Malay and Chinese based species of ikan bilis listed, with the dominant specieson their social linkages in the production, distribution called Stolephous Heterolobus (Ong). Anchovies areand consumption of ikan bilis in the state of Terengganu generally called by suitable names according to theiron the east coast of the Malay Peninsula from the days colour, form and size; thus Malay names refer to moreof British control up to the present day. This does not than 10 types, e.g. bilis puteh (white bilis), bilis hitammean that this study will be solely devoted to history (black bilis), and bilis halus (fine bilis). Ikan bilis haveitself, for I intend to relate the historical development historically been used as food on the Malay Peninsulato the current social structure. and at present, are eaten by Malaysians as a highly popular food item in dry, fermented or raw form.My case study is the village of Kampung SeberangTakir, one of the old fishing villages in Terengganu They are often mixed into the favourite breakfast fare(Figure 2), and I collected data relevant to this study of many Malaysians like nasi lemak (coconut rice servedthrough participatory research and interviews of with sambal belacan – a hot and spicy sauce, or fried byrespondents in Seberang Takir, including government themselves or together with other ingredients). Ikanofficers. I also conducted archival research at libraries bilis is also used as topping for rice porridge and noodles,and government offices in Kuala Terengganu and Kuala filling for buns, and stock for soups. In fermented form,Lumpur. Finally, to place Kampung Seberang Takir a fish sauce called budu is mainly produced and used onin a broader perspective, I also conducted research in the east coast of the Peninsular2.Terengganu’s other fishing villages, Pulau Langkawi inKedah and Pulau Pangkor in Perak. Fish Landing and Consumption Ikan bilis is a small but important fish in Malaysia,This paper shall proceed as follows. First, I will describe contributing in the last 30 years between 2 and 5 perikan bilis, its species, use, landing and consumption. cent of the total annual marine landings in the countrySecond, I shall briefly explain about the research site (Department of Fisheries Terengganu “Laporan 1971-and trace the history of Seberang Takir, focusing on 2000”; hereafter referred to as ASDOF). In 2000, a totalthe social relations between Chinese and Malay in the of 22,516 MT (metric tonnes) of ikan bilis estimatedareas surrounding the ikan bilis fishery. Third, I shall at RM70 million in wholesale value were landed inexamine inter-ethnic relations in Seberang Takir from Malaysia (ASDOF 2000, Figure 4).the viewpoint of the roles of bilis taokeys (supervisors)and middlemen. Finally, I shall discuss the inter-ethnic Today ikan bilis are mainly caught by anchovy purserelations in the bilis fishery and its connection to global seine boats. The main landing centres are at Pulauconditions. Langkawi, Pulau Pangkor and Terengganu on the peninsula (Figure 1). The number of landings in PerakThe terms for assemblers, wholesalers and retailers, used grew sharply from the early 1960s and the number ofin the present study are as shown in Figure 3, and the landings in Kedah grew dramatically from the mid-1970sterm ‘merchant’ is widely used to mean a distributor. (Figure 5). Fishing on the west coast of the MalaysianMoreover, I will use the term, ikan bilis, to refer to Peninsular is more advanced because of technologicalanchovy. In addition, I shall use the term ‘salted dry innovation and better capital infusion by the Chinese,fish’ as the category in which ikan bilis was included in but the result of over fishing has reduced the volumethe colonial era. of landings. Although productivity drives have been planned, the fact is that large quantities of bilis are nowABOUT IKAN BILIS AND PRODUCTION TO being imported from Thailand (Figure 9).DISTRIBUTION CHANNELSSpecies and Use The consumption of bilis in Malaysia and SingaporeThe ikan bilis are the young of anchovies that are had gone up in the late 1980s as a result of increaseddistributed widely along the coast and islands from East recognition of the anchovies as a source of calciumAsia, Southeast Asia and South Pacific oceans to the supplement.3 Consumption rose markedly by 2.4 times Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 82. 