Divorce Decree
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Divorce Decree

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Original Divorce Decree inclusive of original custody order

Original Divorce Decree inclusive of original custody order

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  • 1. STATE OF MAINE DISTRICT COURT Cumberland, 55. Location: Portland Docket No. FM-08-5IO Igor Malenko, Plaintiff, v. DIVORCE JUDGMENT (Title To Real Estate Involved) Lori Handrahan, Defendant. Notice of the pendency of this action for divorce has been duly andseasonably given according to law. A final hearing was conducted on December8, 2008 through December 9, 2008. Plaintiff appeared, and was represented byMichael Waxman, Esq. Defendant appeared, and was represented by KennethAltshuler, Esq. The Guardian ad litem, Elizabeth Stout, Esq., appeared,presented reports with recommendations and testified. The court also tooktestimony from both of the parties and from five witnesses called by Defendant.Numerous exhibits were admitted into evidence. The Report of the Guardian adlitem dated October 23, 2008 and her Supplemental Report dated December 5,20081 were admitted into evidence pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1507. The court finds the essential facts in this matter are as follows. The parties were married in Maine on May 30, 2006, and Maine has bothsubject matter and personal jurisdiction over this case. Plaintiff and Defendantmet in Plaintiffs birthplace, Macedonia, in May of 2005. Their relationshipcontinued in Holland, where Plaintiff was residing at the time, and in the springof 2006, the parties moved to the United States. In early 2006 Defendant becamepregnant with the parties daughter, Mila. Mila was born on November 29,2006.I Defendant objected to the portions of the Supplemental Report containing reference tosocial science studies, treatises and articles regarding the relocation of children becausethe Defendant did not have adequate opportunity to consider those materials andpotentially offer materials in rebuttal. The court finds the Supplemental Report veryuseful apart from the studies, treatises and articles cited in it, and is considering theSupplemental Report on that basis.
  • 2. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, both of the parties are very intelligent, and they both love Mila very much. Plaintiff was born in Ochrid, Yugoslavia (now Macedonia) in 1972. He is 36 years old. He moved from Macedonia to Holland. While residing in Holland, he attended a technical college, but he did not graduate. He is a certified swim teacher. Currently, he works at Idexx Laboratories as a laboratory technician. He earns about $25,000.00 per year. He also attends Southern Maine Community College and plans to transfer to the University of Southern Maine to eventually obtain a degree in biotechnology. Defendant was born in 1969 and is 39 years old. She obtained her Ph.D. inSociology in 2001 from the London School of Economics and Political Science.She is currently a Senior Gender Advisor for CARE International. Her income is$87,000.00 per year. The primary issue for the courts determination in this case is the parentalrights and responsibilities of the parties relating to Mila. This issue is hotlycontested and very contentious. Plaintiff claims that he is not mentally ill, nordoes he have any significant psychological problems that impede his ability to bea safe, prudent and caring parent. He urges the court to order shared parentalrights with primary residence being allocated to Defendant, provided she stayshere in Maine. Further, he requests the court to order unsupervised contactbetween he and Mila with liberal visitation. Defendant claims that Plaintiff hassignificant mental illness, he is violent and abusive, and he poses a significantrisk to Milas well being. She urges the court to order sole parental rights to her(even if she relocates out of state) and supervised visitation to Plaintiff. The parties divergent positions place the court in a precarious position,because if it incorrectly assesses the facts of this case, it places Mila at risk ofharm in one form or another. The Guardian has nicely stated the courtsdilemma in determining the issue in her Supplemental Report. She accuratelyand succinctly characterizes the two types of potential harm that can come toMila in the context of each of the parties positions. She then considers theprobability of each of those two types of harm coming to pass. Based upon all ofthe evidence presented, the court agrees with the Guardians opinion that it isunlikely that