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Master kenmare

  1. 1. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT – A PERSECTIVE ON THE CURRENT REFORM AGENDA RODNEY THOM AND SENATOR PASCHAL DONOHOE INTRODUCTION The current crisis has led to a review of the fiscal architecture of the Eurozone . This paper reviews the latest proposals for the reform of the fiscal anchor of the currency area – the Stability and Growth Pact. Through reviewing the history of the Pact it argues that centralisation and the decision to make greater use of sanctions a central feature of this new agenda is a weakness. It proposes a more decentralised choice for the SGP, with more focus on strong peer review and an acknowledgement of the financial markets as a source of sanction. This choice could see the retention of some of the current proposals, for example the retention of additional surveillance powers, but questions whether additional sanction capacity will strengthen the long term credibility of the Pact. THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is intended to maintain fiscal discipline for Eurozone members. The first SGP (1997 – 2005) required Member States to deliver budget deficits below 3% of GDP and that debt-to-GDP ratios should be at most 60% or declining towards this reference level. Breaching these targets would trigger the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) that would ultimately result in the fining of a Member State. The current SGP (amended by reforms in 2005) allowed exception to these fiscal rules based on economic conditions. It also allows the consideration of other factors such as investment programmes, R&D expenditure and pension reform in the assessment of deficit levels. KEY FEATURES OF THE OPERATION OF THE SGP This paper does not propose to review the entire history of the SGP. This section will emphasise key points in relation to the historical operation that are relevant for assessing the current reform proposals. An ineffective sanction mechanism. No Member State was ever sanctioned for non compliance with SGP objectives. By 2003 five economies had deficits in excess of the three percent reference value with the overall deficit for the euro area rising from an almost balanced position in 2000 to 3.1 percent of GDP in 2003. As a result the Excessive Deficit Procedure was invoked against Portugal and Germany in 1
  2. 2. 2002, France in 2003, the Netherlands and Greece in 2004 and Italy in 2005. At no stage were sanctions ever triggered against Member States for the breaching of deficit targets. While all breaches of the three percent reference value are potentially damaging to fiscal consolidation, the cases of France and Germany proved to be of particular significance. When the EDP was triggered both countries were given until 2004 to take the necessary corrective actions. However by late 2003 it became clear that their deficits were continuing to rise and that neither France nor Germany would meet their targets. The Commission proposed extending the deadline to 2005 and that ECOFIN should issue notices to both countries that fines would be imposed if their deficits were not reduced. The Council rejected these proposals and although the Commission’s view was subsequently upheld by the European Court of Justice no action was taken against France and Germany and the EDPs against them were effectively put into abeyance. The cases of France and Germany over 2002-2004 pointed to obvious credibility and enforcement problems for the SGP. If the two largest euro area economies fail to comply with the rules then why should smaller countries do so? The growth of structural budget deficits. In addition to avoiding deficits in excess of 3 percent the SGP also requires each country to maintain a budget close to balance or in surplus over the medium term. While it is not precisely defined this so-called CBS (Close to Budget Surplus) rule is generally interpreted to mean that the actual budget balance should be at least zero when the economy is at potential or full employment. The importance of the CBS rule is that compliance leaves scope for automatic stabilisers and perhaps discretionary fiscal policy to operate within the 3 percent threshold value when economic activity slows or an economy moves into recession. The absence or minimisation of structural budget deficits is therefore vital for allowing Member State economies to operate within the SGP framework while maintaining the scope for discretionary fiscal measures. Low levels of structural debt or their complete absence indicates operation of the Pact. 2
  3. 3. This did not happen. Most Member State economies developed structural deficits prior to moving into recession. These structural deficits have deepened during the current crisis. The development of macroeconomic imbalances. Participation in the SGP did not prevent the development of distortions within Member State economies. Apparent budgetary health masked the development of asset bubbles or the decline of competitiveness. The fiscal records of Ireland and Spain have, until recently, been largely consistent with the requirements of the SGP with government budget balances averaging +1.6 and +0.1 percent of GDP respectively over 1999 to 2007. Also, the Irish debt to GDP ratio fell from 48 to 29 percent and the Spanish ratio from 62 to 32 percent over the same period. The evaluation of participation in exclusively budgetary terms masked the sustainability of Pact membership. Since 2007 both Ireland and Spain have experienced emerging structural deficits