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Assuring the peace in south atlantic waters

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  • 1. 1CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGECSC 27MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES (MDS) THESISASSURING THE PEACE IN SOUTH ATLANTIC WATERS.A STANDING NAVAL FORCES SOUTH ATLANTIC. Utopia or possibility?By Cdr Eduardo Ligio GANEAU (Argentine Navy)This paper was written by a student has attended the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment ofone of the requirements of the Master Degree in Defence Studies established by the Royal Mili-tary College of Kingston, Canada. This paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains factsand opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It doesnot necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government ofCanada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released,quoted or copied except with express permission of the Canadian Department of National De-fence.Este trabajo fue escrito por un estudiante que asistió al Colegio de las Fuerzas Armadas Cana-dienses en cumplimiento de uno de los requisitos de la Maestría en Estudios de Defensa esta-blecidos por el Royal Military College de Kingston, Canadá . Este es un documento escolar ypor lo tanto contiene hechos y opiniones que el autor solamente ha considerado como apropia-dos y correctos para el tema. Éste no refleja necesariamente la política o la opinión de ningunaagencia, incluyendo el Gobierno de Canadá y el Departamento de la Defensa Nacional. Estetrabajo no puede ser distribuido, reproducido o copiado, excepto con el expreso permiso delDepartamento Canadiense de la Defensa Nacional.2004
  • 2. 2CONTENTSINTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 7Mentality and perceptions……………………………………………………………………..……….8SECTION 1STRATEGIC SITUATION....................................................................................…......………....10Generalities of the maritime environment..................................……………………….….……10The South Atlantic Theatre............................................................……………………………...10Geografic frame ..................................................................................………………………..…..10Strategic frame…………………………………………………………………………………………...11Littoral environment…………………………………..…………………………………………....….11American littoral…………………………………………..…………………….………….……….……11African littoral………………………………………………..………………….…………………......…11Antartic front……………………………………………………………………………...………………13Maritime environment………………………………………………………………….……...………14Maritime shipping ……………………………………………………………….……………..……..…14- The global maritime shipping environment………………………………………………..…….…..14- Current trends in the global shipping industry………………………………………….………...…15- Sea lines of communication………………………………………………………………......………17Resources……………………………………………………………...………………………..……….18- Renewal resources………………………………………………………………………………...…..18Fisheries………………………………………………………………………………………..……….18Fresh Water…………………………………………………………………………………….………21- Non renewal resources…………………………………………………………………….....………21The growing importance of sub-sea resources………...…………………………………...…….21Oil, energy and geopolitics in the same coin……………………………………..….……………27South Atlantic Region, the New Strategic Oil Supply Flashpoint……………………………..…28Atlantic Equatorial Africa as new U.S. vital interest…………………………………..……..……29A power projection space……………………………………………………………………………….31Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………..….31SECTION 2INERNATIONAL LAW AND SECURITY IN SOUTH ATLANTIC.................…….…...….……....33Security under United Nations organization (UN)………………………………………….…….33The Law of the Sea Convention…………………………………………………………………..…34Security as a concept of South Atlantic Rim common interest……………………………..…35The Threats…………………………………………………………………………….……………..…36Basic current threats (from a “continental” point of view)…………………………………….…..…36Information Age Threats to Security…………………………………………………………..………36Maritime threats……………………………………………………………………………….…...……37
  • 3. 3- Piracy……………………………………………………………………………………….…….…...37- Terrorism at sea……………………………………………………………………….…….………..38Security options……………………………………………………………………………………..…39Collective security model………………………………………………………………….……………40Co-operative security model………………………………….………………………………………...41Security model by means of integration……………………………………………………………….42Different intends involving countries of the South Atlantic Rim…………………….…….….42The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance – TIAR………………………………….……42The South Atlantic Maritime Area – AMAS………………………………………..………………….44South Atlantic Treaty Organization – OTAS………………………………………….…………..…..44Zone Of Peace and Co-Operation of the South Atlantic – ZPCAS……………………………..….46Actors in security of South Atlantic Rim…………………………….……….……….……….…..48The ZPCAS littoral countries…………………………………………………………………………...48- American Front Countries………………………………………………………………………….….48- African Front Countries…………………………………………………………………………….….48Another actors……………………………………………………………………………………………48- United States of America………………………………………………………….………….…48- NATO………………………………………………………………………………….…………..50- Russia……………………………………………………………………………………………..52- China………………………………………………………………………………...………...….54- Europe………………………………………………………………………….……………...….56- United Kingdom……………………………….………………………………………..……..…56- France……………………………………………………………………………………...……..57- Portugal…………………………...……………………………………………………......…….57- Norway………………………………………………………………………………..........…….57- Paraguay……………………………………………………………………………….……...…57- Bolivia……………………………………………………………………………………………..57- Chili……………………….…………………………………………………….…………………58- Another countries………………………………………………………………………….…….58Interaction....................................................................................................................................58Summary……………………………………………………………………………….…………..……58SECTION 3DEVELOPING A STRATEGY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC......……...........………...……………59The root of the problem.............................................................................................................59Why not to copy a NATO model?………………………………………………..……...…………..62The NATO……………………………………………………………………………...……………..….64The NATO model……………………………………………………………………..……..………….64NATO naval organization………………………………………...………………….………………..66A new structure for NATO…………………………………………………………..………………..68The NATO example of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic……………..………………......…..69The NATO example of the Striking Fleet Atlantic………………………………………….……..71Merits of this Maritime Security Model……………………………………………………….…….73Naval Co-operation in the South Atlantic Ocean…………………………………………………76Summary...................…….....................................................................................................…. 81
  • 4. 4SECTION 4THE CAPACITIES OF SEA POWER……...……………………………...….……………………….83Advantages of sea power………………………….……………………………………………..…..83Sea Denial and Operations Other Than War……………………………….…………………..…….84- Presence and Deterrence…………………………………………….………….………..……85- Peace Operations…………………………….……………………………………………….…86- Humanitarian Operations……………………………………………..…………….…………..86- Protection of Shipping and Freedom of Navigation………………………………..…….…..86- Maritime Constabulary Tasks…………………………………………………….…………….86- Environmental Operations……………………………………………………….……………..87- Embargoes/Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)…………………………………………87- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)……………………………………..……..….87Operations in Wartime…………………………………………………………………….………….…88- Sea Control………………………………………..………………….………………….…..…..88- Power Projection…………………………………………………….…………………..………88- Tasks for Maritime Operations…………………….……………………………………...……89Information Warfare……………………………………………………………………………….…….91Tactical Environmental Support……………………………………..…………………………………92Summary…………………………………………………………………………...………………..…..92SECTION 6FORCE PLANNING FOR NAVAL FORCES…………………………………………………………94The spectrum of military conflict…………………………………………………………...……….94A Strategic Risk Management in Defence……………………………………………….……….103What can be done?: A Capability-Based Planning…………………………………...……..….105Concept of operations for combined naval forces………………………………..….…..…….108Capability goals for a combined naval force…………………………………………….………112What levels of capacity?……………………………………………………………..……...………113The force planning scenarios……………………………………………………………….……...117The value-ranked capabilities………………………………………………………………..….…129Summary………………………………………………………………………………..…………..….129SECTION 6THE STANDING NAVAL FORCE SOUTH ATLANTIC…………………….….……………….…131Utopia of a Standing Naval Force South Atlantic?………………………………..….....……..131The South Atlantic Rim Naval Forces……………………………………….…………………….131What is missing?……………………………………………………………………….……………..136Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………….137CONCLUSIONS......................................…..................................................................………..138ANNEX 1 – THE SOUTH ATLANTIC THEATRE………………...…………................………....144ANNEX 2 – THE SOUTH ATLANTIC SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION………..………......146
  • 5. 5ANNEX 3 – SOUTH ATLANTIC STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE ………………….………....……147ANNEX 4 – THE SOUTH ATLANTIC COMBINED / JOINT TASK LIST............……….….…. 148ANNEX 5 – NAVAL FORCES OF SOUTH ATLANTIC….…………......................……….…….161BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................…......................................…..…………164***
  • 6. 6ASSURING THE PEACE IN SOUTH ATLANTIC WATERS.A STANDING NAVAL FORCES SOUTH ATLANTIC. Utopia or possibility ?INTRODUCTIONThe South Atlantic RimThe South Atlantic Rim1is experiencing political and economic changes during last dec-ades. The region holds enormous strategic and economic vital importance for the littoral coun-tries and significant importance by same reasons for some another powers. Despite a historywith conflict and violence inside and/or between countries of West Africa and East South Ameri-ca, the region seams to be more stable and peaceful than decades before.However, there is an ominous and pervasive sense of uncertainty about the future. Theinternational terrorism, the necessity of natural resources, the destiny of Antarctica, the fragilityof democracies, the Malvinas/Falklands conflict, the evolution of the law of the sea, and someothers limits controversies, the existence of important sea lines of communications, the evolutionof economic growth and political changes are playing a significant role in determining a hegem-ony to fill the power vacuum. As USA, France, United Kingdom, among others maintain and re-inforce their presence, they exercise their political, economic and military influence.Medium and small countries of the region, in some cases with insignificant navies, exceptBrazil and major powers, seam sometimes to ignore the importance of navies to control the in-fluence of the sea over the land life.South Atlantic Ocean provides important sea lines of communication (SLOC´s) to all na-tions in this rim and to some big powers. Economic, political and security interests of many southAtlantic Rim nations intersect at sea. This intersection further suggests that the timing might beright to examine forms of maritime cooperation. At present, except for a few bilateral or multilat-eral treaties, there are no broadly recognized procedures, which can provide guidelines for theconduct of maritime activities within the region.Maritime security, an important dimension of regional security, could act as catalyst forestablishing a permanent South Atlantic Rim security regime. Maritime cooperation can serve asa bridge to broader security cooperation among nations and also provides collective assurancefor all against a breakdown of international law and order.Eastern South American and Western African countries have viewed themselves as dis-tinct and competitive in their continental regions during history. Any significant increase instrength by one of them has almost certain been to evoke an offsetting maneuver by others.There is almost no pretense of collective security or cooperation based on shared domestic val-ues, even on the part of the existing democracies. Cooperative security started in South Americalast decade but there is still emphasis on equilibrium and preservation of national self-interest.Traditional bilateral arrangements or limited multilateral forums as Organization of Ameri-can Estates (OAE) and its Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA), Zone ofPeace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic, Tlatelolco Treaty, MERCOSUR, New Partnershipfor African Development (NEPAD), Southern Africa and the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic and Mone-1For the purposes of this paper, the term South Atlantic Rim, describes all nations and /or continents whose shorelines arewashed by the South Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas.
  • 7. 7tary Community of Central Africa (EMCCA) and Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) serve only a marginal capacity in addressing economic, political and security issues.It is well known that any proposal must be inserted inside the frame of United Nations andmight be the establishment of a preliminary step towards establishing a permanent South Atlan-tic Rim security architecture by forging international linkages through maritime confidence build-ing measures.Mentality and perceptionsTwo profoundly different views of the type of naval policy countries should adopt domi-nate the debate in maritime and military’s affaires.On one hand is the internationalist or ‘blue water’ philosophy. The other perspective isessentially continental. Seeing only the need for a coast guard rely on the liberal democraticideal of a peaceful world in which reasonable men solve their differences by negotiation and,thus, compromise. This argument is often persuasive, but invariably lacks depth in that it fails totake due account of the unexpected, or the fact that not everyone is ‘reasonable’.One problem with this view is that there is often absolutely no recognition of the traditionalnaval role in diplomacy and crisis management. It is an entirely ‘continental’ perspective, lackingan understanding of national or international maritime issues. This view is still widely supported,by pro-army’s mentalities or by army’s influences so any future proposal to government for anaval force structure and related employment strategy will almost certainly run the gauntlet ofcriticism from those who do not understand the value of navies as extensions of state policy overthe sea and thus advocate their reduction or elimination. Thus, any future naval force plan has toexplain not only the return to countries on the investment, but also what will happen if those ca-pabilities are not maintained.2In this sense, continental alliances are more common than those built around a maritimeor oceanic environment. The proposal here, will be to analyse the convenience and possibility tostart building a South Atlantic naval organization starting by implementing a Standing NavalForce South Atlantic (SNFSA).***2HAYDON, Peter, Canadian Cdr.(R). “What Naval Capability Does Canada Needs?”, Canadian Military Journal Vol. 2, No. 1Spring 2001.
  • 8. 8SECTION 1STRATEGIC SITUATIONGeneralities of the maritime environmentThe following special characteristics of the sea must be highlighted in this basic but es-sential start: flat surface (sea state, currents, tides), mass of the water (liquid mass, depth, tem-perature, salinity, submarine life, currents), bottom (solid mass, relieve, composition, depth, life,etc.), air space over the sea (gas mass, temperature, pressure, weather, life, etc.), coverage(the sea covers 70 % of the earth’s surface), medium of efficient transport of large and heavyitems in long distances, increasingly exploitation of economic resources that holds and covers,influence (approximately 70% of the world’s population lives within one hundred miles of acoastline), special and evolutionary international law, and the called “freedom of the sea”3The South Atlantic TheaterGeographic frame (See Annex 1)The South Atlantic is framed to the north by an intercontinental strait of around 1,600 NMbetween the South American coast in Natal, Brazil, and the African coast in Freetown, SierraLeona. There are different lines taken by authors as the northern limit but, to this paper, the limitwill be arbitrary draw between the northern point of the Brazilian coast in the limit with FrenchGuyana and the northern point of the coast of Senegal close to St.-Louis in the limit with Mauri-tania. This criterion is along with the countries that compose the Zone of Peace and Cooperationin the South Atlantic.The western side of South Atlantic is the eastern South American coast as far as CapeHorn with three access to the Pacific: the Drake passage, the Magellan strait and the BeagleChannel. The eastern side is the western coast of the African continent until its end in the Agul-has Cape. Antarctica is the southern coastal limit and it contributes to conforms the main pas-sages both to the East toward the Indic Ocean and to the West toward the Pacific.Strategic framePower, oil and food, among others, are usually source of conflict and South Atlantic hasspecific relation with them. It’s purposed to follow the next more detailed analysis:Littoral environmentAmerican littoralThe American Front Countries are Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Brazil is the most powermember in the ZPCAS. Last decades has taken an important naval development and currentlyhas the main fleet in South Atlantic, including two aircraft carriers. Argentina has been a recog-3Canadian Forces College, “Naval Doctrine Manual, MCP 1”, p. 4-13/39.
  • 9. 9nized power in South Atlantic last century but last two decades it’s naval power and maritimeinfluence significantly decreased because of it´s political and economical problems.Warnings are being raised by some U.S. officials, news media and private individualsabout the growing threat in Latin America posed by violent Islamic extremist groups. In theirview, a new Islamic narco-terrorist threat is emerging as Islamism militants forge alliances withlocal narco-terrorist groups like the rebels in Colombia.However, while the risk exists that Islamic militants could attack U.S. and its allies assetsin the region, the threat may not be yet as great or immediate as some of the more extremealarmists claim. Buenos Aires in Argentina and Sao Paulo in Brazil are believed to have com-bined populations of 3 million Islamists. Successful car bomb attacks in 1992 and 1994 againstthe Israeli Embassy and a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina are attributed toHezbollah participation.4African littoral“Local and internal conflicts are the backdrop to trends and developments in the region.Famine and poverty remain ever-present handicaps to greater peace and security. However, anumber of long-running conflicts have been resolved or brought close to resolution. In a sign of agreater determination amongst regional countries to solve their own security problems, the NewPartnership for African Development (NEPAD) although driven largely by political and economicaims, has security elements referring to peacekeeping in its documentation.It is likely that this will develop in three main areas: peacekeeping operations, crisis earlywarning, and the non-proliferation of small arms. In a further development, military commenta-tors in South Africa have discussed the creation of an Indigenous Military Peace-building Initia-tive (IMPI), promoting the idea of a regional security forum for conflict resolution and prevention,and also the restructuring and democratic control of armed forces. Both NEPAD and IMPI are ata very early stage in their development. Given the partnership inherent in the NEPAD process,Western countries involved may make any necessary investment conditional on democratic re-forms, which may be unacceptable to some African partner countries.”5Piracy and maritime security is a growing threat to the region. There are concerns aboutsecurity at ports and on merchant shipping specially focused in places where security is poor.Despite attempts of the International Maritime Organization – a special working group of the UN– to counter terrorism at sea by providing standardized, consistent framework for assessing therisk to ships and port facilities and for taking security measures to counter these risks, suchmeasures are too costly for most governments in the region, and foreign aid is needed in orderfor any such measures to be implemented.6Cote dIvoire and Democratic Republic of Congo are turmoil-ridden African states thatgarner little or no attention from the international community. Each of these countries suffersfrom internal strife, but each has been largely ignored by the outside world -- unless you countthe presence of international peacekeepers, who have the uncanny knack of keeping the peacein places where the peace is already pretty much kept. Each of these crises, and others as well,4Stratfor Agency. “Latin America: A Safe Haven for Al Qaeda?”. September 04, 2003, 2225 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz5Chipman, J.. The Military Balance 2002-2003, “Sub-Saharan Africa – Regional Trends”. The International Institute for Stra-tegic Studies (IISS). London, UK. 2002. p.1.6Ibid, p.1.
  • 10. 10carries its own humanitarian calamities. There are important instability in Ivory Coast where arecommon rebel uprising last time that hold the northern half of the country.7Nigeria disputes over the ownership of offshore oil fields have created tension betweenthe Bight of Biafra states. Although Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria recently resolved their disputeover territorial waters, a quarrel between Nigeria and Cameroon is ongoing and tensionsthroughout the region have heightened following the development boom.Nigeria placed its forces on high alert in 2000 after learning France was building an airbase near the disputed Bakassi peninsula. 8Nigeria’s one of the worlds leading oil exporters, with production of around 2.3 millionbbl/d of oil during 2001, and with net oil exports of around 2.0 million bbl/d, including around885,000 bbl/d to the United States. Ongoing inter-ethnic tensions and persistent political andethnic strife in the Niger Delta region, including violence, kidnapping, sabotage and the seizureof oil facilities, often disrupts Nigerian oil production.In January 2001, the Nigerian navy announced plans to clamp down on arson attacks onoil facilities following the loss of billions in oil revenues due to vandalism. The Federal govern-ment also has ordered the navy to sink any ship conveying crude products that cannot be ac-counted for. The government estimates that as much as 300,000 bbl/d of Nigerian crude is ille-gally bunkered (freighted) out of the country. In December 2000, Nigeria reinstated the deathpenalty for vandalism of pipelines and electricity infrastructure.Equatorial Guinea is a burgeoning oil and natural gas power, has garnered attention as well,receiving more than $5 billion in private foreign investment over the past five years and prompt-ing the United States to reopen its embassy in October 2003.9In 2000, the U.S. State Depart-ment approved an application by Military Professional Resources Inc., a Virginia-based privatemilitary training company, to assess Equatorial Guineas coast guard requirements to protect itsoffshore oil installations. The company also hopes to build and train the countrys coast guard.10Antarctic frontIt belongs to the unique explored but not exploited continent. It’s far from theother continental masses except from southern cone of South America. The exis-tence of important renewal resources like krill, whales and other fish, fresh water,birds and mammals make it of interest to the main powers. While Antarctic krill havea circumpolar distribution, being found south of the Polar Front and north of the iceedge, the assumed centres of high krill concentration are areas around SouthGeorgia and the Antarctic Peninsula.11Antarctica has growing scientific interest along with the development of sci-ences and technology. Not only states but also international companies are inter-ested on it. In the meanwhile, the ecologic ONG defend Antarctic unpolution andenvironmental conservation.127Streatfor Agency. “Africa Net Assessment: Sub-Saharan Oil and Arms”. April 30, 2004, 1703 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz8Stratfor Agency. “Chinas Risky Business in Equatorial Guinea”. November 22, 2000 0000 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz9Stratfor Agency. “Africa Net Assessment: Sub-Saharan Oil and Arms”. ”. April 30, 2004 1703 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz10Stratfor Agency. “Chinas Risky Business in Equatorial Guinea”.November 22, 2000 0000 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz11FAO. “Review of The State of World Fishery Resources: Marine Fisheries – Southern Oceans”. 1997. Http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/W4248E/w4248e3212Bardi, Julio & Ass.. “100 Años de Orcadas y la Secretaría del Tratado Antártico-Parte 1” [ 100 Years of Orcadas and theSecretary of the Antarctic Treaty]. Newsletter, Countura Política, Nª 1005, Año 21, Tomo 118. 2004.
  • 11. 11Geological soundings in the Antarctic, reveals the presence of oil, gas, andmanganese with no international mechanism to control exploitation of the region.13Charming of the earth is slowly growing and Antarctica deicing continues. Tourism is in-creasing. The ozone layer has been steadily thinning since monitoring began in 1985. Nowherehas this decrease been more dramatic than over the Antarctic - the hub of global wind currents.As a consequence, Argentina and South Africa will face problems in the years to come, espe-cially since agriculture, fishing and tourism are central to their economies.Security in Antarctica is ruled by the international Antarctic Treaty. Thetreaty, which entered into force in 1961, establishes Antarctica as a zone of peaceand bans all military activities, including the testing of weapons. However militarypersonnel and equipment may be used for scientific purposes. 14Maritime environmentMaritime shippingThe following areas concerns to this issue:- The global maritime shipping environmentAnalyzing the importance of maritime shipping in the global economy, there is a continuetotal annual growth in maritime trade. However, world shipments of tanker cargoes decreased.Crude oil major loading areas include in second order to West Africa after Western Asia (MeddleEast).Petrobras, the Brazilian oil company, announced that for the first time exports had ex-ceeded imports. The discovery of oil in the Campos Basin, off the coast of Espiritu Santo, mightmake this trend permanent. The pattern and volume of shipments are similar during last pastyears with temporary fluctuations due to several reasons. Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) shipmentsare worldwide slightly increasing.Main dry cargo shipments of iron ore, coal, grains, bauxite/alumina and rock phosphateare also increasing as the remaining ones. There is a booming production of steel, which withAustralia account for about two-thirds of world exports.World grain shipments are suffering a decrease. One of the main loading areas is theeast coast of South America with almost 22 percent of world exports.European Union (EU) countries and some Eastern European countries account for 54 per centof world bauxite imports and are supplied from West Africa.Dry cargoes are increasingly being carried in containers along the liner trade routes. Con-tainers flow along South Atlantic along north-south and intra-regional routes. In the routes linkingEurope to Africa, flows increase in spite of political upheavals in some countries of West Africa.Routes linking Europe and North America with South America north ward flows are expanding ata higher rate than southward ones due to currency depreciation and devaluation in some southAmerican countries that pushed up exports and contracted imports.http://www.geostrategy.com.13Rodríguez, Silverio T. (LCdr Portuguese Marine Corps). “The Strategic Importance of the Portuguese Atlan-tic Islands”. US Naval War College. CSC 1984.14Antactic Treaty, Article 1.
  • 12. 12As transported cargo is modestly increasing, changes in the average world transport dis-tance are minimal. However, there are indications of supplies of crude oil and dry cargoes mov-ing shorter distances to destinations in Europe and Norh America. This reflects that there isnatural a tendency to find sources closer to these main markets.15So, South Atlantic Rim coun-tries are becoming more important, and in the same way the south-north routes.- Current trends in the global shipping industryThe world fleet is expanding. The tonnage of oil tankers and bulk carriers is expanding,too. The world fleet of fully cellular container ships continued to expand substantially. However, the fleetof general cargo ships decreased.The average age of the total world fleet is dropping to about 12.5 years and it reflects in-creased scrapping of old tonnage and deliveries of new buildings. The total tonnage sold fordemolition increased last years. Developed countries have continued the trend of lowering theaverage age of their fleet that has been apparent over the last few years. Container ships con-tinued to be the youngest fleet.Last deliveries reflected the steady trend towards larger vessels. The average size oftankers was 128,600 deadweight tons. Another feature was the slightly smaller size of bulk car-riers. The average deadweight tonnage had lowered to 62,400 in 2002. New buildings for othertypes of vessels, including general cargo ships and container ships, increased both in numberand in deadweight tonnage. The trend towards larger vessels continues.Aging of the fleet is also a changing subject. On 13 November 2002 the Aframax tankerPrestige carrying 77,000 tons of heavy fuel sent a distress call after severe weather off thenorth-west Spanish coast caused her to list. The accident polluted about 200 km of coast innorth-west Spain and weeks later also sections of the southern coast of France, causing majoreconomic and environmental damage. The 26-year old single-hull vessel had been on her wayfrom Latvia to Singapore.The accident had important impacts. Questions were raised concerning the state portcontrol carried out by European countries in accordance with the Paris MOU. The fact that the Prestigehad not been inspected over the last twelve months in spite of visiting several ports for bunkering high-lighted the practice of conducting such inspections only when vessels actually dock, as well as the lowrate of inspection in some countries.The question of the need to have authorized places of refuge to counter the worst fea-tures of marine accidents was raised again by the Prestige. In early 2001, coastal authoritiesdenied entry to the tanker Castor, which had developed extensive cracks after sailing in heavyweather in the Mediterranean Sea with 29,500 tons of unleaded gasoline. The cargo was finallytransferred to another vessel at sea.Moreover, two European countries, France and Spain, announced in early December aunilateral measure based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) whereby sin-gle hull tankers carrying heavy oils must sail outside their 200-mile exclusive economic zones.By early January, Spain alone had expulsed seven vessels, while charters started to includeextended sailing routes to comply with the measure. Malta, one of the registries most affected bythe expulsions, complained of this sudden and muscular measure.The main legal rights in the maritime environment are about immunity of warships, inno-15United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat. Chapter 1. Review of MaritimeTransport, 2003. Geneva, 2003. p.1-18. http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2003_en.pdf
  • 13. 13cent passage, coastal state rights and obligations, flag state responsibilities and protectionagainst piracy.Naval Control of Shipping should make the protection of shipping in wartime.The main threats in peacetime are terrorism and piracy. Navies and coast guards shouldgive protection to shipping. Both can produce crime at sea and can be state supported.The main lessons learned here are about the necessity of acting with urgency, the com-plexity of the action with regard to the application of law, the necessity of training for differentthreats, and the difficulty of avoiding collateral damage with weapons effects.It could be a potential impact on economic activity with disruption of trade. The role ofstates must be to protect trade, prevent illegal trade, power projection and develop and applyregulations. Sanctions can be applied. Purposes of sanctions are punishing of transgression,deterrence, compelling changes in behaviour, restricting activities and signal resolve. Some ex-amples are Palestine 1945-8, Cuban Missile Crisis, Beira Patrol 1965-74, Iraq – 1990-, Adriatic1992-6.By the other side, there could appear some sanction limitations as to be inadequate tostrategic goal, it could be insufficient forces, it must impact on impact correctly on target nation,sanctions create antidotes, it’s possible to find actions of target country allies and it may producealienation of world commerce.In case of blockades, they have to along with some principles: it’s limited to states en-gaged in hostilities, an area and start date should be established, it applies to all, and there areneutral rights. They must produce an impact on heavy traffic, there are big search and commandand control requirements, and there is a requirement for all-encompassing sanctions.With regard to power projection, as very good example, it’s important to show the impor-tance of sealift for the Falkland/Malvinas and Gulf Wars. The future shipping requirements willbe suitability, availability, contracts and costs.In conclusion, shipping is a global, international industry, it’s difficult to protect, there areimportant legal issues, there are iinadequate mandates to control and, overall, trade will getthrough.16- Sea lines of communicationSecurity and access to sea lines of communication (SLOCs) is of increasing importance,as these sea lines are the maritime highways for vast flows critical to the rapidly growing pros-perity not only of the countries of the South Atlantic Rim but also for other countries.Threats to the security and access to SLOCs include both military concerns (conflicts be-tween regional and extra-regional countries, international terrorism as well as sea mines) andnon-military concerns (natural disasters and accidents, piracy, and particularly “creeping jurisdic-tion” of regional states).17By its relative position in the globe, the South Atlantic “Mediterranean” position betweenthe North Atlantic, the Indic and the Pacific is important for the control of sea lines of communi-cations transporting oil and other strategic resources. This would be much more important incase of close of Panama and/or Suez Canals.16Thomas, Robert H.. Presentation “The Global Maritime Shipping Environment”, Canadian Forces College, CSC27, 19 Janu-ary 2001.17Weeks, Stanley B. “Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Security and Access”, Policy Paper 33. Internet.
  • 14. 14It’s important to consider, not only maritime sea lines, but also chock points. Maritime traf-fic inside, to and from South Atlantic itself is not an important proportion of the global total. How-ever, this is very important to the countries of the region because it is the main part of their inter-national trade. Moreover, the recent growth in United States dependence on its Western Hemi-sphere neighbors is an illustration of a “nearer-is-better” phenomenon and it grows the SouthAtlantic importance.There is another traffic that not touches any littoral but pass throughout the South Atlantic.The main line in this case passes by the chock point south of Capes of Agulhas and Good Hopein South Africa and is normally sailed by “Ultra Large Crude Carriers” (ULCCs) or more than300,000 dead weight tons (DWT) and “Very Large Crude Carriers “ (VLCCs) from 200,000 to300,000 DWT, usually called super tankers, with oil and charge from Middle East to Europe andUSA.It’s important to remark that more than three-fifths of global oil is moved by sea and therest is done by pipelines. Tankers have made global (intercontinental) transport of oil possibleand they are low cost, efficient, and extremely flexible. “Suezmax” tankers between 180,000 and125,000 DWT; “Aframax” tankers between 125,000 and 75,000 DWT; “Panamax” tankers ofaound 50,000 DWT; “Handymax” tankers of around 35,000 DWT; and “Handy Size” tankers of30,000-20,000DWT can pass across the Suez Canal but they should take the “route of Cape” ifthe other way is close by any reason.The Drake Passage, chock point south of South America, has currently commercially veryless importance and it only could grow in case of Panama Canal closing. There is small traffic bythis way because only tankers bigger than “Panamax” would need to use this route. The Trans-Panama Pipeline would let to transfer the oil between the Caribbean and the Pacific in case ofnecessity. However, there is not choice for the U.S. aircraft carriers moving from one coast ofthe country to the other for maintenance or strategic necessities. This is an example of how theDrake means much more than a lot of people may show.It’s possible to see the main lines of communication of South Atlantic in Annex 2.Resources- Renewal resources. Fisheries:They represent a substantial protein resource in a world where shortage of food is be-coming an increasing challenge. Some riche fisheries in the region attract fishermen from othernations that expertice a lack of resources as a result of overexploitation of their traditional fish-ing grounds. This is a recipe for a clash of interests.Fisheries and the living resources in South Atlantic represent an important resource of na-tional wealth for some countries of the region. Moreover, fisheries have historically constituteda necessary precondition for human settlement along the coast.18Pollution, climate change and irresponsible fishing are all taking a toll on the worlds ma-rine resources.Globally, reports FAO, 25 percent of major marine fish stocks are under exploited ormoderately exploited. Forty-seven percent are fully exploited and are therefore producing18Olsen , Kjell- Birger. “Norway-the Coastal State: Protein. Energy. Lines of Communication. Shipping”. NAVAL FORCESSpecial Issue 7/2002. p. 9, 10.
  • 15. 15catches that have reached, or are very close to, their maximum sustainable limits. Another 18percent of stocks or species groups are overexploited, while 10 percent of stocks have becomesignificantly depleted or are recovering from depletion. 19South Atlantic fisheries are a well-known source of food. Regional and foreign countriesuse to fish in these areas and many conflicts usually arise based in illegal fishing inside ZEE orprotected zones. More over, legislation about the migration of some species of fish from insideto outside the ZEE and vice versa grew another issue of possible dispute that has to be con-sidered in the future. They are all areas of potential conflicts.Despite the existence of many Regional Fishery Bodies (RFB) with influence in South At-lantic as:1- Management Bodies:International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas - ICCASouth Atlantic Fisheries Organization – SEAFOConvention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources - CCAMLR2- Advisory Bodies:Atlantic Africa Fisheries Commission - AAFCFishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic - CECAFRegional Fisheries Advisory Committee for the Southwest Atlantic - CARPASJoint Permanent Commission for the Argentina/Uruguay Maritime Front – COFREMARSub-Regional Commission on Fisheries (West Africa) - SRCFRegional Fisheries Committee for the Gulf of Guinea - COREPWestern Central Atlantic Fishery Commission - WECAFC3- Scientific Body:International Council for the Exploitation of the Sea – ICES20,illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing occurs in all capture fisheries and includes arange of illicit activities: fishing without permission or out of season; using outlawed types offishing gear; disregarding catch quotas; or non-reporting and underreporting catch weights andspecies.According to an FAO, IUU fishing is increasing in both intensity and scope, and is serious-ly undermining national and regional efforts to sustainably manage fisheries.21Regionally, the countries of North America, Europe and the Southwest Pacific have themost national fishing boats operating outside their own national waters.Africa is one of two regions with the greatest number of countries granting access to for-eign flagged fishing vessels.Argentina in South Atlantic is one of 22 countries of the world that accounted for over80% of the worlds total marine catch in 2002.22A recent Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) survey conclud-ed that while some controls are in place, fewer than 50% of countries are exerting effectivecontrol over high-seas fishing vessels flying their flags. Moreover, “unreported high seas fishingand the current lack of implementation of adequate reporting mechanisms by a large number of19FAO. “Excess capacity and illegal fishing: challenges to sustainable fisheries”. 2004. http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/focus/2004/47127/index.html20FAO, Marine Resources Service, Fishery Resources Division, Fisheries Dpt.. “Review of the State of World Fishery Resour-ces: Marine Fisheries”. FAO Fisheries Circular No. 920 FIRM/C920(En) Rome, 1997. ISSN 0429-9329.http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/W4248E/W4248E00.21FAO “Illegal fishing and high-seas fisheries”. 2004. http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/focus/2004/47127/article_47140en22FAO. “Fishing capacity: global trends”. 2004. http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/focus/2004/47127/article_47136en
  • 16. 16high seas fishing nations," the FAO study noted. 23Therefore, effective monitoring and en-forcement of South Atlantic littoral countries are key to effective fisheries management.. Fresh Water:Ice of Antarctic Continent, barriers and ice floes in the region are so far the biggest re-serve of fresh water in the world. It has a growing importance of this resource in a world wheremore countries are suffering more scarcities and shortages than before. High development andincrement in population make grow fresh water necessities.- Non renewal resourcesThe growing importance of sub-sea resources.In response to the growing potential of sub-sea resources, basic questions have arisenabout who has a right of access to sub-sea resources in the deep oceans, and how may thisright be enjoyed. The International Seabed Authority is the international agency established todefine, control and regulate all activities in the deep-sea bed and the ocean floor beyond thelimits of national jurisdiction as areas for the benefit of common humanity.The main types of mineral deposits of potential economic value that occur on and be-neath the seafloor in the extended continental shelf areas are: conventional hydrocarbons(crude oil and natural gas), gas hydrates, placer deposit, phosphorite deposits, evaporite depos-it, polymetallic sulphides (pms), and manganese and cobalt-rich nodules and crusts.Extended “legal” continental shelf (ELCS) lie beyond 200 nautical mile jurisdiction of na-tion states exclusive zones, and their limits are defined by the criteria established by the UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 76, 1982.Placer deposits comprising heavy minerals, gold and diamonds are limited to near-shoreareas and have negligible resource potential in the ELCS regions. Evaporite deposits occur onmany continental margins. However, they only overlap with ELCS regions off eastern NorthAmerica and western central Africa, where their resource is low.The major resource potential within the ELCS regions is held in iron-manganese nodulesand crusts, conventional oil and gas and gas hydrates. In manganese nodules and crusts, fourelemental metals comprise the main components of commercial value: manganese, copper,nickel and cobalt.Technology developed in recent years has enabled direct observation and research onthe deep parts of the seafloor. There already is a capability for drilling for oil and gas in waterdepths beyond 1,500 m, and this is expected to increase as future deep-water prospects arerealized (International Energy Agency, 1996). Similarly, exploration of deep seafloor usingmanned submersibles and remotely operated vehicles has been highly rewarding scientifically.The term (estimated) “resource” is used to describe the potential for materials to occur. Itcomprises estimates of the potential occurrence and abundance of materials, regardless of theirfeasible exploitation. It is not, and should not be taken as, an assessment of non-living reserves.They can be subdivided into:- “Para.marginal resources that are prospectively marketable materials recoverable at prices asmuch as 1.5 times those prevailing now or possible with likely advances in technology”, and23Ibid FAO “Illegal fishing and high-seas fisheries”.
