AODV Protocol

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AODV Protocol

  1. 1. DETECTION & PERVENTION OF BLACKHOLE ATTACK IN AODV PROTOCOL BASED MANET Guided By- Mrs. Monika Dangore. Projectees- – RANJAN MUJUMDAR – TOMY PALLISSERY – UPENDRA BANGALE – DARSHAN RATHI
  2. 2. Keywords 1. AODV - Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) 2. Blackhole 3. MANET - A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) 4. Malicious node 5. PDR – Packet delivery ratio 6. Routing protocol 7. Route Request (RREQ)
  3. 3. Keywords(cont..) 8. Route Reply (RREP) 9. Routing Table or Routing Information Base (RIB) 10. Sequences number
  4. 4. Literature Survey
  5. 5. Sr. No Title of Paper Year of pub. Conferences Idea Result Future work 1 Preventing AODV Routing Protocol from Black Hole Attack .[1] May 2011 International Journal of Engineering Science and Technology (IJEST) Large difference between the sequence number of source node or intermediate node who has sent back RREP or not to find weather it is a malicious node or not . The PDR decreases, the percentage of packets dropped increases Intend to develop simulation by the performance of the proposed solution based on the various security parameters mean delay time, packet overhead, memory usage, mobility, increasing number of malicious node, increasing number of nodes.
  6. 6. Sr. No Title of Paper Year of pub. Conferences Idea Result Future work 2 Black-Hole and Wormhole Attack in Routing Protocol AODV in MANET[2] Feb 2012 International Journal of Computer Science, Engineering and Applications (IJCSEA) Vol.2, No.1. Watchdog Mechanism During blackhole Counter of dropped packets was noticed to decreases at the node, After watchdog method implementation counter of successfully forwarded packets are been done, PDR increases at an marginal rate. Try to Improve the data security in mobile ad- hoc network.
  7. 7. Sr. No Title of Paper Year of pub. Conferences Idea Result Future work 3 Risk Mitigation of Black Hole Attack for AODV Routing Protocol[3] July- Aug. 2012 IOSR Journal of Computer Engineering (IOSRJCE) ISSN: 2278- 0661 Volume 3, Issue 3 (July-Aug. 2012), PP 12- 15 The route confirmatio n request (CREQ) and route confirmatio n reply (CREP) to avoid the black hole attack. Presence of malicious node is Detected and protect the network from degradation. PDR increases, End to end delay decreases, throughput increases. Try and reduces the Time delay, much network overheads because of newly introduced packets.
  8. 8. Sr. No Title of Paper Year of pub. Conferences Idea Result Future work 4 Simulation of AODV under Black hole Attack in MANET [4] Feb 2012 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering Research Paper Source sends a spoof packet to the destination For detecting malicious node. Packet Delivery Ratio increases, Average end to end delivery increases. Incase of blackhole - In AODV the packet delivery ratio is reduced to 80%. After prevention - There is nearly 21% increase in PDR . Try and increase prevention during a blackhole and to improve data security.
  9. 9. Sr. No Title of Paper Year of pub. Conferences Idea Result Future work 5 Performance Analysis of Aodv Protocol under Black Hole Attack [5] Aug- 2011 International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 2, Issue 8 1 ISSN 2229- 5518 Route discovery packet method The performance of the network is decreased. The PDR and Throughput of the network has decreased drastically. Try to improve the performance in later Stages.
  10. 10. Sr. No Title of Paper Year of pub. Conferences Idea Result Future work 6 Black Hole Detection in MANET Using AODV Routing Protocol. [6] Jan- 2012 International Journal of Soft Computing and Engineering (IJSCE) Using promiscuous mode of the node. The throughput of network is decreased, proposed algorithm giving the good throughput with black hole attack. End to End delay decreases. Propose a more feasible solution to detect the black hole attack.
  11. 11. Sr. No Title of Paper Year of pub. Conferences Idea Result Future work 7 Securing and Preventing AODV Routing Protocol from Black Hole Attack using Counter Algorithm[7] July - 2012 International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT) Vol. 1 Issue 5, ISSN: 2278-0181 Counter algorithm or prior Receive- Reply algorithm Significant improvement of packet delivery ratio (PDR) and an average End- to-End delay. Try to improve the performance in later Stages.
