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Avoiding Piracy in DOCSIS
Networks
                     April 29th, 2010

Patricio S. Latini
Director, Sales Engineering
Caribbean and Latin America
Agenda


▪ DOCSIS Provisioning
▪ Piracy Attacks and Solutions
▪ CPE Related Security
DOCSIS Provisioning
DOCSIS Provisioning

▪ Standards Based
  - DHCP, ToD, TFTP


▪ Distributed Architecture
  - DHCP Server has all the customer data
  - CMTS and CMs just policy enforcers
  - CMs are untrusted elements
DOCSIS Piracy

▪ Mostly Based on Hacked Firmware of
  Cablemodems.
▪ Need to be mitigated by a battery of counter
  measures.
  - Network Based
  - CMTS Based
  - Provisioning System Based
DOCSIS Piracy
DOCSIS Piracy
DOCSIS Piracy
Speed Uncapping

▪ Removing the Speed Caps (Limits) by either
  changing them for higher ones or completely
  removing them.
▪ Done by changing the legit configuration file
  used by the Cable Modem with a different one.
▪ Can use a file on a Local PC or in the TFTP
  servers in the Network.
DOCSIS Piracy
Speed Uncapping

▪ Case I – No Shared Secret implemented

 Worst case, the hacker can create a Config file
 with any speed limit (or no limit), put it in his PC
 and instruct the hacked modem to ignore the
 parameters received by DHCP and download a
 file from the Local PC.
DOCSIS Provisioning
DHCP Process

                                          CMTS is a
                                         DHCP Relay
  DHCP Server
  DHCP Server       DHCP Offer                             DHCP Offer
                                           Agent
                    Src: 10.0.0.1                     Src: C4:C4:C4:C4:C4:C4
         10.0.0.1   Dst: 10.0.0.254                   Dst: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF

                    TFTP S: 10.0.0.2
                    TFTP F: silver.bin                                             Cablemodem
  TFTP Server
  TFTP Server                                                HFC               MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
                                                           Network
         10.0.0.2

                          10.0.0.254                  172.16.0.1
   ToD Server
   ToD Server
                                      CMTS
         10.0.0.3

  Provisioning
     System
DOCSIS Provisioning
Hacked TFTP Process
                                                           Hacked Cablemodem
                                                           MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
                                                               IP: 172.16.0.10



  DHCP Server
  DHCP Server                           Src: 192.168.100.1
                                        Dst: 192.168.100.10
         10.0.0.1                       FILE: hacked.bin



  TFTP Server
  TFTP Server                           HFC




                                                                        TFTP - Request
                                                                      TFTP - Response
                                      Network
         10.0.0.2

                    10.0.0.254   172.16.0.1
   ToD Server
   ToD Server
                          CMTS
         10.0.0.3                   Src: 192.168.100.10

  Provisioning                      Dst: 192.168.100.1
                                    FILE: hacked.bin

     System
DOCSIS Piracy
Speed Uncapping

▪ Case II –
  Shared Secret implemented
  No Network Security

 In this case, the hacker cannot create a custom
 config file because it will fail Shared Secret
 verification. However it can get valid files with
 higher speeds from the MSO TFTP Server and
 put them in their own PC.
DOCSIS Provisioning
Hacked TFTP Process
                                                                                      Cablemodem
                                                                                MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
                                                                                      IP: 172.16.0.10


                    Src: 10.0.0.2
  DHCP Server
  DHCP Server       Dst: 200.0.0.10
                    FILE: gold.bin
         10.0.0.1


  TFTP Server
  TFTP Server                                                         HFC
                                                                    Network
         10.0.0.2
                                         TF
                                           TF
                                            PT-
                                               P -e
                                                R
                         10.0.0.254                se
                                                   Rpo
                                                      qu s
                                                               172.16.0.1     Src: 200.0.0.10
                                                       ne
   ToD Server
   ToD Server                                             e
                                                          st
                                                               200.0.0.1
                                                                              Dst: 10.0.0.2

                                      CMTS                                    FILE: gold.bin

         10.0.0.3

  Provisioning
     System
DOCSIS Provisioning
DHCP Process

                                          CMTS is a
                                         DHCP Relay
  DHCP Server
  DHCP Server       DHCP Offer                             DHCP Offer
                                           Agent
                    Src: 10.0.0.1                     Src: C4:C4:C4:C4:C4:C4
         10.0.0.1   Dst: 10.0.0.254                   Dst: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF

                    TFTP S: 10.0.0.2
                    TFTP F: silver.bin                                             Cablemodem
  TFTP Server
  TFTP Server                                                HFC               MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
                                                           Network
         10.0.0.2

                          10.0.0.254                  172.16.0.1
   ToD Server
   ToD Server
                                      CMTS
         10.0.0.3

  Provisioning
     System
DOCSIS Provisioning
Hacked TFTP Process
                                                              Cablemodem
                                                          MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
                                                              IP: 172.16.0.10



  DHCP Server
  DHCP Server                           Src: 192.168.100.1
                                        Dst: 192.168.100.10
         10.0.0.1                       FILE: gold.bin



  TFTP Server
  TFTP Server                           HFC




                                                                       TFTP - Request
                                                                     TFTP - Response
                                      Network
         10.0.0.2

                    10.0.0.254   172.16.0.1
   ToD Server
   ToD Server
                          CMTS
         10.0.0.3                   Src: 192.168.100.10

  Provisioning                      Dst: 192.168.100.1
                                    FILE: gold.bin

     System
DOCSIS Piracy
DHCP Broadcast and Unicast
▪ If a modem makes a DHCP discover with the
  Broadcast flag enabled, the Offer is sent to the
  Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) in the Downstream.
▪ All the broadcast traffic received by a modem is
  copied to the ethernet port.
▪ Anybody with a packet sniffer and get Modem
  MAC Addresses and config file names in the local
  downstream!!!.
▪ When the modem sends a Discover with the
  broadcast flag in 0 the Offer will be sent only to
  the modem MAC Address and will not be copied
  in other modems ethernet port.
DOCSIS Piracy
Speed Uncapping - Protection

DOCSIS Provided
▪ Implement Shared Secret MIC!
▪ Use a Strong Secret - 30 Chars+ and Special
  Characters.
▪ Allow TFTP Files Downloads only from
  Cablemodem IP Networks (172.16.0.0) and block
  from CPE network and others (Use Filters in CMTS
  and routers, not CMs they are untrusted).
▪ Request CM Vendors firmware supporting DHCP
  requests using Broadcast Flag disabled.
CMTS Provided
▪ Implement TFTP Enforce (TFTP Proxy)
▪ Use Dynamic Shared Secret
DOCSIS Piracy
Speed Uncapping – TFTP Enforce

▪ During the DHCP Exchange, the CMTS
  replaces the TFTP Server address and name
  with its own address and stores that information
  in a table.
▪ When the modem sends the TFTP File request,
  the CMTS Proxies it and gets the file from the
  TFTP Server.
▪ By doing that it ensures that the legit file is
  downloaded from the proper server.
DOCSIS Provisioning
TFTP Enforce - DHCP Process


  DHCP Server
  DHCP Server       DHCP Offer                                    DHCP Offer
                                                             Yiaddr:172.16.0.10
                    Src: 10.0.0.1
         10.0.0.1                                            TFTP S: 172.16.0.1
                    Dst: 10.0.0.254                          TFTP F: silver.bin
                    Yiaddr:172.16.0.10
                                                                                      Cablemodem
  TFTP Server
  TFTP Server       TFTP S: 10.0.0.2
                    TFTP F: silver.bin
                                                                    HFC           MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
                                                                  Network
         10.0.0.2

                          10.0.0.254                       172.16.0.1
   ToD Server
   ToD Server
                                      CMTS
         10.0.0.3
                                         CMTS TFTP Client Table
  Provisioning                           CM            TFTP S     TFTP File
     System                              172.16.0.11   10.0.0.2   gold.bin
                                         172.16.0.10   10.0.0.2   silver.bin
DOCSIS Provisioning
TFTP Enforce - TFTP Process
                                                                                Src: 172.16.0.10
                           Src: 172.16.0.1
                              Src: 10.0.0.2                             Src: 172.16.0.1
                                                                               Dst: 172.16.0.1
                           Dst: 10.0.0.2
                              Dst: 172.16.0.1                           Dst: 172.16.0.10
                                                                               FILE: silver.bin
                           FILE: silver.bin
                              FILE: silver.bin                          FILE: silver.bin

  DHCP Server
  DHCP Server
                    TFTP - Response
                      TFTP - Request                                 TFTP - Response
                                                                       TFTP - Request
         10.0.0.1

