Project Management in Action ~in Afghanistan<br />Daniel Harmuth, PMP<br />Lieutenant Colonel in U.S. Army Reserves<br />C...
Mission<br />My mission in Afghanistan during my deployment from June 2009 through Feb 2010 was to mentor and oversee the ...
5/20/2009<br />unclassified<br />3<br />Basic Warrior Training (BWT)<br />Mission // Mission Essential Task<br />Mission<b...
Detachment Locations<br />May 28 2009<br />UNCLASSIFIED-FOUO<br />4<br />Mazar E Sharif<br />Herat<br />KMTC<br />Darulama...
5/20/2009<br />unclassified<br />5<br />CENTCOM<br />Gen Petraeus<br />SHAPE<br />Gen Craddock<br />Gen         <br />USFO...
5/20/2009<br />unclassified<br />6<br />KMTC Mentor Group<br />CSTC-A<br />TF Phoenix<br />ANATC<br />CTAG<br />NCO<br />T...
5/20/2009<br />unclassified<br />7<br />KMTC Aerial<br />To Ranges<br />& Tng Areas<br />KMTC<br />Contonement Area<br />C...
Mission<br />Early in the mission, we were given the task (project) to increase the capacity of training such that we coul...
Project Management Knowledge Areas Used<br /><ul><li>Quality Management
Human Resource Management
Communications Management
Manage Stakeholders
Risk Management
Procurement Management
Implementation
Project Charter
Scope Statement
WBS
Scope Control
Activity Resource Estimating
Schedule Development
Cost Management</li></li></ul><li>Project Charter<br />Operations order from Higher HQ (Combined Security Transition Comma...
Project Charter<br />“a document that formally authorizes a project.” <br />The project charter addresses important aspect...
Project Charter<br />Operations order from Higher HQ (Combined Security Transition Command /  NATO Training Mission - Army...
Scope Statement<br />Inclusions:<br /><ul><li>Worked through various scenarios to solve the mission requirements.  Found t...
Identify base capacity growth requirements for KMTC, Herat, MeS, Khwost, and Darulaman Training Center to maximize trainin...
Identify Resources to include equipment
Identify ANA Leadership involvement to buy into the plan</li></li></ul><li>Horse Blanket<br />May 28 2009<br />UNCLASSIFIE...
Scope Statement<br />Challenges:<br /><ul><li>Improve already bad living conditions for trainees
Improve already low ANA leadership numbers and performance
Improve training results in face of shortened schedule</li></li></ul><li>WBS Development<br /><ul><li>Generated a WBS in M...
New Kandahar RBWT WBS<br />
WBS Development (cont.)<br /><ul><li>Reviewed with higher HQ and project team
Turned into a spreadsheet of tasks and responsibilities as the higher HQ staff could not understand the WBS</li></li></ul>...
Recruiting ballooned after the MoD increased the salary of ANA, and also after Ramazan</li></li></ul><li>Activity Resource...
Quarters
Mess Halls
Ranges
Equipment
Uniforms and Initial issue equipment
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Project Management in Action in Afghanistan

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How we used Project Management in increasing the Army Soldier Basic Training capacity in 2009 to 2010. I commanded a Detachment of U.S. Army Drill SGTs that mentored the Basic Training of the Afghan National Army. We had 5 training locations across Afghanistan.

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  • I was mobilized in March 2009 to head up a detachment of Army Drill SGTs to oversee and mentor the Afghan Army Basic Warrior Training. This is an enduring mission of my USAR Division since 2005.
  • Explain mission at KMTC and 5 remote locations.
  • In one way or another, we used these PMI Knowledge areas to take on our new taking.Some may have been used formally, and some informally. I’ll illustrate this as we go on.
  • In the military we receive an Operations Order that is similar to a Project Charter.Project Charter Definition (click for transition)As the Project Charter authorized a project, an Operations Order signed by the Commanding General give authorization, priority of support, vision, leadership, communication, time frames, and other information.
  • In the military we receive an Operations Order that is similar to a Project Charter.Project Charter Definition (click for transition)As the Project Charter authorized a project, an Operations Order signed by the Commanding General give authorization, priority of support, vision, leadership, communication, time frames, and other information.
  • Based on the direction given in the OO, we had to go and determine the real scope behind the “Broad Brush” scope statements.
