CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
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CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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Graduate School of Asia and Pacific Studies University of Waseda, Tokyo-JAPAN 2008

Graduate School of Asia and Pacific Studies University of Waseda, Tokyo-JAPAN 2008

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    CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION Presentation Transcript

    • PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE IV. CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION Graduate School of Asia and Pacific Studies University of Waseda, Tokyo-JAPAN 2008
    • CONTENTS 1. INTERDICIPLINARY INTERFACE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 2. 2 PUBLIC POLICY 3. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5. BUREAUCRATIC POWER 6. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ETHICS 7. 7 BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS 8. DECENTRALIZATION 9. DIGITAL (E) – GOVERNANCE www.ginandjar.com 2
    • INTERDICIPLINARY INTERFACE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION • ADMINISTRATIVE LAW • DISCRETIONARY POWERS LAW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION BUSINESS POLITICS MANAGEMENT PUBLIC POLICY ECONOMICS PUBLIC CHOICE www.ginandjar.com 3
    • PUBLIC POLICY THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY AND POLICY ANALYSIS IS NOW A WELL ESTABLISHED PART OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. PUBLIC POLICY IS A COURSE OF ACTION ADOPTED AND PURSUED BY GOVERNMENT (HENRY 2004) (HENRY, 2004). PUBLIC POLICY REFERS TO THE DECISIONS MADE BY GOVERNMENT, TO A PURPOSIVE COURSE OF ACTION TAKEN BY GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS IN PURSUING SOLUTIONS TO PERCEIVED PROBLEMS (LEMAY, 2002). PUBLIC POLICY CAN BEST BE VIEWED AS A PROCESS, A , SET OR SERIES OF STAGES THROUGH WHICH POLICY IS ESTABLISHED AND IMPLEMENTED. THE POLICY PROCESS CONSISTS OF A SUCCESSION OF ANALYTICAL STAGES (LEMAY, 2002) www.ginandjar.com 4
    • PUBLIC POLICY FOR MANY YEARS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS WERE SEEN AS NEUTRAL IMPLEMENTORS OF PUBLIC POLICIES SHAPED AND DESIGNED ELSEWHERE IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. SINCE THE 1960s, WITH THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS, BOTH THE POLICY PROCESS ITSELF AND THE , ROLE OF PUBLIC A RATION IN IT HAVE BEEN REEVALUATED. PROCEEDING FROM THE PREMISE THAT POLITICS IS MESSY AND IMPRECISE PROPONENTS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS IMPRECISE, ARGUE THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF RIGOROUS ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES AND DECISION TOOLS WILL DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE BOTH THE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THEM. www.ginandjar.com 5
    • PUBLIC POLICY FURTHER, IT IS ARGUED THAT MORE RATIONAL DECISION PROCESSES WILL NOT ONLY BE MORE EFFICIENT, EFFICIENT BUT ALSO MORE RESPONSIVE TO CITIZEN NEEDS AND PREFERENCES. THIS VERSION OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS VALUES OBJECTIVITY AND NEUTRALITY; IT IS BASED ON AN ABIDING BELIEF IN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS AND ABILITIES. www.ginandjar.com 6
    • PUBLIC POLICY IT MAKES USE OF TECHNIQUES DEVELOPED IN THE FIELDS OF ECONOMICS, MATHEMATICS, STATISTICS, OPERATIONS RESEARCH, AND SYSTEMS DYNAMICS, AMONG OTHERS, TO PROVIDE DECISION MAKERS WITH ADVICE IN THE FORMULATION OF PUBLIC POLICY. IN APPLYING THOSE TECHNIQUES, THE ANALYST MAY ALSO DRAW ON KNOWLEDGE FROM FIELDS SUCH AS SOCIOLOGY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS, LAW, ORGANIZATION - THEORY, THE PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL , SCIENCES, AND ELSEWHERE. POLICY ANALYSIS MUST TAKE THE ANALYST WHEREVER THE POLICY ISSUE LEADS, MAKING ANALYSIS THE MULTI DISIPLINARY ACTIVITY PAR EXCELLENCE. www.ginandjar.com 7
    • PUBLIC POLICY POLICY ANALYSIS INCLUDES: 1) IDENTIFYING THE “PROBLEM” TO BE RESOLVED, 2) SPECIFYING THE GOAL(S) TO BE SOUGHT THROUGH PUBLIC POLICY, 3) IDENTIFYING OR INVENTING THE AVAILABLE POLICY ALTERNATIVES, 4) ) ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF EACH OF THE ALTERNATIVES, BOTH , FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE, 5) IMPUTING VALUES IN A SINGLE, COMMENSURABLE MATRIX TO THOSE EFFECTS, AND 6) CHOOSING THE “BEST” POLICY ALTERNATIVE ACCORDING TO AN EXPLICIT DECISION RULE. www.ginandjar.com 8
    • PUBLIC CHOICE IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE LAST CENTURY, THE DISCIPLINE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DEVELOPED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK SET BY WILSON. THE ENDS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION WERE SEEN AS THE quot;MANAGEMENT OF MEN AND MATERIAL IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE PURPOSES OF THE STATE.quot; www.ginandjar.com 9
    • PUBLIC CHOICE IN HIS BOOK: ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1945), HERBERT SIMON, SUSTAINED A DEVASTATING CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY IMPLICIT IN THE TRADITIONAL STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. SIMON ELUCIDATED SOME OF THE ACCEPTED ADMINISTRATIVE PRINCIPLES AND DEMONSTRATED THE LACK OF LOGICAL COHERENCE AMONG THEM. www.ginandjar.com 10
    • PUBLIC CHOICE DURING THE PERIOD FOLLOWING SIMON S CHALLENGE SIMON'S CHALLENGE, ANOTHER COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS HAS GRAPPLED WITH MANY OF THESE SAME INTELLECTUAL ISSUES. THIS COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS COMPOSED PREDOMINANTLY OF POLITICAL ECONOMISTS HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE DECISIONS. ONE FACET OF THIS WORK HAS BEEN MANIFEST IN BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND THE DEVELOP-MENT OF THE PLANNING PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING (PPB) PLANNING, SYSTEM. www.ginandjar.com 11
    • PUBLIC CHOICE ONE OF SIMON'S CENTRAL CONCERNS WAS TO SIMON S ESTABLISH THE CRITERION OF EFFICIENCY AS A NORM FOR EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS. SIMON ARGUED THAT THE quot;CRITERION OF EFFICIENCY DICTATES THAT CHOICE OF ALTERNATIVES WHICH PRODUCE THE LARGEST RESULT FOR THE GIVEN APPLICATION OF RESOURCES.quot; IN ORDER TO UTILIZE THE CRITERION OF EFFICIENCY, EFFICIENCY THE RESULTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS MUST BE DEFINED AND MEASURED CLEAR CONCEPTUAL MEASURED. DEFINITIONS OF OUTPUT ARE NECESSARY BEFORE MEASURES CAN BE DEVELOPED. www.ginandjar.com 12
    • PUBLIC CHOICE PUBLIC CHOICE REPRESENTS ANOTHER FACET OF WORK IN POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. MOST POLITICAL ECONOMISTS IN THE PUBLIC CHOICE TRADITION BEGIN WITH THE INDIVIDUAL AS THE BASIC UNIT OF ANALYSIS. THE TRADITIONAL quot;ECONOMIC MANquot; IS THEN REPLACED BY quot;MAN: THE DECISION MAKER.quot; MAN: MAKER www.ginandjar.com 13
    • PUBLIC CHOICE THE SECOND CONCERN IN THE PUBLIC CHOICE TRADITION IS WITH THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PUBLIC GOODS AS THE TYPE OF EVENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE OUTPUT OF PUBLIC AGENCIES. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY IS ALSO CONCERNED WITH THE EFFECT THAT DIFFERENT DECISION RULES OR DECISION-MAKING ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE UPON THE PRODUCTION OF THOSE EVENTS CONCEPTUALIZED AS PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES SERVICES. www.ginandjar.com 14
    • PUBLIC CHOICE FOUR BASIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR ARE NORMALLY MADE: FIRST, INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO BE SELF- INTERESTED (NOT EQUIVALENT TO “SELFISH”). THE ASSUMPTION OF SELF-INTEREST IMPLIES PRIMARILY THAT INDIVIDUALS EACH HAVE THEIR OWN PREFERENCES WHICH AFFECT THE DECISIONS THEY MAKE, AND THAT THOSE PREFERENCES MAY DIFFER FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INDIVIDUAL. www.ginandjar.com 15
