School of Politics
and Sociology
COURSEWORK COVER SHEET
Student Number: 12311550
Programme of Study: MSc Global Politics
Title of Course Unit: POSO008S7 Politics of Globalisation
Core x Option 
Essay 1  Essay 2 x
(Please tick as appropriate)
Essay Title:
“War is not contrary to globalization, it is one of the principal means by which it is
realised”. Discuss.
Word Count: 2,895
For official use only
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Date: Date:

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“War is not contrary to globalization, it is one of the principal means by
which it is realised”. Discuss.
In 1974, Tom Stoppard wrote “war is capitalism with the gloves off” (Ratcliffe, 2008, p. 420). Could we
argue that war is also globalization with the gloves off? War has been an enduring feature of human
society since records began, and, if one is to believe many contemporary writers, so has globalization,
although both have developed new and distinctive features in the last half-century, such as, in the case
of globalization, the rise of media communications and the internet, or for war, the move from inter-
state war to Kaldor’s ‘new wars’ – systemic, enduring and borderless conflict and violence (Kaldor,
New and Old Wars, 1999). But in what way do these two lasting phenomena interact, and has this
changed in recent times? Is war really the means by which globalization spreads?
This essay will examine the relationship between globalization and war, and will argue that war
certainly is not contrary to globalization. However, whilst in the past, war was used by the West as a
means to realise the globalization of liberal democracy and free market economics, it is now losing its
usefulness in this sense, as wars are less likely to be waged by states against each other in order to
facilitate globalizing forces. In fact, advances in technology and the destruction wreaked by modern
day warfare make countries less able to participate in globalized markets, and therefore hinder
globalization, in its economic sense at least. However, given that globalization is a multifaceted
phenomenon, it should not be assumed that because inter-state war is on the decline, the existence of
other forms of war does not lead to the realization of other forms of globalization. This essay will
argue that a globalized criminal ‘shadow economy’ benefits from modern-day warfare, predominantly
as a side effect of demand generated by these conflicts, but also that the complex interaction of this
strengthened ‘shadow economy’ with other globalizing forces is an important factor in the
continuation of this warfare.
How do we define globalization then, for the purposes of this discussion? Globalization is a much
notoriously imprecise phenomenon, with definitions tending to converge on ideas of interconnection
and interdependence of states and peoples. The neo-liberal optimist view depicts globalization as a
new phenomenon, leading to the inevitable spread of democracy as a form of political organization,
free markets and the emergence of a ‘global society’ (Berdal & Malone, 2000, p. 7). Alternatively, it is
argued that globalization is nothing new: Hirst and Thomson reflect every claim of the
“hyperglobalists” with examples of similar phenomena from the past; countering, for example,
accounts of the modern expansion of free trade with accounts of the extent of free markets from 1850

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– 1914, and emphasising the continuing role of the state (1998). What both accounts share, however,
is that they recognize the multifaceted and complex nature of the forces that are commonly
recognized as globalization. This essay focuses on the economic aspects of globalization, whilst
recognizing that its impact is uneven, with the vast majority of what is called globalization taking place
in and between the countries of the North. It also sees globalization, not as something radically new,
but as a continuation of a historical series of globalizations, each of which increased the integration
and interdependence of national economies, be it through empire or through the actions of
multinational companies or international organizations such as the IMF. The state is still seen to be a
key player, particularly in the strong states of the North, but a ‘shadow globalization’, beyond the
realm of the state, is also identified. This is also nothing new, in that ‘shadow’, criminal economies
have always existed within and between states, but the global reach and integration of criminal
organizations is seen as a new phenomenon.
It is also important to clarify what is meant by war in this essay, and particularly, given that we will
look back to imperial wars in order to compare and contrast the impact of these wars on historical
globalizations with the impact of modern wars on modern-day globalization, how it has changed,
particularly since the end of the Cold War. The standard interpretation, following the Correlates of
War project, limits the definition of war to inter-state conflicts in which state controlled militaries are
the main actors and in which there are a minimum number of related deaths per annum (Gowa, 1999,
p. 45). Kaldor, on the other hand, defines war as conflict between states or political groups which is
waged for a political end, although she also uses the term ‘war’ to conflate this more traditional
definition of war with organized crime and large-scale violations of human rights (Kaldor, New and Old
Wars, 1999, p. 2). In this essay, the more traditional definition is used: the wars examined usually
involve a state actor, although in other senses they may not meet the Correlates of War criteria; and
there are political motivations behind the violence, notwithstanding the personal gains which may
accrue to some of the participating elites. Organized crime, undertaken for purely private gain, and
without the aim of gaining control of the political system, is excluded.
Historically, war has been used by states to expand their influence and open markets in developing
countries. Lenin described how imperialism compelled states to find new sources of raw materials and
new markets in which to sell finished product (1999, p. 13), but even before the 19th and 20th centuries
and the expansion of European empires, there are a wealth of examples. As early as 106BC, the Roman
Senate was issuing decrees prohibiting viticulture in the provinces of the Empire, in order to guarantee
the markets for Roman wine (Anderson, 2004, p. 111). Later, during the era of the British Empire, the

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use of force was used to ensure that Chinese markets for Indian opium remained open, in order to
enable India to continue to buy British textiles (Barkawi, 2006, p. 21).
It has also been argued that warfare has led to globalization in the sense that the demand for
innovative weaponry has intensified industrialization (Barkawi, 2006, p. 28) and facilitated the
development of technologies which have, in turn, facilitated the globalization of modern life: the
advancement of aircraft technology and the internet, for example. Without these, the “speeding up of
global interactions and processes” (Held, 1999, p. 15) widely touted as a key feature of modern-day
globalization, would not be possible.
There is, however, an evident paradox in the argument that war is an important means by which
globalization is realised. Since the end of the Cold War, now almost twenty years ago, no war has
taken place in or between those countries which are now seen to be as most ‘globalised’, namely the
countries of Europe, Japan, and North America. To limit the analysis to measures of economic
globalization, these most developed countries held 75% of FDI in 1995. In contrast, the poorest
countries in the world, those also most likely to be afflicted by war, participation in global markets has
declined by more than 40% since 1980, with these countries now accounting for just 0.4% of global
exports and 0.6% of global imports (Scholte, 2005, p. 328). It is clear, therefore, that even if those wars
in the global South are being waged for globalization-related motives, they are not being successful in
realizing economic globalization in these countries.
This apparent failure of war to realise globalization is reflected in a change in the exercise of influence
of the North in the South with relation to economic globalization. Whereas in the past, military force
might have been used to ensure the opening of markets, now other means are used to do the same
job. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, is hugely influential in persuading developing
countries to implement specific policy programmes, often to the benefit of its main sponsors, the
countries of the North. Pressure to liberalize capital markets, for example, led to the Asian financial
crisis of 1997, but only Malaysia implemented non-IMF approved policies and was able to shorten the
downturn. For the other countries affected, the influence of the IMF, and therefore by proxy the
United States, induced them to bow to imposed policies which fitted in with the United States’ market
fundamentalist ideology at the time (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 93)
So why is war now less effective than previously in realising globalization? Mann (2001) argues that
the techniques used in modern warfare are now far less likely to create secure and prosperous
potential markets for the aggressor’s products and services. For example, the need to kill insurgents in
Afghanistan and Iraq whilst protecting the lives of American soldiers has led to increasing numbers of