                                                                                                   Cablemodem
  TFTP Server
  TFTP Server                                                           HFC                 MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
                                                                      Network                      IP: 172.16.0.10
         10.0.0.2

                           10.0.0.254                         172.16.0.1
   ToD Server
   ToD Server
                                     CMTS
         10.0.0.3
                                            CMTS TFTP Client Table
  Provisioning                              CM            TFTP S       TFTP File
     System                                 172.16.0.11   10.0.0.2     gold.bin
                                            172.16.0.10   10.0.0.2     silver.bin
DOCSIS Piracy
Speed Uncapping – Dynamic Secret

▪ This feature goes one step further than TFTP
  enforce, the CMTS instead of just doing a proxy
  of the file, it disassembles the file and
  recalculates the MIC with a per session shared
  secret and reassemble the file.
▪ After the modem gets the file and sends the
  Registration Request, the MICs must match.
▪ This is much more secure as an individual
  secret is used for each file download.
DOCSIS Provisioning
Dynamic Shared Secret
                                                                                Src: 172.16.0.10
                           Src: 172.16.0.1
                              Src: 10.0.0.2                             Src: 172.16.0.1
                                                                               Dst: 172.16.0.1
                           Dst: 10.0.0.2
                              Dst: 172.16.0.1                           Dst: 172.16.0.10
                                                                               FILE: silver.bin
                           FILE: silver.bin
                              FILE: silver.bin                          FILE: silver.bin

  DHCP Server
  DHCP Server
                    TFTP - Response
                      TFTP - Request                                 TFTP - Response
                                                                       TFTP - Request
         10.0.0.1

                                                                                                   Cablemodem
  TFTP Server
  TFTP Server                                                           HFC                  MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
                                                                      Network                      IP: 172.16.0.10
         10.0.0.2

                           10.0.0.254                         172.16.0.1
   ToD Server
   ToD Server
                                     CMTS
         10.0.0.3
                                            CMTS TFTP Client Table
  Provisioning                              CM            TFTP S       TFTP File Dynamic MIC
     System                                 172.16.0.11   10.0.0.2     gold.bin            0x12dce5f5430
                                            172.16.0.10   10.0.0.2     silver.bin 0x524c45f5879
DOCSIS Provisioning
Dynamic Shared Secret
                                    Registration ACK            Service Flows
                                                                Classifiers
                                                                MAC CPE
                                                                MD5 CMTS MIC=

  DHCP Server
  DHCP Server                                                   0x524c45f5879

                                                          REG - Response
                                                            REG - Request
         10.0.0.1

                                                                                     Cablemodem
  TFTP Server
  TFTP Server                                                 HFC                MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
                                                            Network                  IP: 172.16.0.10
         10.0.0.2

                    10.0.0.254                         172.16.0.1
   ToD Server
   ToD Server
                            CMTS
         10.0.0.3
                       CMTS TFTP Client Table
  Provisioning         CM           TFTP S       TFTP File Dynamic MIC
     System            00:00:DE:AD:00:00     10.0.0.2       gold.bin          0x12dce5f5430
                       00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF      10.0.0.2       silver.bin       0x524c45f5879
DOCSIS Piracy
Cablemodem MAC Cloning

▪ A Cable Modem identifies to the Network by its
  MAC Address
▪ Cloning the MAC Address of a Modem allows
  an un-provisioned modem to get the Service of
  a provisioned modem.
▪ This is much more dangerous because a
  Hacker behind a cloned modem can do illegal
  activities and be untraceable.
▪ Hacked Firmware allows to change the MAC
  address of a compromised modem to any value
DOCSIS Piracy
Cablemodem MAC Cloning

▪ DOCSIS 1.1 Specified BPI Plus as a method to
  authenticate a Cable Modem
▪ All Modems DOCSIS 1.1 and over, have an
  embedded certificate that is Signed by the
  Manufacturer and Cablelabs
▪ When BPI+ is enabled the modem must send
  the Certificate to the CMTS and it validates the
  signature with its own database. If it fails the
  CMTS can deny the service.
DOCSIS Piracy
MAC Cloning - Recommendations
▪ BPI+ is enabled in the Configuration File, all the
  previous protection measures should be
  implemented in order to ensure that the file is not
  modified and BPI+ is disabled.
▪ It is recommended to remove all DOCSIS 1.0
  modems from the network and only having
  DOCSIS 1.1 Modems, by doing so all DOCSIS
  1.0 Config files can be deleted from the TFTP
  Server.
▪ Ensure all the modems send the DHCP broadcast
  flag in 0 in order to ensure that that their offers
  are not sent on the broadcast.
DOCSIS Piracy
MAC Cloning – BPI+ Mandatory

