Meeting of WA5 (Tsunami Safety Area)for the IAEA-ISSC EBPSentido Zeynep Hotel, Antalya, Turkey2 May 20131A Proposal ofTsun...
Contents2(Part I) Reforming WA51. EBP steps for tsunami safety2. Critical needs in the post-Fukushima phase raisinga refor...
31. EBP steps for tsunami safety(1) Tsunami EBP (April 2007-March 2010)* Tsunami propagation analysis method – computer co...
42. Critical needs in the post-Fukushima phaseraising a reform of WA5(1) Engineering impacts of the Fukushima accident- Ma...
53. Reforming WA5(1) New framework (approved at Donor Meeting, Jan. 2013)WA5 Tsunami Safety (Leader: Imamura (Tohoku Univ....
WG5-1 Tsunami HazardLeader: ImamuraCo leader Jones(NRC),Titov(NOAA)Task 5.1.1 Information Exchange.1 River run-up.2 Volcan...
7(2) Timeframe* 2 May 2013: Endorsement at WA5 meeting, Antalya* 27-28 May 2013: Kick-off of WG5-2, Tokyo+Decision of the ...
84. WG5-2 outputs(1) Information exchange and context developmentsTask 5.2.1 General decision scheme for tsunamisafetyTask...
9(2) Safety reportTask 5.2.3 Develop safety report on integratedtsunami design and PRA procedures* Outline of the Safety R...
10(1) Resources from Japan- NRA: -Basic Concept- “New Regulatory Standard Relatedto Earthquakes and Tsunamis for Light Wat...
11- JEA (Japan Electric Association): “Technical Guideline forTsunami Design of Nuclear Power Plant (Tentative)” (to bepub...
121. Introduction2. Fundamentals of earthquake-tsunami engineering for nuclear safety3. Accident scenarios at NPPs under e...
13(2) Load effects and actions of tsunami1) Inundation heightInundation at Fukushima I NPS (by TEPCO)Fukushima I NPS (Unit...
142) Hydrodynamic forces (impulsive, sustained in push-pull)Destroyed sea wall gate (Miyako) Bent steel pillars (Onagawa)T...
154) Buoyancy and uplift 5) Seawater intrusion throughunanticipated pathsHeat exchanger room at Onagawa NPSRB basement (by...
*Eliminate "cliff-edge" effects through "smooth fragility"and/or "safe relocation".16(3) Key issues in design and fragilit...
172. Risk-informed decision scheme/ Design-PRA integration(1) Critical lessons from the Fukushima accident (Kameda, 2011)1...
Scheme of seismic/tsunami safety assurance of NPPinter-connected* Quantitative safety assessment of theentire plant system...
19
20(3) Required regulatory framework (Total Process)
ManagementcategoryRisk stages in nuclear safety assessment andSA management requirements(Japanese trend, April 2013)Core d...
22+Key safety parameters:1) Design point to define benchmark assurance,2) Design margin of SSC to clarify their beyond-des...
Conclusions23(Part I)* Reforming WA5, approved at the Donors’ Meetingin March 2013, was presented for developing aconsensu...