  • 17. 17- “Sub-marginal resources that are materials recoverable at prices higher than 1.5 times thoseprevailing now but that have some foreseeable use and prospective value”.(Known) “Reserves” are, by definitions, proven deposits of known abundance and volumewith progress in exploration, advance in technology, and changes in economic conditions.“Proven reserves of most minerals are relatively small when compared with the estimatedresources that may be found by future exploration or become recoverable as a result of techno-logic advances or changes in economic conditions. This is particularly true for sub-sea re-sources, because only a small part of the seabed has been explored and most of the resourcesit contains are not yet economically recoverable”.24Marine Placer depositsThe most economically important of these minerals are: cassiterite (tin), ilmenite (titani-um), rutile (titanium), zircon (zirconium), chromite (chromium), monazite (thorium), magnetite(iron), gold and diamonds.In most placer deposits, economically valuable minerals have been mechanically concen-trated in rivers along beaches, fan-aprons and river deltas. The majority of heavy mineral marineplacer deposits are intrinsically linked close to their geological sources and to near-shore orshallow continental shelf environments. The majority of placer deposits are found along manypresent shorelines.The minerals rutile and ilmenite are the main sources of titanium and are or have beenmined from placer-derived deposits from beach sand in east South Africa and Brasil. Diamondsare mined in beach and shelf sediments along the west coast of South Africa, and are used asjewelry and for industrial cutting and grinding processes.Placer deposits are limited to continental shelf regions less than 120 m deep.Marine phosporite depositsPhosphorite deposits are naturally occurring compounds containing phosphate in the formof a cement binding sediments in tropical to sub-tropical regions. They tend to occur in waters ofmedium depth.Major localities include south and Southwestern Africa and the eastern margins of South Ameri-ca. None of locations overlap with the extended continental shelf regions, except for a small por-tion on the southeastern margin of Argentina.The bulk of sub-sea phosphorite resources in ELCS regions must be classed as sub-marginal and hence of little economic value.Marine evaporite depositsThey are anhydrite and gypsum (calsium sulphates), common salt (sodium chloride), andpotash-bearing minerals. Important deposits of magnesium bearing salts are also deposited insuch basins.It’s possible to find deposits in ELCS regions of the northeastern margin of Brazil and West Afri-24Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, “Global Non-Living Resources on the Extended Continental Shelf: Prospects at the Year2000-ISA Technical Study: Nº 1”, Southampton Oceanography Centre, Empress Dock, Southampton, United Kingdon, 2000, p.17.
  • 18. 18ca.Thick beds of a magnesium salt and tachydrite (calcium-magnesium hydrate) previouslyknown only in trace amounts, occur in areas associated with potash in the Sergipe salt basinalong the eastern coast of Brazil and in the Congo basin along the mid-south-western coast ofAfrica.All marine evaporite deposits must be regarded as sub-marginal resources but they canbe produced more cheaply in the future.Marine polymetallic sulphides“The majority of sub-sea polymetallic sulphides (PMS) are massive ore bodies containingvarying proportions of pyrrhotite, pyrite/marcasite, sphalerite/wurtzite, chalcopyrite, bornite, andisocubanite. Some massive polymetallic sulphides located on spreading centres behind deep-ocean trenches also contain galena (lead sulphide) and native gold. Other minor sulphides of tin,cadmium, antimony, arsenic and mercury also occur in varying amounts at different localities.”25“It’s unlikely that sub-sea PMS deposits, such as those located in international waters onthe Mid-Atlantic Ridge will become mining targets in the foreseeable future because of theirdepth (greater than 2500m) and remote locations from shore. However, high gold and base-metal grades, sites are located close to land, and in water depths less than 2000 m. Under thosecircumstances, massive sulphide mining may become economically viable.”26Marine manganese nodules and crusts“They are concentrations of iron and manganese oxides, ranging from millimeters to tensof centimeters in diameter. They can contain economically valuable concentrations of nickel,copper and cobalt (together, making up to three weight percent). They include trace amounts ofmolybdenum, platinum and other base metals.The current known distribution of manganese nodules and crusts on the ocean floor isbased on information acquired by side scan sonars, drill cores, dredged samples, seafloor pho-tos, video camera records and direct observation from submersibles”.27“The major elements in dry nodules are oxygen, manganese, iron, silica, lesser amountsof aluminum, calcium, sodium, and magnesium and trace elements of which nickel, copper, andcobalt are the greatest economic interest.”28“Cobalt bearing manganese-iron crusts cover thousand of square kilometres in the Atlan-tic Ocean bearing manganese-iron crusts cover thousand of square kilometres in the AtlanticOcean and are found on the Blake Plateau, Sierra Leona Rise, and east flank of the Mid-AtlanticRidge.”29“Nodules are sparsely and irregularly distributed through broad areas of the Atlantic.Good possibilities for finding nodules in other areas near continental margins where they havehigh Mn/Fe ratios include areas such as the southern and south-western African continentalmargin.”3025Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 2626Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 27.27Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 28.28Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 29.29Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 3330Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p.35-36
  • 19. 19The top ten countries, ranked in descending order, that have the greatest resource poten-tial of nodules and crusts in their ELCS area: USA, Madagascar, Brazil, Antarctica, Argentina,Japan, South Africa, Canada and India.Argentina and South Africa have ELCS areas where, on average, high grades are foundand that may in future have selected locations exploited for manganese nodule and crust recov-ery.There are no considered viable resources over 10 kg/m2 within any of the ELCS areas,and hence, at a regions scale, all nodules and crusts in these regions must be considered para-marginal.Marine hydrocarbon deposits“Oil and gas are hydrocarbon deposits that occur naturally within thick sedimentary se-quences. These are largely confined to the continental shelves, continental slopes, continentalrises, and small ocean basins.”31“These areas are almost exclusively on the continental shelvesand contain sedimentary sequences greater than 1,000m in thickness.”32“With the exception ofa small area off central western Africa, none of these areas lie within the ELCS regions.”33Theremaining largest fields after those of Persian Gulf and North Sea include the ones located inSouth America and West Africa.34Technological improvements in recovery efficiency and greater access to deep-water ar-eas are increasing the range of economically recoverable resources offshore. Favorable off-shore conditions occur along Antarctica seaboard and the Atlantic seaboards of South America,including Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina, and western Africa.“Hydrocarbon resources in the ELCS regions are mostly sub-marginal to para-marginal.However, there is considerable potential for exploitation in the future when technology and eco-nomic conditions make exploration, proving, and ultimately exploiting of these resources via-ble.”35Marine gas hydrate depositsGas hydrate is a crystalline compound composed of gas molecules, normally methane,en-caged within water molecules to form a solid similar to ice. One volume of hydrate also stores164 volumes of un-pressured methane-a measure of the value of the resource. Gas hydratesoccur widely in nature mainly beneath the seafloor in deep-sea sediments but also close to theseabed in shallow arctic seas. The methane in gas hydrate forms naturally by organic decay inthe thick sediments normally found in the deep water adjacent to continental margins. The deep-sea pressures (500m depth) and intra sediment temperatures (increasing with depth) determinethe gas hydrate stability.36Known hydrates are found on the Atlantic margins of South America, especially at equa-torial latitudes. Isolated occurrences are also found off Antarctica. High potential exists in Ant-arctic, eastern margin of South America and the African margin.31Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 37.32Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 40.33Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 41.34Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 42.35Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 46.36Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 47.
  • 20. 20Exploitation of gas hydrates has potential hazards, since the stability of hydrates hasbeen implicated in the stability history of continental slopes. Until the technology for safe exploi-tation of hydrates is in place, all gas hydrate resources must be considered sub-marginal.37In conclusion, the non-living resource potential within the extended legal continental shelf(ELCS) lie beyond the 200 nautical mile jurisdiction of nation states´ exclusive economic zones,and their outer limits are defined by the criteria established by the United Nations Convention onthe Law of the Sea, Article 76. Eight different types of non-living resources are assessed. Themajor resource potential within the ELCS regions are held in iron-manganese nodules andcrusts, oil, gas and gas hydrates. Four elemental metals are the main components of value inmanganese nodules and crusts: manganese, copper, nickel, and cobalt.“The value of the non-living resources in the ELCS regions depends on the technologicaldevelopments that will allow their extraction and production. Because of this, with perhaps theexception of conventional gas and oil, and possibly gas hydrates, many resources on the ELCSwill remain uncompetitive with onshore resources” by now.38Oil. Energy and geopolitics in the same coin.Energy and geopolitics are often two sides of the same coin. Each affects the other bothdirectly and indirectly because of economic necessity, and the military and political tools usedeither to ensure or disrupt regular energy supplies directly impact the political and economic sta-tus of countries the world over. The end result is a complex web of relationships-economic, polit-ical and military-where a minor quiver in a single strand can send vibrations throughout thewhole.Oil has historically been a source of conflict and exploitation, reserves and potential inland and offshore is very important in the South Atlantic region. Moreover, the Guinea Gulf iscurrently an important source of oil and much economical interest grows around this area.With the seeds planted for widespread oil exploration after both the 1973 OPEC embargoand the 1991 Gulf War, significant advances in exploration and production technology have ac-celerated success in finding alternative sources of crude. Those technological advances havefacilitated the discovery of vast oil reserves in many unforeseen geographic regions.The shift of U.S. reliance away from Arabian Gulf oil resources becomes evident oncecurrent data on reserves and production is reviewed. At the onset of the Gulf War in 1991, theUnited States depended on the Arabian Gulf Region for 27.8% of its oil imports. That figurealone justified the U.S. concern that instability in the region demanded fast, powerful, and deci-sive U.S. action.Since the Gulf War, aggressive exploration for alternatives to U.S. dependence on theArabian Gulf Region for petroleum needs have been both serious and successful. The processof exploration and discovery outside of the Middle East has fostered a slow but steady shift inthe energy resource center of gravity away from the Arabian Gulf and toward the South Atlantic.Angola is one of the two biggest non-OPEC movers and shakers with plans to raise pro-duction levels by 1.0 million bdp by 2007.37Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 51-52.38Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 53.
  • 21. 21The eastern South American shelf is one of the widest of the world, it has the potential tobe a very important source, and just there, Argentina and United Kingdom disputed their rightsover Malvinas/Falkland Islands.South Atlantic Region, the New Strategic Oil Supply Flashpoint39Long ignored by policy makers, the South Atlantic Region is just now emerging as a newenergy center of gravity. Specifically, the growing discoveries of energy reserves in AtlanticEquatorial Africa combined with those of oil-rich South America can already be recognized asvital U.S. interests.It seems U.S. foreign and military policy have unintentionally overlooked the essentialneed for stability particularly in Africa, stability that will ensure uninterrupted flow of energy re-sources to the U.S. throughout the foreseeable future.Significant discoveries in Latin America and Atlantic Equatorial Africa shed new light onthe strategic importance of the South Atlantic geographic region. Thus a shift in the U.S. energyparadigm has been essential in order to bolster the reliability of these newly discovered sourcesof energy. An Stratfor Agency report called “Iraq: Energy´s Rip Van Winkle” recently (2003) said:“Finally, where the energy flows so will the U.S. Navy sail.”At present, Atlantic Equatorial Africa provides the United States with approximately 1.3mbd or 13.5% of its total oil imports. That figure equals or possibly exceeds current oil importsfrom Saudi Arabia and almost seven times the amount imported from Kuwait.Combining that percentage with imports from South America (excluding Mexico), SouthAtlantic sources are now providing the United States with close to 45% of its imported oil. (Mexi-co exports about 1.3 million b/d of crude oil to the U.S.). That figure is more than double theamount of oil imported from the Arabian Gulf. The Gulf region, now supplying the United Stateswith approximately 18% of its oil imports, is steadily decreasing in its energy importance to theUnited States.Looking only at proven oil reserves, the combined total reserves in South America, includ-ing Brazil, Columbia, Argentina, and Venezuela – are almost 85 billion barrels.When the Atlantic Equatorial Africa figure of 25 billion barrels (a figure that continues to growexponentially with continued exploration) are combined with those of South America, the oil re-serves in the South Atlantic region becomes an astonishing 110 billion barrels or more than 10%of the world total. To put that figure in perspective, Iran and Kuwait have reserves of 93 bbl and97 bbl respectively.The steady development of energy resources in the South Atlantic is progressively allow-ing the United States to become far less dependent on Arabian Gulf sources than it was a dec-ade ago. With that shift of energy dependence comes a shift in the energy center of gravity andso should come a shift in foreign and national military policy.Latin American policy seems to continue concentrating on narcotics as the overriding re-gional issue. The importance of South American energy resources along with the importance ofmaintaining regional stability are recognized but understated.39Mitchel, Antony E. and Wihbey, Paul M..”South Atlantic Region Emerging as New Strategic Oil Supply Flashpoint”. Oil &Gas Journal, Volume 96, Issue 26. June 29, 1998, p. 25-28.
  • 22. 22Atlantic Equatorial Africa as new U.S. vital interest.Oil producing Atlantic Equatorial Africa (Angola, Nigeria, Gabon, Congo, Equatorial Guin-ea) will be a region containing vital U.S. interests. An increased US regional interest has oc-curred towards Africa largely as the result of increasing oil production in the region. In fact, Afri-can oil will likely replace Middle Eastern supplies to the US by 2010.40In addition to the vast oilreserves previously mentioned, two other significant factors help in characterizing the im-portance of U.S. national interest in Atlantic Equatorial Africa.First, the energy potential of that region is not going unnoticed with other world powers.For example, Congo’s fledgling oil industry, whose predominant customers are currently theU.S. and France, is courting Asian consumers. Congo has participated in sales talks with Chi-nese oil firms that are attempting to reduce their Middle East energy dependence. China is alsoa major participant in an international consortium developing oil resources in southern Sudanwhose reserves may equal that of Libya.Second, regional instability runs rampant. That has the potential to cause significant sup-ply disruptions and imperil American lives and property. The London-based International Insti-tute for Strategic Studies recently reported that the greatest danger to progress in sub-SaharanAfrica is political instability and civil unrest. The importance of regional stability in this part of theworld will continue to grow as oil discoveries expand and production levels increase.To reiterate, the South Atlantic Region, and especially Atlantic Equatorial Africa, is be-coming a vital U.S. interest since it is emerging as a new energy center of gravity. It’s alreadyclear that U.S. is changing its engagement, presence, and investment in order to cultivate thisemerging market and secure regional stability.The military dimensions of crisis response options and regional organization also had areassessment fot U.S.. Currently, the borders of the regional commanders-in-chief’s (CinC) are-as of responsibility are anything but seamless. Africa falls under the responsibility of the UnitedStates European Command (USEUCOM), while the South Atlantic Ocean falls under the re-sponsibility of United States Atlantic Command (USACOM); all of Latin America is the responsi-bility of the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).Africa has long been the unwanted stepchild of USEUCOM while USSOUTHCOM hasbeen almost totally focused on counter-narcotics operations, which is reflected in their organiza-tion and structure. USACOM has supported USEUCOM and provided intermittent presence inAtlantic Equatorial Africa through the occasional deployment of a Navy ship to “show-the-flag” inWest African ports. What is now needed is a clear and seamless organization that reflects thenew requirements of the region.Additionally, there exists a need for decisive strategy with a goal of regional stability. Im-plementing that strategy while at the same time redefining the boundaries of the CinC’s areas ofresponsibility has the potential to foster even further investment that will continue regional ener-gy development that is sure to benefit the U.S.In conclusion, the shifting energy center of gravity should in no way cause the U.S. to for-get regional friends and allies in the Persian Gulf. But, ignoring the rapidly developing econo-mies of Atlantic Equatorial Africa would be a tragic mistake that will be exploited by other worldeconomic powers. Weaning U.S. from a dependence on Middle East oil is a smart and healthy40DP&M, VCDS, Canadian Forces. “Future Security Environment-Resource Conflict”. Canadian Forces, 2004.http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda//milassess/2002/003f_e.asp
  • 23. 23development, but there is an expense. Investment and engagement in Atlantic Equatorial Africacan be considered a challenge for policy makers and industrialists but decision seems to be tak-en.As long as political instability exists, there is an unavoidable threat to American lives andproperty. Current American strategy is based on an indecisive (low-profile) approach to a secu-rity environment that can only be characterized as volatile. New security architecture might bewished to reduce and eliminate current and potential threats to U.S. interests.Engagement and conspicuous military forward presence are essential in order to enjoythe benefits of the shift in the energy center of gravity. A seamless military area of responsibilityin the South Atlantic region with an east-west orientation vice the traditional north-south orienta-tion could promote sound and consistent focus that supports vital U.S. interests. With that inmind, one would reasonably conclude that planning as well as our perception of the importanceof policy and security strategy for the South Atlantic region requires immediate attention and ad-justment. 41A power projection spaceFar away from the main global power centers it’s clearly visible that South Atlantic is forforeign powers an easy, cheap and, so, convenient way to approach and influence over botheastern South American and western African littorals showing power by different ways sincemerit visits to gunship diplomacy or conducting power projection by the action of aircraft carriersand amphibious operations.In addition, main powers can use South Atlantic as place of forward and/or global de-ployment of information sources and military assets to gain, keep or defend the control of inter-esting zones. The law of the sea particularly allows accomplishing this function.It’s been possible to estimate for different actors a synthesis of South Atlantic strategicimportance as showed in table of Annex 3.In conclusion, the strategic importance of South Atlantic influences countries of the regionand others outside the rim. Its strategic value is based in the value of transported materials bythis ocean, the value of its renewal and not renewal resources, the importance of its accesspassages and the possibility to influence from the sea over land.SummaryThis section provided the basic frame to understand the situation in the South Atlantic Rim.Generalities of the maritime environment showed the special characteristics of the SouthAtlantic environment, especially as part of the maritime hemisphere. The South Atlantictheatre was described from a geographic and strategic point of view, identifying the dif-ferences between the littorals of South America, Africa and the Antarctic from. The mari-time environment in South Atlantic is important because of the shipping activities withimportant sea lines of communication, the resources involved and as a power projectionspace. South Atlantic Region is the New Strategic Oil Supply Flashpoint and AtlanticEquatorial Africa is a becoming a new vital interest for U.S. and a number of very im-41Mitchell, Anthony E. and Wihbey, Paul Michael, “South Atlantic Region Emerging as New Strategic Oil Supply Flash-point”, http//: www.jinsa.org
  • 24. 24portant actors.Next section will develop the influence of international law and security in theSouth Atlantic Rim.***
  • 25. 25SECTION 2INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SECURITY IN SOUTH ATLANTICSecurity under United Nations organization (UN)The Charter of United Nations Organization recognize the responsibility of Security Coun-cil to determine the existence of threats to the peace and to decide about actions to be taken, asfollow:“CHAPTER VII – Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of Aggression.Article 39:The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act ofaggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance withArticles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security”.42“Article 51:Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if anarmed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measuresnecessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of thisright of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect theauthority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such actionas it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security”.43But it’s very important for the goal of this paper to show how the Charter mention the con-venience of “regional arrangements” for performing “regional actions” in consistency with U.N.:“CHAPTER VIII – Regional arrangementsArticle 52:1- Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealingwith such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate forregional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with thePurposes and Principles of the United Nations.2- The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shallmake every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements orby such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.3- The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through suchregional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or byreference from the Security Council”.44The Law of the Sea ConventionThe sea services of South Atlantic Rim Nations must maintain their role in shaping globalrules and policies that affect international freedom of navigation and maritime mobility, two es-42United Nations. Charter of the United Nations. Chapter VII, Art. 39, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html43Ibid, Art. 5144Ibid, Art. 52
  • 26. 26sential elements of U.S. naval power. The Convention codifies access and transit rights for shipsand it is a comprehensive international legal framework governing the world’s oceans.The Law of the Sea Convention is a complex document that touches on wide range ofU.S. maritime concerns. Since it was finalized in 1982, a primary U.S. interest in the Conventionhas been to preserve essential navigational freedoms and thereby enhance the mobility of U.S.naval power.The Convention supports “anybody ability to operate around the globe, anytime, any-where, allowing the navies to project power where and when needed. It guarantees, for exam-ple, that ships and aircraft may transit straits that otherwise may have been closed by the territo-rial claims of nearby states. More than 135 straits are affected, including the Magellan, in theSouth American Cone.The United States’ interest as a global naval power was behind its initial participation intalks on the Convention as the United Nations conducted negotiations from 1973 to 1982. It’spolicy makers were concerned that transit and access rights of U.S. warships could be restrictedby the rising number of claims from other nations over territorial seas, fishing zones and offshorehigh seas areas.Today, the Law of the Sea Convention helps assure access to the largest maneuverspace on the planet — the sea — under authority of widely recognized and accepted law andnot the threat of force. However, U.S. didn’t signed the Convention, yet.Much of U.S. government’s initial delay in ratification was linked to objections by many in-dustrialized countries to sections related to deep seabed mining. However, changes to the Con-vention in 1994 remedied each of the U.S. objections.Despite its advantages, the Law of the Sea Convention remains controversial because ofwidespread U.S. belief that it would adversely affect U.S. sovereignty, inhibit its intelligencegathering activities or hamper the U.S. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) through which itsforces seek to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction.Critics point to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, created to settle disputes,as a threat to U.S. sovereignty. However, parties to the Convention are free to agree on anymethod of dispute settlement they desire — and the U.S. will not select the Tribunal.Fears to U.S. that ratification would diminish its collection of intelligence are linked to asection of the Convention containing a list of activities that would deprive a vessel of the right ofinnocent passage through territorial seas. These activities include the collection of certain typesof information and the requirement that submarines navigate on the surface. However, such ac-tivity is not a violation of the Convention. Intelligence-gathering activities are not prohibited noradversely affected by the Convention.The Bush Administration’s PSI — potentially a major weapon in the global war on terror-ism — seeks the support of all nations in international efforts to board and search vessels sus-pected of transporting weapons of mass destruction.U.S. learned in Iraq that even its allies sometimes would block access to key battle areas.Freedom of navigation cannot be contingent on the approval of nations along global sea lanesand the Law of the Sea is a legal regimen for the world’s oceans that helps to guarantee world-wide mobility for naval forces. The existence of this Law is an enough reason for South AtlanticRim Countries and navies to work together.
  • 27. 27Security as a concept of South Atlantic Rim common interestSecurity has been defined as “the absence of threats to a State-Nation”45In another way, the UN has an inter-state point of view: “a condition in which the Statesconsider that there is no risk of a military attack, political pressure or economic coercion whichwould prevent their own free development and progress”46The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) of United Nations was toldin a continued general debate that the terrorist attacks against the United States of September11th, 2001 had shown that in the current century - with security challenges increasingly compli-cated by the rapid development of science and technology and the steady deepening of eco-nomic globalization - only international cooperation could bring about real security.47In conclusion, the concept of regional, state and inter-state security, in the widest sensecan be understood as the situation resulting from the control of all threats, thereby ensuring thatthe interests of the states or groups of associated states not be negatively affected and that theobjectives that they have determined be accomplished. It depends more and more of interna-tional cooperation.The threatsWith this regard, threat is stated as “an array of circumstances which, when combined,constitute a potential factor of true damage that may, under certain circumstances, comeabout”48.Any model of current security has, at least, to consider the following threats:Basic current threats (from a “continental” point of view).- The organized crime, particularly drug trafficking or general narcotics activity, and moneylaundering, which expedites the whitening of capital that is the product of criminal activitiesand contributes to corruption.- The international terrorism mainly carried out by Muslim fundamentalist terrorist organiza-tions.- Poverty, that is a source of instability in most African and Latin American countries, which en-danger their capability to govern, therefore endangering democracy.49- Warfare between states of the region.- Foreign military interventions. 5045Nye, Joseph. “El Nuevo Poder Mundial. Actualización de la Política”. The New World Power. Updating of Politics. BuenosAires, Argentina. November 1991. 4346United Nations. “Los conceptos de Seguridad”. [The Security Concepts]. Document A/40/553. 1986. Introd. Paragraph 3,205-209.47United Nations. “New Concept Of Security Needed Following 11 September Terrorist Attack”, Fifty-sixth GeneralAssembly, First Committee, 4thMeeting (PM).48Bartolomé Mariano. “Las Amenazas Transnacionales”. [Transnational Threats] Revista Escuela Superior de GendarmeríaNacional [Journal of the Higher School of National Police], Buenos Aires, 1999.49Ros, Fernando M. (Argentine Mj.), “The Inter-American Treaty Of Reciprocal Assistance, Is It Collapsed?”,Canadian Forces College, CSC 28, Master Of Defence Studies (MDS) Thesis, p. 64-65.50Yaacov Vertzverger. “Risk Taking and Decision Making. Foreign Military Intervention Decisions”, Stanford UniversityPress, Stanford, California, USA, 1998.
  • 28. 28Information Age Threats to Security 51Threat EffectBiological Death or debilitation of people, animals or plants on a grand scale, withattendant economic and social collapse; also, systemic paralysis throughthe contamination of critical facilities.Cyber Destruction or corruption of government or private records or controls,paralyzing critical infrastructure (water, electricity, finance, transportation,etc.), and rendering response ineffective.Nuclear Blast/heat/electro-magnetic effects on cities; military, critical infrastruc-ture, leaving tens of thousands of casualties, paralyzing the economy,and emptying cities by the threat of additional bombings.Radiological Contamination to deny critical areas and produce chaos, as governmentprevention measures prove ineffective.Chemical Local damage, significant casualties, and widespread fear as citizensrealize their vulnerability; also contamination of specific high value tar-gets.Enhanced Con-ventional Muni-tionsConventional violence (truck bombs, hijacked aircraft, etc.) designed bysize or scale to produce extraordinary effects (mass casualties, assassi-nation, etc.)c. Maritime threatsPiracy 52Piracy at sea is becoming rampant. The total number of crew killed increased to 22 from 4as compared to figures for the same period in 2003. Incidents of hijackings increased to 4 ascompared to three last year with incidents of crew being threatened increasing to 11 from 6.On this regard, piracy prone areas and warnings in Eastern South Atlantic/West Africaare: Abidjan, Conakry, Dakar, Douala, Lagos, Luanda, Onne, Tema and Warri.In Western South Atlantic/Eastern South American waters:Brasil: Belem, SantosColombia: Barranquilla.Guyana: Georgetown.Venezuela: Guanta, Puerto Cabello, Sucre.Nigeria continues to show an alarming rise in the number of attacks at sea. 53Piracy at-tacks in Nigeria are ranked second highest with 10 attacks a year. Violence against crewmem-bers continues to rise. The current report shows that 10 crewmembers were killed in Nigeria inthe first quarter of 2004.Pirates are experts at boarding even fast-moving ships at sea and capturing a tanker atsea is far easier than hijacking an aircraft. A hijacked tanker is potentially a threat to any mari-time country. A major oil spill can devastate a countrys fishing and tourism industry for years. A51Mc Intyre, Dave. “We Need to Study War Some More”, The Journal of International Security Affairs, Nº 3, Summer 2002, p.7. http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html.52International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), The World Business Organization. Http://www.iccwbo.org.html53Indonesia continues to record the highest number of attacks with 21 reported incidents in the first quarter of 2004.
  • 29. 29cleanup operation can cost millions of dollars, an amount which poor countries can ill afford.Piracy Maps54Terrorism at seasThe International Terrorism has clearly chosen soft targets, preferable civilians, very vul-nerable, low defended, to produce the biggest number of victims, generating panic to societies,to influence over the wish of people.It’s not new and always represented a way to break the determination of competitors us-ing the terror. It was a common tactic by centuries in land environments. Since seventies lastcentury were common the air kidnapping and seizure of planes until we arrived to the catastro-phe of September 11, 2001 and the humanitarian law became very vulnerable.It’s predictable that terrorist will change the way to act and the maritime theatre has al-ready been and may increment the possibility to be the environment of next terrorist operations.As example, the attack to U.S. Destroyer COLE and, more recently, to the French oil tankerLINBURG close to Yemen, causing many dead, wounded and big material and ecologic dam-age.However, the “maritime” terrorism is less probable in high seas. The press would probablynot cover the new and the attack would loose some sense. It’s more probable that these actscould be near the coast or in the harbours. Al Qaeda would have a fleet of 15 to 50 merchantships sailing around the world under convenience flags and they could have carried explosivesused against USA embassies in Africa during 1998 and can be involved in international weap-ons commerce.The next targets could be touristy cruisers55, super oil tankers and ships with toxic sub-stances to produce ecological disasters or container ships carrying weapons of mass destruc-54ICC. http://www.iccwbo.org/ccs/news_archives/2004/images/piracy_maps_may_04/Piracy_maps_May_04.asp55A cruise ship is capable of carrying approximately 3,000 passengers and 1,000 crewmembers.Piracy and armed robbery - 1 Jan to 31 March 2004Attacks in AfricaPiracy and armed robbery - 1 Jan to 31 March 2004Attacks in Caribbean, South and Central America.
  • 30. 30tion. Mines could be easily laid in the access of important harbours to block the commerce andgrow the panic. Offshore oil platforms, oil and gas marine pipes and oil reservoirs and petro-chemical plants can be easily attacked.Intentions of underwater attacks by “human torpedoes” and small submarines againstU.S. naval assets are commented in Gibraltar and Indonesia. “Micro-submarines” have beenfound in Colombia and there could be others in any other part of the world. All nations can beinvolved in this type of war.56The conclusion is that far away from been safer in this unipolar world, globalisation eraand multithread environment, security has to be acquired by all means and assets at sea. In themost elemental level, threats will be humans, ships, planes, submarines and any other assetthat could provide mobility, could carry people and weapons and could attack civilians or militarytargets and disrupt peace in South Atlantic. They will impose different risks.Hopefully, nobody wont see the day when navy frigates need to escort cruise shipsround-the-clock to safeguard against attacks at sea. But, short of a strong, counter-terrorism pol-icy against not only terrorist groups, but against the nations that arm and safeguard them, es-corting massive tourist ships may be the only means of defense against such attacks.Security optionsSince the creation of the State-Nations after the Peace of Westphalia, nations adoptedsecurity systems based mainly on the development of a military apparatus capable of respond-ing in last and worst instance to the threats facing them. Therefore, in most of security programsthe pre-eminence of the military factor over the remaining power factors is evident. Thus, insome way, the concept of defence has been confused with the wider concept of security, beingthe former just a mean for the consecution of the latter.With the end of the cold war and the appearance of new threats have appeared new de-signs of security models. The three main current options are:Collective security modelIt comprise a collective defence system and is based on the premise that peace may bemaintained, or war may be prevented, if a coalition of states agrees to confront an aggression bythe use of collective force as a last resort. It’s based on three principles: the identification ofcommon threats on the part of the states adopting the model, the sharing of at least one com-mon interest (for example that of maintaining peace, or a certain level of peace), and the estab-lishment of mechanisms and procedures that, in a consensual fashion, must be implementedwithout further delay.This solution can be a good solution to the security problem if:- States subordinate their interests on foreign policy to the higher interest of security offered bythe model (It is well known that interests of states rarely coincide on a permanent basis, es-pecially when the parties involved have totally diverse conditions of development, and there-fore their objectives will be different.56Delamer Guillermo,. Paper “Terrorismo en el mar, ¿un nuevo escenario?” [Terrorism at sea, ¿a new scenary?], Centro deEstudios Hemisféricos Alexis de Tocqueville [Center of Hemispheric Studies Alexis de Tocqueville],. Buenos Aires, 2004.http://www.centrotocqueville.com.ar/html
  • 31. 31- Threats are perceived in the same way defining the degree of dangerousness with the com-mitment to assume similar risks in face of those threats and identifying the parties responsiblefor it.- Consensus is reached regarding the response required by the threat to be faced, and adoptedas such.The model has the implicit need for interstate organizations to exert some powers thatstate members in it have been delegated. It requires some transfer of state powers to interna-tional authorities, thus constituting renunciation of their sovereignty”. This model seems not to beproactive but dissuasion accomplishes this effect.In conclusion, the collective model base it’s effect by showing the challenger or the ene-my the power of a collective and stronger response persuading to act against the alliance. Thismodel shows it’s aptitude looking to a foreign threat of the region.Co-operative security modelIt’s based on the principle of transparency in the relations among the countries of the re-gion through the establishment of measures of mutual trust or Reliance Building Measures(RBM) with the purpose of preventing the immediate causes of the conflict, as well as the con-flict itself, while, at the same time, defining the mechanisms that allow for the punishment of theaggressor.This model should not be interpreted as one of Non-Offensive model, due to the fact thatit includes military, political, economic and even human factors, according to the European Or-ganization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE)57.It should include four measures:- Co-operating states have the obligation to adopt the procedures and mechanisms leading tothe construction and strengthening of mutual trust (e.g. interchange of information on defenceexpenditures, armed forces doctrinal tenets and equipment, realization of joint military exer-cises, interchange of military personnel for upgrading and training, sharing of intelligence,etc.).- Adoption of procedures designed and measures for the solution of discrepancies and disputethrough friendly agreement alone (negotiation between parties, with or without the involve-ment of third parties designated by common agreement, mediation, conciliation, and arbitra-tion).- Adoption of a mechanism that goes beyond the Inter-state relations of military nature andstrives for improvement to the relationships at the level of economic, scientific-technologicaland even political co-operation.- Lastly, it’s necessary to establish organizations that undertake permanent follow-up of coop-eration and security, ones in which all co-operation members are represented and from whichthe veracity of the adopted RBMs may be monitored.This model prevents conflicts among countries of a region in base of reliance and coop-eration to maintain the peaceful relations. 5857OSCE. “Cumbre de la Organización Para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa: La plataforma para la Seguridad Coope-rativa.” [Summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: The platform for Cooperative Security].Istambul, Turkey, November 19, 1999. (Section III).58Ros, Fernando M. “The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Is it Collapsed?, MDS Thesis, Canadian ForcesCollege, 2002, Third Section.
  • 32. 32Security model by means of integrationThe objective pursued, whether these are political, regional or continental in nature, is theachievement and maintenance of peace.59It proposes that peace may be reached as a conse-quence of the development of measures of mutual trust and the conformation of supra-nationalentities through which part of the sovereignty of the contracting states will be delegated.In this mode, once the primary objective of maintaining peace has been obtained, the ef-fects of integration in other fields, such as economics, scientific-technology, judicial and politicalrealms, will be experienced, making it possible to maintain and strengthen the peace achieved,while also incrementing the development of the involved countries, which will ultimately act as adissuasive element against threats. 60Different intends involving countries of the South Atlantic RimIt’s possible to mention only few treaties on regional security involving countries of theSouth Atlantic Rim, as follow:The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance - TIAR61It came into effect on March 12, 1948 materializing aspirations of many American nationswith regard to the adoption of a security mechanism for the continent, as established in theagreement reached at the Inter-American Conference for Maintenance of Peace and Security ofthe Continent, which took place in Rio de Janeiro in February 1947.Article 3 of TIAR establishes in the first paragraph that “The High contracting partieshereby agree that an armed attack on the part of any State against an American State shall beconsidered an attack against all the American States, and consequently, each one of such Con-tracting Members hereby pledge to help to fight such an attack, exercising the inherent right oflegitimate individual or collective defence, as recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations”62TIAR conforms to the model of collective security and perceived threats at that time were:the possibility of a war between the contracting countries, and aggression towards the continenton part of the USSR, either by direct attack or through the diffusion of the communist ideals inthe American countries. The United States had the principle role in the definition of this lastthreat.The mechanisms determined by TIAR would not have been of use to solve the multiplesituations in which the security of the continent may have been threatened, according to the pro-visions of the treaty, because they would not apply in the case of frequent interruptions of demo-cratic governments, or because the United States acted unilaterally when it considered that itsinterests were threatened, leaving the provisions of TIAR aside or only invoking its application atthe last minute, as a way of mitigating the lack of trust of the remaining contracting parties.59Deutsch, Karl W.. The Analysis of International Relations. First Edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc, United States, 1968, p. 110-132.60Ros, Fernando M. “The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Is it Collapsed?, MDS Thesis, Canadian ForcesCollege, 2002, Third Section.61By its initials in Spanish62Organización de los Estados Americanos. “Artículo 3º del Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca”.http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tratados/b-29.html. [Organization of the American States. Article 3 of the Inter-AmericanTreaty on Reciprocal Assistance], Rio de Janeiro, February 09, 1947.
  • 33. 33When the application of TIAR was required by the Argentine Republic due to an attack bya power foreign on the continent, as was the case in the Falkland/Malvinas) war, the treaty didn’thave any particular effect, a consequence, mainly, of the will of the United States, more than anyother contracting party such as Chile, Colombia or the Antilles, which opposed the application ofthe established mechanisms.It demonstrated its inefficiency also in the situation of Haiti during first half of nineties and in thecurrent Colombian situation. Moreover, “New threats” were not appreciated as such by the trea-ty, therefore it lacks the mechanisms required to face them.In the end, due to the non-existence of the perception of similar threats on the part of thecontracting states, sine qua non condition in a collective security model, or to the diversity of in-terests pursued by the signatory countries, it’s possible to affirm that TIAR had, in fact, collapsedand it’s an inefficient instrument for the prevention and reduction of the threats and acts of ag-gression against American states.The Organization of American States Chart of 1948, modified by the Protocol of BuenosAires in 1967 and the Protocol of Cartagena in 1985 and the Pact of Bogotá of 1948 commitsigners, among other issues, to give mutual support in case of an American state be attacked.These treaties have been resigned by another ones like Declaration of Ayacucho in 1974, Dec-laration of Lima in 1985, the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic in 1986 andthe Declaration of Galápagos in 1989.There have also been treaties to commit signers to abstention to develop nuclear weap-ons (Tlatelolco Treaty in 1967) and chemical and biological weapons (Declaration of Mendoza in1991 and Declaration of Cartagena in 1991).63The South Atlantic Maritime Area – AMAS64The Council of the North Atlantic created the meeting of Planning of the Marine Traffic in1950 when warning that in case of war the merchant traffic would constitute a critical factor.Thus the Authority for the Defence of Maritime Traffic was created (DSA) as base of the presentorganization and it had the function to reunite and to lead a common organization of overseasmerchant ships in days of war.In 1950 the Plan for the Defence of Inter-American Marine Traffic is born by the Inter-American Defense Council with the mission of "to control and to protect the Inter-American Ma-rineTraffic in order to contribute to the Defense of the Continent" directly involving the Navies of theintervening countries.In 1965 the Inter-American Committee for the Defence of Maritime Traffic met in BuenosAires and solved to establish an Inter-American Naval Authority attended by an inter-Americancoordinating group and to define the North, Central, South Atlantic, Peru and Chile Maritime Ar-eas for the sea-lanes defence, ordering to constitute regional Subcommittees.Thus, in 1967 a Coordinator of the Maritime South Atlantic Area (CAMAS, by its initials inSpanish) was created for time of peace and he would be transformed into Maritime Area Com-mander in war time (CAM, in Spanish).63These treaties include also the terms of the Non Nuclear Proliferation Treaty of 1967, the Convention of BacteriologicalWeapons of 1971 and the Convention of Chemical Weapons of 1993, which are signed by almost all South American countries.64By its initials in Spanish.