52 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYfrom 16,241 MT in 1985 to 37,812 MT in 1990 (ASDOF Today, the total population is about 1,000,000 people,1985-1990) and retail prices rose correspondingly. Today of which 95 per cent is Malay. In the elections of 1999,ikan bilis has a special value and high price, although Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) took over the statehow this came about is not only because of technology government of Terengganu, one of two states in Malaysiaand capital; its story also has an interesting historical that were under PAS control (the other is Kelantan).twist to it. After PAS came to power in the state of Terengganu, the federal government, controlled by the UnitedProduction to Distribution Channels Malays National Organisation (UMNO), cut back onGenerally, the marketing chain from fishermen to permits for off-shore oil processing in Terengganu, andconsumers of ikan bilis can be divided as follows: the state revenue dropped drastically.catching bilis, processing (boiling, drying, and selection),assembling, inland wholesaling and retailing. These Kuala Terengganu, the capital of the state, sprawlsfive phases is the general pattern, although there are on the right bank of the Terengganu River. Kampungsome variations depending on the locality of landing Seberang Takir is located at the tip of the oppositesites. Figure 3 shows the flow from fishermen, bilis shore of this capital. There are about 320 householdstaokeys, assemblers-cum-wholesalers, wholesalers and in this village. The townspeople’s main occupationthe retailers. Various agents/dealer may play roles at consists of fishing, fish processing and governmentvarious levels. employment. Kampung Seberang Takir is the site of fishing with several jetties. Many fishermen come hereThere is some variation however in the flow from from other villages in Seberang Takir. Seberang Takir isfishermen to consumers. For instance, one chain consists a generic name for several kampung (villages) located inof bilis taokeys, assemblers, wholesalers and retailers. In the vicinity of Kampung Seberang Takir.other chains, one link is reduced to wholesalers andretailers by pass assemblers. Moreover, consumers deal The village is divided into four blocks: 1) a fishingdirectly with producers. Still, most cases involve the area called Hujung Tanjung in the south; 2) an oldmiddlemen (i.e.assemblers-cum-wholesalers in this port area called Pinkalang Titian in the northwest; 3)study). an old residential block in the north; and 4) the area called Pantai in the northeast. The people live inThe social ties between bilis taokeys and middlemen communities that stand side by side along roads. Thereleads to a pre-arranged agreement on fishing rights are no agricultural lands.and financial support, with the taokeys handing overprocessed bilis to middlemen once they receive advanced Under British Control: Malay as Fishermen andmoney for the costs ranging from boats and nets upkeep Chinese as Merchantsto fishermen’s daily wages. This arrangement has had Migration to Seberang Takir can be roughly dated froma long history, and despite certain changes its basic the early years of the 20th century. Before that time, it isfeatures can still be seen even today. said that Seberang Takir existed mainly as an execution ground beyond the river, as the name implies (SeberangHISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SEBERANG means ‘across the other side’, takir refers to one ofTAKIR AND IKAN BILIS FISHERIES punishments under Islam Law). The Malay PeninsulaAbout the State of Terengganu and Seberang Takir of the 19th century was covered with tropical rainforests,Terengganu faces the South China Sea and has a long and most of the people lived at river mouths or at thecoastal line of 240 kilometres. Along this coastal line, nodal point of the arm of a river (Andaya and Andaya;four ports for deep-sea fishing have been established and Gullick).many coastal fishing villages, including the productionvillages of ikan bilis, are scattered in between these ports Kuala Terengganu was also located at the bank of(Figure 2). Terengganu’s economy is essentially agro- the river, and the population was concentrated herebased, which includes forestry and fisheries. (Clifford). On the other hand, many ships came to Kuala Terengganu since it was recognised as a centreEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 83. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 53of monsoon trade from Bangkok, Cochin China and reports by the British adviser. They excelled at usingSingapore, and this city was active as an ‘international lift nets. They made expeditions to the west coast ofport’ (Khoo). the peninsula and their techniques prevailed over the inferior methods of the Chinese during the monsoonIn 1874, under the Pangkor Treaty, the British started season, from December to February (Terengganu Statedirect intervention in Peninsular Malaysia with an “ARTGG”; Clifford). But because the quality of theireye to exploiting tin. Chinese labourers for the tin processing technology was second-rate, Terengganumines and Indian labourers for the rubber plantations salted dry fish including ikan bilis were classified as lowwere flown