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Anatomy of Fraud (2010 & 2013)
- 1. Automated Election System 2010 and 2013 Elections
- 2. MINIMUM SECURITY FEATURES ULTRA VIOLET LAMP Security feature to identify whether a ballot is authentic or fake Required under R.A. 9369 Sec 13 COMELEC DID NOT IMPLEMENT this security feature VOTER VERIFICATION – PAPER AUDIT TRAIL Mechanism to secure that the vote is counted for the chosen candidate(s) Required under R.A. 9369 Sec 7 DISABLED BY COMELEC under Resolution 8786 Sec 36 (b) DIGITAL SIGNATURE Authenticates election results and their respective electronic transmissions Required under R.A. 9369 Sec 19 DISABLED BY COMELEC under Resolution 8786 Sec 40 (f)(g)(h) (March 10, 2010 and Resolution 9640 Sec 51 (e) (f) (g) (h) (February 15, 2013) MANDATORY SOURCE CODE REVIEW Required under R.A. 9369 COMELEC CONTINUES TO FAIL to submit the source code for meaningful independent review
- 3. MINIMUM SECURITY FEATURES Republic Act 9369 – January 23, 2007 SEC. 19. Section 18 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows: "SEC. 22. Electronic Returns. - Each copy of the of the printed election returns shall bear appropriate control marks to determine the time and place of printing. Each copy shall be signed and thumbmarked by all the members of the board of election inspectors and the watchers present. …
- 4. MINIMUM SECURITY FEATURES SEC 19, B, 13. “… The election returns transmitted electronically and digitally signed shall be considered as official election results and shall be used as the basis for the canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a candidate.“ …
- 6. MINIMUM SECURITY FEATURES COMELEC Resolution No. 9640 (15 February 2013) Section 51 e. The screen will display a message “POLL IS BEING CLOSED PLEASE WAIT”, followed by another message “VOTING HAS BEEN CLOSED NO MORE BALLOTS WILL BE ACCEPTED BY THIS PCOS”; f. Thereafter, the PCOS shall automatically count the votes and immediately display a message “WOULD YOU LIKE TO DIGITALLY SIGN THE TRANSMISSION FILES WITH A BEI SIGNATURE KEY?”, with “YES or NO” options;
- 7. MINIMUM SECURITY FEATURES COMELEC Resolution No. 9640 (15 February 2013) Section 51 (c0ntinued) e. Press the “NO” option. The PCOS will display “ARE YOU SURE YOU DO NOT WANT TO APPLY ANY DIGITAL SIGNATURE?”, with “YES or NO” options; f. Press the “YES” option. A message shall be displayed “PREPARING ELECTION REPORTS. PLEASE WAIT” ... followed by a message “GENERATING TRANSMISSION FILES. . . PLS WAIT” then by a message “PRINTING 8 COPIES OF NATIONAL RETURNS PLEASE WAIT” and the PCOS automatically prints the 8 copies;
- 8. BILIRAN PROVINCE May 10, 2010 Very improbably high voter turnout PCOS Audit Log Report (ALR) 147 out of 166 ALRs = 88.6 % voter turnout MBOC / CCS Print Log (PL) 8 out of 8 PLs = 100 % voter turnout
- 9. PCOS AUDIT LOG REPORT (ALR) 147 out of 166 ALRs = 88.6%
- 10. MBOC/CCS PRINT LOG (PL) 8 out of 8 PLs = 100%
- 11. CASE I MBOC/CCS CULABA CP 7805002 BRGY. BACOLOD LAST ENRTRY IN AUDIT LOG 8:39:01PM MAY 10, 2012 CP 7805002 BRGY. BACOLOD RECORDED SUCCESSFUL ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION 11:23:23 PM MAY 10, 2010 FROM IP ADDRESS 10.12.3.143 TIME DIFFERENCE OF THE TWO TRANSMISSIONS 2 H 44M 22 S SAME PRECINCT: FAILURE TO TRANSMIT FROM PCOS/ SUCCESSFUL TRANSMISSION IN MBOC FAILED TO TRANSMIT
- 12. MBOC/CCS CULABA CASE II SAME PRECINCT: TWO TRANSMISSIONS HOURS APART FROM DIFFERENT IP ADDRESSES CP 7805006 BRGY. BOOL WEST CP 7805006 BRGY. BOOL WEST TRANSMITTED AT 1:55:36AM MAY 11, 2010 IP ADDRESS 10.15.2.121 TRANSMITTED AT 3:41:51AM MAY 11, 2010 IP ADDRESS 10.15.3.43 TIME DIFFERENCE OF THE TWO TRANSMISSIONS 1 H 46 M 15 S LAST ENTRY RECORDED IN THE AUDIT LOG OF CP 7805006 WAS AT 3:08:38AM MAY 11, 2010 THE 2ND TRANSMISSION WAS RECORDED 33 MINS 13 SECS AFTER CP 7805006 WAS TURNED OFF SAME CHARACTERISTICS OF DOUBLE TRANSMISSION IN 7 CLUSTERED PRECINCTS IN 2 MUNICIPALITIES: 7805006 / 7805008 / 7805011 / 7805012 / 7805017 / 7805018 / 7804011
- 13. MBOC/CCS ALMERIA CASE III DIFFERENT PRECINCTS: TRANSMITTING FROM THE SAME IP ADDRESS CP 7801002 BRGY. POBLACION 2 CP 7801001 BRGY. POBLACION 1 TRANSMITTED AT 1:06:50AM MAY 11, 2010 IP ADDRESS 10.15.0.157 TRANSMITTED AT 1:23:53AM MAY 11, 2010 IP ADDRESS 10.15.0.157 REG. VOTERS 915 ACTUALLY VOTED 749 TURNOUT 81.85% REG. VOTERS 965 ACTUALLY VOTED 790 TURNOUT 81.86% ALL OTHER ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSIONS IN BILIRAN REGISTERED SEPARATE AND DISTINCT IP ADDRESSES EXCEPT THESE 2 CLUSTERED PRECINCTS
- 14. MBOC/CCS SERVER CASE IV WIDESPREAD DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE TIME OF TRANSMISSION BY PCOS AND THE TIME OF RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION BY MBOC/CCS SERVERS CP7801009 Transmitted 23:26:52 CP7802005 Transmitted 21:28:44 CP7805011 Transmitted 22:42:42 Recorded Receiving Time: CP7801009 23:16:21 (10m) CP7802005 21:19:14 (9m) CP7805011 22:33:57 (9m) CP7807004 20:07:54 (8m) CP7808022 22:54:00 (11m) CP7807004 Transmitted 20:15:38 CP7808022 Transmitted 23:05:28 OUT OF 166 PCOS FUNCTIONING IN BILIRAN ON ELECTION DAY, ONLY 53 HAD COMPLETE DATA ON THE TIME AND DATE OF ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSIONS IN BOTH PCOS AND MBOC/CCS SERVER. OF THESE 53, 52 OR MORE THAN 98%, SHOWED THE PCOS TRANSMITTING LATER IN RELATION TO THEIR RESPECTIVE MBOC/CCS SERVER RECEVING THE SAME EARLIER. THE MBOC/CCS SERVERS RECORDED THE SAME TRANSMISSION AHEAD THAN THE PCOS TRANSMISSION TIME FROM 2 MINUTES UP TO 131 MINUTES.