  12. 12. Sr. No Title of Paper Year of pub. Conferences Idea Result Future work 8 Discovering a Secure Path in MANET by Avoiding Black/Gray Holes [8] August 2012 Internationa l Journal of Recent Technology and Engineering (IJRTE) ISSN: 2277-3878, Volume-1, Issue-3 Large difference between the sequence number of source node or intermediate node who has sent back RREP or not to find weather it is a malicious node or not . Using OPNET. Increase in number of nodes Lesser the End to End, greater the PDR and Throughput. Try to improve performance s with less number of nodes.
  13. 13. Sr. No Title of Paper Year of pub. Location Idea Result Future work 9 Detection and Prevention from Black Hole attack in AODV protocol for MANET.[9] July 2012 International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 – 8887) Volume 50 – No.5, Adding an IDS node to AODV protocol. During blackhole attack- PDR is only 0.14%. Used IDS_AODV in the same network, the packet delivery fractioned is increased up to 99 %. Extended to other proactive and reactive routing protocols. We can also extend this research to secure routing protocols against other attacks such as Wormhole attack, Jellyfish attack etc.
  14. 14. Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing 010010101001010111100100101001001010001010101101010 101010101010101010101010101010101010101011001010011 101001010101010101010101010101010101010101101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010 10101 010101 101010 11110011 101 1001 100 01010101010101010 100101111000100100 10101010101000001 1111100110101010 11101101001111101010111010011010101010100101010100 101010010101010110101010000010100000101101111111010 101001010100100101111110101100110010100110100100100
  15. 15. When/Why do we need AODV? • Basically when there is one node that wants to communicate with another node that is not in range, it finds a route through other nodes. In the example below node 1 is not in range with node 3, so it simply talks to node 3 through node 2. Node 1 Node 2 Node 3
  16. 16. How does it work? • AODV Routing works by using Route Request Messages (RREQ) and Route Reply Messages (RREP). If a node is not in range with a node that it wants to talk to, it sends a RREQ to its neighbors. The RREQ contains source IP address and sequence number, and destination IP address and sequence number, as well as the life span of the RREQ. If a neighbor of the source doesn’t know a route to the destination, it rebroadcasts the RREQ. If a neighbor does know a route to the destination, it sends a RREP back to the source. Below, Node 1 is trying to talk to node 5. Node 3 Node 2 Node 1 Node 4 Node 5 RREQRREQ RREQ RREP
  17. 17. How does it work? continued • As seen in the last slide, node 4 had a route to node 5, so it sent node 1 a RREP. Once node 1 receives the RREP, it notes the route to node 5 and sends the packet on that route. • SUCCESS!! NODE 5 received the packet. Node 1 Node 4 Node 5 RREQ RREP Packet Packet
  18. 18. Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 RREQ RREP Now we can see it all in action!
