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PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

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  • 1. Guardium Encryption for IMS dataDennis EichelbergerIT SpecialistIMS Advanced Technical Skillsdeichel@us.ibm.com 1 © 2011 IBM Corporation
  • 2. Topics • What are the business needs driving data protection • Intro to data protection terminology • An encryption solution from IBM for IMS databases2 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 3. The Primary Source of Breached Data are Database Servers Source of Records Breached (2012) All other sources <1% Desktop/Workstation 34% Mail server 2% Reg employee/end-user 1% Database server 96% Web/app server 80% 0 20 40 60 80 100 POS server 1% % of Records BreachedSource: http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2012_en_xg.pdf Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 4. LensCrafters -- Mainframe Breach Luxottica Group S.p.A. owns LensCrafters chain and worlds largest supplier of high-end eyewear Ray-Ban Polo Ralph Lauren Dolce & Gabbana Prada Donna Karan Versace brands Personally Identifiable Information (PII) for 59,419 employees stolen, with victims in all 50 states "Generally, mainframes are not accessible to the Internet, so the hacker most likely had to compromise other systems internally before getting to the mainframe," said Chris Petersen, a former IT auditor with Price Waterhouse and Ernst & Young.Sources: http://www.internetnews.com/security/article.php/3787431/Mainframe+Breach+at+LensCrafters+Parent+Hits+59K.htm http://privacy.wi.gov/databreaches/2008/nov08.jsp Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 5. LensCrafters -- Mainframe Breach “As mainframes become a major component in service-oriented architectures, they are increasingly exposed to malware. Web services on the mainframe have had a significant impact on security.” -SearchCompliance.com Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 6. TJX Companies -- Security Breach Parent company of T.J. Maxx, HomeGoods, Marshalls, etc. A security breach originally reported to have occurred in May of 2006 was not discovered until December of the same year A forensic investigation by IBM and General Dynamics showed the breach may have occurred in July of 2005 How much did the breach cost TJX Companies? • Initial estimate: $4.5B ($100 per stolen record) • Later estimate: Up to $300 per stolen recordSources: http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9014782/TJX_data_breach_At_45.6M_card_numbers_it_s_the_biggest_ever https://www.braintreepayments.com/blog/pci-compliance-and-the-cost-of-a-credit-card-breachhttp://www.informationweek.com/news/199203277 SearchCompliance.com Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 7. Certegy -- an Insider Tale  Certegy is a subsidiary of Fidelity National Information Services that provides check authorization & check cashing services, partly for the gaming industry  Senior DBA sold 8.5 million customer records containing the following for $580K to data broker Names Bank account info Addresses Credit card info Birth dates  Data theft came to light after retailer reported correlation between transactions and receipt of marketing offers by its customers • Certegy engaged the U.S. Secret Service, which found data had come from separate company owned by the Certegy DBA • “Why did it take Certegy more than five years to find out that confidential consumer information was being sucked out of its database?” (St. Petersburg Times)Sources: http://www.sptimes.com/2007/11/15/news_pf/Northpinellas/Largo_man_stole_data_.shtml http://www.prnewswire.com Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 8. Certegy -- an Insider Tale  Settled class-action suit for $4 million, plus: • $975,000 in fines from Attorney General • Mandatory security audit every year • 2 years of credit monitoring services ($180 per customer)  Rogue DBA sentenced to nearly 5 years in prisonSources: http://www.sptimes.com/2007/11/15/news_pf/Northpinellas/Largo_man_stole_data_.shtml http://www.prnewswire.com Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 9. Other Real-World Examples of Insider Threats Unauthorized changes to financial data • DBA accidentally deleted critical financial table during production hours (was doing a favor for application developer, bypassing change process) • Outsourcer erased logs showing he made changes during the day (because it was more convenient than during the night) Theft of sensitive data • Departing employees stealing design information & other intellectual property • DBAs and outsourcers selling customer information to competitors and crime syndicates Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 10. Other Real-World Examples of Insider Threats Internal fraud • Mortgage processor -- insider changed credit scores to make loans look better • Mobile telecom -- insider created & sold pre-paid phone cards • Electric utility -- insider gave free service to friends and family as part of low-income assistance program • Health provider -- insider sold medical identities for insurance fraud Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 11. The Smarter (& More Secure) Mainframe 71% of the Global 500 run on mainframes • 100% of the world’s top 50 banks • 22 of the top 25 retailers Unique IT value proposition • Efficiency, utilization & server consolidation • Proven reliability, availability & quality-of-service • z/OS with IMS, SAP, WebSphere, InfoSphere