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Building an Inclusive Democracy

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Presented during the FEF Fellows Monthly Meeting for April by Dr. Ron Mendoza. The results are as follows: poverty entrenches political dynasties; education appears to have no bearing on political …

Presented during the FEF Fellows Monthly Meeting for April by Dr. Ron Mendoza. The results are as follows: poverty entrenches political dynasties; education appears to have no bearing on political dynasties; and the media affect only the largest political dynasties. There is less evidence that political dynasties bring about poverty.

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  • Questions and comments on this presentation could be addressed to: POLICYCENTER@AIM.EDU.+AMDGCover photo source: http://www.examiner.com/article/photos-2010-elections-choosing-philippine-destiny-part-1**We acknowledge a similarly titled blog article on this topic by Mr. Ed Lingao of PCIJ. His article can be seen here: http://pcij.org/blog/2011/09/29/poverty-and-dynasties-the-chicken-or-the-egg
  • Sources:Lee Hsien Loong (2004): http://www.google.com.ph/imgres?imgurl=http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e3/Lee_Hsien-Loong_-_World_Economic_Forum_Annual_Meeting_2012_cropped.jpg/220px-Lee_Hsien-Loong_-_World_Economic_Forum_Annual_Meeting_2012_cropped.jpg&imgrefurl=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lee_Hsien_Loong&h=175&w=116&sz=1&tbnid=zPd35pC3Xlt0_M:&tbnh=160&tbnw=106&zoom=1&usg=__v_Vov1nTs7pIq_PfYYvlNRhJ19I=&docid=Vu0haF8Zoc-IUM&itg=1&sa=X&ei=GLUJUZXFLIWiigfgyIH4BQ&ved=0CJMBEPwdMA4Pnoy (2010):Yingluck Shinawatra (2011): http://www.google.com.ph/imgres?imgurl=http://www.bloomberg.com/image/icF_WyPfUqhg.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-15/yingluck-visits-cambodia-as-thailand-seeks-to-mend-links-hurt-by-clashes.html&h=426&w=639&sz=79&tbnid=A-cdHox_tJMnFM:&tbnh=90&tbnw=135&zoom=1&usg=__lgzVqkvryXJVRsKmQPlfxD-pJWo=&docid=4NDaBFEHHzZ15M&sa=X&ei=f7MJUfX6F4aZiAeqk4DgCA&ved=0CEsQ9QEwBA&dur=4284Kim Jong Un (2011): http://www.google.com.ph/imgres?imgurl=http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2010/10/10/world/10korea2-span/10korea2-span-articleInline.jpg&imgrefurl=http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/k/kim_jongun/index.html&h=162&w=126&sz=1&tbnid=FHpYHnuHu_iNGM:&tbnh=162&tbnw=126&zoom=1&usg=__KL7DVJsfZwSV-iDc4VV1mupopNQ=&docid=SMoGSn7lCLk53M&itg=1&sa=X&ei=grcJUdrYHPCXiQfdnIGwBw&ved=0CIYBEPwdMAwPark (2012): http://www.google.com.ph/imgres?imgurl=http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/02432/park-1_2432691b.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/southkorea/9756649/Profile-South-Koreas-first-female-president-Park-Geun-Hye.html&h=387&w=620&sz=56&tbnid=SROgDYTRvdbRGM:&tbnh=90&tbnw=144&zoom=1&usg=__O_4aN2oIowDTlonovS26dkWMXjI=&docid=9yoxNolhzhuAZM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ArMJUefIA66UiQfYhYH4Bg&ved=0CEgQ9QEwCQ&dur=366Sonia Gandhi (President of Indian National Congress 2010; widow of former PM Rajiv Gandhi): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonia_GandhiRahulGandhi (Ruling Congress Party VP; Sonia Gandhi is President of Congress Party): http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21570703-rahul-gandhi-makes-move-last-his-path-power-may-be-helped-fighting-among
  • The Mendoza et al (2012) study focused on the “dynasty3” definition in much of its analysis.Dynasty1: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th or 14th Congress;Dynasty2: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th or 14th Congress, or at least one local government official elected in 2001, 2004, or 2007;Dynasty3: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least one legislator in the 12th, 13th,14th or 15th Congress, or at least one local government official elected in 2001, 2004, 2007 or 2010.Dynasty*: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th, or 14th Congresses, and at least one legislator from the 15th Congress, and at least one local government official elected in 2001, 2004, or 2007, and at least one local government official elected in 2010.
