THE EVOLUTION OF THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT – A PERSECTIVE ON THE CURRENT REFORM
RODNEY THOM AND SENATOR PASCHAL DONOHOE
The current crisis has led to a review of the fiscal architecture of the Eurozone . This paper reviews the
latest proposals for the reform of the fiscal anchor of the currency area – the Stability and Growth
Pact. Through reviewing the history of the Pact it argues that centralisation and the decision to make
greater use of sanctions a central feature of this new agenda is a weakness. It proposes a more
decentralised choice for the SGP, with more focus on strong peer review and an acknowledgement of
the financial markets as a source of sanction. This choice could see the retention of some of the
current proposals, for example the retention of additional surveillance powers, but questions whether
additional sanction capacity will strengthen the long term credibility of the Pact.
THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is intended to maintain fiscal discipline for Eurozone members.
The first SGP (1997 – 2005) required Member States to deliver budget deficits below 3% of GDP and
that debt-to-GDP ratios should be at most 60% or declining towards this reference level. Breaching
these targets would trigger the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) that would ultimately result in the
fining of a Member State. The current SGP (amended by reforms in 2005) allowed exception to these
fiscal rules based on economic conditions. It also allows the consideration of other factors such as
investment programmes, R&D expenditure and pension reform in the assessment of deficit levels.
KEY FEATURES OF THE OPERATION OF THE SGP
This paper does not propose to review the entire history of the SGP. This section will emphasise key
points in relation to the historical operation that are relevant for assessing the current reform
An ineffective sanction mechanism. No Member State was ever sanctioned for non compliance with
SGP objectives. By 2003 five economies had deficits in excess of the three percent reference value with
the overall deficit for the euro area rising from an almost balanced position in 2000 to 3.1 percent of
GDP in 2003. As a result the Excessive Deficit Procedure was invoked against Portugal and Germany in
2002, France in 2003, the Netherlands and Greece in 2004 and Italy in 2005. At no stage were
sanctions ever triggered against Member States for the breaching of deficit targets.
While all breaches of the three percent reference value are potentially damaging to fiscal
consolidation, the cases of France and Germany proved to be of particular significance. When the EDP
was triggered both countries were given until 2004 to take the necessary corrective actions. However
by late 2003 it became clear that their deficits were continuing to rise and that neither France nor
Germany would meet their targets.
The Commission proposed extending the deadline to 2005 and that ECOFIN should issue notices to
both countries that fines would be imposed if their deficits were not reduced. The Council rejected
these proposals and although the Commission’s view was subsequently upheld by the European Court
of Justice no action was taken against France and Germany and the EDPs against them were effectively
put into abeyance.
The cases of France and Germany over 2002-2004 pointed to obvious credibility and enforcement
problems for the SGP. If the two largest euro area economies fail to comply with the rules then why
should smaller countries do so?
The growth of structural budget deficits. In addition to avoiding deficits in excess of 3 percent the SGP
also requires each country to maintain a budget close to balance or in surplus over the medium term.
While it is not precisely defined this so-called CBS (Close to Budget Surplus) rule is generally
interpreted to mean that the actual budget balance should be at least zero when the economy is at
potential or full employment. The importance of the CBS rule is that compliance leaves scope for
automatic stabilisers and perhaps discretionary fiscal policy to operate within the 3 percent threshold
value when economic activity slows or an economy moves into recession.
The absence or minimisation of structural budget deficits is therefore vital for allowing Member State
economies to operate within the SGP framework while maintaining the scope for discretionary fiscal
measures. Low levels of structural debt or their complete absence indicates operation of the Pact.
This did not happen. Most Member State economies developed structural deficits prior to moving into
recession. These structural deficits have deepened during the current crisis.
The development of macroeconomic imbalances. Participation in the SGP did not prevent the
development of distortions within Member State economies. Apparent budgetary health masked the
development of asset bubbles or the decline of competitiveness.
The fiscal records of Ireland and Spain have, until recently, been largely consistent with the
requirements of the SGP with government budget balances averaging +1.6 and +0.1 percent of GDP
respectively over 1999 to 2007. Also, the Irish debt to GDP ratio fell from 48 to 29 percent and the
Spanish ratio from 62 to 32 percent over the same period.
