1CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGECSC 27MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES (MDS) THESISASSURING THE PEACE IN SOUTH ATLANTIC WATERS.A STANDING...
2CONTENTSINTRODUCTION........................................................................................................
3- Piracy……………………………………………………………………………………….…….…...37- Terrorism at sea……………………………………………………………………….…….………..38Security optio...
4SECTION 4THE CAPACITIES OF SEA POWER……...……………………………...….……………………….83Advantages of sea power………………………….……………………………………………....
5ANNEX 3 – SOUTH ATLANTIC STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE ………………….………....……147ANNEX 4 – THE SOUTH ATLANTIC COMBINED / JOINT TASK LIST...
6ASSURING THE PEACE IN SOUTH ATLANTIC WATERS.A STANDING NAVAL FORCES SOUTH ATLANTIC. Utopia or possibility ?INTRODUCTIONTh...
7tary Community of Central Africa (EMCCA) and Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) serve only a marginal capa...
8SECTION 1STRATEGIC SITUATIONGeneralities of the maritime environmentThe following special characteristics of the sea must...
9nized power in South Atlantic last century but last two decades it’s naval power and maritimeinfluence significantly decr...
10carries its own humanitarian calamities. There are important instability in Ivory Coast where arecommon rebel uprising l...
11Geological soundings in the Antarctic, reveals the presence of oil, gas, andmanganese with no international mechanism to...
12As transported cargo is modestly increasing, changes in the average world transport dis-tance are minimal. However, ther...
13cent passage, coastal state rights and obligations, flag state responsibilities and protectionagainst piracy.Naval Contr...
14It’s important to consider, not only maritime sea lines, but also chock points. Maritime traf-fic inside, to and from So...
15catches that have reached, or are very close to, their maximum sustainable limits. Another 18percent of stocks or specie...
16high seas fishing nations," the FAO study noted. 23Therefore, effective monitoring and en-forcement of South Atlantic li...
17- “Sub-marginal resources that are materials recoverable at prices higher than 1.5 times thoseprevailing now but that ha...
18ca.Thick beds of a magnesium salt and tachydrite (calcium-magnesium hydrate) previouslyknown only in trace amounts, occu...
19The top ten countries, ranked in descending order, that have the greatest resource poten-tial of nodules and crusts in t...
20Exploitation of gas hydrates has potential hazards, since the stability of hydrates hasbeen implicated in the stability ...
21The eastern South American shelf is one of the widest of the world, it has the potential tobe a very important source, a...
22Atlantic Equatorial Africa as new U.S. vital interest.Oil producing Atlantic Equatorial Africa (Angola, Nigeria, Gabon, ...
23development, but there is an expense. Investment and engagement in Atlantic Equatorial Africacan be considered a challen...
24portant actors.Next section will develop the influence of international law and security in theSouth Atlantic Rim.***
25SECTION 2INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SECURITY IN SOUTH ATLANTICSecurity under United Nations organization (UN)The Charter of U...
26sential elements of U.S. naval power. The Convention codifies access and transit rights for shipsand it is a comprehensi...
27Security as a concept of South Atlantic Rim common interestSecurity has been defined as “the absence of threats to a Sta...
28Information Age Threats to Security 51Threat EffectBiological Death or debilitation of people, animals or plants on a gr...
29cleanup operation can cost millions of dollars, an amount which poor countries can ill afford.Piracy Maps54Terrorism at ...
30tion. Mines could be easily laid in the access of important harbours to block the commerce andgrow the panic. Offshore o...
31- Threats are perceived in the same way defining the degree of dangerousness with the com-mitment to assume similar risk...
32Security model by means of integrationThe objective pursued, whether these are political, regional or continental in nat...
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  1. 1. 1CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGECSC 27MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES (MDS) THESISASSURING THE PEACE IN SOUTH ATLANTIC WATERS.A STANDING NAVAL FORCES SOUTH ATLANTIC. Utopia or possibility?By Cdr Eduardo Ligio GANEAU (Argentine Navy)This paper was written by a student has attended the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment ofone of the requirements of the Master Degree in Defence Studies established by the Royal Mili-tary College of Kingston, Canada. This paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains factsand opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It doesnot necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government ofCanada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released,quoted or copied except with express permission of the Canadian Department of National De-fence.Este trabajo fue escrito por un estudiante que asistió al Colegio de las Fuerzas Armadas Cana-dienses en cumplimiento de uno de los requisitos de la Maestría en Estudios de Defensa esta-blecidos por el Royal Military College de Kingston, Canadá . Este es un documento escolar ypor lo tanto contiene hechos y opiniones que el autor solamente ha considerado como apropia-dos y correctos para el tema. Éste no refleja necesariamente la política o la opinión de ningunaagencia, incluyendo el Gobierno de Canadá y el Departamento de la Defensa Nacional. Estetrabajo no puede ser distribuido, reproducido o copiado, excepto con el expreso permiso delDepartamento Canadiense de la Defensa Nacional.2004
  2. 2. 2CONTENTSINTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 7Mentality and perceptions……………………………………………………………………..……….8SECTION 1STRATEGIC SITUATION....................................................................................…......………....10Generalities of the maritime environment..................................……………………….….……10The South Atlantic Theatre............................................................……………………………...10Geografic frame ..................................................................................………………………..…..10Strategic frame…………………………………………………………………………………………...11Littoral environment…………………………………..…………………………………………....….11American littoral…………………………………………..…………………….………….……….……11African littoral………………………………………………..………………….…………………......…11Antartic front……………………………………………………………………………...………………13Maritime environment………………………………………………………………….……...………14Maritime shipping ……………………………………………………………….……………..……..…14- The global maritime shipping environment………………………………………………..…….…..14- Current trends in the global shipping industry………………………………………….………...…15- Sea lines of communication………………………………………………………………......………17Resources……………………………………………………………...………………………..……….18- Renewal resources………………………………………………………………………………...…..18Fisheries………………………………………………………………………………………..……….18Fresh Water…………………………………………………………………………………….………21- Non renewal resources…………………………………………………………………….....………21The growing importance of sub-sea resources………...…………………………………...…….21Oil, energy and geopolitics in the same coin……………………………………..….……………27South Atlantic Region, the New Strategic Oil Supply Flashpoint……………………………..…28Atlantic Equatorial Africa as new U.S. vital interest…………………………………..……..……29A power projection space……………………………………………………………………………….31Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………..….31SECTION 2INERNATIONAL LAW AND SECURITY IN SOUTH ATLANTIC.................…….…...….……....33Security under United Nations organization (UN)………………………………………….…….33The Law of the Sea Convention…………………………………………………………………..…34Security as a concept of South Atlantic Rim common interest……………………………..…35The Threats…………………………………………………………………………….……………..…36Basic current threats (from a “continental” point of view)…………………………………….…..…36Information Age Threats to Security…………………………………………………………..………36Maritime threats……………………………………………………………………………….…...……37
  3. 3. 3- Piracy……………………………………………………………………………………….…….…...37- Terrorism at sea……………………………………………………………………….…….………..38Security options……………………………………………………………………………………..…39Collective security model………………………………………………………………….……………40Co-operative security model………………………………….………………………………………...41Security model by means of integration……………………………………………………………….42Different intends involving countries of the South Atlantic Rim…………………….…….….42The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance – TIAR………………………………….……42The South Atlantic Maritime Area – AMAS………………………………………..………………….44South Atlantic Treaty Organization – OTAS………………………………………….…………..…..44Zone Of Peace and Co-Operation of the South Atlantic – ZPCAS……………………………..….46Actors in security of South Atlantic Rim…………………………….……….……….……….…..48The ZPCAS littoral countries…………………………………………………………………………...48- American Front Countries………………………………………………………………………….….48- African Front Countries…………………………………………………………………………….….48Another actors……………………………………………………………………………………………48- United States of America………………………………………………………….………….…48- NATO………………………………………………………………………………….…………..50- Russia……………………………………………………………………………………………..52- China………………………………………………………………………………...………...….54- Europe………………………………………………………………………….……………...….56- United Kingdom……………………………….………………………………………..……..…56- France……………………………………………………………………………………...……..57- Portugal…………………………...……………………………………………………......…….57- Norway………………………………………………………………………………..........…….57- Paraguay……………………………………………………………………………….……...…57- Bolivia……………………………………………………………………………………………..57- Chili……………………….…………………………………………………….…………………58- Another countries………………………………………………………………………….…….58Interaction....................................................................................................................................58Summary……………………………………………………………………………….…………..……58SECTION 3DEVELOPING A STRATEGY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC......……...........………...……………59The root of the problem.............................................................................................................59Why not to copy a NATO model?………………………………………………..……...…………..62The NATO……………………………………………………………………………...……………..….64The NATO model……………………………………………………………………..……..………….64NATO naval organization………………………………………...………………….………………..66A new structure for NATO…………………………………………………………..………………..68The NATO example of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic……………..………………......…..69The NATO example of the Striking Fleet Atlantic………………………………………….……..71Merits of this Maritime Security Model……………………………………………………….…….73Naval Co-operation in the South Atlantic Ocean…………………………………………………76Summary...................…….....................................................................................................…. 81
