Policy Analysis Matrix
Assessing Land and Water Productivity and
Agriculture Competitiveness
Dr. Mahmood Ahmad
FAO Consult...
Why do we need Policies?
Policies are the instruments of action that governments
employ to effect change.
Demand emerges a...
PAM
A simple tool, powerful to communicate
with policy makers but data needs are large
Provides better understanding the r...
What is PAM?

How PAM helps policy makers
address three central agricultural
issues ?

Policy Analysis Matix

or PAM
Polic...
PURPOSE: Ranking of

1.COMPETITIVENESS and EFFICIENCY SYSTEM (2) MEASURES THE TRANSFER
EFFECTS OF POLICIEs
Also : address ...
Where Distortion Comes From
Principal source of distortion are
Market Failure:
• Monopolies or Monopsonies (sellers and bu...
Estimating Efficiency prices for partly
importable/ exportable and domestic factor
• The value (social opportunity cost) o...
Steps in Constructing PAM
Data Collection
Divide country into its ecological zones
Identify important crops in each farm...
inputs
At Private Prices

A

Factor

B

C

D
Domestic Factors
based on shadow prices

Traded outputs and inputs
Prepare Import or Export
Parity Prices
Revenues
At Soci...
Import Parity Prices
Import Parity Price (IPP) = (CIF *
SER) + (HCB) + (TCBM + MCBM)
- (TCFM + MCFM)
Where:
CIF
= Cost, In...
Incentives & Efficiency
All four countries have tremendous comparative in growing cotton, but other than
Kyrgstan, all are...
Water versus Land Productivity
Factor - Driven
Economy

Investment Driven
Economy

Innovation Driven
Economy

Adopted from...
Case Studies
Highlighting
Incentive Structure: Egypt &Iran
Water Productivity: Egypt, Syria, Iran, Palestine
Impact Analys...
Incentive Structure
Iran: Wheat Policy Brief
Irrigated wheat is competitive and carries reasonable comparative advantage

...
Egypt: Competiveness
Ranking by
Profitability LE/feddan
Cotton

Ranking by Cost/Benefits
Ration

1786
Cotton

2.20

Long B...
Comparison of water productivity for
different commodities- Livestock
products carries the lowest
6

5
4
3
2
1
0
Beef

Len...
Syria
Drip Irrigation shows higher water productivity than Sprinkler,
and Small farmers are obtaining much higher producti...
NENA region’s water productivities are higher than global average
and water productivity is much higher in horticulture th...
Case of Palestine
Saving (values) of water determines the rate of return on investments, in
Jericho (low water values), it...
Iran Water Productivity - how we value revenues (the
nominator in the equation), at the gross or at the gross
margins or a...
Output
Total
0
5
14
21
26
30
33
35
36
36
35

Water

AP=O/W
MP=dO/dw
E=MP/AP
Average Product Marginal Product Elasticty
0
0...
Policy Impact Analysis
FAO/RNE
POLICY ANALYSIS
CASES/ BREIFS

Egypt
Palestine
Saving (values) of water determines the rate of return on
investmen...
Case of Egypt: Rent decontrol a major land policy shift
1000

700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

800
600
400
200
0

1
Rent
Bas...
Impact of Energy Cost on Efficiency of Resource Use:
of Al-Batinah region of Oman

Case

Orange
Mango
Lem on

Very high se...
Kazakhstan: Rice policy cost to the nation
(tax payers) was very high and leading to
environmental disaster (Aral Sea)
Wat...
Policy Analysis Matrix "Assessing Land and Water Productivity and Agriculture Competitiveness"
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Assessing Land and Water Productivity and Agriculture Competitiveness, By Dr. Mahmood Ahmad, FAO Consultant on Water Scarcity Initiative, Session : Market Café (I13), Land and Water Days in Near East & North Africa, 15-18 December 2013, Amman, Jordan