into the peninsula (Andaya and Andaya). grade exports in Singapore.According to the Annual Reports of the British Adviserfor Terengganu (henceforth ARTGG), the most Production expansion needed the capital and it was hereremarkable trade product was salted dry fish (including that Chinese merchants called daganan, came in, settingikan bilis). up purchasing and financial agreements with fishermen wherein the former became the sole buyer of caughtSalted dry fish was already being exported to Singapore fish as well as the source of investment or loans neededby the end of the 19th century (Clifford), and ikan bilis by the latter. Although Malay daganan were the firstespecially was sold in Java and Sumatra where rubber to operate in Terengganu (Firth), they were displacedplantations were steadily expanding (Stead). Salted soon after by Chinese capitalists from Singapore whosedry fish was highly popular with labourers as cheap control of the distribution market already placed themfood. As a consequence, production expanded and the in a more advantageous position. It was only a matterexport duty in Terengganu likewise increased (Talib), of time before they would extend their control to thewith export tax accounting for 30 to 40 per cent of production process.all revenue from 1910 to 1920 (Terengganu State,“ARTGG 1910-1920”). Chinese merchants extended their economic pre- eminence by becoming the sole supplier of dailyJudging from the above, we are fairly certain that the commodities to Malay fishermen, driving a hardpeople’s movement to Seberang Takir was due to the bargain to purchase the fish at reduced prices, all in theeconomic development of Kuala Terengganu. It is said name of short-run profits. This imbalance in economicthat many people came to this area in rapid succession, relations forced the colonial state to try to protectspread from this area as the starting point, and made Malay fishermen/peasants.their living by fishing and processing.5 In the 1921census, for example, of the total Terengganu population Nevertheless we need to qualify that conditions didof 153,765, the proportion of Malay was 90 per cent and differ considerably from place to place. In 1939, the9,350 were fishermen (adult males) (Terengganu State social anthropologist Raymond Firth, in his study of“ARTGG 1921”). Women and children however were Kampung Tanjung, an old fishing village in Kualaalso involved in salted fish production. Terengganu, pointed out that: 1) the daganan in Kuala Terengganu were often retired Malay fishermen or menI was told that the port for shipping trade had been whose fathers left them some capital; 2) that Chineseestablished and the people had settled in Pinkalang traders owned small boats; and 3) that Malay fishermenTitian. Today we can still find the mark of great did not obtain daily commodities from Chineseachievement for a Malay trader in his old wooden house traders.and the name of the road. Most of them conducted salttrade relations with Cochin China by sailing ships, and Although there remains some doubt as to whetherit is likely that this salt was used to make the salted dry Malay daganan were supported by Chinese merchants,fish in Terengganu. it is important that fishermen in Kuala Terengganu were not always under the domination of the ChineseThe Malay fishermen of Terengganu had excellent and that they also possessed economic potential. Thesefishing techniques, as can be seen in the annual are important points to consider when we examine the Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 84. 54 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYchanging dynamics of inter-ethnic relations in Seberang In the early 1960s, the trade encountered some majorTakir. changes brought about by the opening of a major thoroughfare to Kuala Lumpur, the new capital whichThe End of Empire and the Independence of enabled commodities to be transported quickly andMalaysia: From Trade to Fishery, Malay and massively between the capital and Terengganu. TheChinese Cooperation independence of Singapore likewise acted as a catalystThere were, by the early 1940s, already jetties, processing for growth and Terengganu began to move ahead withhuts, shops and houses of Malay and Chinese in Hujung modernisation at a pace different from the west coastTanjung of the fishing area at the tip of Kampung (Terengganu State “Kemajuan”).Seberang Takir. Fishermen of Kampung Tanjung on theother side as well as from Kelantan went there.6 Most Bumiputera Rule and Economic Development:people came to work in salted-dry fish processing, while Increase in Malay Fishermen and Migration ofothers began with salted-dry fish processing but soon Chinese Merchantsdiversified to related work like the trade of salt. The ethnic disturbances of May 1969 however proved as a critical