  4. 4. 4SECTION 4THE CAPACITIES OF SEA POWER……...……………………………...….……………………….83Advantages of sea power………………………….……………………………………………..…..83Sea Denial and Operations Other Than War……………………………….…………………..…….84- Presence and Deterrence…………………………………………….………….………..……85- Peace Operations…………………………….……………………………………………….…86- Humanitarian Operations……………………………………………..…………….…………..86- Protection of Shipping and Freedom of Navigation………………………………..…….…..86- Maritime Constabulary Tasks…………………………………………………….…………….86- Environmental Operations……………………………………………………….……………..87- Embargoes/Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)…………………………………………87- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)……………………………………..……..….87Operations in Wartime…………………………………………………………………….………….…88- Sea Control………………………………………..………………….………………….…..…..88- Power Projection…………………………………………………….…………………..………88- Tasks for Maritime Operations…………………….……………………………………...……89Information Warfare……………………………………………………………………………….…….91Tactical Environmental Support……………………………………..…………………………………92Summary…………………………………………………………………………...………………..…..92SECTION 6FORCE PLANNING FOR NAVAL FORCES…………………………………………………………94The spectrum of military conflict…………………………………………………………...……….94A Strategic Risk Management in Defence……………………………………………….……….103What can be done?: A Capability-Based Planning…………………………………...……..….105Concept of operations for combined naval forces………………………………..….…..…….108Capability goals for a combined naval force…………………………………………….………112What levels of capacity?……………………………………………………………..……...………113The force planning scenarios……………………………………………………………….……...117The value-ranked capabilities………………………………………………………………..….…129Summary………………………………………………………………………………..…………..….129SECTION 6THE STANDING NAVAL FORCE SOUTH ATLANTIC…………………….….……………….…131Utopia of a Standing Naval Force South Atlantic?………………………………..….....……..131The South Atlantic Rim Naval Forces……………………………………….…………………….131What is missing?……………………………………………………………………….……………..136Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………….137CONCLUSIONS......................................…..................................................................………..138ANNEX 1 – THE SOUTH ATLANTIC THEATRE………………...…………................………....144ANNEX 2 – THE SOUTH ATLANTIC SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION………..………......146
  5. 5. 5ANNEX 3 – SOUTH ATLANTIC STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE ………………….………....……147ANNEX 4 – THE SOUTH ATLANTIC COMBINED / JOINT TASK LIST............……….….…. 148ANNEX 5 – NAVAL FORCES OF SOUTH ATLANTIC….…………......................……….…….161BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................…......................................…..…………164***
  6. 6. 6ASSURING THE PEACE IN SOUTH ATLANTIC WATERS.A STANDING NAVAL FORCES SOUTH ATLANTIC. Utopia or possibility ?INTRODUCTIONThe South Atlantic RimThe South Atlantic Rim1is experiencing political and economic changes during last dec-ades. The region holds enormous strategic and economic vital importance for the littoral coun-tries and significant importance by same reasons for some another powers. Despite a historywith conflict and violence inside and/or between countries of West Africa and East South Ameri-ca, the region seams to be more stable and peaceful than decades before.However, there is an ominous and pervasive sense of uncertainty about the future. Theinternational terrorism, the necessity of natural resources, the destiny of Antarctica, the fragilityof democracies, the Malvinas/Falklands conflict, the evolution of the law of the sea, and someothers limits controversies, the existence of important sea lines of communications, the evolutionof economic growth and political changes are playing a significant role in determining a hegem-ony to fill the power vacuum. As USA, France, United Kingdom, among others maintain and re-inforce their presence, they exercise their political, economic and military influence.Medium and small countries of the region, in some cases with insignificant navies, exceptBrazil and major powers, seam sometimes to ignore the importance of navies to control the in-fluence of the sea over the land life.South Atlantic Ocean provides important sea lines of communication (SLOC´s) to all na-tions in this rim and to some big powers. Economic, political and security interests of many southAtlantic Rim nations intersect at sea. This intersection further suggests that the timing might beright to examine forms of maritime cooperation. At present, except for a few bilateral or multilat-eral treaties, there are no broadly recognized procedures, which can provide guidelines for theconduct of maritime activities within the region.Maritime security, an important dimension of regional security, could act as catalyst forestablishing a permanent South Atlantic Rim security regime. Maritime cooperation can serve asa bridge to broader security cooperation among nations and also provides collective assurancefor all against a breakdown of international law and order.Eastern South American and Western African countries have viewed themselves as dis-tinct and competitive in their continental regions during history. Any significant increase instrength by one of them has almost certain been to evoke an offsetting maneuver by others.There is almost no pretense of collective security or cooperation based on shared domestic val-ues, even on the part of the existing democracies. Cooperative security started in South Americalast decade but there is still emphasis on equilibrium and preservation of national self-interest.Traditional bilateral arrangements or limited multilateral forums as Organization of Ameri-can Estates (OAE) and its Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA), Zone ofPeace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic, Tlatelolco Treaty, MERCOSUR, New Partnershipfor African Development (NEPAD), Southern Africa and the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic and Mone-1For the purposes of this paper, the term South Atlantic Rim, describes all nations and /or continents whose shorelines arewashed by the South Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas.
  7. 7. 7tary Community of Central Africa (EMCCA) and Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) serve only a marginal capacity in addressing economic, political and security issues.It is well known that any proposal must be inserted inside the frame of United Nations andmight be the establishment of a preliminary step towards establishing a permanent South Atlan-tic Rim security architecture by forging international linkages through maritime confidence build-ing measures.Mentality and perceptionsTwo profoundly different views of the type of naval policy countries should adopt domi-nate the debate in maritime and military’s affaires.On one hand is the internationalist or ‘blue water’ philosophy. The other perspective isessentially continental. Seeing only the need for a coast guard rely on the liberal democraticideal of a peaceful world in which reasonable men solve their differences by negotiation and,thus, compromise. This argument is often persuasive, but invariably lacks depth in that it fails totake due account of the unexpected, or the fact that not everyone is ‘reasonable’.One problem with this view is that there is often absolutely no recognition of the traditionalnaval role in diplomacy and crisis management. It is an entirely ‘continental’ perspective, lackingan understanding of national or international maritime issues. This view is still widely supported,by pro-army’s mentalities or by army’s influences so any future proposal to government for anaval force structure and related employment strategy will almost certainly run the gauntlet ofcriticism from those who do not understand the value of navies as extensions of state policy overthe sea and thus advocate their reduction or elimination. Thus, any future naval force plan has toexplain not only the return to countries on the investment, but also what will happen if those ca-pabilities are not maintained.2In this sense, continental alliances are more common than those built around a maritimeor oceanic environment. The proposal here, will be to analyse the convenience and possibility tostart building a South Atlantic naval organization starting by implementing a Standing NavalForce South Atlantic (SNFSA).***2HAYDON, Peter, Canadian Cdr.(R). “What Naval Capability Does Canada Needs?”, Canadian Military Journal Vol. 2, No. 1Spring 2001.
  8. 8. 8SECTION 1STRATEGIC SITUATIONGeneralities of the maritime environmentThe following special characteristics of the sea must be highlighted in this basic but es-sential start: flat surface (sea state, currents, tides), mass of the water (liquid mass, depth, tem-perature, salinity, submarine life, currents), bottom (solid mass, relieve, composition, depth, life,etc.), air space over the sea (gas mass, temperature, pressure, weather, life, etc.), coverage(the sea covers 70 % of the earth’s surface), medium of efficient transport of large and heavyitems in long distances, increasingly exploitation of economic resources that holds and covers,influence (approximately 70% of the world’s population lives within one hundred miles of acoastline), special and evolutionary international law, and the called “freedom of the sea”3The South Atlantic TheaterGeographic frame (See Annex 1)The South Atlantic is framed to the north by an intercontinental strait of around 1,600 NMbetween the South American coast in Natal, Brazil, and the African coast in Freetown, SierraLeona. There are different lines taken by authors as the northern limit but, to this paper, the limitwill be arbitrary draw between the northern point of the Brazilian coast in the limit with FrenchGuyana and the northern point of the coast of Senegal close to St.-Louis in the limit with Mauri-tania. This criterion is along with the countries that compose the Zone of Peace and Cooperationin the South Atlantic.The western side of South Atlantic is the eastern South American coast as far as CapeHorn with three access to the Pacific: the Drake passage, the Magellan strait and the BeagleChannel. The eastern side is the western coast of the African continent until its end in the Agul-has Cape. Antarctica is the southern coastal limit and it contributes to conforms the main pas-sages both to the East toward the Indic Ocean and to the West toward the Pacific.Strategic framePower, oil and food, among others, are usually source of conflict and South Atlantic hasspecific relation with them. It’s purposed to follow the next more detailed analysis:Littoral environmentAmerican littoralThe American Front Countries are Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Brazil is the most powermember in the ZPCAS. Last decades has taken an important naval development and currentlyhas the main fleet in South Atlantic, including two aircraft carriers. Argentina has been a recog-3Canadian Forces College, “Naval Doctrine Manual, MCP 1”, p. 4-13/39.