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  • Public Policy Intervention aims at changing a given course of events toward some pre-defined objectives, in order to answer to needs, or to exploit opportunities.
  • The PAM approach was first developed in 1981 by researchers at the University of Arizona and Stanford University to study changes in agricultural policies in Portugal. The seminal book applying this analytical approach is Scott R. Pearson et al., Portuguese Agriculture in Transition, 1987. A matrix is an array of numbers (or symbols) that follows two rules of accounting – one defining relationships across the columns of the matrix and the other defining relationships down the rows of the matrix. These accounting relationships are termed the identities of the matrix because they are true by definition (PAM, pp. 18-19).The profitability identity in PAM is the accounting relationship across the columns of the matrix. Profits are defined as revenues less costs. All entries in the PAM matrix under the column defined “profits” thus are identically equal to the difference between the columns containing “revenues” and those containing “costs” (including both costs of tradable inputs and costs of domestic factors).The divergences identity in PAM is the relationship down the rows of the matrix. Divergences cause private prices to differ from their social counterparts. A divergence arises either because a distorting policy intervenes to cause a private market price to diverge from an efficient price or because underlying market forces have failed to provide an efficient price. All entries in the PAM matrix under the third row, defined as “effects of divergences,” thus are identically equal to the difference between entries in the first row, measured in “private prices,” and those in the second row, measured in “social prices.”
  • PURPOSE: (!) RANKING OF COMPETITIVENESS OF SYSTEMS (2) RANKING OF EFFICIENCY SYSTEM (3) MEASURES THE TRANSFER EFFECTS OF POLICIES
  • One source of divergence is the existence of a market failure. A market fails if it does not generate competitive prices that reflect social opportunity cost and lead to an efficient allocation of products or factors. Three basic types of market failures create divergences. The first is monopoly (seller control over market prices) or monopsony (buyer control over market prices). The second are negative externalities (costs for which the imposer cannot be charged) or positive externalities (benefits for which the provider cannot receive compensation). The third are factor market imperfections (inadequate development of institutions to provide competitive services and full information).Efficient policy is a government intervention to correct a market failure and thus offset a divergence. For example, successful regulation of a monopoly would reduce seller prices, cause private and social prices to become equal, and increase income.The second source of divergence is distorting government policy. Distorting policy prevents an efficient allocation of resources to further non-efficiency objectives (equity or security) and thus creates divergences. A tariff on rice imports, for example, could be imposed to raise farmer incomes (equity objective) and increase domestic rice production (security objective), but it would create efficiency losses if the replaced rice imports were cheaper than the costs of domestic resources used to produce the additional rice (as explained in the fifth lecture in this series). Hence, a trade-off would arise, and policy makers would need to assign weights to these conflicting objectives to decide whether to introduce the tariff.The most efficient outcome could be achieved, in principle, if the government were able to enact efficient policies that offset market failures and if the government were to decide to override non-efficiency objectives and remove distorting policies. If these actions – the introduction of efficient policies and the removal of distorting policies – could be carried out, divergences would be offset and the effects of divergences (measured in the bottom row of PAM) would be zero. In this idealized example, all entries in the bottom row of the PAM matrix – I, J, K, and L – would be zero and the entries in the top row would be identical to those in theDivergences Identity• market failures – monopolies/monopsonies, externalities, factor market imperfections• efficient policy – corrects market failures• distorting policy – creates divergences• most efficient outcome – offset market failure, remove distorting policysecond row, i.e., private revenues, costs, and profits would be the same as social revenues, costs, and profits (A = E, B = F, C = G, and D = H).Market failures are often associated with information asymmetries,[5] non-competitive markets, principal–agent problems, externalities,[6] or public goods.[7] However, some types of government policy interventions, such as taxes, subsidies, bailouts, wage and price controls, and regulations, including attempts to correct market failure, may also lead to an inefficient allocation of resources, sometimes called government failure.[11]Air pollution from motor vehicles is an example of a negative externality. The costs of the air pollution for the rest of society is not compensated for by either the producers or users of motorized transport.
  • Egyp1.06Pakistan1.05Kyrgstan1.60Tajkistan1.46
  • The government of Sultanate of Oman subsidizes the electricity used in the agricultural activities. The subsidized price of electricity is about RO 0.010 per K.wat, where as the actual production costs of electricity in Oman is about 0.035 RO per k.wat. The DRC was calculated based on commercial rates charged to other sectors like industry. It is often argued that a higher tier of tariff which is production cost be used to assess the long term impact of electricity prices and will thus tell the long term vitality of our proposed alternative crops. The first scenario will thus asses the impact of actual production costs of electricity on economic efficiency measures or DRC of each crop. lemon, banana, potato, onion, dates and Rhodes Grass are highly sensitive crops to changes in the electricity price because these crops consumed huge quantities of ground water.
  • Policy Analysis Matrix "Assessing Land and Water Productivity and Agriculture Competitiveness"

