3. Isabella has worked as the executive assistant to Martina for ten years. Isabella has worked overtime on many occasions when Martina had special projects to complete. Martina has not given Isabella a raise in her salary for three years and Isabella is thinking about looking for a new position which could pay her more money. Martina is concerned about losing Isabella to another employer but is worried that her own company has not made a profit in the last two years. Isabella and Martina sit down in the conference room to negotiate a possible raise in salary for Isabella. ROLE #1: ISABELLA ROLE #2: MARTINA ROLE #3: OBSERVER (Take notes and report about negotation)
16. Negotiation Considerations Social How will others view the agreement Emotional How will you feel about the agreement Successful Negotiations Lewicki and Fisher Economic Will you be satisfied with the economic results Triad of concerns
17. Perception Subjective. Always check your views, opinions and analysis of your position One’s view of fairness. (Barry Bond’s homerun). Be very careful of your client's (and your own) perception of fairness. Frames
18. Bias Perception: Fixed Pie the erroneous belief that the other party’s interests are directly opposed to one’s own interests when, in fact, they are often not completely opposed.
19. Bias Perception: Thompson and Hastie Explored the consequences for outcomes. They measured individual fixed-pie perceptions after just five minutes of negotiation They found fixed pie predicted individual and joint negotiation payoffs such that fixed-pie perceptions were associated with lower individual and joint profits. Negotiators with strong fixed-pie perceptions failed to identify interests that could be profitably logrolled or that were completely compatible.
20. Bias Perception: Why does this occur? Biased information search (negotiators’ faulty search for necessary information) Biased information processing (negotiators’ faulty processing of available information).
21. Bias Perception: Extremism Partisan perceivers believe that their own perceptions map onto objective reality. When they realize that the other side’s views differ from their own, they first attempt to “straighten out” the other side; when this does not work, they regard the other side as extremist. partisan perceivers tend to view the other side as having interests that are more opposed to their own than is actually the case.
22. Bias Perception: Problems with Extremism Exacerbates conflict Partisan perceivers ascribe more negative traits to their negotiating partner even when partisanship has been randomly assigned right before the negotiation Reduces the likelihood of reaching comprehensive integrative agreements during face-to-face negotiations
23. Bias Perception: Reactive Devaluation Bias Negotiators discount or dismiss concessions made by the other party merely as a function of who is offering them
24. Bias Perception: Stillinger, Epelbaum, Kelter, and Ross (1990) Experiment Participants negotiated with a confederate over the policy of their university regarding a political issue. Constant The antagonism of the negotiating confederate was held constant. During the negotiation, the confederate for a time adopted a stubborn position. Concession In two experimental conditions, however, the confederate ultimately made a concession; in the third (control) condition, no concession at all was made. Rating Subsequently, participants rated the attractiveness and significance of a number of different proposals, including the ones that had been offered in their negotiation session. Results Non-offered concessions were rated as more attractive and significant than offered concessions: The very fact that their counterpart offered them a concession diminished its value in the eyes of the participants.
25. Bias Perception: Fundamental Attribution Error People tend to view their own behavior as largely determined by the situation BUT B. regard other’s behavior as driven by chronic dispositions Larrick and Su (1999) Demonstrated this bias operated in negotiation. Negotiators erroneously attributed tough bargaining behaviors to difficult personalities rather than to situational factors. Fundamental attribution error often results from lack of sufficient information about the opponent’s situation.
26. Bias Perception: Coercion Bias People erroneously believe that A. coercive tactics will be effective in generating concessions when dealing with opponents BUT B. believe that these same tactics, when applied to the self, will have the opposite effect—that is, to increase their resolve not to concede. Rothbart and Hallmark (1988) in-group and outgroup members differed in the judged efficacy of coercion and conciliation as social influence strategies. Out-group members perceived coercion as more effective than conciliation when applied to others, In-group members perceived coercion as less effective than conciliation when applied to their own social or categorical group members.
27. Perceptions: Framing Framing: constructing and representing interpretations. Defining key issues and key problems. Perspective. Separates issue from other ideas. Aggregate and process information. Language we choose engage. notion of what we are doing: discussion, argument, fight Frames persist as long as they are useful. When people hold to their frames, conflict can occur. Frames can be transformative. Change frame, change conversation. Frames can be shifted.
44. Perceptions: Three Views of Frames Categories of experience Interests, rights, power Process of issue development
45. Language Ohio negotiation. Environmentalist. Developers. Environmentalists. Called polluters developers. Conflict. Result of nonverbal looks and glances. Polarizing language.