  9. 9. 9nized power in South Atlantic last century but last two decades it’s naval power and maritimeinfluence significantly decreased because of it´s political and economical problems.Warnings are being raised by some U.S. officials, news media and private individualsabout the growing threat in Latin America posed by violent Islamic extremist groups. In theirview, a new Islamic narco-terrorist threat is emerging as Islamism militants forge alliances withlocal narco-terrorist groups like the rebels in Colombia.However, while the risk exists that Islamic militants could attack U.S. and its allies assetsin the region, the threat may not be yet as great or immediate as some of the more extremealarmists claim. Buenos Aires in Argentina and Sao Paulo in Brazil are believed to have com-bined populations of 3 million Islamists. Successful car bomb attacks in 1992 and 1994 againstthe Israeli Embassy and a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina are attributed toHezbollah participation.4African littoral“Local and internal conflicts are the backdrop to trends and developments in the region.Famine and poverty remain ever-present handicaps to greater peace and security. However, anumber of long-running conflicts have been resolved or brought close to resolution. In a sign of agreater determination amongst regional countries to solve their own security problems, the NewPartnership for African Development (NEPAD) although driven largely by political and economicaims, has security elements referring to peacekeeping in its documentation.It is likely that this will develop in three main areas: peacekeeping operations, crisis earlywarning, and the non-proliferation of small arms. In a further development, military commenta-tors in South Africa have discussed the creation of an Indigenous Military Peace-building Initia-tive (IMPI), promoting the idea of a regional security forum for conflict resolution and prevention,and also the restructuring and democratic control of armed forces. Both NEPAD and IMPI are ata very early stage in their development. Given the partnership inherent in the NEPAD process,Western countries involved may make any necessary investment conditional on democratic re-forms, which may be unacceptable to some African partner countries.”5Piracy and maritime security is a growing threat to the region. There are concerns aboutsecurity at ports and on merchant shipping specially focused in places where security is poor.Despite attempts of the International Maritime Organization – a special working group of the UN– to counter terrorism at sea by providing standardized, consistent framework for assessing therisk to ships and port facilities and for taking security measures to counter these risks, suchmeasures are too costly for most governments in the region, and foreign aid is needed in orderfor any such measures to be implemented.6Cote dIvoire and Democratic Republic of Congo are turmoil-ridden African states thatgarner little or no attention from the international community. Each of these countries suffersfrom internal strife, but each has been largely ignored by the outside world -- unless you countthe presence of international peacekeepers, who have the uncanny knack of keeping the peacein places where the peace is already pretty much kept. Each of these crises, and others as well,4Stratfor Agency. “Latin America: A Safe Haven for Al Qaeda?”. September 04, 2003, 2225 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz5Chipman, J.. The Military Balance 2002-2003, “Sub-Saharan Africa – Regional Trends”. The International Institute for Stra-tegic Studies (IISS). London, UK. 2002. p.1.6Ibid, p.1.
  10. 10. 10carries its own humanitarian calamities. There are important instability in Ivory Coast where arecommon rebel uprising last time that hold the northern half of the country.7Nigeria disputes over the ownership of offshore oil fields have created tension betweenthe Bight of Biafra states. Although Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria recently resolved their disputeover territorial waters, a quarrel between Nigeria and Cameroon is ongoing and tensionsthroughout the region have heightened following the development boom.Nigeria placed its forces on high alert in 2000 after learning France was building an airbase near the disputed Bakassi peninsula. 8Nigeria’s one of the worlds leading oil exporters, with production of around 2.3 millionbbl/d of oil during 2001, and with net oil exports of around 2.0 million bbl/d, including around885,000 bbl/d to the United States. Ongoing inter-ethnic tensions and persistent political andethnic strife in the Niger Delta region, including violence, kidnapping, sabotage and the seizureof oil facilities, often disrupts Nigerian oil production.In January 2001, the Nigerian navy announced plans to clamp down on arson attacks onoil facilities following the loss of billions in oil revenues due to vandalism. The Federal govern-ment also has ordered the navy to sink any ship conveying crude products that cannot be ac-counted for. The government estimates that as much as 300,000 bbl/d of Nigerian crude is ille-gally bunkered (freighted) out of the country. In December 2000, Nigeria reinstated the deathpenalty for vandalism of pipelines and electricity infrastructure.Equatorial Guinea is a burgeoning oil and natural gas power, has garnered attention as well,receiving more than $5 billion in private foreign investment over the past five years and prompt-ing the United States to reopen its embassy in October 2003.9In 2000, the U.S. State Depart-ment approved an application by Military Professional Resources Inc., a Virginia-based privatemilitary training company, to assess Equatorial Guineas coast guard requirements to protect itsoffshore oil installations. The company also hopes to build and train the countrys coast guard.10Antarctic frontIt belongs to the unique explored but not exploited continent. It’s far from theother continental masses except from southern cone of South America. The exis-tence of important renewal resources like krill, whales and other fish, fresh water,birds and mammals make it of interest to the main powers. While Antarctic krill havea circumpolar distribution, being found south of the Polar Front and north of the iceedge, the assumed centres of high krill concentration are areas around SouthGeorgia and the Antarctic Peninsula.11Antarctica has growing scientific interest along with the development of sci-ences and technology. Not only states but also international companies are inter-ested on it. In the meanwhile, the ecologic ONG defend Antarctic unpolution andenvironmental conservation.127Streatfor Agency. “Africa Net Assessment: Sub-Saharan Oil and Arms”. April 30, 2004, 1703 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz8Stratfor Agency. “Chinas Risky Business in Equatorial Guinea”. November 22, 2000 0000 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz9Stratfor Agency. “Africa Net Assessment: Sub-Saharan Oil and Arms”. ”. April 30, 2004 1703 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz10Stratfor Agency. “Chinas Risky Business in Equatorial Guinea”.November 22, 2000 0000 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz11FAO. “Review of The State of World Fishery Resources: Marine Fisheries – Southern Oceans”. 1997. Http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/W4248E/w4248e3212Bardi, Julio & Ass.. “100 Años de Orcadas y la Secretaría del Tratado Antártico-Parte 1” [ 100 Years of Orcadas and theSecretary of the Antarctic Treaty]. Newsletter, Countura Política, Nª 1005, Año 21, Tomo 118. 2004.
  11. 11. 11Geological soundings in the Antarctic, reveals the presence of oil, gas, andmanganese with no international mechanism to control exploitation of the region.13Charming of the earth is slowly growing and Antarctica deicing continues. Tourism is in-creasing. The ozone layer has been steadily thinning since monitoring began in 1985. Nowherehas this decrease been more dramatic than over the Antarctic - the hub of global wind currents.As a consequence, Argentina and South Africa will face problems in the years to come, espe-cially since agriculture, fishing and tourism are central to their economies.Security in Antarctica is ruled by the international Antarctic Treaty. Thetreaty, which entered into force in 1961, establishes Antarctica as a zone of peaceand bans all military activities, including the testing of weapons. However militarypersonnel and equipment may be used for scientific purposes. 14Maritime environmentMaritime shippingThe following areas concerns to this issue:- The global maritime shipping environmentAnalyzing the importance of maritime shipping in the global economy, there is a continuetotal annual growth in maritime trade. However, world shipments of tanker cargoes decreased.Crude oil major loading areas include in second order to West Africa after Western Asia (MeddleEast).Petrobras, the Brazilian oil company, announced that for the first time exports had ex-ceeded imports. The discovery of oil in the Campos Basin, off the coast of Espiritu Santo, mightmake this trend permanent. The pattern and volume of shipments are similar during last pastyears with temporary fluctuations due to several reasons. Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) shipmentsare worldwide slightly increasing.Main dry cargo shipments of iron ore, coal, grains, bauxite/alumina and rock phosphateare also increasing as the remaining ones. There is a booming production of steel, which withAustralia account for about two-thirds of world exports.World grain shipments are suffering a decrease. One of the main loading areas is theeast coast of South America with almost 22 percent of world exports.European Union (EU) countries and some Eastern European countries account for 54 per centof world bauxite imports and are supplied from West Africa.Dry cargoes are increasingly being carried in containers along the liner trade routes. Con-tainers flow along South Atlantic along north-south and intra-regional routes. In the routes linkingEurope to Africa, flows increase in spite of political upheavals in some countries of West Africa.Routes linking Europe and North America with South America north ward flows are expanding ata higher rate than southward ones due to currency depreciation and devaluation in some southAmerican countries that pushed up exports and contracted imports.http://www.geostrategy.com.13Rodríguez, Silverio T. (LCdr Portuguese Marine Corps). “The Strategic Importance of the Portuguese Atlan-tic Islands”. US Naval War College. CSC 1984.14Antactic Treaty, Article 1.