turning point, as Malaysia’s New EconomicAccording to one bilis taokey I interviewed, his father Policy (NEP) mandated state support and favourableand grandfather were captains of sailing ships, sailormen treatment to businesses owned by the bumiputeraor fish dealers. Those who became economically (meaning ‘son of the soil’). As it followed the five-independent and had a flair for business also became year Malaysia Plan, Terengganu made progress in landtaokeys. It is important to note here that fishermen utilisation, industrial development, infrastructure,are not always engaged in fishing but also had various and other development areas (Kemajuan Negriside jobs, such as boat-builders, watermen and small Terengganu).businessmen. New communities sprouted more than two kilometresToday, the number of houses in Hujung Tanjung is less to the north from Kampung Seberang Takir, where oncethan 70, including the processing huts. Based on the there was only jungle. When my host family moved tointerviews and my own observation, it is fair to say that Kampung Teluk Ketapang more than 3 kilometres tothere were at least about 130 houses (including about the north in 1974, there were only a few houses there.10 Chinese houses) between the 1940s to the 1950s. The mother of the family told of a time when it seemedI was told that the Chinese spoke the Malay tongue as if they were the only ones living in the dark forest8.fluently and worked closely with Malay fishermen inthe processing industry. They did not go to sea but Fisheries in Seberang Takir likewise reached a new peak.contented themselves with owning the boats and Large amounts of salted dry fish were carried from thehiring Malay fishermen. In short, the taokey was not an jetties of Hujung Tanjung to Kuala Terengganu acrossoperator or fisherman but a merchant. the river every day. The quantity transported daily by one middleman was three truckloads with 15MTChinese merchants from other states also came to of goods. Bilis were caught too and about 20 taokeys,Kuala Terengganu. According to one respondent, a including Chinese were there at the time to purchasemiddleman, his father moved to Kuala Terengganu from the products. The Department of Fisheries promotedKuantan after World War II and engaged in the export the use of power boats and gave engines to fishingof agricultural products to Singapore.7 He initially boat owners (Department of Fisheries Terengganuexported fruit but with the decline of fruit production “Senarai”). The number of fish landings grew rapidlyin the area, he shifted to salted dry fish, becoming a with the spread of fishing grounds and the growth ofsenior middleman. He eventually expanded his business load capacity.by cooperating with Malay taokeys in Hujung Tanjungwhere he also owned a fish storehouse. Salted dry fish The Malaysia Plan, Lembaga Kemajuan Ikan Malaysiawere exported from Kuala Terengganu to Singapore (LKIM) was established to promote the improvementthrough the ship Hong Ho. of socioeconomic conditions of costal fishermen andEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 85. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 55this led to a sharp rise in the number of fishermen Counter-balancing this decline, however, was the(Department of Fisheries Terengganu “Laporan”). emergence of Malay bilis middlemen in the mid-1990sFrom that time on, however, despite their increased from among those who benefited from the Bumiputeraeconomic presence, Chinese presence began to decline policy. One Malay entrepreneur who started in 1996in Hujung Tanjung as younger generations migrated to succeeded in becoming a mid-size middleman, whenthe city in search of new business ventures. A similar he adopted modern material for preservation and stableout-migration was also happening among sons of the cargo bookings from Thailand. Still, many closed shopChinese middlemen in Kuala Terengganu. after a few years due to the financial shortage and a decrease in the landings.By the end of the 1970s, the production of ikan biliswas at the height of its prosperity. The transport of ikan The government has sought to put a stop to thebilis to Kuala Lumpur from Hujung Tanjung by the new decline by pouring resources into upgrading the fishingbridge connecting to Kuala Terengganu averaged two infrastructure in the area. In November 2002, thetruckloads by the mid-1980. A change in Malaysian construction of the breakwater and the multiple portsfood consumption also led to taokeys becoming more in Hujung Tanjung as a joint-collaboration projectcommitted to producing ikan bilis than before. By 1985 between the state and the federal governments began.the demand for ikan bilis had become quite distinct that This project is to be completed by 2006 and its plannersit merited a separate category in the annual