  • 34. 34The function of the CAMAS was initially carried out in peacetime by the Navies of Argen-tina and Brazil, getting up Uruguay in 1992. The rotation was since then by 2 years. Three LocalCommanders of Operational Control existed initially (COLCO) corresponding to each country, tothat the one of Paraguay was added later.South Atlantic Treaty Organization - OTAS65There summarily were, successive and unfruitful attempts of structuring the South Atlan-tic Organization Treaty (OTAS) and the militarization of the southwestern Atlantic by the gov-ernment of the United Kingdom, like prolongation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO).Among the antecedents of creation of the OTAS, perhaps the most remote one is thenote that the Argentine Foreign Affaires Ministry attended to its homologous ones of Brazil andUruguay (31 of 1956 July), in that it proposes to them to establish a collective naval force, or-dered of the safekeeping of the South Atlantic66.The members of this Organization would be: Uruguay, Brazil, Great Britain and the Ar-gentine Republic. In that opportunity, the government of the Argentine Republic acted like agentchief executive of the government of the United Kingdom, the intellectual author of the project.The July, 26th1956, the Suez Channel was nationalized by Egyptian president Gamal A. Nas-ser, damaging British imperialism.This measurement meant the Egyptian control on the route between the Red Sea and theMediterranean and for the United Kingdom (and United States) it implied the loss of a vitalcommunication channel with the Middle East and Asia. Little days after the Egyptian decision,the government of the United Kingdom revalues the South Atlantic like alternative communica-tion route.The U. S. Department of State, considered the project Argentine, sponsored by the For-eign Office, like one British diplomatic maneuver destined to turn the South Atlantic in a “marenostrum” and to use the Cape of Good Hope like succession of the Suez Channel. The Ameri-can opposition made to shipwreck this project.In the Sixties, extensive geographic portions of Asia and Africa sponsored Resolution1514 (XV) of United Nations to deepen the process of de-colonization inaugurated in the secondpostwar period. The countries of Asia and Africa were emancipated politically and they were got-ten up to the system of United Nations67.The accentuation of the de-colonialist fight impelled to the Salazar’s regime of Portugaland the racist regime of South Africa to project the creation of the OTAS. The invoked argumentto build this agreement was "Soviet expansionism". The "communist ghost" was used to breakthe diplomatic isolation of these regimes and to attract the anti-communist South AmericanArmed Forces. Diverse factors prevented this attempt of creation of the OTAS.Most significant was the energetic action of the United Nations condemning the colonial-ism, as well as the diplomatic action of some African States that repudiated the possible estab-65By its initials in Spanish66Trías V. “Imperialismo y geopolítica en América Latina” [Imperialism and geopolitics in Latin America]. Cimarrón. Ed.Bs.As. 1973. p. 138-141.67More than thirty African states were into United Nations in the sixties last century.
  • 35. 35lishment of a scheme of naval collective security, that tied South African racism, the Portuguesecolonialism and the "anti-communist" authoritarian governments of Argentina and Brazil68.The fights in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, ended the Portuguese colonialismin the seventies. Its extinction increased the diplomatic isolation of the South African racist re-gime. In this context, the government of the white minority tried and obtained a special relationwith the authoritarian governments of the American South Cone.The Argentine government arisen from the coup detat of 1976 impelled the constitution ofa OTAS and the members of this naval pact would be Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile andSouth Africa. Brazil was against69.The Argentine military government (1981) elaborated another project destined to milita-rize the South Atlantic. The same one contemplated the recovery of the archipelago of the Falk-lands with American endorsement. After the insolvent Argentine military recovery of the Falk-lands (1982) and the well known "American treason” the United Kingdom militarized the SouthAtlantic and NATO extended its military arms towards the South Atlantic, establishing militarybases in Ascension Id. (archipelago of Santa Helena) and in the Falklands.Another factor, that it is added to this process of militarization of the South Atlantic is thetransgression of the government from the United Kingdom to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which de-nuclearizes Latin America for war aims.Zone Of Peace and Co-Operation of the South Atlantic – ZPCAS 70 71The Brazilian government presented in the XLI ordinary sessions to the U. N. GeneralAssembly (year 1986), a project that declares to the South Atlantic "Zone of Peace and Cooper-ation", involving countries with interests in the mentioned area. The initiative aroused the initialadhesion of the governments of Uruguay, Argentina and of the socialist States of Eastern Eu-rope.The ZPCAS has been recognized by the international community as a valuable mecha-nism, providing the countries in the two shores of the South Atlantic with an important frameworkfor concerted efforts in the pursuit of the common goals of peace, social and economic devel-opment, and protection of the environment. The Zone is an instrument that supplement otherinstitutions and arrangements, and provides member states with mechanisms to better coordi-nate their actions in facing common problems.The adoption of UNS General Assembly resolutions on the ZPCAS, with gradually fewerabstention votes since its inception in 1986, is quite indicative of the fact that the relevance ofthis initiative is not confined only to its member states, but has a meaningful impact on the pro-motion of the objectives of the United Nations as a whole.There have been proposals about that there are priority areas in which the ZPCAS’s po-tential can be most fruitfully put into practice, such as de-nuclearization of the region, protectionof the marine environment, and cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking and related of-fences, as well as the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons.68Alencastre A. “América Latina, Africa e Atlántico Sul” [Latin America, Africa and South Atlantic]. Ed. Paralelo. Río deJaneiro. 1980, p. 6,7.69“Argentina-Brasil, los pasos cambiados”[“Argentina-Brazil, the changed steps”]. Magazine “Carta Política” Nº31. Bue-nos.Aires. May 1976. p. 55, 67.70By its initials in Spanish71United Nations,General Assembly, 50th plenary meeting, A/RES/41/11, 27 October 1986.
  • 36. 36There remains no doubt that the goal of complete de-nuclearization of the South Atlanticregion is an achievable aim. The Tlatelolco and Pelindaba treaties provide a basic frame of ref-erence for this endeavor. All members of the Zone are parties to the NPT. Furthermore, the co-operation of a denuclearized South Atlantic with the Rarotonga and Bangkok treaties wouldmake possible the prospect of a Southern Hemisphere free of nuclear weapons.With respect to the protection of the marine environment, it’s understood that the creationof new mechanisms on the issue, within the framework of the United Nations Convention on theLaw of the Sea, would bring a positive contribution to prevent accidents and to promote the ex-change of information and cooperation.The fight against drug trafficking is another objective to be pursued. To that end, coordi-nation of efforts within the ZPCSA can be decisive. Bilateral agreements between South AtlanticStates, as well as multilateral activities such as the anti-drug initiative launched in the FourthMinisterial meeting are instrumental in fostering the effectiveness of actions undertaken againstthis form of organized crime.It has been also shared the concerns of the international community as regards the po-tentially destabilizing role played by the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. To that ex-tent it is highly commendable that, within the Zone, the Organization of American States, theOrganization of African Unity, the Southern African Development Community and the EconomicCommunity of West African States have undertaken appropriate initiatives to alleviate that majorthreat to international peace and security.In order fully to achieve its goals, the ZPCSA needs the continuing support from the Unit-ed Nations system, including the UNDP and international financial institutions.The periodical ZPCAS’s Ministerial Meetings have renewed the commitment of memberstates to the objectives of the Zone. Final declarations and the innovative plans of action adopt-ed on those occasions have set out various modalities of cooperation for the common purposeof ensuring peace, security and development.The Zone works as a catalyst for the promotion of dialogue and cooperation among thecountries of the Atlantic coast of West Africa and South America. Both sides of the Atlantic canalso benefit from each other’s experience in the promotion of democratic values, expansion oftrade and investment, air and sea links and the intensification of South-South cooperation.Brazil attaches great importance to the strengthening of the ZPCAS and it can be sup-posed it will continue to work actively with other South Atlantic countries and with the entire UNmembership for the full implementation of resolution 41/11.72Actors in South Atlantic RimThe ZPCAS littoral countries- American Front Countries: Brazil – Uruguay – Argentina.- African Front Countries: Senegal - Cabo Verde – Gambia – Guinea - Guinea Bissau - SierraLeona – Liberia - Ivory Coast – Ghana – Togo – Benin – Nigeria – Cameroon - EquatorialGuinea - Santo Tome y Principe – Gabon – Congo - Democratic Republic of Congo – Angola –Namibia - South Africa.72Caldas de Moura, Luiz Tupy, Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN, Statement "Item 36 - Zoneof Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic", http://www.un.int/brazil/statements-agnu.htm, New York, 21 November 2001.
  • 37. 37Another actors- United States of AmericaEnergy and geopolitics affects the other both directly and indirectly because of economicnecessity, and the military and political tools used either to ensure or disrupt regular energysupplies directly impact the political and economic status of countries the world over. The endresult is a complex web of relationships - economic, political and military - where a minor quiverin a single strand can send vibrations throughout the whole.To understand the status of that web, one must first understand its previous incarnation.Before the Bush administration, the global energy network was part and parcel of the interna-tional financial architecture managed by the Bretton Woods institutions of the International Mon-etary Fund and the World Bank. This paradigm was defined by its adherence to convertible cur-rencies, international trade and a general absence of major trade barriers among the developedcountries of the noncommunist world. It also required relative quiet in relations among the prima-ry trading nations.Stability became of paramount importance, and even the superpowers realized they hada mutual interest in keeping their differences from boiling over - for reasons other than avoidingnuclear Armageddon. As the Cold War ended, this paradigm of relative openness and stabilityexpanded across the former Iron Curtain and quickened its march into the developing world aswell. From an economic point of view, the end of the Cold War did not represent a fundamentalbreak with the previous order, but rather an expansion of that order into new territory.For energy markets, this network of interlocking economic relationships, which are predi-cated upon global stability, provided a cushion of reliability and cover from political risk that keptdevelopment and financing costs down. So long as the global system supported open bordersand emphasized predictable stability over change, energy firms were able to take on long termprojects that would have not been feasible in a more fluid and unpredictable environment.The result of this environment after the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks was a slow but steadyinvestment in new technologies and higher cost production areas outside of the low-cost Per-sian Gulf.new producing regions such as the North Sea, Alaska and deepwater Africa came in-to their own. The dissolution of borders that accompanied the end of the Cold War opened in-vestment into the former Soviet Union as well, particularly in the Caspian region.The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush has engineered a fundamentalbreak with that order. The Bush administrations core policy can be summed up as a multifacet-ed effort to establish the permanent economic, political and military dominance of the UnitedStates. This policy requires the modification or destruction of groups, states or organizations thathave the capability to constrain or block Washingtons freedom to act anytime, anywhere and inany way.From an ideological viewpoint, this means working toward the emasculation of the UnitedNations, the World Trade Organization and the European Union. It means driving home to thosewho might oppose the United States that such effort would be counterproductive. It also meansmaking examples of those who disagree with the new American vision to put other potential dis-senters in their place.The Sept. 11 attacks provided both the necessary public support for the strategy and therationale for its full-scale adoption. This is not to say that the Bush administration had a blueprintin hand on Sept. 10, but rather that the events of Sept. 11 colored and helped engender a roadmap that already was under development.
  • 38. 38So far the new strategy has been broadly successful. The events leading up to the Iraqwar are particularly illustrative: During the run-up, the United States was able to discredit theUnited Nations, occupy a country that had long been defiant and obtain international "permis-sion" for Washingtons ultimate role in determining that countrys future. Washington also hasused economic policy to punish states such as France and Germany that openly opposed itspolicy on Iraq. It also used its military success to lash a number of Middle Eastern powers closerto its foreign policy needs while establishing a presence in the region that allows it to pressureany number of less-than-obedient entities. Though the current guerrilla war represents a threatto long-term U.S. goals, it is only one facet of a huge developing story that, for the most part,has been penned by an American.- NATOAt a 1999 summit in Washington, D.C., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization welcomedits first new members of the post-Cold War era: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.Fifteen years after the Berlin Wall fell the alliance admitted the three remaining formerSoviet satellites (Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia) and three former Soviet republics (Estonia,Latvia and Lithuania), as well as a piece of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia).But the expansion did more than add 50 million people and rationalize NATOs easternborder. NATO is an instrument for Western (read: U.S.) influence globally. The alliance still hastroops operating in long-term missions in Afghanistan. Because the United States remains thepre-eminent power in the alliance - and in the world - it is Washington that calls the shots.NATOs home front is not merely secure; it is not even a front anymore. The only spot onthe European continent that requires forces is the Balkans, and even this is childs play com-pared to the tasks of NATOs past. Places such as Kosovo will be a headache for at least a gen-eration, but such brushfires do not threaten NATOs core -- or even new -- members. That haschanged the very nature of NATO from a defensive (or offensive, depending on your politics)military alliance to a tool of global influence.73Despite the second enlargement of NATO after the end of Cold War, the possibility forSouth Atlantic Rim Nations to become a NATO member is still far away. Argentina, as a wellknown case of wishes to go into NATO after have been named Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA)by the U.S. in 1997, was not able to conquer the aspiration. After the July 8th., 1999 letter ofPresident Menem to the NATO President, asking for being incorporated as associated memberto NATO, the answer of the President Javier SOLANA did not let any chance, as follow:“Dear Mr. President.On behalf of the North Atlantic council, let me first take the opportunity to thank you for your let-ter of 8 July and the support you express for the NATO intervention in Kosovo. I have noted the interest ofArgentina to intensify and deepen its engagement in the preservation of international peace and security,and I see your letter as a confirmation of Argentina´s profound interest in cooperating with NATO towardsour common goals. This commitment has already been clearly demonstrated in Argentina´s valuable con-tributions to SFOR and KFOR.I appreciate Argentina´s desire to further institutionalize her relationship with NATO, but inthis regard it must be noted that the PfP74is a structure for NATO´s cooperation with Euro-AtlanticPartnership Countries.73Stratfor Weekly, “NATO Expansion: More Muscle for U.S. To Flex”. http://alert@stratfor.com, 02 April 2004 21:12:3573Anti-Apartheid and Solidarity Movements. http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/aam/74PfP (Partnership for Peace) is based on bilateral relations between the Alliance and individual participating countries, focus-
  • 39. 39We trust that the ongoing valuable cooperation with Argentina can continue, of which theforthcoming meeting in Buenos Aires on various aspects of peace support operations is a good ex-ample.Yours sincerely,Javier Solana”The NATO treaty stipulates that an attack on any member constitutes an attack againstthe Alliance as a whole. South Africa seems also to have welcome an arrangement to be NATOmember, so that it could feel secure in the knowledge that should help be needed, assistancewould be forthcoming from powerful Western nations. As it was said, here is again a major prob-lem in extending the NATO area beyond its present limit.NATO justified that the Western alliance had to take account of the importance of the sea-route around the Cape, which would need protection in times of crisis or during a war. The em-phasis on possible NATO operations outside its treaty area in time of crisis is a recent develop-ment, which is primarily aimed at attributing a major strategic importance to South Africas de-fence role.In November 1975, the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton, suggested at a luncheon in London that three or four NATO members with "blue-water"navies, including Britain, could combine in a group outside the alliance framework to monitorwhat was going on in the Indian Ocean, where the Soviet naval presence allegedly representeda serious threat to the Wests lines of communication. In this way, he suggested, a NATO "areaof interest" could be established beyond Europe. Sir Peter said that the Wests ability to defenditself was greatly weakened by the lines drawn on its maps, including one at the Tropic of Can-cer. This novel approach to create a separate grouping, which could presumably establish for-mal links with South Africa, would in effect extend NATOs operations far beyond its Treaty ar-ea.75- RussiaRussian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanovs visited five South American countries and Cubathis year and highlights the importance Russian President Vladimir Putin has assigned to build-ing strong commercial and diplomatic relationships in what many U.S. policymakers historicallyhave viewed as Washingtons backyard.Moscow sees Latin America generally as promising for Russian exporters and investors.However, Putin appears particularly interested in building stronger relations with Argentina, Bra-zil, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela. This makes sense for several reasons.These five countries are important global exporters of agricultural, mineral and energycommodities. Traditionally, they also have been South Americas largest markets for importedmanufactures and consumer goods, although Venezuelas economy contracted in 2002 and2003 because of its unresolved political crisis.Russias trade with Latin America was only a very small fraction in U.S. trade with the re-gion. However, Moscow believes that Russian trade could easily triple in the next three years.This would still be very small in comparison with U.S. trade volumes, but for Russia, it would rep-resent a significant gain.ing chiefly on practical cooperation. In particular, PFP activities help Partners build forces capable of participating in peace-keeping operations alongside NATO troops.75Anti-Apartheid and Solidarity Movements. http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/aam/
  • 40. 40Putin also seeks closer relations with these countries for geopolitical reasons. His pro-Western leanings are driving closer relations with the United States and the European Union,but Putin doesnt really trust them - nor should he, for that matter. As a result, even as Moscowlooks to improve relationswith Western powers, it also wants to develop alliances with key regional powers such as Indiaand South Africa, in addition to South America.From Moscows perspective, South Americas key players are Argentina, Brazil, Chile,Uruguay and Venezuela. These governments are the regions strongest advocates of a newglobal model for international relations. They support a reformed United Nations in which a re-structured and expanded Security Council would sit atop a pyramid sustained by multi-polar alli-ances. This expanded Security Council would include new permanent members such as Brazil,India and South Africa. Moscow shares this visionof U.N. reorganization -- primarily to rein in Washingtons unilateralist tendencies.Ivanov said in Buenos Aires, "No state, however strong, is capable of sorting out worldproblems on its own, so the appeal for multilateralism has nothing to do with anti-Americanism."Rather, he added, "Moscows proposal is that this is the approach best geared to meeting theinterests of the United States."For their part, these governments also are keen to develop closer ties with Russia. Thiswas made clear by the invitation they extended to Ivanov to participate in the Mercosur customunions Dec. 16, 2003 presidential summit in the Uruguayan capital of Montevideo. No seniorofficials in the Bush or Clinton administrations received similar invitations.Brazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva seems to perceive Moscow as a valued allyin his efforts to secure a permanent seat for Brazil on a restructured U.N. Security Council. Ar-gentine President Nestor Kirchner might see Russia as a promising market for the countrys ag-ricultural commodities exports, and as a source of new foreign direct investment at a time whenArgentina remains a pariah with its traditional creditors because it has not seriously moved torestructure about $100 billion in defaulted debt.Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez seems to see in Putin a natural ally against what heperceives as Washingtons hegemonic pressures on Latin America generally, and the Andeanregion particularly. Chavez also wants stronger ties with Russias military and with Russian oilfirms to encourage investment in Venezuelan oil ventures.Brazil is the key to Moscows South American strategy. Brazil is Russias second largesttrading partner in the Western Hemisphere, after the United States. Russian trade with Braziltotaled about $1.8 billion in 2003, with some Brazilian economists forecasting a rise to nearly $6billion by 2006.Ivanov said in Brasilia that joint commercial opportunities exist to improve booster rock-ets, remote sensing technologies and telecommunications satellites. He also offered Russianassistance in developing Brazils nuclear industry, a high priority for Da Silvas government.Moscow also wants to sell military equipment to Brazil: Ivanov stressed that Russian investorsare interested in jointly developing Brazilian facilities to produce at least 24 multi-role SU-35Flanker jet fighters. Da Silvas government is shopping for new fighters in a deal worth morethan $700 million.A Russian-Brazilian alliance might surface at the United Nations shortly after Brazil occu-pies a temporary Security Council seat on Jan. 1, 2004. Since taking office a year ago, Da Silvahas presided over a more assertive tone in Brazils foreign policy. For example, the Foreign Min-istry successfully blocked the United States and the European Union at the World Trade Organi-zations meeting in Cancun in September 2003. In November, it blocked the U.S. trade agenda
  • 41. 41again at a summit in Miami of the Western Hemispheres Trade Ministers.Under Da Silva, Brazil also has taken a stronger interest in other regional issues, such asopposing the U.S.-led military offensive in Colombia against rebel and drug-trafficking groups.Da Silva also has reached out to India, South Africa and Portuguese-speaking Africancountries. Brazils relations with China also have grown rapidly during his tenure, driven mainlyby swelling Chinese demand for Brazilian commodities.Given Da Silvas assertive style in foreign policy, it is likely that Brazil will make itselfheard on a broad range of issues within the Security Council - including Iraq and the MiddleEast. Many of Brazils positions will dovetail with Moscows and frequently differ from Washing-tons.Da Silva also will seek Russian support on issues important to Brazil - winning a perma-nent U.N. Security Council seat, or pushing the United Kingdom to transfer its sovereignty overthe Falkland Islands to Argentina. Ivanov pledged during his South American trip that Moscowsupports these goals. Da Silva likely will test that pledge in the coming year.76- ChinaChina has recently increased its relations with African nations in at least two strategic ar-eas - arms and oil. Pushing arms purchases in the Gulf of Guinea, however, could lead to a re-gional arms race that would threaten the Gulfs lucrative oil industry.Now, Beijing may be trying to tap a potentially lucrative market for arms sales among Gulfof Guinea nations flush with oil revenues. Increased arms purchases, however, could spark aregional arms race, threatening the security of the regions booming oil industry and multination-al oil companies operating there.Although Western oil companies have long operated in Nigeria, improved technology hasmade drilling in offshore oil fields belonging to Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea highly profitableas well.Equatorial Guineas plans to upgrade its military and booming economy present an enticing op-portunity for Chinas arms industry 77“In Africa, Beijing sees opportunities to expand its markets, augment its diplomaticstrength, diversify its energy resources and project power.Over the last five decades, Beijing has developed close ties with African nations primarilyas a way to develop a diplomatic power base and a market for its state-owned enterprises. It hasprovided 53 African countries with various kinds of aid, including economic grants, interest-freeloans and preferential loans. By 2000 more than 640 Chinese-aided projects in agriculture, en-ergy, transportation, textiles, machinery, construction engineering, water conservation, electricalpower, broadcast and telecommunications had been completed in Africa.Chinas modus operandi for developing relations with countries it deems strategically significantis well established. Like any large power, China engages in development projects, military assis-tance programs and bilateral trade in order to foster cooperation with and, later, dependence onBeijing.Even more of a concern for China is diversifying its energy resources. In 1993 China became anet importer of oil, with imports comprising approximately 20 percent of its consumption (a figure76Stratfor Agency. “Falkland Islands: Russias Chip In a Regional Gambit”. December 22, 2003 2007 GMT.http://www.stratfor.biz77Stratfor Agency. “Chinas Risky Business in Equatorial Guinea”.November 22, 2000 0000 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz
  • 42. 42slated by some experts to grow to 40 percent by 2010).Among the countries in Africa from which China imports oil are Nigeria, Sudan, Angola,Algeria, Gabon, Cameroon, Libya and Egypt.Beijing hopes to foster better relations with Nigeria and Angola along the same vein as itsrelationship with Sudan. Nigeria has estimated oil reserves of 22.5 billion barrels, and Angolasreserves are estimated currently at 12.5 billion barrels and growing. This year China has inkeddeals to undertake large public works projects in both countries, which are desperate for invest-ment and assistance in non-hydrocarbon sectors.But Chinas diplomatic concerns in Africa have evolved from trying to win friends and se-cure markets to developing strategic, long-term relations with regional powers on the continent.From north to south and east to west, Beijing has played its cards deftly. South Africa, Sudan,Nigeria and Egypt -- Chinas four largest trading partners in 2001 -- all offer tactical advantagesin their respective regions.In the south, China enjoys a close relationship with regional powerhouse South Africa,which is the largest and most advanced economy on the continent. Beijings relationship withPretoria stretches back to its support of Nelson Mandelas African National Congress while itfought a guerrilla campaign against the countrys apartheid government.South Africa is Chinas largest trade partner on the continent. And ties to the governmentin South Africa offer Beijing a large amount of political influence in the sub-Saharan region.In the north, Egypt has long had a solid relationship with China. In 1956 Egypt was one of thefirst non-Soviet-bloc nations to recognize Beijing, and that relationship has expanded now to in-clude greater mutual strategic concerns. Egypt is Chinas third-largest trading partner in Africa,and as a conduit to the Arab world and guardian of the Suez Canal, it is an important economicand political hub for Chinese interests.Beijing also is cementing continent-wide relations with nations that can help it projectpower in the 21st century. China is slowly but steadily expanding and upgrading its navy, includ-ing acquiring Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers. As the navy pursues a truly global reach, itwill need ports of call for logistics supportFrom port facilities, rail links, power plants, telecommunications facilities and weaponsfactories, Chinese companies are working on projects in Africa that most Western firms wouldshy away from.In addition, Chinese interest on the continent provides leverage against U.S. and Europe-an influence. If South Africa, Nigeria or Egypt are unsatisfied with the extent of cooperationWashington is offering in the economic or military spheres, they can not-so-subtly use China asa lever in negotiations.” 78- EuropeEurope is in search of its real limits. New borders appear after the explosion of the com-munist block while at the same time the old ones disappear, adding the ancestral rivalries thatresurge with more force, demonstrating that "the furies" had been become sleepy but they hadnot died. The western models, the democracy, the laws of the market and the principles of thefree trade seem to clearly win.The European Economic Community had six countries founders in the beginning: Bel-gium, Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Successive extensions in spite78Stratfor Agency. “Chinas 21st Century Africa Policy Evolving”, August 07, 2002, 2017 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz
  • 43. 43of the periodic economic crises, they at the same time give testimony of the vitality of the Euro-pean process of construction and, of the attraction that has exerted the quality of its results. TheEuropean unification advances, there are blurred inner borders, its expansion is significant andits power grow in terms of politics, economics and military.- United KingdomIt keeps the colonies of Tristán da Cunha Ids, Santa Elena archipelago, with military support inAscension Id., Southern Sandwich and Georgia Ids., and Falklands/Malvinas Ids.. It seems to bethe extension of NATO organization in South Atlantic despite the southern limit of Cancer Tropic.Moreover, because of it’s maritime tradition and power it´s the second power in South Atlanticafter its ally U.S.A.- FranceIt maintains heavy influence over its former colonies Ivory Cost and Congo. It´s expanding itsmilitary intervention in Ivory Coast. The recent instability in Cote dIvoire is a test case for coop-eration between France, the United States and Nigeria, which have all sent military forces to theWest African country. But diverging interests in the oil-rich region could be an obstacle for fur-ther cooperation in the future.79- PortugalIt maintains influence over its former colonies Angola and Guinea Bissau.- NorwayIt keeps the Bouvet Id. in South Atlantic with 200 NM ZEE.- ParaguayIt’s a country that has historically interested in having a door to the South Atlantic by using theParana River and the Rio de la Plata.- BoliviaIt’s the same case as Paraguay.- ChileIt has historically had heavy ambitions to win influence over the Atlantic. After the Beagle Treatywith Argentina won a limited maritime area in the South Atlantic near the Cape Horn, despite thebi-oceanic principle defended by Argentina.79Stratfor Agency. “Cooperation in Ivory Coast Test Case for U.S., France, Nigeria”. September 27, 2002 2027 GMT.http://www.stratfor.biz.
  • 44. 44-Another countriesInteractionApart of the interests of each actor in the region it’s very important to consider the interactionthat appear between two or more of them at the Regional Level (Bilateral relations in Africa andSouth America, MERCOSUR, Argentina-Chile, Argentina-RU, Antarctica, etc.) and the GlobalLevel (East-West conflict), North-South conflict, food crisis, water crisis, etc.). With this respect,it’s very easy to find that there are many sources of possible conflicts.SummaryRegional Security organizations are considered under the United Nations Chart (UNC). The“Law of the sea” is a U.N. convention that gave special rules to be applied in the maritime envi-ronment. It principally assures the freedom of navigation around the world and sovereigntyrights for littoral countries. This law assures security as a concept of South Atlantic Rim Coun-tries common interest. Basic, information age and maritime threats have been identified in theSouth Atlantic. Piracy and terrorism are acquiring growing protagonism in South Atlantic waters.There are three main security options to save peace in South Atlantic: collective security model,co-operative security model or security model by means of integration. There have been differ-ent intends to develop security that involved countries of the South Atlantic Rim: The South At-lantic Maritime Area – AMAS, the South Atlantic Treaty Organization – OTAS, and the Zone ofPeace and Co-Operation of the South Atlantic – ZPCAS.The recognized actors in security of the South Atlantic Rim are the ZPCAS littoral countries,both African and South American fronts, and other actors as United States of America, NATO,Russia, China, Japan, Europe, United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Norway, Paraguay, Bolivia,Chili, and a number of others with interests in the region. The strategic analysis become moredifficult by seeing the interactions among all of them.Next section will show the example of NATO for developing a strategy for the South At-lantic region.***
  • 45. 45PART 3DEVELOPING A STRATEGY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTICThe root of the problemCan South Atlantic Rim Nations work together to resolve their problems cooperatively orwork collectively to provide regional security?In order to answer to this question and argue a case for a South Atlantic Rim Alliance in acooperative/collective defence model to solve common security problems, one must understandwhat is required to rally nations to form an alliance. Alliances arise when there is a community ofinterests and some would add when there is a hegemon present at the outset that is able tolead, as well as, provide political, economic and perhaps some military infrastructure to help in-stitute an alliance.The initial costs of creating cooperative/collective regimes could be paid by the hegemon,which because it is the most powerful member of the system, has the most (in absolute terms) togain from the creation of the system wide benefits that result from a cooperative/collective re-gime.Alliances promote cooperation by reducing operating costs, both in political and fiscalterms, between participating nations. They reduce or nullify problematic issues by exhibiting apattern of cooperation which each state can view as being better not only for its own nationalinterest but also better for the sum of the whole alliance. This then raises higher expectationsabout future cooperation.80It’s common sense to agree that multilateral approaches to managing South Atlantic Rimsecurity concerns must be based upon a participation of a reliable US hegemonic presence thatis supported by strong bilateral security relations.81The formulation of a South Atlantic Rim alliance at this time is attractive because of the fi-nancial savings offered by multinational integration of units, especially when combined with mul-tilateral coordination of arms control policies: these create the possibility of greater reductions inmilitary forces and thus in military spending.An alliance is also desirable simply because of past successes like NATO, which demon-strate that states can work together higher expectations of mutually beneficial cooperation in thefuture. States like individuals, expect the reciprocation of concessions much more if there is apast experience of such reciprocation.82NATO also demonstrates that a security alliance imposes obligations and requires coop-eration but this improvement of protection expands also to economic benefits for the partici-pants. Countries that don’t belong to the alliance are finally not as reliable for all the communityas those who compose it.Middle and small power states can play a valuable role in mediating disputes between themajor powers. Unfortunately, may be a risk that medium and small powers are observers to aneconomic and political chess game among the more powerful countries. Changing the strategicprofile of smaller nations by offering incentives (e.g. high political and military appointments with-in the alliance organization) may well work to bring about greater cooperation. Small states have80Chernoff, Fred. “After Bipolarity”. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1995, p. 15.81Chernoff,p. 15.82Chernoff, p. 261
  • 46. 46a vested interest in maintaining an alliance, which should motivate more cooperative initiativesfor them. Because small states can no longer depend on bipolar rivalry to force the larger pow-ers to defend them in guaranteed alliances and because of the continuing benefits of alliancewith larger powers, small states are likely to behave more cooperatively in alliances in the fu-ture.83Alliance models show that security cooperation is possible under certain conditions, butonly if national leaders and bureaucracies use the appropriate depth of diplomatic communica-tion. There can be no diplomatic ambiguities in defining the terms and conditions for determiningthe mandate of an alliance or articulating the terms and conditions for resolving disputed issues.The larger regional powers must allow other affected states to discuss policy proposalsand make a valuable contribution to their final form. Communication in this regard is the mostimportant variable. When interests are substantially affected by a decision, those states must bebrought into the decision-making process and allowed to reshape it. All of the South Atlantic Rimnations must recognize the importance of involving other states in genuine and deep consulta-tions. Careful attention of national leaders and astute diplomacy are the key elements for suc-cess.84Most of countries in the South Atlantic Rim nations share with the Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic an interest in precluding this southern ocean from becoming anarea of strategic competition among its regional countries and among these countries and oth-ers. Important regional security issues, for example the debate over who owns the sovereignrights to the Malvinas/Falklands Islands, could be settled by internationalizing the issue if partsaccomplish the rules of international law.Why not to copy a NATO model?“The Treaty made reference to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which authorizescollective self-defence and stipulates that in the event of an armed attack on one of the signato-ries, the other parties to the Treaty would come to the aid of the victim of aggression”.85Support for the preservation of international security activities within frameworks providedby a UN or NATO-type organization is essential because they demonstrated to be useful. A mul-tilateral NATO-type organization within the South Atlantic Rim community would permit similarresolutions to conflicts to be resolved within a framework of regional states that would be ex-pected to participate regardless of their direct interest.True the South Atlantic Rim region is diverse, but so are the nations of Europe, NorthAmerica and Middle East. Given NATO´s successes in the Persian Gulf War and IFOR re-sponse in Bosnia, this institution received more favorable consideration by many nations of theworld and some of them are demanding to going into the treaty. NATO has worked well at main-taining internal cooperative and collective security.As a multilateral security institution, the NATO model can provide a similar forum for co-operation and consensus which will serve to guarantee prosperity and peace for the South At-lantic Rim region. This does not imply that NATO should expand into the South Atlantic regionbecause the organization has remarked it has not interested on it (e.g. Argentine case). The83Chernoff, p. 26284Chernoff, p. 272.85Jordan, Robert S.. “Alliance Strategy and Navies. The Evolution and Scope of NATO´s Maritime Dimension”. St. Martin´sPress, New York, USA. 1990. p. 2.
  • 47. 47NATO model could provide an initial framework on which to build a unique South Atlantic alli-ance.Security arrangements need time to evolve and certainly should not be rushed.86Themodest achievements of the South Atlantic Maritime Area and Zone of Peace and Cooperationof the South Atlantic suggest that, in principle, multilaterally is a preferred approach to dealingwith regional security problems. A well-integrated multilateral security strategy could be effectiveif coordinated by an organization with appropriate rules and leadership and given popular con-sensus.Such collective security strategy should rest on the following commitments:1- A light level of commitment by all South Atlantic Rim States in forming a positive multilateralrelationship. This will require a greater effort by all leaders of all Pacific Rim Nations to under-stand regional sensitivities and an additional requirement to be “up front” when communi-cating their concerns and ideas in support of a multilateral partnership.2- There must be abroad commitment by South Atlantic Rim nations to preserve regional securi-ty and prosperity throughout the entire region. This implies a high level of trust and sense ofglobal commitment to improve trade relationships and regional team effort to resolve historicaldifferences. South Atlantic leaders must come to the realization that regional prosperity feedsnational prosperity, which would serve to further region-wide cooperation as epitomized byZone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic.3- A determination by all South Atlantic Rim Nations not to abstain from tough bargaining. Thismay include the use of draconian efforts, such as the threat of trade sanctions in order to re-solve potential disparities.4- A decision by all South Atlantic Rim Nations to recognize a requirement to establish a singlecollective institution which can work to resolve geopolitical and military issues in order to so-lidify regional security. Any regional cooperation should be compatible with global frameworkssuch as the United Nations, which should serve to complement and strengthen these frame-works.875- A requirement for a great effort by all leaders of all South Atlantic Rim Nations to understandand exercise good leadership, understand regional sensitivities and to be “up front” whencommunicating their concerns an ideas in support of a multilateral partnership.88Defence cooperation within the South Atlantic Rim is relatively good on a bilateral levelbut is reduced in the number of multilateral arrangements. The armed forces of some South At-lantic Rim Countries are engaged in a network of bilateral and multilateral training activities andexercises. Although South Atlantic Rim Countries seem to be comfortable with these arrange-ments, there are no long-range strategic plans to formalize a collective alliance that combinespolitical, economic and military interests. This is particularly difficult to accomplish in countrieswere threats are not feel close and defence (taken as international security), save exceptions,seems not to be considered a priority.Building on current bilateral and multilateral arrangements, South Atlantic Rim Nationscould move on to explore new concepts for enhancing multilateral cooperation and improvingcost effectiveness. This type of alliance would provide a particularly valuable incentive for small-86Mann, Paul. “Asians Pursue Collective Security”. Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 28, 1994, p. 24.87Cronin, Patrick M. and Vogel, Ezra F. “Toward a New Joint Security Declaration.” Institute for National Strategic Studies-Strategic Forum, No. 51, November 1995, p. 5,6.88Hoffer. K.W. “A standing saval force Pacific: can it build confidence in Pacific rim security alliance?”. Exercise New Hori-zons, Canadian Forces College, 1996. p. 12, 13/26.