  12. 12. 12As transported cargo is modestly increasing, changes in the average world transport dis-tance are minimal. However, there are indications of supplies of crude oil and dry cargoes mov-ing shorter distances to destinations in Europe and Norh America. This reflects that there isnatural a tendency to find sources closer to these main markets.15So, South Atlantic Rim coun-tries are becoming more important, and in the same way the south-north routes.- Current trends in the global shipping industryThe world fleet is expanding. The tonnage of oil tankers and bulk carriers is expanding,too. The world fleet of fully cellular container ships continued to expand substantially. However, the fleetof general cargo ships decreased.The average age of the total world fleet is dropping to about 12.5 years and it reflects in-creased scrapping of old tonnage and deliveries of new buildings. The total tonnage sold fordemolition increased last years. Developed countries have continued the trend of lowering theaverage age of their fleet that has been apparent over the last few years. Container ships con-tinued to be the youngest fleet.Last deliveries reflected the steady trend towards larger vessels. The average size oftankers was 128,600 deadweight tons. Another feature was the slightly smaller size of bulk car-riers. The average deadweight tonnage had lowered to 62,400 in 2002. New buildings for othertypes of vessels, including general cargo ships and container ships, increased both in numberand in deadweight tonnage. The trend towards larger vessels continues.Aging of the fleet is also a changing subject. On 13 November 2002 the Aframax tankerPrestige carrying 77,000 tons of heavy fuel sent a distress call after severe weather off thenorth-west Spanish coast caused her to list. The accident polluted about 200 km of coast innorth-west Spain and weeks later also sections of the southern coast of France, causing majoreconomic and environmental damage. The 26-year old single-hull vessel had been on her wayfrom Latvia to Singapore.The accident had important impacts. Questions were raised concerning the state portcontrol carried out by European countries in accordance with the Paris MOU. The fact that the Prestigehad not been inspected over the last twelve months in spite of visiting several ports for bunkering high-lighted the practice of conducting such inspections only when vessels actually dock, as well as the lowrate of inspection in some countries.The question of the need to have authorized places of refuge to counter the worst fea-tures of marine accidents was raised again by the Prestige. In early 2001, coastal authoritiesdenied entry to the tanker Castor, which had developed extensive cracks after sailing in heavyweather in the Mediterranean Sea with 29,500 tons of unleaded gasoline. The cargo was finallytransferred to another vessel at sea.Moreover, two European countries, France and Spain, announced in early December aunilateral measure based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) whereby sin-gle hull tankers carrying heavy oils must sail outside their 200-mile exclusive economic zones.By early January, Spain alone had expulsed seven vessels, while charters started to includeextended sailing routes to comply with the measure. Malta, one of the registries most affected bythe expulsions, complained of this sudden and muscular measure.The main legal rights in the maritime environment are about immunity of warships, inno-15United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat. Chapter 1. Review of MaritimeTransport, 2003. Geneva, 2003. p.1-18. http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2003_en.pdf
  13. 13. 13cent passage, coastal state rights and obligations, flag state responsibilities and protectionagainst piracy.Naval Control of Shipping should make the protection of shipping in wartime.The main threats in peacetime are terrorism and piracy. Navies and coast guards shouldgive protection to shipping. Both can produce crime at sea and can be state supported.The main lessons learned here are about the necessity of acting with urgency, the com-plexity of the action with regard to the application of law, the necessity of training for differentthreats, and the difficulty of avoiding collateral damage with weapons effects.It could be a potential impact on economic activity with disruption of trade. The role ofstates must be to protect trade, prevent illegal trade, power projection and develop and applyregulations. Sanctions can be applied. Purposes of sanctions are punishing of transgression,deterrence, compelling changes in behaviour, restricting activities and signal resolve. Some ex-amples are Palestine 1945-8, Cuban Missile Crisis, Beira Patrol 1965-74, Iraq – 1990-, Adriatic1992-6.By the other side, there could appear some sanction limitations as to be inadequate tostrategic goal, it could be insufficient forces, it must impact on impact correctly on target nation,sanctions create antidotes, it’s possible to find actions of target country allies and it may producealienation of world commerce.In case of blockades, they have to along with some principles: it’s limited to states en-gaged in hostilities, an area and start date should be established, it applies to all, and there areneutral rights. They must produce an impact on heavy traffic, there are big search and commandand control requirements, and there is a requirement for all-encompassing sanctions.With regard to power projection, as very good example, it’s important to show the impor-tance of sealift for the Falkland/Malvinas and Gulf Wars. The future shipping requirements willbe suitability, availability, contracts and costs.In conclusion, shipping is a global, international industry, it’s difficult to protect, there areimportant legal issues, there are iinadequate mandates to control and, overall, trade will getthrough.16- Sea lines of communicationSecurity and access to sea lines of communication (SLOCs) is of increasing importance,as these sea lines are the maritime highways for vast flows critical to the rapidly growing pros-perity not only of the countries of the South Atlantic Rim but also for other countries.Threats to the security and access to SLOCs include both military concerns (conflicts be-tween regional and extra-regional countries, international terrorism as well as sea mines) andnon-military concerns (natural disasters and accidents, piracy, and particularly “creeping jurisdic-tion” of regional states).17By its relative position in the globe, the South Atlantic “Mediterranean” position betweenthe North Atlantic, the Indic and the Pacific is important for the control of sea lines of communi-cations transporting oil and other strategic resources. This would be much more important incase of close of Panama and/or Suez Canals.16Thomas, Robert H.. Presentation “The Global Maritime Shipping Environment”, Canadian Forces College, CSC27, 19 Janu-ary 2001.17Weeks, Stanley B. “Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Security and Access”, Policy Paper 33. Internet.
  14. 14. 14It’s important to consider, not only maritime sea lines, but also chock points. Maritime traf-fic inside, to and from South Atlantic itself is not an important proportion of the global total. How-ever, this is very important to the countries of the region because it is the main part of their inter-national trade. Moreover, the recent growth in United States dependence on its Western Hemi-sphere neighbors is an illustration of a “nearer-is-better” phenomenon and it grows the SouthAtlantic importance.There is another traffic that not touches any littoral but pass throughout the South Atlantic.The main line in this case passes by the chock point south of Capes of Agulhas and Good Hopein South Africa and is normally sailed by “Ultra Large Crude Carriers” (ULCCs) or more than300,000 dead weight tons (DWT) and “Very Large Crude Carriers “ (VLCCs) from 200,000 to300,000 DWT, usually called super tankers, with oil and charge from Middle East to Europe andUSA.It’s important to remark that more than three-fifths of global oil is moved by sea and therest is done by pipelines. Tankers have made global (intercontinental) transport of oil possibleand they are low cost, efficient, and extremely flexible. “Suezmax” tankers between 180,000 and125,000 DWT; “Aframax” tankers between 125,000 and 75,000 DWT; “Panamax” tankers ofaound 50,000 DWT; “Handymax” tankers of around 35,000 DWT; and “Handy Size” tankers of30,000-20,000DWT can pass across the Suez Canal but they should take the “route of Cape” ifthe other way is close by any reason.The Drake Passage, chock point south of South America, has currently commercially veryless importance and it only could grow in case of Panama Canal closing. There is small traffic bythis way because only tankers bigger than “Panamax” would need to use this route. The Trans-Panama Pipeline would let to transfer the oil between the Caribbean and the Pacific in case ofnecessity. However, there is not choice for the U.S. aircraft carriers moving from one coast ofthe country to the other for maintenance or strategic necessities. This is an example of how theDrake means much more than a lot of people may show.It’s possible to see the main lines of communication of South Atlantic in Annex 2.Resources- Renewal resources. Fisheries:They represent a substantial protein resource in a world where shortage of food is be-coming an increasing challenge. Some riche fisheries in the region attract fishermen from othernations that expertice a lack of resources as a result of overexploitation of their traditional fish-ing grounds. This is a recipe for a clash of interests.Fisheries and the living resources in South Atlantic represent an important resource of na-tional wealth for some countries of the region. Moreover, fisheries have historically constituteda necessary precondition for human settlement along the coast.18Pollution, climate change and irresponsible fishing are all taking a toll on the worlds ma-rine resources.Globally, reports FAO, 25 percent of major marine fish stocks are under exploited ormoderately exploited. Forty-seven percent are fully exploited and are therefore producing18Olsen , Kjell- Birger. “Norway-the Coastal State: Protein. Energy. Lines of Communication. Shipping”. NAVAL FORCESSpecial Issue 7/2002. p. 9, 10.
  15. 15. 15catches that have reached, or are very close to, their maximum sustainable limits. Another 18percent of stocks or species groups are overexploited, while 10 percent of stocks have becomesignificantly depleted or are recovering from depletion. 19South Atlantic fisheries are a well-known source of food. Regional and foreign countriesuse to fish in these areas and many conflicts usually arise based in illegal fishing inside ZEE orprotected zones. More over, legislation about the migration of some species of fish from insideto outside the ZEE and vice versa grew another issue of possible dispute that has to be con-sidered in the future. They are all areas of potential conflicts.Despite the existence of many Regional Fishery Bodies (RFB) with influence in South At-lantic as:1- Management Bodies:International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas - ICCASouth Atlantic Fisheries Organization – SEAFOConvention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources - CCAMLR2- Advisory Bodies:Atlantic Africa Fisheries Commission - AAFCFishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic - CECAFRegional Fisheries Advisory Committee for the Southwest Atlantic - CARPASJoint Permanent Commission for the Argentina/Uruguay Maritime Front – COFREMARSub-Regional Commission on Fisheries (West Africa) - SRCFRegional Fisheries Committee for the Gulf of Guinea - COREPWestern Central Atlantic Fishery Commission - WECAFC3- Scientific Body:International Council for the Exploitation of the Sea – ICES20,illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing occurs in all capture fisheries and includes arange of illicit activities: fishing without permission or out of season; using outlawed types offishing gear; disregarding catch quotas; or non-reporting and underreporting catch weights andspecies.According to an FAO, IUU fishing is increasing in both intensity and scope, and is serious-ly undermining national and regional efforts to sustainably manage fisheries.21Regionally, the countries of North America, Europe and the Southwest Pacific have themost national fishing boats operating outside their own national waters.Africa is one of two regions with the greatest number of countries granting access to for-eign flagged fishing vessels.Argentina in South Atlantic is one of 22 countries of the world that accounted for over80% of the worlds total marine catch in 2002.22A recent Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) survey conclud-ed that while some controls are in place, fewer than 50% of countries are exerting effectivecontrol over high-seas fishing vessels flying their flags. Moreover, “unreported high seas fishingand the current lack of implementation of adequate reporting mechanisms by a large number of19FAO. “Excess capacity and illegal fishing: challenges to sustainable fisheries”. 2004. http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/focus/2004/47127/index.html20FAO, Marine Resources Service, Fishery Resources Division, Fisheries Dpt.. “Review of the State of World Fishery Resour-ces: Marine Fisheries”. FAO Fisheries Circular No. 920 FIRM/C920(En) Rome, 1997. ISSN 0429-9329.http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/W4248E/W4248E00.21FAO “Illegal fishing and high-seas fisheries”. 2004. http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/focus/2004/47127/article_47140en22FAO. “Fishing capacity: global trends”. 2004. http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/focus/2004/47127/article_47136en
  16. 16. 16high seas fishing nations," the FAO study noted. 23Therefore, effective monitoring and en-forcement of South Atlantic littoral countries are key to effective fisheries management.. Fresh Water:Ice of Antarctic Continent, barriers and ice floes in the region are so far the biggest re-serve of fresh water in the world. It has a growing importance of this resource in a world wheremore countries are suffering more scarcities and shortages than before. High development andincrement in population make grow fresh water necessities.- Non renewal resourcesThe growing importance of sub-sea resources.In response to the growing potential of sub-sea resources, basic questions have arisenabout who has a right of access to sub-sea resources in the deep oceans, and how may thisright be enjoyed. The International Seabed Authority is the international agency established todefine, control and regulate all activities in the deep-sea bed and the ocean floor beyond thelimits of national jurisdiction as areas for the benefit of common humanity.The main types of mineral deposits of potential economic value that occur on and be-neath the seafloor in the extended continental shelf areas are: conventional hydrocarbons(crude oil and natural gas), gas hydrates, placer deposit, phosphorite deposits, evaporite depos-it, polymetallic sulphides (pms), and manganese and cobalt-rich nodules and crusts.Extended “legal” continental shelf (ELCS) lie beyond 200 nautical mile jurisdiction of na-tion states exclusive zones, and their limits are defined by the criteria established by the UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 76, 1982.Placer deposits comprising heavy minerals, gold and diamonds are limited to near-shoreareas and have negligible resource potential in the ELCS regions. Evaporite deposits occur onmany continental margins. However, they only overlap with ELCS regions off eastern NorthAmerica and western central Africa, where their resource is low.The major resource potential within the ELCS regions is held in iron-manganese nodulesand crusts, conventional oil and gas and gas hydrates. In manganese nodules and crusts, fourelemental metals comprise the main components of commercial value: manganese, copper,nickel and cobalt.Technology developed in recent years has enabled direct observation and research onthe deep parts of the seafloor. There already is a capability for drilling for oil and gas in waterdepths beyond 1,500 m, and this is expected to increase as future deep-water prospects arerealized (International Energy Agency, 1996). Similarly, exploration of deep seafloor usingmanned submersibles and remotely operated vehicles has been highly rewarding scientifically.The term (estimated) “resource” is used to describe the potential for materials to occur. Itcomprises estimates of the potential occurrence and abundance of materials, regardless of theirfeasible exploitation. It is not, and should not be taken as, an assessment of non-living reserves.They can be subdivided into:- “Para.marginal resources that are prospectively marketable materials recoverable at prices asmuch as 1.5 times those prevailing now or possible with likely advances in technology”, and23Ibid FAO “Illegal fishing and high-seas fisheries”.
