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ISSN: 2278 – 1323
                                    International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology
                                                                                        Volume 1, Issue 4, June 2012


                   IP Spoofing Attack Detection using Route Based
                                    Information
                                                  Sneha S. Rana1, T. M. Bansod2
                                    1
                                        Department of Computer Technology, VJTI Mumbai, India
                                    2
                                        Department of Computer Technology, VJTI Mumbai, India
                                                     rana.sneha9@gmail.com
                                                     tmbansod@gmail.com

                                                                           IP spoofing is commonly associated with malicious
Abstract— IP spoofing is almost always used in one of the              network activities, such as Distributed Denial of Service
most difficult attack to defend against – Denial of Service            (DDoS) attacks which block legitimate access by either
(DoS) attack. DOS attack is evolving due to proliferation of
diverse network application. Researchers have performed                exhausting victim servers’ resources or saturating stub
studies on online/offline network devices such as routers and          networks access links to the Internet. Perpetrators of
IDS/IPS. While, the task of deep packet inspection is                  DoS/DDoS attacks typically target sites or services hosted
powerfully handled by IDS/IPS, the real time processing
                                                                       on high-profile web servers such as banks, credit card
requirement is best suited for routers. The IP packet header
information is efficiently handled by routers, hence proposing         payment gateways, and even root name servers. DDoS
a technique the uses the router specific features will be best         attacking tools spoof IP addresses by randomizing the 32-
suited for real time processing. In this paper we introduce a          bit source-address field in the IP header which conceals
technique which uses the router specific information to
identify the IP spoofing based attack and mitigate it using that       attacking sources and dilutes localities in attacking traffic.
information.                                                               The recent ―backscatter‖ study, which quantifies DoS
                                                                       activities in the current Internet, has confirmed the
                                                                       widespread use of randomness in spoofing IP addresses.
Keywords— Dos attack, IP Spoofing, Network security                    Moreover, some known DDoS attacks, such as smurf and
                                                                       more recent Distributed Reflection Denial of Service
                      I. INTRODUCTION                                  (DRDoS) attacks are not possible without IP spoofing.
Criminals have long employed the tactic of masking their               Such attacks masquerade the source IP address of each
true identity, from disguises to aliases to caller-id blocking.        spoofed packet with the victim’s IP address. Overall, DDoS
It should come as no surprise then, that criminals who                 attacks with IP spoofing are much more difficult to defend.
conduct their nefarious activities on networks and                         Route-based and host-based are two different
computers should employ such techniques. IP spoofing is                approaches taken by researchers to thwart DDoS attacks.
one of the most common forms of on-line camouflage.                    The former installs the defense mechanism inside IP
                                                                       routers and hence trace the source of attack and block the
   The concept of IP spoofing was initially discussed in
                                                                       corresponding traffic originating from that source.
academic circles in the 1980's. While known about for
                                                                       However, the drawback of this approach is that it requires
some time, it was primarily theoretical until Robert Morris,
                                                                       coordination among different routers and networks, and
whose son wrote the first Internet Worm, discovered a
                                                                       also a widespread deployment to reach the proximity of the
security weakness in the TCP protocol known as sequence
                                                                       attacker. The host-based approach can be deployed
prediction. Stephen Bellovin discussed the problem in-
                                                                       immediately. Also, a much stronger incentive is required to
depth in Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite, a
                                                                       deploy the defense mechanism at the end system compared
paper that addressed design problems with the TCP/IP
                                                                       to that of network service provider.
protocol suite. Another infamous attack, Kevin Mitnick's
                                                                       The current host-based approaches protect an Internet
Christmas Day crack of Tsutomu Shimomura's machine,
                                                                       server either by using sophisticated resource-management
employed the IP spoofing and TCP sequence prediction
                                                                       schemes or by significantly reducing the resource
techniques. While the popularity of such cracks has
                                                                       consumption of each request to withstand the flooding
decreased due to the demise of the services they exploited,
                                                                       traffic such as SYN cookies and Client Puzzle. Without a
spoofing can still be used and needs to be addressed by all
                                                                       mechanism to detect and discard spoofed IP traffic at the
security administrators.
                                                                       very beginning of network processing, spoofed packets will
                                                                       share the same resource principals and code paths as

