Space Security and European Union - Leader, Decision Maker or Enabler?
 

Space Security and European Union - Leader, Decision Maker or Enabler?

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Thought leaders around the globe are voraciously debating the impact of a 9 billion plus ...

Thought leaders around the globe are voraciously debating the impact of a 9 billion plus
population on planet Earth by 2050. The complexity of meeting the needs of a large and
diverse population is driving the search for innovative technologies and applications.
Space is emerging as the lead innovator, by facilitating new technology and applications
to confront evolving issues and opportunities.

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    Space Security and European Union - Leader, Decision Maker or Enabler? Space Security and European Union - Leader, Decision Maker or Enabler? Document Transcript

    • Space Security and European Union -Leader, Decision Maker or Enabler? A Frost & Sullivan White Paper by Aman Pannu
    • TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................ ............... 2 SPACE SECURITY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE FOR A GLOBAL INDUSTRY 3 Space Security and its Role .......................................................... 3 Industry Challenges ...................................................................... 4 Space Security .............................................................................. 5 Europe .......................................................................................... 5 SPACE SECURITY: THREAT DOMAINS AND THE WORLD ................... 6 Space Weapons (Terrestrial and Space Based) ............................. 6 Space Situation Awareness (SSA) and Orbital Debris .................. 7 Space Traffic Management ............................................................. 8 Spectrum Management and Issues ................................................ 8 Space Terrorism ............................................................................. 9 Global Space Security Trends ........................................................ 9 EUROPEAN UNION: PAVING THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABLE SPACE .... 12 EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (EU CoC)........... 13 European SSA System ................................................................... 15 CONCLUDING REMARKS ....................................................................... 17 ABOUT FROST & SULLIVAN .................................................................. 182 Frost & Sullivan
    • SPACE SECURITY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE FOR A GLOBAL INDUSTRYSpace Security and its RoleThought leaders around the globe are voraciously debating the impact of a 9 billion pluspopulation on planet Earth by 2050. The complexity of meeting the needs of a large anddiverse population is driving the search for innovative technologies and applications. “...The complexity ofSpace is emerging as the lead innovator, by facilitating new technology and applications meeting the needs ofto confront evolving issues and opportunities. Almost a third of the countries (there a large and diverseare 195 listed countries as of 2011) have a satellite (at the very least) orbiting the population is drivingEarth, even more so, most of the countries use space based applications. the search for innovativeFigure 1: Satellite Manufacturing (World) Forecast 2011-2020 technologies and applications. Space is emerging as the lead 140 innovator, by 120 facilitating new technology and 100 applications to confront evolving 80 issues and opportunities....” 60 40 20 0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 900 Conservative 990 Medium 1189 High Source: Frost & Sullivan, 2011Having weathered the economic crisis more strongly than most industries,Frost & Sullivan research suggests the space industry is forecasted to close the decadewith approximately 10-15 percent more satellites (900 plus) launched in comparison tothe last decade. Government (Civil and Military) projects will continue to drive demand(68 percent), however commercial satellites is forecasted to increase its share by morethan 5 percent (2011-2020) over the last decade.Military as well as Commercial and Civil end-users rely on Space as a critical elementof global information infrastructure supporting frontline operations for them. The roleof space is no longer limited to ground connectivity, both in air and maritime domains.Space ensures seamless connectivity in the most challenging conditions, such as thatseen in the Haiti disaster, and most recently in Japan. Frost & Sullivan 3
    • Figure 2: Global Space Industry Trends 2010 Desire to advance regional space capabilities is an opportunity for established Space participants, wherein they can work in partnership to gain market share while enhancing technical capabilitis for individual nations. For satellite manufacturers the current economic downturn induced a plausible slowdown and this is an opportunity to invest the time and expertise in developing new technologies for attaining higher efficiencies through advanced capabilities and streamlined production activities. Real-time communications on the move will be the main driver for communications (and earth observation including reconnaissance) satellites. Some of the applications driving demand for next-generation high throughout satellites, are: DTG, SNG, IPTV, VSAT services and other tailor- made broadcasting packages. The increasing demand for higher bandwidth communication and the finite orbital slots have triggered the satellite operators to stipulate satellites that are more powerful, and more flexible than ever before. There is an evident opportunity in the development of high throughput satellites. Source: Frost & Sullivan, 2011The early interpretation of Space’s operating environment as harsh and inaccessible (formaintenance or repair), led to the industry researching and developing newtechnologies and custom designed, ruggedised products to operate efficiently. Thisinadvertently led to a stream of spin-off benefits for terrestrial applications. In recentyears, there is a growing shift towards the use of off-the-shelf components and systems,which is creating new opportunities