    • PUBLIC CHOICE SECONDLY, INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO BE RATIONAL. RATIONALITY IS DEFINED AS THE ABILITY TO RANK ALL KNOWN ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO THE INDIVIDUAL IN A TRANSITIVE MANNER. THIRD, INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO ADOPT MAXIMIZING STRATEGIES. STRATEGIES MAXIMIZATION AS A STRATEGY IMPLIES THE CONSISTENT CHOICE OF THOSE ALTERNATIVES WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL THINKS WILL PROVIDE THE HIGHEST NET BENEFIT AS WEIGHED BY HIS OWN PREFERENCES. AT TIMES THE PREFERENCES ASSUMPTION OF MAXIMIZATION IS RELATED TO THAT OF SATISFYING, DEPENDING UPON ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO AN INDIVIDUAL IN A DECISION- MAKING SITUATION. www.ginandjar.com 16
    • PUBLIC CHOICE FOURTH, AN EXPLICIT ASSUMPTION NEEDS TO BE STATED CONCERNING THE LEVEL OF INFORMATION POSSESSED BY A REPRESENTATIVE INDIVIDUAL. THREE LEVELS HAVE BEEN ANALYTICALLY DEFINED AS INVOLVING CERTAINTY, RISK, AND UNCERTAINTY. www.ginandjar.com 17
    • PUBLIC CHOICE THE CONDITION OF CERTAINTY IS DEFINED TO EXIST WHEN: 1) AN INDIVIDUAL KNOWS ALL AVAILABLE STRATEGIES; 2) EACHSTRATEGY IS KNOWN TO LEAD INVARIABLY TO ONLY ONE SPECIFIC OUTCOME, AND; OUTCOME AND 3) THEINDIVIDUAL KNOWS HIS OWN PREFERENCES FOR EACH OUTCOME. GIVEN THIS LEVEL OF INFORMATION, THE DECISION OF A MAXIMIZING INDIVIDUAL IS COMPLETELY DETERMINED. www.ginandjar.com 18
    • PUBLIC CHOICE UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK, THE INDIVIDUAL IS STILL ASSUMED TO KNOW ALL AVAILABLE STRATEGIES. ANY PARTICULAR STRATEGY MAY LEAD TO A NUMBER OF POTENTIAL OUTCOMES, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IS ASSUMED TO KNOW THE PROBABILITY OF EACH OUTCOME. THUS, DECISION MAKING BECOMES WEIGHTING PROCESS WHEREBY HIS PREFERENCES FOR DIFFERENT OUTCOMES ARE COMBINED WITH THE PROBABILITY OF THEIR OCURRENCE PRIOR TO A SELECTION OF A STRATEGY. www.ginandjar.com 19
    • PUBLIC CHOICE DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY IS ASSUMED TO OCCUR EITHER WHERE (1) AN INDIVIDUAL HAS A KNOWLEDGE OF ALL STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES, BUT LACKS KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE PROBABILITIES WITH WHICH A STRATEGY MAY LEAD TO AN OUTCOME, OR (2) AN INDIVIDUAL MAY NOT KNOW ALL STRATEGIES OR ALL OUTCOMES WHICH ACTUALLY EXIST. www.ginandjar.com 20
    • PUBLIC CHOICE UNDER CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY, THE DETERMINATENESS OF SOLUTIONS IS REPLACED BY CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE quot;SOLUTIONS quot; SOLUTIONS. ESTIMATIONS ARE MADE ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF STRATEGIES. (VINCENT OSBORNE & ELEANOR OSBORN, 1971) OSBORN www.ginandjar.com 21
    • PUBLIC CHOICE PUBLIC CHOICE IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING IN ADMINISTRATION. OTHER MODELS INCLUDE INCLUDE: RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE MODEL; BARGAINING MODEL; INCREMENTAL MODEL; PARTICIPATIVE MODEL. (LEMAY, 2002) www.ginandjar.com 22
    • ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFERS TO THOSE LAWS AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE CREATED BY THE ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES THAT MAKE RULES AND ADJUDICATE CASES CONCERNING PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AND THE LIMITS NEEDED TO CONTROL SUCH AGENCIES. INCLUDED IN THE BODY OF LAWS (OR RULES AND REGULATIONS) OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES THAT COLLECTIVELY MAKE UP ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ARE INTERPRETATIVE RULES—THOSE RULES THAT SPECIFY RULES THOSE AN AGENCY'S VIEWS OF THE MEANING OF ITS REGULATIONS OR OF THE STATUTES IT ADMINISTERS. www.ginandjar.com 23
    • ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IS RESTRICTED TO AGENCY ACTIONS THAT COVER THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE PARTIES. IT EXCLUDES THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND DEPARTMENTS OR THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT (MATTERS COVERED IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW). ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CONCERNS THE QUASI-LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. THE ADMINISTRATORS OF SUCH AGENCIES ARE POLICY MAKERS—BUT WITH A LIMITED RANGE OF AUTHORITY WHEN MAKING RULES. www.ginandjar.com 24
    • ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES' FORMAL POWERS ' INCLUDE: 1) INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS; 2) ORDERING THE ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN PRACTICES; 3) ) SETTING STANDARDS;; 4) PROSECUTING FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF LAWS AND STANDARDS, INCLUDING ISSUING CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDERS AND IMPOSING FINES; www.ginandjar.com 25
    • 5) SETTING FORTH RULES AND REGULATIONS; 6) HOLDING HEARINGS BEFORE ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS; 7) HOLDING ADJUDICATION HEARINGS; 8) ISSUING, WITHHOLDING, AND REVOKING LICENSES; 9) PROVIDING FOR APPEAL PROCEDURES; 10) ORDERING TEMPORARY CESSATIONS OF ACTIVITIES; AND 11) SEIZING PROPERTY AND IMPOSING FINES AND PENALTIES. www.ginandjar.com 26
    • LIMITATIONS OVER REGULATORY AGENCY DISCRETION ARE BUILT INTO THE RIGHTS AND PROCEDURAL RULE SAFEGUARDS DESIGNED INTO AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY'S ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURES, OR PRACTICES AS WELL AS THROUGH JUDICIAL REVIEW. OTHER CONTROL DEVICES ALSO LIMIT AGENCY DISCRETION. ONE SUCH DEVICE IS MEDIA SCRUTINY. INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING AND THE ABILITY OF MEDIA MEMBERS TO HOLD AGENCIES UP TO PUBLIC RIDICULE DOES SERVE AS SOMETHING OF A CHECK ON AGENCY ABUSE OF POWER. www.ginandjar.com 27
    • ANOTHER DEVICE IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OMBUDSMAN, OR AN OFFICIAL WHO IS CHARGED WITH PROCESSING AND EXAMINING COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE BUREAUCRACY. OMBUDSMEN TYPICALLY REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURES OR OTHER OFFICE THAT HOLDS AUTORITY. CITIZEN ACTION GROUPS SUCH AS COMMON CAUSE ALSO CAN SERVE AS INFORMAL WATCHDOGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. www.ginandjar.com 28
    • TYPICALLY AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY WITH REGULATORY TYPICALLY, POWERS IS ESTABLISHED BY STATUTORY AUTHORITY. THE STATUTE CREATES THE AGENCY, DESCRIBES ITS PRIMARY MISSION OR GOALS (OFTEN IN QUITE BROAD AND GENERAL TERMS), AND LAYS OUT ITS JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES-AND, IN SO DOING, SOMETHING OF ITS LIMITATIONS AS WELL. WELL THE LEGISLATURE AT THE SAME TIME MIGHT PASS A GENERAL REGULATORY STATUTE STATING THE BROAD OUTLINES OF THE LAW; THE AGENCY THEN DEVELOPS APPROPRIATE RULES, REGULATIONS, STANDARDS, OR GU GUIDELINES THAT IT INTENDS TO US TO IMPLEMENT OR S S O USE O O MODIFY THE LAW OR TO MEET NEW SITUATIONS. www.ginandjar.com 29
    • ALTHOUGH ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES ENJOY WIDE DISCRETION IN DEVELOPING THE MASSIVE BODY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, RULES OR REGULATIONS, THEIR DISCRETION HAS ITS LIMITS. THESE LIMITS MAY BE IMPOSED BY THE LEGISLATURE WHEN IT ESTABLISHES AN AGENCY OR WHEN IT ENACTS AMENDING LAWS REGARDING AN AGENCY'S JURISDICTION, AS WELL AS BY AGENCY S THE COURTS THROUGH THEIR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTIONS AND RULINGS. (LEMAY, (LEMAY 2004) www.ginandjar.com 30