- 15. ELECTRONICALLY-TRANSMITTED RESULTS MUNICIPALITY OF ALMERIA PCOS TRANSMISSION MBOC MINUTES RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION MBOC PRINT LOGS RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION Minutes by Which MBOC Received Results AHEAD of CLUSTERED TIME DATE TIME DATE TIME DATE IP ADDRESS PCOS Transmission PRECINCT 7801001 1:33:41 5/11/10 1:24 AM 5/11/10 1:24:29 5/11/10 10.15.0.157 9 7801002 1:07 AM 5/11/10 1:07:34 5/11/10 10.15.0.157 incomplete data 7801003 2:18:11 5/11/10 2:07 AM 5/11/10 2:07:24 5/11/10 10.11.0.20 11 7801004 8:21:10 5/11/10 8:12 AM 5/11/10 8:12:19 5/11/10 10.12.0.3 9 7801005 3:21:43 5/11/10 3:13 AM 5/11/10 3:13:18 5/11/10 10.11.4.9 8 7801006 23:10:42 5/10/10 8:59 PM 5/10/10 20:59:46 5/10/10 10.24.24.83 131 7801007 23:10:42 5/10/10 11:00 PM 5/10/10 23:00:22 5/10/10 10.12.0.53 10 7801008 0:06:00 5/11/10 11:57 PM 5/10/10 23:57:07 5/10/10 10.12.19.131 9 7801009 23:26:52 5/10/10 11:16 PM 5/10/10 23:16:21 5/10/10 10.11.9.120 10 7801010 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission 7801011 8:16:36 5/09/10 8:15 PM 5/10/10 20:06:13 5/10/10 10.11.48.22 10 7801012 19:58:08 5/10/10 7:49 PM 5/10/10 19:49:30 5/10/10 10.11.18.64 9 7801013 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission 7801014 21:49:00 5/10/10 9:43 PM 5/10/10 21:43:39 5/10/10 10.11.7.81 5
- 16. ELECTRONICALLY TRANSMITTED RESULTS MUNICIPALITY OF BILIRAN PCOS TRANSMISSION MBOC MINUTES RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION MBOC PRINT LOGS RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION Minutes by Which MBOC Received Results AHEAD of CLUSTERED TIME DATE TIME DATE TIME DATE IP ADDRESS PCOS Transmission PRECINCT 7802001 22:36:14 5/10/2010 22:26:07 5/10/2010 10.11.40.212 10 7802002 20:05:53 5/10/2010 19:54:42 5/10/2010 10.11.9.116 11 7802003 19:48:23 5/10/2010 19:38:36 5/10/2010 10.11.37.105 10 7902004 20:20:44 5/10/2010 20:10:37 5/10/2010 10.11.2.164 10 7802005 21:28:44 5/10/2010 21:19:14 5/10/2010 10.12.12.103 9 7802006 0:46:54 5/11/2010 0:36:43 5/10/2010 10.12.10.29 10 7802007 2:16:26 5/10/2010 10.11.0.103 incomplete data 7802008 20:06:11 5/10/2010 19:57:16 5/10/2010 10.12.20.124 9 7802009 20:04:33 5/10/2010 19:58:12 5/10/2010 10.11.16.178 6 7802010 0:49:38 5/10/2010 0:39:03 5/10/2010 10.11.7.96 10 7802011 13:39:51 5/10/2010 20:04:01 5/10/2010 10.11.29.241 time stamp error 7802012 CF CARD INSERTED TO LAPTOP incomplete data 7802013 23:08:19 5/10/2010 23:01:46 5/10/2010 10.12.14.140 7 7802014 21:34:36 5/10/2010 21:25:10 5/10/2010 10.12.30.210 9 7802015 23:13:49 5/10/2010 10.12.2.194 incomplete data 7802016 19:49:42 5/10/2010 19:36:54 5/10/2010 10.12.24.97 12
- 17. ELECTRONICALLY-TRANSMITTED RESULTS MUNICIPALITY OF CULABA PCOS TRANSMISSION MBOC MINUTES RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION MBOC PRINT LOGS RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION Minutes by Which MBOC Received Results AHEAD of PCOS Transmission CLUSTERED PRECINCT TIME DATE TIME DATE TIME DATE IP ADDRESS 7805001 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission 7805002 11:25 PM 5/11/10 23:25:03 5/10/10 10.12.3.143 incomplete data 7805003 00:28:18 5/11/10 12:18 AM 5/11/10 0:18:23 5/11/10 10.11.11.12 10 7805004 01:21:47 5/11/10 1:10 AM 5/11/10 1:10:31 5/11/10 10.15.29.126 11 7805005 23:14:39 5/10/10 11:03 PM 5/10/10 23:03:00 5/10/10 10.15.27.222 11 7805006 02:04:08 5/11/10 1:56 AM 5/11/10 1:56:50 5/11/10 10.15.2.121 7 7085007 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission 7805008 2:05:54 5/11/10 1:57AM 5/11/10 1:57:06 5/11/10 10.11.6.177 9 7805009 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission 7805010 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission 7805011 22:42:42 05/10/10 10:34 PM 5/10/10 22:33:57 5/10/10 10.11.11.139 9 7805012 02:26:41 5/11/10 2:17 AM 5/11/10 02:17:25 5/11/10 10.11.2.192 9 7805013 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission 7805014 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission 7805015 19:50:20 05/10/10 7:41 PM 5/10/10 19:41:05 5/10/10 10.12.9.202 9 7805016 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission 7805017 11:02 PM 5/10/10 23:01:51 5/10/10 10.11.19.47 incomplete data 7805018 21:17:33 5/10/10 9:06 PM 5/10/10 21:06:13 5/10/10 10.12.41.14 11