for market participants. As such, Space has becomean integral part of our lives, in many ways an inconspicuous part, from daily applicationsof communications, navigation, and internet; to complex roles such as militaryoperations, disaster management, monitoring and control; to unique and spin-offapplications in robotics, agriculture, and healthcare.Industry ChallengesEuropean Space’s global presence is based on a network of applications and products,both in outer space and terrestrial, delivered by a diverse set of participants. As muchas this omni-presence being a ‘unique’ nature of the Space industry, it is also a challenge.The continuous connectivity based on Space assets is made possible by a set of policies,code of conducts and agreements, although not sufficient enough, defining the bestpractices for Space operations including access to space, orbit allocation andpositioning, spectrum management, orbital debris management, Research andDevelopment (R&D), Space security and so on. One such challenge for Space is theindustry’s inconsistent ‘growth lifecycle’ at a global level, with countries/regions like US,Russia and Europe at an advanced stage of the ‘industry lifecycle’ compared to the Restof World (ROW). The outlook of the Space industry in the medium to long-term, is thatof growth according to Frost & Sullivan. This along with the aspirations of multiple ‘new’participants to become a space fairing nation, driven by the political will and economicintent, makes the Space environment a complex domain to operate in and secure. In thiscontext, industry experts continue to express that the (Outer) Space must bedefended, or to start with, not declared as ‘theatre of action’, there is an imperativeneed for regulations and policies preventing nations from arming space. Frost & Sullivan 4
    • The risk of ‘arming’ space is not only a military threat, it also poses a considerable riskto the commercial infrastructure, a challenge that must be addressed now. AlthoughSpace Security and Situational Awareness is becoming a prominent feature of most, ifnot all space policies now, it is very evident that the current guidelines and rulesregulating this area are somewhat patchy.Space Security “...Frost & Sullivan research suggests that it is likely the currentSpace Security is the secure and sustainable access to, and use of, space and freedom competing guidelinesfrom Space-based threats 1 . Space Security is attaining a critical momentum to outline a will emerge as aset of best practices for the industry. However, this is still largely influenced by regional standardised globalmarket / political dynamics. Frost & Sullivan’s research suggests that it is likely the guideline, but this willcurrent competing guidelines will emerge as a standardised global guideline, but this will probably only happenprobably only happen when the industry starts loosing a satellite a year and when the when the industrystakeholders realise the risk as real time to their assets, a step too late in forestalling starts loosing aan unsafe space environment. In this paper, Frost & Sullivan presents an overview of the satellite a year...”Space Security issues, challenges and opportunities in context with the European Union(EU) Space policy and initiatives. Both military and commercial Space assets face a rangeof threats (which is further compounded by the growing dual-use of satellites), includingaccidental collisions, anti-satellite missiles, lasers, electronic jamming and hacking. Thisis very aptly summarised in the statement by Gerard Brachet, the Chair, UN Committeeon the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (2008), “Ensuring long term secured access anduse of outer space is not a defence issue only. It requires an active dialogue betweenthe civilian and military communities to address how space can be kept safe and secure.Both express the same concern: security of their space assets. And they share the sameenvironment around our planet 2 ”.EuropeEurope, with its unique ‘collaborative’ model (inter-governmental and inter-industry)for both EU and also for the European Space Agency (ESA), is well positioned tofacilitate the global norm for Space standards and policies. However, this is a road withmany obstacles. In 2008, European Parliament highlighted the need for space assets toensure that the political and diplomatic activities of the EU may be based onindependent, reliable, and complete information in support of its policies for conflictprevention, crisis management operations, and global security. This applies especially tothe monitoring of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means oftransportation and verification of international treaties, the transnational smuggling ofsmall arms, the protection of critical infrastructure and of the EU’s borders, and civilprotection in the event of natural and man-made disasters and crises. In contrast to theevolutionary path of Space for United States of America (US) and Russia, which wasdominantly military in nature, Europe’s space programme has evolved around scientificscope. Although in recent times Europe is focusing progressively on building a dual-useand cooperative model encompassing both military and commercial activities. For thispaper Frost & Sullivan has analysed issues and developments across main Space Securitydomains such as Space Weapons, Space Terrorism, Space Situational Awareness andOrbital Debris, and Space Traffic Management.1 UNIDIR/2006/17 Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security 20062 Seeking Common Security in Space, J.M. Logsdon, Director- Space Policy Institute, Elliot School of International Affairs, TheGeorge Washington University, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/space_security_logsdon.pdf 5 Frost & Sullivan