  17. 17. 17- “Sub-marginal resources that are materials recoverable at prices higher than 1.5 times thoseprevailing now but that have some foreseeable use and prospective value”.(Known) “Reserves” are, by definitions, proven deposits of known abundance and volumewith progress in exploration, advance in technology, and changes in economic conditions.“Proven reserves of most minerals are relatively small when compared with the estimatedresources that may be found by future exploration or become recoverable as a result of techno-logic advances or changes in economic conditions. This is particularly true for sub-sea re-sources, because only a small part of the seabed has been explored and most of the resourcesit contains are not yet economically recoverable”.24Marine Placer depositsThe most economically important of these minerals are: cassiterite (tin), ilmenite (titani-um), rutile (titanium), zircon (zirconium), chromite (chromium), monazite (thorium), magnetite(iron), gold and diamonds.In most placer deposits, economically valuable minerals have been mechanically concen-trated in rivers along beaches, fan-aprons and river deltas. The majority of heavy mineral marineplacer deposits are intrinsically linked close to their geological sources and to near-shore orshallow continental shelf environments. The majority of placer deposits are found along manypresent shorelines.The minerals rutile and ilmenite are the main sources of titanium and are or have beenmined from placer-derived deposits from beach sand in east South Africa and Brasil. Diamondsare mined in beach and shelf sediments along the west coast of South Africa, and are used asjewelry and for industrial cutting and grinding processes.Placer deposits are limited to continental shelf regions less than 120 m deep.Marine phosporite depositsPhosphorite deposits are naturally occurring compounds containing phosphate in the formof a cement binding sediments in tropical to sub-tropical regions. They tend to occur in waters ofmedium depth.Major localities include south and Southwestern Africa and the eastern margins of South Ameri-ca. None of locations overlap with the extended continental shelf regions, except for a small por-tion on the southeastern margin of Argentina.The bulk of sub-sea phosphorite resources in ELCS regions must be classed as sub-marginal and hence of little economic value.Marine evaporite depositsThey are anhydrite and gypsum (calsium sulphates), common salt (sodium chloride), andpotash-bearing minerals. Important deposits of magnesium bearing salts are also deposited insuch basins.It’s possible to find deposits in ELCS regions of the northeastern margin of Brazil and West Afri-24Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, “Global Non-Living Resources on the Extended Continental Shelf: Prospects at the Year2000-ISA Technical Study: Nº 1”, Southampton Oceanography Centre, Empress Dock, Southampton, United Kingdon, 2000, p.17.
  18. 18. 18ca.Thick beds of a magnesium salt and tachydrite (calcium-magnesium hydrate) previouslyknown only in trace amounts, occur in areas associated with potash in the Sergipe salt basinalong the eastern coast of Brazil and in the Congo basin along the mid-south-western coast ofAfrica.All marine evaporite deposits must be regarded as sub-marginal resources but they canbe produced more cheaply in the future.Marine polymetallic sulphides“The majority of sub-sea polymetallic sulphides (PMS) are massive ore bodies containingvarying proportions of pyrrhotite, pyrite/marcasite, sphalerite/wurtzite, chalcopyrite, bornite, andisocubanite. Some massive polymetallic sulphides located on spreading centres behind deep-ocean trenches also contain galena (lead sulphide) and native gold. Other minor sulphides of tin,cadmium, antimony, arsenic and mercury also occur in varying amounts at different localities.”25“It’s unlikely that sub-sea PMS deposits, such as those located in international waters onthe Mid-Atlantic Ridge will become mining targets in the foreseeable future because of theirdepth (greater than 2500m) and remote locations from shore. However, high gold and base-metal grades, sites are located close to land, and in water depths less than 2000 m. Under thosecircumstances, massive sulphide mining may become economically viable.”26Marine manganese nodules and crusts“They are concentrations of iron and manganese oxides, ranging from millimeters to tensof centimeters in diameter. They can contain economically valuable concentrations of nickel,copper and cobalt (together, making up to three weight percent). They include trace amounts ofmolybdenum, platinum and other base metals.The current known distribution of manganese nodules and crusts on the ocean floor isbased on information acquired by side scan sonars, drill cores, dredged samples, seafloor pho-tos, video camera records and direct observation from submersibles”.27“The major elements in dry nodules are oxygen, manganese, iron, silica, lesser amountsof aluminum, calcium, sodium, and magnesium and trace elements of which nickel, copper, andcobalt are the greatest economic interest.”28“Cobalt bearing manganese-iron crusts cover thousand of square kilometres in the Atlan-tic Ocean bearing manganese-iron crusts cover thousand of square kilometres in the AtlanticOcean and are found on the Blake Plateau, Sierra Leona Rise, and east flank of the Mid-AtlanticRidge.”29“Nodules are sparsely and irregularly distributed through broad areas of the Atlantic.Good possibilities for finding nodules in other areas near continental margins where they havehigh Mn/Fe ratios include areas such as the southern and south-western African continentalmargin.”3025Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 2626Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 27.27Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 28.28Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 29.29Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 3330Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p.35-36
  19. 19. 19The top ten countries, ranked in descending order, that have the greatest resource poten-tial of nodules and crusts in their ELCS area: USA, Madagascar, Brazil, Antarctica, Argentina,Japan, South Africa, Canada and India.Argentina and South Africa have ELCS areas where, on average, high grades are foundand that may in future have selected locations exploited for manganese nodule and crust recov-ery.There are no considered viable resources over 10 kg/m2 within any of the ELCS areas,and hence, at a regions scale, all nodules and crusts in these regions must be considered para-marginal.Marine hydrocarbon deposits“Oil and gas are hydrocarbon deposits that occur naturally within thick sedimentary se-quences. These are largely confined to the continental shelves, continental slopes, continentalrises, and small ocean basins.”31“These areas are almost exclusively on the continental shelvesand contain sedimentary sequences greater than 1,000m in thickness.”32“With the exception ofa small area off central western Africa, none of these areas lie within the ELCS regions.”33Theremaining largest fields after those of Persian Gulf and North Sea include the ones located inSouth America and West Africa.34Technological improvements in recovery efficiency and greater access to deep-water ar-eas are increasing the range of economically recoverable resources offshore. Favorable off-shore conditions occur along Antarctica seaboard and the Atlantic seaboards of South America,including Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina, and western Africa.“Hydrocarbon resources in the ELCS regions are mostly sub-marginal to para-marginal.However, there is considerable potential for exploitation in the future when technology and eco-nomic conditions make exploration, proving, and ultimately exploiting of these resources via-ble.”35Marine gas hydrate depositsGas hydrate is a crystalline compound composed of gas molecules, normally methane,en-caged within water molecules to form a solid similar to ice. One volume of hydrate also stores164 volumes of un-pressured methane-a measure of the value of the resource. Gas hydratesoccur widely in nature mainly beneath the seafloor in deep-sea sediments but also close to theseabed in shallow arctic seas. The methane in gas hydrate forms naturally by organic decay inthe thick sediments normally found in the deep water adjacent to continental margins. The deep-sea pressures (500m depth) and intra sediment temperatures (increasing with depth) determinethe gas hydrate stability.36Known hydrates are found on the Atlantic margins of South America, especially at equa-torial latitudes. Isolated occurrences are also found off Antarctica. High potential exists in Ant-arctic, eastern margin of South America and the African margin.31Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 37.32Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 40.33Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 41.34Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 42.35Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 46.36Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 47.