- 18. ELECTRONICALLY TRANSMITTED RESULTS MUNICIPALITY OF MARIPIPI PCOS TRANSMISSION MBOC MINUTES RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION MBOC PRINT LOGS RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION Minutes by Which MBOC Received Results AHEAD of CLUSTERED TIME DATE TIME DATE TIME DATE IP ADDRESS PCOS Transmission PRECINCT 7807001 20:47:44 05-10-10 8:42 PM 05-10-10 20:36:41 05-10-10 10.12.39.124 11 7807002 19:42:24 05-10-10 7:35 PM 05-10-10 19:33:00 05-10-10 10.12.14.180 9 7807003 1:00 PM 05-10-10 19:53:17 05-10-10 10.12.23.108 incomplete data 7807004 20:15:38 05-10-10 8:00 PM 05-10-10 20:07:54 05-10-10 10.12.26.165 8 7807005 20:12:30 05-10-10 8:06 PM 05-10-10 20:03:00 05-10-10 10.12.16.121 9 7807006 19:58:52 05-10-10 8:05 PM 05-10-10 19:52:53 05-10-10 10.12.16.212 6 7807007 21:12:49 05-10-10 9:08 PM 05-1040 21:03:20 05-10-10 10.12.40.208 9 7807008 not transmitted 10:45 PM 05-10-3.0 CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission 7807009 not transmitted 11:55 PM 05-10-10 CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission 7807010 not transmitted 1:05 AM 05-11-10 CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission 7807011 20:23:32 05-10-10 8:16 PM 05-10-10 20:14:57 05-10-10 10.12.5.178 9 7807012 20:42:07 05-10-10 8:40 PM 05-10-10 20:34:56 05-10-10 10.12.42.112 7 7807013 19:29:05 05-10-10 7:20 PM 05-10-10 18:19:58 05-10-10 10.11.12.94 69 7807014 19:41:43 05-10-10 7:40 PM 05-10-10 19:34:13 05-10-10 10.12.4.227 7 7807015 20:59:32 05-10-10 9:05PM 05-10-10 21:00:40 05-10-10 10.12.7.191 (1)
- 19. PCOS CASE V PROTECTIVE COUNTERS OF PCOS SHOW VARIOUS INITIAL NUMBERS INDICATING 4,114 BALLOTS HAD BEEN SCANNED EVEN BEFORE ELECTION DAY Ballot Cast #1 (Valid) PC = 1 IF NO BALLOT HAD BEEN CAST AND SCANNED (PRELOADED) THEN THE PROTECTIVE COUNTER SHOULD HAVE STARTED WITH ZERO Ballot Cast #2 (Valid) PC = 2 Ballot Cast #3 (Rejected) PC = 2 Ballot Cast #4 (Valid) PC = 3 Ballot Cast #5 (Valid) PC = 4 THE PROTECTIVE COUNTER COUNTS THE NUMBER OF VALID SCANS MADE BY THE PCOS. IT ADVANCES BY ONE (1) EVERYTIME A VALID BALLOT IS SCANNED. REJECTED BALLOTS ARE NOT COUNTED. THE PROTECTIVE COUNTER APPEARS ON THE 8TH ENTRY OF THE PCOS AUDIT LOG REPORT EVERY TIME THE PCOS IS TURNED ON.
- 20. EXTENT OF PROTECTIVE COUNTER PROBLEM IN BILIRAN ONLY 2 PCOS HAD PROTECTIVE COUNTERS STARTING AT ZERO. 145 PCOS HAD PROTECTIVE COUNTERS STARTING FROM 1 TO 128. THE MAJORITY OF THE PCOS REFLECTED 29 SCANS BEFORE TESTING AND SEALING. TOTAL SCANS RECORDED IN THE PROTECTIVE COUNTERS OF 145 PCOS BEFORE TESTING AND SEALING IS 4,114 BALLOTS. THE 4,114 BALLOTS ARE SUSPICIOUSLY HIDDEN AND CANNOT BE TRACED INDIVIDUALLY IN EACH OF THE AUDIT LOG REPORTS OF ALL THE 145 PCOS WITH INITIAL DATA ON THEIR PROTECTIVE COUNTERS.
- 21. CASE VI PAPER AUDIT TRAIL OF THE SMARTMATIC AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM (AES) DOES NOT MATCH IN SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS PCOS Audit Log Report (Trace to Hash Codes) Hash Codes of Ballot Images (Trace to Ballot Images) Ballot Image (Determination of Match or Mismatch)) PAPER AUDIT TRAIL IS COMPOSED PRINCIPALLY OF 3 DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY THE PCOS TO INCLUDE: PCOS AUDIT LOG REPORT, HASH CODES OF THE BALLOT IMAGES, AND THE BALLOT IMAGES. A MORE EXTENSIVE AUDIT COULD INCLUDE INDEPENDENTLY PRODUCED DOCUMENTS BY THE MBOC/CCS SERVER SUCH AS THE PRINT LOG.