  • 48. 48er nations, which cannot afford a large military infrastructure. In order to establish regional secu-rity and stability in the South Atlantic Rim, a balance of power and multilateral security arrange-ments are preferable to the dominance of any single player (e.g. Brazil or South Africa).All countries of the region should take the lead in supporting initiatives such as Zone ofPeace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic to develop cooperative/collective security dialoguein the region, with a view to working gradually forward towards a permanent regional securityarrangement. More over, all countries can play an active role in these developments, anddemonstrate that it has security interests to protect collective interests in the South Atlantic. Atleast, they can provide a more visible and “standing” naval presence there.The NATOBesides war, nuclear and conventional weapons, and access to natural resources, NATOdefines security risks as follows: “Alliance security must also take account of the global context.Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of ter-rorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. Theuncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armedconflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance.”89The NATO modelNATO´s achievement in developing standing naval forces is widely recognized. TheNATO framework has considerable potential to be applied more widely. The operational andtechnical standards, which NATO has established, could easily be transposed into the SouthAtlantic region. The NATO architecture may not be tailored specifically for the south AtlanticRim, but can be shaped to support a common security institution.90NATO procedures have become an industry standard, which may have universal valueand appeal. Whether NATO can be an agent for the UN depends, not only on the need forNATO capabilities, but also on its political acceptability in specific instances. Although NATO isthe only international body to form Standing Naval forces, the demand for multinational forces tosupport UN resolutions suggests that the time may be ripe for others.91As a model, NATO provides key elements, which can be used for designing a South At-lantic Rim combined - multinational - naval force. These elements are:- Proactive politico-military authorities that work together to determine agreeable solutions toresolving disputed issues.- Effective command and control architectures.- Universally agreed guidelines for ROE.- Interoperability of secure communications and data exchange information links.- Standardized operating procedures.NATO maritime forces have achieved an enviable record of maintaining freedom of theseas, demonstrating NATO solidarity, and sustaining forward presence in strategically importantareas. Given South Atlantic Rim Nations support in creating a STANAVFORSOUTHATLANT,89D10. “Northwood Headquarters. The centre of British military interventions”. http://thed10group.gzzzt.net/nwd_brief.pdf90Pugh, p. 191.91Goode, A.J. “For example, see NATO.” US Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1995, p. 57.
  • 49. 49there is little doubt that South Atlantic naval forces can achieve an appropriate level of solidarityand effectiveness.NATO forces have also developed unique skill that allow disparate forces with widely dif-fering capabilities to operate together efficiently throughout the alliance area of responsibility andbeyond.One of the concerns against a NATO-type architecture for the South Atlantic is the factthat the region is too diverse. The NATO example is proof that differing forces and cultures canbe brought together and made to function when there is a common will to do so. NATO standingnaval forces can serve as the core and a model for South Atlantic Rim multinational operations,whether led by a regional security organization, the UN or conducted under the auspices of onenation.92A South Atlantic Rim Standing Naval Force would have fewer overtones of a Brazilianhegemony. Combining the unique maritime capabilities of South Atlantic Rim military forces intocomplementary joint task force or combined Task Group could tailor naval forces to specific mis-sion roles. In the US vernacular, this is defined as “adaptive forward presence”. Adaptive forcepresence promotes new friendships as participating nations observe the benefits of training withmultinational armed forces in an atmosphere of trust and confidence. It encourages and helpssustain a stable geopolitical climate in which to promote economic growth. It also assists, no on-ly nation building efforts but the advancement of democracy by illustrating the political commit-ment of South Atlantic nations, as well as, increasing the readiness of participating forces. For-ward presence and international cooperation engender helps to build coalitions for collectiveaction in time of crisis.93Their operational flexibility permits a rapid response to situations rang-ing from disaster relief and civilian evacuations to crisis intervention and direct action missions.In any coalition formed to provide an international response to a serious crisis, unity ofpurpose is as important as unity of command. One measure of commitment would be ac-ceptance of a common ser of Rules of Engagement. These rules would be developed well be-fore hand and agreed upon before the requirement for a coalition operation. Given the differinginterests of nations, obtaining prior agreement will be difficult.NATO has shown that if the political situation allows, multilateral regional/extra-regionalforces can address even the most difficult of operational issues successfully. NATO standardsneed not be confined to the NATO region. NATO maritime doctrine is practice in the South At-lantic Rim forces on a regular basis.To be effective, a multilateral force needs a core of nations that:- Are accustomed to working together.- Share a common body of procedures, tactics, and doctrine.- Have a similar approach to logistics support- Have developed methods to promote and encourage interoperability – especially in C3I.94NATO naval organizationSupreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) is based in Norfolk, VA, USA and the pri-mary task of ACLANT is to contribute to security in the Atlantic area by safeguarding the Allies92Goode, p. 55.93Larson, Charles R. “Cooperative Engagement.” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1993, p. 84.94Goode, p. 56
  • 50. 50sea lines of communication, supporting land and amphibious operations, and protecting the de-ployment of the Alliance’s sea based nuclear deterrent 95. It has three Regional Commands:- NATO Regional Command West Atlantic (RC WEST), based in Norfolk, VA, USA.- NATO Regional Command East Atlantic (RC EAST,) based in Northwood, UK. In addition, ithas a sub-regional responsibility as component Command Naval Forces North under RegionalCommand North of allied Command Europe. According to NATO, this link is a crucial elementof NATO´s ability to conduct joint operations effectively in Europe96. In response to the end ofthe Cold War and the advent of Partnership for Peace (PfP), NATO reviewed its infrastructureand defence plans to prepare it to face the rather more diverse risks inherent to the post-ColdWar period. This has led to expanded roles and tasks for the combined Regional HeadquartersEast Atlantic and Headquarters Allied Naval Forces North97. The “more diverse risks” are de-scribed in NATO´s new strategy, which was passed during NATO´s war on Yugoslavia in1999.- NATO Regional Command South Atlantic (RC SOUTH) based in Lisbon, Portugal.There is a current transition of Regional Headquarters South Atlantic to Joint Headquar-ters Lisbon. This transformation is more significant than JHQ Lisbon assuming responsibility asthe third operational level headquarters under Allied Command Operations. The headquarterswill also assume the role as NATO’s only standing Joint Headquarters.Over the past five years, RHQ SOUTHLANT has maintained a broad mission, with itsprimary focus as the lead for the Maritime portion of the Operational Capabilities Concept As-sessment and Feedback and as the Rapid Environmental Assessment Center of Excellence.Additionally, the headquarters has been an essential player in both the NATO Partnership forPeace and Mediterranean Dialogue programs.While JHQ Lisbon will continue to play a role in these critical NATO programs, its missionwill shift to a more operationally focused mission in support of current and future NATO opera-tions. JHQ Lisbon has purposefully been designed as a small but robust headquarters that oncefully operational will be capable of rapidly deploying anywhere in the NATO area of responsibilityand beyond. Once deployed, the headquarters will be capable of providing a sea based com-mand and control element during the initial stages of operations ranging the entire operationalspectrum from peacekeeping to war fighting.9895NATO. “The Military Force Structure”. The NATO Handbook, Chapter 12.http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1207.htm96EASTLAND Hq., NATO. “EASTLAND structure”. http://www.eastlant.nato.int/hq_info/structure.htm97EASTLAND Hq., NATO. “EASTLAND history”. http://www.eastlant.nato.int/hq_info/eastlant_history.htm98Joint Headquarters Lisbon. NATO. “From RHQ SOUTHLANT to JHQ Lisbon”,http://www.southlant.nato.int/southlant_story.htm, Updated: 18 March 2004
  • 51. 51A NATO Shipping Centre at Northwood – UK has been activated in 2001 in support of NATOnaval forces deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean. These forces establish a deterrent navalpresence and conduct surveillance and monitoring operations. The Shipping Centre providesshipping information to the warships whilst also acting as a point of contact for the merchant ma-rine. Operation Active Endeavor is NATO maritime operation in the Eastern Mediterranean aspart of international campaign against terrorism. This operation started Oct 2001. The surveil-lance operation and activation of the Centre have been discussed with Lloyds of London whohave indicated that a deterrent naval presence would have a beneficial stabilizing influence oninsurance premiums in the region. In February 2003, the North Atlantic Council extended Opera-tion Active Endeavour, under the wider Article Five counter-terrorism initiative, to continue tomonitor shipping in the Mediterranean. The operation has been one of the Alliance’s most suc-cessful missions, combating the shipment of arms, drugs and illegal immigrants by sea andStanding Naval Force Atlantic showed the versatility and power of NATO maritime forces. 99A new structure for NATO.“At their meeting on 12 June 2003, Alliance Defense Ministers100agreed on the design ofa new streamlined military command structure. It will be leaner, more flexible, more efficient, andbetter able to conduct the full range of Alliance missions.Strategic level—At the strategic level, there will be only one command with operationalresponsibilities, Allied Command Operations commanded by SACEUR. It will perform the opera-tional duties undertaken until now by Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic.SACEUR will continue to be dual-hated as Commander US European Command. In addition, anew functional command, Allied Command Transformation, commanded by SACT (the SupremeAllied Commander Transformation) will be established to take responsibility for promoting andoverseeing the continuing transformation of Alliance forces and capabilities. SACT will be dual-hated as Commander, US Joint Forces Command.Allied Command Operations, with its headquarters, SHAPE, near Mons, Belgium, will be99Allied Naval Forces North, NATO. “Demonstrating NATO’s Resolve in the Campaign Against Terrorism”. Update: EnVi-sion No 1, 2004. http://www.navnorth.nato.int/navnorth/100On 2 April 2004 NATO celebrated the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.Since then, NATO joins 26 Allies in a commitment to defend each others’ security and territorial integrity.
  • 52. 52responsible for all Alliance operations. The levels beneath SHAPE will be significantly stream-lined, with a reduction in the number of headquarters. The operational level will consist of twostanding Joint Force Commands (JFCs) one in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and one in Naples,Italy – which can conduct operations from their static locations or provide a land-based Com-bined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters and a robust but more limited standing Joint Head-quarters (JHQ), in Lisbon, Portugal, from which a deployable sea-based CJTF HQ capability canbe drawn.The component or tactical level will consist of six Joint Force Component Commands(JFCCs), which will provide service-specific – land, maritime, or air – expertise at the operationallevel and will be available for use in any operation. For the Joint Force Command in Brunssum,there will be an Air Component Command at Ramstein, Germany; a Maritime ComponentCommand at Northwood in the United Kingdom; and a Land Component Command at Heidel-berg, Germany. For the Joint Force Command in Naples, there will be an Air Component Com-mand at Izmir, Turkey; a Maritime Component Command in Naples; and a Land ComponentCommand at Madrid, Spain.101The NATO example of the Standing Naval Force AtlanticThe Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) is a permanent peacetime multi-national naval squadron composed of destroyers, cruisers and frigates from the navies of vari-ous NATO nations. The Force operates, trains and exercises as a group, providing day-to-dayverification of current NATO maritime procedures, tactics and effectiveness.STANAVFORLANT father, Admiral Richard G. Colbert, visualized first a combined force,primarily naval, including army and air components, with modest size drown from seven or sightcountries. Its primary mission would be surveillance and se control, but it could also be a peace-keeping force, thus providing a place for the participation of armies. An important aspect of thisforce was its training. The idea of mixed manning was tried out; Colbert recommended feasibilityof manning a single ship with officers and men from different nations and the experiment wassuccessfully carried out in 1964-5.In 1966, Colbert began to develop a proposal to create a Standing Naval Force Atlanticand proposed a permanent combined naval contingency force.102NATO Ministers met as theDefence Planning Committee on 1967 and devoted particular attention to the security of theflank regions of Allied Command Europe. They decided to transform the "Matchmaker" NavalTraining Squadron into a Standing Naval Force Atlantic of destroyer-type ships. This force, con-tinuously operational, enhanced existing co-operation between the naval forces of membercountries.“The goals of the newly formed peacetime force were clear from the outset:- to maintain the naval art within NATO at a high level, by providing squadron experi-ence and training for units and their staffs on a multi-national basis;101NATO, Joint Headqarters Lisbon. “NATO Transformation”. Http://www.southlant.nato.int/nato_transformation.htm Updat-ed: 18 March 2004.102Hattendorf, John B. “Naval History and Maritime Strategy. Collected Essays. Chapter 10, International Naval Cooperationand Admiral Richard G. Colbert: The Intertwining of a Career with an Idea”. Krieger Publishing Company. Malabar, FL, USA.2000. p. 173-174.102Allied Command Atlantic-ACLANT, NATO. “The Military Force Structure - Standing Naval Force Atlantic(STANAVFORLANT)”. NATO Handbook, Chapter 12. http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb12070402.htm
  • 53. 53- to provide continuous and visible evidence of the solidarity and unity of NATO, byshowing the flags of the various member navies working closely together;- to be available, at the first threat of a challenge, for immediate deployment to the sce-ne; and- to provide an initial element around which a more powerful NATO naval force could beformed.”103The Force has involved a total of over 500 ships and more than 150 000 serving men and wom-en. It participates annually in a series of scheduled NATO and national exercises designed tomaintain readiness and foster interoperability. It provides a visible, practical example of Alliedsolidarity and transatlantic cooperation. Last exercises have also demonstrated the capacity ofthe Force to undertake peace support and humanitarian operations outside the traditional areaof responsibility of the Alliance, in line with NATOs policy of extending security throughout theEuro-Atlantic area.104The NATO example of the Striking Fleet Atlantic“NATO´s Supreme Allied Command Atlantic´s (SACLANT) chain-of-command has a per-manent Striking Fleet Atlantic. It´s Commander COMSTRIKFLTLANT (CSFL) commands a mul-tinational force whose primary mission is deters aggression, and protects NATO´s Atlantic inter-ests. Establishing and maintaining maritime superiority in the Atlantic, CSFL ensures the integri-ty of NATO´s SLOCs. Countries contributing include: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany,Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.CSFL is the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic’s major subordinate at-sea command-er. At such, he commands a multinational force whose primary mission is to deter aggression byestablishing and maintaining maritime superiority in the Atlantic. By serving its mission, he canensure the integrity of NATO´s sea lines of communication. The composition of the force can betailored to manage crisis situations as they evolve, providing support to aviation forces, as wellas amphibious and marine forces.In wartime, this force should likely consist of three to four carrier battle groups, one or twoanti-submarine task forces, an amphibious task force and about 22,000 Dutch, British and Amer-ican marines.The Striking Fleet’s potent mix of sea-control and power projection gives this force a unique abil-ity to carry out its missions at sea and to directly support Allied Command Europe land air opera-tions as required. NATO exercises are conducted periodically to ensure the interoperability offorces under realistic environmental conditions. The multinational exercises also help strengthencommand and control procedures.As part of STRIKFLTLANT and to ensure allied forces operate effectively under realisticconditions, US Second Fleet conducts NATO exercises at least once annually. Every U.S. JointTask Force 120 exercise includes some Allied participation and even NATO procedures. Theseexercises sharpen war-fighting skills and allow combined, joint forces to improve their ability forrapid deployment and employment of maritime, air and land forces. The exercises are based on103Ibid Hattendorf, J.B. p. 191-192. Colbert Papers, file 54: Script for unclassified briefing on STANAVFORLANT, 1968, p.9-13.
  • 54. 54generic scenarios and demonstrate alliance solidarity and strength as well as commitment tomember nations.CSFL is a fully integrated NATO headquarters staff, which numbers over 275 personnel.Included in this number are 28 multi-national officers from 12 NATO nations. They hold positionsat various levels of the chain of command. The staff is embarked aboard the command shipUSS MOUNT WHITNEY (LCC/JCC 20). One of the most capable C4I platforms afloat today,MOUNT WHITNEY is a communications rich, readily deployable, mobile and sustainable head-quarters platform which provides the embarked Commander with the long reach to lead as-signed forces. Capable of accommodating up to 1410 personnel, her comprehensive NATO andC3 suite has been progressively upgraded to meet the requirements of joint and combinedcommand at the operational level. Using NATO-specific systems and procedures is a routinematter at CSFL. During a past NATO test exercise, the Joint Operations Center was convertedfrom 80 percent U.S C2 systems to 75 percent NATO systems in only seven days.MOUNT WHITNEY fulfils multiple national and NATO tasking and serves as NATO´sSea-based Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Headquarters platform. First proposed in 1994,NATO´s CJTF Concept requires that a CJTF Commander and associated staff be capable ofleading a CJTF composed of up to an army corps, NATO Expanded Task Force (NETF), com-parably sized air forces and other components and forces. Three NATO Commands, RegionalCommand North, Regional Command South, and Striking Fleet Atlantic are designated as Par-ent CJTF HQs, tasked to have a trained, pre-designated core staff around which the CJTF HQcan be activated using augmentees drawn from an Alliance-wide pool. Only CSFL is designatedas a Sea-based CJTF HQ, and USS MOUNT WHITNEY is identified as the HQ´s prime com-mand platform. Primarily designed for non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO) outsideAlliance territory (peace support, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, non-combatant evacuation), a key element of the concept is to develop a capability to integrate Part-ner and other non-NATO nations into Alliance-led crisis operations. A CJTL could also be anoption for Article 5 operations.Deployment of the MOUNT WHITNEY could be achieved in as little as 72 hours given thenecessary political will. Embarkation of some critical augmentees would provide a comprehen-sive short-term command and planning capability during transit while the main staff augmenta-tion could be embarked at virtually any available port en route to the crisis area. Her inherentmobility, readiness and ability to move easily from within sight of a shoreline to over the horizonmake the MOUNT WHITNEY the ideal NATO, political, and CJTF Commander’s headquarters ofchoice in a rapidly developing crisis situation.On scene within days, and sustainable for months, the CJTF Commander is optimallypoised to transfer ashore from the MOUNT WHITNEY upon provision of suitable host nationsupport and adequate force protection, if the situation is stable and the move politically desira-ble. The CSFL staff could, if required, also serve as a Maritime Component Commander, direct-ing all associated maritime units in a contingency operation. In addition, both the Land Compo-nent Commander and a Joint Force Air Component Commander can be embarked aboardMOUNT WHITNEY. A powerful and flexible Bi-Strategic Commander asset, Mount Whitney sup-ports the needs of the Alliance and can be assigned to either Supreme Allied Commander Atlan-tic (SACLANT) or Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).”105105GlobalSecurity.org. “U.S. Second Fleet COMSECONDFLT-NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic COMSTRKFLTLANT-JointTask Force 120-Joint Task Force 140”. Http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/c2f.htm
  • 55. 55Merits of this Maritime Security ModelTraditionally, maritime forces perform three functional roles. They:1- Maintain sovereignty over ocean areas of legitimate national interest.2- Represent their nations diplomatically.3- Carry out maritime operations as dictated by their respective governments.106The effectiveness of one state’s capability to protect its national interests within and out-side its territorial borders can be measured as a function of political and military cooperationand/or integration it has with other states within the region. Maritime security is based on a mu-tual understanding of the political and naval aims of each state and their mutual involvement inthe process of safeguarding regional peace and security.A naval collaboration at sea provides an opportunity to test concepts in developing securi-ty frameworks, specifically, construction of a permanent South Atlantic Rim multilateral securityalliance.Broad dissemination of official naval policy should facilitate cooperative dialogue, not onlyat the military level, but also stimulates discussion at the diplomatic. A low profile, systematicengagement of naval, military and foreign affaires between states at a bilateral and subsequentmultilateral level can serve to maximize the required support for an overall multilateral securityframework.It’s well known that good relations among navies are a tradition and they have contributedmany times to keep good relations among governments. These good relations based on mari-time traditions and/or continuous or periodical exercises or exchanges at sea, and with low influ-ence of politicians at sea, have been the best link to join governors after foreign bad relations orcrisis time.107By employing these principles, the creation of a STANAVFORSOUTHATLANT wouldprovide an additional opportunity for South Atlantic Rim nations to approach to a multilateral co-operation.In this forum, realistic and practical goals for achieving maritime security in the South At-lantic can focus on practical agendas for concrete future action.Since maritime forces have attributed which are valuable for promoting universal security,they might be actively engaged as instruments to safeguard against “regionalitis” becoming athreat to world peace in the long run.108Multinational operations present a number of challenges which must be resolved if they areto be effective. Whatever agreements and organizations are created, the major objective mustbe one, which will enable coalition forces to work together. Participating nations must reconciledifferent national security and force structures, allowing for differences in force capabilities, andresolve a range of equipment and procedural operability issues. Nations can prepare for theseoperations through:- Political interaction- Exercises- War games- Personnel exchanges106Zulkarnen, Isaak. “Canada re-aligns fleet to boost naval presence in Asia Pacific.” Asian Defence Journal, 8/95, p. 60.107This is, for example, the case of Argentina with United States, United Kingdom, Chili and Brazil.108Pugh, Michael. “Which way to security, globalism or regionalism.” Maritime forces in Global Security. Halifax, Centre forForeign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, June 1994, p. 182.
  • 56. 56- Port visits- Cultural, legal and language training- Technical support- Equipment standardization programs with potential partners.From a political and military point of view, this preparation supports the operational readi-ness of multilateral forces with better cost-effectiveness during peacetime and reduces risks tothe multinational forces operating as a coalition during a crisis or a war.Multilateral operations need to be directed towards well understood and agreed upon ob-jectives. It is also important that all partners strive for unity of effort. Other principles and publicinformation are also relevant, but these two are paramount.109The importance of a combined allied maritime force will also serve to increase transpar-ency and enhance regional security. It will provide South Atlantic leaders with an option of a flex-ible response in the event of crisis. Sea power and sea control capability are growing in im-portance in the uncertain security environment of the entire world. Regional security initiativesand naval cooperation can help to maintain stability.110As South Atlantic Rim Nations present and future progress and well being are heavily de-pendent on national security, and sea borne trade and the security of shipping are of primaryimportance, the following three regimes might be taken into consideration to kick-off the processof forming a STANAVFORSOUTHATLANT:- This organization would stimulate the development of regional Maritime Confidence BuildingMeasures (MCBM), which will subsequently contribute to the formalization of a permanent SouthAtlantic Rim alliance.- The first regime would cover:. Regional avoidance of incidents at sea.. Regional maritime surveillance.. Safety regime.This would reduce the potential for incidents or accidents involving naval forces operating inSouth Atlantic waters and provide a useful peacetime mechanism for enhancing maritimesafety along the busier shipping routes in the area while nurturing trust and confidence in theprocedures and mechanisms for exchanging maritime surveillance data with other nations.- The second regime would be a peacetime maritime non-conventional regime to deal with:. Humanitarian operations. Disaster relief recovery operations. Counter narcotics and ant piracy operations. Fishery patrols. Oceanographic research.It’s in this realm that naval forces should interact most frequently, and where the impera-tive for closer naval cooperation needs to be the most evident.A combined Standing Naval Force South Atlantic can increase a regional response in theevent of crisis or war, and thereby strengthen deterrence. Ideally, a multinational force likeSTANAVFORSOUTHATLANT will operate under regional alliance architecture similar to that ofNATO. It’s possible that multinational allied naval operations in the South Atlantic region couldbe conducted and coordinated under the UN flag. The failure of the UN to adequately coordinatemilitary operations is well illustrated by its unsuccessful attempts to stop hostilities in the Bal-109US Naval Doctrine Command, “Multinational Maritime Operations.” Draft 4. Norfolk, VA. October 12, 1995, p. ES-1/4.110Bateman, p. 46.
  • 57. 57kans. Much work will be required to establish a UN Military Council in order to improve the effi-ciency of UN peacekeeping operations as a whole. However, there will always be a requirementfor limited, though significant requirement for naval peacekeeping in support of littoral opera-tions.111Naval Co-operation in the South Atlantic OceanAs it was told, co-operation in the South Atlantic Ocean, between the main navies ofSouth Atlantic Rim is not new. Despite the South Atlantic is the most difficult place to work, tradedepends on the sea and southern countries are islands in the southern hemisphere. Merchantships are continually crossing the seas to connect southern ports with the world. Countries liveand survive because of these connections, and they need to protect their ships. The current sit-uation demand that, this protection ranges from the control of shipping in peace time to the pro-vision of information for safe sailing and of the security of an efficient search and rescue organi-zation, including the regulation of operations in war.The control and protection of shipping is an international effort. Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguayand Argentina are linked in the AMAS112, included in the regulation of the TIAR113, which pro-vides these countries with the necessary information in the area, and connects them with othersimilar organizations. Co-operation between AMAS and the Southern African Navies is neces-sary to control and protect maritime traffic in the South Atlantic, and to contribute to the work thatother organizations are doing in the other oceans of the world. Even during peacetime, it mustbe covered the entire ocean with the information necessary for safe passage and for effectivesearch and rescue operations. For this, international co-operation is absolutely necessary. Nocountry can explore the ocean on its own.Most of the countries facing the South Atlantic may have the ability to conduct their ownhydrographic and cartographic work, according to the regulations of the International MaritimeOrganization and the International Hydrographic Bureau. But none of them are able to conductcomplete oceanographic or meteorological research.In oceanographic and meteorological terms, everything is dynamic and connected. Thesame samples of water passing to the south of Argentina will later be reaching the shores ofSouthern Africa, the Caribbean Sea northern Europe. The cold water formed in the ice shells ofthe Weddell Sea, will reach the Mediterranean, at the end of a long trip following the depths ofthe Atlantic. This means that seemingly insignificant pollution introduced into the water will havea contaminating result in unexpected places in the world oceans. This is another internationalproblem connected with marine research.A change in the surface conditions of the sea, in remote locations such as the coast ofPeru, for example, could have a dramatic effect in the evolution of the rainy seasons of SouthernAfrica. Another change could be expected if the change is going on in the middle of the Atlantic.As well as the physical conditions, the fish-life at sea is also moving. It is not possible tobuild a fence in the water to organize international borders for fish. That means that if there is afailure protecting resources, it will affect not only national economies but also the economies ofneighbors and, perhaps, even the resources of far distant countries.111Sokolsky, Joel J., “NATO´s new maritime role: The sea power solution or allies adrift?” Halifax, Centre for Foreign PolicyStudies, Dalhousie University, June 1994, p. 148.112By its initials in Spanish. [South Atlantic Maritime Area Organization]113By its initials in Spanish. [Interamerican Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance]
  • 58. 58Co-operation in maritime research is a necessity not only because of the interrelation be-tween the oceanographic and meteorological parameters, but also because if working together,it’s possible to do the things better and cheaper.In this way to good international relations, the Argentine Navy has got much experience inthis kind of co-operation. For more than forty years it has been co-operating with not only the USNavy and other navies in America, but also with governmental and non-governmental organiza-tions such as the National Science Foundation, the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, andthe Universities of Scrips, Columbia and Paris. Sometimes with ships working together, butmostly sharing vessels, personnel, instruments or the costs of the operations.Obviously, this co-operation yielded a lot of information about the western Atlantic and thenorthern Antarctic Oceans, information that would be much more difficult and expensive to getalone. For example, there are jobs working together Argentina with Chile and the United Stateson projects of geophysical research, with aircraft in the Weddell Sea and in the determination ofthe concentration of ozone in the Antarctic atmosphere; problems which are affecting SouthAmerica as well as Southern Africa, among others.South Africa and Argentina are ones of the few countries, which can say that, to thesouth, there is nothing but the Antarctic. And that means that they have a special responsibilityin this matter. Argentina, in only one decade, has been doing continuous research in this areaequivalent to one century, mostly in co-operation with other countries while offering them tech-nical and logistical support as a result of its geographical situation.The same points mentioned relating to the Atlantic Ocean are applicable to the AntarcticOcean and continent, but the conditions of work are poorer and co-operation is greatly needed.Recognizing that South Atlantic Rim Countries knowledge about the Atlantic is poor, it must beaccepted that they know almost nothing about the Antarctic Ocean.In strategic and geopolitical terms, each country has its own policy and navies are instru-ments of this policy. First of all, the South Atlantic must be an area of “co-operative security”. Toreach this co-operative security, it is necessary to show a complete transparency in military ac-tivities, and for that South Atlantic Rim Countries have their navies, and they need co-operationbetween them.The relations with United Kingdom are important and a very special issue. The conditionsin the South Atlantic Ocean are much better than they were during the eighties last century, andthat there exists a regime of communications and confidence built up by the Governments of theUnited Kingdom and Argentina. Also, the diplomatic relations between both countries have beenrebuilt in a very professional way, both countries again exchange their Ambassadors and Argen-tina has a representative in the International Maritime Organization in London.The Argentine Government believes that the resumption of diplomatic, economic and mili-tary links with the United Kingdom has led to improved stability in the South West Atlantic. Un-derstandings have been reached under the protection of the formula on sovereignty – commonlyknown as ‘Umbrella’ – in several areas, such as fisheries, search and rescue and confidencebuilding measures.There are areas where agreement seems to be more elusive and the central question ofthe sovereignty dispute over the Falklands/Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Is-lands, remains unresolved. The Argentine Republic’s sovereignty rights over these Id. and thesurrounding maritime areas are based on solid, historical and legal foundations. The sovereigntydispute has been formally and expressly recognized by the United Kingdom itself, the UnitedNations and other international organizations. Various United National General Assembly resolu-tions, particularly Resolutions 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December
  • 59. 591973 and 37/9 of 4 November 1982, expressed that there was a sovereignty dispute betweenArgentina and the United Kingdom, and established that it must be resolved by negotiations,taking into account the interest of the population of the islands.Argentina considers that the dispute must be resolved in conformity with paragraph 6 ofGeneral Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, which granted pre-eminence tothe principle of territorial integrity in the de-colonization of territories that belonged to a state. It isworth recalling that, prior to 1833, the islands were an integral part of Argentina.As stated previously since 1990, there have been constructive developments occurring inthe South West Atlantic. The position of the Argentine Government in this regard has beenbased on a firm and clear commitment to achieve the peaceful resolution of all differences withthe United Kingdom concerning the sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. In the jointstatement issued in Madrid on 19 October 1989 by Argentina and the United Kingdom, bothGovernments agreed on a formula for sovereignty which protects the parties’ position with re-gard to sovereignty or territorial and maritime jurisdiction over the Malvinas Islands, SouthGeorgias and the South Sandwich Islands, and the surrounding maritime areas. Notwithstandingthe dispute and under the protection of the formula mentioned, both countries continued pavingthe way for bilateral co-operation in the South Atlantic:- In the Argentine-British joint statement of the conservation of fisheries of 28 November 1990,the two Governments agreed to open the way for co-operation in this field on an ad-hoc basis,by means of the establishment of the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission.- In December 1992, a scientific sub-committee was created with the brief to advise the com-mission on fisheries stock assessments, concerning the most relevant offshore species. Sim-ultaneously, as a gesture of good will and for the sake of conservation, Argentina decided torestrict itself to issue only 45 fishing permits for foreign-chartered fishing vessels, instead ofthe large number were envisaged.- Subsequently, in 1993, the Argentine and British Governments reached understandings con-cerning levels of catches in the area. They also developed an early-warning scheme in orderto identify potential problems regarding stocks conservation. This is a further example of co-operation on concrete issues.- Furthermore, representatives of both Governments at the eighth meeting of the Commission(London, 6 and 7 June 1994) agreed to continue co-operation to curtail illegal activities of fish-ing vessels in the area, and confirm their commitment to conserve the fisheries on the basisfor the best available scientific data. To that effect, Argentine and British scientists are cur-rently involved in providing technical advise to the Fisheries Commission. Joint scientificcruised and data exchange take place on a regular basis.- Both countries are at present considering alternatives for a longer-term fisheries understand-ing.- In the sphere of hydrocarbons, the Argentine Republic has stated that it cannot accept anyunilateral action on oil exploration and exploitation in the area under dispute, which can havea bearing on the sovereignty dispute. Important talks between the United Kingdom and Ar-gentina were held 1994. The delegations had a full exchange of information on the respectivegovernments’ legislatively measures and proposals, and agreed to reflect further on otherproposals and suggestions of co-operation made by both sides.- Argentina has insisted on maintaining conservation policies in the Antarctic areas, in accord-ance with the relevant international instruments applicable such as the convention on theConservation of Antarctic Maritime Living Resources. On 1993, the Governments of Argentina
  • 60. 60and the United Kingdom had agreed, under the ‘umbrella’ of sovereignty, to renew their con-servation efforts within the framework of the above-named convention.In contrast with these positive trends, the existence of a British military base in Falk-lands/Malvinas is a reminder of the past that ignores the new regional and international securitycontext. However, the need to progress towards military organizations in the South Atlantic hasencouraged Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek interim understanding and design confi-dence building measures in the military sphere. Starting with the joint declaration issued in Ma-drid on 15 February 1990, both countries have made progress in this filed with a view to thecomplete organizations of the security and military situation in the South West Atlantic.The General Assembly resolutions on the Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the SouthAtlantic, call upon all states to co-operate in the promotion of peace and co-operation estab-lished in the declaration of the zone and to refrain from any action inconsistent with those objec-tives. The establishment of the Zone of Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic is an im-portant development with concerns all the states of the region. Existent mechanisms likeCAMAS, which links Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay in the promotion of safe navigation, could bestrengthened. It must be recalled that the establishment of a fully co-operative environment, asenvisaged by UNGA Resolution 46/11, requires a constructive approach free from controversialelements which would run counter and inhibit the full coming into being of the zone.Some of the points just mentioned suggest the emergence of an improved atmospherebetween Argentina and the United Kingdom in the South West Atlantic. Other developments stillhinder this process, and they could not be easily reconciled with the objectives of the Zone ofPeace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic.Finally, all the countries in the South Atlantic Rim are members of the United Nations Or-ganization, and it means another responsibility for their navies. They must always be preparedto take part in international peacekeeping, observation or humanitarian operations. Their crewsmust be specifically trained to work with crews of other countries. Leadership must take in ac-count the necessity to plan and conduct combined operations. To reach and maintain this goal,the co-operation involved in combined exercises such as those regularly carried out by the Ar-gentine, Brazil, South Africa, United States, Uruguay are especially helpful.In conclusion these navies can benefit much to their respective countries by performingpermanent operations:- Co-operating in the Maritime Traffic Control and in search and rescue, as they are doing, withthe exchange of information and personnel, because they know that it will benefit the securityin the area, their trade, the protection of life at sea.- Working together, or helping each other, to intensify the research of the physical, chemicaland biological characteristics of the ocean and its nearest atmospheric layers, to the benefit oftheir naval operations and of the economic interest of their countries, including the preventionof weather calamities.- Exchanging students or members of their navies, improving relations between all ranks oftheir personnel in their careers, and transferring their experiences.- Controlling the pollution in their areas of responsibility and exchanging information and expe-rience in this matter.- Protecting the resources of their Economic Exclusive Zones, insuring their rational and lawfulexploitation and avoiding this exploitation from affecting the ecosystem globally.- Creating and maintaining a climate of confidence in the area, showing the highest transpar-ency in their military activities.
  • 61. 61- Finally, acting in communication, in order to co-ordinate the execution of dispositions estab-lishment by international organizations such as the Maritime International Organization or theInternational Hydrographic Bureau, to make sailing in the South Atlantic a safer activity day byday.114SummaryNATO is “the” example in the world and this section showed its military and naval organi-zation. Despite NATO was born to counter the URSS threat, it has reinforced its strenght afterthe end of the Cold War because it denoyed its virtues to save security of its members.The NATO evolution shows that the security environment is continuesly changing andany security model needs to follow the changes of not only national, but also regional and globalsituation. Security does not depend of only one country. The merits of the Standing Naval ForceAtlantic for NATO as a maritime security option can be applied in the South Atlantic Rim as apoint of start in naval co-operation to save peace in the South Atlantic Ocean.Next section will see the advantages of sea power in the security options.***114De Abelleyra, Juan (Captain) Naval, Military and Air Attaché, Argentine Embassy Paper “Naval Co-operation in theSouth Atlantic Ocean” presented at a conference on South Africa and International Naval Co-operation on 9 August at theNassau Centre, Cape Town, jointly hosted by the Institute for Defence Policy and the South African Institute of Interna-tional Affairs, African Defence Review, Issue No 19, 1994.
