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Tamil Insurgency & Sri Lankan Army Action Against it

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  • 1. 1
  • 2. Sri Lankan Armed Forces Campaign Against Tamil Insurgents 2
  • 3. expressed their grievances through political channels, and later in the 1970s encouraged by many external and THEME regional players, resorted to violence and terrorism. Peace overtures by Sri Lankan Government did not bear any result and armed conflict sparked on. Suicide attacks and protracted insurgency also resulted into hundreds of civilian and military casualties. Sri Lankan Armed Forces finally accomplished decisive victory in this counter insurgency campaign by end of May 2009, bringing about total subjugation of the rebels along with elimination of the terrorist leadership. It had truly been a tale of unflinching national spirit, military professionalism and resolve for sacrifices by the Sri Lankan armed forces and public alike. Above in view, carry out analysis of the Tamil 3 insurgency in Sri Lanka examining its back ground,
  • 4. Sri Lankan Armed Forces Campaign Against Tamil Insurgents 4
  • 5. IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MOST MERCIFUL 5
  • 6. Introduction • The pearl of Indian ocean. • Target of a ruthless insurgent movement • Sri Lanka fielded a series of responses • Episode of violence, grief and death 6
  • 7. Introduction • The worst face of terrorism • LTTE had evolved into a globally prominent organization 7
  • 8. Introduction • Managed suicide killing of two head of states • LTTE stood strong enough to hold its own naval fleet 8
  • 9. Introduction • May 2009, witnessed a decisive victory by Sri Lankan Armed Forces • LTTE laying down their arms and accepting defeat • Elimination of insurgent leadership leaving disorder 9
  • 10. Aim To present the analysis of Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka with a view to draw pertinent lessons for dealing with terrorism 10
  • 11. SEQUENCE Part – I Tamil Insurgency – Its Rise and Support LT HASAN Part – II Past Measures for Conflict Resolution LT TAFSEER Part – III Change in Strategy LT HABIB Part – IV Analysis & Lessons Learnt LT ANEES 11
  • 12. PART – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE & SUPPORT Contents Genesis of LTTE Role of Tamil Diaspora and India Conclusions Genesis of LTTE Conclusions Role of Tamil Diaspora and India Preview 12
  • 13. History Of Sri Lanka Is Marked By Inveterate Mutual Fear Sinhalese Part - I Tamil 13
  • 14. In The Pre Colonial Era • Small Sinhalese Kingdoms in the centre and South • Tamil kingdom in the North of the island Part - I 14
  • 15. INDIA Jaffna SRI LANKA Part - I 15
  • 16. Four Centuries Of Colonial Rule British 1815-1948 Dutch 1658-1796 Portuguese 1505-1638 Part - I 16
  • 17. Three Main Steps Emergence of LTTE 1956 Sinhala Only Act 1972 1972 Late 70s Revival of Isolation of Tamils Sinhalese Nationalism THE TIPPING POINT IN THE CONFLICT
  • 18. Emergence Of LTTE • LTTE came into existence in 1974 • Prabhakaran was the founding member Part - I 18
  • 19. THREE MAIN REASONS FOR SURVIVAL • Other groups were MarxistLeninist • They entered mainstream following Indo – Lanka accord of 1987 • LTTE systematically lobbied for assistance from the Tamil Diaspora Part - I 19
  • 20. Organization Part - I 20
  • 21. Central Governing Committee Central Governing Committee Political Wing Part - I Military Wing Interna tional Wing 21
  • 22. Military Wing Army Intelligence Navy Special Forces Air Force Black Tigers
  • 23. Political Wing  Political Wing formed the second tier of LTTE’s organization Part - I 23
  • 24. International Secretariat Propaganda Wing Part - I Fund Raising Ariyana Group Arms Procurement (KP Department) 24
  • 25. Tactics Part - I 25
  • 26. Pause And Pounce “Action and inaction” was the leitmotif of LTTE’s modus operandi against SLF Part - I 26
  • 27. Outsourcing LTTE made use of “Outsourcing” to gain maximum benefit Part - I 27
  • 28. Suicide Bombing • An asymmetric strategy • Not a religious phenomenon for LTTE • Types of suicide missions Part - I 28
  • 29. Gender Manipulation • LTTE used gender manipulation to improve combat efficiency • The women were grouped with small male teams • To ensure that the men fought for winning the admiration Part - I 29
  • 30. Political Assassinations • LTTE carried numerous out high profile assassinations • Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India • President Premadasa of Sri Lanka Part - I 30
  • 31. Tamil Diaspora • As of 2001, Tamil Diaspora around the globe was 600,000 to 800,000 strong • 23 to 30% of global Tamil population Part - I 31
  • 32. Tamil Diaspora • 250,000 Tamils in North America alone • 200,000 Tamils resided in Europe • Almost 30,000 in Australia • The Tamil Diaspora is highly educated and occupies professional jobs Part - I 32
  • 33. Indian Role Indian involvement in the conflict was underpinned by its interest in the region 33