    • SPACE SECURITY: THREAT DOMAINS AND THE WORLD‘Houston we have a Problem’, or is it ‘World we have a Problem’? starting in 2007 withChina annihilating one of its defunct satellites by using a ground-based missile anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon, and (in response) the US ASAT mission in 2008, the Spaceindustry experienced the very real threat of securing the Space assets, both from an actof destruction (passive or aggressive), and the aftermath in the form of orbital debris. “Frost & SullivanHowever, as early as the 1980’s the US successfully tested a direct-ascent interceptor believes that the idealagainst a satellite in low earth orbit in the 1980s. The interceptor was launched by a vulnerabilitymissile carried on an F-15 aircraft. Since then the technical capability (and as such the management systemstrike capability) of such systems has evolved formidably. The threat of total destruction should entail both anis not the only issue that concerns the security of space. There are technologies that internal and externalcan cause temporary impairment of Space assets in the short term, or even over a component.”prolonged time period. Preventing a satellite from accomplishing its missiontemporarily, reversibly, or non-destructively is commonly called denial, while permanentdisabling is called destruction. Then there is the very real risk of orbital collisions andthe more imminent threat of orbital debris. Taking such threats into consideration andthe growing reliance of Space applications and its end-users on commercial as well asmilitary space assets, demands that the Space community clearly define theexpectations and boundaries from each participant / stakeholder. This becomes evenmore critical when we consider the complex and diverse nature of next generationthreats such as electronic interference, space weapons, laser attacks, high-poweredmicrowave attacks, Attacks on Ground Stations, Laser Attacks on Satellites: Heating andStructural Damage, Kinetic Energy Attacks- Ground and Space based, ElectromagneticPulse from a High-Altitude Nuclear Explosion and more. As mentioned in theintroduction, Frost & Sullivan categorises these threats across the following SpaceSecurity domains:Space Weapons (Terrestrial and Space Based)The deployment and potential use of weapons / arms on or from space assets is seenas a dangerous avenue and needs to be on the priority list of regulations in order toavoid it from becoming the next war frontier. Although it is important to note that atpresent there is no such imminent arms race, yet. Some experts even share the outlookthat it might be more realistic to address surrounding space threats, such as the recentASAT activity, from a policy perspective before defining the framework forweaponisation of space. Successful agreements and code of conduct in areas withsomewhat lesser direct threat to national security should potentially pave the way forachieving common objectives in this field. Some notable (and concerning) incidents ofusing Space Weapons include: • January 2007 - China destroyed one of its defunct weather satellites orbiting at about 900km. This created around 2700 new pieces of tracked debris and NASA estimates more than 150,000 pieces of debris larger than 1cm were created. • February 2008 - US destroyed one of its satellites in the Low Earth Orbit (LEO), few lasting pieces of debris were created as the satellite was in a lower orbit, from which most debris rapidly re-entered the atmosphere. Frost & Sullivan 6
    • The perplexing element of the Chinese test is that, in contrast to the US policy,historically China (with Russia) has been proponent in banning the use of arms in space.Although there is no imminent risk of a Space ‘Arms’ race, industry stakeholders areexploring guidelines for enforcing a ban or defining a code of conduct (to begin with)to rein in such an Arms race.Space Situation Awareness (SSA) and Orbital DebrisLieutenant General WL Shelton (US) defines SSA as “the understanding of the spacemedium to include tracking all manmade objects in space, discerning the intent ofothers who operate in space, knowing the status of our own forces in real-time, andunderstanding the natural environment and its effect upon space operations — simplystated, SSA is the foundation for all space operations 3 ” . Currently the US commandsthe most comprehensive SSA system, although in line with the strategic objectives setout in the European Space Policy of 2007 a corresponding preparatory programme forthe European SSA System has been active since the end of 2008. The SSA encompassesthe domains of objects orbiting the Earth (including space debris), space weather andnear-Earth objects, determining the various threats to space assets such as the growingnumber of debris, space weather, meteorites, intentional attacks, orbital collisions andmore. It is this vast scope of activities that fall under SSA that make it a prerequisitefor ensuring a safe, secure and sovereign conduct of space operations. The foundationsfor an effective SSA system are based on total visibility of the space assets, which canbe achieved through an extensive database of the orbital location, motion data, functionand state of space assets.Even though Space debris is mapped under the SSA programme, this is considered aspecific threat / space security issue because of the growing risk it poses to the spaceassets in outer Space. According to the Space Secure Foundation (data based on theUnited States militarys Space Surveillance Network) there are approximately 21,000man-made objects in Earth orbit. Frost & Sullivan research indicates that currentlycollisions are the smallest contributor to fragments of debris. However, as the numberof debris objects increases, collisions become more likely, thus creating yet moredebris. As the satellites are clustered in a few useful orbits and objects remain in thoseorbits for many years, the risk of collision is higher than might be expected. In thiscontext industry experts estimate a collision to occur every 5 years on average (leadingto approximately 8-9 collisions over this period). The main orbital debris collisionsrecorded over the last two decades are: • December 23, 1991: Russias Cosmos 1934 satellite collided with a piece of debris from Cosmos 926 at an altitude of 980 kilometres. Two pieces of debris from Cosmos 1934 were catalogued after that incident. • July 24, 1996: Frances Cerise spacecraft was hit at an altitude of 685 kilometres by a piece of Ariane rocket debris left from an explosion 10 years earlier. Part of a large boom on Cerise was severed, but the satellite later resumed operations.3 Statement of Lieutenant General WL Shelton , commander Joint functional Component Command for Space before the SubCommittee on Strategic Forces Senate Armed Services Committee on Space Posture, 2008-S http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/docs/testShelton080304.pdf Frost & Sullivan 7