Plaintiff poses a risk of harm to Mila. Defendant claims that Plaintiff is a violent and dangerous batterer, andthat placing Mila in his care unsupervised will subject her to risk of physicalharm. Defendant made allegations about specific instances of Plaintiffs conductto illustrate her claim. In addition to weekly "rage attacks"2 where Plaintiff usedawful language directed at her, Defendant pointed to five alleged instances ofviolent conduct by Plaintiff. The first incident occurred when Plaintiff was in2 Defendant claims one of the rage attacks occurred in front of Dr. David Pritchard duringa marital therapy session. Defendant testified that Plaintiff said he would "finish me offand snap my neck." Dr. Pritchard has said that no such incident occurred at all. 2
  • 3. high school in Macedonia. During a soccer game, Plaintiff and a friend became involved in a physical dispute. Plaintiff apparently "head-butted" the friend, causing the friend to fall and strike his head. The friend lapsed into a coma and sustained serious injury. The matter was litigated in Macedonian juvenile court, and a finding was made that the act was one of negligence with no intention to harm. Defendant asserts that this event has significance to the issue of Plaintiffs alleged violent nature, but this court accepts the Macedonian courts findings that the event was one of negligence occurring during a heated athletic contest. The second incident of alleged violent conduct by Plaintiff is a food-throwing incident that Defendant claims occurred prior to Milas birth.Defendant alleges that Plaintiff threw hot chicken at her when she didnt arriveat the dinner table quickly enough after Plaintiff had cooked the meal. Plaintiffclaims that this incident did not occur. The third incident occurred within three months after Milas birth.Defendant claims that as she was breast-feeding Mila on a bed, Plaintiff threw asweater at her during a dispute. Defendant says the sweater hit her and Mila.Plaintiff has acknowledged that the incident occurred, but claims that he threwthe sweater on the bed and that it did not hit Defendant or Mila. The fourth incident occurred during a discussion the parties were havingabout a home purchase. Defendant claims she was breast-feeding Mila duringthe discussion. A dispute arose about the type of house the parties wereconsidering. Plaintiff went into a rage and rushed at her. She raised her armdefensively, Plaintiff slapped it hard twice and walked out of the room. Plaintiffclaims that the incident occurred, but that Defendant was pointing her finger inhis face making accusations that he was not being supportive and spending toomuch money. Plaintiff claims that he swiped at Defendants hand and walkedout of the room. The fifth incident occurred at the lunch table. Again, the parties werehaving a dispute about their home purchase and about the hiring of a nanny forMila. Defendant claims that Plaintiff raised a fist and she ducked. She felt a jarhit her head and thought that she might have sustained a "mild concussion."She called the South Portland Police to respond and they did so. Plaintiff claimsthat the incident occurred, but that he swept a plastic peanut butter jar off thetable and it didnt hit Defendant at all. Defendant testified on cross-examinationthat the police officers did not examine her head when they met with her. Thatseems implausible. Moreover, although the observations of the police officersregarding the incident were not fully developed, Defendant acknowledged thatthe police report notes that she had no bruising, abrasion or complaint of pain. Defendant believes that Plaintiff suffers from Post Traumatic StressDisorder, and she has insisted that he see mental health professionals to addressthis perceived problem. Plaintiff has acquiesced in her requests that he be 3
  • 4. examined3, and each time he was evaluated, there were no indications that he was mentally ill at all. Defendant claims all of these mental health professionals are incompetent because they dont see that Plaintiff has PTSD. Defendant has insisted that Plaintiff take medication not prescribed to him because, based on her research, Plaintiff needs the drugs to deal with a mental illness (that he does not have). Defendant even tried (unsuccessfully) to get Plaintiff to sign a health care power of attorney. Plaintiff actually did take some of the drugs that Defendant insisted he needed. He did so because Defendant used her superior position (both financially and with regard to Plaintiffs Green Card status) as leverage to get him to comply with her wishes. While the parties resided for a short