- 22. CASE VII ILLEGAL EXTENSION OF VOTING TIME Clustered Precinct Barangay/Municipality No. of Voters Listed in MOV After 7PM List of Names of Voters Who Voted After 7PM Actual Vote Cast After 7PM (ALR) No. of Hours Voting Was Extended (ALR/MOV) Loss of Fmr. Rep. Glenn Chong 7801003 Caucab, Almeria 234 none 251 5H 59M 57S 43 7801004 Iyusan, Almeria 0 none 354 11H 31M 08S 66 7801005 Jamorawon, Almeria 156 none 254 5H 32M 41S 89 7801013 Talahid, Almeria 222 none 227 5H 26M 58S 192 7802010 Julita, Biliran No Entry none 139 3H 01M 15S 149 7802013 Sangalang, Biliran No Entry none 133 3H 25M 16S 46 7803015 Looc, Cabucgayan 276 none 270 10H 22M 38S 29 7804001 Palanay, Caibiran 249 none 276 5H 18M 07S 60 7804009 Bariis, Caibiran 263 none 255 7H 34M 24S 88 7804010 Binohangan, Caibiran 160 none 219 7H 01M 40S 172 7804011 Cabibihan, Caibiran 178 none 304 9H 30M 45S 78 7804022 Villa Vicenta, Caibiran 107 none 98 4H 16M 29S 83 7806001 Poblacion, Kawayan 0 none 335 8H 40M 55S 37 7806003 Balacson, Kawayan 216 attached (211) 510 5H 30M 00S 125 7806009 Inasuyan, Kawayan 134 none 212 4H 6M 30S 84 7806016 San Lorenzo, Kawayan 220 none 242 5H 49M 14S 132 7808025 Libtong, Naval No Entry none 202 6H 20M 22S 86 TOTALS 2,415 4,281 1,559
- 23. GENERAL OUTLINE OF ELECTORAL FRAUD 2010 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS GENERAL MODES (TWO) AUTOMATED FRAUD (2 MODES) MANUAL FRAUD (1 MODE) MULTIPLE TRANSMISSIONS NATIONAL COVERAGE (CASE I, CASE II, CASE III) CONCEALMENT MECHANISM (CASE IV) PRELOADED CF CARDS CONCEALMENT MECHANISM (CASE VI) LOCAL COVERAGE (CASE V) EXTENDED VOTING TIME LOCAL COVERAGE (CASE VI) MODE 1 MODE 2
- 24. EVIDENCE OF FRAUD STATISTICAL 60-30-10 Pattern Consistent Vote Share (each and all senatorial candidates for every bulk votes reported by the transparency server) Suspiciously High Voter Turnout More Votes Than Voters Changing Vote Totals PHYSICAL Manual/Actual Ballot Count Post-Election Tampering/Cover-up
- 25. 60-30-10 PATTERN
- 26. 60-30-10 PATTERN Shares of Cumulative Votes in the 16 Official Senatorial Canvass Reports (Source: www.rappler.com) Team PNoy UNA Independents 16th Canvass 59.6% 30.8% 9.6% 15th Canvass 59.6% 30.8% 9.6% 14th Canvass 59.6% 30.9% 9.6% 13th Canvass 59.6% 30.8% 9.6% 12th Canvass 59.7% 30.8% 9.6% 11th Canvass 59.6% 30.8% 9.6% 10th Canvass 59.6% 31.0% 9.4% 9th Canvass 59.4% 31.0% 9.6% 8th Canvass 59.2% 31.2% 9.6% 7th Canvass 58.9% 31.4% 9.6% 6th Canvass 59.1% 31.2% 9.8% 5th Canvass 58.8% 31.4% 9.8% 4th Canvass 58.6% 31.2% 10.2% 3rd Canvass 58.4% 31.2% 10.4% 2nd Canvass 58.1% 32.2% 9.7% 1st Canvass 58.4% 31.5% 10.2% Average 59.13% 31.14% 9.74%
- 27. Consistent Vote Share of Senatorial Candidates (Source: Rappler Transparency Server)
- 28. Consistent Vote Share of Senatorial Candidates (Source: Rappler Transparency Server)
- 29. Consistent Vote Share of Senatorial Candidates (Source: Rappler Transparency Server) Notice that on every bulk vote that enters it is consistent that every candidate gets uniform vote share
- 30. Consistent Vote Share of Senatorial Candidates (Source: Rappler Transparency Server)
- 31. SUSPICIOUSLY HIGH VOTER TURNOUT 2013 Significant Election Statistics 100% turnout = 70 clustered precincts 90%-99.9% turnout = 2,687 clustered precincts 80%-89.9% turnout = 44,453 clustered precincts Total CPs with questionable voter turnout = 47,210 clustered precincts (Sources: COMELEC Data at comelec.gov.ph and radarsweep.com)
- 32. MORE VOTES THAN VOTERS Local Elections Pasay City, Metro Manila Clustered Precincts 1/2/3/4/5/6/7/8/9/10/20/21/22/23/24/25/27/28/46/47/48/49 TOTAL VOTER TURNOUT IN 22 CPs 7,547 VOTES REPORTED VOTES OF PASAY CITY MAYOR 9,045 VOTES EXCESS CREDITED VOTES 1,498 VOTES NOTE: These 22 Clustered Precincts were the first to be counted. (Source: Jairus Bondoc, Philippine Star)
- 33. MORE VOTES THAN VOTERS National Elections (Source: Jairus Bondoc, Philippine Star) 129/304 42% 175/304 58%
- 34. CHANGING VOTE TOTALS Rappler.com Mirror Server of COMELEC ----------------------------------------------------------- Total Number of Voters Who Voted: 39,898,992 As Of: May 18, 2013 05:37pm Comelec.gov.ph ----------------------------------------------------------- Total Number of Voters Who Voted: 31,568,679 As Of: May 29, 2013 08:26am DISCREPANCY ----------------------------------------------------------- Votes: 8,330,313 Time: 10 days 14 hours 49 minutes
- 35. MANUAL/ACTUAL BALLOT COUNT Aranas, et al vs The Municipal Election Registrar, et al Civil Case No. 4378-13 for Opening of Ballots and Manual Counting of Votes Cast for Eduardo Villanueva Regional Trial Court Branch 34 (Gapan City, Nueva Ecija) ruled in a decision dated 21 Mar 2014: The petitioners have standing to sue on matters of transcendental importance or paramount public interest as ascertaining by manual count their votes cast in the 2013 elections In CPs 19, 29 and 30 of General Tinio, Nueva Ecija, senatorial candidate Villanueva actually garnered 900 votes as against the official COMELEC PCOS count of only 781 votes Villanueva could have garnered 119 more votes if the PCOS counted correctly COMELEC did not appeal the decision which is now final Source: Certified True Copy of Decision Signed by Judge Celso O. Baguio
- 38. MANUAL/ACTUAL BALLOT COUNT SENATORIAL CANDIDATES MANUAL COUNT SOV VOTES MANUAL COUNT SOV VOTES HAV IND UNA LP IND UNA LP 1. ALACANTARA, SAMSON (SJS) 30 31 30 31 2. ANGARA, EDGARDO (LDP) 203 388 203 388 185 3. AQUINO, BENIGNO BAM, (LP) 131 262 131 262 4.BELGICA, GRECO 40 40 40 40 5. BINAY, NANCY (UNA) 155 295 155 295 140 6. CASINO, TEDDY (MKB) 62 127 62 127 7. CAYETANO, ALAN PETER (NP) 176 377 176 377 201 8. COJUANGCO, TINGTING (UNA) 122 65 122 (65) 9. DAVID, LITO (KPTRAN) 39 39 39 39 10, DELOS REYES, JC (KPTRAN) 18 28 18 28 11. EJERCITO ESTRADA, JV (UNA) 142 282 142 282 140 12. ENRILE, JUAN PONCE JR. (UNA) 128 259 128 259 13. ESCUDERO, CHIZ 179 367 179 367 188 14. FALCONE, BAL (DPP) 15 15 15 15 15. GORDON, DICK (UNA) 168 348 168 348 180 16. HAGEDORN, ED 110 248 110 248 17. HONASAN, GRINGO (UNA) 178 359 178 359 181 18. HONTIVEROS, RISA (AKBAYAN) 120 237 120 237
