Infrastructure Protection from Extreme Natural Hazards: Marine oil terminals


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ANA MARIA CRUZ, Ph.D Consultant, Natural and Industrial Disaster Risk Management and Adjunct Professor, Kyoto University

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  • Natech disasters are particularly problematic types of disasters for a number of reasons. Simultaneously, response efforts are likely to be required to attend to both the technological disaster and the triggering natural disaster If these problems are not taken into account during the planning process, emergency response needs are likely to overwhelm response capacity. Steinberg and Cruz (2004) found that risk management and emergency response planning for accidental hazmat releases during normal day-to-day plant operation are not sufficient if they have not taken into account the problems that accompany a natech event. Although safety techniques have been developed and implemented to prevent or contain accidents at industrial facilities and other hazardous installations, they are typically not designed to accommodate releases that are triggered by, and are simultaneous with, natural disasters
  • IN this study I propose the use of a comprehensive analysis approach that encompasses the industrial facilities, lifeline infrastructure, and the community. The effects and consequences of the earthquake on these three systems affects emergency response capacity as well.
  • Will pose many challenges to the oil and gas sector A changing climate including increased temperatures, changes in ….
  • coastal flooding and storm surge, rising sea-levels, and ground subsidence and erosion
  • coastal flooding and storm surge, rising sea-levels, and ground subsidence and erosion
  • Ports and marine terminals are affected by earthquakes and tsunamis, and liquefaction and soil problems during earthquakes (Tang 2000, Erdik 1998). Ground shaking, settlement, and lateral displacement caused damage to port facilities in Izmit Bay following the Kocaeli earthquake (Tang (2000). To illustrate, ground subsidence and/or submarine slides caused the loss of 200 meters of pier at the AKSA chemical company in Yalova on the south shore of Izmit Bay (Steinberg and Cruz 2004). Liquefaction and permanent ground deformation devastated the Port of Kobe, Japan, damaging more than 90 % of the port’s moorings (Erdik 1998). Damage to ports can have severe economic impact on a region, as occurred following the Kobe earthquake, cutting Kobe off from the rest of Japan and the outside world (Cataldo 1995). The American Society of Civil Engineers’ Ports and Harbors Committee has developed planning and design guidelines for small harbors (Sorensen et al. 1992), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has done research concerning design and redevelopment of ports and harbors (Lillycrop et al. 1991).
  • In 1964 a large earthquake of 7.5 magnitude triggered a 4 m tsunami in Niigata, Japan. The earthquake initially caused fires in five storage tanks and hundreds of oil spills at two oil refineries in Niigata harbor (Iwabuchi et al. 2006). When the tsunami hit the already earthquake stricken facilities additional damage to storage tanks and plant processing equipment occurred and spread the fire throughout the two plants. The ignited crude oil from the refineries was then carried by the flood waters into residential areas and resulted in the destruction of 286 houses by fire (Iwabuchi et al. 2006, Akatsuka and Kobayashi 2008, Cruz, Krausmann, and Franchello 2010).
  • The are various ways in which chemical accidents and industrial losses can be reduced. In each case, it is important to understand that these measures all help to reduce the risk and/or impacts of chemical releases to some extent, but do not eliminate them entirely (Steinberg 2003) . To insure the best results risk and risk reduction, alternatives should be evaluated and adopted along the entire life cycle of a plant.