    • • January 17, 2005: A spent stage from the US Thor-Burner 2A rocket launched in 1974 collided at 885 kilometres with a piece of a Chinese rocket stage that had exploded in March 2000. Four pieces of debris were catalogued. • February 10, 2009: The first collision between two satellites occurred 800km above Northern Siberia. One was an active US communications satellite, while the other was a defunct Russian satellite. The event created around 1400 “...having an catalogued debris objects. advanced Space situational AwarenessThe non-binding nature of the international agreements on space debris may limit the system is of little useincrease, but it will continue to grow nonetheless . The International Telecommunication if this meansUnion (ITU) provides the guidelines for orbit allocation / traffic, these guidelines watching debris build(including space debris mitigation and satellite’s end-of-life cycles) are mostly aligned to up to the point whereGeostationary Earth Orbit (GEO). However, Space debris is probably the most your own satellitesaddressed of the issues on hand, even though there is much to refine and formalise, become unusable...”such as a concrete and clear set of rules for GEO as well as LEO. Since 1993, the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) has been developing guidelinesfor space debris mitigation, eventually endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2008(followed by an endorsement by UN Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space(COPUOS) in 2007). The main thing to comprehend here is that having an advancedSpace Situational Awareness system is of little use if this means watching debris buildup to the point where your own satellites become unusable. Keeping this in contextEurope continues to play an active role in facilitating the formulation of well articulatedguidelines addressing the issues of space debris in all orbits. However, it is the lessonslearnt from the success of such cooperative measures that Europe can leverage tofurther define its SSA programme and guidelines.Space Traffic ManagementThe growing number of actors within the space domain requires well definedregulations for registering and capturing data such as launch of satellites, orbitallocations, intended purpose, relevant technologies, re-entry operations, and in-orbitoperations. As noted in the previous section, the guidelines for these activities are notcomprehensive enough and do not traverse the depth of the issues surrounding spaceoperations. As an example of the gaps in the current regulations consider theregistration of a satellite. The limitation of the fact that only one state of registry canexist for any satellite, makes it difficult (if not impossible) to account for allstakeholders in a satellite programme with multiple actors, in practice leading to anumber of unregistered operational satellites. This lack of accountability is a potentialrisk / threat to the security of space. Taking this into consideration, Frost & Sullivannotes that effective (and cooperative) regulations would facilitate a better environmentfor all space participants, by limiting any potential deliberate and / or unintendedexploitation.Spectrum Management and IssuesAnother domain of concern for space participants is the orbital congestion in terms oforbital slot, spectrum management and RF interference. Whilst this is not a directthreat to space assets, and does not command a military response to mitigate, this hasthe potential of creating potentially volatile rifts between established space participantsand the emerging / aspiring participants. Frost & Sullivan 8
    • The ability to efficiently manage orbital slots and spectrum will require systematiccataloguing based on transparency and mandated disclosures. It is the need of havingsuch ‘rules of the road’ that are acceptable to all participants which will enable theresolving of any potential conflicts in the future.Space Terrorism “..There is an arisingSpace terrorism is an evolving discussion, but nonetheless considered a real albeit awareness forlatent threat to space. Considering that both military and commercial actors rely formulating a spaceheavily on Space based applications, the potential of a non-state actor causing policy for protectingdiminutive (if not destructive) damage to space assets and its services could have both military andserious consequences on critical applications and its end-users. There is an arising commercial spaceawareness for formulating a space policy for protecting both military and commercial assets..”space assets, and ground infrastructure against terrorist attacks. Some of the knownspace terrorist attacks are 5 : • First, the mobile satellite communication signal provided by Thuraya Satellite Telecommunications from three widely separated locations inside Libya was jammed. • Secondly, Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) hijacked the Intelsat Ltd. Intelsat-12 satellite in geosynchronous orbit to beam their propaganda across the Indian subcontinent. While Intelsat continuously tried to interrupt LTTE’s pirating, LTTE was able to continue its satellite piracy for 2 years. • Thirdly, two similar events happened in China, where China’s Falun Gong spiritual movement in June 2002 overrode the broadcast signals of nine China Central Television stations and 10 provincial stations and replaced the programming with their content and in 2004 disrupted AsiaSat signals for four hours.To effectively combat the threat of Space terrorism the global Space community needsto devise a counter-terrorism policy for Space. However, this will need to be based ona tripod approach, addressing and covering political intent, civil law, and where requiredmilitary action. Europe can leverage its cooperative model (and hands-on involvementin NATO) to facilitate the formulation of such a policy.Global Space Security TrendsAgreements and guidelines in Space have historically proven to be intricate andcomplex, and continue to be so. This is the case because such agreements not onlyrequire a political coherence but also technical relevance. This is more often the reasonwhy most Space agreements are not water tight, and have a high degree of ambiguityattached to them. From the Cold War era of two-party discussions, Space has growninto a multilateral discussion (not so optimistic would propound it even as anargument). However, the US and Russia continue to influence any such developments.5 The Need to Counter Space Terrorism, ESPI Perspective 17, January 2009 Frost & Sullivan 9