The evaluation of participation in exclusively budgetary terms masked the sustainability of Pact
membership. Since 2007 both Ireland and Spain have experienced emerging structural deficits which
have, certainly in the Irish case, resulted from a severe loss of competitiveness, inappropriate policies
which narrowed the tax base and an over reliance on the property and construction sectors as sources
of government revenue. This was despite membership of the Pact.
CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS
Reform of the SGP is seen as vital to prevent a re-occurrence of the current crisis. This reform agenda
was led by the work of two different groups. The European Council appointed a Taskforce on Economic
Governance led by the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy. The European
Commission also set in place a separate review led by the Commissioner for Budgetary and Economic
Affairs Olli Rehn.
Both of these bodies have now made recommendations which are due for discussion at the October
European Council meeting. These review processes were independent of each other and they do
contain differing levels of detail in different areas. However the policy direction of both groups is
consistent and their key conclusions are as follows:
Sanctioning Member States with very high levels of debt. The key development in this area is the
widening of the debt parameters that trigger action. Under the previous pact sanctions were only
applicable against governments that failed to address their budget deficits. These recommendations
would trigger sanctions against both government debt levels and annual budget deficits.
Recent statements by President Van Rompuy on this issue have been very specific in this area. He has
stated that “For example, a country would be subject to an excessive deficit procedure even with a
deficit below 3% if the debt is above 60% and the path of debt reduction considered is unsatisfactory”1.
The inclusion of total debt levels marks a substantial departure in SGP policy. However it is consistent
with the thinking behind previous reforms. The original pact had a very sharp focus on a 3% ceiling on
annual government deficits. However this “linked fiscal discipline, an inherently long run concept, to
short term outcomes [of] annual budget balances”2. The 2005 reform package emphasised cyclically
adjusted budget balances and allowed more exceptions to financial rules. The current proposal now
continues progress towards a more comprehensive definition of debt levels.
Extending sanction measures to focus on debt prevention. Earlier proposals focussed on the
‘corrective’ arm of the SGP. The European Commission has made an additional proposal to strengthen
the ‘preventative’ arm of the Pact. This is a significant development as current policy frames sanction
capacity as a deterrent. This reform aims to position sanctions as an incentive to maintain fiscal
Current SGP policy focuses on the use of Medium Term Objectives (MTOs) for Member State
economies. These objectives are budgetary goals expressed as a percentage of GDP. Targets are
adjusted for the impact of the business cycle and exclude exceptional items. This reflects recent
thinking that it is preferable to express EU budgetary targets as structural objectives. Member States
that are not delivering their MTO are expected to make progress towards this target with an annual
rate of adjustment of 0.5% in structural budget reduction as a percentage of GDP.
The Commission has acknowledged two difficulties with this approach. First, few Member States were
making progress in delivering their MTO. Secondly, measurement difficulties existed in that it was
difficult to determine the position of an economy in their business cycle. The assessment model also
did not give enough recognition to the risk profile of an economy, such as the impact on budgetary
health of the collapse of asset bubbles.
Reform proposals seek to deal with this by introducing a new concept, that of Prudent Fiscal Policy
Making (PFPM). This new objective implies that public spending growth should not be faster than
expected GDP growth. If a Member State breaches this requirement they will receive a warning from
the Commission. If corrective action is not taken the Member State is then liable to sanction. The
Commission is very clear on the aim of this proposal, it is to “ensure that revenue windfalls are not
spent but are instead allocated to debt reduction”3.
Pursuing member states that do not address persistently poor competitiveness and macroeconomic
imbalances. This element of the reform agenda introduces another new concept, that of an Excessive
Imbalance Procedure (EIP). This acknowledges that budgetary difficulties are also a result of dislocation
in the ‘real’ economy, such as job losses due to un-competitiveness or the collapse of the financial
services and construction sector. EIP provides a framework for measuring these macroeconomic
imbalances with particular focus on competitiveness.
A scoreboard for each Member State economy has been created by the Commission. This scoreboard
consists of a set of indicators that will track individual areas of economic performance. These areas
could include current account and external debt indicators, the tracking of real exchange rate
performance trends and private debt levels. The Commission will publish a review of individual
national scorecards. If imbalances are detected a three stage process is triggered:-
- If the imbalance is not deemed to be serious, no further action is taken.
- If an imbalance or potential imbalance exists then the Commission will recommend preventative
action to the European Council.