  • 62. 62SECTION 4THE CAPACITIES OF SEA POWERA forward naval presence is key to maintaining maritime stability in a given region. Insome cases, individual units or special task groups can maintain forward presence. In othercases, nothing less than a carrier battle group can do. In response to a crisis, the key to successis the ability to:- Concentrate powerful and ready forces,- Do it on short noticeMaritime forces can be mixed and matched to suit the operational and political objectivesof an alliance. They can also be rapidly assembled in a forward area and maintain the threat ofdirect military action for an extended period of time, unlike air or ground forces which requiresignificant logistic effort to support ground operations.The establishment of a naval task group can be done with minimal impact on allies orhost nations. The relatively unobtrusive nature of continued maritime cooperation will make itmore politically acceptable than cooperation between other branches of the military. The inher-ent mobility and flexibility of naval forces make them ideally suited for deterring conflict and ag-gression through forward presence in peacetime and timely response in crisis and conflict.Combined operations at sea is a more acceptable form of cooperation for allies to perpetuate,and will be of less political significance.115“Naval forces have many advantages as instruments of government action wherever theysail. They enjoy a freedom of movement and independence not shared by aircraft or land forces.Ships can be propositioned at a distance from shore and they can be easily withdrawn. A bal-anced, modern Standing Naval Force Pacific can provide many response options to any crisisclose to the sea, whether the need is surveillance, patrol or response. In view of potential threatsin the Pacific this is a necessity.”116Advantages of sea power117“Naval forces are among the most useful of diplomatic tools. Policy makers can sendthem to over two-thirds of the worlds surface at any time without having to obtain advance bas-ing rights or prior permission to conduct naval movements. Having a sound capability for deploy-ing military forces to almost any coastal (littoral) area makes it possible for the United States toprovide the tangible leadership that is necessary to facilitate the assembly of coalition forces, ornegotiate forward basing rights should the circumstances so require.While U.S. maritime forces may not be immediately visible offshore, they are a potent de-terrent to potential adversaries since such forces can arrive quickly and remain indefinitely. Rou-tine forward deployment provides the President of the United States with "on-call military pres-ence" almost anywhere in the world and furnishes the capability to project military power andshow credible resolve without provoking war. This presence also reminds potential adversariesof U.S. military capability and resolve to enforce international law. In this regard, the oceans and115Sokolsky, p. 149.116Rear-Admiral Bruce Johnston, ex Commander (Canadian) Maritime Forces Pacific. Johnston, Bruce. “Canada´s naval pres-ence on the Pacific rim both virtual and real.” Vanguard, Vol. 1, No. 4, December 1995, p. 15.117Global Security, “Sea Power”. http://www globalsecurity.org/military/operations/seapower
  • 63. 63U.S. naval forces provide the United States with unparalleled peacemaking capability and pro-mote the rule of law.Sea Denial and Operations Other Than WarAs world attention turns from the old ideological East-West confrontation of the Cold War to theeconomic disparity between developed free market societies and developing nations, there hasbeen a re-emergence of maritime interception operations in situations short of hostilities. Therehas been no decrease in crises that require military operations other than war. Transoceanicoperating and logistic capability permit the United States to take a lead in such operations, oftenas a member of a multinational coalition.Since 1989, coalition naval forces have enforced several multilateral embargoes. Thesehave been supported by the consensus of the international community, and conducted underinternational law. Such embargoes are best understood as attempts to maintain world order,peace, and human rights rather than as acts of war. Modern maritime interception operationsare typically mandated by resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, and normally allowhumanitarian shipments of food and medicine to the civilian population. Naval "visit and search"operations are conducted with respect to international law and custom.Examples of maritime interception operations include the multinational maritime interdic-tion operations against Haiti, Serbia/Montenegro, and Iraq. These operations are less than air-tight and require time to take effect. However, they are part of the foreign policy process, whichled to the implementation of democracy in Haiti, motivated Serbia to accept the Dayton Accord,and reduced Iraqs capability for military aggression both before and after the Gulf War. TheUnited States has been at the forefront of this emerging area of modern operational peacemak-ing.In the realm of military operations other than war, naval forces also contribute presenceand amphibious capability, along with the ability to apply power at varying levels of intensity in"smaller scale contingencies." Maritime forces seek to ensure continued, unhindered and unre-stricted use of the sea to further national or shared interests and objectives. The following para-graphs discuss the nature of maritime force employment in peace and war. It must be remem-bered, however, that the distinctions drawn between peacetime and wartime operations are notclear cut in many instances.Maritime forces lend themselves well to various peacetime operations, which differ fromwartime operations in some respects. Although in some situations peacetime operations are de-signed to influence governments and military forces (presence and deterrence) they are increas-ingly designed to influence non-national entities, such as criminal organizations and transnation-al groups. Non-governmental and non-military organizations often have the expertise and thefinances to conduct certain operations and may be involved in peacetime operations to varyingdegrees.Maritime forces should be prepared to deal with these other organizations and recognizethe contributions they can bring to an operation. In some contingencies, maritime forces mayoperate more in a supporting or enabling role, contributing a supply of well-trained and equippedpersonnel who can adapt and sustain themselves. Peacetime operations will normally have avarying mix of security, humanitarian, and environmental components, and may be grouped un-der the following broad headings:- Presence and Deterrence
  • 64. 64The presence of maritime forces can avoid confrontation and support political aims with-out necessarily violating national sovereignty. Maritime forces may strengthen diplomatic ef-forts by "showing the flag" (presence) in a benign fashion as a general indicator of interestand latent capability, thereby helping to prevent emerging conflicts. Alternately, maritime forc-es can be deployed as a deterrent against specific actions. Maritime forces can also "shield"states at their request by establishing an at-sea presence within territorial seas, thus providinga "trip-wire" function in threatened areas. These operations are, however, fraught with dangerbecause not all parties may cooperate with or refrain from challenging such deployments.Nevertheless, the use of maritime forces is less intrusive than the use of land based forces.- Peace OperationsThis term is used in a generic sense to cover a range of activities, including conflict pre-vention, peace making, peace keeping, peace enforcement, and peace building. The use ofmaritime forces in peace operations will usually complement land forces and may involve aconsiderable range of tasks. These tasks may include monitoring/observing cease-fires, in-terposition between the maritime forces of belligerents and establishing disengagementzones, providing a neutral venue for supervised negotiations, and preventing forces of thebelligerent parties from violating agreements.- Humanitarian OperationsMaritime forces are well suited to support humanitarian aid efforts that relieve or reducethe suffering, loss of life, and damage to property caused by natural or man-made disasters.In particular, military forces are useful to provide a secure environment to allow the humani-tarian relief efforts of other organizations to progress as directed by cognizant legal authority.Short notice readiness, flexibility, and mobility allow maritime forces to respond quickly to adisaster, particularly if they have aviation and Marines or other troops embarked. Maritimeforces can be tailored to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation, civil au-thorities, or non-governmental organizations. Maritime forces may provide personnel, equip-ment, supplies, medical and dental care, security, limited construction and engineering, com-munication, and transportation support.- Protection of Shipping and Freedom of Navigation.When nations make claims over waters that are contested, challenges to freedom of nav-igation may arise. In such instances maritime forces can exercise freedom of navigation bytraversing or exercising in the contested waters (in accordance with recognized internationallaw). Maritime forces may also protect merchant shipping with flag-state consent that couldotherwise be threatened.- Maritime Constabulary Tasks.In the last three decades developments in international maritime law, particularly the ex-tension of national authority further from shore, has resulted in a variety of low intensity con-stabulary functions. These functions are likely to involve naval forces as well as coast guardsand/or civilian maritime agencies. Specific functions may include:
  • 65. 65. Enforcement of fisheries regulations and EEZ arrangements.. Operations against piracy.. Counter-terrorism.. Interdiction of drugs and other contraband trade.. Interdiction of the slave trade or illegal migration.. Enforcement of environmental regulations.. Control of traffic separation schemes and other maritime traffic management tasks.- Environmental Operations.Maritime forces may also be tasked to respond to oil spills and other environmental disas-ters. In these cases, maritime forces can be a valuable source of trained and disciplined per-sonnel as well as equipment. Often these operations will be conducted in concert with or insupport of other governmental, international, or private agencies whose specific missions in-clude disaster response.- Embargoes/Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO).Maritime forces may be tasked to enforce internationally imposed sanctions. Effective en-forcement of sanctions may require sophisticated coordination of military operations at seaand in the air. This is especially true in areas of armed conflict or high tension, where the ab-sence of commonly understood and accepted rules of engagement can greatly increase therisks to enforcement units. Assigned tasks may include stopping, inspecting, seizing, and di-verting suspect ships and aircraft and establishing and enforcing a maritime exclusion zonefor the maritime vessels of one or more parties to a conflict.- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).Noncombatant evacuation operations are conducted to move personnel out of an areawhere deteriorating security conditions place lives at risk. This type of operation is similar toan amphibious raid, involving swift incursion, temporary occupation of an objective, and fastwithdrawal after the mission is complete. During a NEO, rules of engagement usually limit theuse of force to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. Maritime forcesmay have an integral capability to accomplish a NEO without assistance from other forces. Ifnot, ships stationed at sea may provide lift capability and the close, secure staging areas forother forces. By evacuating directly from a secure site to ships outside territorial seas a verylow political profile can be maintained. The evacuation force commander must be prepared todeal with the political sensitivity of the situation that will be monitored, if not controlled, fromthe highest level.Operations in WartimeIn wartime the activities of the maritime force are normally aimed at achieving sea controland projecting power ashore.- Sea Control
  • 66. 66Use of the sea requires a degree of control. Total sea control is rarely possible as long asan adversary continues to threaten forces in the area. Therefore, a degree of sea control isnormally established within a designated area for a defined period of time. Sea control mustprovide security for forces, facilities, and sea lines of communications. Large maritime forcesusing an area for their own purposes can usually achieve and maintain sufficient sea control,but smaller specialist forces and civilian shipping require sea control to be established by oth-er forces or escorts. Sea denial is a subset of sea control. Sea denial is achieved when mari-time forces prevent an opposing force from using the sea for its own purposes. Sea denial isnormally exercised in a given area and for a limited time.- Power ProjectionConflicts at sea rarely exist in isolation from a land campaign or the pursuit of territorialobjectives. Even when the maritime component is operationally dominant, the ultimate out-come in the theater is likely to depend on success ashore. Maritime forces often must be pre-pared to operate in the littoral environment to project force ashore as part of joint operationsinvolving naval, air, and land forces. Naval forces are normally the first forces into a crisis ar-ea and may comprise the enabling force that allows a joint force access to the region. Navalforces then contribute to operations ashore by conducting operations in direct or indirect sup-port of those land operations. It is important to note that a maritime commander responsiblefor sea control may find it necessary to plan and execute power projection actions (e.g., mari-time air attack of a littoral enemy air field) in order to achieve and/or maintain sea control.- Tasks for Maritime OperationsAlthough the following tasks are primarily applicable to wartime operations, some, or all,may apply to any maritime operation. All require an ongoing surveillance effort, using bothforce and external sensors, and good intelligence to create a common tactical picture on whichthe force can base decisions.. Anti-Air Warfare (AAW): AAW encompasses the threat from all aircraft and airborne weapons,whether launched from air, surface, or sub-surface platforms. Denial of intelligence to the en-emy and achieving adequate attack warning are crucial to the AAW battle. AAW is based onthe principle of layered defense: defeating air raids using sea- and shore-based aircraft, long-and medium-range surface-to-air missile systems, point defense missile systems, guns,close-in weapons systems, electronic decoys, jammers, and chaff. These layers are neces-sary to gain early warning, counter the enemy surveillance and targeting effort, destroy at-tacking aircraft before they can release their weapons and, finally, to destroy or decoy mis-siles before they can hit friendly forces.. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): The ASW protection of a force depends on defense-in-depthand close coordination between maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, surface ships, and friend-ly submarines. The complexity of such coordination, and the special environmental factors in-volved makes the submarine threat one of the most difficult problems to counter.. Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW): Action against enemy surface forces may seek to achieve ei-ther sea control or denial. Long range warning from intelligence sources is valuable prior to
  • 67. 67detection by shore or ship-based fixed-wing aircraft, ship-borne helicopters, or ships sensors.Once a threatening force is detected its composition and disposition must be ascertained be-fore an attack can effectively be pressed home.. Strike Warfare (STW): Maritime forces contribute to strikes against targets ashore using carri-er-based strike aircraft, sea-launched cruise missiles, naval guns, and special operationsforces. In maritime air operations, particularly in the littoral environment, air forces work inclose cooperation with naval forces to ensure the most effective use of available air assets instrike roles.. Amphibious Warfare (AMW): An amphibious operation is an operation launched from the seaby naval and landing forces against a hostile or potentially hostile shore. Amphibious opera-tions integrate virtually all types of ships, aircraft, weapons, special operations forces, andlanding forces in a concerted joint military effort. Amphibious operations are probably themost complex of all joint operations; detailed, specialized knowledge and a high degree ofcoordination and cooperation in planning, training, and execution are essential for success.Maritime forces will be responsible for: the safe and timely arrival of seaborne forces at anamphibious objective, landing of a force in good order at the right place and time, defense ofshipping, and control of ship-to-objective movement. An amphibious force can poise at sea,raiding or landing at a politically decided time and place independent of shore infrastructure.. Command and Control Warfare (C2W): Supported by intelligence, C2W integrates the use ofoperational security (OPSEC), operational deception (OPDEC), psychological operations(PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction to deny information to, influence,degrade, or destroy an adversarys C2capabilities and to protect friendly C2against such ac-tions.. Special Operations: Maritime Special Operations Forces (SOF) contribute direct and indirectsupport to sea control and power projection missions. Capable of operating clandestinely,SOF can provide advance force operations, hydrographic and near-shore reconnaissance inadvance of a landing, direct action missions, combat search and rescue missions, and theability to degrade enemy lines of communications.. Mine Warfare (MW): Mine warfare can involve both the offensive use of mines and defensiveMine Counter Measures (MCM). Offensive mine laying operations aim to dislocate enemy warefforts and improve the security of own sea lines of communications by destroying, or threat-ening to destroy enemy seaborne forces. MCM includes active measures (to locate and clearmined areas), passive measures (routing shipping around high threat areas), and self-protective measures (ship signature reduction).. Naval Control of Shipping (NCS): A multinational maritime mission may require some form ofcontrol and coordination of shipping within a given region. The control and coordination ofshipping aids the force commander by reducing the surveillance and reconnaissance effortand managing confrontation between shipping and an adversary. NCS is implemented by ad-vising ship owners and operators of the situation, the region(s) affected, and the measuresbeing implemented. Shipping authorities accepting NCS agree to provide position, movement,and communication information to naval authorities and, subject to the masters discretion,
  • 68. 68comply with any routing information and direction given by naval authorities.Information WarfareThe ocean environment enhances military command, control, and communications.Ocean-borne platforms can provide military units deployed overseas with constant, secure, real-time communication with tactical and strategic leadership in land. Information superiority hasseveral components: gathering, processing, and disseminating information; information opera-tions to defend against attack; and information operations directed against an adversarys infor-mation. Information warfare is in its infancy but holds forth the hope of military dominance with-out the use of physical force or loss of life.Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (IS&R): The forward presence of ocean-basedmilitary forces enables to gain a better understanding of developing political military situations.Developing better intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are key ways to improveawareness of the battle space, to track the disposition of enemy forces, to enhance transparen-cy among nations (i.e., reduce the risk of accidental war), and to monitor allies and neutral warfighting assets. Better IS&R technology permits more precise tracking of enemy assets, allowingfor more effective disabling of opponents with less use of firepower, less brute force, and lesschance of collateral damage to noncombatants. It also promises the potential for improved tacti-cal and strategic awareness, enabling forces to "fight smarter." Thus, the use of up-to-date in-formation technology and modern sensors can help reduce battle space confusion, often re-ferred to as the "fog of war."Tactical Environmental SupportA thorough understanding of the dynamics of the ocean environment is necessary for the suc-cess of maritime missions. The Navys operational oceanography community is responsible forunderstanding the effects of the natural environment on the planning and execution of naval op-erations, and for interpreting atmospheric and ocean phenomena for forces worldwide. Thiscommunity must respond to new technological opportunities and to new mission needs. Theocean and marine environment affect all aspects of naval warfare. Amphibious, mine, and spe-cial warfare forces all require rapid, accurate environmental information to support their basicoperations. The oceans structure, which varies due to subtle changes in salinity and tempera-ture, determines how sound propagates through water and thus affects the use of sonars; like-wise, the environment can be used to find or hide submarines. Similarly, changes in temperatureand moisture through the atmosphere affect radars used to detect incoming aircraft or missilesand can create "ducts" where radars cannot detect incoming threats. Todays high-tech weapon-ry increasingly requires sophisticated environmental inputs for optimal performance and to sup-port the precision required to engage hostile targets while avoiding collateral damage to civilianspersons, property, and other noncombatants.”Summary
  • 69. 69A forward naval presence is key to maintaining maritime security in South Atlantic. Con-centrating powerful and ready forces, and doing it on short notice are recognized advantages ofsea power in responding to a crisis.Flexibility of maritime forces force development let them to adequately respond to militaryactions with or without maritime or land threats by Sea Denial and Operations Other Than War(Presence and Deterrence, Peace Operations, Humanitarian Operations, Protection of Shippingand Freedom of Navigation, Maritime Constabulary Tasks, Environmental Operations, Embar-goes/ Maritime Interdiction Operations – MIO, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations –NEO),Operations in Wartime (Sea Control, Power Projection, Tasks for Maritime Operations), Infor-mation Warfare and Tactical Environmental Support.Next section will show some doctrine of spectrum of military conflict, and force planningscenarios and tools of Canadian Forces applied to think on a capability based planning for con-forming a combined naval force in the South Atlantic Rim.***
  • 70. 70SECTION 5FORCE PLANNING FOR NAVAL FORCESPlanning the required size and composition of the South Atlantic Rim Countries alliancenaval force structure can be an arduous effort. It consists of appraising the security needs of theregion, establishing military requirements, and selecting military forces within resource constrain.One used tool and first step that applies here is the spectrum of military conflict.An appropriate range of military missions, operations, and scenarios may be analyzed fortheir relative destructiveness and likelihood of occurrence during a time period under considera-tion. An inevitable debate involves how far into the future it’s necessary to look. The factors thatdrive this time horizon are both international and domestic. How soon, for example, could anycountry o the South Atlantic Rim alliance become a military peer competitor of the UnitedStates? At home, what are the lead times for procuring major weapon systems to replace agingforce structure?118The spectrum of military conflictConstructing a “spectrum of military conflict” has many important attributes that can assistboth strategists and force planners by:- Encouraging a comprehensive review of the operations, missions, and scenarios that a coun-try’s armed forces or a regional military force may encounter in the time period under analy-sis.- Examining them for completeness, relevance, and plausibility.- Stimulating debate over likelihood and destructiveness.- Facilitating aggregation into major planning cases.- Setting priorities for the allocation of resources.The spectrum of military conflict takes in account military missions, operations and sce-narios. “Unavoidably, the spectrum of (military) conflict accentuates the utility of military power,as opposed to economic and political instruments for achieving national goals. It also reducescomplex realities and relationships to stark, unqualified judgments, at the constant risk of over-simplification.” Dangerously, this spectrum of military conflict relies upon expert opinion aboutthe future, in spite of fact that such judgment has often been wrong. Economic and social evolu-tion and continuous political and military upheavals alter formulations of the spectrum of conflict.By the same logic, technological progress may reorient today’s thinking about the probability anddestructiveness of future operations, missions, and scenarios.One US used version of the spectrum depicts it as in figure 1. An aspect of this rendition isthe way it aggregates operations into three major planning cases: low, mid and high intensity. Italso makes distinction in weighing the “probability of occurrence” against “risk to the nation”.119118Bartlet and Holman. “The Spectrum of Conflict: What Can It Do for Force Planners?”, Naval War College Review, Winter1996, Vol. XVIX, No. 1, p. 119,128.119Barlett and Holman, p.119, 120.
  • 71. 71FIGURE 1Other 1993 US version of the spectrum use two diverging axes to portray the likelihoodand level of hostilities, with a smooth curve connecting the extreme cases of peacetime en-gagement and global nuclear war (figure 2). In the aftermath of the Cold War, global nuclear warwas deemed far less probable but still not out of the question. The term “peacetime engage-ment” was a notable change, but most important was the graphic judgment that more operationsmight take place at the lowest level of hostilities than during the Cold War.120FIGURE 2120Bartlet and Holman, p. 122SPECTRUMOF MILIT.CONFLICTHIGH INTENSITYMID INTENSITYLOW INTENSITYRISK TOTHE REGIONPROBABILITYOF OCCURRENCEVERYLIKELYLIKELIHOODOFHOSTILITIESUNLIKELYPEACETIMEENGAGEMENTLEVEL OFHOSTILITIESGLOBALNUCLEAR WAR
  • 72. 72A more complex version of the concept appeared in the 1991 Joint Military Net Assess-ment (JMNA) (figure 3). In this case, the spectrum of conflict is used to assess specific conflictscenarios. Several of which are generic (peacetime engagement; counterinsurgency and coun-ter narcotics (CI/CN); and lesser regional contingencies (LRC), global, and nuclear. Others aremore specific in terms of location (Mayor Regional Contingency-West (MRC-W for Korea),Mayor Regional Contingency-East (MRC-E for Southwest Asia), and war escalating from a Eu-ropean crisis. This depiction is built around the axes “probability of occurrence” / consequencesof failure” and “level of violence”. It must be assumed that the point of origin is low for the twoaxes, while the extremes are higher.121FIGURE 3Operations and MissionsThe second step is to list specific military tasks that dominate planning. An example appears inUS Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, which presents a summary section enti-tled “Range of Military Operations” as follow:1. Operations Other than Wara. Ops. that involve the use or threat of forcei. Deterrence.ii. Compellence through raids and strikes.iii. Peace enforcement.iv. Counter terrorism.121Bartlet and Holman, p. 122-124.MRC-EMRC-EMRC-WCI/CNCONSEQUENCESOFFAILUREPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEPEACETIMELRCMRC-WGLOBALNUCLEARCI/CNLRCEUROPEEUROPEGLOBALNUCLEARLEVEL OF VIOLENCE
  • 73. 73v. Enforcements of sanctions.vi. Support to insurgency and counterinsurgency.vii. Maritime interception.viii. Evacuation of noncombatants.b. Ops. that do not involve the use or threat of force.i. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.ii. Nation assistance.iii. Security Assistance.iv. Foreign internal defence.v. Counter drug operations.vi. Arms control.vii. Support to domestic civil authorities.viii. Evacuation of noncombatants.ix. Peacekeeping.2. Wara. Attackb. Defendc. Blockades122Last years events suggest the wisdom of addition of another major planning case:3. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).As another option to show all the range of tasks that a military organization should havethe capability to accomplish at the different decision levels, annex A details as an example theCanadian Joint Task List.123The measure: the “risk”At this point it’s necessary to define some elemental concepts:- Threat: The agent will produce a not required consequence or will menace with some risk.“Threat is an array of circumstances which, when combined, constitute a potential factor oftrue damage that may, under certain circumstances, come about”124.- Risk: An expression of possible loss in terms of severity and probability.- Risk Assessment: The process of detecting hazards (and/or threats) and assessingassociated risks.125The term “destructiveness” will be considered in place of “severity”, and “likelihood” assimilar concept to “probability”.DestructivenessThe third step in force planning is to plot relevant operations and missions along a horizon-tal axis, from the least to the most destructive. Risks to the region, intensity of conflict, level of122Bartlet and Holman, p. 124.123Canadian Forces, VCDS, DP&M. “Canadian Joint Task List v1.4”. http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/cjtl/cjtl14124Bartolomé Mariano. Las Amenazas Transnacionales. [Transnational Threats] Revista Escuela Superior de GendarmeríaNacional [Journal of the Higher School of National Police], Buenos Aires, 1999.125Pedir confirmación de OPNAVINST 3500, Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, “OPERATIONAL RISKMANAGEMENT”.
  • 74. 74hostilities, and level of violence, are concepts that suffer from vagueness and subjectivity. Theterm “destructiveness” lends itself to measurement and tends to reduce misunderstanding. Inrelation to destructiveness, operations and missions it’s necessary to identify associated“threats”. Threats, destructiveness, and required operations and missions define the spectrum ofmilitary conflict.Identification of threats and estimation of destructiveness for any mission, operation, orscenario (for the time period under consideration) in the context of national and regional inter-ests is a necessity. It must take full account of the many assumptions and uncertainties that mayskew their hypotheses. Specifically, it’s suggested to evaluate hypothetical destructiveness interms of its scope and duration.Scope: at least would involve such factors as:- Lethality of weapons involved- Number of forces engaged- Geographic expanse of the war.Duration: is the estimated length of time a given conflict will last. Certain operational environ-ments tend to lengthen wars, often belying the initial predictions of unwary strategist. In gen-eral, the duration of conflict depends upon:- The intensity of historical animosity between the opponents- National will to bear the costs of war- Physical geography- Rules of engagement-especially restrictive rules of engagement and attempts to control esca-lation, which have lengthened the conflicts from Vietnam to Bosnia.Potential destructiveness deserves more attention than it has received, especially duringan era of ethnic chaos and collapsing states. Civil wars possess a deceptively different kind ofdestructiveness (combining both scope and duration) than do state-to-state conflicts.Figure 4 is an illustrative spectrum of military conflict for missions, operations, and sce-narios. It includes not only tasks but also, more importantly, weapons of mass destruction (nu-clear, chemical and biological). The unprecedented proliferation over the last past years ofweapons-grade uranium and plutonium has increased the possibility of a nuclear incident, eitherby terrorists or by rogue states. Similarly, the rapid diffusion of chemical and biological capabili-ties has increased the chance of attack by other weapons of mass destruction. Such scenarioscould be quite destructive, especially if they posit attacks on civilian population centers.FIGURE 4SPECTRUM OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, MISSIONS & SCENARIOS (1995 – 2005)HYPOTHETICAL DESTRUCTIVENESS1.  NUCLEAR WAR (COMPETITOR)2.  ROGUE STATE USE OF WMD3.  TERRORIST USE OF WMD4.  MAJOR WAR (COMPETITOR)5.  TWO NEARLY SIMULTANEOUS MAJOR REGIONALCONTINGENCIES6.  MAYOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY7.  COUNTERINSURGENCY8.  SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY9.  PEACE ENFORCEMENT10.  COUNTERTERRORISM11.  COUNTERDRUG12.  FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENCE13.  PEACEKEEPING14.  ARMS CONTROL15.  SECURITY ASSISTANCE16.  NATION ASSISTANCE17.  EVACUATION ASSISTANCE18.  HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE19.  OVERSEAS PRESENCELOWHIGH
  • 75. 75LikelihoodThe fourth step is to plot the estimated likelihood (probability) of occurrence for all thesementioned operations, missions, and scenarios in a perpendicular axis. Individual analysts andseparate services or departments may highly disagree about the likelihood of different contin-gencies, just as they would over their relative destructiveness. However, the usefulness of thespectrum of conflict lies in accentuating and debating both variables.The risk assessmentA matrix lets to accomplish this second step - assessment - of an Operational RiskManagement process. Using a matrix to quantify and prioritize the risk(s) does not lessen theinherently subjective nature of risk assessment. However, a matrix does provide a consistentframework for evaluating risk. Although different matrices may be used for various applications,any risk assessment tool includes probability and severity. For this case, it’s used likelihood anddestructiveness. The risk assessment code (RAC) defined by a matrix represents the degree ofrisk associated with a threat considering these two elements. While the degree of risk issubjective in nature, the RAC does accurately reflect the relative amount of perceived riskbetween various hazards. Using this matrix, the RAC is derived as follows:- Destructiveness (Severity) - An assessment of the worst credible consequence which canoccur as a result of the action of a threat. It is defined by potential degree of not wishedconsequences as dead, illness, infrastructure, damage, loss of assets (time, money,personnel), effect on mission, etc.. The combination of two or more actions may increase theoverall level of risk. Destructiveness categories are assigned as Roman numerals accordingto the following criteria:a. Category I - The threat may cause death, loss of infrastructure, facilities, assets or result ingrave damage to regional/national interests.b. Category II - The threat may cause severe injuries, illness, infrastructure damage, damageto regional, national or command interests or degradation to efficient use of assets.c. Category III - The threat may cause minor injuries, illness, infrastructure damage, damageto regional, national or command interests or degradation to efficient use of assets.d. Category IV - The threat presents a minimal danger to personnel, health, infrastructure,regional, national or command interests or efficient use of assets.- Likelihood (probability) - The likelihood that the action of a threat will result in a not desiredconsequence as damage, injury, dead or loss, based on an assessment of such factors aslocation, exposure (times or duration of operation), affected populations, experience orpreviously established statistical information. Likelihood will be assigned an English letteraccording to the following criteria:a. Subcategory A - Likely to occur immediately or within a short period of time. Expected tooccur frequently to an individual item or person or continuously to a region, country, fleet,inventory or group.b. Subcategory B - Probably will occur in time. Expected to occur several times to anindividual item or person or frequently to a region, country, fleet, inventory or group.c. Subcategory C - May occur in time. Can reasonably be expected to occur some time to anindividual item or person or several times to a region, country, fleet, inventory or group.d. Subcategory D - region, country to occur.
  • 76. 76- Risk Assessment Code - The RAC is an expression of risk which combines the elements ofhazard severity and mishap probability. Using the matrix shown below, the RAC is expressedas a single Arabic number that can be used to help determine hazard abatement priorities.LikelihoodDestructiveness A B C DI 1 1 2 3II 1 2 3 4III 2 3 4 5IV 3 4 5 5In some cases, the worst credible consequence of a hazard may not correspond to thehighest RAC for that hazard. For example, one hazard may have two potential consequences.The severity of the worst consequence (I) may be unlikely (D), resulting in a RAC of 3. Theseverity of the lesser consequence (II) may be probable (B), resulting in a RAC of 2. Therefore,it is also important to consider less severe consequences of a hazard if they are more likely thanthe worst credible consequence, since this combination may actually present a greater overallrisk.However, it will not be easy task to set such risks and priorities. Some will argue that Wardeserves the highest priority preparing for the coming decades because of its destructivenessand the criteria “who can the most can the less”, while others would assign the greatestimportance to Operations Other Than War because it’s a every day job, e.g. in peacekeepingoperations. A few might even favor WMD, particularly where rogue states are involved. In aperiod of constrained resources the ability to set priorities will continue to be crucial, and thespectrum of conflict in the South Atlantic Rim is a valuable aid.126A Strategic Risk Management in DefenceInherent to a Operations Planning Process, and throughout the execution of an opera-tional mission, is the assessment, management and taking of risk. Risk is inherent in virtuallyeverything we do.“Operations risk management at the strategic, operational and tactical levels is a accom-plished through the operations planning process and is developed and perfected through opera-tional research, lessons learned and doctrine development. Corporate risk management, how-ever, speaks to the notion of managing our `ultimate strategic risk´ that is the correct apportion-ment of defence resources to produce military forces of value to the country now and in the fu-ture.”Risk management should be a constant factor in planning and execution of modern de-fence practices. The processes that allocate resources in both the short and long term supportthe dual nature of defence planning for today and tomorrow. Risk tolerance and a recognition ofdefence´s capacity to mitigate (or not) the major elements of risk, are areas were a South Atlan-tic Rim Defence Organization should elaborate formally through capability based planning. 127126Bartlet and Holman, p. 127-128.127Canadian Forces, VCDS. “Capability-Based Planning Overview”, Defence Planning & Management. http//:www.vcds.dnd.ca/dp&mRAC Definition:1 - Critical2 - Serious3 - Moderate4 - Minor5 - Negligible
  • 77. 77A straightforward record-keeping mechanism assessing impact and likelihood of riskwould serve to highlight monitoring or follow-up responsibilities for the defence organization asindicated in the following Risk Management Rating and Action Matrix:IMPACT RISK MANAGEMENT RATING AND ACTION MATRIX High Considerable Managementand MonitoringSpecific Management andMonitoring and Monitoringfor the RiskExtensive Management andMonitoring of the Risk Moderate Possibly Accept Risk butwith Justification and Moni-toringManagement Effort Worth-while, Use Specific Monitor-ingSpecific Management andMonitoring for the categoryof risk Low Accept Risk, Continue Rou-tine MonitoringAccept Risk but use SpecificMonitoringGeneral Management andMonitoring for Type of RiskLIKELIHOOD Low Medium HighRESOURCESMajor Elements of Risk in DefenceIntegrated strategic risk management in defence is focused through the understanding ofmajor risk elements. Individually these elements are not entirely unique to defence, but in totalthey represent an important and distinct risk environment peculiar to the region. The elements ofrisk are listed below in priority in two categories. The first contains those elements where thedefence organization has a direct and decisive role in risk mitigation; the second contains ele-ments where there may only be opportunity for an indirect or a partial role:- Direct and Decisive.. Failure in Operations: The nature of defence business is such that consequences of failureare very high-higher than most other parts of government. Balance is sought between in-vesting in current operations and those of tomorrow. Decisions should be made to best posi-tion the military in any conflict, now or well into the future. The risks are often unclear or verysubjective. Defence is risk averse, despite the obvious benefits of calculated risk-taking, hasits origins in the catastrophic nature of military failure.. Stewardship of Defence Resources: The risks of not practicing effective stewardship of re-sources include making wrong investment decisions, making the right investment decisionsat the wrong time, and making the right decisions but not ensuring effective delivery. Theserisk elements are compounded by a number of factors including procurement cycle andcomplexity, defence spending as an element of governments economic policy, and a criticalneed for inter-operability with allies.. “Reliability of Information Systems: Information systems, be they in support of deployed op-erations or in support of force generation and corporate management activities, have be-come increasingly important for decision-making in defence.”. “Defence Culture: The defence culture may be summarized as one of attempting to meet allchallenges through a well disciplined hierarchy, using personal leadership to instill a mis-sion-oriented focus throughout the chain of command, and looking inward to prevent errorsin the future. Risk is most probable when the `can-do´ attitude outpaces real capability, and
  • 78. 78when the focus of institutional learning is so narrow or low-level in scope it fails to have thedesired institutional impact.”. Isolation from population: Defence may remain a relatively insular environment in some re-spects. The risk of losing public support is an area for constant attention in managing risk.- Indirect and Partial.. Government Policies and Direction: The nature of developing defence capability demandsconsistent investment over relatively long lead times, as much as 15 years in most cases.With Governments mandates averaging 5 years, there is risk for defence in investing re-sources in specific programs that could be overturned or delayed by a new Government.Moreover, difficult decisions pertaining to organization and force structure are made in thearena of political will and risk.. Domestic environment: A strong position in societies while being well partnered throughoutgovernment, with allies and the wider defence community will serve to mitigate risk.. Demographics. Trends in demographics generate considerable potential for risk in Defenceand requires to manage this element of risk by identifying, well in advance, broad human re-source requirements.. Risk Sharing in Defence and Security Matters: The nature of defence demands that the riskbe shared among the Department of Defence, other government departments, and allies.This environment serves on the one hand to mitigate and manage risk, while on the othertaking some aspects of risk mitigation out of the hands of defence organizations.. Defence Constituency: Fracturing or diluting of an up-to-date defence agenda among mili-tary and government and defence authorities produces this risk.What can be done?: A Capability-Based PlanningCapability-based planning128identifies the capabilities needed by the military (includingnaval) forces to deliver its mandate and then seeks to create them. To have a capability meansto have the ability to act in a specific way in a specific situation. Military capability is generatedwhen plans, people and equipment are combined to achieve imposed goals. Capability-basedplanning is the process to determine the right blend of plans, people, equipment and activity tooptimize the capacity of the defense organizations and military forces to fill its assigned roles.A capability-based planning is designed to mitigate the two fundamental risks that organi-zations of defence must overcome when planning for the future:- The first is that military forces may be unable to accomplish the mission set for them. Includedin this risk is the possibility of failure in operations or battle.- The second is that defence organizations may fail to deliver defence capability required bycountries with the resources allocated.The international environment is uncertain and volatile, and possible threats are oftenhard to identify and predict, and change often. Capability-based planning is the best tool foridentifying core priorities and developing change initiatives in force structure and strategy be-cause it focuses planners on identifying what capabilities are necessary for the defence organi-zation and, by extension, naval forces, expressed in the defence international treaties. Capabili-ties are prioritized and planning can focus on capabilities identified as key to the organization in128Canadian Forces, VCDS. “Capability-Based Planning Overview”, Defence Planning & Management.http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dp&m
  • 79. 79an environment of scarce resources.Three main areas most affect force development: the international environment, domesticconsiderations, and developments in military art and science.Assessing the two major types of conflict possible today – interstate and intra-state – it’s clearthat the armed forces must remain poised for both. A similar conclusion results from an as-sessment of autonomy and interoperability: the armed forces, including naval forces, must becapable of working with most likely coalition or alliance partners, while retaining autonomouscapability to act domestically. The requirement to act not only in their own seas but also abroadaffects both the nature of forces to procure, which must be designed with global transportationconsiderations in mind, and the necessity of access to adequate transport platforms. Capabilitiesthat are relevant to both inter and intra state conflicts are more useful than those unique to onepossibility.At home, the navies will remain focused on operational activities to assert sovereigntyand to support the rule of law in their countries. At the same time, the navies should maintainthe combat capability to respond appropriately to its expeditionary responsibilities abroad insupport of foreign policy objectives, including confidence building, crisis prevention, humanitari-an or intervention missions.Multi-purpose capabilities are central to future naval force planning. Naval units able toundertake expeditionary operations will also be capable, by virtue of the flexibility inherent inwell-equipped, highly disciplined military units, of successfully discharging the majority of do-mestic responsibilities that they might be called upon to perform. Hence, the navies should fo-cus first on units capable of combat in mid-level operations129in interstate war.At the same time naval units must also be capable of the range of activities in that widespectrum of activity known as ‘Operations Other Than War’ (OOTW), which addresses both in-tra-state conflict - peace support and peacekeeping operations - and support to domestic opera-tions. Naval involvement in OOTW has been frequent since the end of the Cold War, and is like-ly to remain so for the foreseeable future. Many of the combat capabilities required for interstatewars have applicability in OOTW, yet there are requirements unique to OOTW as well. Theneed to resort to combat capabilities is increasingly likely in many complex Chapter VI UN oper-ations, and planning to use combat capabilities is essential in Chapter VII UN operations. Thevariety and complexity of current military operations, whether they are focused on the delivery ofcombat capability or on other aspects of military competency, is a central challenge when plan-ning future forces.The capability to conduct operations requires more than just combat capabilities. Ena-bling capabilities, such as effective command & control, as well as responsive logistics, are cen-tral to an effective overall military capability. One method that allows a sense of the relative val-ue of different force development proposals is to derive a set of weighted criteria - such asCombat, Non-combat, Joint & Combined Interoperability, Global Reach, Future Strategic Adapt-ability and Corporate - from policy guidance and then evaluate force structure proposals in termsof these categories.Such criteria address a cross-section of different defence and change objectives, and al-so promote flexibility. For example, the ability required for one task, joint & combined globalreach, is often entirely suitable in another context as well. In this case, the capability to deploy isimportant not just for the naval forces´ global responsibility but also for moving across the vastdistances of their countries themselves. The force planning scenarios, as they will be explained,129See glossary for a definition of mid-level operations.