- 39. MANUAL/ACTUAL BALLOT COUNT SENATORIAL CANDIDATES MANUAL COUNT SOV VOTES MANUAL COUNT SOV VOTES HAV IND UNA LP IND UNA LP 19. LEGARDA, LOREN (NPC) 193 415 193 415 222 20. LLASOS, MARWIL (KPTRAN) 25 25 25 25 21. MACEDA, MANONG ERNIE (UNA) 48 99 48 99 22. MADRIGAL, JAMBY (LP) 60 143 60 143 23. MAGSAYSAY, MITOS (UNA) 66 113 66 113 24. MAGSAYSAY, RAMON (LP) 122 287 122 287 165 25. MONTANO, MON 13 13 13 13 26. PENSON, RICARDO 37 38 37 38 27. PIMENTEL, KOKO (PDP) 178 360 178 360 182 28. POE, GRACE 193 395 193 395 202 29. SENERES, CHRISTIAN (DPP) 23 23 23 23 30. TRILLANES, ANTONIO IV (NP) 157 361 157 361 204 31. VILLANUEVA, BRO. EDDIE (BP) 103 241 103 241 32. VILLAR, CYNTHIA HANEPBUHAY (NP) 132 285 132 285 153 33. ZUBIRI, MIGZ (UNA) 120 240 120 240 Total Votes per Group 515 1,127 1,844 868 1,930 3,877 Overall Total Votes 3,486 6,675 Vote Percentage per Group 14.77% 32.33% 52.90% 13.00% 28.91% 58.08%
- 45. WHO IS COMELEC? THE CHARACTER OF THE MAIN SUSPECT IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE
- 46. COMELEC SCAMS 689.7 M OVERPRICED BALLOT SECRECY FOLDER 1,815,000 PIECES @ 380.00 PER PIECE
- 47. COMELEC SCAMS OVERPRICED WAREHOUSE LEASE 3 BLDGS/5 YRS = 90.567M 1 BLDG/1 YR = 112M 1 BLDG/1 YR = 400M
- 48. COMELEC SCAMS 292 M OVERPRICED BALLOT PACKAGING CONTRACT
- 49. ALL THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT ONE GIGANTIC OR FANTASTIC HAPPENSTANCE OR MERE COINCIDENCE. THEY ARE NOT THE FABRIC OF ONE’S IMAGINATION WOVEN INTO ONE FANTASTIC TALE BUT RATHER THE PRODUCT OF COLLUSION AND INTERVENTION. LIKE AN ORCHESTRA, THE CADENCE OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES OR EVENTS CLEARLY IMPLIES THE ABLE HANDS OF A MASTER OR CONDUCTOR, AND DEFINITELY THAT MASTER IS NOT THE VICTIM. END
Editor's Notes
- As with any crime committed, the pursuit of justice entails a lot of hard work, perseverance and patience. The success or failure of any quest for justice depends much on how much evidence is obtained, processed and interpreted. Nowhere are these postulates true than in crimes involving technology and automation. By its very nature, technology and automation are beyond the ordinary reach and comprehension of most of our people. A charge of fraud in an automated election is definitely not easy to comprehend and prove. Since it was our first experience in automated elections, everybody, except the ones who run the system, had any idea what to look for, how to interpret them, how to connect one proof to another, and how to present them for better understanding of ordinary citizens. In the case of Biliran, immediately after the unexpected defeat of Fmr. Rep. Glenn Chong, the people from all municipalities demanded, and were able to get certified true copies of 88% of all audit log reports generated by the PCOS, and 100% of all MBOC print logs generated by the Consolidation and Canvassing System. Over the last 30 months, our group of young volunteers from different fields poured over close to 25 boxes of documents (including approximately 35,000 pages of ballot images) in detail and came up with a comprehensive analysis of the automated elections in 2010. We endeavor as much as possible to present to you a clear and easy-to-comprehend presentation, including our final conclusion that two modes of election fraud was committed in 2010, one for national coverage and another for local coverage. This conclusion is backed by certified true copies of documents obtained from the COMELEC itself and from the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. We will also endeavor to expose to the greater public ways and means to prevent the commission of this kind of fraud in this coming elections in 2013 and all future automated elections. One good thing is that our knowledge and understanding of the capabilities and severe shortcomings of the PCOS system has enabled us to devise ways and means to prevent it. Only by making known our observations and conclusions will the public come to know of the full extent of the vulnerabilities of the system. And by making it known, the public can help devise ways and means to prevent a hijacking of the elections based on the information we share. We have no other agenda than to obtain justice for our people in Biliran and expose proof of fraud to prevent our country and people from perpetual enslavement by the vested interests that controls the PCOS. Be aware though that as we continue to move on from one election to another using the same PCOS system, these vested interests will become more adept at hiding any traces of fraud which will make our task of discovering and proving them all the more difficult if not impossible. We hope that by presenting these documents, empirical evidences and conclusions, we are able to enlighten our people and warn them of the greater evil that looms just around the corner while almost all of us, millions of Filipinos, have no idea about either because we are plainly ignorant, or because the collusion of certain entities, especially but not limited to the COMELEC, have successfully suppressed most objections and evidences. We will never stop exposing and devising ways to prevent this great evil until our country final acts to get rid of this menace.
- FIRST CASE OF PCOS ELECTION IRREGULARITY: The Audit Log Report of Clustered Precinct 7805002 (Brgy. Bacolod, Culaba, Biliran) clearly showed that no successful transmission was ever made to all three (3) servers after several attempts, including the MBOC/CCS of Culaba. The last entry of the ALR was recorded at 8.39PM of May 10, 2010 before it was shutdown. However, in the MBOC/CCS of Culaba, a successful electronic transmission of results was received and recorded at 11.23PM of May 10, 2010 from IP address 10.12.3.143. Plainly, the MBOC/CCS of Culaba received an electronic transmission of results 2 hours 44 minutes and 22 seconds after the PCOS was already shutdown. The modem of each PCOS is dependent on the power supply of the PCOS itself. So much so that if the PCOS had already been shutdown, no power supply is available to the modem to be able to transmit. Where then did this transmission come from?