  • This is a abstract of the planning spreadsheet of training classes by dates and locations that is synchronized with other operations: - Build Leadership - Unit leadership trainingUnit equipment fieldingUnit collective trainingTransporting new units to duty locations
  • In the midst of pulling back the onion skins of developing scope, we uncovered many challenges.Many of these seemed so daunting that we were not sure the mission could be accomplished in the time frame and resource allotted.Attrition rate was 25%Cadre fills were so low we could barely complete the current mission
  • We developed a WBS (Ghannt Chart) based on locations, facilities to increase/improve, leadership to develop,
  • I took this to the higher HQ staff (logistics and Engineer) to discuss what needed to happen and when, based on the WBS.Because the Higher HQ staff did not have a PM background they did not want to take the time to learn how a WBS worked. These were British, French and American Officers.Thus, I turned it into a spreadsheet to brief in my meeting with the General.
  • During the process of construction to increase capacity, the Recruiting Command initiated a signing bonus and increased the salary of all soldier ranks. This quickly ballooned the recruiting numbers and Recruiting Command had thousands of recruits in holding areas waiting for Basic Training.
  • Estimating how long it would take to perform these tasks when we have not down these repetitively in any location in Afghanistan.Local contractors were all different in each area.We had troubles getting the current quantities of equipment to remote bases, so doubling the quantities was a concern, along with vendors that could not guarantee delivery….
  • Our main schedule was based on the long pole in the tent, which was facility increase construction.Higher HQ completed their project schedule and briefed to the General before they secured contractors to work on the projects. By the time the contractors were secured, scheduled were already behind, and the typical response from them as to if they could complete on time was “In Shala”…Culture to never say “no”…
  • As the plan was briefed by Higher HQ before the details came in, the budgets were too low. The issue with people that did not have to execute on the ground making the final plans.My predecessor went around the country to our various training locations and determined the resource requirements, but after I reviewed it and our mission, I figured his estimates were 50% too light. This created issues in budgets, allotting new positions for ANA Leadership and Cadre, and also U.S. Mentors. Cost over runs were a norm.
  • Relating back to my predecessor defining resources:I was told he did not develop these with the Afghan Counterparts.We told the Afghan Leadership to develop their personnel resource requirements and we also did the same. We set-up meetings to review theirs together……By doing this we gained their trust as we wanted to hear what they wanted and they were more open to our suggestions. They also accompanied us when we had to argue with Higher HQ for the 50% more ANA personnel.The next slides are an example of what I briefed the General regularly.
  • This slide was to display the sheer lack of ANA Cadre we had…Pay attention to the “Short” in the last column.
  • Percentages were “Short”
  • This was our synchronization plan to generate ANA Cadre…. Which was not the preferred method, but maybe the only one which would work due to corruption in the Corps.
  • Early planning meeting with Coalition Partners and Staffs were without the ANA.How to make the plan “their plan”.Even though we think we control the military progress, we had to beg to get ANA MoD to issue a Directive, as the ANA would not do anything without it.
  • Some of our Higher HQ staff would think that because the developed a plan, the ANA would follow it.We had to brief and get each level of Commander. This would have been easier for the NTM-A Commander to get MoD to issue the Directive at the beginning.Because this would affect each local Commander, I had to travel around and get each to by into the plan so they would actually execute it once the recruits started to come, and training schedules changed, etc.
  • Needless to say, everything in Afghanistan involved Risk, aside from IEDs and being shot at.We used 3 of the 6 PMBOK Risk Mgt processesWith everything being constant or the same as previous years with seasonal changes in recruiting, we all knew that we only had a slim chance of everything aligning and the facilities being ready, recruits to fill capacity, and enough Cadre.We also identified intra-country transportation as an issue.
  • For Risk Monitoring, we had weekly meeting across Kabul at our Higher HQ or at NTM-A to include all staff members from multiple commandsEngineersLogisticsRecruitingTrainingPersonnelMurphy’s Law
  • Procurement management was managed at our Higher HQ (CTAG-A), and was literally a dumpster fire:Contracts were being let without us validating the requirementsContractors identified previously were getting engaged in other construction projects by other US Army CommandsHigher HQ contracts officer went on 3 weeks leave, then was relieved of logistics dutiesEveryone wanted to wash their hands of the contracts in the endWe sent 2 Drill SGTS to assist, and then everyone acted as though they were respon..