                                                                                                                          285

                                                  All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET
ISSN: 2278 – 1323
                                          International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology
                                                                                              Volume 1, Issue 4, June 2012

legitimate requests. Under heavy attacks, current                         As a proactive solution to such attacks, several filtering
approaches are unlikely to be able to sustain service                 schemes, which must execute on IP routers, have been
availability due to resource depletion caused by spoofed IP           proposed to prevent spoofed IP packets from reaching
packets. Furthermore, most of existing host-based solutions           intended victims. The ingress filtering blocks spoofed
work at the transport-layer and above, and cannot prevent             packets at edge routers, where address ownership is
the victim server from consuming CPU resource in                      relatively unambiguous, and traffic load is low. However,
servicing interrupts from spoofed IP traffic. At high speed,          the success of ingress filtering hinges on its wide
incoming IP packets generate many interrupts and can                  deployment in IP routers.
drastically slow down the victim server. Therefore, the                   Park and Lee proposed the route-based packet filters as
ability to detect and filter spoofed packets at the IP layer          a form of International Journal of Database Theory and
without any router support is essential to protection against         Application mitigating IP spoofing, which assumes that
DDoS attacks. Since filtering spoofed IP packets is                   there is one single path between one source node and one
orthogonal to the resource-protection mechanisms at higher            destination node, so any packet with the source address and
layers, it can be used in conjunction with advanced                   the destination address that appear in a router that is not in
resource-protection schemes.                                          the path, should be discarded.
    The scheme introduced in this paper filters out the                   Subsequently, a new method which is Hop-Count
bogus traffic with very less false positive rate. It scans the        Filtering (HCF) proposed another novel simplified scheme
incoming IP packet without using any cryptographic                    to identify packets whose source IP addresses is spoofed.
technique. The basic idea behind the scheme is to use the             The information about a source IP address and its
packet information – the route that packet travels along              responding hops from a server (victim) are recorded in a
with the TTL field. The TTL field of the packet is used to            table at the server side when there are attacks free. Once an
determine if the packet has travelled the right number of             attack alarm is raised, the victim will inspect the incoming
hops before reaching the destination. In IP spoofing the              packets’ source IP addresses and their responding hops to
attacker can falsify the IP address of the source but he              differentiate the spoofed packets.
cannot ideally alter the number of hops the packet would                  To validate that an IP packet carries the true source
travel to the destination.                                            address, SAVE, a source address validity enforcement
  In this paper we discuss the related work by other                  protocol, builds a table of incoming source IP addresses at
researchers, the present system for detecting the IP                  each router that associates each of its incoming interfaces
Spoofing based attack and then we put forward our scheme              with a set of valid incoming network addresses. SAVE runs
to detect IP spoofing based attack.                                   on each IP router and verifies whether an IP packet arrives
                                                                      at its expected interface. By matching incoming IP
                                                                      addresses with their expected receiving interfaces, the set
                    II. RELATED WORK                                  of IP source addresses that any attacker can spoof is greatly
The two basic detecting mechanism of IP spoofing based                reduced.
attack is packet filtering and packet traceback at the node               In attack situations where a large number of infected
level. Many techniques have been proposed by various                  hosts are utilized, the information from a large number of
researchers based on the above mentioned two                          network devices should be combined to induce a
mechanisms. The partial path of the packet is inspected in            meaningful decision.
order to find the true origin of the attack packet. This task
of finding the true source of the malicious packet is called
traceback mechanism. The first step towards the necessary                             III. DETECTION MECHANISM
legal action to discourage such attack in future is to identify       In this paper we describe the IP spoofing detection
the source address correctly. Savage et al. proposed to let           mechanism which will first identify if the packet is
routers mark packets probabilistically, so that the victim            malicious or not and if found malicious it will then try to
can collect the marked packets and reconstruct the attack             identify the true source of the IP packet from where the
path. One enhanced scheme of probabilistic packet marking             packet has originated. IP packet header fields – the TTL
has been proposed by Song et al. to reduce the false                  and the ID field of the packet will be used to help find the
positive rate for reconstructing the attack path. Another             attack source. The TTL of an IP header is a record of how
enhanced scheme of probabilistic packet marking has been              many routers the packet has traversed and the ID is a serial
proposed to reduce the computational overhead.                        number that is used in de-fragmentation.

