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1Made by Elder Nick Quan of Period 4                                      2                                      3        ...
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No question has tantalized historians of the wartime period more than thisone. Did Roosevelt know the Japanese were going ...
No question has tantalized historians of the wartime period more than thisone. Did Roosevelt know the Japanese were going ...
No question has tantalized historians of the wartime period more than thisone. Did Roosevelt know the Japanese were going ...
2
Neither view is seamless, and the reality may lie in a combination of two, withsuch factors as human frailty, overconfiden...
Neither view is seamless, and the reality may lie in a combination of two, withsuch factors as human frailty, overconfiden...
3
Were these provocations to force Japan into war, or sensible reactions toJapanese aggression in China and elsewhere in Asi...
Were these provocations to force Japan into war, or sensible reactions toJapanese aggression in China and elsewhere in Asi...
4
There is no longer any doubt that some Americans knew that “Zero Hour,” asthe Japanese ambassador to Washington called the...
There is no longer any doubt that some Americans knew that “Zero Hour,” asthe Japanese ambassador to Washington called the...
5
Many Americans, including Roosevelt, dismissed the Japanese as combatpilots because they were all presumed to be “nearsigh...
Many Americans, including Roosevelt, dismissed the Japanese as combatpilots because they were all presumed to be “nearsigh...
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WWII Pacific: Pearl Harbor

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Wh 10 wwii pacific 4 pearl harbor - dont know much about history

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Transcript of "WWII Pacific: Pearl Harbor"

