christina seeberg elverfeldt - Agroforest Carbon Finance Schemes in Indonesia - Aug 2009
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Agroforest Carbon Finance Schemes in Indonesia - a Case Study in Central Sulawesi

Agroforest Carbon Finance Schemes in Indonesia - a Case Study in Central Sulawesi

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  • Land use changes: 1/3 of anthropogenic carbon emissions Indonesia 3rd largest greenhouse gas emitter Payments for Environmental Services (PES) Programmes
  • 87% of households are farmers i n villages

christina seeberg elverfeldt - Agroforest Carbon Finance Schemes in Indonesia - Aug 2009 christina seeberg elverfeldt - Agroforest Carbon Finance Schemes in Indonesia - Aug 2009 Presentation Transcript

  • Agroforest Carbon Finance Schemes in Indonesia - a Case Study in Central Sulawesi Christina Seeberg-Elverfeldt Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Rome, Italy University of Göttingen Göttingen, Germany 26 th August 2009 World Congress of Agroforestry 2009, Nairobi, Kenya
  • How much do you have to pay him to stop cutting the tree?
  • Problem statement Surroundings of Lore Lindu National Park in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia
  • Problem statement: Vicious cycle of poverty and deforestation Cocoa boom: 230% area increase in 20 years 30% of land acquired by clearing primary forest Poverty of local ethnic groups Encroachment & Deforestation Land sales to migrants Expenditures for ceremonial purposes
  • Objective
      • Assess the i mpact of carbon payments on smallholder households
      • Evaluate the potential of carbon credits to provide an incentive for adoption of sustainable land-use systems
      • Assess the potential of carbon payments to contribute to the conservation of the rainforest
    • 4 household classes (HH I ; HH II ; HH III ; HH IV ) characterised on basis of dominant cocoa agroforestry system
    • 4 cocoa agroforestry systems: I – II – III – IV
    • Linear programming model, maximising farm level gross margin
    Methodology I III II IV Shade tree cover Management intensity Sustainability
    • Characteristics of household classes
    Household class Attributes HH I HH II HH III HH IV Poverty Index Poorest Poor Poor Better-off Ethnicity (% migrants) 0 19 22 80
  • Results (1)
    • Scenario 1 & 2: Impact of carbon payments on household income
    Total Gross Margin – Baseline Situation 1€=11,500 IDR (2006) Scenario 1: Impact of carbon credits on TGM Scenario 2:Impact of carbon credits on TGM
  • Results (2)
    • Scenario 3: Incentives for environmentally friendly agroforestry systems
    • Carbon certificates: Price premiums for shade grown, biodiversity rich & sustainable cocoa agroforestry systems I and II
    Household Class HH I HH II HH III HH IV M inimum credit price ( CER /tCO 2 e ) € 14 € 27 € 32 € 185
  • Results (3)
    • Scenario 4: Incentives for rainforest conservation
    • Carbon certificates to prevent further deforestation activities (REDD)
    • Emission reduction from reduced deforestation may be among the least-expensive mitigation options available (IPCC 2007, Stern Review 2006)
    Household Class HH I HH II HH III HH IV Minimum credit price (CER/ tCO 2 e avoided) € 1 € 10 € 23 € 54
  • Conclusions
    • The impact of payments on households depends on the prices they obtain on the carbon markets
    • Solution to vicious cycle of deforestation & poverty: Target carbon sequestration payments to shade intensive agroforestry systems I & II
    • “ Win-Win-Win” situation:
      • income of poorest, local households increased
      • encroachment process at NP forest margin stopped
      • environmentally friendly land-use systems (carbon sequestration, biodiversity) promoted
  • Linear Programming Model Objective function: Maximise farm level gross margin 4 household classes (HH I – HH II - HH III - HH IV ) Data land-use systems Carbon annuity payments Agricultural activities Carbon budget cocoa & shade trees Resource endowments Carbon credits (tCER) 5 – 30 €/tCO 2 Assumptions...