▪ Hacked firmware also supports changing the
  advertised supported DOCSIS Version in order
  to cheat the provisioning.
▪ Some CMTSs support BPI+ mandatory, that
  means that if a modem tries to register without
  BPI+ is rejected.
▪ All modems and config files need to be DOCSIS
  1.1 enabled.
DOCSIS Piracy
MAC Cloning – Other Cases
▪ Some modems vendor are vulnerable to full Flash
  copy (MAC and Certificates)
▪ This Creates a full Clone
▪ High Tech Equipment and physical access is
  required for that.
▪ BPI+ cannot do much about that.
▪ Some CMTSs support manual deny lists in order to
  block that modems to pass from Ranging stage.
▪ Your provisioning system could have detection
  algorithms in order to detect the same MAC coming
  from different CMTS/Upstream Ports
CPE Related Security
Customer Security

CMTS
▪ Packet Filters
▪ Source Verify (Source Address Verification)
▪ DHCP Option 82.1 and 82.2 relaying
▪ Protocol Throttling (DHCP and ARP)
DHCP Server
▪ CPE Lease Logging
Customer Security
Source Verify

▪ CMTS snoops all CPE DHCP offers and
  creates a list of CPE MAC/IP and CM Table
▪ When a CPE sends and ARP Request, the
  CMTS Looks for in the table for an existing
  entry, if there is not matching entry, the ARP
  is discarded.
▪ This allows to avoid ARP Poisoning.
▪ Also allows a tight control to be sure that all
  the IP addresses being used by CPEs were
  assigned and logged by the DHCP Server.
DOCSIS Provisioning
Source Verify
                                                                         Src: 00:11:22:33:44:55
                         Src: 10.0.0.254
                           Src: 10.0.0.1                                 Dst: FF:FF:FF:FF.FF:FF
                                                                  Src: C4:C4:C4:C4:C4:C4
                         Dst: 10.0.0.1
                           Dst: 10.0.0.254                        Dst: 00:11:22:33:44:55
                         Giaddr:200.0.0.1
                           chaddr: 00:11:22:33:44:55              yiaddr: 200.0.0.10
                           yiaddr: 200.0.0.10
  DHCP Server
  DHCP Server
                    DHCP --Discover
                    DHCP Offer                                 DHCP --Discover
                                                               DHCP Offer
         10.0.0.1


  TFTP Server
  TFTP Server                                                    HFC
                                                               Network
         10.0.0.2
                                                                                           Cablemodem
                         10.0.0.254                       172.16.0.1                   MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
   ToD Server
   ToD Server                                              200.0.0.1                       IP: 172.16.0.10

                                  CMTS
         10.0.0.3
                                        CMTS MACDB Client Table
  Provisioning                          CPE MAC          CPE IP              CM MAC
     System                             00:11:22:33:44:55 200.0.0.10          00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
DOCSIS Provisioning
Source Verify
                                                               Who has : 200.0.0.1
                                                              Src: 00:11:22:33:44:55
                                                       Src: C4:C4:C4:C4:C4:C4
                                                               Dst: 00:00:00:00:00:00
                                                       Dst: 00:11:22:33:44:55
                                                       tell: 200.0.0.1

  DHCP Server
  DHCP Server
                                                       ARP REP
                                                        ARP REQ
         10.0.0.1


  TFTP Server
  TFTP Server                                            HFC
                                                       Network
         10.0.0.2
                                                                               Cablemodem
                    10.0.0.254                   172.16.0.1               MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
   ToD Server
   ToD Server                                    200.0.0.1                     IP: 172.16.0.10

                          CMTS
         10.0.0.3
                             CMTS MACDB Client Table
  Provisioning               CPE MAC          CPE IP            CM MAC
     System                  00:11:22:33:44:55 200.0.0.10       00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
Customer Security
CMTS Option 82.1 and 82.2 Relay