46. Trust/Distrust Frame Trust distrust different frames. Main role of negotiator / mediator. Decide which you are doing: Building trust. Managing distrust. Marcos de la desconfianza de la confianza diversos. Posicion principal del negociador/del mediador. Decida cuál usted está haciendo: Confianza del edificio. Desconfianza de manejo.
47. Trust/Distrust Frame Trust Frame. Little step by step process. Reliability. Competence. Distrust Frame. Apologies. Reparation. Say vs Do. Marco de la confianza. Marcos de la desconfianza de la confianza diversos. Papel principal del negociador. Poco proceso paso a paso. Confiabilidad. Capacidad. Marco de la desconfianza. Apologías. Reparación. Diga contra hacen.
48. Managing Trust Creating positive expectations. Confident expectations about the other. Shape them by: Language. Clear exceptions. Manage expectation. Crear expectativas positivas. Expectativas confidentes sobre la otra. Fórmelas cerca: Lengua. Excepciones claras. Maneje la expectativa.
49. Managing distrust Tools. Boarders. Boundaries. Processes. Not trust building. Manages downside risk. Distrust binding. Prenuptial agreement. Herramientas. Huéspedes. Límites. Procesos. No edificio de la confianza. Maneja riesgo de baja. Atascamiento de la desconfianza. Acuerdo Prenuptial.
50. Frames as Categories of Experience 1 Substantive. What the conflict is about. 2 Outcome. The predispositions the parties have to achieving a specific result. 3 Aspiration. Predispositions the parties have towards satisfying a broader set of interests. 4 Conflict Management Process. How the parties will go about resolving their dispute. Substantivo. Sobre cuál el conflicto está. Resultado Las predisposiciones los partidos tienen que alcanzando un resultado específico. Aspiración. Predisposiciones que los partidos tienen hacia la satisfacción de un sistema más amplio de intereses. Proceso de la gerencia del conflicto. Cómo los partidos irán alrededor a resolver su conflicto.
51. Frames as Categories of Experience (cont.) 5 Identity. How the parties define “who they are”. 6 Characterization How one party defines the other party. 7 Loss-gain. How the parties view the risks of particular outcomes. 5. Identidad. Cómo los partidos definen “quién son”. 6. Caracterización Cómo un partido define el otro partido. Pérder-gane. Cómo los partidos ven los riesgos de resultados particulares.
52. Decision Trap: Frame Blindness Understanding Frames. Framing Traps. Boundaries. Reference Points . Yardsticks . Metaphors. Thinking/Cultural Frames. Dealing With Frames. Marcos de comprensión. Trampas que enmarcan. Límites. Puntos de referencia. Criterios. Metáforas. Pensamiento/marcos culturales. El ocuparse de los marcos.
53. Use of dialogue to reframe intractable conflicts Reduce tension and manage the de-escalation of hostility: techniques such as listening projects, study circles, and some forms of mediation. Perspective taking: techniques such as acknowledging critical identities, imaging of identities Reduzca la tensión y maneje el decapado de la hostilidad: técnicas tales como proyectos que escuchan, círculos de estudio, y algunas formas de mediación. Tomar de la perspectiva: técnicas tales como reconocimiento de las identidades críticas, proyección de imagen de identidades
54. Use of dialogue to reframe intractable conflicts Establish a common ground as a basis for agreement: techniques such as search for common ground and visioning/search processes enable reframing around a smaller set of issues. and characterizations, narrative forums, and listening circles allow disputants to understand the conflict and its dynamics. Enhance the desirability of options and alternatives: Several approaches exist that may enhance the desirability of alternative options when presented to parties with divergent frames. Establezca un terreno común como base para el acuerdo: las técnicas tales como búsqueda para los procesos del terreno común y el visioning/de la búsqueda permiten reframing alrededor de un sistema más pequeño de ediciones. y las caracterizaciones, los foros narrativos, y los círculos que escuchan permiten que los disputants entiendan el conflicto y su dinámica. Realce la deseabilidad de opciones y de alternativas: Varios acercamientos existen que pueden realzar la deseabilidad de opciones alternativas cuando están presentados a los partidos con los marcos divergentes.
56. Escalation Discovery makes us overconfident. We want to get more certainty. Negotiator wants all the info (legal:depos) before theycan decide We spend too much money on finding information (legal: discovery) It increases “loss aversion”. Try to settle early.