statistics of hope that it will reinvigorate the fishing industry.export/import released by the government (Departmentof Fisheries Terengganu “Laporan”). Before proceeding, it would be worthwhile here to highlight a number of points regarding the history ofIn the same year, oil was produced offshore in ikan bilis production in Seberang Takir. First, the ethnicTerengganu, prompting state authorities to come up groups involved were not always confined to a singlewith a master plan in order to increase its control over activity. This ‘division of labour’ only came when thethe area (“Terengganu Master Plan Study”) as a result of British colonial government ‘assigned’ definite roles tothis new and potentially huge revenue base. the Malays (fishermen) and the Chinese (merchants). This colonial classification in effect removed oneIn 1984, however, monsoon rains destroyed over 30 dynamic feature of Malay fishing communities, and thatHujung Tanjung houses standing on the coast of the is the multiple occupations of this maritime people.South China Sea. People were forced to move to newlands in Kampung Teluk Ketapang in areas opened Second, as production expanded during the colonialand provided by the state government. The last of the period, Chinese merchants came to TerengganuChinese merchants also passed away that day, and after and began to dominate the distribution system ofa few years, the number of bilis landings declined.9 commodities. In Seberang Takir, however, Malays still managed to retain control over the processingNew Wave: Birth of Malay Merchants of the and trade of fish via daganan, a credit system that wasOncoming Generation as competitive as the Chinese lending system. UnderAfter 1990, total fish landing went from bad to worse Bumiputera Rule, the number of fish landings grew afterand processing huts were being closed year after year, the introduction of power boats and as a consequenceforcing bilis taokeys to adopt various recourses to stay of the favourable treatment of Malays, the number ofin the ikan bilis business. The number of fishermen also Malay fishermen also increased.dropped precipitously (right below, Figure 9), with thenumber of fishermen in Seberang Takir reaching its Third, from the late 1970s, ikan bilis production roselowest since the late 1980’s (Department of Fisheries remarkably as urban consumption increased. Yet,Terengganu “Senarai”). The main reason for this is this could not prevent the out-migration of youngerthat the next generations of fishermen and bilis toakey Chinese who see better business opportunities outside ofmerchants did not like to become fishermen.10 Terengganu (particularly in Kuala Lumpur) as a result of Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 86. 56 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYthis reorganisation of the Malaysian economy. Finally, fishing methods are purse seine net, anchovy pursefrom 1990, the decrease in the landings of bilis, forced seine net and drift net. The use of traps is a recentlybilis taokeys to seek alternative ways to survive. During added feature to fishing in the area.11 Nine jetties havethis period also, new Malay generations found a niche anchovy purse seine for the bilis fishery and there is onein the bilis business which the Chinese abandoned, bilis taokey holding the additional post of jetty taokeyand began taking control of share of the diminishing in each jetty. The production process goes on like this:pie with Chinese senior middlemen who remained in After being caught, the bilis is boiled, dried and sorted.Terengganu. This activity of processing requires a supervisor called bilis taokey, a former salted dry fish taokey who does notIt was in this context that Kampung Seberang Takir need to engage in further fishing (see Figure 6).developed as a fishing village. During the colonial days,this village was a prime location since it was near the In my field research, I found that there are five majorstate capital of Kuala Terengganu which also happened features of bilis taokeys in the area (Table 1: 1). First,to be the biggest port on the east coast, and closely linked fishing is conducted by Malay fishermen in power boatsto the trade of salted dry fish. This strategic location with cooking functions and bilis purse seine nets. Thealso enabled Malays in Seberang Takir to maintain production and distribution phases are mainly undergood access to credit and the market and thus establish the complete control of Chinese businessmen, as ina more autonomous, if not independent relationship the case of Langkawi. Moreover, it is evident that thevis-à-vis the Chinese merchants. Some Seberang Takir Malays do not always like to be under the thumb of theMalays even managed to become taokey-cum-captains Chinese. Those with the economic potential and