    • In the later years Europe carved a niche position for itself, especially after the end ofthe Cold War era. Recently, China, India, and other emerging / aspiring space fairingnations have actively voiced or participated in gathering momentum to discussframework options to address the issues such as the threat to space security discussedin the previous pages. However, for now the growth in the number of space fairingnations has put the historical space powers such as the US and Russia on a back foot,leading them to adopt defensive space postures. Furthermore, today’s spaceenvironment demands an operationally responsive framework to meet the everchanging and unpredictable nature of threats, such as asymmetric warfare, terrorism,cyber warfare and more. The war frontier is no longer limited to Land, Air, and Sea.Space is widely noted as the fourth frontier of conflicts, both military and commercial “...today’s spacestakeholder driven. environment demands an operationallyUntil recently the US was strongly opposed to negotiations on the control of space responsive frameworkweapons (for nearly three decades). However, in the National Security Space Strategy to meet the ever(2011) the US projects a somewhat open posture towards participating in negotiations changing andrelated to continuing and the peaceful use of Space. Even though there is a definitive unpredictable naturemention of its clear intention of ‘right to defend or dissuade’ against any potential of threats...”threats, this is considered as a step in the right direction (albeit with little or no regardto other actors and their right to defend). Many experts believe that the US shifttowards such a stance is considered mainly a result of the pressures / restraints of theeconomic crisis and the Chinese anti-satellite test of January 2007.As Space activities have increasingly become tied to the national power of pre-eminentStates, Frost & Sullivan notes, it is crucial for other countries to understand that the USneeds to retain an option in principle to deploy force if required. After all it is largelythis Space power that enabled the US to affect outcomes according to its preferences,interests, and if necessary change the behaviour of other actors in order to achievedesired outcome aimed at protecting its national security (and economic) interests todate. As a result, core Space programmes such as the SSA are at the crux of US NationalSpace Policy. Furthermore, the US is currently conducting the much anticipated SpacePosture review, which is delayed, and expected in 2011.China, on the other hand does not command a very expansive and extensive Spaceheritage. Some of the notable landmarks for the Chinese Space programme are thelaunch of China’s first satellite in 1970, the launch of China’s first communicationssatellite in 1984, and China’s first human spaceflight in 2003. Against the generalperception of the masses, China positions itself as a cooperative member of the Spaceclub, rather than a Space power. For many years China, with Russia has tabled aresolution for Prevention of Arms in Outer Space. However, in 2007 with the ASAT testconducted by China many questions were left unanswered. Although it is worthconsidering that the Chinese actions were intended to soften the stand of thoseopposing such a resolution, namely the US and Israel. Frost & Sullivan notes thatimmaterial of the intention, the 2007 incident risked starting an Arms Race in space, anoutput that would serve no good to any of the stakeholders.Listed below are the main milestones in setting agreements, guidelines or initiatives thatfacilitates or are related to formulation of regulations in space since its evolution: • 1950 RAND report - considered the birth certificate of American Space policy • 1958 Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space, 5814/in NSSP, NSC Documents • 1962 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space as stated in UNGA Resolution 1962 (XVIII) Frost & Sullivan 10
    • • 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)- Treaty banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water• 1967 Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space• 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space• 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty• 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects• 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space• 1977 Environmental Modification Convention - listed Space among the places where specific military activities were banned• 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies• 1982 Reagan National Space Policy was established in NSDD 42 - This National Space Policy directed the Department of Defence to develop and deploy an operational ASAT capability, both to deter threats to US and allied space systems and, within the limits of international law, to deny hostile military forces the use of space-based support.• 1982 ITU updated the International Telecommunications Convention (the Nairobi Convention) prohibiting interference with non-military communications• 1986 UN General Assembly adopted a set of Principles on Remote Sensing• 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty• 2002 Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation• 2002 Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunications Union and its Radio Regulations• 2007 European Space Policy (jointly developed by the European commission and ESA)• 2007: UN COPUOS Mitigation Guidelines• 2008: At the Conference on Disarmament, Russia and China formally presented a draft treaty on “The Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Space Objects” (PPWT). However, the then US administration immediately reiterated its opposition to any new legal restrictions on its access to or use of space. Potential reasons for opposition from the US / potentially other space fairing nations would include the unverifiable nature of the ban on arming outer Space, and the clear not-mention of ASAT weapons, such as the one tested by China in 2007• 2008 EU Draft ‘Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities’• 2009 Treaty of Lisbon- making Space a shared competency of the European Union and its Member States• Other relevant regulations / agreements include the Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space as stated in UNGA Resolution 47/68; the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries as stated in UNGA Resolution 51/122; the Recommendations on the Practice of States and International Organisations in Registering Space Objects as stated in UNGA Resolution 62/101; the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as stated in UNGA Resolution 62/217. Frost & Sullivan 11