  1. 1. 1Made by Elder Nick Quan of Period 4 2 3 4 5
  2. 2. 1
  3. 3. No question has tantalized historians of the wartime period more than thisone. Did Roosevelt know the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor, and did 1he deliberately allow the attack that took more than 2,000 American lives?
  4. 4. No question has tantalized historians of the wartime period more than thisone. Did Roosevelt know the Japanese were going to attack Pear Harbor, and did 1he deliberately allow the attack that took more than 2,000 American lives? There are two basic views about America’s entry into the war. The first saythat FDR was preoccupied with the war in Europe and didn’t want war with Japan.American strategic thinking, perhaps reflecting Anglo-Saxon racism about Japaneseabilities, dismissed the Japanese military threat. Hitler is a much bigger threat than Tojo. I don’t need to worry about Japan.
  5. 5. No question has tantalized historians of the wartime period more than thisone. Did Roosevelt know the Japanese were going to attack Pear Harbor, and did 1he deliberately allow the attack that took more than 2,000 American lives? There are two basic views about America’s entry into the war. The first saythat FDR was preoccupied with the war in Europe and didn’t want war with Japan.American strategic thinking, perhaps reflecting Anglo-Saxon racism about Japaneseabilities, dismissed the Japanese military threat. The other says that FDR view Japan, allied to the German-Italian Axis, ashis entrée into the European war. This stand holds that FDR made a series ofcalculation provocations that pushed Japan into war with America. The ultimateconclusion to this view is that FDR knew of the imminent Japanese attack on PearlHarbor and not only failed to prevent it, but welcomed it as the turning point thatwould end isolationist obstruction of his war plans. Back to Main
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  7. 7. Neither view is seamless, and the reality may lie in a combination of two, withsuch factors as human frailty, overconfidence on both sides, and the tensions of a world 2already at war thrown in. You might also cast a vote for historical inevitability. Aclash between Japan and the United States and other Western nations over control ofthe economy and resources of the Far East and Pacific was bound to happen. A smallisland with limited resources but great ambitions, Japan had to reach out to control itsdestiny. That put it on a collision course with the Western nations that had established acolonial presence in the Pacific and Asia, and had their own plans for exploiting that partof the world.
  8. 8. Neither view is seamless, and the reality may lie in a combination of two, withsuch factors as human frailty, overconfidence on both sides, and the tensions of a world 2already at war thrown in. You might also cast a vote for historical inevitability. Aclash between Japan and the United States and other Western nations over control ofthe economy and resources of the Far East and Pacific was bound to happen. A smallisland with limited resources but great ambitions, Japan had to reach out to control itsdestiny. That put it on a collision course with the Western nations that had established acolonial presence in the Pacific and Asia, and had their own plans for exploiting that partof the world. With that in mind, there are certain facts that remain. Japanese-Americanrelations were bad in the 1930s, and worsened when the Japanese sank an Americanwarship, the Panay, on the Yangtze River late in 1937, a clear violation of all treaties andan outright act of war. But America was not ready to go to war over a single ship.Attempting to influence the outcome of China’s struggle against Japan, Rooseveltloaned money to the Nationalists in China and began to ban exports to Japan ofcertain goods that eventually included gasoline, scrap iron, and oil. $ Loans money Back to Main
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  10. 10. Were these provocations to force Japan into war, or sensible reactions toJapanese aggression in China and elsewhere in Asia? Historical opinion divides on 3this point. It is clear that moderation on either side might have prevailed. But in theUnited States, the Secretary of State was demanding complete Japanese withdrawalfrom their territorial conquests. At the same time in Japan, hawkish militants led byGeneral Hideki Tojo (1884-1948) had gained power. Moderation was tossed aside andthe two speeding engines continued on a runaway collision course. Historical Opinion
  11. 11. Were these provocations to force Japan into war, or sensible reactions toJapanese aggression in China and elsewhere in Asia? Historical opinion divides on 3this point. It is clear that moderation on either side might have prevailed. But in theUnited States, the Secretary of State was demanding complete Japanese withdrawalfrom their territorial conquests. At the same time in Japan, hawkish militants led byGeneral Hideki Tojo (1884-1948) had gained power. Moderation was tossed aside andthe two speeding engines continued on a runaway collision course. By late in 1941, it was more than apparent that war was coming from Japan.American and foreign diplomats in Japan dispatched frequent warnings about theJapanese mood. And more significantly, the Japanese diplomatic coder had beenbroken by American intelligence. Almost all messages between Tokyo and itsembassy in Washington were being intercepted and understood by Washington. Embassy Japan sends/ Agencies sends/ receives intercept receives messages messages, messages translates and reads them. Then sends themJapan to their recipients. Embassy in Washington Back to Main Intelligence Agencies
  12. 12. 4
  13. 13. There is no longer any doubt that some Americans knew that “Zero Hour,” asthe Japanese ambassador to Washington called the planned attack, was scheduled to 4December 7. They even knew it would come at Pearl Harbor. According to JohnToland’s account of Pearl Harbor, Infamy, Americans had not only broken the Japanesecode, but the Dutch had done so as well, and their warnings had been passed on toWashington. A British double agent code-named Tricycle had also sent explicit warningsto the United States.
  14. 14. There is no longer any doubt that some Americans knew that “Zero Hour,” asthe Japanese ambassador to Washington called the planned attack, was scheduled to 4December 7. They even knew it would come at Pearl Harbor. According to JohnToland’s account of Pearl Harbor, Infamy, Americans had not only broken the Japanesecode, but the Dutch had done so as well, and their warnings had been passed on toWashington. A British double agent code-named Tricycle had also sent explicit warningsto the United States. Here is where human frailty and overconfidence, and even American racismtake over. Most American military minds expected a Japanese attack to come in thePhilippines, America’s major base in the Pacific; the American naval fortifications atPearl Harbor on Oahu were believed to be too strong to attack, as well as too far awayfor the Japanese. The commanders there prepared for an attack by saboteurs, whichexplains why the battleships were packed together in the harbor, surrounded defensivelyby smaller vessels, and why planes were parked in neat rows in the middle of the airstripat Hickam Field, ready to be blasted by Japanese bombing runs. Back to Main
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  16. 16. Many Americans, including Roosevelt, dismissed the Japanese as combatpilots because they were all presumed to be “nearsighted.” The excellence of their eyes 5and flying abilities came as an expensive surprise to the American military. There wasalso a sense that any attack on Pearl Harbor would be easily repulsed. The Japanesewould get a bad spanking, and America would still get the war it wanted in Europe.Whether or not the attack was invited and specific warnings were ignored, the completedevastation of the American forces at Pearl Harbor was totally unexpected. Even today,the tally of that attack is astonishing. Eighteen ships were sunk or seriously damaged,including eight battleships. Of these eight, six were later salvaged. Nearly two hundredairplanes were destroyed on the ground, and 2,403 people died that morning, nearly halfof them aboard the battleship Arizona, which took a bomb down its smokestack andwent to the bottom in minutes.
  17. 17. Many Americans, including Roosevelt, dismissed the Japanese as combatpilots because they were all presumed to be “nearsighted.” The excellence of their eyes 5and flying abilities came as an expensive surprise to the American military. There wasalso a sense that any attack on Pearl Harbor would be easily repulsed. The Japanesewould get a bad spanking, and America would still get the war it wanted in Europe.Whether or not the attack was invited and specific warnings were ignored, the completedevastation of the American forces at Pearl Harbor was totally unexpected. Even today,the tally of that attack is astonishing. Eighteen ships were sunk or seriously damaged,including eight battleships. Of these eight, six were later salvaged. Nearly two hundredairplanes were destroyed on the ground, and 2,403 people died that morning, nearly halfof them aboard the battleship Arizona, which took a bomb down its smokestack andwent to the bottom in minutes. A day after the attack, Roosevelt delivered his war message to Congress. Thelong-running battle between isolationists and interventionists was over. Back to Main
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