Warehouse, Cognos 8 BI, … • z/VM & Linux with Oracle, MySQL, Cognos, … • Virtualization Robust Security Model • Built-in encryption with hardware acceleration • z LPAR hosting is the only server with Common Criteria EAL5 certification • z/OS, RACF & Tivoli zSecure Audit protect access to system resources (CICS, DB2, IMS…) Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 12. Data Protection Drivers  Industry Compliance  Regulatory Compliance  Information Governance12 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 13. Industry Compliance Driving Data Protection  PCI “Payment Card Industry” compliance… • World-wide accepted standards that protect against credit card fraud - Requires adaptation of business controls to protect against compromising sensitive data • Examples of standards - Protect stored cardholder data - Restrict access to cardholder data by business on a “need-to-know” basis - Restrict physical access to cardholder data13 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 14. Industry Compliance Driving Data Protection  PCI “Payment Card Industry” compliance (cont’d) • PCI standards require sensitive personal information of credit card holders to be encrypted, including: - Account number - Expiration date - Name and address - Social Security number • Compressed data is not acceptable as data encryption14 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 15. Regulatory Compliance Driving Data Protection  Governmental Regulations • Basel III (2010-2011) − Measurement of total banking risk based on capital adequacy, stress tests and market liquidity risks • Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) • Strengthen financial reporting and internal controls by fixing responsibility within a companies’ management • HIPAA (1996) − Provide national standards for electronic health care records and secure those medical records, prove how they have been used and who has used them15 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 16. Regulatory Compliance Driving Data Protection  Governmental Regulations • Patriot Act (2001) - Prevent usage of the financial system to support illegal activities, particularly terrorism • Various anti-money laundering (AML) - Prevent the laundering of money derived from illegal activities • Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999) - Protection of personally identifiable financial information (PII)16 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 17. Data Protection - Not Just an Activity for One Group  Initial concerns and questions - What is the right database encryption solution? - Would the application need to be modified? - Would application performance be impacted? - Which group will own key management? - What is the security team’s role? - What is the audit team’s role? - What is IMS systems programmer role? - What is the DBA’s role?17 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 18. Focal Areas for a Strong Security Strategy  Encrypting the data • Reduce the liability even if data is accessed, using encryption reduces the usability of that data  Monitoring access to the data • Have visibility to data access -- identify who accessed data, when it was accessed or updated18 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 19. What is Encryption?  Data that is not encrypted is referred to as “clear text”  Clear text is encrypted by processing with a “key” and an encryption algorithm • Several standard algorithms exist including DES, TDES and AES  Keys are bit streams that vary in length • For example AES supports 128, 192 and 256 bit key lengths19 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 20. What is Encryption?  Encryption is a process where clear-text is converted using a known ALGORITHM • AES • DES • TDES  A key is used in the encryption process to produce CYPHERTEXT and can be either a: • Clear key • Secure key20 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 21. Encryption is a technique used to help protect data from unauthorized access Encryption Process Clear Text Encryption algorithm Ciphertext (e.g. AES) (Encrypted Data) Key Decryption Process Ciphertext Encryption algorithm Clear Text Key  Data that is not encrypted is referred to as “clear text”  Clear text is encrypted by processing with a “key” and an encryption algorithm – Several standard algorithms exist, include DES, TDES and AES (next slide)  Keys are bit streams that vary in length – For example AES supports 128, 192 and 256 bit key lengths21 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 22. Encryption Algorithms – Which Ones Are Best?  DES (Data Encryption Standard) − 56-bit, viewed as weak and generally unacceptable today by the NIST  TDES (Triple Data Encryption Standard) − 128-bit, universally accepted algorithm  AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) − 128- or 256- bit, newest commercially used algorithm  What is acceptable? – DES is viewed as unacceptable – TDES is viewed as acceptable and compliant with NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) – AES 128 or 256 is also viewed as acceptable and strategic22 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 23. Encryption Algorithms – Which Ones Are Best?  For more information: – TDES NIST Special Publication 800-67 V1 entitled "Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher" and can be found at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf – TDES NIST FIPS Publication 197 entitled "Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)" and can be found at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf23 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 24. Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility (ICSF)  Provides: z/OS integrated software support for data encryption  Operating System S/W API Interface to Cryptographic Hardware − CEX2/3C hardware feature  Enhanced Key Management for key creation and distribution − Public and private keys − Secure and clear keys − Master keys  Created keys are stored/accessed in the Cryptographic Key Data Set (CKDS) with unique key label − CKDS itself is secured via Security Access Facility  See Reference Section of this presentation for more details24 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 25. What are Encryption Keys?  Master Keys – Used to generate, encrypt, and store user keys into the CKDS (Cryptographic Key Data Set) – Loaded into the CEX2/3C hardware, and stored NO WHERE else  User Keys (Data Encrypting Keys) – Generated via ICSF services – Stored inside the CKDS – Public or Private – Clear or Secure – Used by the IBM InfoSphere Guardium Encryption Tool along with encryption algorithm to convert user data to Ciphertext25 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 26. Cryptography on z/OS  Clear Key  Secure Key – Key is exposed in the storage – Key is only ever exposed in of processor bounds of a secure processor – Can be viewed in dump of – Can never be seen in storage storage – Dump will not reveal key – If correctly interpreted can – Key is held encrypted under expose data Master key – Sometimes acceptable for – Crypto Express 2/3 (Configured short-lived keys with other as CEX2/3C) provides this constraints function for System z – Used in software-based  Fee based option cryptography – APIs available via Integrated – Used by CPACF Cryptographic Support Facility (ICSF) – Can be used from Java on z/OS platform26 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 27. Encryption in a Nutshell How can you as an IMS Support person achieve this ?27 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 28. InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption for DB2 and IMS Databases InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption protects Sensitive and Private information minimizing the liability risks associated with Information Governance. High Performance and Low overhead by using the available cryptographic hardware Uses the major encryption algorithms Conforms to the existing z/OS security model Complies with Security and Privacy regulations Implementation at the IMS segment level No changes to application programs28 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 29. InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption for DB2 and IMS Databases To create an exit that encrypts and decrypts IMS data, the Tool can be implemented in one of two ways: 1) Through JCL. The product provides sample jobs where the JCL can be modified to meet your needs for encrypted IMS databases. These jobs can be found in the distribution libraries: DECIMSSK – IMS Secure Key DECIMSCK – Clear Key DES DECIMSCB – Clear and Secure Key AES DECIMSDV – Driver exit for compressed and encrypted IMS segment DECIMSJB – IMS Clear Key 2) Using the ISPF interface. ISPF panels are presented to you to create customized jobs for encrypting non-compressed and compressed IMS database segments.29 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 30. InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption for DB2 and IMS Databases  Implementation steps − Create an encryption key − Create an encryption exit − Unload database to be encrypted − Generate and install DBD with encryption exit − Reload database using the new DBD30 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 31. InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption – ISPF Main Menu Selections: 1 = use to create an encryption exit that will be used standalone; that is without co-existence with a compression routine 2 = use to create both an encryption exit and a driver module to call an existing compression routine then the encryption exit31 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 32. InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption – ISPF Definition for Creating Encryption Exit IMS Clear key selected Encryption routine is called Usual DSECRYPT Jobcard The label (name) of the Encryption key that has CSF lib = Installation Encryption dataset been previously created by ZAP lib = Dataset containing AMASPZAP program a security administrator SMP lib = Guardium load dataset EXIT lib = Load dataset for Encryption exit Exit Name = Load module name for Encryption exit32 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 33. InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption – ISPF Definition for Creating Encryption Exit ISPF created linkjob for encryption exit creation (step 1) Encryption routine is called DSECRYPT33 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 34. InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption – ISPF Creating Zap Job for Encryption Exit Key Encryption key label used Encryption routine is called by DSECRYPT exit DSECRYPT34 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 35. InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption – DBD Definition with Encryption Exit Encryption routine is called DSECRYPT The COMPRTN is added to the DBD source to invoke encryption Note, that only DATA is being encrypted here35 