  • Infrastructure Protection from Extreme Natural Hazards: Marine oil terminals

    1. 1. Infrastructure Protection from Extreme Natural Hazards: Marine oil terminals ANA MARIA CRUZ, Ph.D Consultant, Natural and Industrial Disaster Risk Management and Adjunct Professor, Kyoto University IDRC, Davos, Switzerland 31 May 2010
    2. 2. Introduction <ul><li>More than 80% of world shipping is done by sea </li></ul><ul><li>Some regions of the world’s energy imports depend almost entirely on sea trade </li></ul><ul><li>Extreme natural hazards can affect marine oil terminals and ports and could lead to Natechs </li></ul>
    3. 3. Introduction <ul><li>Natech events pose major challenges for marine oil terminals, ports, and nearby communities </li></ul><ul><li>Identifying the vulnerability of marine oil terminals and ports to extreme natural hazards is vital to their safety and continued operation </li></ul><ul><li>As occurs with major oil and petrochemical facilities, impacts likely to trigger domino effects </li></ul>
    4. 4. Natural hazard induced chemical releases and oil spills <ul><li>Extreme event </li></ul><ul><li>Response efforts </li></ul><ul><li>Lifelines and </li></ul><ul><li> safety systems </li></ul>simultaneous multiple releases mitigation response natural disaster technological disaster
    5. 5. Significant safety and environmental risks from impacts of external hazards <ul><li>External hazards not generally factored in safety analysis, industrial risk assessments and emergency response plans </li></ul><ul><li>Most risk assessment requirements concern individual infrastructures and rarely includes systemic risks </li></ul><ul><li>Potential for chemical releases and oil spills may increase due to changing climate </li></ul>
    6. 6. Comprehensive Analysis Framework Extreme natural hazard LIFELINES/ OTHER SYSTEMS MARINE OIL TERMINAL & PORTS COMMUNITY
    7. 7. Potential impacts and vulnerability <ul><li>The challenges for marine terminals and ports in addressing natural hazard issues will vary by location </li></ul>
    8. 8. Marine terminals and ports are likely to be impacted by a changing climate including: Sea level rise <ul><li>Located in coastal areas </li></ul><ul><li>Increased coastal flooding, storm surge, rising sea-levels </li></ul><ul><li>Increased soil problems such as ground subsidence and erosion </li></ul><ul><li>e. g., US Gulf Coast has experienced highest sea level rise </li></ul>
    9. 9. Changes in ambient temperature: <ul><li>Higher temperatures increased deterioration of equipment and infrastructure </li></ul><ul><li>Changing temperatures and weather patterns </li></ul><ul><li>may lead to water scarcity and hence higher energy costs </li></ul><ul><li>Higher temperatures can lead to problems with service water intake (mussels, jellyfish) </li></ul>
    10. 10. Severe storms, heavy rains and coastal flooding events could increase <ul><li>Areas where storms & flooding are already a concern, conditions could deteriorate </li></ul><ul><li>Increased rainfall could lead to more rapid deterioration of infrastructure, raising costs </li></ul><ul><li>Can affect logistics such as road and rail delivery and distribution, worker transportation </li></ul>
    11. 11. Hurricane/typhoon strength winds and tornados: <ul><li>May damage buildings and structures at ports by toppling equipment, storage tanks, and dislodging roofs </li></ul><ul><li>Protruding parts such as rails, piping and connections between storage tanks and other units vulnerable to high wind speeds </li></ul><ul><li>Projectiles can damage equipment, break pipes and connections, and puncture tanks </li></ul>
    12. 12. Chevron refinery affected by Hurricane Georges* 1998 Facility’s port terminal damaged by storm surge and high winds Flooded naphtha tank farm Tornado damages cooling tower Salt-water intrusion on control panel Hurricane Georges in 1998, Pascagoula, MS (*Cruz et al. , Natural Hazards Review, 2001) Control center moved by storm surge
    13. 13. Storm surge and coastal flooding: <ul><li>Storm surge and high winds can affect onshore infrastructure, offshore oil and gas operations, ships and vessel and pipelines </li></ul><ul><li>Wave inundation and underwater wave loads can severely compromise structural integrity of platforms, piers, and other sea infrastructure </li></ul>
    14. 14. Earthquake impacts <ul><li>Ports and marine terminals can be affected by earthquakes and tsunami </li></ul><ul><li>Earthquakes can cause liquefaction and soil problems </li></ul><ul><li>Ground shaking, settlement, and lateral displacement caused damage to port facilities in Izmit Bay during Kocaeli EQ </li></ul><ul><li>Liquefaction and ground deformation devastated port of Kobe, Japan </li></ul><ul><li>EQ damaged more than 90% of port’s moorings </li></ul>