    1. 1. Policy Analysis Matrix Assessing Land and Water Productivity and Agriculture Competitiveness Dr. Mahmood Ahmad FAO Consultant on Water Scarcity Initiative Session : Market Café (I13)
    2. 2. Why do we need Policies? Policies are the instruments of action that governments employ to effect change. Demand emerges at different levels for introducing: – A change ( A demand driven extension) – A review (wheat procurement ?) – A new issue (Alternative energy) – Not all demands are satisfied (Food security) 2
    3. 3. PAM A simple tool, powerful to communicate with policy makers but data needs are large Provides better understanding the relationships between a country’s policies affecting its food economy and the underlying efficiency of its agricultural systems. FAO/RNE used PAM for supporting member countries in preparing agriculture strategies or policy review often with for donor (World bank, UNDP and others) support for Egypt, Iran, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. Policy review for Oman, Yemen, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Few policy analysis cases/briefs would be highlighted in second half presentation
    4. 4. What is PAM? How PAM helps policy makers address three central agricultural issues ? Policy Analysis Matix or PAM Policy Analysis Tool based on a very simple basic equation. Profit = Revenues – osts’ Agriculture Policy Environments Estimation is based on private (financial es) and social prices (economic). Impact of new public investment Mostly the divergence between two types rofitability comes from policy intervention. Insight into issue of virtual water The analysis is often based on preparing crop budgets, and the fact most price distorare largely embedded in water ---- excellent to assess water productivity in physical and ue terms and to assess allocative efficiency. OLICY ANALYSIS RAMEWORK AM estimates the competitiveess and farm-level profits (D) fluence of investment policy n economic efficiency and omparative advantage (H) olicy transfers, incentive or otectionist policy (L) Revenues At Private Prices At Social Prices Divergence Traded Inputs Costs Domestic Factors Profits A B C D E F C H I J K L Policy Indicators Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC) = A/E Effective Protection Coefficeint (EPC) = A-B/E-F
    5. 5. PURPOSE: Ranking of 1.COMPETITIVENESS and EFFICIENCY SYSTEM (2) MEASURES THE TRANSFER EFFECTS OF POLICIEs Also : address three central issues of agricultural policy analysis efficiency and public investment – before and after public investment efficiency and agricultural research – before and after new technology whether farmers, traders, and processors earn profits, comparison of before and after the policy change Successful public investment (in irrigation) would raise the value of output or lower the costs of inputs. public investment in new farming or processing techniques, would enhance farming or processing yields and thus increase revenues or decrease costs. Countries achieve rapid economic growth by promoting activities that generate high social profits (large positive H). Tradeoffs: Water productive efficiency versus allocative efficiency Approaches issue of food security (domestic production versus imports) in a scientific way competitiveness and farm profits – before and after policy change
    6. 6. Where Distortion Comes From Principal source of distortion are Market Failure: • Monopolies or Monopsonies (sellers and buyer control over the market) • Externalities Negative ---costs for which the imposer cannot be charged or Positive ---benefits for which provider cannot receive compensation or factor market imperfection (inadequate development of institutions to provide competitive services and information) • Policy enacted to improve market failure Distorting government policy Commodity Specific Policy (taxes, subsidy, direct regulation), import duty If market failure does not exist, then all divergence between private and social prices of tradable outputs and inputs are caused by distorting policies.