  • 34. Reasons For Involvement • Sri Lankan overtures towards West, caused worry • To placate the Indian Tamil population • India was not interested in Tamil independence Part - I 34
  • 35. Support Provided • 32 training camps operating all over India INDIA Part - I 35
  • 36. Change In Indian Approach • Indian policy makers soon realised that their policy could backfire • India withdrew its official support after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi INDIA Part - I 36
  • 37. CONCLUSIONS TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT Part - I 37
  • 38. Sinhalese-Tamil Rivalry • Sinhalese-Tamil rivalry has its roots in the history beyond the colonial rule • Rivalry kept simmering during the colonial period and gained momentum in post independence era Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 38
  • 39. Sinhalese Nationalism • Tamils initially democratic path • Revival of Nationalism pursued Sinhalese Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 39
  • 40. LTTE Emergence • Astute leadership, steadfastness to Tamil nationalism and strong link with Diaspora; enabled LTTE to emerge as the leading resistance group Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 40
  • 41. LTTE Organizational Structure • LTTE developed an elaborate organizational structure • That held them in good stead during the three decade long civil war Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 41
  • 42. LTTE - Novel Tactics • Militarily, LTTE never failed to innovate and obfuscate security forces with its novel tactics • It gave new dimensions to suicide bombing Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 42
  • 43. Tamil Diaspora • Tamil Diaspora supported the insurgency possible through legitimate all and illegitimate means • The war can rightly be termed as the “Diaspora funded war” Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 43
  • 44. Indian Involvement • Indian involvement in the conflict was based on self interest • Tamils misinterpreted Indian involvement and tried to invoke the 1971 war Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 44
  • 45. Indian Involvement • Indians, were never interested in the Tamil Eelam • Would have encouraged Tamil population in India to raise demand for independence Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 45
  • 46. PART – II Political And Military Response Contents 1. Political Response 2. Military Response 3. Conclusions
  • 47. Thimpu Talks SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT Peace Talks TAMIL MILITANTS Part - II TAMIL POLITICIANS JULY 1985 47
  • 48. Fighting continued between two sides and Sri Lankan forces managed to corner LTTE in Jaffna Part - II 48
  • 49. Indian Sponsored Peace Talks • Indo-Lankan agreement at Colombo in Jul 1987 • Indian forces were never welcomed by either side Part - II 49
  • 50. Indian Sponsored Peace Talks • Extremist JVP loathed presence of Indian forces • LTTE started ambushing Indian Forces and abandoned the truce Part - II 50
  • 51. Indian Sponsored Peace Talks • Forms the basis of “Op Pawan” by IPKF • President Premadasa demanded immediate withdrawal of IPKF on 2nd January 1989 Part - II 51
  • 52. Indian Sponsored Peace Talks • Rajiv Gandhi refused to withdraw IPKF • V P Singh in December 1989, declared the policy as utter failure Part - II 52
  • 53. Eelam War II • Newly elected government of Chandrika Kumaratunga offer peace talks • Policy of military engagement with the Tigers • Retaking the control of Jaffna from insurgents Part - II 53
  • 54. 1994 Peace Talks • President Kumaratunga initiated peace talks in 1994 • Short lived cease fire took place but failed Part - II 54
  • 55. Reasons • Lack of sincerity • Lack of professionalism • Lack of flexibility Part - II 55
  • 56. Eelam War III • Failure of 1994 talks led to Eelam War III • LTTE resorted to shoulder fired anti aircraft, “Stinger Missiles” • Hit two Sri Lankan planes flying over Jaffna Part - II 56
  • 57. Operation Jayasikurui Operation terminated in 1999 without meeting all its objectives Part - II 57
  • 58. Norwegian Sponsored Peace Talks SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT CEASE FIRE AGGREEMENT Part - II LTTE 58
  • 59. Critical Issues • LTTE’s exclusion from reconstruction talks • Tamil people were not receiving the full economic benefits of peace • Tamil held areas are not as peaceful Part - II 59
  • 60. Parliamentary Elections – 2005 • Mahindra Rajapakse offered to hold unconditional peace talks in 2005 • LTTE instead announced refresh war effort Part - II 60
  • 61. Peace Dialogue Peace talks started from 28-29 Oct 2006 but the peace talks broke down Part - II 62
  • 62. Eelam War IV • Resolved not to hold talks • Pursue the military option • Leadership is not interested in a peaceful coexistence • In 2006 fighting officially resumed after a cease fire Part - II 63