▪ The CMTS can add to either CM or CPE
  DHCP Discover packets the option 82.
▪ Option 82.1 specifies the Upstream Port name
  from where the request came.
▪ Option 82.2 specifies the MAC Address of the
  Cablemodem from where that Discover came.
▪ For CPEs is Very useful to know to which
  Cablemodem (MAC) that Device is connected
  in order to take provisioning actions, or just for
  keeping a log.
DOCSIS Provisioning
Option 82 Relay
                                                                    Src: 00:11:22:33:44:55
                         Src: 10.0.0.254
                         Dst: 10.0.0.1                              Dst: FF:FF:FF:FF.FF:FF
                         Giaddr: 200.0.0.1
                         hwaddr: 00:11:22:33:44:55
                         Opt 82.1:Upstream 1
                         Opt 82.2 :00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
  DHCP Server
  DHCP Server
                    DHCP - Discover                        DHCP - Discover
         10.0.0.1


  TFTP Server
  TFTP Server                                                 HFC
                                                            Network
         10.0.0.2
                                                                                    Cablemodem
                         10.0.0.254                    172.16.0.1              MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
   ToD Server
   ToD Server                                          200.0.0.1                    IP: 172.16.0.10

                                  CMTS
         10.0.0.3

  Provisioning
     System
Customer Security
Protocol Throttling
▪ ARP and DHCP are protocols that are necessary
  for system operation and cannot be completely
  filtered.
▪ Hackers can take advantage of that and generate
  denial of service attacks.
▪ DHCP DoS can overload the DHCP Server.
▪ ARP DoS can saturate the local segment with
  ARP Traffic.
▪ CMTSs support Protocol Throttling, that means
  that they allow a certain acceptable amount of
  traffic of that protocols and drop the rest.
Questions?
Thanks!

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Expo Canitec 2010, Taller Arris

