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DNV suggestions for changes to the US safety regime


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Carl Arne Carlsen, Director for Mobile Offshore Units, DNV, shares with us some changes that could be incorporated into the US safety regime.

Carl Arne Carlsen, Director for Mobile Offshore Units, DNV, shares with us some changes that could be incorporated into the US safety regime.

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  • 1. An Enhanced Safety Regulatory RegimeFPSO Summit 2010, Singapore September 29, 2010Presented by Carl Arne Carlsen, Director for Mobile Offshore Units in DNV29 September 2010
  • 2. Contents Learning from the history Proposal for an enhanced safety regulatory regime29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 2
  • 3. Some offshore accidents with high impact on offshore safety regulations Ekofisk Bravo (1977) Alexander Kielland (1980) Ocean Ranger (1982) Piper Alpha (1988) P36 (2001) Deepwater Horizon (2010) ? How to reduce risk in the future? Alexander Kielland Deepwater horizon Ocean Ranger Ekofisk Bravo Piper Alpha P36 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 201029 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 3
  • 4. 1977 Ekofisk Bravo -> organising the activities (Norway) Oil drift simulation for Bravo accident. The accident Input to planning the clean –up operations Blow out 22. April 1977 by DNV Stopped by Red Adair and Boots Hansen after 8 days No fire, but 22 500 tonnes oil released, Accident happened during removal of valve for maintenance and well stabilisation by mud - unsatisfactory installation of down hole safety valve during night - mud started leaking out next morning - safety valves on deck were not closed Oil recovery equipment mobilised- took several days and found to be inadequate even in calm water. Only 4% of the oil recovered. The oil evaporated or was broken down by the sea New safety regulations Investigation focused on lack of safety planning and procedures during maintenance – a general need for better organisation of safety by operators Contributed to develop and implement specific regulations for oil companies own control by the oil directorate ( June 7, 1979) Intensified focus by authorities and industry to improve organisation and equipment for oil recovery after blow outs Rescue vessel mobilization requirement established – on the spot within 25 minutes of an accident>29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 4
  • 5. 1980 Alexander Kielland – > design principles ,evacuation and internal control(Norway) The accident (27 March 1980) Fatigue crack developed around hydro phone in bracing – column broke off-rig capsized 123 people killed , 89 survived Inadequate life saving equipment 3 Lifeboats crashed against platform- one landed up side down unable to release life rafts Only a few crew members had survival suits. Not enough life jackets on deck. Only 76 persons had been through safety course , whereof 50 only one day course First rescue vessel arrived after 1 hour – too late to contribute New safety regulations Structural design for platforms inadequate - safety barriers introduced for better structural robustness Survival floatability to enable evacuation of people Mandatory rescue suit (further developed to survival suits) for all people onboard and for all helicopter passengers. Increased focus on meeting mobilisation requirement to rescue vessels ( 25 min) Stricter requirements to life boat launching arrangements, un obstructed launching in 25 degrees heel , steering capacity and lifeboats heading away from platform Implementation of the ”internal control ” principle principle for operators overall safety responsibility (May 15, 1981) > 29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 5
  • 6. 1982 Ocean Ranger -> upgrade of international regulations (Canada) The accident Capsized and sunk in 1982 offshore Newfoundland One of the largest and most modern drilling units of its time 84 lives lost, no one survived. Eye witnesses indicate 1 boat, 56 people in the sea suffered hypothermia and drowned 3 standby vessels lacked rescue means to take onboard people Water entered into the ballast control room , requiring local valve operation in the pontoons to counter heel Crew did not understand how to operate the ballast system manually and in emergency situation Pumps only astern , not able to upright rig heeling forward after filling of forward chain lockers . Shortcomings for survival gear and training New safety regulations Major upgrades of offshore safety regulations in Canada Contributed to next major revision of the IMO MODU code (1989) Revision of rules with requirements relating to: - Ballast Control - Damage Stability Improved offshore training – emergency ballast control training, simulators Improved evacuation equipment and planning Improved means for taking people out of the water in severe weather from standby and rescue vessels>29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 6
  • 7. 1988 Piper Alpha, designed for rough seas, not for explosions- > the “safety case” (UK)The accident New safety regulations Turning point for UK Offshore Safety Legislation Leak of gas condensate ignited and caused a large explosion Changed layout - Physical separation principles 167 died and 62 rescued - Firewalls Lack of communication between shifts - New principles for process safety - Three parallel gas trains - One closed down Risk analyses became mandatory – the safety case - Safety valve removed - the “safety case” – safety critical elements - Next shift, started closed train again - ALARP principle introduced (As Low As Reasonably Practical) Consequences escalated - Formal requirement for QRA for temporary safe refuge - Platform not designed for explosions ( appropriate separation, fire walls): New requirements on UK shelf - Surrounding platforms’ oil transfer to Piper - Update design to prevent and mitigate consequences of Alpha not closed down, feeding the fire accidents - Assumed living quarters a safe place but it - Safety cases involving all operating staff was sitting above control room which was - Formal hand over communications > above risers - Several did not try to evacuate, waiting in the living quarter for helicopter rescue . 29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 7