                                                                                                                   286

                                                 All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET
ISSN: 2278 – 1323
                                           International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology
                                                                                               Volume 1, Issue 4, June 2012




                        Fig 1: IP Header
                                                                                          Fig 2: TTL based detection


A. Detection Mechanism based on TTL
One most common attack based on IP spoofing is DDoS
attack. Such attack is initiated when the attacker
compromise various botnets using some malicious way.
These compromised hosts then spoof the attack packet by
inserting some random IP address in the source address
field of the IP packet. This detection mechanism keeps
track of the packet flow information embedded in the IP
header (figure1). TTL is a 8 bit field in IP header
determines the maximum lifespan of an IP packet. As the
IP packet transit through the network each intermediate
node decrements the TTL value by one before forwarding it
to the next node. Hence, this mechanism uses the number
of Hop the packet travelled to detect if the packet is                                Fig 3: ID based detection algorithm

legitimate or not. This information is obtained by
subtracting the final TTL with the initial TTL value. This
hop count value is then compared with the stored hop count                            IV. TRACEBACK MECHANISM
corresponding to the source address. If both the values are           The basic idea of IP traceback approach based on packet
same then the packet is malicious.                                    marking is that the router marks packets with its
    The fact that the ID increases monotonically for the              identification information as they pass through that router.
given session can be utilized for the detection. Since the            The mark overloads a rarely used field in IP packet header,
rates from the spoofed victim and that of the zombie/bot              i.e., 16-bit IP identification field. The identification of a
are different, at certain point the ID should be less that the        router could be 32-bit IP address, hash value of IP address,
value of the previous packet. In the case when ID values              or uniquely assigned number. In the last two cases, the
decreases abnormally, the Source-IP Based Lookup Table                length of identification information is variable and could be
is updated and the packet is forwarded based on the                   less than 16 bits. Since the marking space in packet header
dropping probability routing.                                         is too small to record the entire path, routers mark packets
                                                                      with some probability so that each marked packet carries
                                                                      the information of one node in the path. In addition, based
B. Detection Mechanism based on ID field                              on the length of router identification and the
                                                                      implementation of marking procedure, the router may only
The utilization of Identification field in IP header is done in
                                                                      write part of its identification information into the marking
case of packet assembly when large data is sent across the
network. This field is set to a large value initially during          space. While each marked packet represents only a small
the transmission session and steadily increases to 65,535 to          portion of the path it has traversed, the whole network path
0.                                                                    can be reconstructed by combining a modest number of
                                                                      such packets. This kind of approach is referred to as
                                                                      probabilistic packet marking (PPM). The PPM approach

                                                                                                                        287

                                                 All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET
ISSN: 2278 – 1323
                                              International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology
                                                                                                  Volume 1, Issue 4, June 2012