  20. 20. 20Exploitation of gas hydrates has potential hazards, since the stability of hydrates hasbeen implicated in the stability history of continental slopes. Until the technology for safe exploi-tation of hydrates is in place, all gas hydrate resources must be considered sub-marginal.37In conclusion, the non-living resource potential within the extended legal continental shelf(ELCS) lie beyond the 200 nautical mile jurisdiction of nation states´ exclusive economic zones,and their outer limits are defined by the criteria established by the United Nations Convention onthe Law of the Sea, Article 76. Eight different types of non-living resources are assessed. Themajor resource potential within the ELCS regions are held in iron-manganese nodules andcrusts, oil, gas and gas hydrates. Four elemental metals are the main components of value inmanganese nodules and crusts: manganese, copper, nickel, and cobalt.“The value of the non-living resources in the ELCS regions depends on the technologicaldevelopments that will allow their extraction and production. Because of this, with perhaps theexception of conventional gas and oil, and possibly gas hydrates, many resources on the ELCSwill remain uncompetitive with onshore resources” by now.38Oil. Energy and geopolitics in the same coin.Energy and geopolitics are often two sides of the same coin. Each affects the other bothdirectly and indirectly because of economic necessity, and the military and political tools usedeither to ensure or disrupt regular energy supplies directly impact the political and economic sta-tus of countries the world over. The end result is a complex web of relationships-economic, polit-ical and military-where a minor quiver in a single strand can send vibrations throughout thewhole.Oil has historically been a source of conflict and exploitation, reserves and potential inland and offshore is very important in the South Atlantic region. Moreover, the Guinea Gulf iscurrently an important source of oil and much economical interest grows around this area.With the seeds planted for widespread oil exploration after both the 1973 OPEC embargoand the 1991 Gulf War, significant advances in exploration and production technology have ac-celerated success in finding alternative sources of crude. Those technological advances havefacilitated the discovery of vast oil reserves in many unforeseen geographic regions.The shift of U.S. reliance away from Arabian Gulf oil resources becomes evident oncecurrent data on reserves and production is reviewed. At the onset of the Gulf War in 1991, theUnited States depended on the Arabian Gulf Region for 27.8% of its oil imports. That figurealone justified the U.S. concern that instability in the region demanded fast, powerful, and deci-sive U.S. action.Since the Gulf War, aggressive exploration for alternatives to U.S. dependence on theArabian Gulf Region for petroleum needs have been both serious and successful. The processof exploration and discovery outside of the Middle East has fostered a slow but steady shift inthe energy resource center of gravity away from the Arabian Gulf and toward the South Atlantic.Angola is one of the two biggest non-OPEC movers and shakers with plans to raise pro-duction levels by 1.0 million bdp by 2007.37Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 51-52.38Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 53.
  21. 21. 21The eastern South American shelf is one of the widest of the world, it has the potential tobe a very important source, and just there, Argentina and United Kingdom disputed their rightsover Malvinas/Falkland Islands.South Atlantic Region, the New Strategic Oil Supply Flashpoint39Long ignored by policy makers, the South Atlantic Region is just now emerging as a newenergy center of gravity. Specifically, the growing discoveries of energy reserves in AtlanticEquatorial Africa combined with those of oil-rich South America can already be recognized asvital U.S. interests.It seems U.S. foreign and military policy have unintentionally overlooked the essentialneed for stability particularly in Africa, stability that will ensure uninterrupted flow of energy re-sources to the U.S. throughout the foreseeable future.Significant discoveries in Latin America and Atlantic Equatorial Africa shed new light onthe strategic importance of the South Atlantic geographic region. Thus a shift in the U.S. energyparadigm has been essential in order to bolster the reliability of these newly discovered sourcesof energy. An Stratfor Agency report called “Iraq: Energy´s Rip Van Winkle” recently (2003) said:“Finally, where the energy flows so will the U.S. Navy sail.”At present, Atlantic Equatorial Africa provides the United States with approximately 1.3mbd or 13.5% of its total oil imports. That figure equals or possibly exceeds current oil importsfrom Saudi Arabia and almost seven times the amount imported from Kuwait.Combining that percentage with imports from South America (excluding Mexico), SouthAtlantic sources are now providing the United States with close to 45% of its imported oil. (Mexi-co exports about 1.3 million b/d of crude oil to the U.S.). That figure is more than double theamount of oil imported from the Arabian Gulf. The Gulf region, now supplying the United Stateswith approximately 18% of its oil imports, is steadily decreasing in its energy importance to theUnited States.Looking only at proven oil reserves, the combined total reserves in South America, includ-ing Brazil, Columbia, Argentina, and Venezuela – are almost 85 billion barrels.When the Atlantic Equatorial Africa figure of 25 billion barrels (a figure that continues to growexponentially with continued exploration) are combined with those of South America, the oil re-serves in the South Atlantic region becomes an astonishing 110 billion barrels or more than 10%of the world total. To put that figure in perspective, Iran and Kuwait have reserves of 93 bbl and97 bbl respectively.The steady development of energy resources in the South Atlantic is progressively allow-ing the United States to become far less dependent on Arabian Gulf sources than it was a dec-ade ago. With that shift of energy dependence comes a shift in the energy center of gravity andso should come a shift in foreign and national military policy.Latin American policy seems to continue concentrating on narcotics as the overriding re-gional issue. The importance of South American energy resources along with the importance ofmaintaining regional stability are recognized but understated.39Mitchel, Antony E. and Wihbey, Paul M..”South Atlantic Region Emerging as New Strategic Oil Supply Flashpoint”. Oil &Gas Journal, Volume 96, Issue 26. June 29, 1998, p. 25-28.
  22. 22. 22Atlantic Equatorial Africa as new U.S. vital interest.Oil producing Atlantic Equatorial Africa (Angola, Nigeria, Gabon, Congo, Equatorial Guin-ea) will be a region containing vital U.S. interests. An increased US regional interest has oc-curred towards Africa largely as the result of increasing oil production in the region. In fact, Afri-can oil will likely replace Middle Eastern supplies to the US by 2010.40In addition to the vast oilreserves previously mentioned, two other significant factors help in characterizing the im-portance of U.S. national interest in Atlantic Equatorial Africa.First, the energy potential of that region is not going unnoticed with other world powers.For example, Congo’s fledgling oil industry, whose predominant customers are currently theU.S. and France, is courting Asian consumers. Congo has participated in sales talks with Chi-nese oil firms that are attempting to reduce their Middle East energy dependence. China is alsoa major participant in an international consortium developing oil resources in southern Sudanwhose reserves may equal that of Libya.Second, regional instability runs rampant. That has the potential to cause significant sup-ply disruptions and imperil American lives and property. The London-based International Insti-tute for Strategic Studies recently reported that the greatest danger to progress in sub-SaharanAfrica is political instability and civil unrest. The importance of regional stability in this part of theworld will continue to grow as oil discoveries expand and production levels increase.To reiterate, the South Atlantic Region, and especially Atlantic Equatorial Africa, is be-coming a vital U.S. interest since it is emerging as a new energy center of gravity. It’s alreadyclear that U.S. is changing its engagement, presence, and investment in order to cultivate thisemerging market and secure regional stability.The military dimensions of crisis response options and regional organization also had areassessment fot U.S.. Currently, the borders of the regional commanders-in-chief’s (CinC) are-as of responsibility are anything but seamless. Africa falls under the responsibility of the UnitedStates European Command (USEUCOM), while the South Atlantic Ocean falls under the re-sponsibility of United States Atlantic Command (USACOM); all of Latin America is the responsi-bility of the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).Africa has long been the unwanted stepchild of USEUCOM while USSOUTHCOM hasbeen almost totally focused on counter-narcotics operations, which is reflected in their organiza-tion and structure. USACOM has supported USEUCOM and provided intermittent presence inAtlantic Equatorial Africa through the occasional deployment of a Navy ship to “show-the-flag” inWest African ports. What is now needed is a clear and seamless organization that reflects thenew requirements of the region.Additionally, there exists a need for decisive strategy with a goal of regional stability. Im-plementing that strategy while at the same time redefining the boundaries of the CinC’s areas ofresponsibility has the potential to foster even further investment that will continue regional ener-gy development that is sure to benefit the U.S.In conclusion, the shifting energy center of gravity should in no way cause the U.S. to for-get regional friends and allies in the Persian Gulf. But, ignoring the rapidly developing econo-mies of Atlantic Equatorial Africa would be a tragic mistake that will be exploited by other worldeconomic powers. Weaning U.S. from a dependence on Middle East oil is a smart and healthy40DP&M, VCDS, Canadian Forces. “Future Security Environment-Resource Conflict”. Canadian Forces, 2004.http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda//milassess/2002/003f_e.asp
  23. 23. 23development, but there is an expense. Investment and engagement in Atlantic Equatorial Africacan be considered a challenge for policy makers and industrialists but decision seems to be tak-en.As long as political instability exists, there is an unavoidable threat to American lives andproperty. Current American strategy is based on an indecisive (low-profile) approach to a secu-rity environment that can only be characterized as volatile. New security architecture might bewished to reduce and eliminate current and potential threats to U.S. interests.Engagement and conspicuous military forward presence are essential in order to enjoythe benefits of the shift in the energy center of gravity. A seamless military area of responsibilityin the South Atlantic region with an east-west orientation vice the traditional north-south orienta-tion could promote sound and consistent focus that supports vital U.S. interests. With that inmind, one would reasonably conclude that planning as well as our perception of the importanceof policy and security strategy for the South Atlantic region requires immediate attention and ad-justment. 41A power projection spaceFar away from the main global power centers it’s clearly visible that South Atlantic is forforeign powers an easy, cheap and, so, convenient way to approach and influence over botheastern South American and western African littorals showing power by different ways sincemerit visits to gunship diplomacy or conducting power projection by the action of aircraft carriersand amphibious operations.In addition, main powers can use South Atlantic as place of forward and/or global de-ployment of information sources and military assets to gain, keep or defend the control of inter-esting zones. The law of the sea particularly allows accomplishing this function.It’s been possible to estimate for different actors a synthesis of South Atlantic strategicimportance as showed in table of Annex 3.In conclusion, the strategic importance of South Atlantic influences countries of the regionand others outside the rim. Its strategic value is based in the value of transported materials bythis ocean, the value of its renewal and not renewal resources, the importance of its accesspassages and the possibility to influence from the sea over land.SummaryThis section provided the basic frame to understand the situation in the South Atlantic Rim.Generalities of the maritime environment showed the special characteristics of the SouthAtlantic environment, especially as part of the maritime hemisphere. The South Atlantictheatre was described from a geographic and strategic point of view, identifying the dif-ferences between the littorals of South America, Africa and the Antarctic from. The mari-time environment in South Atlantic is important because of the shipping activities withimportant sea lines of communication, the resources involved and as a power projectionspace. South Atlantic Region is the New Strategic Oil Supply Flashpoint and AtlanticEquatorial Africa is a becoming a new vital interest for U.S. and a number of very im-41Mitchell, Anthony E. and Wihbey, Paul Michael, “South Atlantic Region Emerging as New Strategic Oil Supply Flash-point”, http//: www.jinsa.org