  • 63. Eelam War IV • Continued fighting led to territorial gains • Operation is termed as Eelam War IV • Changed Sri Lankan strategy started to pay dividends Part - II 64
  • 64. CONCLUSIONS POLITICAL AND MILITARY RESPONSE 65
  • 65. Failure Of Peace Negotiations Attributed to LTTE’s belief that they could achieve political goals through violence and intimidation Part – II Political and Military Response 66
  • 66. Lacked Sincerity Of Purpose Both came to the negotiations table only because of either external pressure or to achieve some shortterm gains Part – II Political and Military Response 67
  • 67. Display Flexibility • To reach a compromise solution • Agenda should widen as the negotiations proceed to maintain confidence in the process Part – II Political and Military Response 68
  • 68. Role Of IPKF • IPKF failed to bring peace in Sri Lanka • LTTE considered the agreement has deflected their goal to establish independent Tamil State Part – II Political and Military Response 69
  • 69. Role Civil Society • • • • Crucial for any settlement to ethnic conflicts People’s voice was weak in Sri Lanka Be informed of the broad contours of the talks Broad-basing of negotiations will weaken manipulation Part – II Political and Military Response 70
  • 70. Change In Strategy • Paid the dividends in the form of complete eradication of LTTE leadership • Army this time focused on elimination of LTTE leadership instead Part – II Political and Military Response 71
  • 71. PART – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY Part Part Part 1 2 3 Change in Political Thinking Change in Military Strategy Conclusions
  • 72. Past Political Strategy • Mounting pressure by the International community • Straight forward military strategy could not be formulated • Insufficient provision of equipment and logistics • Lack of international and regional interagency and security cooperation Part – III 74
  • 73. Past Political Strategy • Weak agencies to develop frontline intelligence • Lack of political commitment Part – III 75
  • 74. THE NEW STRATEGY 76
  • 75. Nuanced Political Approach • LTTE invited to negotiation table • LTTE’s unwillingness to implement peace accords • International community tried to force the government • Resisted all such external pressures Part – III 77
  • 76. Model Of Fighting Terrorism “Given the political will, the military can crush terrorism” Part – III 78
  • 77. Model Of Fighting Terrorism • • • • • • • • Unwavering political will Disregard for biased international opinion No negotiations with forces of terror Improved flow of conflict information Absence of political intervention Complete operational freedom Accent on young commanders Kept the regional countries in the loop Part – III 79
  • 78. Proactive Foreign Policy • • • • To gain support of international community To create awareness in support of official stance Complete support from China, Russia and Pakistan Keeping United States, India and Europe neutral Part – III 80
  • 79. Change In Military Strategy Part – III 81
  • 80. Change In Military Strategy • Unconventional war, in a conventional mode Part – III 82
  • 81. Change In Military Strategy • Transform the national security doctrine, training and weaponry Part – III 83
  • 82. Change In Military Strategy CONVENTIONAL GUERI LLA TRANSFORMATION Part – III 84
  • 83. NAVAL Strategy Part – III 85
  • 84. Air Strategy • Continuous raids on identified LTTE fortifications and nerve centers • Sri Lankan Air force did well to counter LTTE air threat Part – III 86
  • 85. Land Forces Strategy • Focused on destroying terrorists instead of capturing the territory Part – III 87
  • 86. Operational Level • Focused on supporting huge logistic demands for tactical level operations Part – III 88
  • 87. Tactical Level • Shifted from large scale operations to small scale platoon and section level operations Part – III 89
  • 88. Tactical Level • Multi pronged attacks to paralyze Tamil resistance Part – III 90
  • 89. Morale Of Troops • Good training • Effective casualty evacuation plans Part – III 91
  • 90. Brief Account Of Operations • Military offensive commenced in February 2007 which continued up to March 2009 and finally concluded in May 2009 • LTTE command structure completely destroyed Part – III 92
  • 91. Brief Account Of Operations Part – III 93
  • 92. xx 53 February 2007 55 TF xx 57 58 Part – III TF TF xx TF 59 94
  • 93. xx 53 February 2007 55 August 2008 TF TF xx 57 58 Part – III TF TF xx 59 95
  • 94. xx 53 February 2007 55 August 2008 November 2008 xx 58 TF TF TF Part – III TF xx 59 96
  • 95. xx 53 February 2007 August 2008 November 2008 55 xx 58 January 2009 TF TF TF Part – III TF xx 59 97
  • 96. February 2007 August 2008 November 2008 January 2009 March 2009 Part – III 98
  • 97. CONCLUSIONS CHANGE IN STRATEGY Part – III 99
  • 98. Unwavering Political Will Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY 100