  • 80. 80are situated in the context of the spectrum of conflict (see next Figure). The scenarios do notcover all future possibilities for naval forces operations, but they do provide a good point of de-parture for force development.PEACE CONFLICT WAROPERATIONS OTHER THAN WARWARFIGHTINGNON-COMBAT OPERATIONSCOMBAT OPERATIONSSARDisasterReliefInt’l HumanitarianAssistanceSurv & Control ofCdn Territory & ApproachesEvacuation of Citizens OverseasPeace Support Operations (such as UN Chapter VI)Aid of the Civil PowerNational Sovereignty/InterestEnforcement Peace Support Operations (such as UN Chapter VII)Defence of Country´s TerritoryCollective DefenceWho can do the most can usually do the least. Forces trained in military operations canbe employed domestically. The reverse is not true. Military capabilities can generally be em-ployed in domestic settings, but there are domestic responsibilities of naval forces, such as theskill sets required for search and rescue or counter-terrorism, that require unique preparations.Mandated tasks such as these must be addressed through special units dedicated to thosetasks.Determining a viable and affordable force structure that can accomplish all assigned tasksis an inherently complex, controversial and iterative process. The process is complicate. Forexample, existing equipment is often too valuable to retire, and simply maintaining the personnelskills necessary in complex military operations - such as operating a helicopter from the deck ofa destroyer - may result in decisions to keep old equipment in operation even when it is no long-er very cost effective to do so.Having determined an appropriate focus for naval forces development, the question be-comes what particular types of capabilities best support this focus? How much of each type of isrequired? The dramatic changes in the strategic environment that came at the end of the ColdWar spurred many western militaries around the world to abandon threat-based force planningand return to the generic need for military capabilities. Capability-based planning requires a co-herent methodology. A comprehensive table of military tasks at the military strategic, operation-al and tactical levels provides a framework to discuss the capabilities needed to perform them,and facilitates the discussion of how best to prioritize capabilities.An Allied Joint Task List (AJTL) can fulfill this role. The Force Planning Scenarios providethe context for assessing which tasks must be done, and to situate assessments of to what de-gree the naval forces might reasonably anticipate being required to undertake the task. A South
  • 81. 81Atlantic Standing Naval Force Tactically Self-Sufficient Unit should provide a conceptual focusfor assessing how much of a specific capability South Atlantic Rim Countries require.Concept of operations for combined naval forcesThe concept of operations for combined naval forces must have the ability to assess theneed for, plan the deployment of, sustain and command deployed forces, in the region and, whynot, abroad.Military strategic level capabilities are focused on determining the military strategic objec-tives and desired end state, outlining military action needed, allocating resources and applyingconstraints.A more problematic level of capability for the naval forces is the operational level, whichcan be defined as producing and sequencing the campaign plan which orchestrates military re-sources to achieve the desired end state and military strategic objectives. National naval forcesrequire selective capabilities at this level, but they will not need a comprehensive operationallevel capability if they normally participate in international operations as a contributing part of acoalition.Most of the navies lack the capability to achieve operational goals by themselves in inter-national situations. This is unlikely to change. Therefore, the fundamental asset that any navalforce requires for international operations (also a key contributor to domestic responsibilities) iswhat may be termed a tactically self-sufficient unit (TSSU). It follows that TSSU’s must be ca-pable of integrating into a South Atlantic Combined Force package as a “task-tailored” compo-nent. The consequence of the requirement to integrate into a Combined Force is that TSSU’smust be modular and adaptable, capable of integrating with other international and nationalforces that are likely to be involved in a combined operation. A corollary of the coalition natureof naval operations internationally is that decisions regarding commitments of any TSSUs arevitally important, highlighting the importance of military strategic level command capability in allthe naval forces.The minimum requirement of the TSSUs will be that they can at least conduct medium in-tensity operations. This in turn requires that TSSUs have an adequate combat capability includ-ing suitable self-defence and reasonable offensive capability.TSSUs embody a collection of tactical capabilities and must be supported by - and havethe ability to be supported by - a wide range of tactical, operational and strategic enabling capa-bilities. A current example of one type of TSSU is a naval Task Group (TG) like the StandingNaval Force South Atlantic. The various ships that form a TG are capable of sea control in alimited area and therefore can make a tactically valuable contribution to an alliance operation.The different ships each provide capabilities unique to their class, and their combination createsa synergistic effect that multiplies their effectiveness. While a TG provides a TSSU capable ofmaking a significant contribution, it can also be argued that some of the current naval ships con-stitute TSSUs by themselves. For example, usually a frigate has sufficient sensors, weaponsand command & control capability to provide an effective contribution to an embargo operationon its own, or to form part of an alliance sea control operation when integrated with an aircraftcarrier battle group (CVBG). A common characteristic between the two situations is that theCommand & Control capability as well as the Information & Intelligence capability required bythe two formations is approximately the same. Naval Aviation Patrol Aircraft (NAPA) can pro-vide important sea control capabilities to a coalition operation. A TSSU of NAPA might at theupper end of expected operations involve 6 aircraft, while a minimum MPA TSSU may be just
  • 82. 82two. The main requirement of all these contributions is that a TSSU must be able to make amilitary contribution sufficiently relevant that it can identify the SASNF.Another class of capability that is necessary for the SNFSA, and which might be de-scribed as enabling but also as essential, is Information & Intelligence. This capability use to bea national level enabler that allows naval forces to coordinate Other Government Departments(OGDs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)s when complex situations or emergenciesarise. This is also a capability needed to support combat operations that can be vital in domes-tic operations. Information & Intelligence embraces all knowledge needed by a commander,including intelligence on opposing forces, friendly forces, weather and geography. This infor-mation enables a commander to plan and act flexibly, allowing a balance between demands ofconcentrating the force, economy of effort and security. This reduces risk and maximizes effec-tiveness. Surveillance and reconnaissance are a necessary part of this capability. Information& Intelligence is derived from the collection and subsequent analysis of data from sensors,commercial systems and alliance networks. The knowledge and insight that results must thenbe communicated to operators in a timely manner. Determining the degree of ability in all of theareas that support an Information & Intelligence capability is complicated by the range and varie-ty of means and options available, but basic competencies in obtaining, analyzing and dissemi-nating Information & Intelligence are clearly the minimum requirement.The capability to command & control, also an interagency enabler, builds upon the capa-bility to develop Information & Intelligence. Command is a human centred activity that revolvesaround the act of deciding what to do, and includes planning, directing, coordinating and control-ling forces in operations. A TSSU requires an appropriate command & control capability to en-sure that its efforts are focused effectively. A basic military command & control capability musthave sufficient flexibility to harness additional resources in rapidly changing circumstances, asunexpected eventualities are a predictable development in combat operations. Once the basiccapability needed to command a TSSU is achieved, these competencies along with the support-ing Information & Intelligence capabilities, provides commanders with the ability to focus the ef-forts of more than their own units. In particular, the commander of a TSSU supporting civilagencies in the event of a disaster should employ integral command, Information & Intelligencecapabilities to orchestrate the actions of their unit, those of the agencies being supported, andany volunteer NGOs, thereby maximizing the overall effectiveness of the operation. The basiccompetencies required by a naval formation must multiply the effectiveness of a larger effort,acting as a self-synchronizing agent or integrating node, creating synergy in a chaotic situation.Any TSSUs also require adequate mobility when involved in operations. At the immediatetactical level this requires that TSSUs be able to manoeuvre into a position of advantage fromwhich either force or unit capabilities can be applied effectively. This can be either with respectto an enemy or in the face of natural obstacles in the event of a disaster.More generally, the capability to deploy TSSUs significant distances - on a scale thatstraddles the operational and strategic levels - is required for both national and international op-erations. Nationally the requirement derives from the expanse of each country, unless the farmore expensive alternative of stationing units in many localities is adopted. Internationally, theglobal nature of potential operations mandates some capability to deploy anywhere, althoughthe issue of how quickly naval units must be capable of global deployment requires further atten-tion. Operational (or limited strategic) mobility therefore provides naval forces tactically self-sufficient units with an important enabling capability that allows fewer units to respond to a largevariety of contingencies.TSSUs by definition must have the capability to provide the deployed logistic and other
  • 83. 83support required in the conduct of operations. The overall force design must ensure that theseTSSUs are linked to those nationally based support structures that sustain them. This harmoni-zation is essential to ensure that operational support requirements are developed as part of theoverall support concept. A key competency within this capability is that of timely mission plan-ning and theatre reconnaissance and activation. TSSUs are by definition flexible in their organi-zation and structure – this is particularly true in the case of support structures, which are shapedby a range of inter-related planning factors.In conclusion, the concept of TSSU must be applied to the SNFSA.Capability goals for a combined naval force.This JTL has been accepted as the core task framework for the entire Canadian Forces(the Canadian Joint Task List - CJTL). Annex 4 displays the entire proposed South AtlanticCombined & Joint Task List (SACJTL).The concept of a task list is well known by developed countries. The armed forces of theUnites States began developing a Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL). It is still used ex-tensively, and NATO has adopted the task list methodology and developed its own version. TheUnited Kingdom took the fundamental concept embodied in the JMETL and developed theirJoint Essential Task List (JETL). The JETL simplified the approach taken by the US, identifying400 tasks as opposed to about 600 for the US version. The UK also introduced a more flexibletask framework that allowed security issues such as peacekeeping to be addressed in a com-prehensive manner. Canada took these examples to think its own Canadian Joint Task List andthis is the reference taken for this study.The Concept of Operations of the SNFSA should provide a point of departure for furtherforce structure explorations, but holistic force development requires a number of other concep-tual tools. The introduction of the Combined & Joint Task List (SACJTL) establishes a frame-work for describing, and relating, the myriad types of capabilities that may be required, to greateror lesser degrees, by the any military force. The CJTL provides a common language for anynational or allied force development within the context of force planning scenarios. Beyond con-text and language, decision support and risk analysis tools are being developed to assist seniorofficers and officials as they assess the bewildering variety of possibilities and options involvedin ensuring the operational effectiveness of a modern military. The most mature decision sup-port tool is called Fundamental Investigation of Defence Options or FIDO. The current risk orgap analysis model, an ambitious effort that is still evolving, is known as the Scenario Opera-tional Capability Risk Assessment Model (SOCRAM).The task descriptions in the SACJTL focus on what effect is to be produced by the task,not on how the task is to be accomplished. This allows the task list to be used as a frameworkto describe capabilities.The proposed SACJTL has eight major capability areas:- Command- Information & Intelligence- Conduct Operations- Mobility- Protect Own Forces- Sustain- Generate Forces- Co-ordinate with Other National and International Organizations. (Co-ord with ONIO).
  • 84. 84The SACJTL has three levels of combined tasks in it: military strategic, operational andtactical. The tasks within each level are further broken down into two additional layers of sub-tasks. Each layer of sub-tasks becomes more detailed and specific. This three-tier blueprint,and associated sub-levels, captures the complex, multi-dimensional, multi-level nature of militaryactivity were naval forces must accomplish their functions.Different task lists can be developed by the different services and elements of the militaryforces as necessary to complement the SACJTL and address unique and specific aspects. Dif-ferent services may also consider it important to develop operational function lists to describeactivities in a manner similar to that of the SACJTL, but with the focus on field (“operational”)practice as opposed to functional activity. At the general level the SACJTL provides a compre-hensive list of the capabilities a nation may need, and therefore allows the definition of specificcapabilities that any country needs. The different natures of the various lists may result, fromtime to time, in suggestions that new tasks be added to this SACJTL. There are, therefore, goodreasons for allowing a re-ordering of existing tasks and the initiation of new tasks by differentservices and elements of the military forces, but each task description should ultimately betranslated or linked to the SACJTL. The linkages between the separate task lists and theSACJTL are essential to allow a common comprehension of overall force capabilities and re-quirements.What levels of capacity?Next table attempts to translate the SNFSA Concept of Operations so as to provide aguide to the level of capability appropriate for the SNFSA. It must clearly be understood that theconformation of a SNFSA belongs to the Tactical Level and the next are goals that do not reflectthe initial level of capabilities. The table represents capability goals required to satisfy allied poli-cy directives. The boxes marked with H are those where the Military and Naval Allied Forcesmay seek a High degree of capability. Those with M indicate a medium or moderate level ofcapability may considered acceptable, either because the South Atlantic Alliance and theSNFSA cannot achieve a high degree of capability in this area of military operations on its ownbecause of the complexity and cost, or because the allied naval organization has assessed thatthe risks associated with only achieving moderate capability in that area are reasonable in thecontext of limited resources. An L indicates that the naval forces could seek only a low degreeof capability in that area, with a similar rationale as to the limited expectations in that area madeas for M. The assessments reflected by the H,M and Ls in the table represent a suggestionof the initial goal of capabilities required in light of current threats and geopolitical trends.Capability Goals in the conformation of a SNFSAReference: (1) Coordination with Other National and International Organizations (ONIO)LevelConduct Mobility ProtectMilitary/NavalStrategic H H M H M M M HNaval Operat. M M L H M M M HNaval Tactical M M M M H H M HOperations (1) CoordwithONIOInfo &IntelCommand Sustain Generate
  • 85. 85The goals are subjective and evolve as situation change. They nonetheless represent auseful initial point for assessments of force structure options and specific capability proposals.The command capability area is one of the most important because it describes the fun-damental decisions involved in whether and how to bring naval force to bear in any given situa-tion. A High level of command capability at the military strategic level of war is assessed asnecessary for the SNFSA because it is at this level of conflict that the SNFSA commanders mustbe advised regarding regional military options. National naval forces cannot rely on allies to per-form this capability for them, and must therefore be independently competent at the military stra-tegic level. The degree of command capability required at the operational level is less easy todetermine. Ideally, the Naval Organization would have a High level of capability here as well,but this is not assessed as essential because the naval forces will conduct operational level mili-tary efforts as part of a coalition or alliance, unless it’s a domestic operation. Therefore aMedium level of capability is reasonable. A similar rationale is the reason for only a Mediumlevel at the tactical level. This does not mean that the SNFSA will not have a good tactical oroperational level of capability in some aspects of command, but it does suggest that overall themost important area of capability in command is at the military strategic level.The analysis that produced the goals for the Information & Intelligence capability areaparallels that of the command stream. This is hardly surprising, given the close inter-relationshipbetween command and Information & Intelligence.The ‘conduct operations’ capability area is different in nature and assessment from thefirst two capability areas. With regard to the strategic situation and threats in South Atlantic it’snot difficult to conceive of any country of the region, except Brazil, ever undertaking significantmilitary strategic level operations by itself, but in case of conforming a South Atlantic Alliance aMedium degree of capability is considered acceptable. It is unlikely that the South Atlantic Na-val Organization would undertake substantial manoeuvres indicated by the operational level ofconduct operations, so that a Medium level of conduct operations at this level is again accepta-ble. However, SNFSA may be tasked with significant tactical tasks, although the modest size ofmost of the current and near future naval forces suggests that this combined force will not un-dertake the most challenging tactical operations unilaterally. A Medium degree of capabilityoverall is therefore deemed appropriate, with the understanding that future creation of smallnumber of other highly effective TSSUs may be the most appropriate way of acquiring the requi-site level for regional capability.Mobility is perhaps the most significant change in capability goals since the end of theCold War. Up to a decade ago it was used to get mobility goals more by forward deploymentthan by an actual capability to transport military units efficaciously around the globe. Since thereand given today the increased possibility of sending naval units anywhere in the region or in theworld at short notice, there has been a major change in the amount and type of mobility capabil-ity needed. Moreover, the wide extension of South Atlantic theatre of operations reinforces thisnecessity. The goal of High at the military strategic level reflects the mentioned circumstances.The South Atlantic Rim naval forces are currently far from Highly capable in military strategicmobility, and it may be argued that Medium is all we should aim for. However, a significant im-provement in military strategic mobility is necessary. Once the naval forces are deployed into atheatre, there are fewer requirements for mobility, but, considering the initial existence a smallSNFSA and, at most few other TSSUs, and the eventual necessity to change theatres, a Highcapability is assessed necessary in combined naval forces of the region at operational level.Tactically, a Medium level of mobility is deemed appropriate.‘Protect’ is one of the most difficult areas of capability to assess. The military strategic
  • 86. 86level of protect refers to measures designed to best protect infrastructure and the mobilizationbase from damage in the event of attack. Any country of the region is strategically fortunate inits geographic position with respect to most of potential threat except terrorism, which makes anassessment of Medium necessary at least. At the operational level, the SNFSA may be theonly or even the lead military force in a theatre of operations. Therefore, the necessity of thiscapability should be acceptable and Medium at least. At the tactical level, a High level of ‘pro-tect’ capability is assessed in case of being the only naval force in the theater.The sustainment capability assessments are similar to those for protect. Infrastructureand bases should be at least of Medium level in most of countries. Until good reliance can beplaced on allies for logistic support in the theatre of operations it is recommended SNFSA worksas a tactically self-sufficient unit. So, a High level is required at the tactical level. Consideringthe existence of many developing countries, mostly in the African littoral, Medium is at least ap-propriated at the operational level.Force generation, the broad range of activities required to define, develop and prepareforces for operations, indicates that countries of the region requires at least a Medium level ofcapability in all levels because there are a number of opportunities to participate.Finally, the last column of capabilities refers to the capability of military and naval forcesto co-ordinate with other international or national organizations in the region, international alli-ances, and non-governmental agencies to achieve regional security objectives. The capabilitygoal in this stream at all levels is assessed as ‘High’ at the military strategic, the operational andtactical level. At the military strategic level the capabilities necessary include such diverse activi-ties as disaster relief, coordinating civil defence and fostering regional and alliance security rela-tionships. At the operational level the focus is on effective co-ordination with local governmentsand alliance authorities in a theatre of operations, while tactically the aim is to ensure efficientinteractions between the various government and non-government agencies that will be directlyinvolved in operations (this includes Civil-Military Co-operation, or CIMIC, capabilities). The ca-pability to ‘Coordinate with Other International Organizations’ is generally a functional and pro-cedural challenge: most equipment required for this capability area is primarily developed forother capability goals.The goals portrayed in the table can be used to guide decisions made regarding newequipment projects, amongst other things. The capability goals will provide a single agreedframework to assist in determining priorities amongst different project proposals in a Long TermCapital Programme for the alliance. The judgment of military experts will still be needed to as-sess how best to achieve the capability goals.The operational research tools Scenario Operational Capability Risk Assessment Model(SOCRAM) and Fundamental Investigation of Defence Options (FIDO) are efforts to measurethe capability goals and how to best achieve them.The force planning scenariosSOCRAM is designed to provide better insight into the relative amount of capability thatthe naval forces require in the force planning scenarios. Running the SOCRAM, a large numberof times allow a profile of capability demand, representing concurrent operations, to be devel-oped. These estimates can then be compared to an estimated amount of overall capability pro-vided by a specific force structure option like the SNFSA.The Force Planning Scenarios are used to assess risk; describe operational considera-tions, resource requirements, and other influencing factors; and rationalize capability require-
  • 87. 87ments.Eleven main scenarios have been at least identified in the South Atlantic Rim regionwhere a combined naval force or a Standing Naval Force could participate as follow:1- Search and rescue in the South AtlanticSituation:. A luxury cruise liner has caught fire approximately 400 NM offshore. It has declared anemergency (thus its position is known); or. An sailor in a small boat is lost in the middle of the South Atlantic; or. A major airliner has been forced down during its flight between Buenos Aires and CapeTown. There are survivors.Physical environment: Offshore area in the South AtlanticMissions:. Assist national authorities, navies or coast guards in maritime search and rescue. Coordinate search and rescue effortMission success criteria:. Respond in a timely manner. Sustain operations as requiredPartial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:. Coordination. Search. Rescue (First Aid and Evacuation)C4I Arrangements: Coordination and cooperation with other navies or coast guards, civilauthorities, and volunteers.Sustainment information: Operations are to be sustained as long as necessary.2- Disaster relief in any country of South Atlantic RimSituation: A exceptional inundation has occurred on the East Coast of Argentina resulting inunequal damage. There is major devastation. Many rural areas have been cut off and thusthe total damage is not fully known at this point in time. However, the magnitude of whathas occurred has clearly overwhelmed the local authorities. The Government has declareda national emergencyPhysical environment:. Major devastation has occurred near the littorals with the potential of secondary effects. Accident at seaMission:. Assist national authorities in the provision of reliefMission success criteria:. Respond in a timely manner. Execute assigned and implied tasks in an effective and efficient manner. Sustain operations as requiredPartial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:.Coordination and assistance. Evacuation / Transport. Medical assistance. Damage assessments. Distribution of food and provision of emergency aid
  • 88. 88. Support to law enforcement agencies / security as appropriate. Search and rescue. Provision of specialty advice. Provision of communications for relief operationsC4I Arrangements: Coordination and cooperation with other navies or coast guards, civilauthorities, and volunteers.Sustainment information:. Initially deployed forces must be completely self-sufficient.. Deployed force will be sustained as long as necessary (until the local authorities can copeeffectively on their own)3- International humanitarian assistanceSituation: A situation has arisen in a Littoral African country that has placed a large numberof lives at risk. The magnitude of the situation has completely overwhelmed local govern-ment, infrastructure and support facilities. The country involved has asked for internationalhelp in the form of humanitarian assistance to relieve human suffering and stop loss of life.Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) are already deployed, but are also overwhelmed.The United Nations assessed the situation and has passed a resolution calling for the for-mation of a regional or multinational force, with a 6-month mandate, that will assist in the de-livery of humanitarian supplies by sea and air to several staging areas for subsequent distri-bution by local authorities and NGOs, and provide support services for local government au-thorities and NGOs at the staging areas.Physical Environment: Wide range of possible terrain types (coastal, inland, urban, rural)and all weather conditions.Threat Information: The level of threat encountered should be very low, but should not bediscounted, as there is potential that not all involved parties / organizations will welcomeforeign military involvement / aid.Mission:. Assist in provision of humanitarian aid to relieve human suffering and help improve the sit-uation until local authorities and NGOs can effectively deal with the situation.. Provide security, communications, etc. in support of local authorities and HGOs in theirrole of delivering humanitarian support.Mission success criteria:. Ability to field mission-mandated forces and capabilities. Ability to meet deployment timelines. Ability to sustain the force response for the required duration. Further Mission Success Criteria would be established in conjunction with officials from thecountry to be supported.Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:. Coordination with multinational organizations, national/local authorities and NGOs. Medical assistance. Civilian engineer infrastructure damage assessment (and aid as appropriate). Delivery of food and emergency aid. Security / protection of supplies, people and equipment. Security tasks (as appropriate). Provision of specially advice.
  • 89. 89C4I Arrangements:. With the armed forces of other nations, local governments, NGOs, countries providing hostnation support.Sustainment information: Initially deployed forces must be completely self-sufficient andthey will be sustained as long as deemed necessary.4- Surveillance / control of the South Atlantic and its approachesSituation: Incidents of piracy, drug smuggling and landings of illegal immigrants on anycountry coasts have resulted in calls for the country Government to "do something" but it’snot able by its own military and constabulary forces.Physical environment: South Atlantic waters and its maritime approaches.Threat information: The overall threat environment is very low. The targets of the operationsmay be independent or not surface vessels or small aircraft seeking to avoid interceptionand effect covert transit. It is considered likely that the platforms will be equipped with tech-nically sophisticated equipment (ESM, ECM) and armed with small arms.Missions:. Cooperate with other navies or conduct surveillance of appropriate approaches to theSouth Atlantic region and identify platforms of interest. If necessary, naval forces should beprepared to intercept them prior to the established limits or territories.Mission success criteria:. Ability to detect and identify platforms of interest. Ability to track platforms of interest. Ability to respond to situation (intercept, board surface vessels/force landing of small air-craft) as per requests or in response to rules of engagement. Ability to meet timing criteria.Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:. Contribute to threat assessment. Contribute to surveillance of South Atlantic waters and approaches. Contribute to C2 process as requested. Contribute to tracking of platforms of interest. Be prepared to intercept and board/force landing of platforms of interest.C4I Arrangements: Cooperation with national governmental agencies is clearly critical inthis scenario.Sustainment Information: A heightened state of surveillance may be required for indicatedperiod of time.5- Evacuation of people overseasSituation: An internal conflict between a country’s government and an insurgent group hasreached a level where it threatens the stability of the country and its general peace and or-der. The alliance has decided to evacuate their citizens (200 personnel). The government ofthe country is in no position to question this decision, however, it is possible that the insur-gents could take alliance hostages to further their cause.Physical environment: It includes a wide range of possible terrain types (coastal, inland, ur-ban, rural) and all weather climatic conditions.Threat Information. Insurgent groups well established and supported, that has as its ulti-mate aim to replace the current government of a country. The forces of this group are wellsupported in terms of financial support, safe havens, and military advice and training by
  • 90. 90groups in neighboring nations. It has the capacity to field both light conventional forces aswell as irregular troops.Missions:. Conduct operations to evacuate Canadian citizens from the country.Mission success criteria:. Ability to field mission-mandated forces and capabilities,. Ability to meet deployment timelines,. Sustainment of the force response for the required duration.Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:. Operations to secure launching point (as appropriate). Deployment of naval assets to area of operations. Employment of naval forces in evacuation and evacuation support operations. Sustainment operations. Coordination with both multinational and non-governmental agencies. Planning with allies. Evacuation / transport for citizens. Provision of medical assistance for citizens. Redeployment of naval forces elements and citizens.C4I Arrangements: C4I arrangements with the armed forces of other nations and civilianagencies and OGDs will be necessary.Sustainment Information. Deployed forces must be completely self-sufficient for the dura-tion of the mission.6- Peace support operations, Chapter 6 UNCSituation: Tension between two bordering states escalated until actual conflict broke out. Af-ter a series of quick successes and setbacks on both sides, the situation evolved into a pro-longed stalemate. Both parties agreed to a UN-brokered cease-fire. Non-Governmental Or-ganizations (NGOs) have deployed into the area, and the UN Security Council passed aResolution to establish a UN force with a 24 month mandate under Chapter 6 of the UNCharter to conduct peace support operations along the border area to contribute to the es-tablishment of an environment where peace building can take place.Physical environment: Two countries involved. The physical environment encountered wouldinclude terrain from both coastal regions and inland, urban and rural.Threat Information. The overall threat environment is low. UN Forces are being formed atthe request of the two states previously involved in the conflict. The cease-fire is holding atthe current time.Mission. Conduct peacekeeping operations under the auspices of Chapter 6 of the UN Char-ter.Mission Success Criteria:. Ability to field mission-mandated forces and capabilities,. Ability to meet mission-deployment timelines,. Sustainment of the naval force response for the required duration.Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:. Deployment of naval assets to area of operations,. Employment of naval forces in peacekeeping duties,. Sustainment operations,. Creating a secure and stable environment where peace building can take place, and
  • 91. 91. Redeployment of naval force elementsC4I Arrangements: Arrangements with Regional Command elements, the armed forces ofother nations, NGOs, the two states involved in the initial conflict, and UN Headquarters willbe necessary.Sustainment Information. Sustainment of naval force elements should be accomplishedaccording to negotiated support arrangements (force initially self-sufficient for a set periodof time after which negotiated UN support arrangements are put in place). The duration ofthe operation is indefinite and will be based on the standard six month timeframe (with ex-tension of the mandate possible at the end of the initial 24 month period).7- Aid to any civil powerSituation: As a SARC government lost authority and water has grown more and morescarce in the country, groups involved in disputes have had time to become organized. Theaffected region has expanded to include the jurisdiction of two provinces. In at least onecase a minor dispute has escalated creating large-scale unrest, including armed insurrec-tions. The armed forces are divided. The situation has reached a point where civilian au-thorities can no longer cope, military assistance has been requested but internal disputesimpele to solve the problem. The government as asked for military help to the SARC alli-ance.Physical Environment: Maritime and coastal. Coastal includes urban and rural environment.Threat Information: There is a clear possibility of internal armed action in some country dur-ing some instances.Mission. To assist the civil authorities in restoring law and order.Mission Success Criteria:. The restoration of law and order to a level that the national and provincial authorities cancope. The above must be achieved with the minimum use of force and with minimal casualties.Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:. Assist in threat assessment,. Assist in surveillance,. Assist in controlling access/perimeter control,. Assist in the disarming of antagonists, and. Assist in the removal of antagonists from occupied areas.C4I Arrangements: Coordination with national authorities and law enforcement agencies isclearly critical in this scenario.Sustainment Information. Deployed troops are to be self-sufficient. Duration of one to threemonths is likely.8- Sovereignty of countries and regional interests enforcementSituation: Discovery of highly concentrated deposits of gold, copper and zinc in commerciallyexploitable quantities on the seabed close to the 200 NM limit of a South Atlantic Rim Nation(SARN) coast have led to a dispute over seabed rights. SARN claims for extended jurisdic-tion under UNCLOS III, and enacted into Canadian law through the Oceans Act, have beenrejected by a certain country, and deep seabed exploitation vessels from that country havebegun operations just beyond the 200 NM limit resulting in increased friction. The countrydispatched a frigate to protect her claims to exploitation of seabed resources, even within
  • 92. 92200 NM. It also rejected SARN calls for a cessation of seabed operations until the case hadbeen resolved by international arbitration, labeling such action as simple obstructionism.Diplomatic overtures and discussions in international fora have not produced even a hope ofresolution.Physical Environment: An offshore area over any country of the alliance is claiming jurisdic-tion.Threat Information: Previous to the dispute the threat environment was very low. As the dis-pute continues the possibility of skirmishes and low-intensity conflict must be considered.Mission: The naval forces are to enforce claims in the extended Economic Exclusive Zoneby supporting operations aimed at halting the other country’s deep seabed operations. Ifhostile operations are encountered, the naval forces will be required to conduct sea controloperations in order to achieve the regional objective of peace by asserting sovereignty overthe seabed resources in dispute.Mission Success Criteria:. Ability to provide combat capable forces in a timely manner. Ability to stop the other country from mining (i.e. enforce Canadian claims).Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:. Contribute to threat assessment,. Contribute to surveillance of the area of dispute,. Contribute to the C2 picture/process. Use of combat capable forces as required.C4I Arrangements: Cooperation with Canadian national authorities of countries clearly criti-cal in this scenario.Sustainment Information. Duration: 30 to 90 days (longer possible but unlikely).9- Peace support operations, Chapter 7 UNCSituation: Tension between two non-South Atlantic Rim bordering states has escalated to in-clude armed conflict. One state is likely to attain an overwhelming victory over its opponent.It has been assessed by the international community that this would be unacceptable. Thisled to a resolution by the UN Security Council that a regional force under UN command beformed and deployed to restore the previous situation. A combined South Atlantic Rim forceis being established under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.Physical Environment: The physical environment encountered would include maritime envi-ronment and terrain from both coastal regions and inland, urban and rural, in all weather cli-mate conditions.Threat Information: Enemy forces to be faced will include a full range of combat capability,with modern tactical doctrine and current generation equipment for its land, naval and airforces. Enemy C4I assets are assessed to be state-of-the-art. Use of NBC weapons againstcoalition forces is assessed as being unlikely, but can not be completely discounted.Mission: As part of a coalition of like-minded nations formed under the auspices of Chapter 7of the UN Charter, the combined naval force are to conduct operations to restore the pre-conflict boundaries as well as enforce a naval embargo and a no flight zone.Mission Success Criteria:. Ability to field mission-mandated forces and capabilities,. Ability to meet mission-deployment timelines,. Sustainment of the naval force response for required duration.
  • 93. 93Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:. Operations to secure Coalition Force launching point (as appropriate),. Deployment of naval force assets to area of operations,. Employment of naval force in operations,. Sustainment operations. Redeployment of naval force elements.Coalition and Theatre Situation. A group of like-minded nations and the South Atlantic Alli-ance have agreed to participate in this operation under the auspices of a UN resolutionmandated under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.C4I Arrangements. C4I arrangements with the alliance headquarters, the armed forces ofother nations and UN Headquarters will be required.Deployment Information. The naval force elements involved in this mission will be deployedby owned or arranged strategic lift assets (including that of allies and commercial sources).Sustainment Information. Sustainment of naval force elements will be accomplished accord-ing to negotiated support arrangements (force initially self-sufficient for a set period of timeafter which negotiated UN support arrangements are put in place). The duration of the op-eration is anticipated to be 3 months to one year.10- Defence of peace in the regionSituation: A military superpower has become increasingly hostile. One of the nations closelyaffiliated with the emerging superpower is a country of the South America or Africa which it-self has become increasingly disruptive. It has recently come under the control of criminalelements to the extent that they can be said to intimidate much of the government. Govern-ment in the normal sense has, for all intents and purposes, ceased to exist and this is havinga destabilizing effect on neighbouring nations. The South Atlantic Rim governments, agree-ing that prompt and decisive action is crucial and have decided to establish a combined forceto eliminate the South Atlantic region threat posed by the hostile country. The superpowerhas stated that it will come to the defence of its partner and threatened retaliation if South At-lantic Rim forces interfere with its ally.Physical Environment: The air and sea approaches to North America, Canadian territory andthe territory of the Latin American nation.Threat Information: A superpower has an effective military force with a vast array of modernweapons at its disposal, but would most likely use its naval assets to threaten the peace inthe region with a naval force of ships, warships, aviation, submarines, cruise missiles andamphibious forces. It is also likely to support small landing parties to conduct covert attacksand other terrorist activities.The threat regime has a wide network of connections in the underworld in countries of theSouth Atlantic Rim. The regime has used bribes and other inducements to ensure the loyaltyof the nations military forces. These military forces are expected to staunchly defend the re-gime, while the regime is likely to sponsor terrorist activities in the South Atlantic Rim Coun-tries.The criminal organizations have developed capabilities to attack banking and other commer-cial information systems as well as to engage in other subversive activities.Missions:. Timely threat warning and accurate attack assessment must be provided. In light of thestated threat to any South Atlantic Rim Nation by the emerging threat power, the allied com-bined naval force, would be primarily employed to detect and counter any hostile threats ap-
  • 94. 94proaching to South Atlantic while providing maritime surveillance and vital point protection.The naval force would support civil authorities in countering terrorist activities.The naval force would provide a small force to assist any country operations to restore stabil-ity to the affected region.Mission Success Criteria:. Ability to field mission-mandated forces and capabilities,. Ability to meet mission-deployment timelines,. Sustainability of the naval force response for the required duration.Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Missions:. Deployment of naval force assets to the areas of operation,. Employment of naval force in operations,. Sustainment operations. Redeployment of naval force elements.Allied and Theatre Situation.In defence of any South Atlantic Rim Country territory, national naval forces are conductingarea surveillance operations and have forces prepared to intend to intercept upon identifica-tion of the target.The national naval force in coordination with the combined naval force, has been formed todeploy and conduct operations in the South Atlantic region.C4I Arrangements: Coordination with other national naval forces is required.Sustainment Information. Naval force elements would have to be sustained for as long asrequired.11- Collective defenceSituation: A South Atlantic Rim Nation and its non-allied neighbour have a long-standingdispute over a border. Tension has increased over time and there have been a growingnumber of actual incursions by the neighbouring nation. The allied nation under pressurehas, under Article 5, called upon its South Atlantic Rim allies to provide a credible deterrentforce.Physical Environment: The land mass involved includes a wide variety of terrain, includingplains, highlands, mountains, coastal areas and urban centres. Both countries possess acoastline with deep water approaches and several port facilities.Threat Information: The enemy forces include a full range of combat capability, with moderntactical doctrine and current generation equipment for its land, naval and air forces. EnemyC4I assets are assessed to be state-of-the-art. Use of NBC weapons against allied forces isassessed as being unlikely, but cannot be completely discounted.Mission: The combined naval force as part of the South Atlantic Rim Nations Alliance forces,will, in the first instance, mount a formidable show of force and conduct operations to stophostilities as soon as possible and restore and return control of the invaded territory, watersand airspace to the allied nation.Mission Success Criteria:. Ability to field mission-mandated forces and capabilities,. Ability to meet mission-deployment timelines,. Sustainability of the combined naval force response for the required duration.Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:. Deploy forces to theatre. Secure the rear area for the assembly and deployment of allied forces
  • 95. 95. Defend territory or waters not yet occupied by the invading nation. Eject enemy forces from invaded territory or waters. Establish a buffer zone along the internationally recognized border. Assist in the restoration of civil authority in the occupied territory. Sustain forces as long as required.Alliance and Theatre Situation: Alliance commences its operation with the deployment of theRapid Reaction Force.C4I Arrangements: Alliance C4 arrangements apply. Emergency Preparedness involved inallied countries is coordinating the provision of civil support with OGDs.Sustainment Information. Naval force elements would have to be sustained for as long as re-quired.The value-ranked capabilitiesWhen all the capabilities in a given force structure are assessed against the relative prob-ability of occurrence of the eleven force planning scenarios, then an estimate of the level of ‘risk’(chance that the force structure will not provide a satisfactory level of capability) can be made.The corollary of this is that the capabilities imposing the greatest risk are identified and possiblepaths to rectifying the deficiency can be articulated.The other tool seeks to find force development priorities by assessing possible alterna-tives in the context of defence policy, strategy and the security environment. In order to accom-plish this, the assessment process is based on the principles of value-focused thinking.130To make decisions in a value-focused context, this tool uses a multi-criteria decisionmodel known as Fundamental Investigation of Defence Options (FIDO). The various capabili-ties (or projects) being considered are ranked relative to each other based on assessment crite-ria developed based on defence objectives, structured to allow an appropriate balance betweenbenefits, costs and risks. The result of the relative assessment would be a value-ranked list ofcapabilities.SummaryForce planning for military forces is a necessity to develop the adequate responseto any threat and its involved risk in any security system. So, force planning must be ap-plicable for developing combined naval forces for regional maritime security in the SouthAtlantic Rim. This is a difficult process that must consider the spectrum of military conflictand a strategic risk management in defence.The Capability-Based Planning used by Canadian Forces is an excellent tool thatis almost completely adaptable for the South Atlantic Rim Combined Naval Force forceplanningThe concept of operations for combined naval forces has the ability to assess the needfor, plan the deployment of, sustain and command deployed forces, in the region and,130Value-focused thinking essentially consists of two activities: first deciding what you want and then figuring out how to getit. In the more usual approach… alternative-focused thinking, you first figure out what alternatives are available and thenchoose the best of the lot. With value-focused thinking, you should end up getting much closer to getting all of what you want(Ralph L. Keeney, “Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking”. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UniversityPress, 1992. p 4.)