57. Emotions Emotions drive negotiations: you cannot avoid them…deal with them. Become aware of your emotions, your clients and the other sides. My experience: Always be professional, be courteous, do not become vindictive it is better to build relationships rather than break them.
68. De Dreu, Nauta, and van de Vliert (1995) found that negotiators tend to make self-serving evaluations of conflict behavior.
69. Una de las metas más fundamentales de la vida humana es la preservación y el mantenimiento de la uno mismo-identidad.
70. De Dreu, Nauta, y van de Vliert (1995) encontraron que los negociadores tienden a hacer evaluaciones interesadas de comportamiento de conflicto. 05/09/08
74. La evaluación interesada de los behaviorwas del conflicto se asoció a la frustración creciente, solución de problemas reducida, y probabilidad realzada del conflicto futuro.
75. Así, el uno mismo-realce puede ser un antecedente de motivación central de la escalada del conflicto.05/09/08
76.
77. Specifically, the egocentric bias tends to make parties believe that it is fair for them to have more of the negotiated.
79. Specifically, the egocentric bias tends to make parties believe that it is fair for them to have more of the negotiated.05/09/08
80.
81. Egocentrism leads parties to anticipate that others will make over-harvesting decisions and deplete common goods.
82. Negotiators claim what they want and, at the same time, believe that their claim is fair.
83. Egocentrism leads parties to anticipate that others will make over-harvesting decisions and deplete common goods.05/09/08
84.
85. When people are given feedback indicating that they have not performed well on a task, they are more likely to promote themselves.
86. La gente experimenta una amenaza para su amor propio, ella necesita afirmar al uno mismo (Steele, 1988).
87. Cuando dan la gente la regeneración que indica que ella no se ha realizado bien en una tarea, ella es más probable promoverse. 05/09/08
88.
89. More likely to evaluate that person stereotypically if their self-images have been threatened by negative feedback (Fein and Spencer, 1997).
90. La derogación de una blanco estereotipada aumenta el amor propio de la gente cuya se ha amenazado uno mismo-imagen (Fein y Spencer, 1997). Más probablemente evaluar a esa persona stereotypically si sus uno mismo-imágenes han sido amenazadas por la regeneración negativa (Fein y Spencer, 1997). 05/09/08
92. Step #1: Preparing Your Strategy Assess the situation. There are four basic bargaining situations depending on: (1) The perceived importance of the ongoing relationship and (2) the perceived conflict over the the stakes involved (to what degree do both sides want the same limited resource such as money, power, terms, etc.)
93. The Situational Matrix Perceived Conflict Over Stakes High Low High Importance of Relationship Low
94. Negotiating in the Quadrants Quadrant IV: Tacit Coordination - Calls for tactful avoidance of conflict, not negotiation. Quadrant III: Transactions - Stakes are substantially more important than relationships. Leverage counts. Competition, problem solving. Quadrant II: Relationships - Treat the other party well, generously, the stakes are secondary. Accommodate. (Einstein job offer, e.g.) Quadrant I: Balanced Concerns - Problem solving or compromise
95. Prepare a Bargaining Plan Make a list of questions you intend to ask at the beginning of the negotiation in order to assess the assumptions of the other side: Is a relationship most important to them? Are the stakes most important to them? Do they believe it is a Balanced Concerns situation? Prepare your bargaining plan based on the other side’s assumptions.
98. Having multiple items in the bargaining mix and being creative in dealing with them can be very helpful - in both competitive and collaborative negotiations.
99. Sistema de las ediciones que son o se podrían considerar en las negociaciones.
100. A menudo, diferencias substanciales entre los partidos en la importancia de varias ediciones.
101.
102. Developing Rapport The “liking rule.” We prefer to say “yes” to someone we like and trust. We like and trust people exactly like ourselves -- similarity. Research the decision maker’s likes and dislikes, hobbies, sports, etc. thoroughly Negotiate face-to-face, not online or over the phone -- tough to build trust, rapport, and understanding.
104. Obtaining Information on Interests, Issues, and Perceptions (reconassance) Exchange information without giving up anything. Ask questions -- don’t be a blabbermouth -- and remember the cardinal rule of discovery: Probe first, disclose later. Test for understanding Make sure you understand Summarize
105. Signaling Expectations and Leverage Deliver bad news (deal breakers, threats) early in a negotiation. Sell all the deal terms early. Indicate where you can and cannot be flexible (credibility). Signal your expectations and leverage.