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 36. InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption – Browse of IMS HDAM Database with Clear Data Clear data36 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 37. InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption for DB2 and IMS Databases  Implementation steps − Unload database − Generate and install DBD with encryption exit − Reload database using the new DBD37 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 38. InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption – Browse of IMS HDAM Database with Encrypted Data Encrypted data38 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 39. InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption  Protects sensitive and private data  Reduces liability risks  Uses the available cryptographic hardware  Conforms to the existing z/OS security model  Complies with Security and Privacy regulations  Implementation at the IMS segment level  Implemented using standard IMS procedures and exits39 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 40. InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption  Protects sensitive and private data  Reduces liability risks  Uses the available cryptographic hardware  Conforms to the existing z/OS security model  Complies with Security and Privacy regulations  Implementation at the IMS segment level  Implemented using standard IMS procedures and exits40 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 41. Reference Section Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 42. Cryptography on z/OS  Clear Key  Secure Key – Key is exposed in the storage – Key is only ever exposed in of processor bounds of a secure processor – Can be viewed in dump of – Can never be seen in storage storage – Dump will not reveal key – If correctly interpreted can – Key is held encrypted under expose data Master key – Sometimes acceptable for – Crypto Express 2/3 (Configured short-lived keys with other as CEX2/3C) provides this constraints function for System z – Used in software-based  Fee based option cryptography – APIs available via Integrated – Used by CPACF Cryptographic Support Facility (ICSF) – Can be used from Java on z/OS platform42 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 43. CKDS – Cryptographic Key Dataset  Key element of the IBM encryption solution on z/OS  VSAM Key Sequenced Dataset  Contents are ICSF generated data encrypted keys  Accessed by ICSF API and Services − Key Label (known by application requestor) used to find key record in the CKDS  Copy of CKDS cached in operating system storage at first ICSF invocation for performance − Refreshable  CKDS administration performed using ICSF services and ISPF interfaces.  Use of specific individual keys can be controlled via RACF profiles and permissions  CEX2/3C hardware feature required for use − Unless with a combination of HCR7751 or greater and clear key only, then CEX2/3C is optional43 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 44. IMS Data Encryption for IMS and DB2 Databases The following restrictions apply:  An IMS segment can be associated with only one Segment Edit/Compression exit. If your IMS segment is already associated with a non-IBM Segment Edit/Compression exit and you want to implement Data Encryption for IMS and DB2 Databases, you must code an alternative solution for your existing exit.  HIDAM index databases cannot be encrypted (the IMS DBD COMPRTN) parameter does not allow index databases to be specified on the Segment Edit/Compression exit). Administrators of data governance should consider the following points:  When you install and initialize ICSF, consider setting the CHECKAUTH installation option to NO. Setting CHECKAUTH to YES adds considerable CPU path length. Setting KEYAUTH to YES also adds CPU path length.  Depending on your security requirements, you can define different encryption key labels for as many segments as you need to. (Encryption key labels are set up by your security analyst.)  A separate exit must be built for each encryption key label that you define. Note that you need to balance your security requirements against the increased maintenance of multiple exits.  The first time that you use Segment Edit/Compression exits at your installation, your system programmer needs to provide APF authorization for the Segment Edit/Compression EXITLIB.  If you are already using Segment Edit/Compression exits, you need to ensure that the Segment Edit/Compression exits reside in an APF-authorized EXITLIB.44 Copyrite IBM 2013
  • 45. Details About Clear Key Versus Secure Key Performance  Clear key elapsed time performance is MUCH superior than secure key.  Secure key (performed inside the CEX2C) is generally viewed as more secure from a cryptographic perspective.  Clear key uses special instructions that run on the z9 – z10 general purpose processors, so performance is measured in milliseconds.  Secure key encryption is dispatched to run on the cryptographic coprocessors on the CEX2C crypto feature. This tends to be measured in microseconds as this is essentially an I/O operation.  Secure key elapsed time measurements (depending on workload and type) can be from 10x to 40x more than clear key.  Secure key is probably NOT appropriate for most (to date all) OLTP workloads, but each customer needs to make this encryption decision based on their security requirements and performance expectations45 Copyrite IBM 2013

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