- If a severe imbalance develops or preventative action is not taken by the Member State peer
pressure review will be accelerated. The relevant Government will be obliged to produce a
corrective action plan detailing a commitment to deal with the imbalance and corrective
measures with target timings. The European Council may then adopt this plan or invite the
Member State to improve the plan within a specific time period.
Changing the decision making process for sanction application. This broader definition is
accompanied by a revision of the trigger mechanism for sanctions and development of the nature of
The trigger mechanism is revised by changing the body that can trigger sanctions and the extending the
grounds upon which penalties are levied. Previous SGP policy designated the European Council as the
deciding body for the application of sanctions. This raised the obvious issue of the reluctance of
Member States to fine their neighbours and to condemn behaviour that they themselves might be
guilty of in the future. The fundamental reluctance is dealt with by proposing that the European
Commission make this decision. In theory, the Commission is above the political or ‘short term’
concerns of Member States.
The decision mechanism has also been changed by the introduction of ‘reverse voting’. This means that
the Commission would propose a sanction to ECOFIN. This proposal must be accepted unless a
qualified majority is assembled to oppose it. The default option is now the most likely outcome given
the likely difficulty of assembling a qualified majority. This has been termed ‘semi-automaticity’.
Further Development of Sanction Mechanisms. The key feature of sanction measures in previous SGPs
was that they were never used. The change in decision making procedures will make it more likely that
they will be used but also introduce two different forms of sanctions.
- Sanctions for not addressing macroeconomic imbalances. If a Member State fails to address EIP
issues it will face sanctions. This fine will be an amount of 0.1% of their GDP in the previous year.
The Commission states that “The yearly fine will give euro-area Member States the necessary
incentive to address the recommendations to draw up a sufficient corrective action plan even
after the first fine has been paid”4. Sanctions are clearly intended to provide an incentive to deal
with non budgetary economic difficulties within Member State economies.
- The introduction of sanctions for not addressing excessive public debt issues. If a Member State
does not reduce debt levels they are required to pay a non interest bearing deposit of 0.2% of
GDP. If the Commission deems that the relevant Government does not implement an appropriate
action plan this deposit is then transformed into a fine.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE REFORM AGENDA
The ambition of the proposed reform agenda for the SGP reflects the commitment of the various
European authorities and national Governments to ensure the future financial stability of the
European economy and the economic health of individual member states. The assumption is that
by extending the arsenal of measures of economic performance, by improving the strength of
sanctions and by increasing the likelihood of their triggering the effectiveness of the SGP will be
This paper takes a different view and the rationale for this view is developed below. It
acknowledges the progress and momentum in this agenda but poses questions in a number of
areas. In each area the paper will make proposals to the issues noted.
The Centralisation of Decision Making and Measurement. This package proposes an extensive
increase in the powers of the European Commission. However spending and taxation decisions will
remain mostly national decisions. An important change is that most Member States now
understand that national decisions have ‘spillover’ impacts on neighbouring economies that in turn
affect their own national interest.
This agenda proposes to mediate this tension by an increased role for the Commission. However
this mediation creates a further dilemma. De Grauwe describes it well when he stated that “..the
European Commission will be able to impose sanctions on national Governments and Parliaments
and force them to lower spending and/or increase taxes, while this institution will not face the
political sanction of its decisions”5. Simply, nationally elected governments will face mandate or
sanction from bodies with lesser domestic political legitimacy. The risks in this approach are self
This reflects the institutional bias of the plan in strengthening the power of existing supra national
bodies (the Commission) or creating additional organisations (the European Systemic Risk Board).
However a vital objective of any proposal must be to strengthen national ownership of key
decisions with ‘spillover’ effects. The creation of domestic instruments with greater political as
opposed to just legal legitimacy could be a more effective way of achieving this.
These instruments could be a set of fiscal rules and/or an independent fiscal policy council. Given
the volatility of economic conditions a fiscal policy council may be the more appropriate. This body
could perform a number of different roles6 including:
- Identifying the location of a national economy on the business cycle and the status of
- Making recommendations on overall budget status and on the need for any corrective action.
These are some of the key functions proposed for the European Commission in the new SGP
framework. The ECB has noted the importance of “enhancing fiscal frameworks, by promoting a
strengthening in national legislation of national fiscal rules and institutions consistent with the
provision of the EU fiscal framework, approved by national parliaments and monitored by
independent national budget offices or fiscal institutions”. However the current proposals place far
more emphasis on centralised institutions rather than national independent bodies.