    15. 15. Tsunami impacts <ul><li>Even small tsunami waves (less than 1m) can affect marine storage terminals </li></ul><ul><li>Damage to tanks likely due to buoyancy loads during low water flow velocities </li></ul><ul><li>High likelihood of salt water intrusion on low lying equipment (motors, pumps) due to flooding </li></ul><ul><li>High water velocities can cause erosion and scour in some areas and could undermine pier piles and equipment foundations </li></ul>
    16. 16. Example from 1964 Niigata 7.5 magnitude earthquake* <ul><li>EQ causes fires in 5 storage tanks and hundreds of oil spills at two refineries in Niigata Harbor </li></ul><ul><li>Tsunami triggered by EQ causes additional damage and spreads fire </li></ul><ul><li>Flood waters carry ignited oil into residential areas destroying 286 homes </li></ul>*Iwabuchi et al. 2006; Akatsuka and Kobayashi 2008
    17. 17. Natech risk reduction measures: <ul><li>Design codes and standards </li></ul><ul><li>Chemical process safeguards </li></ul><ul><li>Combined natural hazard and chemical process safeguards </li></ul><ul><li>Land use planning </li></ul><ul><li>Disaster mitigation and response planning </li></ul>
    18. 18. <ul><li>Avoiding building in coastal areas subject to flood, storm impacts </li></ul><ul><li>Adopt flood and storm surge protection measures to slow, block, and/or steer water away from critical infrastructure </li></ul><ul><li>Revise building code requirements, storm surge and flood load requirements, and wind loads for port and marine oil terminal buildings and infrastructure </li></ul>Mitigation and adaption options
    19. 19. Additional flood protection measures include: <ul><li>Water proofing (buildings, equipment) </li></ul><ul><li>Elevation of buildings or building components above the 100-yr flood contour level can protect building functionality and contents </li></ul><ul><li>Emergency response and contingency planning </li></ul>
    20. 20. Conclusions (cont.) <ul><li>Extreme natural hazards, particularly climate related, must be an integral part of marine oil terminal and ports’ management and infrastructure protection planning </li></ul><ul><li>However, although natural hazards are often addressed indirectly through construction codes and chemical process safeguards, gaps remain </li></ul>
    21. 21. Conclusions <ul><li>Consideration of multiple releases and chain effects need to be factored in (planning by one establishment/agency alone is no longer sufficient) </li></ul><ul><li>Natech risk reduction requires addressing interdependencies (locally, regionally and even globally), and organizational issues </li></ul><ul><li>Adequate contingency planning and emergency response and recovery essential to insure continuity of operations </li></ul>
    22. 22. Acknowledgements <ul><li>Dr. Elisabeth Krausmann, Joint Research Center of the European Commission, Ispra, Italy </li></ul><ul><li>Prof. Laura J. Steinberg, Dean, School of Engineering, Syracuse University, USA </li></ul><ul><li>Dr. Hatice Sengul, Tubitak, Turkey </li></ul><ul><li>Prof. Norio Okada, Director, Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Japan </li></ul><ul><li>Funding organizations: US National Science Foundation (2000-2004); Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (2005-2006); Natural Hazards Center, USA; Joint Research Centre, Italy </li></ul>
    24. 24. <ul><li>To promote interdisciplinary research on integrated disaster risk management which contributing to the implementation of success models for efficient and equitable disaster risk reduction. </li></ul><ul><li>T o foster integration between disciplines, stakeholders, levels of government, and between global, regional, national, local and individual efforts in disaster risk management that fill the gap between theory and practice. </li></ul><ul><li>To publish the International Journal of Integrated Disaster Risk Management ( IDRiM Journal ) to promote knowledge transfer and dissemination of information, concepts and methodologies on integrated disaster risk management and validated implementation technologies. </li></ul>International Society for Integrated Disaster Risk Management Purpose:
    25. 25. I DRiM Society DRS, DPRI, Kyoto University Uji Campus, Gokasho, Uji, Kyoto 611-0011 Japan Tel: +81(0) 774384043 Fax: +81(0) 774384044 [email_address] Contacts: