This brief paper is a first introduction to those complex dynamics, describing the different incentives, roles and interests of the involved actors in the field of lobbying.
ABSTRACT: In the next three pages I will expose some of the main weak points in the
European decision making process, where there is a lack of regulation, not acheiving a minimun level of transparecy in the relationships between European institutions and lobbies (interest groups). The importance of a stronger regulation over the lobbies will be explained on a rationalchoice theory basis: Even without the aim of becoming corrupt, the members of the institutions are incentivated to benefit the lobby industry thanks to several structural loopholes such as the “revolving doors” problem, the un-balanced experts committees or the lack of human resources in the institutions. Even though the size of the issue is considerable, solutions are quite easy and cheap. Nevertheless, an institution as distant to the average citizen as the EU needs some feedback from society, but not at any price.