  • 1. Avoiding Piracy in DOCSIS Networks April 29th, 2010 Patricio S. Latini Director, Sales Engineering Caribbean and Latin America
  • 2. Agenda ▪ DOCSIS Provisioning ▪ Piracy Attacks and Solutions ▪ CPE Related Security
  • 4. DOCSIS Provisioning ▪ Standards Based - DHCP, ToD, TFTP ▪ Distributed Architecture - DHCP Server has all the customer data - CMTS and CMs just policy enforcers - CMs are untrusted elements
  • 5. DOCSIS Piracy ▪ Mostly Based on Hacked Firmware of Cablemodems. ▪ Need to be mitigated by a battery of counter measures. - Network Based - CMTS Based - Provisioning System Based
  • 8. DOCSIS Piracy Speed Uncapping ▪ Removing the Speed Caps (Limits) by either changing them for higher ones or completely removing them. ▪ Done by changing the legit configuration file used by the Cable Modem with a different one. ▪ Can use a file on a Local PC or in the TFTP servers in the Network.
  • 9. DOCSIS Piracy Speed Uncapping ▪ Case I – No Shared Secret implemented Worst case, the hacker can create a Config file with any speed limit (or no limit), put it in his PC and instruct the hacked modem to ignore the parameters received by DHCP and download a file from the Local PC.
  • 10. DOCSIS Provisioning DHCP Process CMTS is a DHCP Relay DHCP Server DHCP Server DHCP Offer DHCP Offer Agent Src: 10.0.0.1 Src: C4:C4:C4:C4:C4:C4 10.0.0.1 Dst: 10.0.0.254 Dst: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF TFTP S: 10.0.0.2 TFTP F: silver.bin Cablemodem TFTP Server TFTP Server HFC MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF Network 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.254 172.16.0.1 ToD Server ToD Server CMTS 10.0.0.3 Provisioning System
  • 11. DOCSIS Provisioning Hacked TFTP Process Hacked Cablemodem MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF IP: 172.16.0.10 DHCP Server DHCP Server Src: 192.168.100.1 Dst: 192.168.100.10 10.0.0.1 FILE: hacked.bin TFTP Server TFTP Server HFC TFTP - Request TFTP - Response Network 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.254 172.16.0.1 ToD Server ToD Server CMTS 10.0.0.3 Src: 192.168.100.10 Provisioning Dst: 192.168.100.1 FILE: hacked.bin System
  • 12. DOCSIS Piracy Speed Uncapping ▪ Case II – Shared Secret implemented No Network Security In this case, the hacker cannot create a custom config file because it will fail Shared Secret verification. However it can get valid files with higher speeds from the MSO TFTP Server and put them in their own PC.
  • 13. DOCSIS Provisioning Hacked TFTP Process Cablemodem MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF IP: 172.16.0.10 Src: 10.0.0.2 DHCP Server DHCP Server Dst: 200.0.0.10 FILE: gold.bin 10.0.0.1 TFTP Server TFTP Server HFC Network 10.0.0.2 TF TF PT- P -e R 10.0.0.254 se Rpo qu s 172.16.0.1 Src: 200.0.0.10 ne ToD Server ToD Server e st 200.0.0.1 Dst: 10.0.0.2 CMTS FILE: gold.bin 10.0.0.3 Provisioning System
  • 14. DOCSIS Provisioning DHCP Process CMTS is a DHCP Relay DHCP Server DHCP Server DHCP Offer DHCP Offer Agent Src: 10.0.0.1 Src: C4:C4:C4:C4:C4:C4 10.0.0.1 Dst: 10.0.0.254 Dst: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF TFTP S: 10.0.0.2 TFTP F: silver.bin Cablemodem TFTP Server TFTP Server HFC MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF Network 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.254 172.16.0.1 ToD Server ToD Server CMTS 10.0.0.3 Provisioning System
  • 15. DOCSIS Provisioning Hacked TFTP Process Cablemodem MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF IP: 172.16.0.10 DHCP Server DHCP Server Src: 192.168.100.1 Dst: 192.168.100.10 10.0.0.1 FILE: gold.bin TFTP Server TFTP Server HFC TFTP - Request TFTP - Response Network 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.254 172.16.0.1 ToD Server ToD Server CMTS 10.0.0.3 Src: 192.168.100.10 Provisioning Dst: 192.168.100.1 FILE: gold.bin System
  • 16. DOCSIS Piracy DHCP Broadcast and Unicast ▪ If a modem makes a DHCP discover with the Broadcast flag enabled, the Offer is sent to the Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) in the Downstream. ▪ All the broadcast traffic received by a modem is copied to the ethernet port. ▪ Anybody with a packet sniffer and get Modem MAC Addresses and config file names in the local downstream!!!. ▪ When the modem sends a Discover with the broadcast flag in 0 the Offer will be sent only to the modem MAC Address and will not be copied in other modems ethernet port.