    • BUREAUCRATIC POWER AS SOCIETY BECAME MORE COMPLEX AND ORGANIZATIONS GREW LARGER, ORGANIZATIONS (BOTH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC) INCREASED THEIR DIVISION OF LABOR INTO MORE AND SMALLER SPECIALIZED UNITS. LARGER INSTITUTIONS BEGAN TO DEFER TO THE JUDGMENTS OF THESE UNITS, WHICH SHOWS THAT A MAJOR FOUNDATION OF BUREAUCRATIC POWER IS EXPERTISE, OR SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE. www.ginandjar.com 31
    • AS SOCIETY BECAME MORE COMPLEX AND SPECIALIZED, DECISION MAKERS RELIED ON EXPERT ADVICE SOME BUREAUCRATIC AGENCIES, ADVICE. AGENCIES THEN, DEVELOPED A NEAR MONOPOLY ON THE TECHNICAL DATA OR CRITERIA USED TO DECIDE POLICY. DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF POLICY THEY IMPLEMENT, BUREAUCRACY HAVE DISCRETIONARY POWER, EITHER MORE OR LESS. www.ginandjar.com 32
    • IN THE MINDS OF MOST OBSERVERS THE ISSUE IS NOT OBSERVERS, WHETHER BUREAUCRACIES HAVE POWER BUT THE MAGNITUDE AND OMINOUS NATURE OF THAT POWER POWER. BUREAUCRACIES ARE SEEN AS TOO INFLUENTIAL, TOO UNCHALLENGED, AND SUBSEQUENTLY DANGEROUS. , Q BURCAUCRATS ARC THOUGHT OF AS ASSUMING A PREMINENT, EVEN UNCHECKED ROLE IN THE FORMATION AND EXECUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY. POLICY THE DEDUCTIVE CASE FOR WHY BUREAUCRACIES ARE TOO POWERFUL CAN BE MADE ON AT LEAST FOUR GROUNDS. www.ginandjar.com 33
    • FIRST, THE WEBERIAN ORGANIZATIONAL FROM SEEMS TO BE AN INHERENTLY POWERFUL INSTRUMENT BECAUSE OF ITS PROPERTIES: ITS UNIFIED HIERARCHY CONCENTRATES CONTROL, CONTROL ITS HIGH DEGREE OF SPECIALIZATION PROVIDES GREAT EXPERTISE, ITS PERMANENT RECORDS ACCUMULATE VAST QUANTITIES OF INFRMATION AND OFFICIALLY INTERPRET THE PAST AND ITS TENURED WORKFORCE PAST, CANNOT BE REMOVED AND HENCE IS NOT ACCOUNTABLE. SECOND, SECOND THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW AND POLICY, PUTS BUREAUCRACY IN THE POSITION OF REPRESENTING THE SOVEREIGN STATE TO CITIZENS IN CONCRETE, EVERYDAY TERMS. TO THEM, THE STATE IS BUREAUCRACY. BUREAUCRACY www.ginandjar.com 34
    • THIRD, THE TECHNICAL NATURE OF MODERN ADMINISTRATION MEANS THAT LEGISLATORS AND OTHER ELECTED OFFICIALS MUST DELEGATE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY OR EVEN RULE-MAKING POWER TO THE BUREAUCRATS, WHO THUS ARE quot;LEGISLATORSquot; OF SORTS. FOURTH, FOURTH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY, INFORMATION ASYMMETRY FAVORING THE AGENTS GIVES THEM THE ABILITY TO OUTMANEUVER THEIR PRINCIPALS AND PURSUE THEIR OWN OBJECTIVES. www.ginandjar.com 35
    • TO SUM UP, BUREAUCRACIES ARE CHECKED BUT NOT CHAINED. THEY ARE RESPONSIVE TO EXTERNAL POLITICAL CONTROL BUT NOT POLITICALLY SUPINE. THEY REACT NOT MERELY TO STATIC INSTRUCTIONS BUT TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES THEY NOT ONLY CIRCUMSTANCES. IMPLEMENT POLICY BUT SHAPE AND ADVOCATE IT. www.ginandjar.com 36
    • ACCOUNTABILITY AND ETHICS CORRUPTION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS BOTH PROFESION AND SCIENTIFIC STUDY FROM THE BEGINNING HAS BEEN VERY MUCH CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEMS OF CORRUPTION OR ABUSE OF POWER. A CORRUPTED BUREAUCRACY, BY DEFITION, IS ONE THAT, DOES , , , NOT DO WHAT IT IS SUPPPOSED TO, SINCE ILLEGAL PAYMENTS TO OFFICIALS ARE PRESSUMABLY NOT MADE UNLESS THOSE WHO RECEIVE PAYMENT CAN AND DO CONTRAVENE THE INTENT OF THE LAWS THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO APPLY. ALTHOUG FORMALLY SALARIED, BUREAUCRATS IN SUCH QUASI-SALARY SYSTEMS INDULGE IN SELF ENRICHMENT ON A LARGE SCALE SELF-ENRICHMENT (RIGGS,1995). www.ginandjar.com 37
    • THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION IS ENDEMIC TO POLITICS AND TO GOVERNMENT SIMPLY BECAUSE ITS DECISIONS INVOLVE SO MUCH POWER AND WEALTH. WEALTH IT BECOMES COMMON PLACE AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT--IN THE WAYS CONTRACTS ARE AWARDED, JOBS ARE CREATED AND FILLED, PEOPLE ARE HIRED OFFICES FILLED HIRED, ARE SOLD, FAVORED POLITICAL ALLIES ARE REWARDED, POWER IS EXERTED, AND THE NEEDS OR PLIGHT OF OTHERS ARE IGNORED. THE DEMAND FOR GOVERNMENT'S REWARDS FREQUENTLY EXCEEDS THE SUPPLY, AND ROUTINE DECISION-MAKING DECISION MAKING PROCESSES ARE LENGTHY, COSTLY, AND UNCERTAIN IN THEIR OUTCOME. www.ginandjar.com 38
    • FOR THESE REASONS LEGALLY SANCTIONED DECISION MAKING REASONS, DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES CONSTITUTE A quot;BOTTLENECKquot; BETWEEN WHAT PEOPLE WANT AND WHAT THEY GET. THE TEMPTATION TO GET AROUND THE BOTTLENECK TO SPEED BOTTLENECK—TO THINGS UP AND MAKE FAVORABLE DECISIONS MORE PROBABLE—IS BUILT INTO THIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY SOCIETY. TO GET AROUND THE BOTTLENECK, ONE MUST USE POLITICAL INFLUENCE—AND CORRUPTION, WHICH BY DEFINITION CUTS ACROSS ESTABLISHED AND LEGITIMATE PROCESSES, IS A MOST EFFECTIVE FORM OF INFLUENCE. (MICHAEL JOHNSTON, 1982) ( , ) www.ginandjar.com 39
    • CORRUPTION, IS A FORM OF PRIVELEDGE IDULGED IN BY THOSE IN POWER IT CONCENTRATES POWER POWER. IN THE HANDS OF A FEW WHO CAN MAKE DECISIONS BASED NOT ON THE GOOD OF THE WHOLE BUT ON THE INTERESTS OF THE FEW. POWER TENDS TO CORRUPT, AND ABSOLUTE POWER CORRUPTS ABSOLUTELY. www.ginandjar.com 40
    • ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY IS THE DEGREE TO WHICH A PERSON MUST ANSWER TO SOME HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR ACTIONS IN THE LARGER SOCIETY OR IN THE AGENCY. AGENCY ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO VOTERS. PUBLIC AGENCY MANAGERS ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO ELECTED EXECUTIVES AND LEGISLATURES. AGENCY LEADERS ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF SOCIETY, WHICH HOLDS GENERAL SOCIETY VALUES AND IDEAS OF DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC MORALITY. www.ginandjar.com 41
    • ACCOUNTABILITY IS DETERMINED BOTH EXTERNALLY (BY CODES OF ETHICS, LEGAL MANDATES CONTAINED IN A CONSTITUTION AND AUTHORIZATION LAWS, AND PROFESSIONAL CODES OR STANDARDS) AND INTERNALLY (BY AGENCY RULES AND REGULATIONS OR PERSONALLY INTERNALIZED NORMS OF BEHAVIOR AND MORAL ETHICS). DEMOCRACY REQUIRES A SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY: CHECKS AND BALANCES ON GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES, THE SECURITY OF REGULAR AUDITS, AND THE INQUISITIVE EYE OF COMMUNITY AND MEDIA WATCHDOGS. (ROOSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005) www.ginandjar.com 42
    • ETHICS ETHICS CONCERN WITH WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS WRONG. (FREDERICKSON, (FREDERICKSON 1994) ETHICS CAN BE CONSIDERED A FORM OF SELF- SELF ACCOUNTABILITY, OR AN “INNER CHECK” ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS CONDUCT. (ROOSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005) www.ginandjar.com 43
    • ETHICS ARE IMBEDDED IN THE VALUES AND NORMS OF SOCIETY, AND IN AN ORGANIZATION IN ITS ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE. VALUES ARE ANY OBJECT OR QUALITIES DESIRABLE AS MEANS OR ENDS THEMSELVES, SUCH AS LIFE, JUSTICE EQUALITY, HONESTY, EFFICIENCY, JUSTICE, EQUALITY HONESTY EFFICIENCY FREEDOM. VALUES ARE BLIEFS, POINTS OF VIEW, ATTITUDES. ATTITUDES www.ginandjar.com 44
    • STANDARDS AND NORMS STANDARDS AND NORMS ARE DEFINED AS PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT ACTION BINDING UPON THE MEMBERS OF A GROUP AND SERVING TO GUIDE, CONTROL, OR REGULATE PROPER AND ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR. BEHAVIOR STANDARDS AND NORMS ARE THE CODIFICATION OF GROUP, ORGANIZATIONAL, COMMUNITY GROUP ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNITY, OR GOVERNMENTAL VALUES. LAWS, REGULATIONS, CODES OF ETHICS. RULES ARE TYPICAL OF STANDARDS AND NORMS. (FREDERICKSON, 1994) www.ginandjar.com 45
    • ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS INVOLVES THE APPLICATION OF MORAL PRINCIPLES TO THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIALS IN ORGANIZATIONS. ORGANIZATIONS BROADLY SPEAKING, MORAL PRINCIPLES SPECIFY 1) THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES THAT INDIVIDUALS SHOULD RESPECT WHEN THEY ACT IN WAYS THAT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE WELL- BEING OF OTHER INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY; AND 2) THE CONDITIONS THAT COLLECTIVE PRACTICES AND POLICIES SHOULD SATISFY WHEN THEY SIMILARLY AFFECT THE WELL- BEING OF INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY. (DENNIS THOMPSON, 1985) www.ginandjar.com 46