- SECOND CASE OF PCOS ELECTION IRREGULARITY: The MBOC/CCS Print Log indisputably shows a receipt of an electronic transmission of results purportedly from Clustered Precinct 7805006 (Brgy. Bool West, Culaba, Biliran) at 1:55:36AM of May 11, 2010 from IP 10.15.2.121. However, the same MBOC/CCS Print Log subsequently received and recorded another electronic transmission of results purportedly for the same Clustered Precinct 7805006 at 3:41:51AM of May 11, 2010 but from a different IP 10.15.3.43. The last recorded entry or event in the Audit Log Report of CP7805006 was 3:08:38AM of May 11, 2010. Therefore, the second transmission of results received and recorded by the MBOC/CCS server came 1 hour 46 minutes 15 seconds after the sending PCOS (CP7805006) had already been shutdown. In going over the next slides showing all 7 precincts exhibiting the same characteristics of double transmission of results, the following guides might be helpful for a full understanding of this phenomena: Does the evidence or documentation clearly establish the fact of double transmission for a single precinct? Was the IP address used to originally transmit the results the same or different from the subsequent transmission? Was the PCOS supposedly sending a second transmission still open and functioning at the time of the recorded receipt of the second transmission? How many hours did it elapse between the first and second transmissions? Did the MBOC/CCS Print Log show how it handled the second transmission? Did it disregard the second transmission or did it override the first transmission?
- THIRD CASE OF PCOS ELECTION IRREGULARITY: The MBOC/CCS Print Log of the Municipality of Almeria shows that 2 clustered precincts, CP7801002 and CP7801001 both of Brgy. Poblacion transmitted one after the other at 1:06:50AM and 1:23:53AM of May 11, 2010, respectively. However, even a cursory examination of the Print Log will show that both separate clustered precincts transmitted from one and the same IP 10.15.0.157. An examination of all 8 MBOC Print Logs in Biliran will show that all PCOS which electronically transmitted results transmitted from separate and distinct IP addresses (including even the double transmissions), except for these 2 precincts where they share one and same IP address. Earlier, we have established that the system used in assigning IP addresses to the different PCOS was static and not dynamic. A static IP assignment system would have assigned different or individual IP addresses to these 2 separate precincts. The fact that they share the same IP address puts much doubt on the election results from these subject precincts. The official explanation of COMELEC and SMARTMATIC in this case is the same as in Case I (Brgy. Bacolod). According to them, the protocol to follow in case of failure to transmit is to remove the CF card and transmit from another available PCOS. Under this protocol, one condition precedent must be established before the protocol becomes operable, ie. failure to transmit. In other words, there must first be a failure to transmit before transmission can be attempted in another PCOS. In the succeeding slides, we will rebut this explanation of COMELEC and SMARTMATIC. Before moving on, we draw your attention to the eerie similarity of the turnout percentages of both precincts. Mathematically, the turnout percentages of both precincts are exactly the same, although numerically there is a difference of 0.01%. One more actual voter in Precinct 2 would have added 0.11% to the total percentage of 81.85%. One more actual voter in Precinct 1 would have added 0.10% to the total percentage of 81.86%. So that for both precincts’ turnout percentages to be not mathematically the same, the difference should have been at the least 0.10%. In other words, in Precinct 2, one voter is equivalent to 0.11% while in Precinct 1, one voter is equivalent to 0.10%. The fact that the difference between the two precincts is only 0.01% then that is only a fraction of one voter in either precinct. Therefore, both numbers, while numerically different, are actually and mathematically the same.
- FOURTH CASE OF PCOS ELECTION IRREGULARITY: The illustration above shows five (5) randomly selected precincts across Biliran which electronically transmitted results on election day to their respective MBOC/CCS servers. By examining their respective PCOS Audit Log Report, we were able to pinpoint the time at which the first transmission was made by the PCOS to their respective MBOC/CCS servers. The time of first transmission is shown below each clustered precinct number. By examining the respective MBOC Print Log, each transmission can be traced and identified. The recorded time at which the transmission was received by the respective MBOC/CCS server for each of the 5 precincts is shown right next to the MBOC/CCS Server picture clip. Opposite the recorded times are the variances in minutes. By a simple comparison of the two (2) recorded times (PCOS and MBOC/CCS), the difference is quite glaring. It would appear then that the respective MBOC/CCS servers recorded their receipt of the transmissions ahead by a few minutes before the PCOS recorded its own transmission time. Stated differently, the MBOC/CCS server already recorded a receipt of transmission of results even before the PCOS did actually send one. These discrepancies, aside from being widespread, entail at least a couple of dangerous effects on the election system, as follows: The MBOC/CCS server which recorded an earlier transmission could reject any and all subsequent transmissions from purportedly the same precinct. The authentic results which came later in time may be rejected or disregarded if a spurious result is transmitted and recorded ahead of it. With these transmission time discrepancies littering the audit or paper trail produced by both the PCOS and MBOC/CCS, any subsequent audit becomes muddled and very difficult to definitively trace any fraud committed. The very simplistic explanation of COMELEC and SMARTMATIC in this case was that the date and time of the PCOS and MBOC/CCS servers were not synchronized. Ostensibly, it may explain the discrepancies observed in Biliran. However, the simplicity of the explanation requires us to believe that more than 98% of the PCOS would have their respective time set later and that 100% of the MBOC/CCS servers would have their respective time set earlier. In other words, if this were an innocent case of unsynchronized times and dates, then the tables next following this slide would have shown any number (some) of PCOS ahead in time and any number (some) of MBOC/CCS servers late in time. The tables clearly show that this is not the case. What the tables of compiled information show is the uniformity of the PCOS being set late and uniformity of the MBOC/CCS servers being set in advance. In its entirety, the tables indisputably show the following: There is synchronization of the respective time in more than 98% of the PCOS to be LATE. There is synchronization of the respective time in 100% of the MBOC/CCS servers to be ADVANCE. There is NO synchronization between the two groups (PCOS and MBOC/CCS server). When more than 98% and 100% of 2 groups of available data show uniformity within that same group, it is definitely a pattern. This leads us to conclude that this widespread discrepancies pertaining to vital transmission information is far from being innocent but that the same was designed to confuse any subsequent audit of the system. This is just one more circumstance of the system being primed for cheating. We believe that this widespread discrepancies in the times of transmission and receipt, between the PCOS and MBOC/CCS servers, respectively, is intended to hide any fraudulent machination arising from double or multiple transmissions (one of two modes of fraud). We see no other logical explanation.
- FIFTH CASE OF PCOS ELECTION IRREGULARITY: In our study of 147 audit log reports, we found out that the PCOS actually had two (2) separate counting mechanisms. One counter counts and segregates the votes for candidates while the other counter counts the valid ballots as they are scanned by the PCOS. This second counter is denominated in the audit log reports of each PCOS as protective counter. The illustration above shows five (5) ballots which when scanned by the PCOS will update the protective counter by increments of one (1) for each valid ballot scanned. However, when a ballot is rejected the protective counter does not count it. The protective counter information can be found on the 8th entry of the PCOS audit log report every time the PCOS is turned on or rebooted.