106. Signaling Leverage Your Leverage as You See It Strong Weak Firm How You Want to Act Flexible
107. If You Are Going to Be Flexible, Get Credit for It Let the other side know what alternatives you have before you show you are not going to use the alternatives (BATNAs). By revealing your alternatives and not using them, you get credit for being generous and reasonable. Be fair, but always make sure you get credit for being fair.
108. Match the Other’s Side’s Style Tit for tat in style, too. If the they are screaming, tough, fierce competitors, they will like and respect you if you are like them. Yell back If they are bullies, confront them early. Once again, the reciprocity principle at work. Train people to be cooperative.
109. Step #3: Opening and Making Concessions The bargaining stage is dominated by tactics, which depend on the situation. Competitor Vs competitor, relationship vital, etc. Bargaining formally begins when negotiators on one side open with a concrete, plausible (in their mind) offer.
110. Opening Tactics: Open First? If you are uninformed about the other side’s business, interests, or demands, never open first. If you are well informed, always open first: It lets you fix the range -- the zone of realistic expectations. Sometimes forces the other side to rethink its goals. Most important, allows you to set the anchor. We tend to be heavily influenced by first impressions.
111. Anchoring When the other side hears a high or low number, they adjust their expectations (unconsciously) accordingly. The first offer anchors the other side’s perception of your walk-away price (NBC Super Bowl). First offer must be somewhat reasonable (no more than 50% higher than you will settle for). As high as possible--as close to the other side’s walk-away as possible (that’s the home run). Outlandish numbers at the beginning can kill the deal or destroy your credibility if you drastically reduce the offer later.
112. Framing Framing is a process of describing or explaining a situation a particular way. Framing is the use of analogy, metaphor, or characterization to define the problem or to advocate a solution of that problem.
113. Framing Frame all of your offers. Framing emphasizes the value of your offer. Framing provides justification for the other side to make concessions. “Just pennies a day” frames an offer. To those who like to win, frame as a gain, a win -- emphasize benefits. For those who are afraid to lose (losses loom larger than gains to many), frame as a possible loss -- emphasize the pain and shame of losing.
114. 2/7/2011 Negotiating with Objective Criteria Frame each issue as a joint search for objective criteria. Ask “What’s your theory?”. Agree first on principles before discussing the substantive issues. Capítulo cada edición como búsqueda común para los criterios objetivos. Pida "cuál es su teoría?". Convenga primero en principios antes de discutir las ediciones substantivas.
115. 2/7/2011 Negotiating with Objective Criteria Reason and be open to reason. Don’t use standards to hold a position. Splitting the difference on standards is legitimate. Asking a third party to decide is sometimes best. La razón y esté abierta a la razón. No utilice los estándares para llevar a cabo una posición. Partir la diferencia en estándares es legítimo. Pedir que los terceros decidan es a veces la mejor: mitigación.
116. 2/7/2011 Negotiating with Objective Criteria Never yield to pressure, only to principle. Invite them to state their reasoning. Suggest objective criteria. Compare giving in to your BATNA and to your reputation. Nunca rinda a la presión, solamente al principio. Invíteles a que indiquen su razonamiento. Sugiera los criterios objetivos. Compare dar adentro a su BATNA y a su reputación.
117. Opening: Optimistic or Reasonable Depends on the situation: Relationship - High, generous Transaction - Open optimistically (high, but not too high) - the highest for which there is a supporting standard or argument enabling you to make a presentable case. Make the highest opening you can “with a straight face.” Don’t open high if you have no leverage and the other side knows it.
118. Optimistic Openings Take advantage of two psychological tendencies: The Contrast Principle and the Norm of Reciprocity. The contrast principle: If I want you to pay me $500,000 for a schedule, and I open with $750,000 (supported by presentable, “straight-face” argument), my settlement of $500,000 seems reasonable and gives the perception of getting a good deal. If I had opened for $550,000 and only come down to $500,000, the contrast would have been small and the deal not satisfying.
119. Optimistic Openings The Norm of Reciprocity: I make an optimistic opening ($750,000), and you reject it. I moderate my offer by making a significant concession ($650,000), and you feel obligated to accept it (reciprocity). Big then small offer -- “door in the face” -- second offer seems reasonable.