  • 96. 96why not, abroad. Military Strategic, Operational and Tactical capabilities are assessed forgetting in the future for a combined South Atlantic Rim Naval Force.The fundamental asset that any and the proposed naval force requires for interna-tional operations (also a key contributor to domestic responsibilities) is what may betermed a Tactically Self-Sufficient Unit (TSSU), specially considering the characteristicsof the South Atlantic theatre. The proposal for the requirement of a South Atlantic TSSUwill be the STANDING NAVAL FORCE SOUTH ATLANTIC as follow.131***131As it was told at the initiation of this Section, the model used belongs to Canadian Forces.
  • 97. 97SECTION 6THE STANDING NAVAL FORCE SOUTH ATLANTICUtopia of a Standing Naval Force South Atlantic?As there is the real interest and potential for some countries of the region to participate inany future security operations in the South Atlantic Rim region, there has been a requirement forsome naval forces to cooperate bilaterally and through multilateral exercises/formations withother navies in the region. This is not new as some of these countries personnel, aboard shipsand aircraft, have worked with the others during major exercises. That is, for example, the caseof UNITAS (joining navies of Argentina, Brazil, United States and Uruguay among others),ATLASUR (between navies of Argentina, Brazil and South Africa) and FRATERNO (joining innaval operations the two most important navies of the region). What is purposed by this job isthe initiative to expand this activity on a more permanent basis with all nations in the South At-lantic region in a multinational context by conforming a SNFSA.The UN´s weakness as an organization for deploying maritime forces beyond limitedpeacekeeping operations on the UNTAC/UNPROFOR type may mean that it will have to dele-gate operational control to regional forces. Given the rapid changes in the international environ-ment, especially the growing chaos and disorder in the new world order, a compelling case canbe made for the development of a SNFSA and an overall South Atlantic Rim Security Alliance toprotect and preserve continued economic, political, cultural growth of South Atlantic Rim Na-tions. In relation to limited contingencies in territorial waters and Economic Exclusion Zones(EEZ), a SNFSA have comparable advantages in terms of proximity and political profile. Suchcontingencies could involve the protection of fisheries, off shore installations, marine transport,fight against piracy and terrorism, etc.Any future strategy should also consider elements of current US military doctrine for em-ploying “proportional or cooperative engagement” strategy. This concept reduces hegemonicregional forces while increasing the contribution of regional allies. This strategy shift may applypressure all over South Atlantic Rim countries in terms of burden sharing.The South Atlantic Rim Naval ForcesBy using the example of NATO, a Standing Naval Force South Atlantic, composed by carri-er, destroyer, frigate and/or corbet class ships, submarines, aviation and amphibious forces fromnavies of South Atlantic Rim Countries could operate under a single chain of command, possiblya Supreme Allied Commander South Atlantic based some fix or rotary place (country by country)with sub-regional commands based in those sub-regions as:1. Northern West Africa and South America2. Southern South America3. Southern West AfricaDespite starting maybe difficult, it should involve representatives from all nations in theSouth Atlantic Rim. It would enhance clarity by contributing to consensus in the Zone of Peaceand Cooperation of the South Atlantic.Naval units from Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa and Uruguay could initially formthe permanent membership in the naval force. Other naval ships from other members could pe-riodically join them during exercises in each area. The force would carry out a program of
  • 98. 98scheduled exercises, maneuvers, and port visits and could be rapidly deployed to a threatenedarea in times of crisis or tension. Between exercises, ships would remain under national com-mand.The following table defines a proposed capability plan for the SNFSA in the future:Annex 5 shows naval forces of the South Atlantic Rim Countries, distributed by SouthAmerican and West African littorals, mentioned by country from north to south.132The analysis of these forces can be resumed as follow:1- South American Atlantic littoral has more powerful naval forces than the West African littoral.2- Brazil and Argentina are medium size navies in South America and South Africa is growingfrom a small navy to a medium navy in the African littoral. Uruguay in South America andNigeria in Africa are small navies with few principal combatants. The rest of the countrieshave only very small size units to care of coastal or inner waters.3- Brazil has one medium size aircraft carrier (CV) and another of smaller size.4- Only Brazil (5 + 2 in acquisition), Argentina (3) and South Africa (2 + 3 in acquisition) haveconventional propelled submarines (SSK). They sum 10 SSK and other 5 will come in thenext years. They will be 15 in the near future.5- Brazil (10 FFG, 4 FF, 5 CC + 8 in acquisition), Uruguay (3 FFG), Argentina (5 DDG, 8 FFG),Nigeria (1 FFG, 2 FS) and South Africa in the short term (4 FSG in acquisition), have princi-pal combatants as destroyers, frigates and corbets. The current total is of 38 principal com-batants and it will be increased to 50 in short term.6- Only Brazil - 24 cbt ac. MD A-4 (15 embarked) and 54 armed hel.; Argentina - 31 cbt.ac. (14F/A, 17MR/ASW), 8 transport ac. and 27 armed hel.(11 ASW/SSW, 12 CBT SPT, 4 of coastguard) including the coastal guard; and Uruguay - 6 ac (3 T/A, 3 SSW) and 9 armed hel.,have Naval Aviation as a special component of their navies in charge of air operations fornaval support. Except South Africa, which maritime aviation depends from the Air Force, therest of the navies have very small air support to maritime operations.As it’s easy to understand, the current capabilities of South Atlantic Rim navies are veryheterogeneous and only few countries could fulfill the requirement to participate with as-sets in the constitution of the SNFSA. But, the problem can be easily solved if under-standing, decision, simplicity and a plan can progressively be developed. The followingrequirements should be ideally fulfilled:- There is a good understanding of benefits of a South Atlantic regional security optionand the proposal is considered of unanimous national interest.- There is a unanimous decision of participating.132Information from Jane’s Fighting Ship 2003 and Military Balance 2002.LevelConduct Mobility ProtectMilitary/NavalStrategic H H M H M M M HNaval Operat. M M L H M M M MNaval Tactical H M M M H H M HOperations (1) CoordwithONIOInfo &IntelCommand Sustain Generate
  • 99. 99- It must be affordable- The starting organization is simple and effective: a STANDING NAVAL FORCESOUTH ATLANTIC.- Combined training and doctrine.- Delegates and Governors of all South Atlantic Rim Countries participate with sincerity,clarity of ideas and common objectives.- The leadership of the organization, the combined naval forces and the SNFSA isshared among all countries of the region.- Objectives are clearly defined.- “Consensus” is the key word to take decisions as in NATO.- The regional security organization started a plan of shared national investments to fulfill en-hanced capabilities as required in a regional force planning.- It must further national concepts of active internationalism; and- It must provide adequate security for each national’s ocean domain.In the meanwhile, current naval forces in the South Atlantic Rim are enough to built aSNFSA with some of the assets indicated in Annex 6 with “Medium” capabilities in Tacti-cal Command, Sustain and Coordination with National and Other International Organiza-tions, and “Low” capabilities in Tactical Information & Intelligence, Conduct Operations,Mobility, Protect and Generate (See next table).The SNFSA could be initially be conformed in similar way to a US CARRIER BATTLEGROUP133, by the following assets:1 AIRCRAFT CARRIER (CV)1 AIR WING (AW)2 SUBMARINES (SSK)1 REPLENISHMENT SHIPS (AOR)6 DESTROYERS or FRIGATES (DD or FFG)and add: 1 AMPHIBIOUS SHIP with a MARINE CORP BATALLION1 Naval Aviation Patrol Aircraft Element (3 planes)It’s very important to recognize that this Tactically Self-Sufficient Unit (TSSU), willnot be able so sustain all year, 24 hs. operations because of limitations on maintenance,and the defence and strike capabilities of the CV Battle Group.Naval forces with aerial capabilities avoid the time to built land-based air forces.The disposal of carrier battle group mobility, defence and power projection capabilitiescarries real advantages. Composed as a TSSU they are self-contained, and could affordat least limited sustained operations. The carrier battle group includes an underway re-plenishment ship which can supply additional fuel and weapons, extending the durationof operations. The cost of self-contained mobility is limited stores of fuel and weapons, sothat operations cannot be sustained for long (usually not more than a week) without re-plenishment.The comparison between carriers and land bases is not too different from one be-tween the Marine Corps and the conventional Army. The Marines are designed to behighly mobile. The amphibious ships give them a self-contained capability, although thatmobility limits what they can take with them. Special Forces are far lighter than the Ma-133The conformation of a US Carrier Battle Group has been verified by the author onboard the CVN Theodore Roosevelt asship-rider during its deployment 1996/97.
  • 100. 100rines, to the point where they have much less capacity to resist enemy ground forces,and often far less mobility once deployed. Naval aviation from carriers brings the Marinesand naval forces the necessary defence. Moreover, sea based air assets are used to ob-tain information and prepare the theater for next operations.Submarines are capable of conducting a wide range of traditional and non-traditional missions and are potent ASW/AsuW/I&W platforms. With their ability to oper-ate covertly, often in areas well beyond friendly surface and air coverage, they can be asignificant force-multiplier. Besides its main missions, the SSK is adaptable to other non-routine operations that require covertness.Destroyers and frigates provide AAW/ASW/ASuW protection. They undertakesmost C² functions, are employed as general-purpose combatants and can be assigned tosome warfare duties to accompanying units, specially when conducting complex opera-tions. They can usually carry one or two maritime helicopters, which significantly enhancethe TSSU capabilities.Embarked Maritime Helicopters (MH) use to carry dipping sonar which, combinedwith their radar suite, makes them an efficient platform for ASW. With a different configu-ration they can also support AsuW by performing long range surveillance, third party tar-geting, or by conducting Battle Damage Assessment. They can also carry troops andsupplies ashore, conduct over-land reconnaissance, carry out MEDEVACs and SAR, anssupport Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).The Afloat Logistic Support (AOR) is an integral part of each TSSU with roles offuel, solid stores and ammunition replenishment; logistic co-ordinator; second-linemaintenance of embarked helicopters; and providing a limited medical and dental facility.They can extend around six times the number of days the task group can keep the seasand continue operations. They are usually equipped with good communications and pic-ture compilation systems, can embark up to two or three helicopters, and are fitted with abasic capability to defend themselves.Maritime Patrol Aircrafts (MPA) are usually deployed in support of the TSSU. Theexact number depends upon the mission, operating area and availability. They are themost effective ASW and AsuW platform, providing large area surveillance. In ASW, itseffectiveness in locating target submarines are vastly improved if supported by cueingfrom strategic ASW assets. MPAs can assist with building the recognized maritime pic-ture in coastal waters during AsuW operations. They are very good Over the HorizonTargeting asset available to the TSSU during long-range surface engagements with theirradar and communication fit.What is missing?The answer is easy: It’s the difference between what is necessary or should be done withwhat there are or effectively can be done:LevelConduct Mobility ProtectNaval Tactical Current Cap. M L L L L M L MNaval Tactical Future Cap. H M M M H H M HWhat is missing? M to H L to M L to M L to M L to H M to H L to M M to HOperations (1) CoordwithONIOInfo & IntelCommand Sustain Generate
  • 101. 101The general composition of SNFSA should arrive from threat-informed and well-reasonedtransformation, the latter being a directional process that is also a continuum. To remain on pur-pose, the SNFSA should provide regional sea-based access for military activities, for diplomacy,for humanitarian and quality-of-life support and relief efforts. It should also insure power projec-tion modes that can influence actions at sea and upon shore. It must reflect the evolution andevolutionary impact of concepts that enhance doctrine and policies, strategies, tactics, organiza-tions, technologies equipment and equipment procurement, thus the employment of advancedsensors, platforms, weapons and their integration, plus personnel skills training.The today playing field since 9/11 is different than before. While we know internationalterrorism is capable, we also know that they are quite unpredictable, that we can meet them in avariety of settings under unexpected circumstances. South Atlantic Rim countries will be in aposition where the SNFSA will have to rotate its forces, but maintaining “surge” capability, thatis, the ability to “surge” naval forces forward in a very agile and dynamic way in order to respondto the different scenarios.Synthesizing, in the medium term another TSSU is at least required, in similar composi-tion to the first one for assuring 24 hs. operations for continuous some period and all year dis-posal CV capabilities. This goal could be called the Alternative and/or Complementary SNFSA.SNFSA effectiveness will be measure by the ability to meet direct challenges to the SouthAtlantic regional security and to provide concrete and visible contributions to international opera-tions and security.It must show visible naval presence and conduct crisis management procedures. In orderto be credible it must especially focus on two things: quality and rapid reaction capability.Established political decision and rules of engagement about the opportunities and cir-cumstances when SNFSA have to deploy and act is a condition to let the force preventive de-ployment and opportune action to considerable reduce reaction times and have effective re-sponse.SummaryCombined exercises as UNITAS, ATLASUR and FRATERNO, involving since longtime ago the main naval forces of the South Atlantic make the conformation of theSNFSA a real possibility.The analysis of naval forces in the South Atlantic region shows that there isenough number and quality of naval assets to conform a proposed SNFSA.Some mentioned requisites should be accomplished to make it a reality.Current naval assets permit to conform only one TSSU in similar composition to aU.S Carrier Battle Group. However, only one CV available in the South Atlantic Regiondoesn’t secure all time operations. At least two carriers and their battle group are re-quired to keep all time and rapid reaction capabilities.***
  • 102. 102CONCLUSIONSThe geographic composition of the region (three continental littorals and three main pas-sages linking surrounding oceans and the North Atlantic) and the strategic analysis as sea lineof communication, fountain of resources and space of power projection make the South Atlanticregion an important maritime influenced area.The South Atlantic is mainly surrounded by least developed countries in the African litto-ral, except South Africa (developing country), and developing countries of the South Americanlittoral. Mentalities of their people make a number of them use to not understand the importanceof the sea and its influence over national and regional economies, development and well being.Composition of many navies in the region without principal combatants shows economical limita-tions, the recognized value of the maritime interests is low and the sea is not an important issuefor their lives to justify bigger investments in their maritime defence.Since population increase, resources scarce and globalization effects shorten distances,the value of the South Atlantic is growing and there are more threats with increased risks. Mainlyland-focused mentalities in a number of these countries makes them not to be prepared to facecurrent sea threats. Traditional and new threats are increasing in the South Atlantic Rim regionin accordance with the importance of shipping along most important sea lines of communication,available resources and global and regional instability. In synthesis, risk in the region is growingin terms of probability and severity.Current and future intrastate, interstate, regional and global situation with growing threatsand risks make it necessary to take part on peace securing by implementing a cooperativeand/or collective security option.South Atlantic Rim and other foreign countries to the region dependence on and use ofthe South Atlantic is, in sum, the importance of sea power in these oceanic waters. The mer-chant fleets, the fisheries, the oil and gas resources and industry, the sea lines of communica-tion, the threats to these maritime activities as well as the importance as a place from where toproject power make regional and extra-regional countries dependent of South Atlantic.Despite many European continental countries have recently been included in NATO, itsexpansion doesn’t consider the possibility to include South Atlantic Rim countries into the NorthAtlantic organization as it was communicated by NATO President, Javier Solana to ArgentinePresident Carlos Menem by letter of July 23rd, 1999.UN Chart consider the conformation of regional security organizations to act in case ofdefence and it’s applicable to the South Atlantic Rim region.In the same way there have been a number of intentions of conforming a multinational or-ganization with security goals around the South Atlantic theatre but non of them has been suc-cessful until now. The UN declaration of the “Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlan-tic” is still, in fact, only an intention. However, it means an important coincidence in the thought
  • 103. 103the South Atlantic must be a zone of peace that allows and ensure communications, cooperationand coordination between the countries of South America and Africa.The militarization of the Western South Atlantic (the Falkland fortress) is a particular issuethat goes counter the spirit of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic and cantake relation with US, NATO, and or UK wishes to control the Southern Cone passages betweenthe Atlantic and Pacific Ocean and to be close to the South Atlantic and Antarctic growing inter-ests.Last conclusions lead to this wider conclusion: security in South Atlantic is a ne-cessity that must be accomplished in a cooperative and collective defence system bycountries of the South Atlantic Rim.There is asymmetry between navies of South Atlantic Rim countries. However, thetotal number and type of assets make it possible the conformation of a permanent navalforce in South Atlantic with similar purposes to those of the NATO Standing Naval ForceAtlantic.Experience of periodical multinational exercises between the main navies of theregion (Brasil, Argentina and South Africa) shows that naval cooperation has been suc-cessful and operations denoted very good effectiveness, coordination and doctrine.Thereby, as it was for the STANAVFORLANT, next step can be the conformation of aSNFSA.However, the South Atlantic Rim navies must prepare for a wide variety of future contin-gencies, and do so with limited resources. The question therefore becomes how best to recon-cile current demands and future investments and to determine the elements of the future navalforces structure that must be either maintained and developed because they do not currentlyexist in the size the situation seems to require. The answer to this question can utilize the mostobjective and transparent methodology that defence science can produce. The force planningfor Canadian Forces is the considered example.Risk management must be a constant factor in planning and execution of modern de-fence practices. The processes that allocate resources in both the short and long term supportthe dual nature of defence planning for today and tomorrow. Risk tolerance and a recognition ofdefence´s capacity to mitigate (or not) the major elements of risk, are areas were a South Atlan-tic Rim security organization must elaborate formally through capability based planning.The nature of defence business is such that consequences of failure are very high-higherthan most other parts of governments. Defence must be risk averse, despite the obvious bene-fits of calculated risk-taking, and it has its origins in the catastrophic nature of military failure.These risk elements are compounded by a number of factors including procurement cycle andcomplexity, defence spending as an element of governments economic policy, and a criticalneed for inter-operability with allies.One of the goals of any multinational security option is the convenience for all allies to re-duce defence spending by reaching similar levels of security or, in similar way, getting much bet-ter security while investing similar or not proportional increased spending.
  • 104. 104The first part of the proposed force development process started with the premise that aCapability Based Planning and the South Atlantic Combined and Joint Task List (SACJTL) is thebasis for determining required capabilities. The Tactical level of the SACJTL is the most basicand appropriate starting point for assessment, although considerations at the operational andstrategic level are factored in where appropriate. The Tactical level is the starting point becauseit is where the main navies of South Atlantic have showed very good understanding to achieveresults in both domestic and international operations. Developing of Force Planning Scenarioswill provide the general context for the evaluations that must be done for each project andemerging concept.The requirement to act not only in their own seas but also abroad affects both the natureof forces to procure, which must be designed with regional/global transportation considerationsin mind, and the necessity of access to adequate transport platforms. Capabilities that are rele-vant to both inter and intra state conflicts are more useful than those unique to one possibility.At home, the navies will remain focused on operational activities to assert sovereigntyand to support the rule of law in their countries. At the same time, the navies will have to main-tain the combat capability to respond appropriately to its expeditionary responsibilities in theSouth Atlantic in support of the purposed cooperative/collective alliance, foreign policy objec-tives, including confidence building, crisis prevention, humanitarian or intervention missions.Multi-purpose capabilities are central to future naval force planning.The capability to conduct operations requires more than just combat capabilities. Ena-bling capabilities, such as effective command & control, intelligence as well as responsive logis-tics, are central to an effective overall naval capability to accomplish any mission in the SouthAtlantic region.The fundamental and minimum element that any naval force like SNFSA requires for in-ternational operations (also a key contributor to domestic responsibilities) is the Tactically Self-Sufficient Unit (TSSU). Operational (or limited strategic) mobility provides tactically self-sufficientnaval units with an important enabling capability that allows fewer units to respond to a largevariety of contingencies.The minimum requirement of the SNFSA will be that they can at least conduct medium in-tensity operations against a threat with a minimum of offensive and defensive naval power. This,in turn, requires that SNFSA have an adequate combat capability including suitable self-defenceand reasonable offensive capability. The different naval assets each provide capabilities uniqueto their class, and their combination creates a synergistic effect that multiplies their effective-ness.Information & Intelligence embraces all knowledge needed by a commander, including in-telligence on opposing forces, friendly forces, weather and geography. It enables a commanderto plan and act flexibly, allowing a balance between demands of concentrating the force, econ-omy of effort and security. This reduces risk and maximizes effectiveness. Surveillance andreconnaissance are a necessary part of this capability. Information & Intelligence is derivedfrom the collection and subsequent analysis of data from sensors, commercial systems and alli-
  • 105. 105ance networks. The knowledge and insight that results must then be communicated to opera-tors in a timely manner.A SNFSA operating as a TSSU can be an excellent solution to participate in allkind of scenarios presented in Section 5. A SNFSA conformed in similar way to a USCarrier Battle Group, with the addition of an amphibious ship with a Marine Corp Batallionand a Naval Aviation Patrol Aircraft Element of at least 3 planes type P-3 Orion or similarcan be the first step in the conformation of the SNFSA.UN and South Atlantic Rim countries are interested on establishing the Zone ofPeace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic and can delegate operational planning, ex-ecution and control of peace support operations (Chapter 6 and 7) to South Atlantic re-gional forces.In similar way, US could see SNFSA in the future as effective as the NATO Stand-ing Naval Force Atlantic and rely on regional decisions, military planning and naval train-ing, planning and execution of naval operations in the South Atlantic Rim region, lettingthis regional security organization maintain the peace in the South Atlantic.South Atlantic Rim Countries could see in the purposed SNFSA their own navalforce capable of intervening in any threat to regional security and peace in the South At-lantic. Now is the chance for these countries to show some statesmanship and push for aSouth Atlantic alliance force (the SNFSA) to, at least, develop humanitarian and peacesupport operations, and combat terrorism and piracy at sea. These theatres and threatsare real and immediate. One cannot prevaricate and wait until spilled oil, for example, hitsthe beaches at African or South American countries.Combined exercises as UNITAS, ATLASUR and FRATERNO, which involvessince long time ago the main naval forces of the South Atlantic, make the confor-mation of a permanent naval force – the proposed STANDING NAVAL FORCESOUTH ATLANTIC - a real possibility and not an utopia.However, as it was stated before, the following requirements should be ideally ful-filled:- There is a good understanding of benefits of a South Atlantic regional security optionand the proposal is unanimously considered of national interest,- It is affordable,- There is a unanimous decision of participating,- The starting organization is simple and effective. Therefore the proposal of theSNFSA,- Development of combined training and doctrine. It’s easy disposable by using currentcombined doctrine,- Delegates and Governors of all South Atlantic Rim countries participate with sincerity,clarity of ideas and common objectives,- The leadership of the organization, combined naval forces and SNFSA is sharedamong all allied countries of the region,- Objectives are clearly defined,
  • 106. 106- “Consensus” is the key word to take decisions as in NATO,- The regional security organization started a plan of shared national investments to fulfill en-hanced capabilities as required in a regional force planning,- It must further national concepts of active internationalism,- It must provide adequate security for each national’s ocean domain,…but they depend of all South Atlantic Rim countries naval, military and political au-thorities decision... In the meanwhile, joining the SNFSA is the easiest practical initialdecision and action.***
  • 107. 107ANNEX 1THE SOUTH ATLANTIC THEATERTHE AMERICAN FRONTBRASILURUGUAYARGENTINAANTARCTICAPARAGUAYBOLIVIACHILIFALKLANDS/MALVINASID. SOUTHERNGEORGIA ID.
  • 108. 108ANNEX 1 (cont.)THE SOUTH ATLANTIC THEATERTHE AFRICAN FRONT***SOUTHAFRICANAMIBIAANGOLADEMOCRATICREP. OF CONGOCONGOGABONEQUATORIALGUINEACAMEROONIGERIABENINTOGOGHANAIVORYCOASTLIBERIASIERRALEONAGUINEABISSAUGUINEAGAMBIASENEGALCABO VERDE I
  • 109. 109ANNEX 2MAIN SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC***
  • 110. 110ANNEX 3SOUTH ATLANTIC STRATEGIC IMPORTANCERelative assessed importance is measured by the author as high (H), medium (M) and low (L).ACTORS RESOURCES SLOCs PWRPROJ.Renewals Not RenewalsTrade TransportFishery Others(algas,energy)Oil Minerals1- For AMERICAN South Atlantic countriesBrazil M L H L H H M Uruguay H L L L H L LArgentina H M M  L  H M M2- For AFRICAN South Atlantic countriesSouth Africa M L L L  H M L/M Nigeria L L H L H M LLiberia L L L L L H LAngola L L H L H L LGabon L L H L H L LOther countries L L M L H L L3- For foreign countries to the South Atlantic regionUSA - - M  M  M  M  M UK M M L  M  M  M  H France - - H M M M MRussia L - M L L L LChili L L M L L L MJapan M - H - L M -China M - H - L L LIndia - - M - L L -Taiwan H - M - L L -Middle East countries - - M - M M -***
  • 111. 111ANNEX 4THE SOUTH ATLANTIC COMBINED / JOINT TASK LIST1341- MAJOR HEADING DEFINITIONSCapability Area 1Military Strategic Command: Develop and revise national and multinational military strategy and provide strategic direction.South Atlantic Rim Alliance authorities must provide military strategic direction.Operational Command: Command in battle requires firm adherence to the military aim, but flexibility of method. Commandis the most important element in ensuring that operational capability is directed towards achievement of the military objective.Command is the intelligent exercise of authority over assigned and attached joint and multinational forces to accomplish themission. Includes planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces in conducting campaigns and operations.Tactical Command: To exercise authority and direction over assigned or attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission.C2 involves arranging personnel, equipment, and facilities during the planning and conducting of military operations.Capability Area 2Military Strategic Information and Intelligence: Provide Intelligence, Strategic Surveillance and Reconnaissance as Re-quired by Strategic Consumers for formulating Regional Level Policy, Strategy, Military Plans and Ops.Operational Information and Intelligence: Embraces all knowledge needed by the commander and force, including intelli-gence on the enemy, own forces, weather and geography. Accurate, timely information enables the commander to plan and actflexibly and to strike a balance between demands of concentration of force, economy of effort and security; reducing risk. Op-erational surveillance and reconnaissance are included.Tactical Information and Intelligence: The Intelligence architecture will be tailored to fit the operation and take into accountissues such as access to intelligence databases, links to sources and agencies and the provision of the most efficient informationflow between the component parts of the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance system.Capability Area 3Conduct Military Strategic Operations: The conduct of operations at the national level requiring co-ordination of high levelissues across multiple boundaries of responsibility, both within Regional Alliance Authorities and National Governments andfrequently across regional lines of responsibility.Conduct Operational Level Operations: The nature of the strategic objectives will determine both the military objectives andthe scope and intensity of military operations. Military success, therefore, is the achievement of an ‘end state’, that is to say astate of affairs which meets given objectives. Effecting this end state is achieved through shaping the Joint Operations Area(JOA) and attacking the enemy’s cohesion.Conduct Tactical Level Operations: Apply SNFSA capacities to achieve operational objectives.Capability Area 4134This Combined / Joint Task List is based on CANADIAN JOINT TASK LIST (CJTL-Version 1.3 – 12 September 2000 –prepared by DDA )
  • 112. 112Strategic Mobility: Deploy the generated force and cargo to the theatre of operations, redeploy within theatre, or to anothertheatre, to meet new objectives. Once the purpose is achieved, recover the force to its home base.Operational Mobility: Deployment, which includes the mounting and strategic deployment, reception, and the onward de-ployment in-theatre, also involves establishing the LOC infrastructure. Recovery is the return of the force, its equipment andany unused stock to its original base, and the dismantling of the supply and movements infrastructure.Tactical Mobility: To move forces to achieve a position of advantage with respect to enemy forces. This task includes theemployment of forces on the battlefield in combination with fire or fire potential. Manoeuvre is the dynamic element of com-bat, the means of concentrating forces at the decisive point to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum andmoral dominance which enables smaller forces to defeat larger ones. The task includes the movement of combat and supportunits.Capability Area 5Military Strategic Protect Forces: Determine measures to best protect national infrastructure and mobilisation base fromdamage in the event of attack.Operational Level Protect Forces: Embraces all aspects of protecting bases, platforms, weapons, men, materiel and informa-tion. Aim is to preserve commanders freedom of action and minimise effects of enemy action; a balance needs to be struckbetween absolute security and other imperatives such as mobility, flexibility and surprise. Security includes dominating theelectromagnetic spectrum. Conserve the force’s fighting potential so that it can be applied at decisive place and time. Includesactions to counter enemy forces by making friendly forces, systems and facilities difficult to locate, strike and destroy.Tactical Protect Forces: Protect military units, personnel, equipment, areas, activities and supplies from enemy and friendlysystems and natural occurrences. This includes mitigating the effects of NBC and radiological weapons, and - so far as is prac-tical - maintaining the mobility and counter-mobility of operational forces, as well as protecting forces against combat areahazards.Capability Area 6Military Strategic Sustainment: Maintain the necessary level of military logistic activity for the duration required to achievethe objectives.Operational Level Sustainment: Provide logistic and other support required to sustain the force on operations within the thea-tre. Includes identification of operational requirements and establishment of priorities for employment of resources provided.Tactical Level Sustainment: Any military force requires sustainment during every stage of a campaign, from force generationto recovery and afterwards. Without adequate sustainment, a significant proportion of the means and will to fight will be lost.Capability Area 7Military Strategic Force Generation: The process of bringing forces, or part of them, to a state of readiness for operations, byassembling, and organising personnel, supplies, and materiel. This task includes the training and equipping of forces and theprovision of their means of deployment, sustainment and recovery to meet all current and potential threats. Account must betaken of the need to cater for concurrent operations and timely recuperation. It also embraces the mobilisation, regenerationand reconstitution necessary to meet a major conflict, such as general war, and the long-term development of capability to meetchanging circumstances.Operational Force Generation: Establish, direct, and control the facilities and personnel required to improve in-theatre per-formance. Develop doctrine and requirements to facilitate effective joint operations at the operational level.
  • 113. 113Tactical Force Generation: Establish, direct and control the facilities and personnel required to prepare units for operationalmissions.Capability Area 8Military Strategic Co-ordination with Other International and National Authorities and non-governmental agencies:Pursue regional security through co-ordination with other extra regional International and National Authorities, and non-governmental agencies.Operational Co-ordination with Other International and National Authorities and non-governmental agencies: Provideliaison with allied and host government.Tactical Co-ordination with Other International and National Authorities and non-governmental agencies: Ensure effi-cient interactions between regional forces and non-governmental organizations.2- SACJTLS - MILITARY STRATEGIC LEVELC4IS 1 – Military Strategic Command:S 1.1 – Provide Direction to the ForcesS 1.1.1 – Articulate Political Direction & Define and State & ObjectivesS 1.1.2 – Formulate the Policy on Peace Support OperationsS 1.1.3 – Determine the Capability & Goals of the Multinational Elements of the ForceS 1.1.4 – Review Contingency Plans & Determine Changes RequiredS 1.1.5 – Issue Executive Summary of Estimate, Priorities, Joint Plans & Supreme Allied Commander(SAC)/Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) DirectivesS 1.1.6 – Formulate Command Arrangements, Identify & Direct Changes to the Joint / Combined ForcesNotice to Move (NTM)S 1.1.7 – Formulate, Issue & Review Rules of Engagement (ROE)S 1.2 – Determine the objectives to Attack the AdversaryS 1.2.1 – Produce the Joint Integrated Target List (JITL)S 1.2.2 – Prepare & Co-ordinate Targets for Conventional AttackS 1.2.3 – Determine Force Effectiveness Conduct Phases 2 & 3 BDAS 2 – Strategic Information and IntelligenceS 2.1 – Plan & Direct Intelligence ActivitiesS 2.1.1 – Develop Strategic Intelligence PolicyS 2.1.2 – Determine Strategic Defense Intelligence Requirements & PrioritiesS 2.1.3 – Prepare Strategic Collection PlanS 2.1.4 – Allocate Intelligence Resources WorldwideS 2.1.5 – Resolve Regional/National Defense Intelligence IssuesS 2.1.6 – Monitor Worldwide Situation & Collection of Information for Intelligence Purposes on Designat-ed Areas of Regional / National InterestS 2.2 – Manage & Exploit Information, CIS & ProceduresS 2.2.1 – Provision of Scientific & Technical IntelligenceS 2.2.2 – Collate National InformationS 2.2.3 – Direct & Co-ordinate Strategic CommunicationsS 2.2.4 – Provide & Manage Strategic Defense Information ServicesS 2.2.5 – Develop IT Interoperability PolicyS.2.3 – Direct the Production of Strategic IntelligenceS 2.3.1 – Analyze All Situational InformationS 2.3.2 – Produce Intelligence ProductsS 2.3.3 – Conduct Joint Intelligence Preparation of Battlefield (JIPB)S 2.4 – Disseminate & Integrate National Intelligence
  • 114. 114S 2.4.1 – Prepare Indications & WarningsS 2.4.2 – Provide Defense Intelligence Products to Alliance / National PlannersS 2.4.3 – Respond to National RFIsS 2.5 – Evaluate Intelligence EffectivenessS 2.5.1 – Determine Effectiveness of Defense Intelligence ProcessOPERATIONAL FORCESS 3 – Conduct Strategic OperationsS 3.1 – Shape the Theatre of OperationsS 3.1.1 - Demonstrate Military IntentS 3.1.2 – Plan & Co-ordinate Sanctions &EmbargoesS 3.1.3 – Define the Policy & Initiate Information OperationsS 3.1.4 – Determine & Direct Media OperationsS 3.2 – Coordinate Provision of Military Operations Other Than War (OOTW)S 3.2.1 - Co-ordinate and Control Policy for the Conduct of Operations and MACPS 3.2.2 – Orchestrate Operations to Provide Service Assistance for Disaster Relief and Humanitarian AidInside Countries of the Region / NationS 3.2.3 – Conduct Information ManagementS 3.2.4 – Establish Interdepartmental Co-operation StructuresS 3.2.5 – Perform Crisis ManagementS 3.2.6 – Assist in Co-ordinating Civil DefenseS 3.2.7 – Provide Policy for and Assist in Countering Weapon and Technology ProliferationS 3.2.8 – Advise and Support Counter Drug OperationsS 3.2.9 – Advise and Support in Combating TerrorismS 3.2.10 – Conduct Corporate Public Information ActivitiesS 4 – Strategic MobilityS 4.1 – Determine the Requirement for Deployment & Recovery SupportS 4.1.1 – Examine Strategic Movement OptionsS 4.1.2 – Produce DOASTS 4.1.3 – Determine Line(s) of Communications (LOC)S 4.1.4 – Construct Movement Plan & Obtain Strategic Lift AssetsS 4.1.5 – Organize the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration (RSOI)S 4.1.6 – Organize Route Clearance & SupportS 4.2 – Initiate Deployment & RecoveryS 4.2.1 – Decide & Establish the LOCS 4.2.2 – Manage Strategic Movement ResourcesS 4.2.3 – Organize the Mounting ForcesS 4.2.4 – Move Forces to/from TheatreS 4.2.5 – Review, Assess & Rectify Reported Capability ShortfallsS 5 - Force ProtectionS 5.1 – Define the Protection of the ForceS 5.1.1 – Determine & Direct Ballistic Missile Early WarningS 5.1.2 – Determine & Direct Security & Counter IntelligenceS 5.1.3 – Determine the Degree of Force ProtectionS 5.1.4 – Direct the Strategic Assets to be ProtectedSUSTAINMENTS 6 – SustainS 6.1 - Sustain the Force with Materiel & ServicesS 6.1.1 – Manage the Combined / Joint Supply ChainS 6.1.2 – Negotiate & Acquire Host Nation SupportS 6.1.3 – Establish Access & Storage AgreementsS 6.1.4 – Provide Legal SupportS 6.2 – Develop Sustainment BaseS 6.2.1 – Determine Sustainment Priorities & BasesS 6.2.2 – Direct Strategic Lift for SustainmentS 6.2.3 – Expand Logistic Support to Match Forecasted RequirementS 6.2.4 – Prepare the Industrial Base
  • 115. 115S 6.2.5 – Match Medical Support to the Sustainment RequirementS 6.2.6 – Match Transportation to the Sustainment RequirementS 6.2.7 – Match Support to Personnel to the Sustainment ReqirementS 6.3 – Direct Personnel SupportS 6.3.1 – Provide Personnel Management & Support ServicesS 6.3.2 – Provide Health ServicesS 6.3.3 – Provide for Long Term Health SurveillanceS 6.3.4 – Direct Casualty EvacuationS 6.3.5 – Activate Combined / Joint Casualty Reporting & Reception Plan (JCRRP)FORCE GENERATIONS 7 – Force GenerationS 7.1 – Assemble & Train Elements & Combined / Joint ForcesS 7.1.1 – Man & Equip the ForceS 7.1.2 – Make Provision for a Combined / Joint Task Force HeadquartersS 7.1.3 – Identity & Implement Changes to Force Readiness StatesS 7.2 – Activate Reserve ForcesS 7.2.1 – Plan Force GenerationS 7.2.2 – Develop Plans & ProceduresS 7.2.3 – Prepare for Reception of Reserve PersonnelS 7.2.4 – Activate & Assemble Reserve PersonnelS 7.2.5 – Monitor Readiness of Individual ReservistsS 7.3 – Direct Personnel RequirementsS 7.3.1 – Determine Manpower RequirementsS 7.3.2 – Direct Personnel ReplacementsS 7.4 – Identify New Technological Possibilities/Acquiere-Dispose Equipment & Facilities.S 7.4.1 – Provide Science & Technology R & D & OA SupportS 7.4.2 – Develop & Acquire New Equipment & Facilities/Dispose of Redundant MaterialCORPORATE STRATEGY & POLICYS 8 – Corporate Strategy & PolicyS 8.1 – Identify Strategic Priorities, Formulate Policy Guidance 6 High Level DoctrineS 8.1.1 – Interpret Policy and Provide GuidanceS 8.1.2 – Determine and Issue Strategic PrioritiesS 8.1.3 – Provide Force Development GuidanceS 8.2 – Foster Alliance & Regional Relations & Security ArrangementsS 8.2.1 – Enhance Regional Politico-Military RelationsS 8.2.2 – Promote Regional Security & InteroperabilityS 8.2.3 – Develop Headquarters or Organizations for CoalitionsS 8.2.4 – Develop Multinational Intelligence/Information Sharing StructureS 8.3 – Provide Support to Regional Governments, International Organizations or GroupsS 8.3.1 – Produce Policy for & Co-ordinate Security Assistance Activities & Assist Civil Affairs in TheatreS 8.3.2 – Assist Foreign Disaster Relief & Humanitarian AssistanceS 8.3.3 – Define Policy for & Co-ordinate Nation Assistance Support NGOs and PVO sS 8.3.4 – Provide a Policy for Civil Military Co-operationS 8.4 – Support Government-wide Programs-InitiativesS 8.4.1 – Operate Youth Employment ProgramsOP - OPERATIONAL LEVELC4IOP 1 – Operational CommandOP 1.1 – Assess SituationOP 1.1.1 – Staff Branches Review Current SituationOP 1.1.2 – Formulate Crisis AssessmentOP 1.1.3 – Project Future Campaigns & Mayor Operations (Sequels)OP 1.1.4 – Co-ordinate PXR/POR Activities & Reports & Lessons IdentifiedOP 1.1.5 – Preserve Historical Documentation of Combined / Joint Operations/Campaigns & Staff theLessons Process
  • 116. 116OP 1.2 – Prepare Plans & Orders, Direct Ops & TrainingOP 1.2.1 – Identify & Report Shortfalls in CapabilityOP 1.2.2 – Conduct Operational Mission Analysis & Staff the Commander’s EstimateOP 1.2.3 – Prepare Campaign or Major Operations & Related Plans & OrdersOP 1.2.4 – Direct Mission Specific TrainingOP 1.3 – Command Subordinate ForcesOP 1.3.1 – Approve Plans & OrdersOP 1.3.2 – Issue Plans & Orders, Execute C2 Policies & ProceduresOP 1.3.3 – Implement Rules of Engagement & Request ChangesOP 1.3.4 – Design & Implement Appropriate Command & Control & Accounting ArrangementsOP 1.3.5 – Synchronize/Integrate Operations & OrdersOP 1.3.6 – Co-ordinate/Integrate ComponentsOP 1.3.7 – Direct Operational RehearsalsOP 1.4 – Organize Joint Task Force HeadquartersOP 1.4.1 – Develop &/or Augment the Joint Task ForceOP 1.4.2 – Establish Command Transition Criteria & ProceduresOP 1.4.3 – Establish Liaison StructureOP 1.4.4 – Deploy Combined / Joint Force Headquarters Advance ElementOP 1.4.5 – Establish or Participate in a Combined / Joint Task ForceOP 1.4.6 – Conduct Combined / Joint Task Force OperationsOP 1.4.7 – Provide Combined / Joint Staff Facilities & EquipmentOP 1.5 – Plan & Direct Operational Manoeuvre & Force PositioningOP 1.5.1 – Co-ordinate the Transition of Combined / Joint Forces to and from Tactical Battle FormationsOP 1.5.2 – Posture Combined / Joint ForcesOP 1.5.3 – Co-ordinate Operations in DepthOP 1.5.4 – Co-ordinate Offensive Operations in the JOAOP 1.5.5 – Co-ordinate Defensive Operations in the JOAOP 2 – Operational Information and IntelligenceOP 2.1 – Plan & Direct Intelligence Activities & ReportsOP 2.1.1 – Establish Commander’s Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIR) & Request for FurtherInformation (RFIs)OP 2.1.2 – Conduct JIPB & Produce Intelligence Estimate & Prepare Collection PlanOP 2.1.3 – State Information RequirementsOP 2.1.4 – Allocate Intelligence ResourcesOP 2.1.5 – Evaluate Intelligence ActivitiesOP 2.1.6 – Integrate Operational Intelligence RequirementsOP 2.1.7 – Integrate Operational Intelligence Resources & Theatre Intelligence RequirementsOP 2.1.8 – Provide Follow On Intelligence Support to the OA Planners& Decision MakersOP 2.1.9 – Conduct Operational Combat AssessmentOP 2.2 – Collect & Share InformationOP 2.2.1 – Collect Situational Information on Neutral & Friendly ForcesOP 2.2.2 – Collate Information on Adversary’s Forces & HazardsOP 2.2.3 – Collate Environmental InformationOP 2.2.4 – Co-ordinate Theatre Surveillance & RecceOP 2.2.5 – Directly Support Theatre Strategic Surveillance & Reconnaissance RequirementsOP 2.2.6 – Collect Target InformationOP 2.2.7 – Collect Joint Combat IdentificationOP.2.3 – Process & Exploit Collected InformationOP 2.3.1 – Manage & Interpret Technical Processing in the JOAOP 2.3.2 – Collate & Correlate InformationOP 2.3.3 –Evaluate, Integrate, analyze & Interpret Op InformationOP 2.3.4 – Identify Operational Issues & ThreatsOP 2.3.5 – Determine Adversary’s Operational Capabilities, COA & IntentionsOP 2.3.6 – Identify Friendly/Adversary/Neutral Centers of GravityOP 2.4 – Preparate & Disseminate Intelligence ReportsOP 2.4.1 – Prepare Intelligence for the JOA
  • 117. 117OP 2.4.2 – Provide Current Intelligence Including WarningsOP 2.4.3 – Provide Applied OPINTELOP 2.4.4 – Provide Target IntelligenceOPERATIONAL FORCESOP 3 – Conduct Strategic CampaignOP 3.1 – Control or Dominate Operationally Significant AreasOP 3.1.1 – Identify & Control Operationally Significant Land Area in the JOAOP 3.1.2 – Gain & Maintain Maritime Superiority in the JOAOP 3.1.3 – Gain & Maintain the Required Degree of Control of the Air.OP 3.1.4 – Assist Host Nation in Populace & Resource ControlOP 3.1.5 – Isolate the JOA, Plan & Co-ordinate Quarantine Sanctions/EmbargoesOP 3.1.6 – Plan & Co-ordinate BlockadesOP 3.1.7 – Plan & Co-ordinate Maritime InterdictionOP 3.2 – Peacetime SecurityOP 3.2.1 – Provide Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA)OP 3.2.2 – Deploy & Co-ordinate Geographic Meteorological, Hydrographical & Oceanographical Sup-portOP 3.2.3 – Orchestrate Non Combat Evacuation Operations (NEO)OP 3.2.4 – Orchestrate Operations to Provide Service Assistance for Disaster Relief & Humanitarian aidOutside the countryOP 3.3 – Plan & Assist in National & Multinational Peacekeeping OperationsOP 3.3.1 – Establish & Co-ordinate a Peacekeeping Infrastructure & Observe & MonitorOP 3.3.2 – Supervise Truces & Cease-firesOP 3.3.3 – InterpositionOP 3.3.4 – Provide Transition AssistanceOP 3.3.5 – Plan Demobilization & DisarmamentOP 3.3.6 – Orchestrate & Provide Humanitarian Relief & its ProtectionOP 3.4 – Plan & Assist in National & Multinational Peace Enforcement OperationsOP 3.4.1 – Restore Law & OrderOP 3.4.2 – Protect Humanitarian Operations & Human RightsOP 3.4.3 – Contain ConflictOP 3.4.4 – Forcibly Separate Belligerent PartiesOP 3.4.5 – Establish & Supervise Protected or Safe AreasOP 3.4.6 – Guarantee or Prevent MovementOP 3.4.7 – Orchestrate the Enforcement of SanctionsOP 3.5 – Plan & Implement Information Operations & Public AffairesOP 3.5.1 – Co-ordinate Info OpsOP 3.5.2 – Plan the C2W CampaignOP 3.5.3 – Establish Media Operations ServiceOP 3.5.4 – Manage Press Relations in the JOAOP 3.5.5 – Co-ordinate Command/Internal Information ProgramsOP 3.5.6 – Direct Community Relations ProgramsOP 3.6 – Plan Joint Force TargetingOP 3.6.1 – Establish Joint Force Targeting GuidanceOP 3.6.2 – Produce the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL)OP 3.6.3 – Apportion Joint/Multinational Operational Firepower ResourcesOP 3.6.4 – Publish Air Tasking Order(s) (ATO)OP 3.6.5 – Assess Battle Damage on Operational Targets & Conduct BDAOP 3.6.6 – Develop Fire Support Co-ordination MeasuresOP 3.7 – Co-ordinate Attack on Operational TargetsOP 3.7.1 – Provide Close Air Support Integration For Surface ForcesOP 3.7.2 – Plan the Interdiction of Operational Forces/TargetsOP 3.7.3 – Plan & Synchronize FirepowerOP 3.7.4 – Plan & Synchronize Non-Lethal AttackOP 4 – Operational MobilityOP 4.1 – Plan & Direct Operational Movement
  • 118. 118OP 4.1.1 – Formulate the Requirement & Organize Intra-Theatre Deployment/RedeploymentOP 4.1.2 – Organize Reception, Staging, Onward Movement& Integration (RSOI)OP 4.1.3 –Organize Air to Air Refueling (AAR) Operations in the JOAOP 4.1.4 – Concentrate Joint Forces in the JOA for OperationsOP 4.2 – Provide Operational MobilityOP 4.2.1 – Overcome Operationally Significant Barriers, Obstacles & MinesOP 4.2.2 – Enhance Movement of Operational ForcesOP 4.2.3 – Co-ordinate Land, Air & Water Space Management to Prevent Mutual InterferenceOP 5 - Force ProtectionOP 5.1 – Protect Operational ForcesOP 5.1.1 – Process/Allocate Operational Aerospace & Maritime TargetsOP 5.1.2 – Integrate Joint/Multinational Operational Defence Systems & ProceduresOP 5.1.3 – Develop Airspace Control PlanOP 5.1.4 – Employ Positive Control MeasuresOP 5.1.5 – Employ Procedural Control MeasuresOP 5.1.6 – Implement, Combat Identification Procedures (CID)OP 5.1.7 – Co-ordinate Operational Area Missile DefenceOP 5.1.8 – Conduct Tactical Warning & Attack Assessment in the JOAOP 5.1.9 – Employ EWOP 5.2 – Co-ordinate Hazard Removal, Survival & Control MeasuresOP 5.2.1 – Remove Operationally Significant HazardsOP 5.2.2 – Establish Disaster Control MeasuresOP 5.2.3 – Develop & Execute Actions to Control Pollution & Hazardous MaterialsOP 5.2.4 – Recuperation from the Effects of Adversarial Conventional AttackOP 5.2.5 – Co-ordinate Personnel Recovery, Including Search & Rescue, & Escape & EvasionOP 5.2.6 – Provide Fire ProtectionOP 5.3 – Provide ProtectionOP 5.3.1 – Prepare Operationally Significant DefencesOP 5.3.2 – Protect Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum in the JOAOP 5.3.3 – Protect use of the Acoustic Spectrum in the JOAOP 5.3.4 – Protect & Secure Flank, Rear Areas & COMMZ in the JOAOP 5.3.5 – Protect/Secure Operationally Critical Installations, Facilities & SystemsOP 5.3.6 – Protect & Secure Air, Land & Sea LOCOP 5.3.7 – Establish NBC Protection in the JOAOP 5.3.8 - Provide Protection/Clear MinesOP 5.4 - Provide SecurityOP 5.4.1 – Define & Establish Force Security MeasuresOP 5.4.2 – Integrate Host Nation Security Forces & MeansOP 5.4.3 – Provide Counter Deception OperationsOP 5.4.4 – Provide Counter PSYOPSOP 5.4.5 – Counter Adversary’s ISTAROP 5.4.6 – Employ & Assess INFOSECOP 5.4.7 – Employ & Assess the Effects of OPSEC in the JOASUSTAINMENTOP 6 – SustainOP 6.1 – Manage Logistic Support in the JOAOP 6.1.1 – Determine Demand, Review Contingency PlansOP 6.1.2 – Establish Priorities & Facilitate the Supply & Distribution of CSups & MaterielOP 6.1.3 – Plan the Reconstitution of ForcesOP 6.1.4 – Provide Transportation & MovementsOP 6.1.5 – Provide Services, Including Local Purchase, Advice & InspectionsOP 6.1.6 – Plan Engineer Support Operations to Sustain the ForceOP 6.2 – Manage Equipment Support in the JOAOP 6.2.1 – Maintain EquipmentOP 6.2.2 – Manage Equipment & Establish Repair PrioritiesOP 6.2.3 – Co-ordinate Recovery, Salvage & Backloading of Materiel & Equipment
  • 119. 119OP 6.3 – Co-ordinate Support & Rehabilitate ForcesOP 6.3.1 – Co-ordinate Field Services RequirementsOP 6.3.2 – Co-ordinate the Operational Area Support for PersonnelOP 6.3.3 – Provide for Personnel ServicesOP 6.3.4 – Provide Religious Ministry Support in the JOAOP 6.3.5 – Provide Legal ServicesOP 6.3.6 – Rehabilitate ForcesOP 6.3.7 – Co-ordinate Mortuary Affairs in the JOAOP 6.4 – Co-ordinate Health Support in the JOAOP 6.4.1 – Provide for Health Services in the JOAOP 6.4.2 – Manage Medical Manpower, Equipment & Resupply within the JOAOP 6.4.3 – Provide Morbidity Surveillance, Casualty Documentation & Real-time Health IntelligenceOP 6.4.4 – Manage Casualty Flow & EvacuationOP 6.4.5 – Provide Medical Advice of Operational Importance to the Commander & StaffOP 6.5 – Develop Logistic CapabilityOP 6.5.1 – Select & Establish Forward Maintenance Bases (FMBs)OP 6.5.2 – Select / Establish PODs & Determine Capacity for ExpansionOP 6.5.3 – Establish & Develop the Force Rear Support Area (FRSA)OP 6.5.4 – Provide for POW RequirementsOP 6.5.5 – Support MACA. Indigenous ForcesOP 6.5.6 - Acquire, Manage & Distribute FundsOP 6.6 – Develop Campaign/Sustainment BasesOP 6.6.1 – Determine Number & Location of Sustaining Bases in the JOAOP 6.6.2 – Provide Civil Military EngineeringOP 6.6.3 – Expand Capacity of PODs & Allocate Space in the AreaOP 6.6.4 – Provide for Real Estate ManagementOP 6.6.5 – Manage Contracts & Contract PersonnelFORCE GENERATIONOP 7 – Generate Operational CapabilitiesOP 7.1 – Formulate Doctrine, Requirements & DevelopmentOP 7.1.1 – Issue Operational Priorities & Policy GuidanceOP 7.1.2 – Formulate New Joint Doctrine & Force DevelopmentOP 7.1.3 – Identify Constraints in Operational CapabilitiesOP 7.1.4 – Generate Operational Requirements to Rectify ConstraintsOP 7.2 – Develop National Joint Training PlanOP 7.2.1 – Provide the Policy & Methodology for Joint Force TrainingOP 7.2.2 – Co-ordinate Allocation of Effort & Resources in the National Joint Training PlanOP 7.2.3 – Provide the Polity & Methodology for the Development of National/Combined Joint Task ListOP 7.3 – Generate Command, Control, Comms & Computers (C4) CapabilitiesOP 7.3.1 – Communicate Operational Information Exchange RequirementsOP 7.3.2 – Determine & Manage Means of Communicating Operational InformationOP 7.3.3 – Maintain Operational Information & Force StatusOP 7.3.4 – Monitor SituationOP 7.3.5 – Collect Data to Identify Remedial ActionOP 7.3.6 – Supervise Communications Security (COMSEC)CORPORATE STRATEGY & POLICYOP 8 – Government Co-ordinationOP 8.1 – Provide Civil Military Co-operation & Integrate Multinational, Other Government Depts & Agency Sup-portOP 8.1.1 – Ascertain National or Agency AgendaOP 8.1.2 – Determine National/Agency Capabilities & LimitationsOP 8.1.3 – Develop Multinational Intelligence/Information Sharing StructureOP 8.1.4 – Co-ordinate Plans with Allied/Coalition SupportOP 8.1.5 – Co-ordinate Host Nation SupportOP 8.1.6 – Co-ordinate Coalition SupportOP 8.1.7 – Foster Civil/Military Co-operation Administration
  • 120. 120OP 8.1.8 – Co-operate with & Support NGOs & PVOs, including DFID & OSCET - TACTICAL LEVELC4IT 1 – Tactical CommandT 1.1 – Prepare & Issue Plans & OrdersT 1.1.1 – Conduct Mission Analysis, Assets Current Situation, Determine End StateT 1.1.2 – Produce & Report Tactical Level Estimates, SITREPs & PlansT 1.1.3 – Monitor Situation, Decide on the Need for Action or ChangeT 1.1.4 – Identify & Report Shortfalls in Capability & RequirementsT 1.1.5 – Consider & Co-ordinate with Coalition Alliance ForcesT 1.1.6 – Maintain Field Records & Report ActionsT 1.2 – Lead Subordinate ForcesT 1.2.1 – Implement Rules of EngagementT 1.2.2 – Issue Orders & Implement C2 Arrangements including Fire Support Co-ordinationT 1.2.3 – Establish & Employ Liaison OfficersT 1.2.4 – Maintain Military Capability, Unit Cohesion, Discipline & MotivationT 1.2.5 – Conduct Mission Specific Training & RehearsalsT 1.2.6 – Manage POWs & Handle RefugeesT 1.3 – Establish CC HQT 1.3.1 – Augment & Integrate into the JHQT 1.3.2 – Establish C$ Procedures & Practices, Supporting Equipment & SystemsT 1.3.3 – Establish Liaison StructureT 1.3.4 – Conduct Operations & Training, Develop DoctrineT 1.4 – Operate & Manage Tactical C4T 1.4.1 – Conduct C4 Services & Manage Communications MeansT 1.4.2 – Manage the Requirement for InformationT 1.4.3 – Report Data to Identify Remedial ActionT 2 – Tactical Intelligence & InformationT 2.1 – Develop & Analyze Tactical Int Activities & RequirementsT 2.1.1 – Establish CCIRs & RFIsT 2.1.2 –Conduct Intelligence Estimate, Including the IPBT 2.1.3 – State Information RequirementsT 2.1.4 – Produce Collection PlanT 2.1.5 –Review Intelligence RequirementsT 2.1.6 – Analyze Intelligence ActivitiesT 2.2 – Collect InformationT 2.2.1 – Collect Situational &Capability Information on Neutral & Friendly ForcesT 2.2.2 – Collate Information on Adversary’s Forces & TargetsT 2.2.3 – Collect Environmental InformationT 2.2.4 – Perform & Control Surveillance & Recce ForcesT 2.2.5 – Collect Joint Combat IdentificationT 2.2.6 – Conduct Special Forces Surveillance & Reconnaissance (SR) OperationsT 2.2.7 – Conduct Rapid Environmental Assessment (REA)T.2.3 – Process Information & IntelligenceT 2.3.1 – Conduct Tactical Level ProcessingT 2.3.2 – Collate & Correlate InformationT 2.3.3 – Evaluate, Integrate Analyze & Interpret Threat InformationT 2.3.4 – Evaluate Social, Political, Economic & Environmental InfoT 2.3.5 – Integrate Intelligence InformationT 2.3.6 – Identify Tactical Issues & ThreatsT 2.3.7 – Determine Adversary’s Operational Capability, Courses of Action & IntentionsT 2.3.8 – Identify Friendly/Adversary/Neutral Centers of GravityT 2.4 – Prepare & Convey Intelligence & ReportsT 2.4.1 – Prepare & Disseminate Intelligence ReportsOPERATIONAL FORCES
  • 121. 121T 3 – Conduct Tactical OperationsT 3.1 – Employ Physical BarriersT 3.1.1 – Select Location of ObstaclesT 3.1.2 – Emplace ObstaclesT 3.1.3 – Execute Quarantines/Sanctions/EmbargoesT 3.1.4 – Implant BlockadesT 3.2 – Control Significant AreasT 3.2.1 - Control or Dominate by Patrols, Firepower or PotentialT 3.2.2 – Occupy Combat AreasT 3.2.3 – Conduct Defensive Counter Air Operations, & Control AirspaceT 3.2.4 – Dominate Key TerrainT 3.2.5 – Establish Sea Control, including National WatersT 3.3 – Conduct Military Operations Other Than WarT 3.3.1 – Conduct Aid of the Civil Power & Civil Communities Including Public Duties & VIP TransportT 3.3.2 – Occupy Combat AreasT 3.3.3 – Conduct Peace Enforcement ActivitiesT 3.3.4 – Conduct the Evacuation of Non CombatantsT 3.3.5 – Conduct Civil-Military Activities, Information & Community Relations ProgramsT 3.3.6 – Support NGOs & PVOT 3.3.7 – Co-ordinate Counter Drug OperationsT 3.3.8 – Provide Training Support & Development to Host NationT 3.3.9 – Conduct Special Forces Support & Influence Operations (SI)T 3.3.10 – Conduct International Humanitarian AssistanceT 3.4 – Conduct Tactical TargetingT 3.4.1 – Identify Targets to AttackT 3.4.2 – Select Weapon Attack SystemsT 3.4.3 – Request Attack AuthorityT 3.4.4 – Assess Attack & Contribute to BDAT 3.5 – Attack TargetsT 3.5.1 – Synchronize Fires& Conduct Lethal Engagement from JIPTL & Opportunity TargetsT 3.5.2 – Conduct Close Support FiresT 3.5.3 – Conduct Interdiction of Forces/TargetsT 3.5.4 – Conduct Special Forces Offensive Action Operations (OA)T 3.5.5 – Conduct Non-Lethal EngagementT 3.6 – Conduct info Ops & C2WT 3.6.1 – Execute Deception PlansT 3.6.2 – Conduct OPSECT 3.6.3 – Conduct PSYOPST 3.6.4 – Conduct EWT 3.6.5 – Protect & Exploit the EMS & Acoustic SpectrumT 4 – Tactical MobilityT 4.1 – Position Tactical ForcesT 4.1.1 –Plan, Record & Control Unit MovementT 4.1.2 – Prepare Forces for, & Conduct Intra Theatre Tactical PositionT 4.1.3 – Move & Close into Tactical PositionT 4.1.4 – Report & Monitor Land, Air and Water Space ManagementT 4.1.5 – Conduct Reception, Staging, Onward-movement & Integration (RSOI)T 4.2 – Conduct Tactical ManeuverT 4.2.1 – Conduct a Show of ForceT 4.2.2 – Plan & Execute DemonstrationT 4.2.3 – Conduct Forcible Entry: Airborne, Amphibious & Air AssaultT 4.2.4 – Reinforce & Expand LodgmentT 4.2.5 – Conduct Raids in the JOAT 4.2.6 – Conduct Penetration, Direct Assault & Turning MovementsT 4.2.7 – Conduct Direct Action in the JOAT 4.2.8 – Conduct Unconventional Warfare in the JOA
  • 122. 122T 4.3 – Provide Tactical MobilityT 4.3.1 – Overcome Barriers, Obstacles & MinesT 4.3.2 – Conduct Engineer Support Operations to Enhance MovementT 5 – Protect Tactical ForcesT 5.1 – Conduct ProtectionT 5.1.1 – Conduct Direct Physical Protection Warning & Threat AssessmentsT 5.1.2 – Defend Against Adversary’s Conventional Attack & MissilesT 5.1.3 – Defend Key Points & Vulnerable AssetsT 5.1.4 – Defend LOC & Log BasesT 5.1.5 – Conduct Counter PSYOPST 5.1.6 – Conduct Post Attack Operations & RecuperationT 5.1.7 – Establish Fire ProtectionT 5.1.8 – Implement CID Procedures & Co-ordinate Movement to Prevent Mutual InterferenceT 5.1.9 – Conduct & Assess the Effects of COMSEC, ECM, EPM & ESMT 5.1.10 – Conduct Search & RescueT 5.2 – Conduct Force SecurityT 5.2.1 – Conduct Personnel SecurityT 5.2.2 – Conduct Security MeasuresT 5.2.3 – Integrate Host Nation SecurityT 5.2.4 – Employ Concealment TechniquesT 5.2.5 – Employ Counter Intelligence, Surveillance, Security & Readiness MeasuresT 5.2.6 – Conduct & Assess the effects of OPSECT 5.3 – Conduct NBC ProtectionT 5.3.1 – Implement National Disaster Control & WMD Measures, including Nuclear Accident ResponseT 5.3.2 – Conduct Detection, Identification & MonitoringT 5.3.3 – Conduct NBC Warning & ReportingT 5.3.4 – Execute NBC Individual & Collective ProtectionT 5.3.5 – Conduct NBC Hazard ManagementT 5.3.6 – Conduct Medical Counter MeasuresSUSTAINMENTT 6 – SustainT 6.1 – Conduct Logistic Support in the JOAT 6.1.1 – Sustain the Force, Utilizing National, Allied & Indigenous AssetsT 6.1.2 – Conduct Transportation & MovementsT 6.1.3 – Supply Services & AdviceT 6.1.4 – Track & Account for Assets & EquipmentT 6.1.5 – Air to Air Refueling (AAR)T 6.1.6 – Establish Support for POWT 6.2 – Conduct Equipment Support in the JOAT 6.2.1 – Conduct Battle Damage RepairT 6.2.2 – Maintain Equipment SupportT 6.2.3 – Conduct Recovery, Salvage & BackloadingT 6.3 – Perform Civil Military Engineering SupportT 6.3.1 – Perform Rear Area RestorationT 6.3.2 – Conduct Engineer support Operations to Sustain the ForceT 6.3.3 – Perform Engineer construction MaterialsT 6.3.4 – Obtain Engineer Construction MaterialsT 6.3.5 – Supply Mobile Electric PowerT 6.4 – Man the Forces & Provide Personnel Support ServicesT 6.4.1 – Conduct Personnel Support Services Including Mortuary AffairesT 6.4.2 – Conduct Medical Support to Optimize Force StrengthT 6.4.3 – Treat Casualties & Conduct EvacuationT 6.4.4 – Advise Commanders on Health of Force to include Battle Casualty RatesT 6.4.5 – Reconstitute Force Elements & Replenish the ForceT 6.5 – Establish Forward BasesT 6.5.1 – Establish Forward Maintenance & Mounting Bases (FMBs)
  • 123. 123T 6.5.2 – Establish the Force Rear Support Area (FRSA)T 6.5.3 – Establish PODsT 6.5.4 – Establish & Maintain Campaign / Sustainment BasesFORCE GENERATIONT 7 – Tactical Force GenerationT 7.1 – Develop & Provide Mission Specific Training for Joint and Combined ForcesT 7.1.1 – Identify Mission Specific Training RequirementsT 7.1.2 – Develop, Conduct & Assess Tier 3 & 4 Training Programmes, Resources & Op CapabilityT 7.1.3 – Identify & Develop Appropriate Joint and Combined Training SystemsCORPORATE STRATEGY & POLICYT 8 – Government Co-ordinationT 8.1 – Provide Civil Affairs & Integrate Multinational, Other Government Departments & Agency SupportT 8.1.1 – Conduct Media Operations & Press RelationsT 8.1.2 – Utilize Host Nation Support / In Theatre ResourcesT 8.1.3 – Foster & Conduct Civil-Military Co-operationT 8.1.4 – Support Internal Organizations in the Control & Co-ord of Indigenous Police ForcesT 8.1.5 – Utilize Public Information ServiceT 8.1.6 – Deliver Geographic, Meteorological, Hydrographical & Oceanographical Support & Data.***
  • 124. 125ANNEX 5NAVAL FORCES OF SOUTH ATLANTIC1- SOUTH AMERICAN LITORALCOUNTRYNAVYpers.PPAL.COMBATANTSHIPSSS PATROL&COASTALCOMBATANTSMINEWARFARENAVALAVIATIONMAR..AVIATION(AIRFORCE)AMPHIBIOUSMARINESSUPPORTANDMISCELANEOUSNAVALBASESCOASTGUARDSEALIFTCAPABILITY1351.1-BRASIL48600 19 (1/2 CV136, 10 FFG, 4FF, 5 CC+8)5SSK(+2)50 (19PCO, 10PCC, 16PCI, 5PCR) (+12)6 MSC 1150 pers., 24 cbtac. A-4 (15embarqed), 54armed hel..30 sar and cbtac. (10 EMB110B, 20EMB111)4 (2 LSD, 2LST), 3LCU, 40LCM/LCVP, 4AKS, 1AGP13900tps45 (9 Survey&Reserch, 22Buoy Ttenders,1 SS Rescue, 3AOR, 1AGP, 2Hospital, 8Training, 4FloatingDocks,16 tugs)6 (Rio deJaneiro, Bahía,Pará, Natal,Recife, Belém,Ladario, SaoPedro D´Aldeia,Río Negro, RíoGrande Do Sul.)- 503 vessels of3,933,327 tonsgross1.2-URUGUAY57001373 (3 FFG) - 8 (3 PCC, 5PCI)3 MSC 300 pers.,6 ac (3 Beach T-34C, 1 Beach B-200T, 2 JetstreamT2,),9 hel (1 Bell47G,8 Wessex)-5 craft (3LCM, 2LCVP)500 tps 6 (1 AGOR ,1 AXL,2 LCVP,1 ARS, 1ABU2 tugs,4 (Montevideo,Paysandú, LaPaloma, Lagunadel Sauce)1800pnl90 vessels of61,806 tonsgross1.3-ARGENTINA1600013813 (5 DDG, 8FFG)3SSK8 PG, 2PCFG, 5PC)- 2000pers., 31 cbt.ac.(14 F/A ,17MR/ASW),23 armed hel.(11ASW/SSW, 12 CBTSPT).Coast Guard:2 SA 330 SuPuma2 AS365 Dauphin25CASA C-212- 1 TPT, 20craft(4LCM, 16LCVP)2800tps27 (5 Survey &Research, 1AXS, 1 AOR, 3AKS/AOTL, 3AKS, 3 BuoyTenders, 1Icebraker, 11YTB,/YTL)5 (BuenosAires, PuertoBelgrano, Mardel Plata,Zárate, Ushuaia,Río Grande,Trelew, PuntaIndio)13240pnl, ,7 PG, 21PC,1 ARS,93 PB,4 AXL,8 YTL/YTR,493 ves-sels of477,254tons gross135Lloyd´s Register of Shipping136CV NaeL Sao Paulo and NaeL Minas Gerais.137Including naval infantry, naval air and Coast Guard138Coast Guard not included.
  • 125. 1262- AFRICAN LITORALCOUNTRY NAVYPERSONNELPPAL.COMBATANT SHIPSSS PATROL&COASTALCOMBATANTSMINEWARFARENAVALAVIATIONMARIT.AVIATION(AIRFORCE)AMPHIBIOUSMARINESSUPPORT &MISCELANEOUSNAVALBASESCOASTGUARDSEALIFTCAPABILITY2.1-SENEGAL600 - - 10 PC(5 PCC, 5PCI)- 1 Twin Otter 1EMB- 1113 LC(1 LCM, 2LCT)- 2 PC (customs) 2 (Dakar,Casamance)- 194 vessels of47,635 tonsgross2.2-CABOVERDE- - - - - - - - - - - - 40 vessels of20,523tons.gross2.3-GAMBIA95 - - 3 PCI - - - - - - 1(Banjul)- 8 vessels of1,884 tons gross2.4-GUINEA400 2(Conakry,Kakanda)- 31 vessels of6,350 tons gross2.5-GUINEABISSAU350 - - 3 PC(2 PCC,1 PCI)- 1 Cessna 337 (patrolac.)- - - - 1(Bissau)- 24 vessels of6350 tons gross2.6-SIERRALEONA200 - - 3 PCI non-op.- - - - - - 1(Freetown)- 48 vessels of17,430 tonsgross2.7-LIBERIA1000plans- - - - - - - - - - - ?2.8-IVORYCOAST900 - - 2 PCC - - - 1 LST - - 1(Locodjo/Abidjan)4 PB 35 vessels of9,508 tonsgross.2.9-GHANA1200 - - 4 PCF, 17PCI, 2 PB,26 PBR)4 Defender ac.(surveill.)- - - 54 PBR 2(Sekondi,Tema)- 205 vessels of117,504 tonsgross2.10-TOGO200 - - 2 PCC - - - - 2 (1 survey &research, 1training)1(Lome)- 12 vessels of42,823 tonsgross2.11-BENIN50 - - 1 PFI - 2 (1 Do 128 , 1Twin Otter)- - - - 1(Cotonou)- 7 vessels of1,118 tons gross2.12-NIGERIA7000(incl.CoastGuard)3(1 FFG,2 FS)- 6(3 PCF,3 PCFG)2MSC/MHC- - 2 LST - 4 (1 survey, 3coastal tugs)3 (Apapa-Lagos, Calabar,Okemini-PortHarcourt)- 287 vessels of432,436 tonsgross2.13-CAMEROON1250 - - 2 PC, 1PCG, 6PBR- 2Do128D- - - - 3 (Douala,Limbe, Kribi)37 PB 61 vessels of13,600 tonsgross1.14-EQUATORIAL GUINEA- - - - - - - - - - - 2 PB 67 vessels of9,508 tons gross2.15-SANTOTOME ANDPRINCIPE2.16- 500 - - 2 PC - 1 EMB-111 - 1 LST, - - 1 12 LCVP 47 vessels of
  • 126. 127GABON 2 LCVP (Port Gentil-Mayumba)15,711 tonsgross2.17-CONGO139800 - - 3 PFI(non-op)- - - - - - 3 (Pointe-Noire, Brazza-ville, Mossaka)- 20 vessels of3,800 tons gross2.18-DEMOC. REP.OF CONGO1000 - - 4 PCF, 4PC- - - - - - 4 (Boma,Kinshasa,Kalémié-LagoTanganyka,Moba)- 20 vessels of12,918 tonsgross2.19-ANGOLA2500 - - 7 PC - - - 1 amph sptship- - 3 (Luanda,Lobito, Nami-be)7 PCI(non-op)124 vessels of65,749 tonsgross2.20-NAMIBIA250140- - - - 1 F406 Caravan ac –1 hel.- - - - 2 (Walvis Bay,Luderitz)2 PC 105 vessels of55,265 tonsgross2.21-SOUTHAFRICA5000 (+4 FSG)1412SSK(+3SSK)1426 PCFG 6(4MHC,2MSC)13 DouglasTurbodakotas-8 SA330 hel(+4 SuperLynx or-dered)2 (1 AOR& 1 AP)143,8 LCU1 AGS (survey& research), 1AGOB (Antarc-tic), 1 AOR, 1YDT 1 AP, 1YTB, 3 AT4 (Simon´sTown, Durban-Salisbury Id.,Saldanha Bay,Gordon´s Bay)3 PB, 28PBI192 vessels of379,280 tonsgross.139This country has been in chaos for some years and it is unlikely that any of the naval craft are seaworthy. A number of small boats may have survived on therivers.140Only coast guard dedicated to fishery protection. Is part of the Ministry of Fisheries)141Class Meko A-200. Adquired to Germany. Deliveries since 2004 to 2006.142Class 209. Acquired to Germany. First delivery 2005.143They have capability to carry 2 hel., perhaps 60 tps and 2 LCU
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