which have, certainly in the Irish case, resulted from a severe loss of competitiveness, inappropriate policies which narrowed the tax base and an over reliance on the property and construction sectors as sources of government revenue. This was despite membership of the Pact. CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS Reform of the SGP is seen as vital to prevent a re-occurrence of the current crisis. This reform agenda was led by the work of two different groups. The European Council appointed a Taskforce on Economic Governance led by the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy. The European Commission also set in place a separate review led by the Commissioner for Budgetary and Economic Affairs Olli Rehn. Both of these bodies have now made recommendations which are due for discussion at the October European Council meeting. These review processes were independent of each other and they do contain differing levels of detail in different areas. However the policy direction of both groups is consistent and their key conclusions are as follows: Sanctioning Member States with very high levels of debt. The key development in this area is the widening of the debt parameters that trigger action. Under the previous pact sanctions were only 3
  4. 4. applicable against governments that failed to address their budget deficits. These recommendations would trigger sanctions against both government debt levels and annual budget deficits. Recent statements by President Van Rompuy on this issue have been very specific in this area. He has stated that “For example, a country would be subject to an excessive deficit procedure even with a deficit below 3% if the debt is above 60% and the path of debt reduction considered is unsatisfactory”1. The inclusion of total debt levels marks a substantial departure in SGP policy. However it is consistent with the thinking behind previous reforms. The original pact had a very sharp focus on a 3% ceiling on annual government deficits. However this “linked fiscal discipline, an inherently long run concept, to short term outcomes [of] annual budget balances”2. The 2005 reform package emphasised cyclically adjusted budget balances and allowed more exceptions to financial rules. The current proposal now continues progress towards a more comprehensive definition of debt levels. Extending sanction measures to focus on debt prevention. Earlier proposals focussed on the ‘corrective’ arm of the SGP. The European Commission has made an additional proposal to strengthen the ‘preventative’ arm of the Pact. This is a significant development as current policy frames sanction capacity as a deterrent. This reform aims to position sanctions as an incentive to maintain fiscal discipline. Current SGP policy focuses on the use of Medium Term Objectives (MTOs) for Member State economies. These objectives are budgetary goals expressed as a percentage of GDP. Targets are adjusted for the impact of the business cycle and exclude exceptional items. This reflects recent thinking that it is preferable to express EU budgetary targets as structural objectives. Member States that are not delivering their MTO are expected to make progress towards this target with an annual rate of adjustment of 0.5% in structural budget reduction as a percentage of GDP. The Commission has acknowledged two difficulties with this approach. First, few Member States were making progress in delivering their MTO. Secondly, measurement difficulties existed in that it was difficult to determine the position of an economy in their business cycle. The assessment model also did not give enough recognition to the risk profile of an economy, such as the impact on budgetary health of the collapse of asset bubbles. 4
  5. 5. Reform proposals seek to deal with this by introducing a new concept, that of Prudent Fiscal Policy Making (PFPM). This new objective implies that public spending growth should not be faster than expected GDP growth. If a Member State breaches this requirement they will receive a warning from the Commission. If corrective action is not taken the Member State is then liable to sanction. The Commission is very clear on the aim of this proposal, it is to “ensure that revenue windfalls are not spent but are instead allocated to debt reduction”3. Pursuing member states that do not address persistently poor competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances. This element of the reform agenda introduces another new concept, that of an Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP). This acknowledges that budgetary difficulties are also a result of dislocation in the ‘real’ economy, such as job losses due to un-competitiveness or the collapse of the financial services and construction sector. EIP provides a framework for measuring these macroeconomic imbalances with particular focus on competitiveness. A scoreboard for each Member State economy has been created by the Commission. This scoreboard consists of a set of indicators that will track individual areas of economic performance. These areas could include current account and external debt indicators, the tracking of real exchange rate performance trends and private debt levels. The Commission will publish a review of individual national scorecards. If imbalances are detected a three stage process is triggered:- - If the imbalance is not deemed to be serious, no further action is taken. - If an imbalance or potential imbalance exists then the Commission will recommend preventative action to the European Council. - If a severe imbalance develops or preventative action is not taken by the Member State peer pressure review will be accelerated. The relevant Government will be obliged to produce a corrective action plan detailing a commitment to deal with the imbalance and corrective measures with target timings. The European Council may then adopt this plan or invite the Member State to improve the plan within a specific time period. 5