does not incur any storage overhead at routers and the                            Based on BGP Updates, IEEE Transactions On
marking procedure (a write and checksum update) can be                            Dependable And Secure Computing, Vol. 5, No. 1,
easily and efficiently executed at current routers. But due to                    January-March 2008.
                                                                             [5] A.Bremler-Barr and H.Levy, Spoofing Prevention
its probabilistic nature, it can only trace the traffic that
                                                                                  Method, In Proc. of INFOCOM, 2005.
consists of a large volume of packets. In the PPM a packet                   [6] S.Savage, D.Wetherall, Anna Karlin,         and Tom
stores the information of an edge in the IP header. The                           Anderson, Network support for IP Traceback.
pseudocode of the procedure is given below for reference.                         IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, Vol. 9, No.
The router determines how the packet can be processed                             3, June 2001.
depending on the random number generated. If x is smaller                    [7] Pierluigi Rolando, Riccardo Sisto, SPAF: Stateless
than the predefined marking probability pm, the router                            FSA-Based Packet Filters, IEEE/ACM Transactions
chooses to start encoding an edge. The router sets the start                      on Networking, Vol. 19, No. 1, February 2011.
                                                                             [8] A. Perrig, D.Song, and A.Yaar, StackPi: A New
field of the incoming packet to the routers address and
                                                                                  Defense Mechanism against IP Spoo_ng and DDoS
resets the distance field to zero. If x is greater than pm, the                   Attacks, Technical Report CMU-CS-02-208, CMU
router chooses to end encoding an edge by setting the                             Technical Report, February 2003.
router’s address in the end field.                                           [9] Stefan sevage, Anna karlin and Tom Anderson,
                                                                                  Network Support for IP traceback, IEEE/ACM
                                                                                  Transactions on Networking, VOL 9., NO. 3 , June
                                                                                  2001.
                                                                             [10] Jieren Cheng, Jianping Yin, Zhiping Cai and
                                                                                  Chengkun Wu, Dos Attack Detection using IP
                                                                                  address Feature Interaction, 2009 International
                                                                                  Conference on Intelligent Networking and
                                                                                  Collaborative Systems.
               Figure 4: the packet marking algorithm                        [11] Ruiliang Chen, Jung-Min Park and Randolph
                                                                                  Marchany, A Divide-and-Conquer Strategy for
                                                                                  Thwarting Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks,
                       V. CONCLUSION                                              IEEE Transactions On Parallel And Distributed
In this paper we discussed the IP spoofing based attack                           Systems, Vol. 18, No. 5, May 2007.
detection using route based information present in IP
packet header i.e. the TTL and ID field of the packet also
we introduced a traceback mechanism to trace back the
attacker right at its origin. . The IP packet header
information is efficiently handled by routers, hence
proposing a technique the uses the router specific features
will be best suited for real time processing. We found the
algorithm is well suited to detect the DDoS attack
situations as long as the network is stable, i.e., the routing
information is not changed.


REFERENCES
[1] Hikmat Farhat, Zouk Mosbeh, A Scalable Method to
    Protect From IP Spoofing, 978-1-4244-2624-
    9/08/$25.00 ©2008 IEEE.
[2] C.Jin, H.Wang, and K. G. Shin, Hop-              count
    filtering: An effective defense against spoofed DDoS
    traffic, In Proc .of the 10th ACM conference on
    Computer and communications security, 2003.
[3] K. Park and H.Lee, On the effectiveness of route-based
    packet filtering for distributed DoS attack prevention
    in power-law Internets, In Proc. of ACM SIGCOMM,
    2006.
[4] Z.Duan, X.Yuan, and J. Chandrashekar, Constructing
      Inter-Domain Packet Filters to Control IP Spoofing
                                                                                                                     288