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A Proposal of Tsunami Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Plants toward Successful Operation of the ISSC-EBP / WA5 - Integration of Hazard, Design, and PRA - by Hiroyuki Kameda Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University Technical Counsellor, JNES

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Transcript of "A Proposal of Tsunami Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Plants toward Successful Operation of the ISSC-EBP / WA5 - Integration of Hazard, Design, and PRA - by Hiroyuki Kameda Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University Technical Counsellor, JNES"

  1. 1. Meeting of WA5 (Tsunami Safety Area)for the IAEA-ISSC EBPSentido Zeynep Hotel, Antalya, Turkey2 May 20131A Proposal ofTsunami Safety Framework forNuclear Power Plants toward SuccessfulOperation of the ISSC-EBP / WA5- Integration of Hazard, Design, and PRA -Hiroyuki KamedaHiroyuki KamedaProfessor Emeritus, Kyoto UniversityProfessor Emeritus, Kyoto UniversityTechnical Counsellor, JNESTechnical Counsellor, JNES
  2. 2. Contents2(Part I) Reforming WA51. EBP steps for tsunami safety2. Critical needs in the post-Fukushima phase raisinga reform of WA53. Reforming WA54. WG5-2 outputs5. Technical resources for WG5-2(Part II) Some technical elaboration1. Tsunami resistant technology as bases for designand fragility assessment2. Risk-informed decision scheme / Design-PRAintegration
  3. 3. 31. EBP steps for tsunami safety(1) Tsunami EBP (April 2007-March 2010)* Tsunami propagation analysis method – computer codesharing and benchmark testing* TiPEEZ system implementation(Succeeded by ISSC-EBP WA5)(2) ISSC-EBP (2011 ~ )- Aug. 2010: Project development at ISSC- Nov. 2010 : Technical elaboration (1stKashiwazakiSymposium)- Jan. 2011: Project approval (1stISSC-EBP Donor Meeting)/ WA1 ~ WA10* WA5 Tsunami Hazard (original form): SR draft ontsunami hazard assessment / SR draft on tsunami PRA /Techdoc draft on TiPEEZ application(Part I) Reforming WA5
  4. 4. 42. Critical needs in the post-Fukushima phaseraising a reform of WA5(1) Engineering impacts of the Fukushima accident- March 2011: Fukushima accident (Great East JapanEarthquake and Tsunami Disaster)=> Urgent needs for tsunami design and tsunami PRAguidelines; those based on tsunami resistant technologyand risk assessment methodologyTsunami safety assurance is realized by integrating design(deterministic format) and PRA (systematic treatment ofinherent uncertainties), i.e., their feed-back mechanism.(2) Needs for reforming WA5- "Tsunami hazard" => "Tsunami safety"i.e.; Integration of Hazard-Design-PRA
  5. 5. 53. Reforming WA5(1) New framework (approved at Donor Meeting, Jan. 2013)WA5 Tsunami Safety (Leader: Imamura (Tohoku Univ.) = [The keywordchanged from “hazards” to “safety”]WG5-1 Tsunami hazard (Leader: Imamura (Tohoku Univ.), Co-leader: Jones(USNRC), Titov (NOAA)) = [minor change with PRA transferred to the newWG5-2]-----------------------------------------------WG5-2: Tsunami design and PRA (Leader: Kameda (Kyoto Univ.), Co-leaders:TBD = [newly established]Task 5.2.1 General decision scheme for tsunami safetyTask 5.2.2 Develop guidance on tsunami design, PRA and integrationSubtask 5.2.2.1 Tsunami designSubtask 5.2.2.2 Tsunami PRASubtask 5.2.2.3 Interaction of design and PRATask 5.2.3 Develop safety report on integrated tsunami design and PRA procedures-----------------------------------------------WG5-3 TiPEEZ application (Leader: Hatayama (Kyoto Univ.)) = [no changeexcept WG5-2 => WG5-3]
  6. 6. WG5-1 Tsunami HazardLeader: ImamuraCo leader Jones(NRC),Titov(NOAA)Task 5.1.1 Information Exchange.1 River run-up.2 Volcano induced tsunami.3 land slide ditto.4 Benchmark.5 Tsunami PRATask 5.1.2 Develop detail guidance.1 Tsunami hazard assessment safety report.2 ditto case study.3 Tsunami PSA safety reportWG5-2 New  Tsunami design and PRA   Leader: Kameda (Kyoto Univ.)   Co leaders: TBDTask 5.2.1 General decision scheme for tsunami safetyTask 5.2.2 Develop guidance on tsunami design, PRA andintegrationSubtask 5.2.2.1 Tsunami designSubtask 5.2.2.2 Tsunami PRASubtask 5.2.2.3 Interaction of design and PRATask 5.2.3 Develop safety report on integrated tsunami design andPRA procedures    WG5-3 TiPEEZ  Leader: Hatayama(Kyoto Univ.)Task 5.3.3 TiPEEZ.1 Application.2 Tech. Doc on TiPEEZ applicationnew formationWA5: Tsunami Safety6
  7. 7. 7(2) Timeframe* 2 May 2013: Endorsement at WA5 meeting, Antalya* 27-28 May 2013: Kick-off of WG5-2, Tokyo+Decision of the framework details+Assignment of task-subtask leaders, experts and writers* WG meetings and consultancy meetings as required* End of 2013: target of SR (main part) draft completion* End of 2014: target of SR (supplements added) draftcompletion (single volume or separate volumes?)(3) Future orientationsThe reform of WA5 will contribute to the IAEA’s scheme ofsite safety against external events byi) consolidation with other external event PRAs (dealt within WA2, 7 and 8), andii) providing substantial technical information for the SafetyGuides relating to site evaluation (SSG-18), design (NS-G-1.5) and safety assessment (SSG-3 and 4).
  8. 8. 84. WG5-2 outputs(1) Information exchange and context developmentsTask 5.2.1 General decision scheme for tsunamisafetyTask 5.2.2 Develop guidance on tsunami design,PRA and integrationSubtask 5.2.2.1 Tsunami designSubtask 5.2.2.2 Tsunami PRASubtask 5.2.2.3 Interaction of design and PRA* Drafting of SR chapters to be undertaken withinthe Task-Subtask activities.
  9. 9. 9(2) Safety reportTask 5.2.3 Develop safety report on integratedtsunami design and PRA procedures* Outline of the Safety Report (tentative)“Integrated Tsunami Design and PRAProcedures for Nuclear Safety”+ Executive statements (IAEA format)1. Introduction2. General decision scheme for tsunami safety ofnuclear installations3. Tsunami design4. Tsunami PRA5. Interaction of design and PRA6. Conclusions+ (Appendix)
  10. 10. 10(1) Resources from Japan- NRA: -Basic Concept- “New Regulatory Standard Relatedto Earthquakes and Tsunamis for Light Water NuclearPower Reactor Facilities” (April 2013: English translationunderway / final full version by July 2013)- NRA-JNES: Safety Review Guide / Construction PermitReview Guide (supporting documents for the newregulatory standard / April 2013)- JNES: (developments of tsunami design guideline (2012~ )and tsunami PRA (2007~ ) )“Guidelines for Structural Design and Risk Evaluationagainst Tsunamis” (to be published in June 2013: Englishtranslation underway)5. Technical resources for WG5-2
  11. 11. 11- JEA (Japan Electric Association): “Technical Guideline forTsunami Design of Nuclear Power Plant (Tentative)” (to bepublished in 2013)- JAEE (Japan Association for Earthquake Engineering)Committee on Tsunami Resistant Technology for Safety ofNuclear Power Plants (2012-2014)(2) Resources from USA, Europe, Turkey, etc.- USA- Europe- Turkey- Other MSs* Participation in WG5-2 has been proposed by China,Finland, France, Japan, Korea, Pakistan, U.S.A.
  12. 12. 121. Introduction2. Fundamentals of earthquake-tsunami engineering for nuclear safety3. Accident scenarios at NPPs under earthquake-tsunami actions4. Performance criteria for nuclear safety under earthquake-tsunami5. Risk-based earthquake-tsunami protection scheme for nuclear safety6. Load effects and actions of tsunamis on NPPs7. Engineering framework for tsunami protection of NPPs8. Fragility assessment9. Relevance to disaster reduction including external zones10.Computer codes for tsunami analysis11.Framework of tsunami resistant technology12.Summary and conclusions1. Tsunami resistant technology as bases for designand fragility assessment(Part II) Some technical elaboration(1) JAEE Committee on Tsunami Resistant Technology forSafety of Nuclear Power Plants (2012-2014)
  13. 13. 13(2) Load effects and actions of tsunami1) Inundation heightInundation at Fukushima I NPS (by TEPCO)Fukushima I NPS (Unit 1) Onagawa NPS (Unit 2)
  14. 14. 142) Hydrodynamic forces (impulsive, sustained in push-pull)Destroyed sea wall gate (Miyako) Bent steel pillars (Onagawa)Tsunami wall across Fudai River3) ScouringSeawalls toppled due to scouring
  15. 15. 154) Buoyancy and uplift 5) Seawater intrusion throughunanticipated pathsHeat exchanger room at Onagawa NPSRB basement (by Tohoku EPCO)6) Debris (particularly,fine sea sand immixedin seawater)* Destroys active equipments(shaft bearings of motors,generators, turbines, etc.)inundation depth
  16. 16. *Eliminate "cliff-edge" effects through "smooth fragility"and/or "safe relocation".16(3) Key issues in design and fragility assessment* Vulnerability of electric devices to water intrusion (switchboards, motors for seawater pumps, cables, instrumentalsensors, data transmission devices, etc.) should bedrastically improved.Enhancementof fragility
  17. 17. 172. Risk-informed decision scheme/ Design-PRA integration(1) Critical lessons from the Fukushima accident (Kameda, 2011)1) Risk-informed decision should be the basis of nuclear safetymeasures: Lack of beyond-design tsunami protection was a majorcause of the accident at Fukushima-I. This requires risk-basedscheme, or risk-informed decision.2) “Scientific imagination” should be a key for establishing riskmodels: Historical high have been too widely used in hazardassessment. Extreme events with very long return periods shouldbe incorporated in risk modeling if no historical data but soundscientific bases. There are evidences.3) Speed in action is critical: The nature does not wait for us. /i) The case of Tokai II NPP should be positively highlightedwhere construction of new side walls with increased height (7m)to enclose sea water pump areas, nearly completion at the time ofthe Great Tsunami, protected the ultimate heat sink function. / ii)Delay of implementing risk-informed decision should be criticallyreviewed.
  18. 18. Scheme of seismic/tsunami safety assurance of NPPinter-connected* Quantitative safety assessment of theentire plant system  (relative to safety goal/ performance goal)Accountabilityto the public・ Basic safety level (Design point) assured explicitly* Benchmark assurance by seismic/tsunami designDeterministic format* Residual risk assessment[Seismic/Tsunami PRA]・ Assurance of low "Residual risk" asseismic/tsunami margin of the entire plantsystem in beyond-DBGM/DBTH rangesFragility・ Design margin as realistic failure point ofindividual SSCs relative to design level* Design margin assessment of SSCProbabilistic assessmentNote: SSC = structure, system, componentDBGM = design basis ground motion / tsunami height"Failure" here means functional loss as well as structural failurehazard levelprobabilitydensityDBGMDBTH* covered by "residualrisk" assessment(entire plant system)core damage frequency(residual risk)* covered byseismic/tsunamidesign(benchmarkassurance)* covered by design marginassessment (SSC)hazard curve density(times/Gal ・yr)core damage prob. dens.(times/Gal ・yr)PRA, fragility(2) Risk-informed decisionHiroyuki Kameda (Kyoto U., JNES)
  19. 19. 19
  20. 20. 20(3) Required regulatory framework (Total Process)
  21. 21. ManagementcategoryRisk stages in nuclear safety assessment andSA management requirements(Japanese trend, April 2013)Core damageFrequency(CDF)Containerfunctional failureFrequency(CFF-1)FP control failureFrequency(CFF-2)StatusOccurrencerate (/yr)FP releaseDesign point* SA mng. II-IV parts conform with NRA’s “Schematic illustration of FP release relativeto occurrence rate” (3 April 2013).* CDF, CFF-1 and CFF-2 correspond, respectively, to the context of Performancegoal-1, Performance goal-2 and Safety goal.* Performance goal-1 and Performance goal-2 must be jointly realized (NSC, 2008).Core damage Controlled releaseUncontrolledreleasePublic exposureNormal operationSafe shutdownPrevention /SA mng. II(containerfunctional failure )Prevention /SA mng. III(large scale release )ll(container damage )Mitigation /SA mng. IV(diffusion )Prevention /SA mng. I(core damage )Design(benchmark assurance)(Design margin)100TBq (Cs137)H. Kameda and K. Ebisawa, v2: 13042710-410-510-6Designimplications
  22. 22. 22+Key safety parameters:1) Design point to define benchmark assurance,2) Design margin of SSC to clarify their beyond-design capacity, and3) Residual risk to define design margin of the entireplant system+These parameters are connected consistently throughfragility concepts and PRA integration.(4) Scope of integration of design-PRA interaction inWG5-2+ Treatments depending on tsunami hazard levels (high,moderate, low)
  23. 23. Conclusions23(Part I)* Reforming WA5, approved at the Donors’ Meetingin March 2013, was presented for developing aconsensus among all WA5 members.* Motivations, expected outputs and anticipatedresources were discussed.(Part II)* For technical elaboration, perspective to tsunamiresistant technology developments, and design-PRA integration for risk-informed decisionscheme were proposed

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