    • THE CONVENTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS HOLDS THAT ADMINISTRATORS SHOULD CARRY OUT THE ORDERS OF THEIR SUPERIORS AND THE POLICIES OF THE AGENCY AND THE GOVERNMENT THEY SERVE. www.ginandjar.com 47
    • THE ETHIC OF NEUTRALITY DOES NOT DENY THAT ADMINISTRATORS OFTEN MUST USE THEIR OWN JUDGMENT IN THE FORMULATION OF POLICY. BUT THEIR AIM SHOULD ALWAYS BE TO DISCOVER WHAT POLICY THEIR S SUPERIORS (ELECTED OFFICIALS) INTEND OR O S( C O C S) O WOULD INTEND; OR IN A DEMOCRACY IN THE CASE OF CONFLICTING DIRECTIVES TO INTERPRET LEGALLY OR CONSTITUTIONALLY WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE POLICY. www.ginandjar.com 48
    • ON THIS VIEW, ADMINISTRATORS MAY PUT FORWARD THEIR OWN VIEWS ARGUE WITH THEIR SUPERIORS VIEWS, SUPERIORS, AND CONTEST PROPOSALS IN THE PROCESS OF FORMULATING POLICY. BUT ONCE THE DECISION OR POLICY IS FINAL, ALL ADMINISTRATORS FALL INTO LINE, AND FAITHFULLY CARRY OUT THE POLICY. FURTHERMORE, THE DISAGREEMENT MUST TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE AGENCY AND ACCORDING TO THE AGENCY'S RULES OF PROCEDURE. PROCEDURE www.ginandjar.com 49
    • THE ETHIC OF NEUTRALITY PORTRAYS THE IDEAL ADMINISTRATOR AS A COMPLETELY RELIABLE INSTRUMENT OF THE GOALS OF THE ORGANIZATION, NEVER INJECTING PERSONAL VALUES INTO THE PROCESS OF FURTHERING THESE GOALS. THE ETHIC THUS REINFORCES THE GREAT VIRTUE OF ORGANIZATION-ITS ORGANIZATION ITS CAPACITY TO SERVE ANY SOCIAL END IRRESPECTIVE OF THE ENDS THAT INDIVIDUALS WITHIN IT FAVOR FAVOR. www.ginandjar.com 50
    • FOUR LEVELS OF ETHICS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THERE IS A HIERARCHY OF LEVELS OF ETHICS, EACH OF WHICH HAS ITS OWN , SET OF RESPONSIBILITIES. 1) PERSONAL MORALITY—THE BASIC SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG. THIS IS A FUNCTION OF OUR PAST AND IS DEPENDENT ON FACTORS SUCH AS PARENTAL INFLUENCES RELIGIOUS BELIEFS CULTURAL AND SOCIAL INFLUENCES, BELIEFS, MORES, AND ONE'S OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCES. www.ginandjar.com 51
    • 2) PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZE A SET OF PROFESSIONAL NORMS AND RULES THAT OBLIGATE THEM TO ACT IN CERTAIN quot;PROFESSIONALquot; WAYS. OCCUPATIONS SUCH AS LAW AND MEDICINE, WHILE OPERATING WITHIN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, ALSO HAVE THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL CODES. CODES www.ginandjar.com 52
    • 3) ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS. EVERY ORGANIZATION HAS AN ENVIRONMENT OR CULTURE THAT INCLUDES BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT. PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS TYPICALLY HAVE MANY SUCH RULES. RULES PUBLIC LAWS, EXECUTIVE ORDERS, AND LAWS ORDERS AGENCY RULES AND REGULATIONS ALL CAN BE TAKEN AS FORMAL ORGANIZATIONAL NORMS FOR ETHICAL BEHAVIOR. www.ginandjar.com 53
    • AN ORGANIZATION'S CULTURE IS COMPOSED OF THE quot;. . . BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND BELIEFS THAT ARE SHARED BY MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION THAT OPERATE ORGANIZATION, UNCONSCIOUSLY, AND THAT DEFINE IN A BASIC TAKEN- FOR-GRANTED' FASHION AN ORGANIZATION'S VIEW OF ITSELF AND ITS ENVIRONMENTquot; ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IS A SOCIAL FORCE THAT CONTROLS PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR BY SHAPING MEMBERS' COGNITIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF MEANINGS AND REALITIES, PROVIDING EFECTIVE ENERGY FOR MOBILIZATION AND IDENTIFYING WHO BELONGS AND WHO DOES NOT. www.ginandjar.com 54
    • ETHICS IS NOT ONLY THE HEART OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IT IS ALSO THE CULTURE, FULCRUM FOR PRODUCING CHANGE. SINCE ETHICS IS THE FULCRUM FOR CHANGING CULTURE, CHANGING CULTURE WITHOUT ETHICS IS AKIN TO CHANGING A TIRE WITHOUT A JACK. (PASTIN, 1986) www.ginandjar.com 55
    • 4) SOCIAL ETHICS. THE REQUIREMENTS OF SOCIAL ETHICS OBLIGE MEMBERS OF A GIVEN SOCIETY TO ACT IN WAYS THAT BOTH PROTECT INDIVIDUALS AND FURTHER THE PROGRESS OF THE GROUP AS A WHOLE. SOCIAL ETHICS ARE FORMAL TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY CAN BE FOUND IN THE LAWS OF A GIVEN SOCIETY, INFORMAL TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY ARE PART OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S SOCIAL CONSCIENCE. (SHAFRITZ, RUSSEL, CHRISTOPHER, 2007) www.ginandjar.com 56
    • THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF DECISION MAKING WHEN MAKING DECISIONS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS INEVITABLY PURSUE CERTAIN GOALS, WHETHER , PERSONAL, ORGANIZATIONAL, OR SOME MIXTURE OF BOTH. THE PURSUIT OF GOALS INVOLVES STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL CHOICES TO ACHIEVE THEM (MEANS AND ENDS). ENDS) SUCH DECISIONS RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROPRIETY OF THE MEANS USED IN IMPLEMENTING A COURSE OF ACTION TO DEAL WITH A PUBLIC PROBLEM. www.ginandjar.com 57
    • INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS WHEN AN INSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT PURSUES ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND SETS ON A COURSE OF ACTION TOWARD REACHING THOSE GOALS, THE END ITSELF MAY BE GOALS SEEN AS SO COMPELLING AS TO SEEMINGLY JUSTIFY ANY MEANS. ORGANIZATIONS HAVE OFTEN STRIVEN TO CLARIFY SUCH DILEMMAS IN DECISION MAKING BY ARTICULATING CODES OF ETHICS TO GUIDE THE BEHAVIOR OF THEIR MEMBERS. MEMBERS www.ginandjar.com 58
    • PERSONAL ETHICS OFTEN AT ISSUE IN DECISION MAKING ARE PERSONAL ETHICS. ETHICS THE TEMPTATION TO DIVERT SOME OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR RESOURCES TO PERSONAL USE CAN BE GREAT AND THE RISK OF EXPOSURE OFTEN SMALL. THE MAIN REASON FOR THE WORLDWIDE PRESENCE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION IS THAT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS HAVE SOMETHING TO ALLOCATE THAT OTHER PEOPLE WANT. WANT www.ginandjar.com 59
    • ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND PERSISTING CHALLENGES OF O O MODERN GOVERNMENT IS HOW TO RECONCILE THE GO S O O CO C DEMANDS OF DEMOCRACY WITH THE IMPERATIVES OF BUREANCRACY. BUREAUCRACIES ARE HIERARCHICAL INSTITUTIONS THAT CAN PROVIDE THE CAPACITY AND EXPERTISE TO ACCOMPLISH COMPLEX SOCIAL TASKS, BUT THEY ARE FREQUENTLY TASKS CHARACTERIZED AS UNDEMOCRATIC AND EVEN THREATENING TO DEMOCRACY. DEMOCRACIES ARE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT THAT ARE BASED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULAR CONTROL. THEY ATTEND IN DIFFERING MEASURES CONTROL TO PRINCIPLES OF MAJORITY RULE AND DEFERENCE TO THE PERSPECTIVES OF INTENSE INTERESTS AMONG THE PUBLIC. www.ginandjar.com 60
    • BUT AS SUCH, THEY NEED NOT NECESSARILY SHOW KEEN SUCH ATTENTION TO THE VALUES OF EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS, O S C OR SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE. BUREAUCRACY MAY BE S U UC C THOUGHT OF AS GOVERNMENT'S TOOL TO EXERCISE COERCION AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PRODUCTIVE ACTION. AS INSTITUTIONAL FORMS DESIGNED TO EMPHASIZE DIFFERENT VALUES, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY SIT IN AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER. www.ginandjar.com 61
    • BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND PERSISTING CHALLENGES OF MODERN GOVERNMENT IS HOW TO RECONCILE THE DEMANDS OF DEMOCRACY WITH THE IMPERATIVES OF BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRACY. BUREAUCRACIES ARE HIERARCHICAL INSTITUTIONS THAT CAN PROVIDE THE CAPACITY AND EXPERTISE TO ACCOMPLISH COMPLEX SOCIAL TASKS, BUT THEY ARE FREQUENTLY CHARACTERIZED AS UNDEMOCRATIC AND EVEN THREATENING TO DEMOCRACY. DEMOCRACIES ARE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT THAT ARE BASED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULAR CONTROL. www.ginandjar.com 62
    • THEY ATTEND IN DIFFERING MEASURES TO PRINCIPLES OF MAJORITY RULE AND DEFERENCE TO THE PERSPECTIVES OF INTENSE INTERESTS AMONG THE PUBLIC. PUBLIC BUT AS SUCH THEY NEED NOT NECESSARILY SUCH, SHOW KEEN ATTENTION TO THE VALUES OF EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS, EFFECTIVENESS OR SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE. EXPERTISE BUREAUCRACY MAY BE THOUGHT OF AS GOVERNMENT'S TOOL TO EXERCISE COERCION AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PRODUCTIVE ACTION. AS INSTITUTIONAL FORMS DESIGNED TO EMPHASIZE DIFFERENT VALUES, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY SIT IN AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER. www.ginandjar.com 63
    • Regime bureaucracy interactions b ea c ac inte actions Power Distribution Power Distribution in Society in Government Executive ascendant Executive sublated 1 2 Democratic political Bureaucracy Democ ac Democracy regime controls dominates democratic bureaucracy political regime 3 4 Bureaucracy Authoritarian political Authoritarianism subordination to regime shares power authoritarian political with Bureaucracy regime Sources: modified from Cariño, L.V. (1992) Bureaucracy for Democracy (Quezon City: University of Philippines Press). (TURNER AND HULME 1997) HULME, www.ginandjar.com 64
    • ONE BASIC APPROACH TO THE BUREAUCRACY- DEMOCRACY PROBLEM IS TO CONCEIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC IMPULSE AS ESSENTIALLY EMANATING FROM quot;ABOVE.quot; THE quot;TOPquot; OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, IN THIS VIEW TOP SYSTEM VIEW, CONSISTS OF THE CENTRAL OR MOST FORMALLY AUTHORITATIVE AUTHORITATIVE' POSITIONS AND ORGANS OF THE GOVERNING SYSTEM: THOSE DIRECTLY CHOSEN BY THE ELECTORATE AND THOSE ENTAILING THE BROADEST AND MOST ENCOMPASSING JURISDICTION. www.ginandjar.com 65
    • BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT LINK TO THE PUBLIC VIA PERIODIC COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS, BODIES LIKE PARLIAMENTS AND ELECTED CHIEF EXECUTIVES HAVE A SPECIAL CLAIM TO REPRESENT THE AGENDA OF THE PEOPLE. PEOPLE ONE CHALLENGE FACING THESE POLITICAL LEADERS, THEN, THEN IS TO MONITOR AND CONTROL THE BUREAUCRACY SO THAT THE AGENTS DO NOT REPLACE THE DEMOCRATICALLY CHOSEN PRINCIPALS AS THE KEY DECISION MAKERS. www.ginandjar.com 66
    • THE OTHER BROAD NOTION OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IS WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED BOTTOM-UP DEMOCRACY. THE LOGIC IS THAT POPULAR CONTROL IS MOST EFFECTIVELY ACHIEVED THROUGH CHANNELS OTHER THAN THE POLITICAL quot;TOP“. www.ginandjar.com 67
    • IN OTHER WORDS, THE BUREAUCRACY AS A POLITICAL WORDS INSTITUTION MIGHT BEST BE CHECKED BY DIRECT POPULAR OVERSIGHT (CITIZENS’ REVIEW BOARDS MONITORING POLICE DEPARTMENTS, CLIENTS CONTROLLING SOME ASPECTS OF AGENCY DECISIONS) OR BY INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT DEVIATE FROM A STANDARD MONOCRATIC AUTHORITY STRUCTURE AND INSTEAD INCORPORATE INCENTIVES FOR BUREAUCRATIC ACTORS TO BE DIRECTLY ATTUNED TO POPULAR PREFERENCES. PREFERENCES ONE WAY THAT THESE OPERATE IS VIA OPENNESS OF THE BUREAUCRACY ITSELF TO PRESSURE AND CONTROL BY ORGANIZED INTERESTS THAT MAY CARE GREATLY ABOUT THE ACTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS. www.ginandjar.com 68
    • NEITHER LINE OF REASONING ABOUT DEMOCRACY AND BUREAUCRACY OFFERS A FULLY SATISFACTORY PICTURE THE TOP-DOWN ARGUMENTS FRAMED IN THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL CONTROL OFFER AN IMPORTANT PIECE OF THE PUZZLE, BUT AN INCOMPLETE ONE. BOTTOM-UP ANALYSTS ALERT AS TO CRUCIAL MODES AND CHANNELS OF POPULAR INFLUENCE BUT LIKEWISE OMIT ELEMENTS THAT MUST BE INCLUDED. ANY VALID PERSPECTIVE MUST NECESSARILY BE GROUNDED IN THE EMPIRICAL FEATURES OF ACTUAL GOVERNING SYSTEMS. www.ginandjar.com 69
    • A GOVERNANCE APPROACH SEEKS TO INTEGRATE POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC FORCES AT MULTIPLE LEVELS TO INDICATE HOW PROGRAMS ARE DESIGNED, DESIGNED ADOPTED, IMPLEMENTED, AND EVALUATED IN TERMS OF BOTH EFFECTIVENESS AND DEMOCRACY. SUCH A POINT OF VIEW CLEARLY RECOGNIZES THAT ONLY WITH EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTING INSTITUTIONS CAN SOCIETIES GENERATE THE FAIRNESS AND SLACK RESOURCES THAT PERMIT DEMOCRACIES WITH THEIR LARGE TRANSACTION COSTS TO EXIST AND PROSPER. www.ginandjar.com 70
    • PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN A DEMOCRACY CHIEF EXECUTIVE EXECUTIVE STAFF SOCIOCULTURAL AGENCIES NORMS OUTSIDE LEGISLATURE AUDITORS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS: LEGISLATIVE MEDIA STAFF AGENCIES DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY HEAD INTEREST COURTS GROUPS POLITICAL PARTIES OTHER AGENCIES, OTHER AGENCIES AGENCIES, SAME LEVEL DIFFERENT LEVELS (ROSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK (ROSENBLOOM KRAVCHUCK, 2005) www.ginandjar.com 71
    • ABOVE FIGURE PRESENTS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK THAT SEES PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION TAKING THE CENTRAL ROLE OR STAGE IN A BROADER POLITICAL SYSTEM (THE CONVERSION PROCESS IN THE SYSTEMS MODEL).) THE MODEL EMPHASIZES THE INTERRELATED NATURE OF THE PARTS AND HOW CHANGE IN AN EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT (CULTURAL, ECONOMIC POLITICAL (CULTURAL ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, SOCIAL) CAUSES CHANGE IN THE STRUCTURES AND INTERNAL PROCESSES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. THESE CHANGES, IN TURN, INFLUENCE THE OUTPUTS OF THE BUREAUCRACY; THAT IS, WHAT GOODS, SERVICES, POLICY PROGRAMS, RULES PROGRAMS RULES, AND REGULATIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED BY BUREAUCRACY. www.ginandjar.com 72
    • AS IN ANY SYSTEM, A FEEDBACK LOOP DEVELOPS IN WHICH THE OUTPUTS AFFECT THE ENVIRONMENT, , WHICH CAUSES FURTHER CHANGE AND OFTEN NEW DEMANDS FROM THE ENVIRONMENT TO CONTINUE, INCREASE OR DECREASE, MODIFY OR OCCASIONALLY DECREASE MODIFY, EVEN CEASE A PUBLIC POLICY OR PROGRAM. www.ginandjar.com 73
    • PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM: THE CONVERSION PROCESS ENVIRONMENT INPUTS ADMINISTRATIVE OUTPUTS • CULTURAL CHANGES LINE AGENCIES • DEMANDS FOR • GOODS AND EVENTS PROGRAMS AND “WITHIN-PUTS” • SERVICE • ECONOMIC CHANGES SERVICES • RULES AND EVENTS • POLICIES SUPPORT • POLITICAL CHANGES • PROCEDURES • PROGRAMME AND EVENTS • MONEY • GOALS • INFORMATION • SOCIETAL CHANGES • STAF • STRUCTURE AND EVENTS ROLES PLAYED BY • PERSONAL • PARTY • EXPERIENCE LEAD TO • INTEREST GROUP • STAFF AGENCIES (ROSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK (ROSENBLOOM KRAVCHUCK, 2005) www.ginandjar.com 74
    • DECENTRALIZATION ALL SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVE A COMBINATION OF CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY. HOWEVER, FINDING A COMBINATION OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND LOCAL AUTONOMY THAT SATISFIES REGIME NEEDS AND POPULAR DEMANDS IS A PERSISTENT DILEMMA FOR GOVERNMENTS. CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION ARE NOT ATTRIBUTES THAT CAN BE DICHOTOMIZED; RATHER THEY REPRESENT HYPOTHETICAL POLES ON A CONTINUUM THAT CAN BE CALIBRATED BY MANY DIFFERENT INDICES INDICES. www.ginandjar.com 75
    • MOST AUTHORS ARE AGREED THAT DECENTRALIZATION WITHIN THE STATE INVOLVES A TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY TO PERFORM SOME SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM AN INDIVIDUAL OR AN AGENCY IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO SOME OTHER INDIVIDUAL OR AGENCY WHICH IS 'CLOSER' TO CLOSER THE PUBLIC TO BE SERVED. THE BASIS FOR SUCH TRANSFERS IS MOST OFTEN TERRITORIAL, THAT IS GROUNDED IN THE DESIRE TO PLACE AUTHORITY AT A LOWER LEVEL IN A TERRITORIAL HIERARCHY AND THUS GEOGRAPHICALLY CLOSER TO SERVICE PROVIDERS AND CLIENTS. www.ginandjar.com 76