  19. 19. Flooding for Control Packet Delivery - Example Y Z B A H S E C G I F M L J D K N Represents a node that has received packet P Represents that connected nodes are within each other’s transmission range 4-13
  20. 20. Flooding for Control Packet Delivery Y Broadcast transmission Z B A H S E C G I F M L J D K N Represents a node that receives packet P for the first time Represents transmission of packet P 4-14
  21. 21. Flooding for Control Packet Delivery Y Z B A H S E C G I F M L J D K N  Node H receives packet P from two neighbors: potential for collision 4-15
  22. 22. Flooding for Control Packet Delivery Y Z B A H S E C G I F M L J D K N  Node C receives packet P from G and H, but does not forward it again, because node C has already forwarded packet P once 4-16
  23. 23. Flooding for Control packet Delivery Y Z B A H S E C G I F M L J D K N  Nodes J and K both broadcast packet P to node D  Since nodes J and K are hidden from each other, their transmissions may collide => Packet P may not be delivered to node D at all, despite the use of flooding 4-17
  24. 24. Flooding for Control Packet Delivery Y Z B A H S E C G I F M L J D K N  Node D does not forward packet P, because node D is the intended destination of packet P 4-18
  25. 25. Flooding for Control Packet Delivery Y Z B A H  Flooding completed S E C G I F M L J D K N  Nodes unreachable from S do not receive packet P (e.g., node Z)  Nodes for which paths go through the destination D also do not receive packet P (example: node N) 4-19
  26. 26. Flooding for Control Packet Delivery Y Z B A H S E C G I F M L J D K N  Flooding may deliver packets to too many nodes (in the worst case, all nodes reachable from sender may receive the packet) 4-20
  27. 27. • AODV is a packet routing protocol designed for use in mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) • Intended for networks that may contain thousands of nodes • One of a class of demand-driven protocols • Each node maintains a routing table that contains information about reaching destination nodes. AODV Overview
  28. 28. • The basic message set consists of: – RREQ – Route request – RREP – Route reply – RERR – Route error – HELLO – For link status monitoring Overview (continued)
  29. 29. • RREQ Messages – A RREQ message is broadcasted when a node needs to discover a route to a destination. – The RREQ also contains the most recent sequence number for the destination. – A valid destination route must have a sequence number at least as great as that contained in the RREQ. AODV Operation – Message Types
  30. 30. RREQ Message B? B? B? B? B? B? B? B A
  31. 31. • RREP Messages – When a RREQ reaches a destination node, the destination route is made available by unicasting a RREP back to the source route. – A node generates a RREP if: • It is itself the destination. • It has an active route to the destination. – As the RREP propagates back to the source node, intermediate nodes update their routing tables (in the direction of the destination node). AODV Operation – Message Types
  32. 32. RREP Message B A A A A A A A
  33. 33. Route Error Message: RERR are used mainly when nodes get moved around and connections are lost. If a node receives a RERR, it deletes all routes associated with the new error. Error messages are sent when a route becomes invalid, or if it cannot communicate with one of its neighbors. AODV Operation – Message Types
  34. 34. • HELLO Message:These are simple messages that nodes send at certain time intervals to all its neighbors to let them know that it is still there. If a node stops receiving hello messages from one of its neighbors, it knows that any routes through that node no longer exist. AODV Operation – Message Types
  35. 35. Message routing A B D F C G E RREQ RREQ RREQ RREQ RREQ RREQ RREQ RREQ RREQ RREP RREP RREP Source Destination
  36. 36. 36 RREQ Format • Type: 1 • J: Join flag (reserved for multicast); R: Repair flag (for multicast)
  37. 37. 37 • G: Gratuitous RREP flag; indicates whether a gratuitous RREP should be unicast to the node specified in the Destination IP Address field • Hop Count: The number of hops from the Source IP Address to the node handling the request • Broadcast ID: A sequence number uniquely identifying the particular RREQ when taken in conjunction with the source node's IP address. • Destination IP Address: The IP address of destination for which a route is desired. • Destination Sequence Number: The last sequence number received in the past by the source for any route towards the destination. • Source IP Address: The IP address of the node which originated the Route Request. • Source Sequence Number: The current sequence number to be used for route entries pointing to (and generated by) the source of the route request.
  38. 38. 38 RREP Format • Lifetime: The time for which nodes receiving the RREP consider the route to be valid.
  39. 39. • There are two phases – Route Discovery. – Route Maintenance. • Each node maintains a routing table with knowledge about the network. • AODV deals with route table management. • Route information maintained even for short lived routes – reverse pointers. AODV Routing
  40. 40. • Broadcast RREQ messages. • Intermediate nodes update their routing table • Forward the RREQ if it is not the destination. • Maintain back-pointer to the originator. • Destination generates RREP message. • RREP sent back to source using the reverse pointer set up by the intermediate nodes. • RREP reaches source, communication starts. Discovery
  41. 41. • Hello messages broadcast by active nodes periodically HELLO_INTERVAL. • No hello message from a neighbor in DELETE_PERIOD, link failure identified. • A local route repair to that next hop initiated. • After a timeout ,error propagated both to originator and destination. • Entries based on the node invalidated. Maintenance
  42. 42. Error Messages RERR • RERR are used mainly when nodes get moved around and connections are lost. If a node receives a RERR, it deletes all routes associated with the new error. Error messages are sent either when a message (not RREQ or RREP) is sent to a node that has no route to the destination, or when a route becomes invalid, or if it cannot communicate with one of its neighbors.
