5. Characteristics of Naxalism Affected Areas
Spans in nine states and includes some thirty-five districts (highly impacted
districts)
In terms of acreage, the Naxal belt translates into approximately 209,787 square
kilometres.
• Dantewada, Bastar, Bijapur and Narayanpur in Chattisgarh (32,189 sq.kms)
• Malkinigiri and Rayagada in Orissa (12,814 sq. kms),
• West and East Singhbhum in Jharkhand (8,884 sq. kms),
• Gadchiroli in Maharashtra (9,275 sq. kms),
• West Midnapore in West Bengal (9,296 sq. kms); Bankura and Purulia not
included
Mainly rural areas alongwith large contiguous forested areas with low-habitat
Complex demographic profile - tribal communities
Limited communications and connectivity infrastructure
6. Area Characteristics - Implications
• Affected area is too large for military oriented classical anti-
insurgency operations - will consume too many troops (in millions)
• Demographic complexity and strong political ideological factors
further limit pursuit of a classical anti-insurgency approach
• Isolation of Naxals from population centers and habitation clusters
an imperative. Large contiguous forest areas to some extent are an
advantage for achieving such isolation
• Command & Control and operational logistics difficult for the anti-
insurgent
• Reliance on electronic communications by Naxals can be exploited,
as also their (semi-permanent) bases in jungles leave signatures
that can be detected and monitored by surveillance platforms
7. Centre of Gravity of Naxalism Identified
• Vulnerable area identified within this - Not more than 70,000 sq km.
• An operational coy can dominate 5X 5 Sq Km
• At present deployment is 348 coy’s. Each Coy thus may be covering on an
average of 150 - 200 Sq km i.e 6 times thinner than required.
• Each police post in Chhattisgarh covers 450 Sq Km. Communication
infrastructure does not exist, lacks resources to tackle any threat
• We need to prioritise, if tactical weight of operations has to succeed
8. Success Ingredients of the Operational Strategy : Punjab
Three Pronged strategy
• The Quality of Local Intelligence (police driven; with focus on grass root ‘Thana’
level operational int, collated together at State level for strategic picture)
• A Capacity for Synchronized Operations (police led) - Stress was on Kinetic
operations
• Transformation of the Punjab Police, and the Degree of Political Resolve
Objective of strategy
• Objective of operations was to break the collective mental paralysis of police
through mass-psychological transformation and operational successes
• Army was used as an "Anvil” and police was used as “Hammer”
• Empowering of Police Stations; Proper Documentation of all crimes; Generated
Information which was collated meticulously
• Exceptional police leadership at the SPs level
9. Multi Pronged Strategy
• Local Community Oriented Developmental ( Education, Jobs, NERGA,
PDS Distribution, children mid-day meal scheme) and Governance
Initiatives needed in support of ant-insurgency efforts
• Specialized Information and Psychological campaigns to neutralize
Naxal’s ideological campaign and influence
• Capacity Building of Security Forces with emphasis on jungle craft
training and intelligence gathering
• Operational and Tactical aspects for existing forces need to be stressed,
and augmented through technological resources
10. Advantages : CI Grid Strategy
• Create a dynamic CI Grid based on sustainability of operation through prioritization of AOR
based on Naxalite threats and Terrain/Demography Configuration (jungle, sparse habitation,
rural, urban, etc.)
• Maintain unified command, control and communication along interstate boundaries for better
sharing of information
• Habitat areas both rural and urban clusters dominated and isolated (from insurgents) by local
police in conjunction with paramilitary forces with local administration infrastructure co located
• Large dense jungle areas sparsely populated need to be left unoccupied but kept under
surveillance using aerial, ground surveillance, radio interception and HUNINT resources
(deployed tactically on the fringes of jungles)
• Developing actionable intelligence and surgical strike capabilities (police Cdo units) in jungles as
well as in other areas
11. Available Options
Option – IIITight CI GridCRPF , IRB/SAPused Police commando’s raised Units in existing with
Option - III Additional commando’s units) Raise more CRPF & IRB and augmented CI Grid
– Police and (CRPF & IRB and for surgical strikes CRPF used to have
Intelligencecommando’sCRPF/IRB targetwith 25 % local youth to psychologically break the will
and police Raise more used to units ” liberated Zones” to target operational &
effective CI Grid in Naxal affected areas and employ themto create aninsurgents in
Intelligence Grid in critical areas to force Naxalites into jungles . Use Special Forces /police
of insurgents. CRPF and IRB units act can be denied by Wide Area Surveillance
liberated zones. Less sensitive areasas anvil and consolidate near population centers.