    7. 7. Estimating Efficiency prices for partly importable/ exportable and domestic factor • The value (social opportunity cost) of producing an additional ton of an importable commodity or exportable (e.g., rice in Egypt) is the amount of foreign exchange saved or generated by replacing a ton of imports – given by the import or export price. • The social (efficiency) prices for domestic factors of production estimated also by application of the social opportunity cost principle --- estimated through observations of rural factor markets. The intent is to find how much output and income are foregone because the factor is used to produce the commodity under analysis (e.g., rice) rather than the next best alternative commodity (e.g., sugarcane).
    8. 8. Steps in Constructing PAM Data Collection Divide country into its ecological zones Identify important crops in each farming system Technology levels (TvA), farm size (SML) Find out that if latest cost of production data exists and its breakdown according to region Establish its adequacy (in prices and quantities) Recommend field survey, if not adequate
    9. 9. inputs At Private Prices A Factor B C D
    10. 10. Domestic Factors based on shadow prices Traded outputs and inputs Prepare Import or Export Parity Prices Revenues At Social Prices E Cost traded inputs F Cost Domestic Factor G Profits H
    11. 11. Import Parity Prices Import Parity Price (IPP) = (CIF * SER) + (HCB) + (TCBM + MCBM) - (TCFM + MCFM) Where: CIF = Cost, Insurance and Freight at the Border; SER = Shadow Exchange Rate; HCB = Handling Cost at the Border; TCPM = Transport Cost from Border to Market; MCBM = Marketing Cost from Border to Market; TCFM = Transport Cost from Farm to Market, and MCFM = Marketing Cost from Farm to Market. what a commodity can cost as an import commodity For correctly comparing (i) the commodities are exactly comparable in physical terms; and (ii) the commodities are compared at the same location. Case of Wheat Exchange Rate Unit Value % 3 LE/US$ 119 $/Ton 15 % 134 Import Duties $/Ton 0 Other Fees $/Ton 0 Total Duties, Tax and Fees $/Ton 12 % 146 $/Ton 496 $/Ton 22 Transport, Market to Farm LE/Ton 22 World Price at Farm LE/Ton 452 Quality Adjustment % 1 World Price at Farm LE/Ton 429 World Price, U.S Gulf Freight, U.S. Gulf to Alexandria World Price, Alexandria World Price, Alexandria World Price Equivalent at Alexandria Transport, Alexandria to Market
    12. 12. Incentives & Efficiency All four countries have tremendous comparative in growing cotton, but other than Kyrgstan, all are taxing farmer with prices ranging from 60 to 70 % of the world price Pakistan Cotton, 1998 Egypt Cotton, 1998 Values Basis Revenues Costs of Production Tradable Profits Values Basis 543.61 138.39 374.92 30.31 Social Values 889.23 168.43 422.32 298.48 Divergence -345.62 -30.04 -47.40 -268.17 Coefficients NPC = 0.61 NPI = 0.82 EPC = 0.56 DRC = Non-tradable 232.91 99.66 122.66 10.60 Social Values 333.81 84.78 113.07 135.97 -100.90 14.88 9.59 -125.36 Divergence Coefficients NPC = 0.70 EPC = Kyrgstan Cotton, 1999 0.54 DRC = 0.45 Tajikistan Cotton, 2001 Costs of Production Tradable Profits Private Values 0.59 Revenues Costs of Production Tradable Non-tradable Private Values Values Basis Revenues Profits Values Basis Revenues Costs of Production Tradable Non-tradable Profits Non-tradable Private Values 346.06 108.91 107.67 129.48 Private Values 731.40 201.23 300.88 229.28 Social Values 355.90 119.16 112.83 123.91 Social Values 790.52 246.06 303.32 241.15 Divergence -9.84 -10.25 -5.16 5.58 Divergence -59.12 -44.82 -2.43 -11.87 Coefficients NPC = 0.92 Coefficients NPC = 0.61 NPI = 0.82 EPC = 97.00 EPC = 0.56 DRC = 0.59 DRC = 0.55