  • 99. Foreign Policy • Undeterred by international pressure • Continued with its policy • Limiting the diplomatic damage through astute diplomacy Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY 101
  • 100. Warfare Transformation • Embarked upon a transformation process from conventional to irregular warfare • Under the dynamic leadership of the Army Chief General Fonseka Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY 102
  • 101. Warfare Transformation • Multipronged, unconventional in nature • Based on sub unit level actions instead of large scale conventional assaults Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY 103
  • 102. Personal Supervision • Personally supervised operations • Maintained touch with field commanders • Appointed young commander to infuse enthusiasm Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY 104
  • 103. Role Of Navy • By choking LTTE’s lifeline through sea Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY 105
  • 104. Role Of Air Force • Precision strikes against insurgents and by destroying elements of LTTE Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY 106
  • 105. PART IV ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT AND LESSONS LEARNT Contents • Political Aspects Military Aspects
  • 106. Causes Of Sri Lankan Success • Two decades in the conflict • Neither side was strong enough to overcome the other Part – IV 108
  • 107. Causes Of Sri Lankan Success Change in strategy came three years ago MOB TACTICS INTELLIGENCE YOUNG COMMANDERS Part – IV 109
  • 108. Political Aspects • To defeat terrorism, all political forces must develop consensus Part – IV 110
  • 109. Strong And Proactive Foreign Policy FOREIGN POLICY Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS 111
  • 110. Consistency In Handling The Conflict 1974 1983 1987 CONSISTENCY 1993 1994 1997 2009 Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS 112
  • 111. No Ceasefire/ Peace Agreements Refit Regroup Re-Arm Re-Supply Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS 113
  • 112. Curtail External Support Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS 114
  • 113. Economic Aspects Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS 115
  • 114. Military Aspects Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 116
  • 115. Clear Objectives Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 117
  • 116. Adaptable Tactical Plans Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 118
  • 117. Secrecy In Operational Planning Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 119
  • 118. Choose Men To Bring Effects Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 120
  • 119. Intelligence Gathering Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 121
  • 120. Coordinated Joint Operations Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 122
  • 121. SUSTAINED MILITARY BUILDUP Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 123
  • 122. LESSONS
  • 123. Political Lessons Part – IV 125
  • 124. National And Political Will Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 126
  • 125. Proactive/ Clear Foreign Policy FOREIGN POLICY Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 127
  • 126. Concessions Will Not Defeat Terrorism Resupply Rearm Re-group Re-fit Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 128
  • 127. Curtail Foreign Support Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 129
  • 128. Regional Cooperation On Security/ Intelligence Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 130
  • 129. Media Handling Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 131
  • 130. Border Control Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 132
  • 131. ENHANCEMENT OF LEAS ANTI TERRORISM CAPACITY Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 133
  • 132. Modernization Of Intelligence Agencies Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 134
  • 133. Strategy For Stability After War Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 135
  • 134. MILITARY LESSONS Part – IV 136
  • 135. Clear Aim And Objectives Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 137
  • 136. Doctrine For LIC Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 138
  • 137. Establishing Special Warfare Center Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 139
  • 138. Procurement Of Weapons And Equipment Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 140
  • 139. Employment Of Special Operations Force Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 141
  • 140. Logistic Buildup Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 142
  • 141. Destroying Safe Havens Of Terrorists Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 143
  • 142. Isolating The Insurgents Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 144
  • 143. Identifying And Targeting Insurgent Leadership Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 145
  • 144. CONCLUSION