                                                        All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET

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  • 1. ISSN: 2278 – 1323 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology Volume 1, Issue 4, June 2012 IP Spoofing Attack Detection using Route Based Information Sneha S. Rana1, T. M. Bansod2 1 Department of Computer Technology, VJTI Mumbai, India 2 Department of Computer Technology, VJTI Mumbai, India rana.sneha9@gmail.com tmbansod@gmail.com IP spoofing is commonly associated with malicious Abstract— IP spoofing is almost always used in one of the network activities, such as Distributed Denial of Service most difficult attack to defend against – Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks which block legitimate access by either (DoS) attack. DOS attack is evolving due to proliferation of diverse network application. Researchers have performed exhausting victim servers’ resources or saturating stub studies on online/offline network devices such as routers and networks access links to the Internet. Perpetrators of IDS/IPS. While, the task of deep packet inspection is DoS/DDoS attacks typically target sites or services hosted powerfully handled by IDS/IPS, the real time processing on high-profile web servers such as banks, credit card requirement is best suited for routers. The IP packet header information is efficiently handled by routers, hence proposing payment gateways, and even root name servers. DDoS a technique the uses the router specific features will be best attacking tools spoof IP addresses by randomizing the 32- suited for real time processing. In this paper we introduce a bit source-address field in the IP header which conceals technique which uses the router specific information to identify the IP spoofing based attack and mitigate it using that attacking sources and dilutes localities in attacking traffic. information. The recent ―backscatter‖ study, which quantifies DoS activities in the current Internet, has confirmed the widespread use of randomness in spoofing IP addresses. Keywords— Dos attack, IP Spoofing, Network security Moreover, some known DDoS attacks, such as smurf and more recent Distributed Reflection Denial of Service I. INTRODUCTION (DRDoS) attacks are not possible without IP spoofing. Criminals have long employed the tactic of masking their Such attacks masquerade the source IP address of each true identity, from disguises to aliases to caller-id blocking. spoofed packet with the victim’s IP address. Overall, DDoS It should come as no surprise then, that criminals who attacks with IP spoofing are much more difficult to defend. conduct their nefarious activities on networks and Route-based and host-based are two different computers should employ such techniques. IP spoofing is approaches taken by researchers to thwart DDoS attacks. one of the most common forms of on-line camouflage. The former installs the defense mechanism inside IP routers and hence trace the source of attack and block the The concept of IP spoofing was initially discussed in corresponding traffic originating from that source. academic circles in the 1980's. While known about for However, the drawback of this approach is that it requires some time, it was primarily theoretical until Robert Morris, coordination among different routers and networks, and whose son wrote the first Internet Worm, discovered a also a widespread deployment to reach the proximity of the security weakness in the TCP protocol known as sequence attacker. The host-based approach can be deployed prediction. Stephen Bellovin discussed the problem in- immediately. Also, a much stronger incentive is required to depth in Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite, a deploy the defense mechanism at the end system compared paper that addressed design problems with the TCP/IP to that of network service provider. protocol suite. Another infamous attack, Kevin Mitnick's The current host-based approaches protect an Internet Christmas Day crack of Tsutomu Shimomura's machine, server either by using sophisticated resource-management employed the IP spoofing and TCP sequence prediction schemes or by significantly reducing the resource techniques. While the popularity of such cracks has consumption of each request to withstand the flooding decreased due to the demise of the services they exploited, traffic such as SYN cookies and Client Puzzle. Without a spoofing can still be used and needs to be addressed by all mechanism to detect and discard spoofed IP traffic at the security administrators. very beginning of network processing, spoofed packets will share the same resource principals and code paths as 285 All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET
  • 2. ISSN: 2278 – 1323 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology Volume 1, Issue 4, June 2012 legitimate requests. Under heavy attacks, current As a proactive solution to such attacks, several filtering approaches are unlikely to be able to sustain service schemes, which must execute on IP routers, have been availability due to resource depletion caused by spoofed IP proposed to prevent spoofed IP packets from reaching packets. Furthermore, most of existing host-based solutions intended victims. The ingress filtering blocks spoofed work at the transport-layer and above, and cannot prevent packets at edge routers, where address ownership is the victim server from consuming CPU resource in relatively unambiguous, and traffic load is low. However, servicing interrupts from spoofed IP traffic. At high speed, the success of ingress filtering hinges on its wide incoming IP packets generate many interrupts and can deployment in IP routers. drastically slow down the victim server. Therefore, the Park and Lee proposed the route-based packet filters as ability to detect and filter spoofed packets at the IP layer a form of International Journal of Database Theory and without any router support is essential to protection against Application mitigating IP spoofing, which assumes that DDoS attacks. Since filtering spoofed IP packets is there is one single path between one source node and one orthogonal to the resource-protection mechanisms at higher destination node, so any packet with the source address and layers, it can be used in conjunction with advanced the destination address that appear in a router that is not in resource-protection schemes. the path, should be discarded. The scheme introduced in this paper filters out the Subsequently, a new method which is Hop-Count bogus traffic with very less false positive rate. It scans the Filtering (HCF) proposed another novel simplified scheme incoming IP packet without using any cryptographic to identify packets whose source IP addresses is spoofed. technique. The basic idea behind the scheme is to use the The information about a source IP address and its packet information – the route that packet travels along responding hops from a server (victim) are recorded in a with the TTL field. The TTL field of the packet is used to table at the server side when there are attacks free. Once an determine if the packet has travelled the right number of attack alarm is raised, the victim will inspect the incoming hops before reaching the destination. In IP spoofing the packets’ source IP addresses and their responding hops to attacker can falsify the IP address of the source but he differentiate the spoofed packets. cannot ideally alter the number of hops the packet would To validate that an IP packet carries the true source travel to the destination. address, SAVE, a source address validity enforcement In this paper we discuss the related work by other protocol, builds a table of incoming source IP addresses at researchers, the present system for detecting the IP each router that associates each of its incoming interfaces Spoofing based attack and then we put forward our scheme with a set of valid incoming network addresses. SAVE runs to detect IP spoofing based attack. on each IP router and verifies whether an IP packet arrives at its expected interface. By matching incoming IP addresses with their expected receiving interfaces, the set II. RELATED WORK of IP source addresses that any attacker can spoof is greatly The two basic detecting mechanism of IP spoofing based reduced. attack is packet filtering and packet traceback at the node In attack situations where a large number of infected level. Many techniques have been proposed by various hosts are utilized, the information from a large number of researchers based on the above mentioned two network devices should be combined to induce a mechanisms. The partial path of the packet is inspected in meaningful decision. order to find the true origin of the attack packet. This task of finding the true source of the malicious packet is called traceback mechanism. The first step towards the necessary III. DETECTION MECHANISM legal action to discourage such attack in future is to identify In this paper we describe the IP spoofing detection the source address correctly. Savage et al. proposed to let mechanism which will first identify if the packet is routers mark packets probabilistically, so that the victim malicious or not and if found malicious it will then try to can collect the marked packets and reconstruct the attack identify the true source of the IP packet from where the path. One enhanced scheme of probabilistic packet marking packet has originated. IP packet header fields – the TTL has been proposed by Song et al. to reduce the false and the ID field of the packet will be used to help find the positive rate for reconstructing the attack path. Another attack source. The TTL of an IP header is a record of how enhanced scheme of probabilistic packet marking has been many routers the packet has traversed and the ID is a serial proposed to reduce the computational overhead. number that is used in de-fragmentation. 286 All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET
  • 3. ISSN: 2278 – 1323 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology Volume 1, Issue 4, June 2012 Fig 1: IP Header Fig 2: TTL based detection A. Detection Mechanism based on TTL One most common attack based on IP spoofing is DDoS attack. Such attack is initiated when the attacker compromise various botnets using some malicious way. These compromised hosts then spoof the attack packet by inserting some random IP address in the source address field of the IP packet. This detection mechanism keeps track of the packet flow information embedded in the IP header (figure1). TTL is a 8 bit field in IP header determines the maximum lifespan of an IP packet. As the IP packet transit through the network each intermediate node decrements the TTL value by one before forwarding it to the next node. Hence, this mechanism uses the number of Hop the packet travelled to detect if the packet is Fig 3: ID based detection algorithm legitimate or not. This information is obtained by subtracting the final TTL with the initial TTL value. This hop count value is then compared with the stored hop