strongof fishing boats themselves. blood and social relations are often able to use these to their advantage.In the post-colonial period, Bumiputera Rule and thereorganisation of economy created a niche for a similar Second, in places like Kampung Fikir, the bilis taokey isgeneration of Malays who were able to share the limited not necessarily just a middleman. Third, in Seberangeconomic pie with Chinese senior middlemen. In the Takir, while fishing on the east coast of the Peninsula isfollowing section, I will look at the social relations commonly done by power boat and boiling on the jetty,between Malay and Chinese in the ikan bilis fishery in there is no other bilis taokey holding the additional postSeberang Takir today, especially focusing on bilis taokeys of captain/operator as in this case. It means then that inand middlemen. Seberang Takir, the bilis taokey may be different from the operator. Finally, the traditional type of fishing, whereMALAY AND CHINESE IN THE NETWORK the boat is small and the gear is a lift net, continues toOF PRODUCTION TO DISTRIBUTION persist despite the dominance of commercial fishing.Bilis Taokey? Captain?At present, there are 10 jetties in Hujing Tanjung, Bilis fishing also appears to consist of two phases:the fishing area in Kampung Seberang Takir. Two to ‘fishing’ or catching fish, and ‘commerce’ or sellingeight boats specialise in coastal fishery while boats for goods (Akimichi). Yet, the role of bilis taokeys inoffshore fisheries are kept at the spillway of each jetty. Seberang Takir shows that ambiguity between ‘fishing’The number of boats operating in coastal fisheries and and ‘commerce’ can also exist. The bilis taokey has tooffshore fisheries varies according to seasons and the cope with various jobs – as captain, boat owner, biliskind of fish being caught. About 80 boats of both types taokey, and jetty taokey. This mixture of responsibilitiesoperate during the fishing season, with the number has had a long history. Very often the one with the mostgoing down to about 60 boats during the off-season. diverse of responsibilities is often the hardest worker on each jetty.A fishing crew may range from one to 15 people perboat, but the total number of those involved in both Bilis taokeys have to maintain good social relationstypes of operation reaches about 450 people during the with fishermen and other taokeys to ensure a smoothfishing season. All the fishermen are Malay. The main production and distribution system. The bilis taokey inEconomic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions :Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast)The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 87. STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Part I ... 57Hujung Tanjung, for example (Figure 7), maintains open The respondent is in his 30s and he grew up underlines of communications with his fishermen to assure the New Economic Policy / Bumiputera Rule. Forthe latter that their relationship is not one of superior- him, the functions of middlemen may be divided intoto-inferior but of equal partners involved in the harvest three categories: First, he has to collect bilis and ensureand sale of ikan bilis. Respect of each other’s turf is also a constant supply of the commodity. This he does byimportant. For instance, a captain often cannot go to resorting to the traditional way of advancing wages tosea without the fishermen’s assent. the bilis taokey for the maintenance costs of boat, nets, and other expenses. In exchange he has sole monopolyThe relations between bilis taokeys, however, may be (or first priority) over the landed bilis. For this particularmore sensitive. Generally, bilis taokeys are divided into middleman, there are five bilis taokey in Hujung Tanjungthree types (Figure 7) based mainly on the fishing linked up with him, with one taokey receiving advancetechnology in their possession and their expertise in wages between 200 to 1000 ringgit each time within thefishing. The size of the bilis fishery of two taokeys with short span of a few days up to 10 days.12the mark of # (the mark # refers to a fish-finder) maybe the same as seven other taokeys who do not use a Note however, that this relationship is also not alwaysfish-finder, but clearly their technology puts the former static as compared to the relationship between fishermenin an advantageous position in all, if not most, of the and a captain, for often, the bilis taokey may also havedifferent aspects of the industry – from fish cultivation, connections with other middlemen and this his otherto fish retail, and so on. clients cannot control or prevent.Differing incomes have also led to contrasting economic During the monsoon season, the middleman’s books arestatus and this has become a source of trouble in the filled up