period of time in Budapest, Hungary,Defendant staged two bizarre incidents fueled by her unwavering belief thatPlaintiff is mentally ill. In one of the incidents, she called a Hungarian medicalteam to the parties residence to evaluate Plaintiff in what has been described asan "intervention." Plaintiff had no idea that she was doing this. The medicalteam performed an evaluation and left the residence, concluding that Plaintiffhad no need for any medical attention.4 The second incident occurred four or five days after the first. In thissecond incident, Defendant telephoned Plaintiffs father in Macedonia, againwithout Plaintiff knowing she was doing this. Defendant insisted that Plaintifftalk with his father about Plaintiffs allegations that his father had mistreated himas a child. Shortly thereafter, Defendant left the residence, and within a fewminutes of her leaving, an ambulance arrived for Plaintiff, responding to a reportthat he was mentally ill. Plaintiff asked the ambulance crew to speak with themedical team that had evaluated him days before, which they in fact did. Theambulance team left the residence a short time later. Dr. Carol Lynn Kabacoff examined both of the parties pursuant to areferral from the Guardian. Dr. Kabacoff is a licensed psychologist specializingin clinical and forensic assessment, including evaluation of parental capacity.After a complete evaluation5, Dr. Kabacoff presented her Parental CapacityEvaluation/Family Assessment of both Plaintiff and Defendant. Although Dr.Kabacoff did not specifically state so in her written report, she made a findingthat Defendant has a narcissistic personality. On the other hand, Dr. Kabacofffound that Plaintiff is not mentally ill at all. The court finds Dr. Kabacoffs reportand her testimony to be very credible. Her findings are corroborated by the factthat other mental health professionals have made similar findings regarding3 Plaintiff has been separately examined by a psychiatrist, a psychologist and a Hungarianpsychiatric medical team.4 A more complete account of this event is contained in Dr. Kabacoff s report in the formof a translated report of the medical team.5 Dr. Kabacoff testified that the evaluation of the parties was the most expensive one thatshe has ever done because it was complex, it involved numerous phone calls fromattorneys and she was "inundated" with material from the parties. 4
  • 5. Plaintiff. They are also corroborated by the evidence of Defendants behavior and by her testimony at trial. As previously mentioned, Defendants quest to obtain a PTSD diagnosis regarding Plaintiff has not only been unsuccessful, it has resulted in some suggestion from physicians that Defendant herself may require mental health treatment.6 True to Dr. Kabacoffs evaluation and observations, Defendant has angrily rejected those suggestions, claimed the doctors who made them are incompetent, and she has unsuccessfully continued to seek a mental health professional who will agree with her "diagnosis" of Plaintiff. The court finds Plaintiffs testimony credible. His demeanor while testifying appeared appropriate and many of his assertions are corroborated by other evidence. On the other hand, the court does not find Defendants testimony to be very credible. This may be related to the observation made by both Dr. Kabacoff and the Guardian that Defendant seems to perceive events differently than others. In any event, Defendant maintained a very defensive demeanor while she testified, and her answers, particularly on cross- examination, indicated a lack of candor. Additionally, some of Defendants assertions are refuted by other evidence. Accordingly, the court ORDERS the following: I. DIVORCE GRANTED The court grants a divorce to the parties upon the grounds ofirreconcilable mari tal differences.II. CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES The parties have one minor child born to this marriage, Mila Malenko,born November 29,2006.III. PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES A. Shared Parental Rights. Shared parental rights and responsibilities areallocated to the parties. As used in this Order, "Shared Parental Rights andResponsibilities II means that most or all aspects of a childs welfare remain thejoint responsibility and right of both parents, so that both parents retain equalparental rights and responsibilities, and both parents confer and make jointdecisions regarding the childs welfare. Matters pertaining to the childs welfareinclude, but are not limited to, education, religious upbringing, medical, dental,and mental health care, travel arrangements, child care arrangements and6 The suspicion that Defendant may benefit from a mental health evaluation and possibletreatment was apparently shared by Dr. Sean McCloy at Maine Integrative Wellness andby Dr. Robert McCarley at Maine Medical Center. 5