120. Concession Tactics Open optimistically and have room to make concessions. Concessions are the language of cooperation. They tell the other side in concrete, believable terms that you accept the legitimacy of their demands and recognize the necessity to cooperate and sacrifice to get a fair deal.
121. Concession Tactics To get movement, offer a small trade -- show that agreement is possible. Give a trade or concession in your least important area. Price to get a desired deal term or payment, e.g. The other side’s first concession is in its least important area of concerns. Try not to give the first major concession (it raises expectations and confuses people). Put the major issues aside, agree on small, easy issues first.
122. Concession Tactics Give small concessions and give them slowly. The slower you give them, the more value they have. A fast concession makes the buyer feel awful and devalues the product. Make them work hard for every concession, they will appreciate it more. Make concessions progressively smaller.
124. Split the Difference? Not unless it’s in your favor. If the other side offers it, it usually isn’t. Split the split.
125. Integrative Bargaining Tactics for integrative bargaining in which both sides start with a complete bundle of offers, demands, and interests are as follows: After a discussion of all the issues (without offers), both sides trade issues and try to problem solve. No issue is closed until all issues have been decided. Sides trade issues in clusters: “If you give me what I want on issues A and B, I’ll give you what you want on X and Y” -- the “If-Then…” scenario. For example, you can throw away deal points you don’t need (set this up in advance).
126. Elements of Negotiation Planning Elementos del planeamiento de la negociación Facts. Both Sides Agree. Needs/Interests. Internal and External. What Are Our Differences? Why? What if on Other Side. Alternatives. Win-Win or Win-Lose. Options. BATNA. Hechos. Ambos Lados Convienen. Necesidades/Intereses. Interno y externo. ¿Cuáles Son Nuestras Diferencias? ¿Por qué? Qué si en el otro lado. Alternativas. Ganar-Gane o Ganar-Pierda. Opciones. BATNA.
127. Elements of Negotiation Planning Elementos del planeamiento de la negociación Legitimacy. Why is your position proper. Communication. Frame and Reframe What You Say. Relationships. Unconditionally Constructive. People centered. Legitimidad. Porqué es su posición apropiada. Comunicación. Marco y reformule qué usted dice. Relaciones. Incondicional Constructivo. Gente centrada.
128. Elements of Negotiation Planning Elementos del planeamiento de la negociación What Do We Need. Complete, Detailed Specifications. Past Understanding. Use Internal Resources. What – Exactly - Do We Need. Complete, Detailed Specifications. Past Volumes. Projected Volumes. Define Performance. Requirements. Specifications. Set Priorities. Qué Lo hacen Necesitamos. Especificaciones Completas, Detalladas. Más allá De Entender. Utilice Los Recursos Internos. Qué - Exactamente - Lo haga Necesitamos. Especificaciones Completas, Detalladas. Más allá De Volúmenes. Volúmenes Proyectados. Defina El Funcionamiento. Requisitos. Especificaciones. Fije Las Prioridades.
129. Other Planning Issues Don’t Assume Everyone Knows. What Are Real Goals of Meeting. Contract? Relation? Information Exchange and Next Meeting Date? The Importance of the Agenda and Ground Rules. Agreements Documents “Specs”. Commitment. No asuma Que Cada uno Sabe. Cuáles son metas verdaderas de la reunión. ¿Contrato? ¿Relación? ¿Intercambio de información y la fecha próxima de la reunión? La importancia de la agenda y de los principios de base. Los Acuerdos Documentan "Espec.". Comisión.
130. Negotiation Planning From Whom Do We Want Bids. Research all prospects in last three years. Use trade directories, yellow pages, etc. To explore base. What Form of Response. Sealed Bids With Non-Price Negotiation. Two Step Bidding. Negotiation. De Quién Nosotros Desean Ofertas. Investigue todas las perspectivas en último tres años. Utilice los directorios comerciales, los Yellow Pages, el etc. Para explorar la base de el acuardo. Qué forma de respuesta. Ofertas Selladas Con La Negociación Del No-Precio. El Hacer una oferta De Dos Pasos. Negociación.
131. Negotiation Planning Availability Issues. Lead Time Commitments. Supplier’s Inventories. Quality Issues. Warranties. Pricing. Target Pricing. Acceptable Range (ZOPA). BATNA. Ediciones De la Disponibilidad. Comisiones Del Tiempo De Plomo. Inventarios Del Surtidor. Ediciones De la Calidad. Garantías. Tasación. Tasación De la Blanco. Rango Aceptable (ZOPA). BATNA.