  6. 6. Changing the decision making process for sanction application. This broader definition is accompanied by a revision of the trigger mechanism for sanctions and development of the nature of these sanctions. The trigger mechanism is revised by changing the body that can trigger sanctions and the extending the grounds upon which penalties are levied. Previous SGP policy designated the European Council as the deciding body for the application of sanctions. This raised the obvious issue of the reluctance of Member States to fine their neighbours and to condemn behaviour that they themselves might be guilty of in the future. The fundamental reluctance is dealt with by proposing that the European Commission make this decision. In theory, the Commission is above the political or ‘short term’ concerns of Member States. The decision mechanism has also been changed by the introduction of ‘reverse voting’. This means that the Commission would propose a sanction to ECOFIN. This proposal must be accepted unless a qualified majority is assembled to oppose it. The default option is now the most likely outcome given the likely difficulty of assembling a qualified majority. This has been termed ‘semi-automaticity’. Further Development of Sanction Mechanisms. The key feature of sanction measures in previous SGPs was that they were never used. The change in decision making procedures will make it more likely that they will be used but also introduce two different forms of sanctions. - Sanctions for not addressing macroeconomic imbalances. If a Member State fails to address EIP issues it will face sanctions. This fine will be an amount of 0.1% of their GDP in the previous year. The Commission states that “The yearly fine will give euro-area Member States the necessary incentive to address the recommendations to draw up a sufficient corrective action plan even after the first fine has been paid”4. Sanctions are clearly intended to provide an incentive to deal with non budgetary economic difficulties within Member State economies. - The introduction of sanctions for not addressing excessive public debt issues. If a Member State does not reduce debt levels they are required to pay a non interest bearing deposit of 0.2% of GDP. If the Commission deems that the relevant Government does not implement an appropriate action plan this deposit is then transformed into a fine. 6
  7. 7. OBSERVATIONS ON THE REFORM AGENDA The ambition of the proposed reform agenda for the SGP reflects the commitment of the various European authorities and national Governments to ensure the future financial stability of the European economy and the economic health of individual member states. The assumption is that by extending the arsenal of measures of economic performance, by improving the strength of sanctions and by increasing the likelihood of their triggering the effectiveness of the SGP will be increased. This paper takes a different view and the rationale for this view is developed below. It acknowledges the progress and momentum in this agenda but poses questions in a number of areas. In each area the paper will make proposals to the issues noted. The Centralisation of Decision Making and Measurement. This package proposes an extensive increase in the powers of the European Commission. However spending and taxation decisions will remain mostly national decisions. An important change is that most Member States now understand that national decisions have ‘spillover’ impacts on neighbouring economies that in turn affect their own national interest. This agenda proposes to mediate this tension by an increased role for the Commission. However this mediation creates a further dilemma. De Grauwe describes it well when he stated that “..the European Commission will be able to impose sanctions on national Governments and Parliaments and force them to lower spending and/or increase taxes, while this institution will not face the political sanction of its decisions”5. Simply, nationally elected governments will face mandate or sanction from bodies with lesser domestic political legitimacy. The risks in this approach are self evident. This reflects the institutional bias of the plan in strengthening the power of existing supra national bodies (the Commission) or creating additional organisations (the European Systemic Risk Board). However a vital objective of any proposal must be to strengthen national ownership of key decisions with ‘spillover’ effects. The creation of domestic instruments with greater political as opposed to just legal legitimacy could be a more effective way of achieving this. 7
