Gender Research For Agnostics: Methods and Findings from IFPRI's Gender and Intrahousehold Research Program

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Gender Research For Agnostics: Methods and Findings from IFPRI's Gender and Intrahousehold Research Program

  1. 1. Gender Research for Agnostics: Methods and Findings from IFPRI’s Gender and Intrahousehold Research Program Agnes R. Quisumbing
  2. 2. What is gender research? (…can I just put a dummy variable and that will take care of it?) <ul><li>… research that takes into account the socially constructed relationships/differences between men and women (not only biological differences) </li></ul><ul><li>The dummy variable may work, but its interpretation will be very different, depending on culture and context (more on this later) </li></ul>
  3. 3. When does it make sense to pay attention to gender in your research? <ul><li>When there are systematic gender differences in… </li></ul><ul><li>Outcomes (yield differentials, health and nutrition indicators, poverty rates, etc.) </li></ul><ul><li>Determinants (effects of male and female schooling, male and female land ownership, male and female headship, etc.) </li></ul><ul><li>Processes (when there are differences in the preferences, motivations, and behavior of men and women) </li></ul>
  4. 4. Gender will not always be the most important variable in all contexts. <ul><li>But it is important to test it. </li></ul><ul><li>Other factors which may be important </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Inter-household differences (e.g. between rich and poor, differences due to caste or ethnicity) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Other sources of intrahousehold differences (age, birth order, relationship to head of household) </li></ul></ul>
  5. 5. Four key aspects of IFPRI’s gender and intrahousehold research program <ul><li>Models of household behavior that allow for individual preferences </li></ul><ul><li>Development of quantifiable indicators of bargaining power </li></ul><ul><li>Methods to address endogeneity and measurement error in these indicators of bargaining power </li></ul><ul><li>Qualitative and quasi-experimental methods for program and project evaluation </li></ul>
  6. 6. Country coverage <ul><li>Four high-concentration countries (Bangladesh, Guatemala, Ethiopia, South Africa) </li></ul><ul><li>Eight supplemental studies countries </li></ul><ul><li>Not in map: Mexico </li></ul>
  7. 7. Qualitative and quantitative methods <ul><li>Combination of qualitative methods with quantitative household surveys </li></ul><ul><li>Qualitative studies inform design of quantitative modules </li></ul><ul><li>Different policy focus in each, but comparable modules across countries </li></ul>
  8. 8. Are there gender differences in outcomes ? The case of yields on male and female plots in Burkina Faso (Udry, JPE 1996; Alderman et al. 1996 Udry et al. Food Policy 1997) HH-year-crop HH-year HH-year-crop Fixed effect categories 11.91 (0.00) 19.49 (0.00) 1.69 (0.02) Joint F-statistic (p-value) 15 21 20 No of indicator variables for soil type, toposequence, plot location -0.28 -0.30 -0.17 Ln plot area -0.21 -0.41 -0.18 Gender (1=female) Vegetables Sorghum All crops Dependent variable: yield per hectare of OLS estimates
  9. 9. Are there gender differences in determinants ? Example 1. Determinants of input intensity at the plot level, Burkina Faso HH-year-crop HH-year-crop HH-year-crop HH-year-crop HH-year-crop Fixed effect categories 42.3(0.0) 10.0(0.0) 74.6(0.0) 42.6(0.0) 27.7(0.0) Joint F-statistic (p-value) 19 19 19 20 20 No. of indicator variables for soil type, toposequence, plot location -6.1 -181 -112 -316 -219 Ln plot area -13.7 -451 -199 42.72 -679 Gender (1=female) Non-hh Child Female Male Manure (kg/ha) Hours of labor (per hectare) Inputs (fixed effects tobit estimator)
  10. 10. Are there gender differences in determinants ? Example 2. The case of cocoa yields in Western Ghana (Quisumbing et al. EDCC 2001) (n=391) Regressors included characteristics of parcel at acquisition, tree variety dummies, tree age variables, and land tenure variables -74.14 (p=0.11) -1.58 -11.12 Yield/ha (random effects) -74.90 -0.049 Female-held parcel -3.48 -0.028 Parcel size -18.36 0.16 Distance to parcel Yield/ha (hh fixed effects) Proportion planted to cocoa (tobit with hh dummies)