    13. 13. Water versus Land Productivity Factor - Driven Economy Investment Driven Economy Innovation Driven Economy Adopted from ICARDA Low Cost Inputs: Labour, Natural Resources Iran, Egypt, Morocco Efficiency Through Heavy Domestic and Foreign Investment China, India, Turkey Unique Value USA, Japan, Korea “NENA Region has good Comparative Advantage in producing high value crops but needs to translate this to competitive advantage” PAM Analysis Water Productivity (Kg/m3*10) 16.00 14.00 Max WP Max Yield 12.00 10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 Land Productivity (Tons/ha)
    14. 14. Case Studies Highlighting Incentive Structure: Egypt &Iran Water Productivity: Egypt, Syria, Iran, Palestine Impact Analysis: Egypt, Oman , Kazakhstan From CA to CA:
    15. 15. Incentive Structure Iran: Wheat Policy Brief Irrigated wheat is competitive and carries reasonable comparative advantage Rain-fed wheat can be competitive if yields are increased and cost are reduced At national level, incentive policy almost neutral, carries comparative and competitive advantage, the present support is not inconsistent with overall policy environment Nominal Protection coefficient (slight tax) = .81 Effective Protection coefficient ( neutral) = .98 Domestic Resource Cost ( as < 1) carries CA= .65
    16. 16. Egypt: Competiveness Ranking by Profitability LE/feddan Cotton Ranking by Cost/Benefits Ration 1786 Cotton 2.20 Long Berseem 1605 Wheat 1.85 Sugarcane 1482 Maize 1.48 Rice 1227 Long Berseem 1.48 Wheat 924 Boad Beans 1.46 Short Berseem 712 Short Berseem 1.11 Boad Beans 583 Rice 0.99 Maize 543 Sorghum 0.99 Sorghum 311 Sugarcane 0.95
    17. 17. Comparison of water productivity for different commodities- Livestock products carries the lowest 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Beef Lentils Wheat Olives Tomato Water productivities are much higher in vegetable compared to fruits and very low in livestock products.
    18. 18. Syria Drip Irrigation shows higher water productivity than Sprinkler, and Small farmers are obtaining much higher productivity Water Productivity, farm size and technology: Net Margin m3 40 35 30 traditional sprinklers LF-well 100 LF-well 200 drip 25 20 15 10 5 0 LF-river MF- river MF- well 100 SF- river SF- well 50
    19. 19. NENA region’s water productivities are higher than global average and water productivity is much higher in horticulture than cereals Horticulture crops in Palestine ($/m3) Gaza Jordan Valley Oman Yemen 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00
    20. 20. Case of Palestine Saving (values) of water determines the rate of return on investments, in Jericho (low water values), it takes 8.46 years as pay back time ,where as in high water values area (Jenin ) only 2.80 years Scaling up --- farmers may well be aware of technological options, but do not invest in unless pushed by cost incentives (rising water prices ) or pulled by profitable market opportunities.
    21. 21. Iran Water Productivity - how we value revenues (the nominator in the equation), at the gross or at the gross margins or at the net profits ($/M3) Gross Revenue Wheat Barley Maize Chickpeas Sunflower Cotton Sugar beet Onion Potato Spring soyben Paddy LG/HQ Paddy LG/HY Paddy short grain 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 Gross Margin Net Profit 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 Or water productivity varies depending how we budget water use (the denominator in the equation), the applied water or consumed water Water applied (WPirrig) Water Productivity Kg/m3 Evapotranspiration (WPET) Water Productivity Kg/m3 8.9 0.5 7.5 0.325 0.175 1.25 Wheat Maize Rice Sorgum 1.75 0.8 Maize Rice Sorgum Potato