with the word pinjam (advanced wages). Hecommunity. As a result there are hardly any cooperative imports bilis from Southern Thailand through a cousinsocieties in Seberang Takir. The final social ties are living near Patani. He must also make sure that he hasbetween siblings. adequate storage capacity to keep the safety and quality of his goods. When he builds his house, he usually addsWhat then are the requirements in order for a fisherman a fully equipped storage of three rooms with modernto become a taokey and give full play to his abilities? capacities.Based on my field research, I would like to emphasisethe following qualifications: 1) personal status in terms Third, the extension of retail outlets is important toof economical background and business ability; and him and Malay schools and dormitories in Terengganu2) socioeconomic situation – as in marriage relations, are often his main market. Bilis-selling by retail isthe stability of other and side jobs of the women and characteristic among Malay middlemen in Terengganu.the family apart from fishing in times of economic In contrast, Chinese middlemen mainly export todifficulty. Pahang and Kuala Lumpur. In the other words, Malay and Chinese middlemen stake and respect their ownFunctions of Middlemen turfs. Finally, to maintain low costs, the middleman usesCrucial to maintaining the marketing chain from his father’s property.fishermen to consumers are the assemblers, wholesalers,and retailers, who are often subsumed under the term The number in Figure 8 shows the ratio between‘middlemen’ (Figure 3). The middleman generally collecting and retail. The middleman collects 50 persupplies consumers and provides a wider market for fish cent of the bilis from Thailand through his cousin, 35 percaught (Haji Omar). For purposes of this study, I use the cent from Seberang Takir, and 15 per cent from northernterm ‘middleman’ to refer to a person who holds the post Terengganu through a dealer. On the other hand, 50 perof assembler and wholesaler in the production. Perhaps cent of bilis gathered from Malay middleman are thenone way of better explaining the role of the middleman retailed to the schools and dormitories in Terengganu,and his distribution channel in detail is through a case 25 per cent to Terengganu retailers, and 15 per cent tostudy of one Malay bilis middleman in Seberang Takir. an exclusive wholesaler in Johor Bahru. Economic Prospects, Cultural Encounters and Political Decisions : Scenes in a Moving Asia (East and Southeast) The Work of the 2002/2003 API Fellows
  • 88. 58 ... Part I STATE BOUNDARIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITYThis ratio gives us a hint as to why this middleman is The implications here are quite interesting. This suggests,relatively successful: 1) he has a constant supply of bilis on the one hand, that more and more people and moneyharvested from the area and imported from Thailand cross national borders in search of profits from this smallthrough his cousin; 2) he has access to or controls the fish. The boundaries set by the state appeared to haveretail sales to Malay schools; and 3) he has exclusive been superseded by economic boundaries dictated bylinks with a dealer in the same village. In short, his the production and consumption of ikan bilis within andsuccess stems from his ability to be an active player in outside the nation-state. The inflow of foreign labourthe chain of Malays across the state boundaries into the in the dwindling ikan bilis fishing industry in Malaysiarural areas, taking a share of the diminished pie in the also suggests that the main consideration now is money.compartmentalisation with Chinese. Fishermen, middlemen, merchants, and even the state now seem to recognise the value of human flowsCONCLUSION unencumbered by the restrictions of state boundaries,I conclude this study by discussing how inter-ethnic all in the name of money.relations may be considered in the wider regionalcontext, and how relations have taken place in These changes may also affect the ‘traditional’ locationscomparison with other areas. Figure 9 shows inter-ethnic of Malays and Chinese in the ikan bilis fishery. On therelations in the ikan bilis fishery of today in the Malay east coast, the distribution chain of Malays is fromPeninsula. As far as bilis fishery concerned, some kind Malays as fishermen to Malays as consumer. In contrast,bifurcation has developed between small- and middle- the Chinese have various distribution channels that isscale Malay businesses on the east coast and large-scale intra- and extra-regional, with the distribution chainChinese businesses on the west coast. controlled by Chinese all throughout and with the various ethnic groups as consumers. As production goesOn the east coast, we can find that not only Malay but down