  • 8. 2001 P36-> life long risk focus (Brazil) The accident Structural rupture of the improperly isolated emergency drainage tank , originally not meant for oily water, gas leakage Rupture of adjacent sea water cooling pipe Emergency firefighting brigade to area of the accident; 17 minutes later – explosion 11 people killed Progressive flooding starting from ruptured sea water pipe when fire water activated and through ventilation pipes Procedures not followed - Sea water pumps (feeding cooling water and fire water) for repair without taking any other alternative preventive action - Opening column compartment for inspection without following procedures - Unexpected flow from ruptured seawater pipe – HVAC remained open - Delay in activation of the drainage pump – more than 1000 alarms,(fire and gas and shut down), blackout after 20 minutes New safety regulations - Deficient procedures and training to deal with emergency situations 5 days later the platform sank Establishment of safety strategies. Risk assessment for non-standard design. Rig designed for drilling, modified to production rig Risk analyses for non standard operation, maintenance, HAZOPs29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 8
  • 9. 2010 Deepwater Horizon -> (USA)The accident Macondo well was drilled initially in 2009 and again in 2010 A commercial field was confirmed 19-20 April – cement job to seal bottom of well 20 April: sequence of close-out activities including removal of mud and pressure tests 20 April: well blowout event, gas vents through Mud Room and into the diesel generators, ignition occurs 20 April: BOP fails to seal well 20 April: 117 staff rescued including 17 injured, 11 fatalities 21 April – 5 May: 20 further attempts to close BOP all fail April-May-June-July uncontrolled blowout continues BP and USCG deploy multiple strategies to stop blowout or to mitigate the oil spill Fleet of response vessels secured, deployed safely with objective to capture all Oil and Gas, with gas to be flared and Oil exported 15 July: Well capped, 4.9m bbls oil spilled in total 9 Sept: relief wells pump cement into bottom and US Govt declares well killedNew safety regulations ? 6 month moratorium implemented pending findings and new regulations MMS reorganized into BOEMRE (Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Regulation and Enforcement) API, IADC develop suggestions BOEMRE public meetings – DNV offers its views on future regulations 29 September 2010 © Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 9
  • 10. Key areas for safety improvements identified by accidents Recommended improvements, key areas Accident Risk Safety Safety Maintenance Emergency Clean up Training assessment organisation/ design/ and rescue management management construction inspection Ekofisk X X X X Bravo Alexander X X X X X Kielland Ocean X X X X Ranger Piper X X X X X X Alpha P36 X X X Deepwater Horizon ?29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 10
  • 11. Are we able to learn? Yes, industry and regulators act Use experience from the past to prevent accidents in the future Changes in national and international regulations Focus on technical issues More focus on human factors needed More focus on organizational factors needed The future – minimizing human errors, they are the main contributor to accidents The right skills - At all levels - Designers, constructors, engineers, operators Ensure human behaviours - Training - Life long learning - Safety culture The right management system - Living the system29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 11
  • 12. The way forward: balancing prescriptive rules and risk management Prescriptive rules Risk based and regulations assessments taking learning to foresee from the past future threats Industry New practice technology Accident Changing Sensitive R&D learning conditions environment29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 12
  • 13. The future: An enhanced safety regulatory regime ? The Vision – Step Change improvement for Safety and Environment Regulations – blend Prescription and Performance Decision making – risk based Clear roles – regulator and Industry Effective and efficient for all parties involved More focus to mitigate high risk elements, less to unimportant issues, i.e. more optimum use of resources29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 13
  • 14. What the O&G & Process Industry both has and has not achieved Over the last 20 years the industry has attained a step change (factor of ten) improvement in occupational safety - Graph shows factor of 3 in last 10 years Different oil USA and EU Process Industry and chemical operating companies - Neither EU nor USA has demonstrated significant improvements for onshore major accidents (OSHA PSM, EU Seveso Directive) Trendline - Chemical Safety Board and Baker Panel highlighted after Texas City that Process Safety (major accidents) and Occupational Safety (personal accidents) are NOT the same North Sea major accident safety has improved - No major disaster since introduction of Safety Case / risk based legislation in UK / Norway (leaks have occurred, but none escalated) - Reducing trend in major hydrocarbon leaks - Factor of 10 in last 13 years – UK HSE Database - “What doesn’t leak can’t explode…” 10x improvement In past 13 years29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 14
  • 15. Vision – Step Change Improvement for Major Accidents The Industry HAS already attained about 10x improvement in occupational safety - Starting point in 1980’s was already very good performance - Many doubted such a big improvement was possible DNV believes major accidents can also be reduced 10x – but with different tools 1. Revised regulatory regime: Blend of Prescriptive and Performance-based regulations 2. Address technical, human and organizational factors: Key lessons from past accidents 3. Enhanced and enforced risk management approach: Addressing Risks, Controls and Conditions 4. Clear roles and responsibilities: Clear to all 5. Shared performance monitoring: All information is readily available where needed DNV believes: - This is practically and economically feasible - Methods described are in use with O&G companies somewhere – but not fully integrated anywhere - Skills and experience available in the regulator, industry, contractors, and 3rd parties29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 15
