Utkur DJANIBEKOV "Cooperative institutions for increasing rural livelihood under CDM forestation on marginal croplands"


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Utkur DJANIBEKOV "Cooperative institutions for increasing rural livelihood under CDM forestation on marginal croplands"

  1. 1. Cooperative institutions for increasing rural livelihood under CDM forestation on marginal croplands Utkur Djanibekov, Nodir Djanibekov, Asia Khamzina, John Lamersemail: utkur@uni-bonn.de UNCCD 2nd Scientific Conference Bonn, Germany, April 9-12, 2013
  2. 2. Irrigated agriculture in Uzbekistan • Central Asia: Irrigated agriculture contributes 15-20% GDP • Dependency of agricultural production on Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers • Khorezm and Southern Karakalpakstan: 30% GRP from agriculture • 20-35% croplands are marginal; Croplands are affected by salinity 2Source: El Beltagy (2002); Suzuki (2003); Lerman and Stanchin (2006); Dukhovny and Sorokin (2007); Perelet (2007), Dubovyk et al. (2012)
  3. 3. Afforestation of marginal croplands March 2004 • Alternative land use for livelihood • Provides: fuelwood, fruits, leaves as fodder, carbon payments • Environmental services: climate change mitigation, biodiversity increase, land rehabilitation • Less irrigation demand than crops May 2006 Yet… • Conversion of croplands into trees is prohibited • State cotton procurement policy low flexibility in land use Photos: KhamzinaSource: Olschewski and Benitez (2005); Zhang et al. (2006); Marechal and Hecq (2006); Pearson et al. (2007); Khamzina et al. (2008); Lamers et al. 3(2008); Alkemade et al. (2009); Thomas et al. (2010); Dargusch et al. (2010); Djanibekov et al. (2012)
  4. 4. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) afforestation Afforestation through an international agreement in the framework of CDM can be an option Still CDM constraints…• High initial investments and transaction costs, e.g., 100,000-600,000 USD• Certain amount of CO2 to comply with requirements Option for afforestation: CDM-farm forestry cooperation Objectives of the study• To identify institutional settings under which farmers can cooperate and afforest marginal croplands• To assess the impact of introducing CDM-farm forestry cooperative on rural community livelihood 4
  5. 5. Data and methodsData sources• 160 farm and weekly market surveys• Tree growth parameters over 7 years Farm type 2Model settings Farm CDM afforestation type 1 farm cooperative• Cooperative game model over 28 years• 3 scenarios: Farm type 31) Business-as-usual (BAU)2) Afforestation, where farmers can plant trees3) CDM cooperative (CDMC), farmers can cooperate in land use (tree planting) and irrigation water use, and share benefits and costs• Flexibility in cotton procurement policy• Annual decrease in irrigation water availability 5
  6. 6. Heterogeneous farms• 3 heterogeneous farm groups based on land productivity attributes Characteristics of farms Farm type 1 Farm type 2 Farm type 3 Total area, ha 100 60 130 Marginal cropland area, ha 23 5 43• Heterogeneity of farms in coalitions Heterogeneity of Farm type 1 Farm type 2 Farm type 3 Coalition coalitionFarm type 1 0.00 0.85 0.15 Farm type 1 and 2 0.43Farm type 2 0.85 0.00 1.00 Farm type 1 and 3 0.07Farm type 3 0.15 1.00 0.00 Farm type 2 and 3 0.50 Farm type 1, 2 and 3 0.67 6
  7. 7. Results: Production of food and tree products• As trees require less irrigation, water not used would be applied for more productive lands and increase production of grains and vegetables• Output would be largest when several farms cooperate (CDMC scenario) Scenarios Commodities BAU Afforestation CDMC t year-1 t year-1 t year-1 Grains (wheat and rice) 500 600 639 Vegetables 76 213 240 Fuelwood n.a. 766 788 Tree leaves as fodder n.a. 35 36 Fruits n.a. 16 16 7
  8. 8. Results: Farm benefits• CDMC would have highest CO2 sequestration• Community profits would be largest when farms cooperate• Yet, profits of some farms would be lower in CDMC in contrast to afforestation 150 Farm profit, 1,000 USD 120 90 60 30 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 Years Farm type 1 BAU Afforestation CDM cooperation Farm type 2 BAU Afforestation CDM cooperation Farm type 3 BAU Afforestation CDM cooperation 8
  9. 9. Results: Fair division of cooperation benefits • Compensation would be needed for losing farms to attract into cooperation • Division of benefits depending on losses would increase farm profits Farm type 1 Farm type 2 Farm type 3Difference between individual increments in net benefitsin the Afforestation and CDMC, 1,000 USD -3 18 -4.4Share in net gains from cooperation, % 0 40 0Share in net losses from cooperation, % 3 0 5Division of net benefits from favored farms, 1,000 USD 0 7.4 0Compensation paid to disadvantaged farms, 1,000 USD 3 0 4.4Profits after compensation, 1,000 USD 89 55 98Increments in net benefits from cooperation, 1,000 USD 0 10 0Relative gain from cooperation, % 0 22 0 9
  10. 10. Conclusion• Flexibility in cotton policy would lead to afforestation of marginal lands• Total benefits of CDM cooperation is highest among the three scenarios• Some farms may lose from cooperation• Compensation has to be arranged from favored farms to disadvantaged ones from participation in cooperation• The more heterogeneous are farmers the more they complement each other• The drivers that could initiate cooperative process and compensations may be external, e.g., through support from the state or NGOs, or internal, such as based on agreements among farmers 10
  11. 11. Thank you for your attention