The development of stronger national institutions could be combined with the development of the
role of the Commission in oversight and peer review. This would strengthen the quantity and
quality of peer review.
The Credibility of Sanction Application. This exists in two different areas. First, will the Commission
be able to actually fine a Member State for their actions? While the answer may be affirmative for
smaller economies it is very much an open question for larger participants. Second, the answer to
the first question has to be only ‘No’ on a single occasion for the entire edifice of surveillance and
sanction to collapse. As this paper noted the credibility of the SGP suffered damage when larger
Member States breached targets with little consequence. However the damage of the non
application of sanctions in the future would be greater than in previous episodes as the reach of
these plans is so much greater.
A different strategic choice is available – “Priority will likely be given to strengthening top down
surveillance. But it is perfectly possible to imagine an alternative scenario in which budgetary
discipline would result from a combination of market forces and institutional reforms at national
level”7. An earlier section questioned whether a more effective review mechanism could be located
at the national level. If the existence of truly independent review institutions located nationally is
assumed, their assessments of macroeconomic imbalances or public debt levels would have
greater national political legitimacy.
This could be supported by the same trends occurring in sovereign debt markets as occurred in
monetary and exchange rate management decisions before the implementation of the euro. The
Exchange Rate Mechanism assumed the existence of the ECU as the system anchor. This gradually
changed with the assumption of the Deutschmark as the benchmark. The market placed greater
credence on national credibility rather than system aspiration. The expectation was that a currency
would be devalued if local policies were consistently expansionary versus the system anchor – the
German economy. An expectation of devaluation combined the usual presence of looser fiscal
policies generated higher local interest rates. This created an incentive for convergence to the
German government bonds have now assumed a similar role in sovereign debt markets. Member
State economies are benchmarked versus the fiscal health of Germany. Divergence is then priced
into market yields. If German fiscal credibility or confidence falters a new anchor will evolve. In this
model policy competition through the selection by the market of credible anchors replaces the
policy coordination model of the Commission8.
This has two important facets that differ from the current direction. It recognises that sanctions are
already in existence and likely to remain in existence for some time through higher bond yields and
greater Credit Derivative Swap exposures. If the market is providing a sanction that Governments
are actually paying now why should this be accompanied by additional potential sanctions that
might be triggered in the future? Second, it proposes that the role of institutions should be to
deliver peer or independent assessments that trigger market reactions – not wield sanctions whose
credibility is decimated the moment they are not implemented.
The Role of Monetary Policy. All of the recommendations in the current agenda focus on the role
of fiscal policy. However this package has little, if anything, to note in relation to the role of
monetary policy. This is consistent with previous SGP reforms. The original pact was defined
exclusively in fiscal terms. The objective of the ECB, and the use of monetary policy, was defined in
terms of delivering price stability.
However ECB research into the role of monetary policy before and during the financial crisis noted
that “we find that in the euro area changes in the supply of credit, both in terms of volumes and in
terms of credit standards applied on loans to enterprises, have significant effects on real economic
activity”9. The supply of credit increased in the Eurozone by more than 10% per year between 1999
and 2009. The role exceptionally low real interest rates played in influencing private debt
development is also clear.
The development of the concept of ‘macro-prudential’ policy acknowledges the interaction
between fiscal and monetary policies. The original definition of the SGP as a purely fiscal ‘parcel’ is
now strained. This paper notes the need for the integration of monetary tools into this framework.
This reform agenda should include proposals in relation to the role of minimum reserve
requirements. Changes in these reserve levels would influence bank credit flows, this in turn would
influence the development of economic imbalances.
Strengthening the Pro Cyclical Bias. As noted above, these proposals widen the debt parameters
that are capable of triggering either sanction or strong peer judgement. This has been done by the
inclusion of the total levels of public debt and trends of public expenditure on the sanction
‘scorecard’. This raises two challenges for SGP participant economies.
First, this will require the cutting of public expenditure and the raising of taxes when debt levels
exceed reference values. However this is most likely to happen during recession. This change in
fiscal policy will be moving in line with the business cycle at a time when a counter cyclical fiscal
policy is needed. It should be emphasised that this would require virtually all Member State
economies to cut demand at a time when their economies are in recession.