    • HOWEVER, TRANSFERS CAN ALSO BE MADE FUNCTIONALLY, THAT IS , , BY TRANSFERRING AUTHORITY TO AN AGENCY THAT IS FUNCTIONALLY SPECIALIZED. SUCH TRANSFERS OF AUTHORITY ARE OF THREE MAIN TYPES. THE FIRST IS WHEN THE DELEGATION IS WITHIN FORMAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES (FOR EXAMPLE WHEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DELEGATES ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT). THE SECOND IS TRANSFER WITHIN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE OR PARASTATAL STRUCTURES (FOR EXAMPLE FROM THE HEADQUARTERS OF A MINISTRY TO ITS DISTRICT OFFICES). THE THIRD IS WHEN THE TRANSFER IS FROM AN INSTITUTION OF THE STATE TO A NON-STATE AGENCY (FOR EXAMPLE WHEN A PARASTATAL NATIONAL AIRLINE IS SOLD OFF TO PRIVATE SHAREHOLDERS). SHAREHOLDERS) www.ginandjar.com 77
    • SOME IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS DECENTRALIZATION IS THE TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR PUBLIC FUNCTIONS FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO SUBORDINATE OR QUASI-INDEPENDENT Q GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND/OR THE PRIVATE SECTOR (WORLD BANK, 2001) www.ginandjar.com 78
    • DECENTRALIZATION IS THE EXPANSION OF LOCAL AUTONOMY THROUGH THE TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AWAY FROM NATIONAL BODY (HEYWOOD, 2002) www.ginandjar.com 79
    • LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAN BE SAID TO BE AUTONOMOUS IF THEY ENJOY A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE, ALTHOUGH AUTONOMY , IN THIS CONNECTION IS SOMETIMES TAKEN TO IMPLY A HIGH MEASURE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT, RATHER THAN SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE (ADAPTED FROM HEYWOOD 2002) HEYWOOD, www.ginandjar.com 80
    • WHY DECENTRALIZE? A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO THE EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES IN MOST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IS THE EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATION OR DECISION-MAKING AND AUTHORITY WITHIN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. GOVERNMENT PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONS ARE COMMONLY PERCEIVED TO BE GEOGRAPHICALLY AND SOCIALLY REMOTE FROM 'THE PEOPLE' AND TO TAKE DECISIONS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OR CONCERN ABOUT ACTUAL PROBLEMS AND PREFERENCES. www.ginandjar.com 81
    • THE POPULAR REMEDY FOR SUCH CENTRALIZATION IS DECENTRALIZATION, A TERM WHICH IS IMBUED WITH POSITIVE CONNOTATIONS-PROXIMITY, RELEVANCE, AUTONOMY, PARTICIPATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVEN DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY. SO GREAT IS THE APPEAL OF DECENTRALIZATION THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO LOCATE A GOVERNMENT THAT HAS NOT CLAIMED TO PURSUE A POLICY OF DECENTRALIZATION IN RECENT YEARS. www.ginandjar.com 82
    • THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS ARGUE THAT DECENTRALIZATION WILL LEAD TO BETTER DECISION MAKING AND HENCE DECISION-MAKING GREATER EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS. GROUNDS www.ginandjar.com 83
    • LOCALLY SPECIFIC PLANS CAN BE TAILOR-MADE FOR LOCAL AREAS USING DETAILED AND UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION THAT IS ONLY LOCALLY AVAILABLE. INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION CAN BE ACHIEVED AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. EXPERIMENTATION AND INNOVATION, FOSTERED BY DECENTRALIZATION INCREASES THE CHANCES OF MORE EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES BEING GENERATED, AND SUBSEQUENTLY DIFFUSED. MOTIVATION OF FIELD LEVEL PERSONNEL IS ENHANCED WHEN FIELD-LEVEL THEY HAVE GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROGRAMMES THEY MANAGE. WORKLOAD REDUCTION AT AGENCIES AT THE CENTRE OF GOVERNMENT WILL RELIEVE THEM FROM ROUTINE DECISION- MAKING AND GIVE THEM MORE TIME TO CONSIDER STRATEGIC ISSUES SO THAT THE' QUALITY OF POLICY SHOULD IMPROVE. SSU S QU O O C S OU O www.ginandjar.com 84
    • TYPES OF DECENTRALIZATION 1. POLITICAL 2. ADMINISTRATIVE 3. FISCAL 4. MARKET www.ginandjar.com 85
    • POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION AIMS TO GIVE CITIZENS OR THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES MORE POWER IN PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING (WORLD BANK, 2001) www.ginandjar.com 86
    • FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION INVOLVES SHIFTING SOME RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EXPENDITURES AND/OR REVENUES TO LOWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT THE EXTENT TO WHICH LOCAL ENTITIES ARE GIVEN AUTONOMY TO DETERMINE THE ALLOCATION OF THEIR EXPENDITURE (WORLD BANK, 2001)4 www.ginandjar.com 87
    • LOCAL FINANCE IN INDONESIA SOURCES LOCAL REVENUES EQUITY FUND OTHERS LOCAL TAXES SHARING REVENUES GIFT RETRIBUTIONS GENERAL EMERGENCY FUND ALLOCATED FUND REVENUES FROM LOAN LOCAL ASSETS SPECIAL ALLOCATED FUND OTHERS www.ginandjar.com 88
    • ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION SEEKS TO REDISTRIBUTE AUTHORITY RESPONSIBILITY AND FINANCIAL AUTHORITY, RESOURCES FOR PROVIDING PUBLIC SERVICES AMONG DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT (WORLD BANK, 2001) www.ginandjar.com 89
    • ECONOMIC OR MARKET DECENTRALIZATION ECONOMIC OR MARKET DECENTRALIZATION WILL CO O C O C O INCLUDE PRIVATIZATION AND DEREGULATION. THEY SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY FOR FUNCTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR (WORLD BANK, 2001) www.ginandjar.com 90
    • FORMS OF DECENTRALIZATION FORMS OF DECENTRALIZATION INCLUDE: 1. DECONCENTRATION 2. DELEGATION TO SEMI-AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES 3. DEVOLUTION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT 4. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS FROM PUBLIC TO NONGOVERNMENT INSTITUITION (CHEEMA & RONDINELLI, 1984) www.ginandjar.com 91
    • DECONCENTRATION DECONCENTRATION INVOLVES THE REDISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES ONLY WITHIN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT (CHEEMA & RONDINELLI 1984) RONDINELLI, www.ginandjar.com 92
    • DELEGATION TO SEMI-AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES ANOTHER FORM OF DECENTRALIZATION IS THE DELEGATION OF DECISION-MAKING AND MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY FOR SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE NOT UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES (CHEEMA & RONDINELLI, 1984) www.ginandjar.com 93
    • DEVOLUTION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANOTHER FORM OF DECENTRALIZATION SEEKS TO CREATE OR STRENGTHEN INDEPENDENT LEVELS OR UNITS OF GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEVOLUTION OF FUNCTION AND AUTHORITY. AUTHORITY (CHEEMA & RONDINELLI, 1984) www.ginandjar.com 94
    • TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS FROM PUBLIC TO NON-GOVERNMENT INSTITUITION DECENTRALIZATION TAKES PLACE IN MANY COUNTRIES THROUGH THE TRANSFER OF SOME PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, OR OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS FROM GOVERNMENT TO FUNCTIONS, VOLUNTARY, PRIVATE, OR NON-GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS. (CHEEMA & RONDINELLI, 1984) www.ginandjar.com 95
