A Time of Unprecedented Uncertainties. Uncertainty No.1 Growing Asian economies, especially China, will shape the global energy future – where will their policy decisions lead us ?
China is already the largest consumer of energy and will be the largest oil consumer in 2035. Growth in primary energy demand IEA WEO 2011 4 500 Mtoe 4 000 China 3 500 India 3 000 Other developing Asia 2 500 Russia Middle East 2 000 Rest of world 1 500 OECD 1 000 500 0 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 Global energy demand increases by one-‐third from 2010 to 2035, with China, India and other Asia accoun@ng for two thirds of the growth 3
Oil demand is driven higher by soaring car ownership IEA WEO 2011 Vehicles per 1000 people in selected markets 800 2010 700 2035 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 United States European China India Middle East Union The passenger vehicle ﬂeet doubles to 1.7 billion in 2035; more cars are built and sold outside the OECD by 2020, making non-‐OECD policies key to global oil demand
shift concerns security isecurity Petroleum about oil s parRcularly the issue for Asia in the 21st Century. Net imports of oil IEA WEO 2011 14 Mb/d 2000 12 2010 10 2035 8 6 4 2 0 European United Japan China India ASEAN Union States US oil imports drop due to rising domes0c output & improved transport eﬃciency: EU imports US oil imports dropf the US rising domestic output & improved transport around 2020 im overtake those o due to around 2015; China becomes the largest importer efficiency: EU overtake those of the US around 2015; China becomes the largest importer around 20
Uncertainty No.2 Does political unrest in producing regions make oil market tighter? What will be the longer term market structure? What will be the impact of Iran Sanction?
Figure 3.21 Breakeven costs, budget breakeven and commercially attractive prices for current oil production for selected producers, mid-2011 IEA WEO 2011 120 BudgetDollars per barrel breakeven Venezuala 100 Ecuador Russia Commercially Nigeria Iran Angola Algeria Saudi aƩracƟve Iraq Libya 80 Arabia Super Breakeven majors UAE cost 60 Kuwait Qatar 40 20 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 0 5 10 Oil producƟon (mb/d)‘Deferred Investment Case’ looks at near-‐term investment falling short by one-‐ and Notes: Only OPEC countries, Russia and the aggregation of the five super-majors (BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell Total) are included. The breakeven cost is the realised oil price at which all operating expenses (excluding taxes) andthird. MENA output falls 3discount rate),y 2015 recovered. capital costs (including a 10% capital .4 mb/d b are fully and Consumers face a near-‐term rise in oil prices to $150/barrel. based on industry sources: APICORP (2011), Deutsche Bank (2011), Credit Suisse Sources: IEA databases and analysis (2011), IMF (2011), PFC (2011) and CGES (2011).
Iran Crisis and the Hormuz Strait 1700 B/D 85% of Japanese2oil import 85% 20% of Japanese LNG 8260 LNG importLNG 3 But if no nuclear LNG 18% reactors are 2010 running,,,,,,? UAE 17 mbd of petroleum 2 (20% of global demand ) 2 82 million tons of LNG pa (30% of global demand) 8
Uncertainty No. 3 Shale gas in theUS brings NaturalGas Revolution."Is the Golden ageof Natural Gas asolution forsecurity? "
The Golden Age for Natural Gas ? IEA WEO 2011 Largest natural gas producers in 2035 Russia ConvenRonal United States UnconvenRonal China Iran Qatar Canada Algeria Australia India Norway 0 200 400 600 800 1 000 bcm Unconven@onal natural gas supplies 40% of the 1.7 tcm increase in global supply, but best prac@ces are essen@al to successfully address environmental challenges 10
Uncertainty No. ４ Strategic Role of Russia as the key exporter of fossil fuels especially Natural Gas
Russia’s focus will move to the East IEA WEO 2011 Russian revenue from fossil fuel exports 2010 2035 $255 billion $420 billion Other Other 17% China 21% European European 2% China Union Other Union Europe 61% 20% 48% 16% Other Europe 15% An increasing share of Russian exports go eastwards to Asia, providing Russia with diversity of markets and revenues 12
Uncertainty No. 5 What is the implication of the Fukushima Nuclear accident to the global energy market and security?