- SIXTH CASE OF PCOS ELECTION IRREGULARITY: Under the Terms of Reference between COMELEC and SMARTMATIC, a proviso requires for an immutable paper audit trail. Theoretically, when any automated system is backed by an irrefutable or indisputable paper audit trail or audit mechanisms, it lends confidence to the users and credibility to outside observers of the automated process. With much more relevance will this theory apply in cases of sovereign elections. Elections, by its nature, are offensive types of confrontation, at least in this country. It presupposes that after elections, a lot of election controversies will necessarily arise and refuse to die down. The arena simply changes from the polling centers to the election tribunals. Especially in this case where the elections in this country was automated for the first time. Therefore, providing for an immutable or incontrovertible means to conduct an audit ultimately to settle election controversies once and for all in a quick and credible manner, it is indeed laudable for COMELEC to have provided such a requirement. At least in theory, it appears to be one of best intentions. However, in reality, as the ‘immutable’ paper audit trail is put to actual test in the field on election day, it increasingly appears that what at first ostensibly appear to be one of best intentions, actually meant the best intentions to hide what must necessarily be hidden from the victims and the public at large. In this particular case, we will endeavor to show that the 3 principal documents produced by each and every PCOS operating on election day did not actually fully match with each other as to provide an immutable paper audit trail. At best, what it provides is a means to muddle any investigation into any fraud that may be committed on election day. No reasonable, credible and incontrovertible audit findings can ever be made with what the SMARTMATIC system provided. We believe that this problem of mismatched paper audit trail is intended to hide any fraudulent machination arising from the preloading of CF cards (one of two modes of fraud). We see no other logical explanation.
- The table above shows significant information culled from both the Minutes of Voting (MOV) and the Audit Log Reports (ALR) to put the 17 subject precincts in the right perspective. Column 3 lists the number of voters per precinct who allegedly voted after 7PM of election day. These figures are individually numerically indicated in the precincts’ respective minutes of voting. Column 5, on the other hand, lists the number of votes actually cast after 7PM of election day as shown in their individual audit log reports. Column 6 shows the extent of the illegal extensions as shown in their respective audit log reports and corroborated by the time entries in the corresponding minutes of voting. In short, with respect to Column 6, both audit log reports and minutes of voting substantially matched. The total of those who allegedly voted after 7PM of election day and at least numerically accounted for in the various minutes of voting is 2,415. While the total actual ballot or vote cast after 7PM of election day is 4,281. The unaccounted difference is 1,866 more voters or votes or ballots however denominated . It is most coincidental, to say the least, that Fmr. Rep. Glenn Chong lost 1,559 votes in all these 17 illegally extended precincts. It is likewise most coincidental that all 17 illegally extended precincts benefitted Espina immensely. Equally significant is Column 4 concerning the list of names of those who allegedly voted past 7PM of election day. For any extension of voting to be legal or valid under the express provision of COMELEC Resolutions 8896 and 8786 (Sec 21), the following substantive requirements must be met: The poll clerk must list down the names of voters still within 30 meters of the precinct at 7:00PM; Call the voter twice in order to vote, so that if the voter is does not answer the call, he/she forfeits the right to vote; and, The list so prepared must be turned over to the Election Officer, thus forming part of the records of the proceedings. The above conditions are not flimsy, but substantive requirements, to prevent fraud. Compliance with these conditions lends legitimacy to any extension of voting time. While failure to enforce these conditions gives the BEI unbridled authority to extend the elections for as long as they wish thereby opening the floodgates to electoral fraud. Notably, of the 17 questioned precincts, 16 did not have any such list at all as mandatorily required by COMELEC regulations. Only one (CP7806003, Balacson, Kawayan) had such list attached to the minutes of voting but all the voters did not actually physically cast their ballots into the PCOS. The BEIs did all the casting or scanning of the 510 ballots beginning at 4:13AM and ending at 8:14AM of May 11, 2010. For this grave reason, the credibility of the elections in this precinct becomes highly suspect, which necessarily infects the attached list. The conspicuous absence of even a single credible list or name out of 4,281 alleged voters throws much weight on the argument of fraud. Precisely, because of the absence of the lists, 1,866 more voters were actually able to vote during such extended voting as accurately reflected in the audit log reports. Stated another way, originally, the BEIs indicated numerically in their respective minutes of voting that a total of 2,415 voters were outside their precincts waiting to vote as of 7PM on election day. During the course of the extensions, it eventually grew by 1,866 more voters (about 77% increase) bringing the final tally to 4,281 who allegedly voted until the next day as shown in the audit log reports. This is loud proof of the absence of any such required list. If the lists really existed at the time of the elections, it could very well be available for production at any time and during the presentation and formal offer of evidence by Espina at the HRET. Not one credible list or name was ever produced or offered in evidence. If it did not exist at the time of the elections, neither could it subsequently be produced at anytime thereafter. Alternatively, assuming for the sake of argument but without admitting that the lists did exist, the BEIs and Election Officers cannot present them in evidence without providing damning evidence against themselves in their conspiracy to commit election fraud through these extensions. If the lists were presented in evidence and showed all 4,281 names of alleged voters, how come they numerically indicated and declared in various minutes of voting only a total of 2,451 alleged voters? If the lists were presented in evidence and showed only 2,451 names of alleged voters, how come the audit log reports showed a total of 4, 281 votes cast during the extensions in all precincts? In either case, the unaccounted 1,866 more alleged voters during the extensions could not be reasonably justified. Since it would be a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea, they’d better be off not choosing any. That probably explains why no such list was ever offered in evidence.