  • 17. DOCSIS Piracy Speed Uncapping - Protection DOCSIS Provided ▪ Implement Shared Secret MIC! ▪ Use a Strong Secret - 30 Chars+ and Special Characters. ▪ Allow TFTP Files Downloads only from Cablemodem IP Networks (172.16.0.0) and block from CPE network and others (Use Filters in CMTS and routers, not CMs they are untrusted). ▪ Request CM Vendors firmware supporting DHCP requests using Broadcast Flag disabled. CMTS Provided ▪ Implement TFTP Enforce (TFTP Proxy) ▪ Use Dynamic Shared Secret
  • 18. DOCSIS Piracy Speed Uncapping – TFTP Enforce ▪ During the DHCP Exchange, the CMTS replaces the TFTP Server address and name with its own address and stores that information in a table. ▪ When the modem sends the TFTP File request, the CMTS Proxies it and gets the file from the TFTP Server. ▪ By doing that it ensures that the legit file is downloaded from the proper server.
  • 19. DOCSIS Provisioning TFTP Enforce - DHCP Process DHCP Server DHCP Server DHCP Offer DHCP Offer Yiaddr:172.16.0.10 Src: 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.1 TFTP S: 172.16.0.1 Dst: 10.0.0.254 TFTP F: silver.bin Yiaddr:172.16.0.10 Cablemodem TFTP Server TFTP Server TFTP S: 10.0.0.2 TFTP F: silver.bin HFC MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF Network 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.254 172.16.0.1 ToD Server ToD Server CMTS 10.0.0.3 CMTS TFTP Client Table Provisioning CM TFTP S TFTP File System 172.16.0.11 10.0.0.2 gold.bin 172.16.0.10 10.0.0.2 silver.bin
  • 20. DOCSIS Provisioning TFTP Enforce - TFTP Process Src: 172.16.0.10 Src: 172.16.0.1 Src: 10.0.0.2 Src: 172.16.0.1 Dst: 172.16.0.1 Dst: 10.0.0.2 Dst: 172.16.0.1 Dst: 172.16.0.10 FILE: silver.bin FILE: silver.bin FILE: silver.bin FILE: silver.bin DHCP Server DHCP Server TFTP - Response TFTP - Request TFTP - Response TFTP - Request 10.0.0.1 Cablemodem TFTP Server TFTP Server HFC MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF Network IP: 172.16.0.10 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.254 172.16.0.1 ToD Server ToD Server CMTS 10.0.0.3 CMTS TFTP Client Table Provisioning CM TFTP S TFTP File System 172.16.0.11 10.0.0.2 gold.bin 172.16.0.10 10.0.0.2 silver.bin
  • 21. DOCSIS Piracy Speed Uncapping – Dynamic Secret ▪ This feature goes one step further than TFTP enforce, the CMTS instead of just doing a proxy of the file, it disassembles the file and recalculates the MIC with a per session shared secret and reassemble the file. ▪ After the modem gets the file and sends the Registration Request, the MICs must match. ▪ This is much more secure as an individual secret is used for each file download.
  • 22. DOCSIS Provisioning Dynamic Shared Secret Src: 172.16.0.10 Src: 172.16.0.1 Src: 10.0.0.2 Src: 172.16.0.1 Dst: 172.16.0.1 Dst: 10.0.0.2 Dst: 172.16.0.1 Dst: 172.16.0.10 FILE: silver.bin FILE: silver.bin FILE: silver.bin FILE: silver.bin DHCP Server DHCP Server TFTP - Response TFTP - Request TFTP - Response TFTP - Request 10.0.0.1 Cablemodem TFTP Server TFTP Server HFC MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF Network IP: 172.16.0.10 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.254 172.16.0.1 ToD Server ToD Server CMTS 10.0.0.3 CMTS TFTP Client Table Provisioning CM TFTP S TFTP File Dynamic MIC System 172.16.0.11 10.0.0.2 gold.bin 0x12dce5f5430 172.16.0.10 10.0.0.2 silver.bin 0x524c45f5879
  • 23. DOCSIS Provisioning Dynamic Shared Secret Registration ACK Service Flows Classifiers MAC CPE MD5 CMTS MIC= DHCP Server DHCP Server 0x524c45f5879 REG - Response REG - Request 10.0.0.1 Cablemodem TFTP Server TFTP Server HFC MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF Network IP: 172.16.0.10 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.254 172.16.0.1 ToD Server ToD Server CMTS 10.0.0.3 CMTS TFTP Client Table Provisioning CM TFTP S TFTP File Dynamic MIC System 00:00:DE:AD:00:00 10.0.0.2 gold.bin 0x12dce5f5430 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF 10.0.0.2 silver.bin 0x524c45f5879
  • 24. DOCSIS Piracy Cablemodem MAC Cloning ▪ A Cable Modem identifies to the Network by its MAC Address ▪ Cloning the MAC Address of a Modem allows an un-provisioned modem to get the Service of a provisioned modem. ▪ This is much more dangerous because a Hacker behind a cloned modem can do illegal activities and be untraceable. ▪ Hacked Firmware allows to change the MAC address of a compromised modem to any value
  • 25. DOCSIS Piracy Cablemodem MAC Cloning ▪ DOCSIS 1.1 Specified BPI Plus as a method to authenticate a Cable Modem ▪ All Modems DOCSIS 1.1 and over, have an embedded certificate that is Signed by the Manufacturer and Cablelabs ▪ When BPI+ is enabled the modem must send the Certificate to the CMTS and it validates the signature with its own database. If it fails the CMTS can deny the service.
  • 26. DOCSIS Piracy MAC Cloning - Recommendations ▪ BPI+ is enabled in the Configuration File, all the previous protection measures should be implemented in order to ensure that the file is not modified and BPI+ is disabled. ▪ It is recommended to remove all DOCSIS 1.0 modems from the network and only having DOCSIS 1.1 Modems, by doing so all DOCSIS 1.0 Config files can be deleted from the TFTP Server. ▪ Ensure all the modems send the DHCP broadcast flag in 0 in order to ensure that that their offers are not sent on the broadcast.
  • 27. DOCSIS Piracy MAC Cloning – BPI+ Mandatory ▪ Hacked firmware also supports changing the advertised supported DOCSIS Version in order to cheat the provisioning. ▪ Some CMTSs support BPI+ mandatory, that means that if a modem tries to register without BPI+ is rejected. ▪ All modems and config files need to be DOCSIS 1.1 enabled.
  • 28. DOCSIS Piracy MAC Cloning – Other Cases ▪ Some modems vendor are vulnerable to full Flash copy (MAC and Certificates) ▪ This Creates a full Clone ▪ High Tech Equipment and physical access is required for that. ▪ BPI+ cannot do much about that. ▪ Some CMTSs support manual deny lists in order to block that modems to pass from Ranging stage. ▪ Your provisioning system could have detection algorithms in order to detect the same MAC coming from different CMTS/Upstream Ports
  • 30. Customer Security CMTS ▪ Packet Filters ▪ Source Verify (Source Address Verification) ▪ DHCP Option 82.1 and 82.2 relaying ▪ Protocol Throttling (DHCP and ARP) DHCP Server ▪ CPE Lease Logging
  • 31. Customer Security Source Verify ▪ CMTS snoops all CPE DHCP offers and creates a list of CPE MAC/IP and CM Table ▪ When a CPE sends and ARP Request, the CMTS Looks for in the table for an existing entry, if there is not matching entry, the ARP is discarded. ▪ This allows to avoid ARP Poisoning. ▪ Also allows a tight control to be sure that all the IP addresses being used by CPEs were assigned and logged by the DHCP Server.
  • 32. DOCSIS Provisioning Source Verify Src: 00:11:22:33:44:55 Src: 10.0.0.254 Src: 10.0.0.1 Dst: FF:FF:FF:FF.FF:FF Src: C4:C4:C4:C4:C4:C4 Dst: 10.0.0.1 Dst: 10.0.0.254 Dst: 00:11:22:33:44:55 Giaddr:200.0.0.1 chaddr: 00:11:22:33:44:55 yiaddr: 200.0.0.10 yiaddr: 200.0.0.10 DHCP Server DHCP Server DHCP --Discover DHCP Offer DHCP --Discover DHCP Offer 10.0.0.1 TFTP Server TFTP Server HFC Network 10.0.0.2 Cablemodem 10.0.0.254 172.16.0.1 MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF ToD Server ToD Server 200.0.0.1 IP: 172.16.0.10 CMTS 10.0.0.3 CMTS MACDB Client Table Provisioning CPE MAC CPE IP CM MAC System 00:11:22:33:44:55 200.0.0.10 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
  • 33. DOCSIS Provisioning Source Verify Who has : 200.0.0.1 Src: 00:11:22:33:44:55 Src: C4:C4:C4:C4:C4:C4 Dst: 00:00:00:00:00:00 Dst: 00:11:22:33:44:55 tell: 200.0.0.1 DHCP Server DHCP Server ARP REP ARP REQ 10.0.0.1 TFTP Server TFTP Server HFC Network 10.0.0.2 Cablemodem 10.0.0.254 172.16.0.1 MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF ToD Server ToD Server 200.0.0.1 IP: 172.16.0.10 CMTS 10.0.0.3 CMTS MACDB Client Table Provisioning CPE MAC CPE IP CM MAC System 00:11:22:33:44:55 200.0.0.10 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
  • 34. Customer Security CMTS Option 82.1 and 82.2 Relay ▪ The CMTS can add to either CM or CPE DHCP Discover packets the option 82. ▪ Option 82.1 specifies the Upstream Port name from where the request came. ▪ Option 82.2 specifies the MAC Address of the Cablemodem from where that Discover came. ▪ For CPEs is Very useful to know to which Cablemodem (MAC) that Device is connected in order to take provisioning actions, or just for keeping a log.
  • 35. DOCSIS Provisioning Option 82 Relay Src: 00:11:22:33:44:55 Src: 10.0.0.254 Dst: 10.0.0.1 Dst: FF:FF:FF:FF.FF:FF Giaddr: 200.0.0.1 hwaddr: 00:11:22:33:44:55 Opt 82.1:Upstream 1 Opt 82.2 :00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF DHCP Server DHCP Server DHCP - Discover DHCP - Discover 10.0.0.1 TFTP Server TFTP Server HFC Network 10.0.0.2 Cablemodem 10.0.0.254 172.16.0.1 MAC: 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF ToD Server ToD Server 200.0.0.1 IP: 172.16.0.10 CMTS 10.0.0.3 Provisioning System
  • 36. Customer Security Protocol Throttling ▪ ARP and DHCP are protocols that are necessary for system operation and cannot be completely filtered. ▪ Hackers can take advantage of that and generate denial of service attacks. ▪ DHCP DoS can overload the DHCP Server. ▪ ARP DoS can saturate the local segment with ARP Traffic. ▪ CMTSs support Protocol Throttling, that means that they allow a certain acceptable amount of traffic of that protocols and drop the rest.