the New Policies Scenario).Low Nbuilt from 1980 onwards are retired after a lifetime of 50 years on average Reactors uclear Case (55 years in the New Policies Scenario). IEA WEO 2011 Table 12.3 Key projections for nuclear power in the New Policies Scenario and the Low Nuclear Case Low Nuclear Case New Policies Scenario OECD Non-OECD World OECD Non-OECD WorldGross installed capacity (GW) in 2010 326 68 393 326 68 393 in 2035 171 164 335 380 252 633Share in electricity generation in 2010 21% 4% 13% 21% 4% 13% in 2035 9% 5% 7% 21% 8% 13%Gross capacity under construction (GW)* 14 54 69 14 54 69New additions in 2011-2035 (GW)** 6 84 91 111 167 277Retirements in 2011-2035 (GW) 176 42 218 71 36 107*At the start of 2011. **Includes new plants and uprates, but excludes capacity currently under construction. 14
Less nuclear means more of everything else IEA WEO 2011 Power generation by fuel in the New Policies Scenario and Low Nuclear Case 14 000 TWh 2009 12 000 2035: 10 000 New Policies Scenario 2035: 8 000 Low Nuclear Case 6 000 4 000 2 000 0 Nuclear Coal Gas Renewables The biggest chunk of the lost nuclear generation is replaced by power generation from gas and coal, leading to a 6% or 0.9 GT increase in CO2 emissions in the power sector
Germany may needs much more Gas to phase out Nuclear by 2022 700twh 600 others 500 Renewables 400 nuclear 300 Gas 200 Coal 100 0 Current Policy 2022 Germany needs to import 16 BCM of gas to achieve electricity mix with 10% demand reduc0on, no nuclear, 35% renewables and CO2 at the target level 16
Lessons from the Fukushima Fukushima accident was caused by human error and should have been avoided. (Mr. Hatamura , Chair of The Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations) Think about the unthinkable; Tsunami and Station Black Out. Change total mind set for “Safety”. Prepare for the severe accidents, common cause failure & compound disasters. Recovery from disaster is at least as important as preparing for it. Independent Regulatory authority ; Reduce risk of too much political involvement; Transparency and Trust, “Back Fitting” of regulation Organization and training of the nuclear emergency staﬀ including the self defense force ; integration of safety and security. International Cooperation : A nuclear accident anywhere is an accident everywhere. Further clariﬁcation needed why it happened only to Fukushima Daiichi and NOT to Fukushima Daini, Onagawa nor Tokai daini.
ネルギー、 、エネルギ には EU の スペインは エネルギー 技術のテー ー供給のセ エネルギー 特に地中海 キュリティ 入れている 太陽計画( マを議論し 、再生可能 Mediterra 、２日目の エネルギ Uncertainty No. 6 。 IEA のプレ nean Sola 大臣会合に ゼンテーシ r Plan)と 報告した。 ョン： 電気自動車 http://www の推進に力 .iea.org/sp を eech/2010 /Tanaka/Se ville.pdfElectric Power Grid and Renewable Energy. " 26Will Renewables be a solution ? Challenge to the Grid for stable supply of the electricity."