  11. 11. Why does gender not seem to matter? <ul><li>Women get to cultivate cocoa on their own plots only after acquiring it as a gift—in return for helping husbands to plant cocoa. So, conditional on planting cocoa, men and women have equal probabilities of cocoa planting </li></ul><ul><li>Women do have lower yields, but only weakly significant (p=0.11) </li></ul><ul><li>Lower yields not due to differences in land tenure (controlled for by land tenure dummies) but possibly other constraints women face </li></ul><ul><li>Need to understand the process by which men and women acquire land, and decisions to plant cocoa—tied up with shifts in the inheritance system </li></ul>
  12. 12. Does gender make a difference in terms of processes ? A more difficult question to answer <ul><li>What is the underlying model of household behavior? </li></ul><ul><li>Tests of the unitary vs. the collective model of household behavior </li></ul><ul><li>Unitary model: households behave as one (common preference, or dictator); households pool resources </li></ul><ul><li>Collective model: different preferences within the household; members do not pool resources </li></ul><ul><li>Prediction of the collective model: one’s share of resources depends on bargaining power within household </li></ul>
  13. 13. What determines bargaining power within the household? <ul><li>Control over resources (assets) </li></ul><ul><li>Factors that can be used to influence bargaining process (legal rights, skills and knowledge, ability to acquire information, bargaining skills, use of violence) </li></ul><ul><li>Mobilization of personal networks </li></ul><ul><li>Basic attitudinal attributes (self-esteem, self-confidence, emotional satisfaction) </li></ul>
  14. 14. Proxies for bargaining power in empirical work <ul><li>Public provision of resources to particular hh member </li></ul><ul><li>Shares of income earned by women </li></ul><ul><li>Unearned income </li></ul><ul><li>Inherited assets </li></ul><ul><li>Assets at marriage </li></ul><ul><li>Current assets </li></ul>
  15. 15. Considerations in choosing a proxy indicator <ul><li>Exogeneity with respect to labor force participation or savings/accumulation decisions </li></ul><ul><li>Rules regarding assignment of asset ownership (legal, customary) </li></ul><ul><li>Marriage market selection </li></ul><ul><li>Cultural relevance of indicators </li></ul>
  16. 16. Focus on assets at marriage <ul><li>Assets at marriage important in many cultures; start of the new social and economic unit </li></ul><ul><li>Determined before decisions made within marriage </li></ul><ul><li>Can be affected by personal and family characteristics </li></ul>
  17. 17. Women bring less to the marriage than men 5.0 5.2 Years of schooling 0.7 2.1 Count of assets at marriage South Africa 5.5 6.4 Years of schooling 659.2 2615.0 Assets at marriage Guatemala 1.3 1.9 Years of schooling 461 2,739 Assets at marriage (1997 birr) Ethiopia 1.7 3.2 Years of schooling 7,064 81,929 Assets at marriage (1996 taka) Bangladesh Wife Husband
  18. 18. Cross-country analysis (Quisumbing and Maluccio OBES 2003) <ul><li>Do assets held by husband and wife affect household decisions on expenditures? </li></ul>
  19. 19. Do assets held by husband and wife affect household decisions on expenditures? <ul><li>Expenditure categories </li></ul><ul><li>Food budget share </li></ul><ul><li>Health budget share </li></ul><ul><li>Education budget share </li></ul><ul><li>Child clothing budget share </li></ul><ul><li>Cigarettes and alcohol budget </li></ul><ul><li>Determinants </li></ul><ul><li>total expenditure per capita </li></ul><ul><li>household size </li></ul><ul><li>demographic composition </li></ul><ul><li>men’s assets at marriage </li></ul><ul><li>men’s schooling </li></ul><ul><li>women’s assets at marriage </li></ul><ul><li>women’s schooling </li></ul>Controlling for total expenditure, test equality of coefficients of men’s and women’s assets at marriage/schooling Control for measurement error in assets using instrumental variables, with family background characteristics as instruments