  • 16. 1. Revised Regulatory Regime Regulators have specialist manpower – but normally limited in number - Regulations should maximize its skills deployment to focus on the most important issues - No point in growing large specialist regulatory workforce that is very hard to keep current - Blend updated Prescription with newer Performance style regulation Industry has deeper knowledge of hazards and risk management - New wells or development approaches can introduce novel hazards - Industry can carry out risk assessments, define necessary controls and monitor conditions - The Operator carries the responsibility for proper Safety and Environmental protection Lessons should be learned from Offshore and Nuclear experience - Clearly define needed safety barriers and assign required performance and ownership - Regulator should ensure the competence of those doing inspections – not attempt all itself - Role for independent 3rd party (e.g. Class Societies) Capture this in a Safety Case-style Regulatory Regime - Operator demonstrates the high level of safety that will be achieved and maintained - All key safety barriers are functioning at their required performance level29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 16
  • 17. 2. Address Technical, Human and Organizational Factors This lesson has been clearly learned from many past disasters - Esso Longford Fire / Texas City Explosion / Three Mile Island / NASA Challenger Purely technical solutions do not address all important failure modes - Process safety culture (i.e. major accidents) – not just occupational safety culture is important - Organizational structures encouraging continuous “mindfulness” of risks A step change will require all three aspects: Technical, Human and Organizational - Future regulations should mandate these aspects to be addressed - UK Safety case regulations require Human factors to be addressed explicitly29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 17
  • 18. 3. Fully Integrated Risk Model A fully integrated tool for - Designing for exemplary safety and environmental performance - Operating for exemplary safety and environmental Risk performance Allowing for full communication between Operator, Contractor and Regulator - Equivalent focus on the Risk – the Controls – and the Condition Controls Condition - Transparent demonstration that safety is substantially enhanced Performance Industry Regulator29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 18
  • 19. Risk Models demonstrate enhanced Safety & Enviromental performance Risk Modeling is needed at both Design and Operations Stages - Risk modeling provides insights as to threats and how well the facility can respond - These show that Step-Change risk targets will actually be achieved – the Safety Case Demonstration aspect - Quantitative analysis at design time (like Nuclear PRA) - Qualitative at operations stage (for more effective communications) - Match blended regulations of Prescription and Performance Design Stage – predictions Operations Stage barrier models e.g. blowout spill fate e.g. showing barriers and owners All risks known, all barriers defined (technical, people, organizational), responsibilities assigned - Demonstrate attainment of high safety targets29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 19
  • 20. 4. Clear Roles and Responsibilities Offshore operations involve many parties - Owner, operator, contractors, independent 3rd parties The Operator owns the overall risk and the Safety case - The regulator may “accept” a safety case, but does not usually “approve” it Bow Tie risk model clearly identifies responsibilities for maintaining barriers at specified performance level - Threats on left-side, Outcomes on right-side29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 20
  • 21. 5. Shared Performance Monitoring and Decision Making The best risk model is still only theory if it isn’t implemented - Technical, human and organizational means are needed to keep it REAL - The status of all barriers must be continuously monitored and known to operators - These must be shared with all who need to know (e.g. with modern IT tools) - Operator, Contractors, 3rd parties, regulator, and Offshore and Onshore locations Teamwork should be employed for key decisions - Decision rooms to address unusual situations or combinations of functional and degraded barriers (onshore and offshore personnel working together and with full knowledge)29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 21
  • 22. Next Steps: The Regulator and The Industry The Regulator Develop suitable regulations for a risk-based approach - Blend of Prescription and Performance regulations - Require a safety case approach – for both Design Stage and Operations Stage The Industry Support updates to Prescriptive Regulations Support the development of suitable Performance Regulations - Risk models to demonstrate improvement in the Safety Case - Include Human and Organizational factors into technical risk models - Implement means to monitor barriers through lifetime and assure functionality29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 22
  • 23. Prescriptive vs performance based regulations The safety case approaches in western countries were designed to bridge the difference between prescriptive codes and performance based codes Prescriptive codes are often reactive, e.g. based on accidents but also to some extent on new understanding through R&D, e.g. for new applications and innovations The results of risk assessments tend to be the interface between technical issues and human interaction rather than the technical issues alone. They normally result in design criteria *, management procedures and maintenance routines Industry codes, e.g. API and class rules are seen as good technical standards to build on to meet the design criteria. Various shelf states that apply performance based regulations accept technical issues based on such industry standards and certified or verified by Classification Societies, e.g. UK, Canada, Australia, Norway Such use of industry standards may be a prerequisit for cost effectiveness of the construction industry to avoid eccessive engineering and unclear scope for newbuilding contracts * e.g. quantify safety requirements - blast wall loadings, fire wall resistance, ventilation requirements, escape vulnerability, etc29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 23
  • 24. Conclusion The Vision – Step Change improvement for Safety and Environment Regulation to be blend of Prescription and Performance Risk informed decision basis – supported by Safety Case Safety and environment protection, demonstration by the industry - Regulators role is oversight and compliance enforcement29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 24
  • 25. Safeguarding life, property and the environment www.dnv.com29 September 2010© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 25