  • Predatory view: state capture could lead to inefficiency or corruption; decentralization could lead to more entrenched control by local elites and political clans (Proud’homme, 1995)Stationary bandit view: elites have a greater incentive to improve socio-economic outcomes rather than pursue immediate plunder (Olson, 2003)
  • The green circles identify the newest branches of the Singson family tree. The number of “Singsons” in office in this tree exceed the number of Singsons in the pie chart later on the presentation because those with asterisks are either Singson-Zaragoza, Singson-Medina or Singson-Goulart (Middle name Singson).
  • Ravanilla (2012) study of data on 1631 municipalities and cities for 229 district based Congressmen during 2001-2010.CDF comprised of PDAF (Priority Development Assistance Funds) and DPWH-CA (DPWH Congressional Allocations)
  • Despite dropping from 37 positions to 23 positions, the Ampatuan family still occupies the highest number of local government positions in Maguindanao
  • It is of note that twoEcleos; mother and daughter fought for the governorship of Dinagat Islands. The mother prevailed. It is also of note that the Ecleos now hold the governor and vice governor posts of Dinagat Islands.
  • Additional tablesLargest clan/s for each province (Provinces are arranged from highest to lowest in terms of the Largest Dynastic Clan (2010 positions) indicator)PROVINCECLANSDINAGAT ISLANDSEcleoSIQUIJORFuaMAGUINDANAOAmpatuanCAMIGUINRomualdoBILIRANEspinaLANAO DEL SURBalindongBATANESAbadILOCOS SURSingsonAGUSAN DEL SURPlazaGUIMARASNavaSAMAR (WESTERN SAMAR)TanLA UNIONOrtegaTAWI-TAWIAhaja, Omar, SahaliMARINDUQUELimQUIRINOAduca, Agustin, Cua, Pagbilao, YlananOCCIDENTAL MINDOROTria, VillarosaAGUSAN DEL NORTEAmanteDAVAO ORIENTALRabat, UyLANAO DEL NORTEDimaporoANTIQUEJavierAPAYAOAmid, Begtang, Bulut, PascuaBATAANGarciaSULULoongSURIGAO DEL SURPimentelAURORAAngara, BitongKALINGADickpus, MangaoangSARANGANIMartinez, YapNUEVA VIZCAYABalgosORIENTAL MINDOROUmaliRIZALSan JuanSORSOGONEscuderoMOUNTAIN PROVINCELacwasanNORTHERN SAMARTanAKLANMirafloresCAPIZCastroABRABernos, CardenasDAVAO DEL SURBautista, CagasSOUTHERN LEYTEMercadoCATANDUANESAbundo, Alberto, TevesIFUGAOBunnol, DulnuanMISAMIS ORIENTALEmano, LagbasTARLACYapBASILANAkbar, Kahallal, SahaliCOMPOSTELA VALLEYBrillantes, GonzagaDAVAO (DAVAO DEL NORTE)Del Rosario Uy,ISABELADySURIGAO DEL NORTEMatugasMASBATELanete, NagaSOUTH COTABATOLadot, LumayagSULTAN KUDARATGarcia, SakaluranBUKIDNONZubiriILOCOS NORTEAguinaldo, Marcos, NaluptaPALAWANAlvarezZAMBALESKhonghunBULACANSantosNEGROS ORIENTALArnaizROMBLONFirmalo, Madrid, MadronaCAVITERemullaZAMBOANGA SIBUGAYJalosjos, Olegario, Palmo, RamisoMISAMIS OCCIDENTALAlmonte, Animas, Dumanjug, Parojinog, Paylaga, Regalado, Tan, VillanuevaZAMBOANGA DEL SURCerillesCAGAYANVargasCOTABATO (NORTH COT.)Cadungon, Catamco, PinolALBAYAlsua, Gonzalez, Imperial, SalcedaCEBUGarciaNUEVA ECIJAJosonILOILOGarinBATANGASMendoza, ReyesNEGROS OCCIDENTALAlvarez, EscalanteEASTERN SAMARAbuda, Baldono, EvardonePAMPANGADavid, Flores, Naguit, PinedaCAMARINES SURFuentebellaQUEZONAlcala, SuarezLEYTEApostol, CariBOHOLChattoCAMARINES NORTEAguilar, Jalgalado, Magana, Padilla, Pajarillo, Parale, Pardo, RamonesLAGUNAChipeco, De Leon, EjercitoPANGASINANCalimlim, Celeste, Espino, ReyesBENGUETCanuto, Cosalan, Dangwa, Fianza  Members of Ampatuan clan who are currently in officeNAMEPOSITIONBONGBONG AMPATUANMAYOR (DATU HOFFER AMPATUAN)AKMAD AMPATUANMAYOR (DATU SALIBO)SAUD AMPATUANMAYOR (DATU SAUDI AMPATUAN)RESHAL AMPATUANMAYOR (DATU UNSAY)TAHIRODIN AMPATUANMAYOR (MAMASAPANO)YACOB AMPATUANMAYOR (RAJAH BUAYAN)ZAHARA AMPATUANMAYOR (SHARIFF AGUAK)ZANDRIA AMPATUANMAYOR (MUSTAPHA)DATU AMPATUANPROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERSAJID AMPATUANPROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERPUTI AMPATUANPROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERKANOR AMPATUANVICE-MAYOR (DATU SALIBO)SAUDI AMPATUANVICE-MAYOR(DATU SAUDI AMPATUAN)AKMAD AMPATUANVICE-MAYOR (MAMASAPANO)SORAIDA AMPATUANVICE-MAYOR(PARANG)ANWAR AMPATUANVICE-MAYOR (SHARIFF AGUAK) Members of Singson clan who are currently in officeNAMEPOSITIONALLEN SINGSONMAYOR (CANDON CITY)RONALD SINGSONMEMBER, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVERYAN SINGSONMEMBER, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVEERIC SINGSONMEMBER, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVEJEREMIAS SINGSONPROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERLUIS SINGSONPROVINCIAL GOVERNORALFONSO SINGSONVICE-MAYOR (CANDON CITY)RYAN SINGSONVICE-MAYOR (VIGAN CITY)  Members of Ecleo clan who are currently in officeNAMEPOSITIONALAN ECLEOMAYOR (BASILIA)GWENDOLYN ECLEOMAYOR (DINAGAT)ALLAN ECLEOMAYOR (SAN JOSE)RUBEN ECLEO, JRMEMBER, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVEROMEO ECLEOPROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERJOSLYN ECLEOPROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERGLENDA ECLEOPROVINCIAL GOVERNORRUBEN AL ECLEOVICE-MAYOR (CAGDIANAO) 
  • The Mendoza et al (2012) study focused on the “dynasty3” definition in much of its analysis.Dynasty1: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th or 14th Congress;Dynasty2: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th or 14th Congress, or at least one local government official elected in 2001, 2004, or 2007;Dynasty3: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least one legislator in the 12th, 13th,14th or 15th Congress, or at least one local government official elected in 2001, 2004, 2007 or 2010.Dynasty*: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th, or 14th Congresses, and at least one legislator from the 15th Congress, and at least one local government official elected in 2001, 2004, or 2007, and at least one local government official elected in 2010.
  • +AMDGRUM
  • Transcript

    • 1. Can Exclusive Politics Produce Inclusive Development? Ronald Umali Mendoza, PhD AIM Policy Center
    • 2. Mendoza, Beja, Venida and Yap. 2012. “Inequality in democracy: Insights from an empirical analysis of political dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress”. Philippine Political Science Journal 33(2):132-145. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1969605 70% of the 15th Philippine Congress is dynastic; and dynasties dominate all of the major political parties. On average, there are more dynasties in regions with higher poverty and lower human development. Dynasties tend to be richer (higher SALNs) when one outlier is removed among present non-dynasties (MP). 80% of the youngest Congressmen (age 26-40) are from dynastic clans.
    • 3. Political Dynasties and Poverty/Inequality Empirical link between political dynasties and poverty/inequality: •PREDATORY VIEW: Dynasties increase P/I -- If dynasties are associated with rent-seeking and state capture, corruption and ineffective and poorly designed policies (e.g. Proud’homme, 1995; Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003). •STATIONARY BANDIT: Dynasties reduce P/I -- If dynasties have longer “runways” for reform and are more firmly associated with socio-economic outcomes (e.g. Olson, 2003; Solon et al, 2009; Dal Bo and Rossi, 2009). •LONG RUNWAY FOR REFORMS: Dynasties are better able to pursue reforms with longer- term gestation periods for results; policy stability and continuity that investors would prefer Additional complexity: •PATRONAGE: High P/I tends to increase dynastic prevalence: the poor vote for dynasties as long as these are able to directly provide support during elections or in times of income shocks (e.g. Coronel, 1998; Manacsa and Tan, 2005). •SELF-PERPETUATION: Politicians are capable of developing dynasties: being in public office affords politicians the opportunity and means to keep on winning or to increase their heirs’ chances of winning (e.g. Dal Bo et al, 2009; Querrubin 2010).
    • 4. Innovations in this Study • THIN DYNASTY • FAT DYNASTY
    • 5. A Snapshot of One Political Dynasty: “Fat –type” Sibling Spouse Cousin PBM (Provincial Board Member) Note: Incumbent positions are in brackets.
    • 6. Province LGU Revenue •Taxes •IRA Governor Municipal Mayor A Municipal Mayor B Municipal Mayor C Cong •PDAF Sangguniang Panlalawigan
    • 7. Distortions in Local Public Finance? Ravanilla (2012): study of legislators and their use of “pork barrel” funds from 2001-2010; Legislators bias distribution of their constituency development fund (CDF) in favor of local patrons and allies ; More political competition (tighter Congressional races) tend to exacerbate this clientelistic distribution bias.
    • 8. Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Elected Officials (2013): Maguindanao AMPATUAN 6 MAYORS 4 VICE MAYORS 13 COUNCILORS AMPATUAN, 23 MIDTIMBANG, 12 MANGUDADATU, 11 SINSUAT, 7 LUMENDA, 5 ABDULLAH, 4 ANGAS, 4 KALI, 4 MAMALAPAT, 4PAGLAS, 4 SANGKI, 4 UTTO, 4 ALI, 3KASIM, 3 MASUKAT, 3 PENDATUN, 3 SABAL, 3 ALIM, 2 BIANG, 2 BUAT, 2 DAGALANGIT, 2 DELNA, 2 DILANGALEN, 2 DIMAUKOM, 2 DIOCOLANO, 2 DUKAY, 2 EBUS, 2 IBRAHIM, 2 IMAM, 2 KATAMBAK, 2 LANGKUNO, 2 LAUBAN, 2 MACAPEGES, 2 MALAGUIAL, 2 MAMA, 2MAMALO, 2 MAMASABULOD, 2 MATALAM, 2 MUSTAPHA, 2 SALENDAB, 2 SANDIGAN, 2 SEMA, 2 TALUSAN, 2 MUSA, 1 PIANG, 1 155 115 58 0 50 100 150 200 250 DYNASTIC NONDYNASTIC FAT THIN Distribution of “Fat” Dynasties
    • 9. Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Elected Officials (2013): Dinagat Islands ECLEO 1 GOVERNOR 1 VICE GOVERNOR 3 MAYORS 2 COUNCILORS 2 PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERS Distribution of “Fat” Dynasties ECLEO, 10 LONGOS, 3 BORJA, 2CREENCIA, 2 LADAGA, 2 LISONDRA, 2 LLAMERA, 2 LUIB, 2 PELISMINO, 2 TAN, 2 VARGAS, 2 31 49 3 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 DYNASTIC NONDYNASTIC FAT THIN
    • 10. Top 10 Provinces in terms of the following dynastic indicators: DYNASTIC SHARE LARGEST DYNASTIC CLAN (SHARE OF TOTAL POSITIONS) DYNASTIC COMPETITION- HERFINDAHL TOP 1 MAGUINDANAO DINAGAT ISLANDS DINAGAT ISLANDS TOP 2 APAYAO SIQUIJOR MAGUINDANAO TOP 3 SULU MAGUINDANAO SIQUIJOR TOP 4 TAWI-TAWI CAMIGUIN APAYAO TOP 5 ILOCOS NORTE BILIRAN QUIRINO TOP 6 ABRA LANAO DEL SUR TAWI-TAWI TOP 7 NEGROS OCCIDENTAL BATANES BILIRAN TOP 8 ILOCOS SUR GUIMARAS SULU TOP 9 QUIRINO AGUSAN DEL SUR CAMIGUIN TOP 10 CEBU SAMAR (WESTERN SAMAR) DAVAO ORIENTAL
    • 11. Snapshot of Inequality – Ecleo Castle and fishing villiage in Dinagat Islands
    • 12. Mendoza, Beja, Venida and Yap. 2013. “Political dynasties and poverty: Resolving the ‘chicken or the egg’ question.” AIM Working Paper. Makati City. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2292277 •Media (proxied by more AM radio stations) increases the share of dynasties in total positions, but it reduces “fat” dynasties. (Interpretation: Media levels the playing field, but it is still dominated by dynasties or would-be dynasties) •Higher poverty incidence increases the chance for dynasties to grow (become “fat”) and dominate the political positions under analysis. •There is weak evidence that suggests that the level of education is negatively associated with the share of political dynasties in the total positions under analysis. •Dynasties (using our proxy indicators) are not associated with increasing (or decreasing) poverty, on average.
    • 13. How do Non-Dynasties Stack Against Dynasties? Source: AIM Policy Center’s 2013 Elections Survey. 9 40 19 4 3 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 GOVERNOR DYN UNCON DYN BEAT DYN DYN BEAT NONDYN NONDYN BEAT DYN NONDYN UNCON NONDYN BEAT NONDYN
    • 14. Source: AIM Policy Center’s 2013 Elections Survey. How do Non-Dynasties Stack Against Dynasties? 172 425 445 215 67 215 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 MAYOR DYN UNCON DYN BEAT DYN DYN BEAT NONDYN NONDYN BEAT NONDYN NONDYN UNCON NONDYN BEAT NONDYN
    • 15. Balimbing Nation Source: AIM Policy Center’s 2013 Elections Survey. 2013 MAYORS CAREER SWITCHINGS DISTRIBUTION 214 32 32 40 240 125 153 78 287 130 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 SWITCH OP 1 SWITCH OP 2 SWITCH OP 3 SWITCH OP 4 WINSWI 0 WINSWI 1 WINSWI 2 WINSWI 3 WINSWI 4
    • 16. This presentation builds on: Mendoza, R.U., E.Beja, V.Venida and D.Yap. 2012. “An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Congress.” Philippine Political Science Journal 33(2):132-145. This study is conducted with the support of the Asian Institute of Management Scientific Research Foundation and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The views expressed herein are the authors’ and these do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Asian Institute of Management, and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. DEMOCRACY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH AIM Policy Center / http://Policy.aim.edu
    • 17. Presented during the Foundation for Economic Freedom’s Fellows Monthly Meeting April 30, 2014, 7:00PM Manila Golf and Country Club Contact Details: Foundation for Economic Freedom, Inc. 105 Philippine Social Science Center (PSSC) Commonwealth Ave., Diliman, Quezon City Telefax: (632) 4532375 (Main Office) Tel No.: (632) 8939602 (Accounting) Website: www.fef.org.ph Email: fefphilippines@gmail.com / fef@fef.org.ph

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