Power grid in Europe ノ orwayー ルウェ N Max Capacity 3.6 GW 最大発電容量 オランダ Netherlands 29.8GW Max Capacity 最大発電容量 イギリス UK 2.4 GW 19.8GW 3GW 3.9 GW Max Capacity 最大発電容量 75.5GW 2.4 GW 3.6 GW スウェ ーデン Sweden 2 GW Belgium ベルギー 0.6 GW Max Capacity 最大発電容量 Max Capacity 2 GW 最大発電容量 32.6GW 15.8GW 0.6 GW France 2.7 GW フランス Germany ドイツ Max Capacity 最大発電容量 Max Capacity 最大発電容量 110.9GW 3.2 GW 0.5 GW 3.2 GW 129.1GW 3.5GW ：GeneraRon capacity Spain スペイン 1.3 GW Swiss スイス 1.5 GW 1.1 GW 2.2 GW ：maximum powerﬂow Max Capacity 最大発電容量 Max Capacity 最大発電容量 1.2 GW 93.5GW 1 GW 17.9GW 2 GW 1.8 GW 2.6 GW 0.5 GW Italy イタリア 4.2 GW 0.3 GW Austria リ オースト ア Max Capacity 最大発電容量 Max Capacity 最大発電容量 93.1GW 18.9GW 0.2 GW Source: IEA 「Electricity InformaRon 2010」 IndicaRve value for Net Transfer CapaciRes (NTC) in ConRnental Europe 19
Power grid in Japan Hydro Gas Coal GeneraRng company Hokkaido Nuclear Oil Other In-‐house Power uRlity company generaRon Tohoku 60 hz <------- Chugoku Kansai Hokuriku Tokyo Kyushu 29GW Shikoku 12GW Okinawa Chubu ---à 50 hz 2GW 40GW Source: Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, Electric Power System Council of Japan, The International Energy Agency 20
Not only Feed-‐in-‐tariﬀs but Grid integraRon ! Snapshot of present penetraRon potenRals
Uncertainty No. 7 第 15 回締約国会議（COP15）（12 月 7-18 日、コペンハーゲン） 12/14）、IEA デー、450ppm シナリオ、省エ Climate Change術ロードマップ、再生可能 Mitigation: Where々な分析成果を発信した。 are we going" and what does thisゼンテーション mean to energy eech/2009/tanaka/cop15.pdf security? ームページ rk/workshopdetail.asp?WS_ID
highlight briefly why the scenario is needed. It is because (as illustrated in Figure 6.2) neitherthe New Policies Scenario, our central scenario, nor the Current Policies Scenario puts us on 450 ppm Scenmario : what we need and where . a future trajectory for greenhouse-gas emissions that is consistent with limiting the increasein global temperature to no more than 2°C, the level climate scientists say is likely to avoidcatastrophic climate change. The 450 Scenario illustrates one plausible path to that objective. Energy efficiency measures account for half the cumulative CO2 abatement achieved in theFigure 6.2 World energy-related CO2 emissions by scenario2 450 Scenario, relative to the New Policies Scenario, over the Outlook period (Figure 6.4). 45 The scale of this reduction underlines the importance of strong policy action to ensure IEA WEO 2011 Gt OECD that potential efficiency gains are realised, in such forms as building standards, vehicle fuel 28% 40 Non-OECD Current Policies economy mandatesGtand insistence on widespread use in industry of the best-available 71% 7 Scenario technologies (Box 6.3). After the cheaper energy efficiency measures are exploited early in 35 the Outlook period, more expensive abatement options take a larger share, and the annual New Policies 33% Scenario 30 share in abatement of efficiency measures falls to 44% in 2035. The increased adoption of 15 Gt 450 Scenario renewable energy (including biofuels) is the second-most important source of CO2 abatement, 65% 25 relative to the New Policies Scenario, growing from a combined 19% in 2020 to 25% in 2035, or a cumulative 24% over the period as a whole. Nuclear power grows rapidly in importance and 20 accounts for a cumulative 9%, while CCS also accounts for an increasing share, growing from 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2035 only 3% of total abatement in 2020 to 22% in 2035, or a cumulative 18%.Note: There is also some abatement of inter-regional (bunker) emissions which, at less than 2% of the diﬀerence betweenscenarios, is not visible in the 2035 shares. Figure 6.4 WorldIn line with practice in previous World Energy Outlooks, we have estimated greenhouse-gasenergy-related CO2 emissions abatement in theemissionsfromallsourcesandforallscenarios(Table6.1).Wehavethenassessedtheconsequences 450 Scenario relative to the New Policies Scenariofor long-term concentrations and temperature increases of such emissions trajectories. 38 GtThe New Policies Scenario, which takes account of both existing government policies and New Policies Scenario Abatement 36declared policy intentions (including cautious implementation of the Copenhagen Accord and 2020 2035 34Cancun Agreements), would result in a level of emissions that is consistent with a long-term Eﬃciency 72% 44%average temperature increase of more than 3.5°C (see Chapter 2 for energy trends in the New 32 Renewables 17% 21%Policies Scenario). The outlook in the Current Policies Scenario, which assumes no change in 30 Biofuels 2% 4%government policies and measures beyond those that were enacted or adopted by mid-2011,is considerably worse, and is consistent with a long term temperature28 increase of 6°C or more. Nuclear 5% 9% 26 CCS 3% 22%The trends and implications of the 450 Scenario, a scenario based on achieving an emissions 24trajectory consistent with an average temperature increase of 2°C, are sometimes presented Total (Gt CO2) 2.5 14.8here against the baseline of the New Policies Scenario to help demonstrate what more 450 Scenario 22needs to be done, particularly in terms of carbon abatement. The main changes to the 20450 Scenario in WEO-2011 relate to the policy assumptions, which reflect changes in 2020 2010 2015 2025 2030 2035domestic and international energy and climate policies (Box 6.2). Non-policy assumptionsrelating to energy and CO2 prices, GDP and population are presented in Chapter 1. Box 6.3 Reaping abatement through efficiency in the 450 Scenario 232. In 2009, energy-related CO emissions contributed 61% to total greenhouse-gas emissions.
Russia n.a. 136 166 168 173 203 150 96 World 2 560 4 705 5 833 5 859 6 308 7 742 5 309 3 309 Share of non-OECD 46% 69% 74% 80% 74% 79% 74% 81%Coal is abundant but CO2 intensive. Share of China Share of India 17% 3% 46% 8% 49% 11% 48% 15% 49% 11% 48% 15% 49% 10% 46% 16% IEA WEO 2011 Figure 10.3 Incremental world primary coal demand by region and scenario China 1990-2009 India Other Current Policies non-OECD Scenario OECD2009-2035 New Policies Scenario 450 Scenario -1 800 -1 200 -600 0 600 1 200 1 800 2 400 3 000 3 600 Mtce The power sector remains the main driver of global coal demand over the projection period 24
The door to 2°C is closing, but will we be “locked-‐in” ? IEA WEO 2011 CO2 emissions (giggatonnes) 45 6°C trajectory 40 35 30 2°C trajectory 25 20 Delay unRl 2017 Delay unRl 2015 15 10 Emissions from exisRng 5 infrastructure 0 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 Without further ac0on, by 2017 all CO2 emissions permi]ed in the 450 Scenario will be “locked-‐in” by exis0ng power plants, factories, buildings, etc
Energy poverty is widespread Source International Energy Agency 1.3 billion people in the world live without electricity and 2.7 billion live without clean cooking faciliRes
Diversity : Energy mix as Energy Security Mix ASEAN 96% 30% 0% IEA 51% 8% 11% EU 27 26% 10% 14% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% Self sufficiency =inland production / tpes (2010 estimates)Nuclear is an important op0on for countries with limited indigenous energy resources (low energy sustainability). 28
Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Does the current IEA system conRnue to work? IEA stockholding cover of global oil demand 60% 40 35 Growing share of 50% non-‐OECD oil days of world oil demand cover 30 % share of world oil demand 40% demand results in 25 declining global 30% 20 demand cover 20% 15 from IEA oil stocks 10 10% 5 0% -‐ IEA 90 days of stockholding, share of world demand with China with India with A SEAN Share of non-‐OECD in global oil demand 29
Overseas Investments by Chinese National Oil Companies: Assessing the Drivers and Impacts 30
ConnecRng MENA and Europe: " Desertec" as “Energy for Peace" Source: DESRETEC FoundaRon 31
Existing and proposed ASEAN Power GridInterconnections 32
Energy for Peace in Asia ? A New Vision Demand Leveling (Time Zone & Climate Difference)Stable Supply (through regional interdependence)Fair Electricity Price Vladivostok Vladivostok Gobi Desert Gobi Desert Beijing Beijing Seoul Seoul Phase 3 Chengdu Chengdu Tokyo Asia Tokyo Delhi Delhi Bhutan Bhutan Shanghai Shanghai Hong Kong Super Grid Dacca Dacca Hong Kong Taipei Taipei Bangkok Bangkok ManilaMumbaiMumbai Manila Kuala Lumpur Kuala Lumpur Singapore Total 36,000km Singapore Presentation by Mr. Masayoshi SON 33
One cannot enhance energy security byrisking someone else‘s: Role of InternationalOrganizations in Energy Sector -IEA vs IAEA: energy vs nuclear security and safety -IEA vs IRENA: energy vs Renewables in developing countries -IEA vs OPEC: oil consumer vs producer -IEA vs EU, ASEAN, APEC: global vs regional -IEA vs UNFCCC: energy vs Climate change -IEA vs OECD: energy security vs economy -IEA vs WB: security vs development -IEA vs WTO: security vs trade -IEA vs G8, G20: energy security vs global governance -IEA vs UN: energy security vs energy access