    22. 22. Output Total 0 5 14 21 26 30 33 35 36 36 35 Water AP=O/W MP=dO/dw E=MP/AP Average Product Marginal Product Elasticty 0 0 5 5 1.00 7 9 1.29 7 7 1.00 6.5 5 0.77 6 4 0.67 5.5 3 0.55 5 2 0.40 4.5 1 0.22 4 0 0.00 3.5 -1 -0.29 Output Total Rvenvues Total Cost Net Rvenues Water Production Fuction Stages Irrational Irrational Irrational Irrational Rational Rational Rational Rational Rational Rational Irrational Marginal Product 40 Value of Output Water Input 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 30 20 10 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 -10 Water Input Total Mar Val Prod Average Product Change in Change In Cost Output W O O*Po C=W*Pw NR=TR-TC MP=dO/dw MVP= MP*Po dC=(E8-E7)….. dO=(C8-C7)… 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 10 5 5 5 10 2 14 28 10 18 9 3 21 42 15 27 4 26 52 20 5 30 60 6 33 7 Marginal Product MC MR dC/dO dTR/dO 0 0.00 0 5 5 1.00 2 18 5 9 0.56 2 7 14 5 7 0.71 2 32 5 10 5 5 1.00 2 25 35 4 8 5 4 1.25 2 66 30 36 3 6 5 3 1.67 2 35 70 35 35 2 4 5 2 2.50 2 8 36 72 40 32 1 2 5 1 5.00 2 9 36 72 45 27 0 0 5 0 0.00 2 10 35 70 50 20 -1 -2 5 -1 -5.00 2
    23. 23. Policy Impact Analysis
    24. 24. FAO/RNE POLICY ANALYSIS CASES/ BREIFS Egypt Palestine Saving (values) of water determines the rate of return on investments, in Jericho (low water values), it takes 8.46 years as pay back time ,where as in high water values area (Jenin ) only 2.80 years Palestine: Water Values and investment payback period Jericho Egypt- Sugarcane Policy Change- Investing modern technology Before After Water Use (cubic meters fedan) 12000 9500 Yield (tons/fedan) 46.73 56.07 Cost of Improvement (Le /Fed) 0 194 Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalgilya Impact of Policy Profitabilty (Le/Fed) 1482 2129 Domestic Resource Cost 1.07 0.81 0 Ahmad-Kieth (2002) Sugarcane: Better Irrigation Practices >>> Water Saving >>> Enhanced Profitability and now carries comparative advantage (DRC< 1) 2 4 6 Years 8 10
    25. 25. Case of Egypt: Rent decontrol a major land policy shift 1000 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 800 600 400 200 0 1 Rent Base R e nt 2 Rent/Le/Feddan Profitabilty/Le/Fed Impact of Rent Decontrol on Wheat 3 4 Private Profitability R ice Base N e w R e nt N e w R e nt N e w P ro fita b ility 5 0 0 700 R e nt 9 0 0 2 6 9 .5 1 1 2 6 2 .2 2 1 0 3 1 .7 3 8 3 1 .7 3 6 3 1 .7 3 M a ize 2 2 3 .2 1 461 184 -1 6 -2 1 6 C o tto n 4 2 5 .2 2 1656 1581 1381 1181 W he at 3 0 5 .4 5 626 431 231 31 S u g a rca n e 6 3 2 .3 0 1473 1606 1406 1206
    26. 26. Impact of Energy Cost on Efficiency of Resource Use: of Al-Batinah region of Oman Case Orange Mango Lem on Very high sensitive crops for changes in electricity price Banana Potato Onion Date (A) Water Melon Date (M) Peper Peper (PGH) Rhodes Grass Energy, water and food security nexus Is becoming critical in energy deficit countries and the environmental cost of cheap energy is Evident in many countries Squash Cucum ber Cucum ber (PGH) Capsicum Quite low sensitive crops for changes in electricity price Date (H) Pum pkin Chicko Eggplant Cabbage Shift from low income, high water use
    27. 27. Kazakhstan: Rice policy cost to the nation (tax payers) was very high and leading to environmental disaster (Aral Sea) Water 11% 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 4,50 Seed 18% Chemicals Land rent 3% 2% 4,00 3,50 3,00 2,50 2,00 1,50 Ton per Ha Thousands Rice: Area, Production and Yield Fertiliers 5% Hired labor 7% 1,00 0,50 0,00 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Years Production (M Mt) Area Harv (M Ha) Yield (Tons/Ha) Rice: Cost Structure Traded 66 and Non Traded 34% Machinery 54% Average Private Profitability Policy Indicators Rice Small Rice Medium Rice Large Crops Yield (c/ha) 32.36 27.52 33.57 Potatoes 55763,9 Grapes 47270,5 0.80 1.29 Apples 18659,9 Cotton 18463,6 Sunflower 16230,9 Sugar beet 9821,9 Private Returns Water KZT/cm to Private Profits (KTZ/ha) 1.16 6415 8953 12080 Rice DRC -4.38 2.71 3.36 SoyaBean Wheat KZT/ha 9149,82 4972,5 4069,35

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