  24. 24. 24portant actors.Next section will develop the influence of international law and security in theSouth Atlantic Rim.***
  25. 25. 25SECTION 2INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SECURITY IN SOUTH ATLANTICSecurity under United Nations organization (UN)The Charter of United Nations Organization recognize the responsibility of Security Coun-cil to determine the existence of threats to the peace and to decide about actions to be taken, asfollow:“CHAPTER VII – Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of Aggression.Article 39:The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act ofaggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance withArticles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security”.42“Article 51:Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if anarmed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measuresnecessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of thisright of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect theauthority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such actionas it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security”.43But it’s very important for the goal of this paper to show how the Charter mention the con-venience of “regional arrangements” for performing “regional actions” in consistency with U.N.:“CHAPTER VIII – Regional arrangementsArticle 52:1- Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealingwith such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate forregional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with thePurposes and Principles of the United Nations.2- The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shallmake every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements orby such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.3- The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through suchregional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or byreference from the Security Council”.44The Law of the Sea ConventionThe sea services of South Atlantic Rim Nations must maintain their role in shaping globalrules and policies that affect international freedom of navigation and maritime mobility, two es-42United Nations. Charter of the United Nations. Chapter VII, Art. 39, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html43Ibid, Art. 5144Ibid, Art. 52
  26. 26. 26sential elements of U.S. naval power. The Convention codifies access and transit rights for shipsand it is a comprehensive international legal framework governing the world’s oceans.The Law of the Sea Convention is a complex document that touches on wide range ofU.S. maritime concerns. Since it was finalized in 1982, a primary U.S. interest in the Conventionhas been to preserve essential navigational freedoms and thereby enhance the mobility of U.S.naval power.The Convention supports “anybody ability to operate around the globe, anytime, any-where, allowing the navies to project power where and when needed. It guarantees, for exam-ple, that ships and aircraft may transit straits that otherwise may have been closed by the territo-rial claims of nearby states. More than 135 straits are affected, including the Magellan, in theSouth American Cone.The United States’ interest as a global naval power was behind its initial participation intalks on the Convention as the United Nations conducted negotiations from 1973 to 1982. It’spolicy makers were concerned that transit and access rights of U.S. warships could be restrictedby the rising number of claims from other nations over territorial seas, fishing zones and offshorehigh seas areas.Today, the Law of the Sea Convention helps assure access to the largest maneuverspace on the planet — the sea — under authority of widely recognized and accepted law andnot the threat of force. However, U.S. didn’t signed the Convention, yet.Much of U.S. government’s initial delay in ratification was linked to objections by many in-dustrialized countries to sections related to deep seabed mining. However, changes to the Con-vention in 1994 remedied each of the U.S. objections.Despite its advantages, the Law of the Sea Convention remains controversial because ofwidespread U.S. belief that it would adversely affect U.S. sovereignty, inhibit its intelligencegathering activities or hamper the U.S. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) through which itsforces seek to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction.Critics point to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, created to settle disputes,as a threat to U.S. sovereignty. However, parties to the Convention are free to agree on anymethod of dispute settlement they desire — and the U.S. will not select the Tribunal.Fears to U.S. that ratification would diminish its collection of intelligence are linked to asection of the Convention containing a list of activities that would deprive a vessel of the right ofinnocent passage through territorial seas. These activities include the collection of certain typesof information and the requirement that submarines navigate on the surface. However, such ac-tivity is not a violation of the Convention. Intelligence-gathering activities are not prohibited noradversely affected by the Convention.The Bush Administration’s PSI — potentially a major weapon in the global war on terror-ism — seeks the support of all nations in international efforts to board and search vessels sus-pected of transporting weapons of mass destruction.U.S. learned in Iraq that even its allies sometimes would block access to key battle areas.Freedom of navigation cannot be contingent on the approval of nations along global sea lanesand the Law of the Sea is a legal regimen for the world’s oceans that helps to guarantee world-wide mobility for naval forces. The existence of this Law is an enough reason for South AtlanticRim Countries and navies to work together.
  27. 27. 27Security as a concept of South Atlantic Rim common interestSecurity has been defined as “the absence of threats to a State-Nation”45In another way, the UN has an inter-state point of view: “a condition in which the Statesconsider that there is no risk of a military attack, political pressure or economic coercion whichwould prevent their own free development and progress”46The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) of United Nations was toldin a continued general debate that the terrorist attacks against the United States of September11th, 2001 had shown that in the current century - with security challenges increasingly compli-cated by the rapid development of science and technology and the steady deepening of eco-nomic globalization - only international cooperation could bring about real security.47In conclusion, the concept of regional, state and inter-state security, in the widest sensecan be understood as the situation resulting from the control of all threats, thereby ensuring thatthe interests of the states or groups of associated states not be negatively affected and that theobjectives that they have determined be accomplished. It depends more and more of interna-tional cooperation.The threatsWith this regard, threat is stated as “an array of circumstances which, when combined,constitute a potential factor of true damage that may, under certain circumstances, comeabout”48.Any model of current security has, at least, to consider the following threats:Basic current threats (from a “continental” point of view).- The organized crime, particularly drug trafficking or general narcotics activity, and moneylaundering, which expedites the whitening of capital that is the product of criminal activitiesand contributes to corruption.- The international terrorism mainly carried out by Muslim fundamentalist terrorist organiza-tions.- Poverty, that is a source of instability in most African and Latin American countries, which en-danger their capability to govern, therefore endangering democracy.49- Warfare between states of the region.- Foreign military interventions. 5045Nye, Joseph. “El Nuevo Poder Mundial. Actualización de la Política”. The New World Power. Updating of Politics. BuenosAires, Argentina. November 1991. 4346United Nations. “Los conceptos de Seguridad”. [The Security Concepts]. Document A/40/553. 1986. Introd. Paragraph 3,205-209.47United Nations. “New Concept Of Security Needed Following 11 September Terrorist Attack”, Fifty-sixth GeneralAssembly, First Committee, 4thMeeting (PM).48Bartolomé Mariano. “Las Amenazas Transnacionales”. [Transnational Threats] Revista Escuela Superior de GendarmeríaNacional [Journal of the Higher School of National Police], Buenos Aires, 1999.49Ros, Fernando M. (Argentine Mj.), “The Inter-American Treaty Of Reciprocal Assistance, Is It Collapsed?”,Canadian Forces College, CSC 28, Master Of Defence Studies (MDS) Thesis, p. 64-65.50Yaacov Vertzverger. “Risk Taking and Decision Making. Foreign Military Intervention Decisions”, Stanford UniversityPress, Stanford, California, USA, 1998.
  28. 28. 28Information Age Threats to Security 51Threat EffectBiological Death or debilitation of people, animals or plants on a grand scale, withattendant economic and social collapse; also, systemic paralysis throughthe contamination of critical facilities.Cyber Destruction or corruption of government or private records or controls,paralyzing critical infrastructure (water, electricity, finance, transportation,etc.), and rendering response ineffective.Nuclear Blast/heat/electro-magnetic effects on cities; military, critical infrastruc-ture, leaving tens of thousands of casualties, paralyzing the economy,and emptying cities by the threat of additional bombings.Radiological Contamination to deny critical areas and produce chaos, as governmentprevention measures prove ineffective.Chemical Local damage, significant casualties, and widespread fear as citizensrealize their vulnerability; also contamination of specific high value tar-gets.Enhanced Con-ventional Muni-tionsConventional violence (truck bombs, hijacked aircraft, etc.) designed bysize or scale to produce extraordinary effects (mass casualties, assassi-nation, etc.)c. Maritime threatsPiracy 52Piracy at sea is becoming rampant. The total number of crew killed increased to 22 from 4as compared to figures for the same period in 2003. Incidents of hijackings increased to 4 ascompared to three last year with incidents of crew being threatened increasing to 11 from 6.On this regard, piracy prone areas and warnings in Eastern South Atlantic/West Africaare: Abidjan, Conakry, Dakar, Douala, Lagos, Luanda, Onne, Tema and Warri.In Western South Atlantic/Eastern South American waters:Brasil: Belem, SantosColombia: Barranquilla.Guyana: Georgetown.Venezuela: Guanta, Puerto Cabello, Sucre.Nigeria continues to show an alarming rise in the number of attacks at sea. 53Piracy at-tacks in Nigeria are ranked second highest with 10 attacks a year. Violence against crewmem-bers continues to rise. The current report shows that 10 crewmembers were killed in Nigeria inthe first quarter of 2004.Pirates are experts at boarding even fast-moving ships at sea and capturing a tanker atsea is far easier than hijacking an aircraft. A hijacked tanker is potentially a threat to any mari-time country. A major oil spill can devastate a countrys fishing and tourism industry for years. A51Mc Intyre, Dave. “We Need to Study War Some More”, The Journal of International Security Affairs, Nº 3, Summer 2002, p.7. http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html.52International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), The World Business Organization. Http://www.iccwbo.org.html53Indonesia continues to record the highest number of attacks with 21 reported incidents in the first quarter of 2004.