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air strikes which inevitably cause more civilian casualties and, as a consequence, support for the
insurgencies that the strikes are designed to eliminate (Rogers, 2006). Combined with the destruction
of infrastructure and industry, the result is a community unable to generate income to buy exports
from the aggressor or any other state.
Another reason stems from the motivations behind modern-day warfare. Mary Kaldor (1999, pp.
72-94) argues that identity politics are behind the wars that we are currently seeing in the South, and
that these identity politics tend to be fragmenting and backward-looking, drawing on ideas of ethnic,
racial or religious identity, in contrast to the politics of ideas which drives states to bond together
diverse groups for the purposes of, for example, creating more expansive markets for capitalist
production. This was seen in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995, which originated from
a virulent and violent ethnic nationalism, which whilst aggravated by economic factors, did not aim to
extend economic influence or open markets elsewhere. These wars, then, whilst they may have
economic factors at their core, are less likely to provide a means for the realisation of economic
globalization, since they do not set out to do so. It is also worth considering whether these conflicts
would lead to greater economic globalization if they did intend to open markets in neighbouring
countries. It seems likely that they would not, as the international sanctions that almost certainly
would be imposed on any small state engaging in such an action would reduce the economic flows into
and out of the state in question.
However, the lack of intent does not mean that there is no impact on economic globalization. Conflict
in the global South is just as likely to lead to the expansion of the globalized economy as the colonial
wars of the past: the distinction is that the economy in question is a different one: the ‘shadow global
economy’, networks of illicit organizations whose business now accounts for a fifth of global trade
(Glenny, 2006). In the South, in order to triumph or even to maintain conflict, non-state militias have
no choice but to depend on these global networks in order to exchange local resources for arms and
other support, and the need for integration on a global rather than simply international scale has
increased, as has the need for these connections to be in the ‘shadow global economy’, since the end
of the Cold War has led to the withdrawal of ideology-motivated support. In Angola, for example, the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has gained in strength considerably as a
result of its move from relying on Cold War sponsored support via South Africa to generating funds
from the trade in diamonds from Angola’s mines with globalized criminal networks. This has allowed
for the maintenance and escalation of the conflict beyond what had previously been possible (Duffield,
2000). Moreover, this escalation has involved an increased supply of arms, and the supply of ‘blood
diamonds’ to pay for them has necessitated the development of smuggling and money laundering

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operations, with the result that both the globalized criminal trade in diamonds and arms has been
stimulated by the end of the Cold War and resulting changes to the organization of UNITA. The
disintegration of state control in weak states such as Angola also opens the borders for previously
restricted trade, in drugs, for example (Keen, 2000, p. 30).
The end of the Cold War also led to the globalization of criminal networks through increasing supply of
arms to these networks, creating the need for a ‘shadow colonialism’. Just as the development of
capitalist production in developed countries led to the expansion of empire in order to find markets
for industrial goods, the supply of weapons created and distributed during the Cold War, which fell
into the hands of criminal organizations (Castells, 2000, p. 174), created the need for these
organizations to establish and strengthen their global connections in order to profit from their sale.
It should also be remembered that the ‘new wars’ that Kaldor refers to do not limit their involvement
to inhabitants of the South, simply looking to global networks to source weapons. The conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq have recruited western participants through links with western Islamic
organizations: of the first fifty captives brought to Guantanamo bay, three were of British origin, and
one British Muslim in Pakistan claimed to have recruited over 200 British volunteers to fight for the
Taliban (Modood, Triandafyllidou, & Zapata-Barrero, 2006, p. 46). The British army are also finding
increasing evidence of British citizens fighting in areas such as Kandahar (Dowling, 2008). These
international participants could not be recruited to the wars in which they are participating without
the presence of global links between sympathetic organizations. Devji takes the analysis further,
interpreting Jihad as being as much a symptom of globalization as other global networks, such as the
environmental or anti-war movements (Devji, 2005). In this case, these conflicts are a principal means
of realizing globalization in its darkest sense, and this globalization is also essential in the continuation
of these conflicts.
War has changed significantly since the age of colonial wars: the political and economic agendas of
Northern states are fading as a cause of war, and this is reflected in the decline of war in Northern
states. In response, they are turning to other measures, such as intervention by international
organizations which, on the whole, represent their interests. In contrast, in the countries of the South,
which are the least globalized in the conventional sense, but which experience the most warfare, the
economic agendas of globalized criminal networks, which benefit from lack of state control and from
the illicit markets for drugs, weapons and fighters opened up by war, are in the ascendant. Where
grievance or greed shows signs of generating violent conflict, criminal networks stand ready to provide
support and to benefit from enhanced global influence.

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If globalization is interpreted as a universally beneficial condition, as it is by the “hyperglobalist”
movement, then more of it cannot be viewed negatively. However, as this essay shows, globalization is
not limited to legitimate economic processes which reduce poverty and promote peace by creating an
interdependent and integrated global system. The globalization of criminal networks, which is being
realised in no small part through involvement in the current wars of the South, is an important
consideration which needs to be taken into account.
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