    • EUROPEAN UNION: PAVING THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABLE SPACEEmerging from the challenges of a complex andunique decision making process of combiningintergovernmental and communitary processes,the European Space Policy is based on afoundation of the Cooperative, Collaborativeand Consultative (C3) approach. This approachhas been proven successful (albeit not always)in a European context where there is acontinuous need for aligning the political intentand actions of 27 member nations, and for ESAwith 18 space fairing nations.Europe is challenged by this unique modelwhere there is a strong role of Member statesin most decision making with an emphasis onintra-European cooperation, in an environment of relatively low budgets, multipleinstitutions and independent national level programmes. In 1975 the merger of twoinstitutions European Space Research Organisation and European Launch DevelopmentOrganisation led to the formation of the ESA. The ESA has established Europe as aleading stakeholder in the space industry, and is highly acknowledged for the technical(R&D) capabilities, fair and competitive markets, dual-use policies and a global outlook.It is important to note that ESA’s role is mainly to do with technical and operationalaspects of space, and has little or no political mandates. However, it works closely withthe political institutions within Europe. Since the inception of the Space Council in2004, Europe has taken a somewhat bolder stance to space policies and matters suchas Space security. However, Europe’s Space programme is primarily designed to operatewithin a non-military realm. Although on one hand this is an attraction for many Spacefairing nations to be on the negotiating table, this has limited Europe’s influence onenabling security issues at a global level with Space participants such as the US, Russiaand China. This is changing, as past activities, mostly at national level, have gathered paceand are leveraged under Europe’s C3 approach to include security as a generic scopefor European Space programmes (this is fundamentally different to the US approachwhere security is primarily defined from a military aspect). Europe’s security focus inSpace is driven by the objective of developing technical capabilities and competence byleveraging national level programmes in a system of systems architecture to serve forthe larger benefit of the European states and its allies.On December 01, 2009 Article 189 of the Lisbon Treaty came into affect making Spacea shared competency of the European Union and its Member States.“To provide for and promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among Europeanstates in space research and technology and their space applications.” - Article 2 of ESAConvention Frost & Sullivan 12
    • The success of any such policy rests on the successful implementation of the C3approach by all concerned stakeholders, such as the EU, ESA and the Member States.Although it is clearly articulated that actions developed under this new competency ofthe EU should not be of a technical nature, but rather of a political nature, whilstleaving the technical actions within the realm of ESA and associated regional andnational institutions. The success of such structure is already visible in the GMES andGalileo programs pursued by EU and ESA. This is a landmark step towards defining acommon European Space Policy, and more importantly gives Space a much neededpolitical impetus.EU ‘Code of Conduct’ for Outer Space Activities (EU CoC)In context of the above discussion, Frost & Sullivan notes that the founding principle ofthe C3 approach is deeply rooted in the conception of the EU CoC drafted at the endof 2008. The EU CoC is not a legally binding agreement (unlike the PPWT resolutiontabled by China and Russia), it is based on voluntary participation with the aim ofdeploying Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBM) and a consultativeapproach to winning the agreement of a diverse group of stakeholders including(importantly) the third countries. The EU CoC is essentially a bottom up approach toaddressing critical but sensitive issues under Space security. Under the EU CoC acomprehensive approach to safety and security in outer Space is guided by theprinciples of freedom of access to Space for all peaceful purposes, preservation of thesecurity and integrity of Space objects in orbit, due consideration for the legitimatedefence interests of States 6 . Notably the EU CoC has an explicit mention of theinherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the UnitedNations Charter. However, this is in consideration of other guiding principles such asthe responsibility of States to take all the appropriate measures and cooperate in goodfaith to prevent harmful interference in outer space activities, and the responsibility ofStates, in the conduct of scientific, commercial and military activities, promotion ofpeaceful exploration and use of outer space and take all the adequate measures toprevent outer Space from becoming an area of conflict.The EU CoC incorporates cooperation mechanisms aimed at engaging subscribingnations to share data based on TCBM principles. This includes a timely notification ofouter Space activities, information on outer space activities, and registration of Spaceobjects. These mechanisms are creating an extensive database of outer space activitiesto enable a near total visibility of space objects and any potential threats.The EU CoC addresses the basic issues surrounding Space security such as orbitaldebris (including having measures on space debris control and mitigation), Spacesituational awareness (further supported by the cooperation mechanisms), datacataloguing and analysis, and information sharing on outer Space activities and Spaceobjects. This bottom up approach coupled with the TCBM is an intelligent approach totackle a very hostile threat of Space weapons to Space security. Having (potentially)garnered support of notable (and most) Space fairing nations, the EU can then leveragethis to influence the historical Space powers such as the US and Russia in articulationof a code of conduct (to begin with) for issues regarding space weaponisation.6 PESC 1697, CODU_ 61, Council conclusions and draft Code of Conduct for outer space activities, 2008,http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17175.en08.pdf Frost & Sullivan 13