  8. 8. These instruments could be a set of fiscal rules and/or an independent fiscal policy council. Given the volatility of economic conditions a fiscal policy council may be the more appropriate. This body could perform a number of different roles6 including: - Identifying the location of a national economy on the business cycle and the status of macroeconomic imbalances. - Making recommendations on overall budget status and on the need for any corrective action. These are some of the key functions proposed for the European Commission in the new SGP framework. The ECB has noted the importance of “enhancing fiscal frameworks, by promoting a strengthening in national legislation of national fiscal rules and institutions consistent with the provision of the EU fiscal framework, approved by national parliaments and monitored by independent national budget offices or fiscal institutions”. However the current proposals place far more emphasis on centralised institutions rather than national independent bodies. The development of stronger national institutions could be combined with the development of the role of the Commission in oversight and peer review. This would strengthen the quantity and quality of peer review. The Credibility of Sanction Application. This exists in two different areas. First, will the Commission be able to actually fine a Member State for their actions? While the answer may be affirmative for smaller economies it is very much an open question for larger participants. Second, the answer to the first question has to be only ‘No’ on a single occasion for the entire edifice of surveillance and sanction to collapse. As this paper noted the credibility of the SGP suffered damage when larger Member States breached targets with little consequence. However the damage of the non application of sanctions in the future would be greater than in previous episodes as the reach of these plans is so much greater. A different strategic choice is available – “Priority will likely be given to strengthening top down surveillance. But it is perfectly possible to imagine an alternative scenario in which budgetary discipline would result from a combination of market forces and institutional reforms at national level”7. An earlier section questioned whether a more effective review mechanism could be located 8
  9. 9. at the national level. If the existence of truly independent review institutions located nationally is assumed, their assessments of macroeconomic imbalances or public debt levels would have greater national political legitimacy. This could be supported by the same trends occurring in sovereign debt markets as occurred in monetary and exchange rate management decisions before the implementation of the euro. The Exchange Rate Mechanism assumed the existence of the ECU as the system anchor. This gradually changed with the assumption of the Deutschmark as the benchmark. The market placed greater credence on national credibility rather than system aspiration. The expectation was that a currency would be devalued if local policies were consistently expansionary versus the system anchor – the German economy. An expectation of devaluation combined the usual presence of looser fiscal policies generated higher local interest rates. This created an incentive for convergence to the German anchor. German government bonds have now assumed a similar role in sovereign debt markets. Member State economies are benchmarked versus the fiscal health of Germany. Divergence is then priced into market yields. If German fiscal credibility or confidence falters a new anchor will evolve. In this model policy competition through the selection by the market of credible anchors replaces the policy coordination model of the Commission8. This has two important facets that differ from the current direction. It recognises that sanctions are already in existence and likely to remain in existence for some time through higher bond yields and greater Credit Derivative Swap exposures. If the market is providing a sanction that Governments are actually paying now why should this be accompanied by additional potential sanctions that might be triggered in the future? Second, it proposes that the role of institutions should be to deliver peer or independent assessments that trigger market reactions – not wield sanctions whose credibility is decimated the moment they are not implemented. The Role of Monetary Policy. All of the recommendations in the current agenda focus on the role of fiscal policy. However this package has little, if anything, to note in relation to the role of monetary policy. This is consistent with previous SGP reforms. The original pact was defined 9
  10. 10. exclusively in fiscal terms. The objective of the ECB, and the use of monetary policy, was defined in terms of delivering price stability. However ECB research into the role of monetary policy before and during the financial crisis noted that “we find that in the euro area changes in the supply of credit, both in terms of volumes and in terms of credit standards applied on loans to enterprises, have significant effects on real economic activity”9. The supply of credit increased in the Eurozone by more than 10% per year between 1999 and 2009. The role exceptionally low real interest rates played in influencing private debt development is also clear. The development of the concept of ‘macro-prudential’ policy acknowledges the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies. The original definition of the SGP as a purely fiscal ‘parcel’ is now strained. This paper notes the need for the integration of monetary tools into this framework. This reform agenda should include proposals in relation to the role of minimum reserve requirements. Changes in these reserve levels would influence bank credit flows, this in turn would influence the development of economic imbalances. Strengthening the Pro Cyclical Bias. As noted above, these proposals widen the debt parameters that are capable of triggering either sanction or strong peer judgement. This has been done by the inclusion of the total levels of public debt