commando’s for surgical strikes in jungles. Create effective population control measures as well
Intelligence capability can be augmented through additional resources
Sorties(WAAS) and population control measures ( controlling supplies) as well as aerial
as surveillance measures using intelligence units augmented with technical equipment to
surveillance
cover difficult terrain
Implications
Implications
• •
ImplicationsIt is mostbe a costly option, augmentsentail raising 300 new CRPF Bns
It will cost effective as it as it will operational dynamics
• • It will cater to developmental not effective tocreatingliberated areas
Manpower Intensive, yet needs without target large security force. The
• Needs intelligence units created can be from capability in Police commando’s
• capacity building for surprise and deception good incentive for sharing
Lesser chances of creating strike locals thus
• In absence of effective grid it will be a wasted strategy
information to synergize operations as well as to control population
• Though a cheaper option, but may alienate population in case of human righton
• Deny insurgents free space using augmented technical intelligence based
violation by police
communication and intelligence Grid
13. Deployment Voids: CRPF/SAP
Area under Maoists Critical Area state wise Vulnerable Existing Additional Battalion
Area Units needed ( 5 Years)
Total Deployment Sq Km Bns
State
Units Ratio Needed
In Sq Km
Thin in No of
58 Chhattis 32189 215 148 40 51
Times ( X )
garh Rest of the Area
covered by
Total Area 208787 1392 24 Orissa 12814 85 59 30 19 surveillance and
denied using
surgical strikes
along with
Critical Area 72458 483 8 Jharkhan 8884 59 41 25 16 Information
d campaigns
Priority Area 58000 387 7 Maharas 9275 56 43 23 20
htra
Vulnerable West
50000 334 6 9296 56 43 26 17
Area Bengal
We are 6- 8 Times Thinner
in critical areas - Major
483 334 144 123 67
Challenge for security forces
14. Units to be Raised and Cost ( next 5 Years)
Area to
be Existing New Cost Per
Cost (in Crores)
covered No of Units Units Units Unit
Units in sq Km Needed Deployed needed
Total Area
72458 483 58 425 33 14025
Covered
Para
Military 18750 123 40 83 33 2739
(CRPF/IRB)
State Police 627
7950 37 18 19 33
(SAP)
Intelligence
15000 25 0 30 20 600
Units
Commando
NA 5 0 8 44 352
Bn
CTJW
NA 10 NA 10 8 80
School
41700 4398 Crores
15. Cost to Benefit Analysis
Commando Battalion
CRPF/IRB Battalion Cost Cost Intelligence Unit CTJW School
Cost for Cost of 120 Units Cost of 8 Units Cost of 30 Units Cost of 10 units
In Crores In Crores In Crores In Crores
Training 1 3 2 1
Leadership 1 2 1 1
Admin 12 10 1 1
Transport 1 2 1 1
Equipment 5 10 4 2
Intelligence Fund 1 2 5 0
Salary 12 15 6 2
Cost Per Unit 33 44 20 8
Total Cost 2739 352 600 80
Total 4398 Crores
Cost to benefit 4398/$100Billion 4398/466200
$ 1 ~ Rs 46.62 Cost to benefit Ratio 0.94 % of the Benefit
16. Special Forces augmented with Intelligence
Special Forces ( Strike commando Battalions)
• They are force multiplier to break the psychological superiority of insurgents as
well as provide surgical strike capability
• They can operate well away from bases and can target liberated zones
• They can synergize operations with real time intelligence obtained in operations
• They can target the top leadership with minimum collateral damage
Intelligence Units
• To augment the field intelligence effort as well as use specialized intelligence