  • 6. residence. Parents who share parental rights and responsibilities shall keep one another informed of any major changes affecting the childs welfare and shall consult in advance to the extent practicable on decisions related to the childs welfare. B. Primary physical residence. Primary physical residence of Mila isallocated to Defendant. There was some indication made at trial that Defendantmay intend to relocate to the Washington, D.C. area in a job-related move. Thecourt finds that it is in the best interest of Mila that she has frequent andcontinuing contact with both of her parents. Therefore, primary physicalresidence of Mila is allocated to Defendant provided she remains in the State ofMaine. If Defendant does in fact relocate out of state, primary physical residenceof Mila shall be granted to Plaintiff. C. Psychological treatment of the parties. The court is mindful of theimportance of cooperation between divorced parents in parenting their children.Such cooperation is one of the statutory factors the court considers in making itsparental rights and responsibilities determination. Because the evidence showsthat Defendant has oppositional tendencies, the court has some concernregarding Defendants ability to cooperate with Plaintiff in the parenting of Mila.Based upon the evidence presented, the court also finds that Defendant may beless inclined than Plaintiff to facilitate Milas continuing contact with, andaffection for her other parent. The Guardian suggests that a parentingcoordinator would be very helpful in helping the parties negotiate the co-parenting of Mila post-divorce. Defendant has expressed some reluctance toentering into a contract with a parenting coordinator. As stated above, the courthas allocated primary physical residence of Mila to Defendant, but it does sowith some trepidation. The court finds that it will be beneficial for Plaintiff to attend biweeklysessions with Dr. Pritchard, and Plaintiff is ordered to do so. The court also findsthat it will be important for Defendant to become better suited to cooperate in theco-parenting of Mila, and to foster Milas relationship with Plaintiff. Dr.Kabacoff has suggested that dialectical behavioral therapy will likely bebeneficial to Defendant in helping her to do these important things. Defendant isordered to engage in a course of dialectical behavioral therapy. If Defendant failsto do so within sixty days of this Judgment, such failure can be ground forPlaintiff to file a Motion to Modify the courts parental rights and responsibilitiesdetermination. D. Contact. Plaintiff is allocated parental contact with Mila as follows: For the next six months, Plaintiff shall have unsupervised contact withMila on Monday, Wednesday and Friday of each week. Plaintiff shall pick-upMila at Connections for Kids at 9:00 AM. Plaintiff shall drop-off Mila atConnections for Kids at 4:00 PM. The court shall schedule a review of this matterin July, 2009. At this review, if it appears that Plaintiffs visits with Mila havegone well, and if Plaintiff has moved into a two-bedroom residence, Plaintiffshall have one overnight visit with Mila per week. This overnight visit shall 6
  • 7. begin at 9:00 AM on Saturday morning, with Plaintiff picking Mila up at Defendants residence at that time. This overnight visit shall conclude at 9:00 AM on Sunday morning, with Plaintiff dropping Mila off at Defendants residence. In addition, Plaintiff shall continue to have two daytime visits with Mila per week, from 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM every Tuesday and Thursday. In the event that Plaintiffs visits with Mila have gone well, after anadditional six months have passed, beginning January, 2010, Plaintiff shall havetwo overnight visits with Mila per week. These overnight visits shall take placebeginning at 6:00 PM on Friday night with Plaintiff picking Mila up atDefendants residence. The overnight visits shall conclude at 6:00 PM on Sundaynight with Plaintiff dropping Mila off at Defendants residence. Plaintiff shallcontinue to have a daytime visit with Mila every Wednesday from 9:00 AM to4:00 PM. In addition: -Mila shall spend 6:00 PM Christmas Eve through noon on Christmas Daywith Plaintiff on even-numbered years. She shall spend 6:00 PM Christmas Evethrough noon on Christmas Day with Defendant on odd-numbered years. -Plaintiff shall have Mila on Thanksgiving Day from 