  43. 43. • AODV route discovery latency is high • AODV lacks an efficient route maintenance technique • AODV lacks support for high throughput routing metrics Limitation of AODV protocol
  44. 44. It gets complicated! • Things get much more complicated with many nodes. This is because nodes have many neighbors so RREQ get rebroadcasted a lot! That’s why sequence numbers and life spans are so key.
  45. 45. 45 RERR Format • N: No delete flag; set when a node has performed a local repair of a link, and upstream nodes should not delete the route.
  46. 46. Second International Conference on Security in Computer Networks and Distributed Systems (snds- 2014),THIRUVANANTAPURAM  Conference Date March 13 -14, 2014 International Conference on Communication Network and Computing(CNC),CHENNAI  Conference Date: Feb 21-22, 2014 Conferences Where We Plan To Participate In
  47. 47. MONTHLY PROJECT MANAGEMENT Completed To be completed Not started #DAY S Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec LITERATURE SURVEY 165 days      LITERATURE SURVEY ON MANET 15 days       LITERATURE SURVEY ON AODV Protocol 23 days       LITERATURE SURVEY ON BLACKHOLE ATTACKS 15 days       Study of NS-2 15 days      IMPLEMENATATION OF SIMPLE DATA TRANSMISSION PROGRAM 27 days      PAPER WRITING AND PUBLISHING IN VARIOUS CONFERENCES 70 days     Start EndToday 2013 GANTT CHART Entire Lifespan of the Project 15th Jul Dec 2013 8th Aug. 23rd Aug 7th Sept. 14th Oct.
  48. 48. References. [1] Jiwen CAI, Ping YI, Jialin CHEN “Preventing AODV Routing Protocol from Black Hole Attack .”,MAY 2011 24th IJEST. [2] Songbai Lu, Longxuan Li, Kwok-Yan, Lingyan Jia “Black-Hole and Wormhole Attack in Routing Protocol AODV in MANET”,FEB 2012 [3] “Risk Mitigation of Black Hole Attack for AODV Routing Protocol” China JULY AUG 2012, IOSR Journal of Computer Engineering (IOSRJCE) ISSN: 2278-0661 Volume 3, Issue 3 (July-Aug. 2012), PP 12-15 [4] “Simulation of AODV under Black hole Attack in MANET” International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering Research Paper FEB 2012 [5] Weerasinghe.H. “Performance Analysis of Aodv Protocol under Black Hole Attack ”, International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 2, Issue 8 1 ISSN 2229-5518 AUG 2011 [6] Dokurer .S, Y. M. Erten , Can Erkin Acar “Black Hole Detection in MANET Using AODV Routing Protocol.”, International Journal of Soft Computing and Engineering (IJSCE) ,JAN 2012 [7] Deng, H., Li, W. “Agrawal, D., "Securing and Preventing AODV Routing Protocol from Black Hole Attack using Counter Algorithm” International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT)Vol. 1 Issue 5, ISSN:2278-0181, JULY 2012 [8] K. Lakshmi1, S.Manju Priya2 A.Jeevarathinam3 K.Rama4, K.Thilagam5, Lecturer, Dept. of Computer Applications, Karpagam University, Coimbatore.” Discovering a Secure Path in MANET by Avoiding Black/Gray Holes “, International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT)Vol. 1 Issue 5, ISSN: 2278-0181,AUG 2012 [9] Ming- Yang Su, Kun- Lin Chiang, Wei Cheng Liao. “Detection and Prevention from Black Hole attack in AODV protocol for MANET.”, International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 – 8887) Volume 50 – No.5, JULY 2012

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