Second, a new credibility challenge is now created due to the introduction of ‘semi – automacity’ in
the sanction trigger mechanism. If the European Council decides to suspend a sanction
recommendation from the European Commission due to the economic conditions of the relevant
economy it sets precedent that undermines the direction of this reform package. Conversely, if it
accepts a sanction recommended for an economy facing, for example, the reduction of private
sector demand and investment then the cyclical direction of the economy is accelerated. However
the ‘offending’ economy will now face a far greater variety of sanctions as it is breaching more debt
parameters. It will then face fines, further adding to debt and deficit pressure.
This paper again notes that a rebalancing of the sanction agenda away from a pure focus on
‘official’ fines and an acceptance that the markets will already impose sanctions on high debt
economies would dilute the pro cyclical bias of these proposals.
Incentives for Good Fiscal Behaviour. The main SGP incentive for prudent fiscal behaviour is the
presence of sanctions and peer review. Of themselves, markets recognise careful fiscal planning by
lower bond yields. Investors are likely to recognise the fiscal history and context of Eurozone
economies when pricing current debt proposals. This context appears to be lacking, again, in this
reform package. There is a lack of a structural incentive within the SGP, beyond market reward, for
fiscal consolidation during normal economic conditions.
For example, assume an economy has levels of public debt consistently below the reference value
of 60%. Why should this Member State not be allowed to deliver a higher deficit during a
recessionary period, particularly if debt levels are still below target levels? Similarly a higher deficit
level due to discretionary spending choices by a Member State with strong fiscal rules or
institutions should not be treated in the same way with none of these mechanisms in place.
Different choices exist to recognise and reward a history and bias for prudent fiscal planning. They
- An additional gradient for deficit levels based on long term average for debt/GDP ratios.
- An optimal fiscal rule that provides a mechanism “by which government accumulates credits
when running surpluses (in good times), to be used to run deficits when needed (in bad times”10.
A Crisis Resolution and Management Framework. The current framework is entirely based on
prevention. The specific assumption is that if debt levels deteriorate to the extent that fiscal
sustainability is threatened sanctions will prevent the development of a default risk. The Greek
crisis indicated the need for a crisis management regime and led to the establishment of the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). By doing so it firmly ended a ‘No Bailout’ expectation
and ruled out exit from the Eurozone due to the likely catastrophic spillover effects.
However this creates additional challenges that the reform agenda should either address directly or
insist upon a detailed timeframe for resolution. There may be a reluctance to clarify these issues
for fear of creating an expectation of default in some Member States. However this paper suggests
that such ambiguity should be addressed during this ‘lull’ in the crisis as opposed to the peak of a
future one. The key challenges are the future of the EFSF and the development of a framework for
The EFSF is a temporary instrument due to cease in June 2013. It appears that the ECB is opposing
the permanent establishment of this body. ECB Governing Council member Ewald Nowotny
recently indicated this when he stated that he said he does not see any need to prolong the fund,
not even in the case of Greece11. Current thinking appears to be that the existence and use of the
fund will be reviewed near to the expiry date. The current formulation strongly reflects the need to
avoid moral hazard through use of rigorous conditionality and IMF involvement.
Considering the options for the future role of such a fund is beyond the scope of this paper but
some key points should be made.
- The direction of sanction application equating to crisis management is discredited. It may (in
theory) stop the development of a crisis but it does not help manage the crisis once it occurs.
This policy void is too vital to be addressed by a temporary mechanism.
- The role and experience of the IMF will provide evidence of how moral hazard can be managed. It
is worth noting that the IMF has now announced the strengthening of their crisis toolkit with the
development of a Precautionary Credit Line and enhancement of their Flexible Credit Line12.
- This experience could be embedded into a future crisis management framework by formalising
principles and procedures for the role of the IMF. This would heighten the credibility of an
intervention and allay concerns of moral hazard.
The possibility of crisis management not working then leads to the vast challenge of crisis
resolution. It is worth noting that a recent Franco German paper on the future of European
Economic Governance clearly stated the need to establish “ in the medium term…a credible crisis
resolution framework that respects the budgetary prerogatives of each Member State”13. The
German Government has now indicated that it intends to present proposals for such a framework
in the next phase of the Taskforce on Economic Governance led by President Van Rompuy.
Again the development of this point is outside the scope of this paper but some key points are
- Sovereign defaults happen.
- Whether the development of a mechanism to deal with this crisis leads to creation of a
possible default is the key question.
- However the current crisis has shown the harsh and sudden impact of ‘spillover’ effects. The
possibility of an orderly resolution mechanism leading to an amelioration of these effects is
CONCLUSION - A DIFFERENT MODEL?
This paper briefly reviewed the history of the Stability and Growth Pact, the key features of previous
reform packages and the distinctive features of the current agenda. It noted the introduction of
‘semi-automaticity’ in triggering sanctions, the development of more debt and fiscal measures that
will be included in the SGP and greater focus on the prevention of macroeconomic balances.
These reforms should be evaluated in the context of the previous operation of the Pact. Despite
similar intentions the use of the EDP never led to sanction application, structural deficits grew across
Member States and macroeconomic imbalances grew under apparently healthy fiscal conditions.
There is much in this agenda to be welcomed. The focus on tracking a broader range of economic
conditions (not just fiscal performance) is to be welcomed. An awareness of total levels of public
debt as opposed to just deficit performance should be conducive to longer term fiscal stability.
However two key risks exist with this agenda as it fails to acknowledge previous failings.
First, sanctions only need to be not levied once for the credibility of the entire Pact to be jeopardised.
It is still an open question whether the Council would sanction a large Member State. If the answer is
‘maybe’ this agenda will be severely weakened. If it turns out to be ‘no’ it will fail completely. The
credibility loss on this occasion will be disproportionately large due to the ambition of this package
and the conditions within which it is proposed.
Second, the pro cyclical bias of the SGP is maintained. Sanctions will be levied at a time when debt
thresholds are surpassed. There is still no structural reward, within the SGP, for fiscal consolidation
during normal economic conditions.
This paper has sketched out a different approach.
- The establishment of national independent fiscal councils or laws, underpinned by a European
template, would have greater legitimacy at the level fiscal policy is set – the Member State.
- A sanction mechanism is already in place through the role that financial markets play in assessing
bond purchases by benchmarking the fiscal stability of Member States against a system anchor, in
this case Germany. This should lead to the removal or reduction in sanctions, which if not
triggered once, would lead to a reduction in the credibility of the fiscal discipline in the Eurozone.
The renewed focus of local and European institutions should be in genuine and impartial peer
assessment and review.
- This change in the sanction mechanism would dilute the pro-cyclical emphasis of the reform
- The locus of institutional innovation should be elsewhere, in providing a structural incentive for
fiscal consolidation or good performance and delivering a plausible and durable crisis
management and resolution framework.
This agenda could be combined with some of the current proposals. For example stronger local fiscal
laws and institutions could be combined with additional oversight capacity for the Commission. This
paper does question whether the introduction of new sanctions and a highly centralised institutional
agenda is the only route forward given the recent history of Pact implementation.
‘Remarks of Herman Van Rompuy’, President of the Council of Europe 195/10, September 2010.
‘Eurozone reform: Not yet fiscal discipline, but a good start’, Charles Wyploz, VoxEU, October 2010.
‘Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and
clarifying the implementation of the extensive deficit procedure’, European Commission 2010/0276,
‘Proposals for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention and
correction of macroeconomic imbalances’, European Commission 2010/0281, October 2010.
‘Why a tougher Stability and Growth Pact is a bad idea’, Paul de Grauwe, VoxEU, October 2010.
‘A New Fiscal Framework for Ireland’, Philip Lane, Institute for International Integration Studies,
‘Euro Area Governance: What went wrong? How to fix it?’, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Bruegel Policy
Contribution, June 2010.
‘Do Bank Loans and credit Standards have an effect on output?’, Lorenzo Coppiello, Arjan
Kadareja,Christopher Kok Sorenson and Marco Protopapa, ECB Working Paper no 1150, January 2010.
‘Deficit Limits and Fiscal Rules for Dummies’, Paola Manasse, IMF Staff Paper Volume 54 No 3, 2007.
Interview given on Monday 27th September 2010 to German weekly Wirtschaftswoche
‘IMF Enhances Crisis Prevention Toolkit’, Press Release no 10/321, August 2010.
‘European Economic Governance – a Franco German Paper’. July 2010.