9:00 AM to 7:00 PMin all odd-numbered years. Defendant shall have Mila on Thanksgiving Dayfrom 9:00 AM to 7:00 PM in all even-numbered years. -Beginning when Mila enters Kindergarten, Plaintiff shall have her duringthe February vacation in all odd-numbered years. Defendant shall have Miladuring the February vacation in all even-numbered years. -Beginning when Mila enters Kindergarten, Plaintiff shall have her duringthe April vacation in all even-numbered years. Defendant shall have Miladuring the April vacation in all odd-numbered years. -Plaintiff shall have Mila on all Fathers Days from 9:00 AM to 7:00 PM. -Defendant shall have Mila on all Mothers Days from 9:00 AM to 7:00 PM. -Plaintiff shall have Mila on Easter from 9:00 AM to 7:00 PM in all odd-numbered years. Defendant shall have Mila on Easter from 9:00 AM to 7:00 PMin all even-numbered years. -Plaintiff shall have Mila on July 4th from 9:00 AM to 7:00 PM in all even-numbered years. Defendant shall have Mila on July 4th from 9:00 AM to 7:00 PMin all odd-numbered years. Plaintiff shall have Mila on Halloween from 3:00 PM to 7:00 PM in all odd-numbered years. Defendant shall have Mila on Halloween from 3:00 PM to 7:00PM in all even-numbered years. -Plaintiff shall have contact with Mila on her birthday, November 29th,from 9:00 AM to 3:00 PM. 7
  • 8. The parties may agree orally or in writing to vary this schedule to accommodate events and needs, or may agree in writing to change it, but in the event they are not in agreement concerning variations or changes, this schedule governs. E. Notifications. In the event Mila is hospitalized, each parent shall immediately notify the other of the nature and extent of such hospitalization, Milas location, and the expected duration of said hospitalization. Each parent shall keep the other informed, when asked at reasonable times, as to the health, welfare and whereabouts of Mila and any significant recent and relevant facts or factors in Milas life; if either parent has any knowledge of any illness or accident or other circumstances seriously affecting Milas health or general welfare, that party shall promptly notify the other of such circumstance. F. Access to Records. Each parent shall have access to records andinformation pertaining to Mila including, but not limited to, medical, dental, andschool records, whether or not Mila resides with the parent. G. Relocation of Children. A parent who intends to relocate Milasresidence must provide the other parent prior notice at least 30 days before theintended relocation. If the relocation must occur in less than 30 days, the parentwho is relocating shall provide notice as soon as possible to the other parent. Ifthe parent who is relocating believes notifying the other parent will cause dangerto the parent or the child, the parent shall notify the District Court of theintended relocation, and the District Court shall provide appropriate notice tothe other parent in a manner determined to provide safety to the relocatingparent and child. H. Permanent injunctions. Both parties are restrained and enjoined frommanifesting any form of conflict with each other, including, but not limited toassaulting, threatening, harassing, intimidating or arguing with the other partyin the presence of, or within the hearing of Mila. Both parties are restrained andenjoined from disparaging each other, or their respective family members,friends or associates in the presence of, or within the hearing of, Mila. Bothparties are restrained from discussing the details of this litigation with Mila, orwith each other in the presence or hearing of Mila. Both parties are restrainedand enjoined from exercising undue influence over Mila with respect to thislitigation. Undue influence includes, but is not limited to, coaching Mila as towhat to say in court, or orchestrating her actions with respect to the court or theother party. Both parties are hereby instructed that neither shall leave any sort oftelephone message, voice mail message, e-mail communication, or other writtenor verbal form of communication which would be likely to be seen or heard byMila which contains any harmful, derogatory, demeaning, or spiteful commentsconcerning the other parent, Mila, the familys dynamics or the family financesor living arrangements. 8