  29. 29. 29cleanup operation can cost millions of dollars, an amount which poor countries can ill afford.Piracy Maps54Terrorism at seasThe International Terrorism has clearly chosen soft targets, preferable civilians, very vul-nerable, low defended, to produce the biggest number of victims, generating panic to societies,to influence over the wish of people.It’s not new and always represented a way to break the determination of competitors us-ing the terror. It was a common tactic by centuries in land environments. Since seventies lastcentury were common the air kidnapping and seizure of planes until we arrived to the catastro-phe of September 11, 2001 and the humanitarian law became very vulnerable.It’s predictable that terrorist will change the way to act and the maritime theatre has al-ready been and may increment the possibility to be the environment of next terrorist operations.As example, the attack to U.S. Destroyer COLE and, more recently, to the French oil tankerLINBURG close to Yemen, causing many dead, wounded and big material and ecologic dam-age.However, the “maritime” terrorism is less probable in high seas. The press would probablynot cover the new and the attack would loose some sense. It’s more probable that these actscould be near the coast or in the harbours. Al Qaeda would have a fleet of 15 to 50 merchantships sailing around the world under convenience flags and they could have carried explosivesused against USA embassies in Africa during 1998 and can be involved in international weap-ons commerce.The next targets could be touristy cruisers55, super oil tankers and ships with toxic sub-stances to produce ecological disasters or container ships carrying weapons of mass destruc-54ICC. http://www.iccwbo.org/ccs/news_archives/2004/images/piracy_maps_may_04/Piracy_maps_May_04.asp55A cruise ship is capable of carrying approximately 3,000 passengers and 1,000 crewmembers.Piracy and armed robbery - 1 Jan to 31 March 2004Attacks in AfricaPiracy and armed robbery - 1 Jan to 31 March 2004Attacks in Caribbean, South and Central America.
  30. 30. 30tion. Mines could be easily laid in the access of important harbours to block the commerce andgrow the panic. Offshore oil platforms, oil and gas marine pipes and oil reservoirs and petro-chemical plants can be easily attacked.Intentions of underwater attacks by “human torpedoes” and small submarines againstU.S. naval assets are commented in Gibraltar and Indonesia. “Micro-submarines” have beenfound in Colombia and there could be others in any other part of the world. All nations can beinvolved in this type of war.56The conclusion is that far away from been safer in this unipolar world, globalisation eraand multithread environment, security has to be acquired by all means and assets at sea. In themost elemental level, threats will be humans, ships, planes, submarines and any other assetthat could provide mobility, could carry people and weapons and could attack civilians or militarytargets and disrupt peace in South Atlantic. They will impose different risks.Hopefully, nobody wont see the day when navy frigates need to escort cruise shipsround-the-clock to safeguard against attacks at sea. But, short of a strong, counter-terrorism pol-icy against not only terrorist groups, but against the nations that arm and safeguard them, es-corting massive tourist ships may be the only means of defense against such attacks.Security optionsSince the creation of the State-Nations after the Peace of Westphalia, nations adoptedsecurity systems based mainly on the development of a military apparatus capable of respond-ing in last and worst instance to the threats facing them. Therefore, in most of security programsthe pre-eminence of the military factor over the remaining power factors is evident. Thus, insome way, the concept of defence has been confused with the wider concept of security, beingthe former just a mean for the consecution of the latter.With the end of the cold war and the appearance of new threats have appeared new de-signs of security models. The three main current options are:Collective security modelIt comprise a collective defence system and is based on the premise that peace may bemaintained, or war may be prevented, if a coalition of states agrees to confront an aggression bythe use of collective force as a last resort. It’s based on three principles: the identification ofcommon threats on the part of the states adopting the model, the sharing of at least one com-mon interest (for example that of maintaining peace, or a certain level of peace), and the estab-lishment of mechanisms and procedures that, in a consensual fashion, must be implementedwithout further delay.This solution can be a good solution to the security problem if:- States subordinate their interests on foreign policy to the higher interest of security offered bythe model (It is well known that interests of states rarely coincide on a permanent basis, es-pecially when the parties involved have totally diverse conditions of development, and there-fore their objectives will be different.56Delamer Guillermo,. Paper “Terrorismo en el mar, ¿un nuevo escenario?” [Terrorism at sea, ¿a new scenary?], Centro deEstudios Hemisféricos Alexis de Tocqueville [Center of Hemispheric Studies Alexis de Tocqueville],. Buenos Aires, 2004.http://www.centrotocqueville.com.ar/html
  31. 31. 31- Threats are perceived in the same way defining the degree of dangerousness with the com-mitment to assume similar risks in face of those threats and identifying the parties responsiblefor it.- Consensus is reached regarding the response required by the threat to be faced, and adoptedas such.The model has the implicit need for interstate organizations to exert some powers thatstate members in it have been delegated. It requires some transfer of state powers to interna-tional authorities, thus constituting renunciation of their sovereignty”. This model seems not to beproactive but dissuasion accomplishes this effect.In conclusion, the collective model base it’s effect by showing the challenger or the ene-my the power of a collective and stronger response persuading to act against the alliance. Thismodel shows it’s aptitude looking to a foreign threat of the region.Co-operative security modelIt’s based on the principle of transparency in the relations among the countries of the re-gion through the establishment of measures of mutual trust or Reliance Building Measures(RBM) with the purpose of preventing the immediate causes of the conflict, as well as the con-flict itself, while, at the same time, defining the mechanisms that allow for the punishment of theaggressor.This model should not be interpreted as one of Non-Offensive model, due to the fact thatit includes military, political, economic and even human factors, according to the European Or-ganization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE)57.It should include four measures:- Co-operating states have the obligation to adopt the procedures and mechanisms leading tothe construction and strengthening of mutual trust (e.g. interchange of information on defenceexpenditures, armed forces doctrinal tenets and equipment, realization of joint military exer-cises, interchange of military personnel for upgrading and training, sharing of intelligence,etc.).- Adoption of procedures designed and measures for the solution of discrepancies and disputethrough friendly agreement alone (negotiation between parties, with or without the involve-ment of third parties designated by common agreement, mediation, conciliation, and arbitra-tion).- Adoption of a mechanism that goes beyond the Inter-state relations of military nature andstrives for improvement to the relationships at the level of economic, scientific-technologicaland even political co-operation.- Lastly, it’s necessary to establish organizations that undertake permanent follow-up of coop-eration and security, ones in which all co-operation members are represented and from whichthe veracity of the adopted RBMs may be monitored.This model prevents conflicts among countries of a region in base of reliance and coop-eration to maintain the peaceful relations. 5857OSCE. “Cumbre de la Organización Para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa: La plataforma para la Seguridad Coope-rativa.” [Summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: The platform for Cooperative Security].Istambul, Turkey, November 19, 1999. (Section III).58Ros, Fernando M. “The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Is it Collapsed?, MDS Thesis, Canadian ForcesCollege, 2002, Third Section.
  32. 32. 32Security model by means of integrationThe objective pursued, whether these are political, regional or continental in nature, is theachievement and maintenance of peace.59It proposes that peace may be reached as a conse-quence of the development of measures of mutual trust and the conformation of supra-nationalentities through which part of the sovereignty of the contracting states will be delegated.In this mode, once the primary objective of maintaining peace has been obtained, the ef-fects of integration in other fields, such as economics, scientific-technology, judicial and politicalrealms, will be experienced, making it possible to maintain and strengthen the peace achieved,while also incrementing the development of the involved countries, which will ultimately act as adissuasive element against threats. 60Different intends involving countries of the South Atlantic RimIt’s possible to mention only few treaties on regional security involving countries of theSouth Atlantic Rim, as follow:The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance - TIAR61It came into effect on March 12, 1948 materializing aspirations of many American nationswith regard to the adoption of a security mechanism for the continent, as established in theagreement reached at the Inter-American Conference for Maintenance of Peace and Security ofthe Continent, which took place in Rio de Janeiro in February 1947.Article 3 of TIAR establishes in the first paragraph that “The High contracting partieshereby agree that an armed attack on the part of any State against an American State shall beconsidered an attack against all the American States, and consequently, each one of such Con-tracting Members hereby pledge to help to fight such an attack, exercising the inherent right oflegitimate individual or collective defence, as recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations”62TIAR conforms to the model of collective security and perceived threats at that time were:the possibility of a war between the contracting countries, and aggression towards the continenton part of the USSR, either by direct attack or through the diffusion of the communist ideals inthe American countries. The United States had the principle role in the definition of this lastthreat.The mechanisms determined by TIAR would not have been of use to solve the multiplesituations in which the security of the continent may have been threatened, according to the pro-visions of the treaty, because they would not apply in the case of frequent interruptions of demo-cratic governments, or because the United States acted unilaterally when it considered that itsinterests were threatened, leaving the provisions of TIAR aside or only invoking its application atthe last minute, as a way of mitigating the lack of trust of the remaining contracting parties.59Deutsch, Karl W.. The Analysis of International Relations. First Edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc, United States, 1968, p. 110-132.60Ros, Fernando M. “The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Is it Collapsed?, MDS Thesis, Canadian ForcesCollege, 2002, Third Section.61By its initials in Spanish62Organización de los Estados Americanos. “Artículo 3º del Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca”.http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tratados/b-29.html. [Organization of the American States. Article 3 of the Inter-AmericanTreaty on Reciprocal Assistance], Rio de Janeiro, February 09, 1947.

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