    • The success achieved in implementation and acceptance of the CoC could then lead toa broader Space legislation / treaty that has essential legally binding clauses, especiallyfor the military component of the Space.The EU CoC and the Lisbon Treaty have established EU as an emerging Space actor inEurope with notable political authority that can continue to build on the Spaceexperience of Europe and its independent states (such as France, Germany, Spain, UK,Italy and more).The EU’s Space security efforts are built on a distributed network approach, leveragingexisting European and national capabilities and assets. Such a network is designed toaddress issues concerning security of European Space interests. The EU continues towork on issues of Space terrorism threats, missile defence issues, threat of Space ArmsRace, and development of a fully operational Space situational awareness system.However, the EU actively combats the challenges of working in a collaborative model,such as security implications of joint projects, deployment of Space for internalsecurity, integration of national programmes, institutional set-up in Europe and thegovernance / political guidance. Despite these challenges Europe has established itselfquite strongly in the ‘Space hierarchy’. The question to ask and answer is where doesEurope (EU and ESA) want to position itself on this hierarchy- Leader, Decision Maker,Enabler? To maintain a leading position in the space hierarchy Europe will need to makeboth political and budgetary commitments towards the sector. It is important toacknowledge and plan Europe’s Space positioning today in line with the evolving Spacetrends globally to avoid sliding down the global Space Hierarchy, and losing theopportunity to influence key decisions and directions for the industry at aninternational level. This would threaten the very principles that Europe has set out toachieve in the EU CoC and even the Lisbon Treaty. Speaking on a non-political (non-budgetary) stand point, Europe is well positioned to play the role of an enabler for now.The potential successes in this role will eventually create opportunities for Europe totake a Leadership role in the industry. This is especially true when we consider thedepreciating share of the historical space powers / leaders (US and Russia) in light ofthe emerging space fairing nations.As an ‘enabler’ the consultative approach of the EU CoC plays a vital role. This is visiblefrom the systematic introduction and promotion of the Draft to various stakeholders.A first “food for thought” paper was presented in September 2007 to the FirstCommittee of the UN General Assembly, and a first version of a draft code of conductwas circulated to the United States, China, and Russia in July 2008. Currently, the EU isconducting rounds of consultations with third countries in order to maximise theconsensus and possibilities of a wide adoption of the Code by the internationalcommunity. Japan, India, and Canada are on the list of target countries to be consultedby the EU. There is a likelihood of engaging further countries for the consultationphase, such as from Latin America, Africa and APAC. EU CoC is designed to encourageall countries to access and operate in space as long as the activities are conducted forpeaceful purposes and do not cause, intentionally or accidentally, harmful damages tospace objects nor create debris. The EU CoC has specific provisions to ensure the codeis adhered to by subscribing nations. This is facilitated by the consultative mechanism,and is further supported by an investigation mechanism within the code. Frost & Sullivan 14
    • Although the EU CoC does not explicitly define the issue of Space weaponisation, theEU CoC strongly disagrees with the developing and testing of ASAT, such as the ChineseASAT Test in 2007. Europe has intentionally and intelligently not aligned its policieswithin the context of military approach to Space security. Europe continues to lobbyinternational stakeholders creating opportunities for aligning security interests ofmultiple actors in line with the Space and security interests of emerging / aspiring Spacefairing nations. Europe’s approach to Space security largely entails a tri-solution, whichincludes identifying and addressing the main issues threatening security of Space,leveraging the capabilities and strategic intent of main stakeholders, and applying the C3approach to reach agreements, achieve common objectives and successfully deliver jointprogrammes. Europe’s Space security focus is on developing a distributed network toaddress issues on hand such as European SSA (including orbital debris) and spectrumissues, Space terrorism, Space traffic and Space weapons.European SSA SystemAnother notable development in Europe with regards to Space security is the 2008initiation of a preparatory programme for the development of a European SSA system.This is intended to address core threats to the security of Space assets includingsurveillance and tracking, orbital debris, efficient Space weather capabilities, and surveysof near Earth objects (NEO). There is an allocation of €50 million over three years(beginning 2008) with a mandate to develop the main elements of this programme,which include: • Core element - covering governance, data policy, data security, architecture and Space surveillance • Optional Elements - Space weather studies, NEO surveillance, and pilot data centres • Enabling Capabilities such as supplementary surveillance radars (scheduled to be discussed in 2011)Europe is working towards creating a system of systems architecture for SSA, whereinit will create a vast network of SSA infrastructure based on existing and developingnational capabilities of Member States and even international stakeholders. At aEuropean level the main stakeholders involved in development and deployment of theEuropean SSA system are the ESA, European Commission, the EU Council Secretariat-General, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Union Satellite Centre(EUSC), and Member States.The programme currently includes four projects that will merge to form SpaceSituational Awareness (SSA) architecture 7 • First, it is looking to develop a Space survey and tracking system. This involves a catalogue registering satellites in Space so as to better manage Space traffic.7The Continuing story of Europe and space Security- A conference organised by Institut Français des RelationsInternationales (Ifri) and the Secure World Foundation- October 2010, http://swfound.org/media/15091/spacesecurityeuropec-ifri-al.pdf Frost & Sullivan 15
    • • Second comes long-term studies of Space weather conditions; • Third, a programme concerning NEOs that should go into implementation phase; and • Finally, a networking and data centre.Attaining full operational capability (FOC) will give Europe a sound platform to conducttechnical exchanges with the likes of the US, aiming at improving the overallperformance of the system. Moreover, it is estimated that the European SSA systemwould reduce the quantifiable estimated loss for European assets due to collision withdebris and space weather (circa €332million on a yearly basis on average, not takinginto account the collateral damage due to loss of services for critical satelliteapplications) 8. An advanced fully operational SSA system can then be leveraged toenhance data sharing amongst international and national stakeholders enabling bettertracking and monitoring of orbital debris, Space objects and any potentially threateningouter Space activities. The potential success of the European SSA system could then beapplied to the formulation of broader international regulations and framework for areassuch as debris mitigation procedures and spectrum management. Largely due toEurope’s balanced approach to security (without an intensive focus on military), and itscollaborative rather than legally binding proposals, it is strategically positioned to alignand collaborate with international stakeholders in reaching agreements on collectiverules of the road and responsible behaviours within Space.However, before contemplating the success of such a system it is important to addresssome outstanding issues such as dual nature of end-user requirements for both civil andmilitary, the rules of the road for data acquisition and sharing, categorisation /classification of assets as national or shared, and the potential access of the assets forthe European SSA system. Initiatives / Programmes such as the Space Data Acquisition(SDA), which is mainly collecting data and processing it in order to avoid accidentsand/or determine responsibilities if they take place, are enabling tools of this system.Frost & Sullivan suggests Europe should approach these issues in a consultativeapproach with an aim to define activities and expectations for each stakeholder. Whileundergoing the consultations with the European stakeholders it will be important toconsider the impact of emerging rules of the road in relation to its implementation inthe broader international framework in the future.Space Terrorism, as mentioned earlier in this paper, is a growing threat for Space assets.Europe should leverage its access and positioning within the Space hierarchy toincrease awareness of this very real danger. Leading by example would be the suggestedroute for Europe, wherein it could introduce ‘counter-terrorism’ measures for Space asa part of the broader European Space Security Strategy.8 A new space policy for Europe: Independence, competitiveness and citizen’s quality of life, Reference: IP/11/398, April2011,http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/398&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr Frost & Sullivan 16
    • CONCLUDING REMARKSSpace security has attained enough critical mass, such that it is an integral part of mostSpace discussions and forums. Europe has the benefit of a unique institutional modelbased on the C3 approach, which it should leverage for leading the formulation of abroader international framework proactively, including a well defined UN Space Policy.However, in the short-term the EU should work closely with additional countries andthe receptive space powers to create an acceptance of the EU CoC. If countries are fornow in full agreement with these initiatives (countries such as Russia and China may bemore interested in pushing through the PPWT) Europe should continue to reach out toother stakeholders / countries. In light of (in the medium to long term) a broaderacceptance of these rules of the road, and the changing environment of Space security(considering orbital debris / collision and other basic issues), Europe would haveestablished a convincing argument for the historical Space powers to buy into a broaderinternational framework for Space and Space security.Europe’s ability to implement these policies is largely dependent on the voluntary buy-in from the stakeholders within EU and in the Rest of the World. Frost & Sullivanexpects the successful implementation / adoption of such policies to Space security willnot only provide a safe and sustainable operating environment for Europe and otherSpace participants, but it will further create opportunities for the industry. Thesuccessful implementation of such rules of the road are driven by the advances in R&Dof efficient data collection and analysis, better imaging and surveillance technologies,spectrum and orbital location optimisation, safer technologies and systems, low cost -high efficiency solutions, and other technologies and applications. This will generate astream of R&D and market opportunity for industry participants. Frost & Sullivansuggests that while positioning these policies to the decision makers the EU and ESAput forth the direct and indirect market opportunities, and not just focus on the costs. Frost & Sullivan 17
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