equipment
• These units will be equipment intensive and not manpower intensive
• They will have advanced communication , surveillance and monitoring equipment
• They can double up as surveillance and communication units on eradication of
insurgency
18. Intelligence and Operational Challenges to Connect Dots..
• Intelligence is generated at multiple levels and
consumed at operational level
• Manual analysis of large data is difficult - with automation it can
be quickly sorted and interpreted through link analysis
• Linkages of historical data essential for better interpretation
• GIS and 3 D imagery linked to database systems are powerful
tools to interpret in real time
• Pull Model of Intelligence is not efficient, it needs to be pushed down
as a consumable commodity
19. Intelligence Grid over Command and Control grid : Features
• Databases managed and updated in real time – generated at grass root level as
intelligence collection, and integration of data through database systems and data-
mining
• Data, Images and records available online across different levels of operational
assets, facilitating analysis and authentication
• Video Image sharing through - powerful tool for planning operations
• Mapping of population ( ID Management) linking it with developmental activities
and demographical survey’s; it will also facilitate better governance and
informational campaigns at grass root level
• Finger printing and verifying suspects using palm top devices from the data
bases is a powerful use of technology
20. Intelligence Equipment
• Surveillance devices for day and night surveillance video/thermal image employing UAV,
RPV’s and Aerial surveillance – It can give you virtual results
• GIS Platform for collation of intelligence and terrain mapping – online accessibility
• Aerial surveillance technologies for interpreting images for Insurgent Camps, logistic
movements, as well as forest
• Management and tracking of suspects in the population by rolling out biometric ID
management system (UID?)
21. Technology - Strategic Level
• Satellite, Air Imagery and RPV based monitoring of forested areas
• Radio Interception through automated Software
• Image interpretation Team can take resources of Armed Forces as also
ISRO to initially get the training as well as utilize its expertise
• Safeguard strategic assets as well as provide real time information
• Data mining and link analysis for intelligence analysis and data visualization
for decision support
• GIS platforms for integrating tactical planning with intelligence inputs
• IED jammers, explosive detectors and other tactical gear for troops
22. Network Analysis and Data visualization
Manual approach Graphic based approach Structured analysis approach4
(1) Manually creation of (1) Graphically representation (1)Advanced analytical capabilities
association matrix by of insurgent networks using to assist investigation
identifying the relations tools such as Link Analysis
through raw data (2) It can help in identifying
(2) Helpful in visualization of networks to mining of large volumes
(2) Helpful in investigation, large amount of relationship of data to discover useful
becomes ineffective where data but without analytical knowledge and create intelligence
datasets are very large functionality. about the structure and organization
of criminal networks
- Data Mining
- Social Network Analysis
- Pattern Tracing and interactions
22
The figure, at face value, may look daunting but in real terms could be narrowed down to a few trouble spots or belts ; Nadia and Murshidabad and Birbhum ; Area under 20 more PS would be added to 28 already included and affected by Maoist Threats
A closer examination of the violence prone districts could possibly reduce the actual footprint by say another 20 to 30 per cent
the security grid so established should form the basis of protecting (orguarding) the populaceand logistic bases for kinetic operations of security forces as well as deny logistical support to insurgents
cover the entire area to obtain actionable Intelligence using HUMINT and technical resources (radio intercepts/UAV surveillance /WAAS sorties Coverage/satellite imagery. (BFSR/heat sensors /thermal mapping / UAV’s/satellite imagery/WAAS).
Internal security is going to remain an issue of concern for a long time and we can not always depend on Army( can 40 – 50 Km on foot and in case of Heptrs, can operate up to a distance of 200 KM from the bases)
Large extent of the area, difficult geography/terrain, cultural and language complexity and lack of infrastructure and communications. Intelligence collection, tactical response, comd & control, as well as governance and information campaigns have to be tackled simultaneously
This will make Intelligence more transparent as well as reduce redundancies and element of error. Humongous data can be analyzed and therefore better chances of quality analysis and prevent corrupt and age old archaic practices
This is the question I will leave it for you all to ponder and debate. Look at what happened to railways. See the IT revolution and BPO industry. Countering Terrorism with Intelligence as well Operational capability of Security forces is what that will make or mar the way we do things. Please gentle man use your influences as well as wherewithal to make this country not only grow but maintain the inclusiveness in the growth as well as prevent it from being affected by incidents of terror which as all of the previous speakers have explained are going to be even more heinous and lethal.
Broken Windows Theory. No place is safe and unsafe places can also be made safe with better planning Look for abnormalities and see and prepare organizations for same
