Ippai energy security presentation chietgj bajpaee


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  • For oil and increasingly important for LNG (gas) transport
  • Ippai energy security presentation chietgj bajpaee

    1. 1. IPPAI Asia Energy Security Summit 2012 Energy-maritime security nexus:Threats facing Asia’s maritime domain Chietigj Bajpaee King’s College London/ Vivekananda International Foundation February 29, 2012
    2. 2. Key points Maritime security integral part of energy security domain Non-state security threats represent prevalent threat to the maritime domain in Asia but lasting threat will emanate from traditional, state-to-state rivalries Sustainable solution contingent upon developing an integrated, holistic and cooperative regional approach to regional maritime security concerns
    3. 3. Maritime-energy security nexus
    4. 4. Strategic importance of maritime domain Vulnerability of chokepoints:  Over half of the world’s annual merchant traffic by tonnage passes through the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits  15 million bpd of oil and petroleum products transit the Strait of Malacca, accounting for half of world’s oil exports Asian dependence on maritime trade routes:  80% of China’s oil imports transit the South China Sea and Indian Ocean  Almost 90% of Indias oil imports come via maritime trade routes  Asia meets three-quarters of its oil demand through imports, which is expected to increase to 90% by 2030 Sea as resource  South China Sea holds an estimated seven billion barrels of oil and 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
    5. 5. Non-state threats receding in South/ Southeast Asia Southeast Asia  Political stability in Indonesia  Peace in Aceh  Regional cooperation – Malacca Straits Patrols South Asia  LTTE defeat removes most potent maritime terrorist threat  Reduced piracy threat in Bay of Bengal/ primarily armed robbery
    6. 6. Non-state threats persist in Indian Ocean Number of successful attacks down  Coordinated approach between regional multilateral joint command operations EU-led Operation Atalanta NATO-led Operation Ocean Shield US-led Combined Taskforce-151  Ship protection measures  Private security companies  Prosecuting captured pirates in regional states with functional judicial systems Piracy threat mutating  Attacking softer/ onshore targets  Increasing ransom demands  Using captured merchant vessels as pirate ‘mother ships’ to broaden range of attacks – ‘balloon effect’  Piracy-terrorist nexus?
    7. 7. Sustainable solution to non-state security threats Collaboration and coordination between local, regional and international stakeholders  Developing rules of engagement for armed guards defending commercial vessels Combating root causes of piracy onshore  Poverty and environmental degradation from commercial overfishing  Ungoverned spaces arising from absence of a stable functioning government in Somalia  Strengthening Puntland police force in north-eastern Somalia  Clear demarcation of Somali EEZ
    8. 8. Inter-state threats re-emerging Growing strategic importance of the maritime domain as economic lifeline to the region Renewed claims to disputed maritime territory fuelled by  Protecting freedom of navigation  Accessing offshore energy resources  Power projection ambitions  Defending sovereignty and territorial integrity  Growing military capabilities  Growing inter-linkages between local, regional and global levels of security
    9. 9. Continental vs. maritime disputes/state vs. non-state actors  Sovereignty in the maritime domain is more fluid or fungible  Players in the maritime domain more diverse, creating multiple levels of interaction/ misunderstanding  E.g. Destabilizing role of fishing communities
    10. 10. Maritime boundary disputes between major powers • Takeshima/ Dokdo (Japan vs. South Korea) • Senkaku/ Daiyutai (Japan vs. China) • Paracel (China vs. Vietnam) • Spratly (China vs. Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei) • Northern Limit Line (North vs. South Korea) • Southern Kurils/ Northern Territories (Russia vs. Japan)
    11. 11. Role of external actors• Adoption of more coordinated regional approach (Vietnam, Philippines, Japan)• Growing engagement with extra-territorial powers (US, Russia, India)• A shift from de facto to de jure recognition of sovereignty over disputed territories would signal clear grounds for escalation of tensions
    12. 12. Road to cooperation Areas of mutual interest in the maritime domain  Maintaining freedom of navigation along SLOCs  Joint exploration of offshore oil and gas resources  Combatting non-traditional security threats, including maritime piracy, terrorism and arms, narcotics and human trafficking  Overcoming regional trust deficit through  Addressing root causes of regional rivalries, including historical, cultural and power considerations  Moving away from informal codes of conduct toward institutionalized mechanisms  Multilateral solution and more open regionalism that takes account of the views of extra-territorial, non-claimant stakeholders
    13. 13. Conclusion• Over short-term inter-state maritime rivalries unlikely to manifest in the form of armed conflict between the region’s major powers. • No major regional power is in a position to exercise unilateral maritime dominance over the Asia-Pacific while the United States remains the region’s predominant military power and maritime hegemon • As most countries remain focussed on internal growth, development and the consolidation of political power, any rivalry is likely to manifest itself in the realm of rhetoric, economics, military modernisation and a competition for allies• But climate of mistrust pervades the region amid persistence of underlying inter-state rivalries• State and non-state security threats in the maritime domain maintain a symbiotic relationship• Need to follow Malacca Straits Patrols model • Functional cooperation built upon pre-existing confidence-building mechanisms (e.g. ASEAN) • Multilateral, inclusive and multi-level model of confidence building
    14. 14. Thank youQuestions?