  • 9. Neither party may utilize Mila as a source of information, nor inquire of Mila, with respect to the activities, finances, social relationships, or personal affairs of the other parent. Neither parent may inquire of Mila about, or pressure Mila to discuss, the other parents current emotional, psychological, or social status or relationships. Neither parent shall harass, interfere with, molest, disturb the employment of or disturb the peace of the other parent or come in the vicinity of the other parents home or place of employment for such purposes. Each parent shall exert every effort to foster a feeling of affection between Mila and the other parent. Neither parent shall do anything that may estrange Mila from the other parent nor injure any of Milas opinions of her father or mother. Neither parent may do or say anything that may hamper the free and natural development of Milas love and respect for the other parent. I. Sanctions. Violation of this Judgment may result in a finding ofcontempt and imposition of sanctions pursuant to 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(7). Suchsanctions may include one or more of the following: (1) require additional ormore specific terms and conditions consistent with the Order, (2) order thatadditional visitation be provided for a parent to take the place of visitation thatwas wrongfully denied or in violation of this Order, or (3) order a parent foundin contempt pay a forfeiture of at least $100.IV. GUARDIAN AD LITEM. The Guardian ad litem shall submit an affidavit indicating heroutstanding fees. Payment of the outstanding balance of the Guardian ad litemsfees is allocated 22% to Plaintiff and 78% to Defendant. Payment of the fees shallbe made in full within sixty days of this Judgment. The Guardians appointmentis extended beyond the entry of this judgment so that she may assist in makingreferrals to Defendant regarding dialectical behavioral therapists, if requested,and to assist the court in assessing the circumstances of the parties at the six-month review described above.V. CHILD SUPPORT A. Regular Support. The court has made certain findings regarding theparties incomes and Parental Support Obligations set forth in the Child SupportWorksheets, which are attached and incorporated by reference. The attachedChild Support Orders and Immediate Income Withholding Order are alsoincorporated by reference. B. Tax Exemptions. Defendant shall claim Mila as a dependent for Federal and State Income Taxpurposes and shall receive any associated tax credits until Mila is no longer eligible. 9
  • 10. So long as an obligation for child support exists, on or before the first day of May of every year the parties shall exchange either photocopies of their federal tax returns or an affidavit concerning their current income. This affidavit shall include the name and address of the employer, the amount of gross wages and/ or salary earned for a typical work week, the amount and source of any additional income, and the amount of gross income received during the preceding tax year. C. Security. Plaintiff shall maintain a term life insurance policy in the face amount of $50,000 for the duration of any child support obligation under this Judgment. Plaintiff shall pay for the cost of the annual premium. Plaintiff shall name Defendant as sole beneficiary of the policy with Mila as beneficiary should Defendant not survive Plaintiff. This policy shall become effective no later than thirty days after the date of this Judgment and Plaintiff shall frovide to Defendant an annual Certificate of Insurance on or before the 30 day and thereafter on or before each annual renewal date the obligation is in place. VI. SPOUSAL SUPPORT. No spousal support has been requested and none is awarded. Accordingly, neither party may seek to institute a spousal support order in the fu ture. VII. PROPERTY ISSUES A. Non-marital property. The court determines that there is non-marital property, which is allocated and set aside to the parties as follows: Item Defendant Plaintiff Approximate X X B. Retirement Assets. The court divides the parties retirement assets as follows: Asset Defendan t Plaintiff Approximate X Xplans (if any) 10
  • 11. x x C. Intangible Property. The court divides the parties other intangible personal assets as follows: Asset Plaintiff Defendant Approximate X Xal Checking & Accounts Defendants Personal Checking D. Real Estate. The real estate located at 28 Franklin Terrace, South Portland, and more fully described in a deed recorded at the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds at Book 25129 and Page 97 is allocated to Defendant. Defendant shall be solely responsible for all debt associated with this real estate, and Defendant shall hold Plaintiff harmless with regard to all debt associated with this real estate. E. Remaining Personal Property. Except as otherwise set forth below, each party has in his or her respective possession the remaining personal property each wants. Accordingly, such remaining personal property is set aside and awarded to the party in whose possession such property reposed on the date of trial. The court divides the remainder of the parties tangible personal assets as follows: Item Defendant Plaintiff Approximate X Xif any) Except as otherwise set forth below, if any debt is associated with any of the foregoing personal property, the party receiving such property shall be 11