count IV. TRACEBACK MECHANISM corresponding to the source address. If both the values are The basic idea of IP traceback approach based on packet same then the packet is malicious. marking is that the router marks packets with its The fact that the ID increases monotonically for the identification information as they pass through that router. given session can be utilized for the detection. Since the The mark overloads a rarely used field in IP packet header, rates from the spoofed victim and that of the zombie/bot i.e., 16-bit IP identification field. The identification of a are different, at certain point the ID should be less that the router could be 32-bit IP address, hash value of IP address, value of the previous packet. In the case when ID values or uniquely assigned number. In the last two cases, the decreases abnormally, the Source-IP Based Lookup Table length of identification information is variable and could be is updated and the packet is forwarded based on the less than 16 bits. Since the marking space in packet header dropping probability routing. is too small to record the entire path, routers mark packets with some probability so that each marked packet carries the information of one node in the path. In addition, based B. Detection Mechanism based on ID field on the length of router identification and the implementation of marking procedure, the router may only The utilization of Identification field in IP header is done in write part of its identification information into the marking case of packet assembly when large data is sent across the network. This field is set to a large value initially during space. While each marked packet represents only a small the transmission session and steadily increases to 65,535 to portion of the path it has traversed, the whole network path 0. can be reconstructed by combining a modest number of such packets. This kind of approach is referred to as probabilistic packet marking (PPM). The PPM approach 287 All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET
  • 4. ISSN: 2278 – 1323 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology Volume 1, Issue 4, June 2012 does not incur any storage overhead at routers and the Based on BGP Updates, IEEE Transactions On marking procedure (a write and checksum update) can be Dependable And Secure Computing, Vol. 5, No. 1, easily and efficiently executed at current routers. But due to January-March 2008. [5] A.Bremler-Barr and H.Levy, Spoofing Prevention its probabilistic nature, it can only trace the traffic that Method, In Proc. of INFOCOM, 2005. consists of a large volume of packets. In the PPM a packet [6] S.Savage, D.Wetherall, Anna Karlin, and Tom stores the information of an edge in the IP header. The Anderson, Network support for IP Traceback. pseudocode of the procedure is given below for reference. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, Vol. 9, No. The router determines how the packet can be processed 3, June 2001. depending on the random number generated. If x is smaller [7] Pierluigi Rolando, Riccardo Sisto, SPAF: Stateless than the predefined marking probability pm, the router FSA-Based Packet Filters, IEEE/ACM Transactions chooses to start encoding an edge. The router sets the start on Networking, Vol. 19, No. 1, February 2011. [8] A. Perrig, D.Song, and A.Yaar, StackPi: A New field of the incoming packet to the routers address and Defense Mechanism against IP Spoo_ng and DDoS resets the distance field to zero. If x is greater than pm, the Attacks, Technical Report CMU-CS-02-208, CMU router chooses to end encoding an edge by setting the Technical Report, February 2003. router’s address in the end field. [9] Stefan sevage, Anna karlin and Tom Anderson, Network Support for IP traceback, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, VOL 9., NO. 3 , June 2001. [10] Jieren Cheng, Jianping Yin, Zhiping Cai and Chengkun Wu, Dos Attack Detection using IP address Feature Interaction, 2009 International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems. Figure 4: the packet marking algorithm [11] Ruiliang Chen, Jung-Min Park and Randolph Marchany, A Divide-and-Conquer Strategy for Thwarting Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks, V. CONCLUSION IEEE Transactions On Parallel And Distributed In this paper we discussed the IP spoofing based attack Systems, Vol. 18, No. 5, May 2007. detection using route based information present in IP packet header i.e. the TTL and ID field of the packet also we introduced a traceback mechanism to trace back the attacker right at its origin. . The IP packet header information is efficiently handled by routers, hence proposing a technique the uses the router specific features will be best suited for real time processing. We found the algorithm is well suited to detect the DDoS attack situations as long as the network is stable, i.e., the routing information is not changed. REFERENCES [1] Hikmat Farhat, Zouk Mosbeh, A Scalable Method to Protect From IP Spoofing, 978-1-4244-2624- 9/08/$25.00 ©2008 IEEE. [2] C.Jin, H.Wang, and K. G. Shin, Hop- count filtering: An effective defense against spoofed DDoS traffic, In Proc .of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, 2003. [3] K. Park and H.Lee, On the effectiveness of route-based packet filtering for distributed DoS attack prevention in power-law Internets, In Proc. of ACM SIGCOMM, 2006. [4] Z.Duan, X.Yuan, and J. Chandrashekar, Constructing Inter-Domain Packet Filters to Control IP Spoofing 288 All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET