Your SlideShare is downloading. ×
Wolfgang Kröger - Reflections focused on the electric power supply system
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×

Thanks for flagging this SlideShare!

Oops! An error has occurred.

×

Introducing the official SlideShare app

Stunning, full-screen experience for iPhone and Android

Text the download link to your phone

Standard text messaging rates apply

Wolfgang Kröger - Reflections focused on the electric power supply system

1,292
views

Published on

Panel I: "International Disaster and Risk Reduction, Sustainability and Resiliency" …

Panel I: "International Disaster and Risk Reduction, Sustainability and Resiliency"
Wolfgang Kroeger, Professor, ETH Risk Center, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

Published in: Technology, Business

0 Comments
0 Likes
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Views
Total Views
1,292
On Slideshare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
3
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
0
Comments
0
Likes
0
Embeds 0
No embeds

Report content
Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
No notes for slide
  • An unprecedented complexity in an ever-increasing interconnected world.Our society is confronted by risks of very different types (economics, environmental, political, etc.).A new dimension of re-emerging systemic risks (with 1 or 2 examples). As footnote: “systemic risks”: depicting the embeddedness of any risk to human health and the environment in a larger context of social, financial and economic consequences and increased interdependencies both across risks and between their various backgrounds.Widening gap between engineering and operating complex systems.Fragmentation of research fields, need for the development of cross-disciplinary new methods and tools.
  • Die herausgearbeiteten gemeinsamen Ursachenmuster weisen darauf hin, dass die Systeme oft jenseits der ursprünglichen Auslegung betrieben wurden und werden, dass Fehlverhalten der Technik eine Rolle gespielt hat, aber auch ein Mangel an Investitionen deutlich wurde und dass vor allem „weiche Faktoren“ wie Mangel an situativem Bewusstsein, innerer Vorbereitung und Koordination über Grenzen hinweg bei der Modellierung und Analyse/Simulation zu berücksichtigen sind.
  • Lassen Sie mich nun von der recht überschaubaren Analyse einer komplizierten Einzelanlage übergehen auf die Modellierung komplexer Netzwerke wie Stromübertragungssysteme. Hier lehrt uns eine recht lange Liste aufgetretener, unterschiedlich verlaufener Stromausfälle, worauf wir dabei zu achten haben.
  • Transcript