  • 12. exclusively responsible for the satisfaction of such debt and shall hold the other party harmless upon any such debt. VIII. DEBT The court allocates existing debt as follows: of DebtDr. $6,400.00 fees 50% 50% Defendant % Plaintiff % Approximate Each party shall assume responsibility for the debt as allocated above andshall hold the other harmless from any liability arising from it. All other debtwhich is not otherwise addressed in this Divorce Judgment shall be the soleresponsibility of the party in whose name it was incurred.IX. COUNSEL FEES. Each party shall be responsible for paying his or her own counsel fees.X. OUTSTANDING PROTECTIVE ORDER The outstanding Order for Protection From Abuse in PA-OB-60S dated June 6, 200B is dismissed in view of this Judgment.XI. MISCELLANEOUS. Each party shall execute and deliver to the other within 30 days anyauthorizations, title documents, instruments of conveyance or other documentsas may be necessary to effectuate the allocation of property and debts made bythis Judgment. Each party shall conclude any physical transfers of propertyordered by this judgment within 30 days. Each party shall indemnify and holdthe other harmless for any costs incurred as a result of a failure by the other partyto comply with this order. Any unpaid obligations from one party to the othershall accrue interest at the statutory rates as set by 14 MRSA § 1602-C(1)(B).Execution(s) may issue on request as provided by M.R.Civ.P. 69. The Clerk is directed to make the following entry in the civil docketpursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 79(a): Divorce Judgment, including Child Support andImmediate Income Withholding and Conditional Income Withholding Ordersentered. This Judgment is incorporated into the docket by reference at thespecific direction of the Court." 12
  • 13. Dated: J d-" d- q - fb Jeff Moskowitz, Judge Maine District Court 13
  • 14. STATE OF MAINE DISTRICT GQURT • Location Y 0 r·t..~ Docket No. FM-O2S-S"_O __ Plaintiff vs. CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET Defendant I. a. Primary care provider (parent children live with most of the time): Plaintiff 0 )([Defendant Both 0 If parents provide substantially equal care, higher income parent should be shown as the n~n-primary care provider. b. Parent providing health insurance for the children: 0 Plaintiff ~Defendant 0 Neither Date of Birth Childs Name Date of Birth 2. cN~r::mMo..~k - J.." ..... (" <;) Yearly Amounts Primary Care Provider Non-Primary Care Provider Combined Income o Self-support reserve o Below poverty level 3. Gross income $ $ :>.S,OOC -cO 4. Minus other obligations a. Support paid to former spouse a. a. o b. Support paid for other children b. b. a c. Other children living with non-primary care c. rovider (See instructions on reverse side.) 5. Total of 4a, b, & c 6. Adjusted Yearly Gross Income a. (Subtract line 5 from line 3) 7. Share of Gross Income a. b. (Add 6a & 6b) (Divide each parents income by combined· % % income) "188. Basic weekly support for all children up to 18 years (or up to 19 years if still in high school) (See instructions on reverse.) a. Total number of children b. Number of children ages 0-11 c. Number of children ages 12-17 __ -L~ _ multiplied by amount from table ~ multiplied by amount from table 8 = $ d.. 8 = $ _ Total (add 8b and 8c):9. Weekly health Name & amount for children per week insurance cost per child rI Q M tll.-l1. . _ Do $ $-------- Total: 9. 3S10. Weekly child care expenses Name & amount per child per week $ d, bS,) J $------- Total: 10.II. Extraordinary medical expenses Name & amount per child per week _ $ o () $-------- Total: II. ~~~~*If parents provide substantially equal care, continue calculations on supplemental worksheet.12. TOTAL WEEKLY SUPPORT OBLIGATION (Add lines 8, 9,10 and I I.)13.WEEKLY PARENTAL SUPPORT OBLIGATION: a. b. Non-Primary Care fum~C~spends directly Provider $ U IJ 1 "a-") l.~ _ Providers support obligation $ ~ . "?:> tt.~ (Multiply line 7a by line 12) (Multiply line 7b by line 12)Date:FM -040, Rev. 09/05 Prepared HorReyt:er) (PlalRtl t:f) (D efelui8f1t) (Judge) (A by: .. (rvhl~i:>llIlt:)~jvjealator)