and trends of public expenditure on the sanction ‘scorecard’. This raises two challenges for SGP participant economies. First, this will require the cutting of public expenditure and the raising of taxes when debt levels exceed reference values. However this is most likely to happen during recession. This change in fiscal policy will be moving in line with the business cycle at a time when a counter cyclical fiscal policy is needed. It should be emphasised that this would require virtually all Member State economies to cut demand at a time when their economies are in recession. Second, a new credibility challenge is now created due to the introduction of ‘semi – automacity’ in the sanction trigger mechanism. If the European Council decides to suspend a sanction recommendation from the European Commission due to the economic conditions of the relevant economy it sets precedent that undermines the direction of this reform package. Conversely, if it 10
  11. 11. accepts a sanction recommended for an economy facing, for example, the reduction of private sector demand and investment then the cyclical direction of the economy is accelerated. However the ‘offending’ economy will now face a far greater variety of sanctions as it is breaching more debt parameters. It will then face fines, further adding to debt and deficit pressure. This paper again notes that a rebalancing of the sanction agenda away from a pure focus on ‘official’ fines and an acceptance that the markets will already impose sanctions on high debt economies would dilute the pro cyclical bias of these proposals. Incentives for Good Fiscal Behaviour. The main SGP incentive for prudent fiscal behaviour is the presence of sanctions and peer review. Of themselves, markets recognise careful fiscal planning by lower bond yields. Investors are likely to recognise the fiscal history and context of Eurozone economies when pricing current debt proposals. This context appears to be lacking, again, in this reform package. There is a lack of a structural incentive within the SGP, beyond market reward, for fiscal consolidation during normal economic conditions. For example, assume an economy has levels of public debt consistently below the reference value of 60%. Why should this Member State not be allowed to deliver a higher deficit during a recessionary period, particularly if debt levels are still below target levels? Similarly a higher deficit level due to discretionary spending choices by a Member State with strong fiscal rules or institutions should not be treated in the same way with none of these mechanisms in place. Different choices exist to recognise and reward a history and bias for prudent fiscal planning. They include:- - An additional gradient for deficit levels based on long term average for debt/GDP ratios. - An optimal fiscal rule that provides a mechanism “by which government accumulates credits when running surpluses (in good times), to be used to run deficits when needed (in bad times”10. A Crisis Resolution and Management Framework. The current framework is entirely based on prevention. The specific assumption is that if debt levels deteriorate to the extent that fiscal sustainability is threatened sanctions will prevent the development of a default risk. The Greek 11
  12. 12. crisis indicated the need for a crisis management regime and led to the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). By doing so it firmly ended a ‘No Bailout’ expectation and ruled out exit from the Eurozone due to the likely catastrophic spillover effects. However this creates additional challenges that the reform agenda should either address directly or insist upon a detailed timeframe for resolution. There may be a reluctance to clarify these issues for fear of creating an expectation of default in some Member States. However this paper suggests that such ambiguity should be addressed during this ‘lull’ in the crisis as opposed to the peak of a future one. The key challenges are the future of the EFSF and the development of a framework for debt resolution. The EFSF is a temporary instrument due to cease in June 2013. It appears that the ECB is opposing the permanent establishment of this body. ECB Governing Council member Ewald Nowotny recently indicated this when he stated that he said he does not see any need to prolong the fund, not even in the case of Greece11. Current thinking appears to be that the existence and use of the fund will be reviewed near to the expiry date. The current formulation strongly reflects the need to avoid moral hazard through use of rigorous conditionality and IMF involvement. Considering the options for the future role of such a fund is beyond the scope of this paper but some key points should be made. - The direction of sanction application equating to crisis management is discredited. It may (in theory) stop the development of a crisis but it does not help manage the crisis once it occurs. This policy void is too vital to be addressed by a temporary mechanism. - The role and experience of the IMF will provide evidence of how moral hazard can be managed. It is worth noting that the IMF has now announced the strengthening of their crisis toolkit with the development of a Precautionary Credit Line and enhancement of their Flexible Credit Line12. - This experience could be embedded into a future crisis management framework by formalising principles and procedures for the role of the IMF. This would heighten the credibility of an intervention and allay concerns of moral hazard. 12
  13. 13. The possibility of crisis management not working then leads to the vast challenge of crisis resolution. It is worth noting that a recent Franco German paper on the future of European Economic Governance clearly stated the need to establish “ in the medium term…a credible crisis resolution framework that respects the budgetary prerogatives of each Member State”13. The German Government has now indicated that it intends to present proposals for such a framework in the next phase of the Taskforce on Economic Governance led by President Van Rompuy. Again the development of this point is outside the scope of this paper but some key points are noted below. - Sovereign defaults happen. - Whether the development of a mechanism to deal with this crisis leads to creation of a possible default is the key question. - However the current crisis has shown the harsh and sudden impact of ‘spillover’ effects. The possibility of an orderly resolution mechanism leading to an amelioration of these effects is high. CONCLUSION - A DIFFERENT MODEL? This paper briefly reviewed the history of the Stability and Growth Pact, the key features of previous reform packages and the distinctive features of the current agenda. It noted the introduction of ‘semi-automaticity’ in triggering sanctions, the development of more debt and fiscal measures that will be included in the SGP and greater focus on the prevention of macroeconomic balances. These reforms should be evaluated in the context of the previous operation of the Pact. Despite similar intentions the use of the EDP never led to sanction application, structural deficits grew across Member States and macroeconomic imbalances grew under apparently healthy fiscal conditions. There is much in this agenda to be welcomed. The focus on tracking a broader range of economic conditions (not just fiscal performance) is to be welcomed. An awareness of total levels of public debt as opposed to just deficit performance should be conducive to longer term fiscal stability. However two key risks exist with this agenda as it fails to acknowledge previous failings. 13
  14. 14. First, sanctions only need to be not levied once for the credibility of the entire Pact to be jeopardised. It is still an open question whether the Council would sanction a large Member State. If the answer is ‘maybe’ this agenda will be severely weakened. If it turns out to be ‘no’ it will fail completely. The credibility loss on this occasion will be disproportionately large due to the ambition of this package and the conditions within which it is proposed. Second, the pro cyclical bias of the SGP is maintained. Sanctions will be levied at a time when debt thresholds are surpassed. There is still no structural reward, within the SGP, for fiscal consolidation during normal economic conditions. This paper has sketched out a different approach. - The establishment of national independent fiscal councils or laws, underpinned by a European template, would have greater legitimacy at the level fiscal policy is set – the Member State. - A sanction mechanism is already in place through the role that financial markets play in assessing bond purchases by benchmarking the fiscal stability of Member States against a system anchor, in this case Germany. This should lead to the removal or reduction in sanctions, which if not triggered once, would lead to a reduction in the credibility of the fiscal discipline in the Eurozone. The renewed focus of local and European institutions should be in genuine and impartial peer assessment and review. - This change in the sanction mechanism would dilute the pro-cyclical emphasis of the reform agenda. - The locus of institutional innovation should be elsewhere, in providing a structural incentive for fiscal consolidation or good performance and delivering a plausible and durable crisis management and resolution framework. This agenda could be combined with some of the current proposals. For example stronger local fiscal laws and institutions could be combined with additional oversight capacity for the Commission. This 14
  15. 15. paper does question whether the introduction of new sanctions and a highly centralised institutional agenda is the only route forward given the recent history of Pact implementation. 15
  16. 16. 1 ‘Remarks of Herman Van Rompuy’, President of the Council of Europe 195/10, September 2010. 2 ‘Eurozone reform: Not yet fiscal discipline, but a good start’, Charles Wyploz, VoxEU, October 2010. 3 ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the extensive deficit procedure’, European Commission 2010/0276, October 2010. 4 ‘Proposals for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances’, European Commission 2010/0281, October 2010. 5 ‘Why a tougher Stability and Growth Pact is a bad idea’, Paul de Grauwe, VoxEU, October 2010. 6 ‘A New Fiscal Framework for Ireland’, Philip Lane, Institute for International Integration Studies, 2010. 7 ‘Euro Area Governance: What went wrong? How to fix it?’, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Bruegel Policy Contribution, June 2010. 8 Ibid. 9 ‘Do Bank Loans and credit Standards have an effect on output?’, Lorenzo Coppiello, Arjan Kadareja,Christopher Kok Sorenson and Marco Protopapa, ECB Working Paper no 1150, January 2010. 10 ‘Deficit Limits and Fiscal Rules for Dummies’, Paola Manasse, IMF Staff Paper Volume 54 No 3, 2007. 11 Interview given on Monday 27th September 2010 to German weekly Wirtschaftswoche 12 ‘IMF Enhances Crisis Prevention Toolkit’, Press Release no 10/321, August 2010. 13 ‘European Economic Governance – a Franco German Paper’. July 2010.