- Based on all the certified documents we have shown in this presentation, we came up with a general outline of how electoral fraud in 2010 was structured. We believe that with respect to fraud involving national coverage, intervention through unauthorized network intrusion or multiple transmissions is the most logical and systematic way of implementing an automated version of dagdag-bawas. The positions involved in this fraudulent scheme is uniform all throughout the various political subdivisions in the country. Centralizing the operation of dagdag-bawas is much easier and significantly manageable to handle in this way because of the definite number of candidates and national political positions involved. At this point, however, we make clear again, we are not accusing any national official of committing, aiding or abetting the commission of this kind of electoral fraud. On the other hand, with respect to fraud involving local coverage, intervention through the preloading of CF cards before the conduct of the elections is the most logical and systematic way of implementing an automated version of dagdag-bawas. The positions involved in this fraudulent scheme varies widely between and throughout the various political subdivisions in the country. It is not logical to centralize this operation in one location because of the thousands of candidates vying for thousands of local political positions across the country. The risk of errors occurring at any stage of the manipulation process and consequent discovery is much greater. The best alternative would be to preload the CF cards before the elections because the same are precinct-specific. In other words, this fraudulent scheme can be tailored-fit so suit the needs involving local positions. At this point also, we make clear as well, that we are not accusing any local official of committing, aiding or abetting the commission of this kind of electoral fraud, except in the case of Biliran where all the documents underlying these conclusions emanated from. Ostensibly, one may argue that if automated fraud in local positions is committed by preloading the CF cards, there would be absolutely no necessity to engage in the more difficult operation of extending the voting time of a considerable number of precincts in order to otherwise duplicate the fraud. It would be a case of useless redundancy. Analyzing deeper, it actually makes real sense that the pre-election recorded ballots or scans in the protective counter served as buffer for the cheater, but he is not guaranteed to win because such a buffer is determined and fixed before the actual voting. No one knows with deadly accuracy by how much votes the cheater would win or still lose given the buffer, unless he is more than fortunate enough to have been given an oracle. As insurance, a selected number of precincts (31), randomly chosen to prevent detection, will have to be purposely delayed through the actions of the BEIs controlled by the cheater. In this way, while the results of the elections from regular precincts are reported and tallied, the cheater would by then know if intervention, and by how much additional votes, are needed to insure his fraudulent victory. This is hybrid fraud in local elections. The cheater could very well have jacked-up his buffer to comfortable levels without worrying about his insurance but then he must also anticipate the public’s reaction if the margin is too high. If the margin is too high to suit his comfort, the public’s rejection of the result might prove scandalously unbelievable and too discomforting for him. If the buffer levels are set too high, there is no way a seamless corrective measure can be made after the voting had started or the results are about to be printed, to bring the margin down to believable levels. The wide popularity of his opponent is definitely a serious consideration in setting the buffer levels. Therefore, the preloading of CF cards as one of the modes of automated fraud does not necessarily and absolutely exclude the commission of manual intervention to commit fraud. They are not mutually exclusive of each other but are in fact, complementary to one another. Where the buffer levels through preloaded CF cards are set at a low level, manual intervention through voting time extensions provide the means to insure an ostensible victory. This manual scheme of electoral fraud, in the final analysis, merely confirms and strengthens the charge of fraud through preloaded CF cards. About a month before the elections, the Espina patriarch publicly stated on radio he would be happy if his son (opponent of Chong) wins even by less than 500 votes. Knowing him as a relic of broadcast history, he was conditioning the mind of the public about the outcome of the elections. With Espina eventually gaining a presumptive margin of just 361 votes, one can definitely assume only two things: the Espina patriarch was much-favored with an oracle about the results of the elections; or, he made sure an imaginary oracle becomes a miracle, not by the intervention of saints, but of sinners with him on the lead.
- Graphical presentation of the 60-30-10 phenomenon which is grossly abnormal since every precinct, town, city, province and region have their respective and distinct biases for or against particular candidates or group of candidates. To result in a uniform pattern or distribution of votes completely disregards these biases. On the other hand, manipulating the results of the elections taking into account these biases will be arduous and complicated which the perpetrators may be better off doing away considering that evidence is definitely hard to uncover for those seeking the truth. The 60-30-10 phenomenon was discovered by mathematics professor Lex Muga of the Ateneo de Manila University.
- Numerical presentation (expressed in percentages of votes garnered per group of candidates) of the 60-30-10 phenomenon.
- Numerical presentation (expressed in percentages of votes garnered per individual candidate) of the 60-30-10 phenomenon. Without fail, each senatorial candidate obtains a specific vote share (percentage) from the first reported canvass down to the last reported canvass. Significantly, the individual vote share (percentage) does not vary in significant extent and is maintained almost uniformly from start to finish regardless of the number of votes reported for each canvass. There are only 2 possible logical explanation for this phenomenon: 1. the votes where cast by robots voting uniformly 2. the voting results were manipulated.
- At the very least, it is impossible to have 100% turnout in any election. The cut-off date of the EDCVL (Election Day Computerized Voters’ List – the list posted at the polling precinct on election day) was February 2013. But even beyond this cut-off date, a number of voters already dead or absent are still active in the list. And between February to May (3 months) any number of people in any precinct would have additionally either died or transferred yet their names are still on the EDCVL. To achieve a 100% turnout on election day would have meant that all the hundreds of voters in each of the 70 precincts indicated above would have returned (both the absent and the dead) and voted.
- There were 304 Certificates of Canvass (COCs) in the 2013 elections (1 COC or consolidated report per province, city and overseas absentee voting post). When 129 COCs representing just 42% of the total were canvassed as of May 18, the partial votes reported for the leading senatorial candidates were by the millions (Poe had 20,147,423), yet when the remaining 175 COCs representing the majority at 58% of the total were canvassed subsequent to May 18, the additional votes reported for the same leading senatorial candidates were not more than 200,000 votes each (Poe got an additional of 189,904 votes only). Stated plainly, how can less than half (42%) of the total COCs produce millions of votes for each candidate while the more than half (58%) of the total COCs produce less than 200,000 votes for each candidate?
- Only 3 clustered precincts where identified by the petitioners and each of the subject precincts showed the PCOS shaving off the votes for Villanueva. The average number of votes shaved off from Villanueva is 39.67 votes per precinct. If 80% of the almost 78,000 clustered precincts functioning on election day were manipulated, the correlated total votes manipulated against Villanueva could reach 2,475,408 votes. This figure is more than enough to affect the overall election results.
- In the end, how much faith can you put in this automated election system heralded as clean and credible by its promoters while adamantly refusing to answer squarely, with proof, the issues hounding the system? Would you be willing to make a leap of faith into the unknown with this system and all its vulnerabilities? With that, we conclude the message we wish to share with you along with the people of this republic. If you believe that the message and the messenger is credible enough, then we, as a people, need to start thinking and doing something about how to insure that our right to give consent to the ruler remains our real right, undiluted by tampering or fraud. For to do otherwise and letting apathy reign in our midst, we all face unimaginable consequences now and far into the future. We have seen that up close in Biliran when the school bus system and the regular medical/dental missions grounded to a halt immediately after the 2010 elections. One need not venture out farther than our case in Biliran. It is a portent of things to come. Plato and his political philosophies, after all, is not just one relic in the archives of history. He and his political philosophies continue to reverberate all this time. And considering thousands of years of political greed, it must be at its peak this time anywhere in the world. Fighting a colossal monster as political greed (wealth and power) is enough to discourage anyone right from the start. But we have a choice of whether we let that monster live and enslave us all, or we go down fighting to free ourselves from it. It is enough for good men to do nothing for evil to triumph. It is enough for common men to postpone acting on this message for some other time to place himself and his future at the gravest peril.