    • 1. Panel I: International Disaster and Risk Reduction, Sustainability and Resilience 1Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference Reflections focused on the electric power supply system Wolfgang Kröger, Professor ETH, Executive Director, ETH Risk Center 4th Conference on Community Resilience, Davos, August 2013 August 29, 2013 | Davos
    • 2. The Synchronized European Grid (ENTSO-E) 2Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference Main goal: Secure (amount, quality), sustainable, and affordable power supply Sum of physical energy flows between ENTSO-E countries: 370786 GWh (2011) Source: ENTSO-E Statistical Yearbook 2011 August 29, 2013 | Davos
    • 3.  Operation of systems beyond original design parameters (high transborder flows, integration of wind power, etc.)  Malfunction of critical equipment and adverse behavior of protective devices; insufficient system automation in some cases (poor investment)  Lack of situational awareness and short-term emergency preparedness  Limited real time system monitoring beyond TSO1) control area and weak cross-border coordination in case of contingencies  Inadequacy of N-1 security criterion, of its implementation/evaluation 1) Transmission System Operator „Soft factors“ dominate and cannot be ignored In general, “there is a growing recognition that tragic accidents and catastrophic failures can be traced back to organizational factors that create conditions that invite disaster” (Madni & Jackson, 2009) Common Patterns of Recent Major Blackouts Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference 3August 29, 2013 | Davos
    • 4. Concept of Resilience | Still Evolving  Concept has been developed and explored in various fields; no commonly accepted definition, in general “the ability of a system or a system-of-systems to resist/absorb initial adverse effects of a disruptive (shocking or creeping) internal or external event/force (stressor) and the time/speed at which it is able to return to an appropriate functionality/equilibrium”.  The system boundary needs to be fixed, can be narrow (technical) or wide (socio-technical), depending on the objectives of study. Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference 4 4August 29, 2013 | Davos
    • 5. Resilience Response Behavior of a Self-Organizing System to Endogenous or Exogenous Disruptions Four essential patterns, (1) absorbing a shock without collapsing, (2) recovering from a shock to gain structure, functions and essential feedback loops again, (3) adapting through self-organization and learning, and (4) eventually transforming into a different system by altering structures, functions and feedback loops. Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference 5 5August 29, 2013 | Davos
    • 6.  The public regards electricity as common good and lacks awareness of increasing blackout risks.  The ENTSO1)-E grid is facing major changes in power generation (intermittency), structure (competitive internal market, new consumer types), technology and preferences (smartness, decentralization) as well as a broadened set of hazards (climate change) and threats (cyber).  Resilience is a promising concept asking for concretization (e.g. perfor- mance measures); it allows to widen the views (from pure prevention and mitigation) and objectives (from purely technical to socio-organizational- technical).  ENTSO-E shall be the suitable organization for developing codes and standards while EU directives shall provide the regulatory framework. 1) European Network of Transmission System Operators responsible for ensuring security of supply Statements (I) 6Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference
    • 7.  Methods to quantify “resilience” and provide guiding principles are still at their infancy and call for fostered research. Principles beyond question: Avoid system collapse and cascades, include other than technical factors. Strive for robust topology, avoid operating the system at its limits, include “all hazards & treats”. Do not use the public internet, unless more secure, for any function vital to the control of the system. Raise awareness that systems may fail, optimise preparations of recovery measures (rapidity, costs).  “Outage curves”, i.e. frequency, size and duration of blackouts, and established target lines are considered worth pursuing. Statements (II) 7Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference
    • 8. 8Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference Thank you for your attention! August 29, 2013 | Davos
    • 9. Blackout Loss [GW] Duration [h] People affected Main causes Aug. 14, 2003 Great Lakes, NYC ~ 60 ~ 16 50 Mio Inadequate right-of-way maintenance, EMS failure, poor coordination among neighbouring TSOs Aug. 28, 2003 London 0,72 1 500´000 Incorrect line protection device setting Sept. 23, 2003 Denmark / Sweden 6,4 ~ 7 4,2 Mio Two independent component failures (not covered by N-1 rule) Sept. 28, 2003 Italy ~ 30 up to 18 56 Mio High load flow CH-I, line flashovers, poor coordination among neighbouring TSOs July 12, 2004 Athens ~ 9 ~ 3 5 Mio Voltage collapse May 25, 2005 Moscow 2,5 ~ 4 4 Mio Transformer fire, high demand leading to overload conditions June 22, 2005 Switzerland (railway supply) 0.2 ~ 3 200´000 passengers Non-fulfilment of the N-1 rule, wrong documentation of line protection settings, inadequate alarm processing Aug. 14, 2006 Tokyo ? ~ 5 0.8 Mio households Damage of a main line due to construction work Nov. 4, 2006 Western Europe (planned line cut off) ~ 14 ~ 2 15 Mio. households High load flow D-NL, violation of the N-1 rule, poor inter-TSO coordination Nov. 10, 2009 Brazil, Paraguay ~14 ~4 60 Mio Short circuit on key power line due to bad weather, Itaipu hydro (18 GW) shut down March 11, 2011 Northern Honshu 41 days Grid destruction by earthquake & tsunami/supply gap Electric Power Supply System | Learning from Major Blackouts Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference 9
    • 10. General Layout of SCADA System HMI – Human-Machine Interface PLC – Programmable Logic Controllers M/RTU – Master/Remote Terminal Unit IED – Intelligent Electronic Devices Panel I | 4th Resiliency Conference