    • Forms of decentralization Nature of Delegation Basic for Delegation Territorial Functional Within formal political structures Devolution (political Interest group decentralization, local representation government, democratic g , decentralization Within public administrative or Deconcentration Establisment of parastatals parastatal structures (administrative and quangos decentralization, field administration From state sector to private sector Privatization of developed Privatization of national function (deregulation, functions (devestiture, contracting out, voucher deregulation, economic schemes) liberalization) (TURNER AND HULME, 1997) www.ginandjar.com 96
    • IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES OF DECENTRALIZATION: 1. BETTER MATCH BETWEEN SERVICE PROVISION AND VOTER PREFERENCES 2. BETTER ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH CLOSER LINKAGES OF BENEFITS WITH COSTS 3. 3 INCREASED MOBILIZATION OF LOCAL REVENUES 4. BETTER PARTICIPATION OF CLIENTS IN SELECTION OF OUTPUT MIX (GERVAIS, 1999) www.ginandjar.com 97
    • IT MUST BE NOTE THAT THE DECENTRALIZATION DOES NOT IMPLY THAT ALL AUTHORITY SHOULD BE DELEGATED. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MUST RETAIN A CORE OF FUNCTIONS OVER ESSENTIAL NATIONAL MATTERS AND ULTIMATELY HAS THE AUTHORITV TO REDESIGN THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AND TO DISCIPLINE OR SUSPEND DECENTRALIZED UNITS THAT ARE NOT PERFORMING EFFECTIVELY. HOW EXTENSIVE THIS CORE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS SHOULD BE REMAINS A MAJOR IDEOLOGICAL AND INTELLECTUAL DEBATE OF THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY. CENTURY www.ginandjar.com 98
    • DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE DECENTRALIZATION IN SOME COUNTRIES HAS BEEN SEEN AS POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT FOR DEALING WITH REBELLIOUS REGIONS. IT HAS HOWEVER MORE BASIC VALUE TO DEMOCRACY HOWEVER, AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION. MANY SCHOLARS HAVE PRESENTED THE ARGUMENT THAT DECENTRALIZATION ENHANCES THE LEGITIMACY AND LEGITIMACY, HENCE, STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY. www.ginandjar.com 99
    • DIAMOND (1999) RAISES FIVE BROAD POINTS ABOUT HOW AUTONOMOUS LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER A DECENTRALIZATION SCHEME CAN IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY. 1) GREATER AUTONOMY TO THE REGIONS HELPS DEVELOP DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND SKILLS AMONG CITIZENS. 2) DECENTRALIZATION INCREASES ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS TO LOCAL INTERESTS AND CONCERNS. 3) IT OPENS UP ACCESS TO POWER OF TRADITIONALLY MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THUS IMPROVES THE REPRESENTATIONAL ASPECTS OF DEMOCRACY. 4) IT STRENGTHENS CHECKS AND BALANCES VIZ-A-VIZ POWER AT THE CENTER. 5) IT PROVIDES OPPORTUNITIES FOR PARTIES AND POLITICAL GROUPS IN OPPOSITION IN THE CENTER TO EXERCISE SOME MEASURE OF POLITICAL POWER. www.ginandjar.com 100
    • FROM THE ARGUMENTS ABOVE IT CAN BE CONCLUDED THAT DECENTRALIZATION ENHANCES THE EFFICACY, QUALITY AND LEGITIMACY OF DEMOCRACY; HENCE DECENTRALIZATION IS A NECESSITY FOR DEMOCRACY. IT IS EVEN MORE SO FOR LARGE—AND PARTICULARLY LARGE AND MULTIETHNIC AND MULTICULTURAL—COUNTRIES SUCH AS INDONESIA AND CHINA, AS DECENTRALIZATION WILL CLOSE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE CITIZENS, THE STAKEHOLDER, AND THE POWER AND THE PROCESS OF POLICY MAKING. MAKING www.ginandjar.com 101
    • DECENTRALIZATION IS NOT JUST A POLITICAL NECESSITY FOR KEEPING THE COUNTRY FROM FALLING APART OR FOR FOSTERING DEMOCRACY. IF MANAGED WELL, DECENTRALIZATION CAN BRING WELL IMPORTANT BENEFITS TO THE COMMUNITIES AND THE ECONOMY AS A WHOLE. HOWEVER, IF MANAGED BADLY, IT COULD HARM THE PEOPLE AND SQUANDER RESOURCES AND BRING INSTABILITY INSTEAD INSTEAD. www.ginandjar.com 102
    • RICH REGIONS ARE DOING FINE, IN FACT THEY MAY HAVE MORE MONEY THAT THEY CAN SPEND WHICH CAN POSE A THREAT TO SPEND, NATIONAL SOLIDARITY BECAUSE OF SOCIAL-JEALOUSY THERE ARE ALREADY SOME INDICATIONS THAT REVENUES NOT BEING USED EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY, ON THE OTHER HAND, POOR REGIONS ARE CHAFING UNDER UNDER. THE RISKS OF AN INCREASE IN CORRUPTION FOLLOWING DECENTRALIZATION ARE HIGH. IT HAS BEEN WIDELY OBSERVED THAT SO FAR NOT ONLY POWER AND REVENUE THAT HAVE BEEN DECENTRALIZED BUT ALSO CORRUPTION. SOME ANALYSTS COMMENT THAT DECENTRALIZATION HAS STRENGTHENED THE POSITION OF THE LOCAL ELITES AND THEIR CLIENTELISTIC NETWORKS IN SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES (HUBER, RUESCHEMEYER AND STEPHENS, 1999). www.ginandjar.com 103
    • TRANSFERS OF REVENUE TO THE AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY TRANSFERS OF EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS ASSOCIATED FUNCTIONS. THEY ARE IMPORTANT TO PREVENT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL DEFICIT TO INCREASE UNABATEDLY CAUSING SEVERE FINANCING AND DEBT PROBLEMS FOE THE COUNTRY IN THE FUTURE. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ALSO NEED TO HAVE THE APPROPRIATE CAPACITY AND SKILLS TO TAKE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY THAT COMES WITH AUTONOMY. BUDGETARY CONTROL AND SUPERVISION SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED TO PREVENT CORRUPTION AND WASTAGE OF RESOURCES. IN SHORT EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZATION WILL ENHANCE SHORT, DEMOCRACY BUT IT REQUIRES ALSO GOOD GOVERNANCE, I.E. CLEAN, TRANSPARENT AND COMPETENT GOVERNANCE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. LEVEL www.ginandjar.com 104
    • GOVERNMENT SYSTEM OF INDONESIA People’s HOUSE OF HOUSE OF SUPREME SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL Consultative REPRESENTA- REGIONAL THE PRESIDENT AUDIT COURT COURT Assembly TIVES REPRESENTA- CABINET BOARD • JUDICIAL TIVES COMMISSION •CENTRAL BANK DECONCENTRATION DECENTRALIZATION ASSISTANCE TASKS DELEGATION (FUNCTIONAL DECENTRALIZATION) REGIONAL STATE-OWNED GOVERNORS ADMINISTRATION ENTERPRISES AUTONOMOUS RURAL ADMINISTRATOR, REGIONS ADMINISTRATION ETC. www.ginandjar.com 105
    • DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA ADMINISTRATIVE DECONCENTRATION GOVERNMENT /REGIONAL GOVERNMENT • REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES • REGIONAL GOVERNMENT CHIEFS • ETC. PRIVATIZATION CENTRAL DELEGATION GOVERNMENT • PRIVATE CORPORATION • SPECIAL AUTHORITY • BOT • ETC. DECENTRALIZATION AUTONOMOUS REGION PROVINCE DISTRICT www.ginandjar.com CITY 106
    • DECENTRALIZATION PRINCIPLES IN INDONESIA Six tasks (Absolute) • Partly by the central 1. Foreign Policy government; 2. Defense 3. Security • P tl based on Partly b d Central 4. Religion deconcentration principles; 5. Justice • Partly based on assistance Government 6. National Fiscal and Monetary Affairs principle Outside the six tasks: Partly Administrative Concurrent Tasks Mandatory Tasks (Province, District, City) 1. Planning and control of development 2. Planning, use, and control of space; 3. Public security; 4. Facilities and infrastructure; 5. 5 Health; 6. Education and potential human resources; 7. Solution to social problems; 8. Manpower (incl. interregional mobility); 9. Cooperatives and SMEs; Partly based on Regional 10. Environment; decentralization principles Governments 11. Land administration; 12. Civil administration; 13. General government administration; 14. Investment; 15. Other basic services (not yet implemented); 16. Other tasks. Elective (Province, District, City) Based on the potentials and characteristics of each region (mining, fishery, agriculture, plantation, forestry, tourism) www.ginandjar.com 107
    • DIGITAL (E)-GOVERNANCE ( ) INFORMATION IS A CENTRAL RESOURCE FOR ALL ACTIVITIES. IN PURSUING THE DEMOCRATIC/POLITICAL PROCESSES, IN MANAGING RESOURCES, EXECUTING FUNCTIONS, MEASURING PERFORMANCE AND IN SERVICE DELIVERY, INFORMATION IS THE BASIC INGREDIENT' (ISAAC- HENRY 1997: I 32) 32). www.ginandjar.com 108
    • INFORMATION IS NO LONGER “WALLED IN , NO LONGER WALLED IN” CONSTRAINED BY TIME AND SPACE. INFORMATION IS WIDELY AVAILABLE TO PEOPLE REGARDLESS OF STATUS,, POSITION, WEALTH, LOCATION, RACE, ETHNIC OR CULTURE. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY GIVES A NEW IMPETUS TO DEMOCRACY AS IT OPENS UP AND WIDENS THE WAY AND MEANS FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISSION MAKING PROCESSES. www.ginandjar.com 109
    • THE MAJOR STEPS HAVE INCLUDED: USING COMPUTER NETWORKS AS A NEW CHANNEL FOR SERVICE DELIVERY, DELIVERY BEGINNING TO REENGINEER SERVICES AND CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SELFSERVICE, EXPANDING RELIANCE ON SERVICES OUTSOURCED TO OTHER AGENCIES AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, SHOWING ANXIETY—BUT NOT MUCH ACTION YET— ABOUT SOCIAL EQUITY AND COHESION, AND BEGINNING TO CONTEMPLATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF NEW FORMS OF ELECTRONIC MONEY. www.ginandjar.com 110
    • IN THESE FIRST YEARS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TWENTY FIRST CENTURY, GOVERNMENTS AROUND THE WORLD ARE PREPARING FOR E GOVERNMENT. E-GOVERNMENT WEBSITES HAVE BEEN CREATED FOR MANY GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, AND THE PUSH IS ON FOR BROADER AND MORE EASILY NAVIGATED PORTALS. TRANSACTIONS ARE BEING OFFERED OVER THE INTERNET. POLITICIANS AND THE PRESS ARE BEGINNING TO TALK ABOUT quot;DIGITAL DEMOCRACY.quot; www.ginandjar.com 111
    • THE INFORMATION AGE IS CREATING NEW CHALLENGES FOR GOVERNANCE BY ENCOURAGING A MORE COMPLEX DIVISION OF LABOR AND A FLOOD OF NEW THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES. MODERN COMMUNICATIONS ARE REDUCING THE POWER OF GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY IN SHAPING OUR SENSE OF COMMUNITY AND DETERMINING WHO HAS THE LEGITIMACY NEEDED TO GOVERN. www.ginandjar.com 112
    • IN THE LONGER TERM, COMPUTER-BASED COMMUNICATIONS COULD SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRUCTURE POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE AS WELL AS ECONOMICS. COMPUTER NETWORKS, ARE MAKING IT MORE NETWORKS CONVENIENT TO PARTICIPATE IN CONVERSATIONS THAT WERE FORMERLY HARD TO JOIN. THIS MAY WELL LEAD TO NEW PATTERNS OF POLITICAL O SO O C COMMUNICATION AND PARTICIPATION. www.ginandjar.com 113
    • THE E-GOVERNMENT PROMISES A NEW HORISON IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS IT WILL CUT COSTS AND IMPROVE EFFICIENCY; MEET CITIZEN EXPECTATIONS; IMPROVE CITIZEN RELATIONSHIP; ENHANCE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES;; INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC CONTROL; FACILITATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. www.ginandjar.com 114
    • THE START OF SOMETHING BIG? OVER THE NEXT TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS, THE EXPANSION OF NETWORK-BASED COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD EXERT A STRONG INFLUENCE ON HOW COMMUNITIES ARE FORMED AND GOVERNED. GOVERNED www.ginandjar.com 115
    • GOVERNMENTS ARE BUILDING HUGE AND INTERCONNECTED COMPUTER NETWORKS, BUT WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE THESE BECOME UBIQUITOUSLY AVAILABLE TO ALL WORKERS AND CITIZENS. THE MOMENTUM IS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED, HOWEVER, AND NOTHING IS LIKELY TO STOP IT. OUTSOURCING WILL CONTINUE TO EXPAND. IN ADDITION, MORE GOVERNMENTS WILL BEGIN TO WORK WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO REFORM ENTIRE INDUSTRIES AND ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURES. www.ginandjar.com 116
    • PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS ARE RAPIDLY BECOMING NETWORKED, AND THEY ARE USING THESE NETWORKS TO PRODUCE AND DELIVER SERVICES. THIS WILL ULTIMATELY LEAD TO EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS, MUCH AS HAS HAPPENED IN THE PRIVATE SECTORY. GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES WILL GRADUALLY BECOME FLATTER, FASTER, AND MORE CUSTOMER FRIENDLY. SERVICES WILL BECOME BETTER INTEGRATED AND CUSTOMIZED, WITH RICH SELF-SERVICE OPTIONS. FEES RATHER THAN TAXES WILL BE USED MORE EXTENSIVELY TO RAISE REVENUES AND COORDINATE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION. www.ginandjar.com 117
    • AS WE PROCEED MORE DEEPLY INTO THE INFORMATION AGE, THE NEW CORE VALUE AND CHALLENGE FOR GOVERNANCE-AT BOTH ORGANIZATIONAL AND SOCIETAL LEVELS WILL BE TO LEARN HOW TO ADAPT TO NEW CONDITIONS AND NEEDS. TO GOVERN SUCCESSFULLY, WE MUST FIGURE OUT HOW , TO PROTECT PUBLIC SAFETY AND PREVENT ABUSES OF POWER WHILE WE SIMULTANEOUSLY PROMOTE GOVERNMENTAL FLEXIBILITY AND LEARNING. WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS ON THIS PROBLEM, BUT OUR STATUS AS WE ENTER THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MIGHT BEST BE DESCRIBED AS quot;JUST AT THE START OF SOMETHING BIG“. (KAMARACK AND NYE JR., 2002) www.ginandjar.com 118
    • THE ROLE OF THE INTERNET THE INTERNET IS A NETWORK OF NETWORKS OF ONE-TO-ONE, ONE-TO-MANY, MANY-TO-MANY, AND MANY-TO-ONE, LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND GLOBAL INFORMATIO. AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES WITH RELATIVELY OPEN STANDARDS AND PROTOCOLS AND COMPARATIVELY LOW BARRIERS TO ENTRY. www.ginandjar.com 119
    • Estimated Global Internet Users in 2002 and 2004 Survey y Global Users 2002 Global Users 2004 ITU 627 million 676 million CIA World Factbook 604 million Not updated NUA 606 million ll Not updated d d Internet World Stats 587 million 798 million Computer Industry Almanac p y 665 million 945 million Mean 618 million 806 million Sources: Analysis of data from ITU, 2004a; U.S. Central Intelligent Agency (CIA), 2003; Computer Industry Almanac, 2004; NUA, 2004 Note: * Based on 2003 projections. (CHADWICK, 2006) www.ginandjar.com 120
    • ALL OF THIS HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE KINDS OF AUTHORITY AND CONTROL THAT MAY BE EXERCISED OVER THE INTERNET AND THE LEVELS OF RESISTANCE THAT MAY BE ACHIEVED BY LESSPOWERFUL GROUPS, WHOSE VOICES MAY BE ABSENT FROM MAINSTREAM CHANNELS LIKE THE PRESS AND TELEVISION. ORDINARY CITIZENS AND THE POLITICALLY MARGINALIZED ARE NO LONGER WHOLLY DEPENDENT UPON THE WAYS IN WHICH THE TRADITIONALLY DOMINANT BROADCAST MEDIA CONSTRUCT THEIR IDENTITIES OR SELECTIVELY FRAME POLITICAL GRIEVANCES. www.ginandjar.com 121
    • POLITICAL COMMUNICATION ON THE INTERNET BECOMES, IN BECOMES THE WORDS OF DOUGLAS KELLNER (1999), quot;MORE DECENTERED AND VARIED IN ITS ORIGINS, SCOPE AND C S O G S, SCO EFFECTSquot;. THE RELATIVE SPEED AND FLUIDITY OF CYBERSPACE SOMETIMES ALLOWS MARGINAL GROUPS TO THRUST THEIR AGENDA INTO THE POLITICAL MAINSTREAM (MITRA, 2001). THE AUTHORITATIVE STATUS OF POWERFUL INSTITUTIONAL PLAYERS, BE THEY GOVERNMENTS, CORPORATIONS, OR MAINSTREAM MEDIA, HAS BEEN LOOSENED. www.ginandjar.com 122
    • POLITICAL ACTORS ARE INCREASINGLY ATTEMPTING TO USE THE INTERNET TO ENHANCE THEIR PRESENCE AND LEGITIMIZE THEIR ACTIVITIES IN WAYS THAT ARE GENUINELY NEW NEW. STATES ARE INCREASINGLY REQUIRED TO REGULATE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR ONLINE AND ARE MONITORING THE USE OF THE INTERNET for ANTI- SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (SUCH AS PORNOGRAPHY), GROUPS AND MOVEMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE A THREAT TO POLITICAL STABILITY AND SECURITY (SUCH AS TERRORISM). www.ginandjar.com 123
    • A WEB PAGE MAY APPEAR AT FIRST GLANCE TO BE A SIMPLE ONE-TO-MANY DEVICE, BUT OFTEN WEB PAGES ARE COMPOSED OF INFORMATION, SUCH AS INFORMATION NEWS FEEDS, FROM MANY DIFFERENT SOURCES THAT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TOGETHER BY AUTOMATED SCRIPTS THAT DYNAMICALLY UPDATE CONTENT WITHOUT HUMAN INTERVENTION. WEB PAGES MAY ALSO CONTAIN DISCUSSION FORUMS ALONGSIDE MORE TRADITIONAL FORMS OF CONTENT. www.ginandjar.com 124
    • DIGITAL DIVIDE www.ginandjar.com 125
    • Internet penetration by region, 2002. Sources: Analysis and adaptation of data from ITU, 2004b. The CIA World Factbook 2004 was used to feel a small number of gaps in the 2002 data. (CHADWICK, (CHADWICK 2006) www.ginandjar.com 126