  20. 20. Summary of expenditure shares regressions Wife-Husband Wife-Husband Positive Negative Positive Wife-Husband Negative Positive Wife-Husband Husband assets Wife assets Cigarettes/alcohol share Husband assets Wife assets Child clothes share Husband assets Positive Positive Wife assets Education share Negative Positive Husband assets Positive Wife assets Food share South Africa Ethiopia Sumatra, Indonesia Bangladesh
  21. 21. Using a gender perspective in program and project evaluations <ul><li>Quantitative methods </li></ul><ul><li>With and without design (comparable groups): impact of new agricultural technologies in Bangladesh </li></ul><ul><li>Matched groups design : compare children of working mothers, those in Hogares Comunitarios program and those outside, matched by age and sex (Guatemala) </li></ul><ul><li>Randomized assignment : control and treatment communities in evaluation of PROGRESA in Mexico </li></ul><ul><li>Qualitative methods </li></ul><ul><li>Focus groups in adopting/nonadopting villages </li></ul><ul><li>Focus groups of parents, madre ciudadoras, social workers, program staff </li></ul><ul><li>Focus groups of promotoras, beneficiary mothers </li></ul>
  22. 22. General Research Findings
  23. 23. Households do not act as one when making decisions <ul><li>Men and women do not always have the same preferences nor pool their resources </li></ul><ul><li>Men’s and women’s resources have different effects on household decisionmaking </li></ul><ul><li>Who is targeted affects the outcome of policy </li></ul>Source: Quisumbing and Maluccio, OBES 2003
  24. 24. Share of resources depends on bargaining power, but women control fewer resources than men
  25. 25. Local norms, not statutory laws, determine women’s rights <ul><li>Formal and informal legal and institutional frameworks are basis for women’s rights </li></ul><ul><li>In Ethiopia, local norms most important factor explaining distribution of assets upon divorce or death (Fafchamps and Quisumbing JDS 2002) </li></ul><ul><li>Local custom may evolve to become more beneficial to women, if women’s labor becomes more valuable (Quisumbing, Otsuka, Payongayong and Aidoo EDCC 2001) </li></ul>
  26. 26. Relative to men, increasing women’s resources benefits families <ul><li>Equalizing resources held by women and men can increase agricultural yields by up to 20% (Alderman et al. 1996) </li></ul><ul><li>Increases in women’s resources have the strongest effects on education, health, and nutrition (Hallman 2000; Smith et al. 2001) </li></ul><ul><li>Women’s social networks help families cope with income shocks (Maluccio et al. 2001) </li></ul>
  27. 27. Increasing women’s resources improves agricultural productivity <ul><li>Burkina Faso : Output of women’s plots, and total household output could be increased by 10-20% by reallocating resources from men’s plots to women’s plots (Alderman et al. 1996) </li></ul><ul><li>Ghana: strengthening women’s property rights increases incentives to adopt agroforestry and is good for environmental management </li></ul>
  28. 28. Improving women’s status and resources improves child health and nutrition Contributions to reductions in child malnutrition, 1970-95 Source: Smith and Haddad 2000
  29. 29. Innovative ways to increase women’s resources have made projects successful <ul><li>Examples include: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Credit and technologies targeted to women (Sharma 2001; Bouis et al. 1998) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Income transfers targeted to women (Skoufias and Mclafferty 2001; Adato et al. 2000) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Community day care programs (Ruel et al. 2001) </li></ul></ul>
  30. 30. Why does it make sense to pay attention to gender in your research? <ul><li>Because it just might make your research better! </li></ul>

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