  • In the end, everything happened as most U.S. Military operations, “not according to plan”:Remote base facilities were getting completed not in the planned order…re-route recruits…New ANA Cadre were being assigned, but those Officers either failed to report or did not exist. Took weeks to deconflict…. Kandahar base was so off schedule, that we ahd to accept the class of 1400 recruits in Kabul at KMTC in the new base gym that didn’t have the showers working yet..Recruiting was so full, Higher HQ just started shipping recruits to remote based to hold for a while until official class dates.
  • The pushed implementation schedules of the remote base facilities started to converge on another major event – our Detachment’s impending RIPTOA.In the end, facilities were livable for the additional recruits, equipment started to arrive, Cadre started to appear out of nowhere from MoD (albeit wrong ranks), OCIE was shipping and arrive un-disturbed in containers.We were still scrambling to fix issues like inoperative showers, Cadre, vehicle shortages or going to the wrong command, new Command and Control structure for RBWTs BUT……I got a surprise Facebook notification on Aug 10, 2010….
  • Project Management in Action in Afghanistan

    1. 1. Project Management in Action ~in Afghanistan<br />Daniel Harmuth, PMP<br />Lieutenant Colonel in U.S. Army Reserves<br />Commander, Detachment 45<br />NATO Training Mission - Army<br />Technology Services Manager<br />Kern County Sheriff ‘s Office<br />
    2. 2. Mission<br />My mission in Afghanistan during my deployment from June 2009 through Feb 2010 was to mentor and oversee the Basic Warrior Training of the Afghan National Army (ANA).<br />Commander of a Detachment of 32 U.S. Army Drill Sergeants and 40 contractors.<br />
    3. 3. 5/20/2009<br />unclassified<br />3<br />Basic Warrior Training (BWT)<br />Mission // Mission Essential Task<br />Mission<br />To instruct new soldiers in Basic, AIT & CTX and train them to high military morals, so they can rescue the Afghan people by fighting the enemies of Afghanistan and the Insurgency.<br />METL <br />Provide Command and Control<br />Plan and Conduct Individual Institutional Training to ANATC Standards<br />Evaluate Institutional Training<br />Support and Sustain Institutional Training<br />Purpose…<br />Establish ANA primacy through training every ANA Soldier on basic Infantry skills first<br />Drill Sergeants: Build the future of ANA strength through a comprehensive drill sergeant school<br />Remote Basic Warrior Training: Manage regional programs and MTTs country-wide to support ANA doctrine and standards<br />Oversee an effective program to transition from Warsaw Pact weapons to NATO weapons<br />Concentrate on overall improvement of basic rifle marksmanship<br />10 Week Course<br />
    4. 4. Detachment Locations<br />May 28 2009<br />UNCLASSIFIED-FOUO<br />4<br />Mazar E Sharif<br />Herat<br />KMTC<br />Darulaman<br />Khwost<br />Kandahar<br />
    5. 5. 5/20/2009<br />unclassified<br />5<br />CENTCOM<br />Gen Petraeus<br />SHAPE<br />Gen Craddock<br />Gen <br />USFOR-A <br />McChrystal<br /> COMISAF<br />CSTC-A<br />MG Formica<br />Pol-Mil<br />BG Wolters<br />DCOMISAF<br />Lt Gen Dutton<br />DCG<br />BG Ierardi<br />ANA Dev<br />BG Wynnyk<br />ANP Dev<br />Col Yackley<br />ISC<br />BG Gorecki<br />DATES<br />BG Bingol<br />CTAG <br />Brigadier<br />Baverstock<br />CAPTF<br />BG Givhan<br />CJTF Phoenix<br />BG Huber<br />CJ1<br />HQ CTAG<br />Col Smailes<br />CJ2<br />ARSIC (C)<br />201 Corps<br />CJ3<br /> ARSIC(E)<br />203 Corps<br />CJ4<br />CFC<br />CJ5<br /> ARSIC(S)<br />205 Corps<br />ADU<br /> RC(N)<br />CJ6<br />Log Sch<br /> ARSIC(W)<br />207 Corps<br />CJ7<br /> RC(E)<br />NMAA<br />CJ8<br /> ARSIC(N)<br />209 Corps<br />CGSC/SOSC<br /> RC(S)<br />KMHS<br /> ARSIC(K)<br />Capital Division<br />CTC-A<br /> RC(W)<br />Coordination<br />KMTC<br />ETTs<br />OMLTs<br />
    6. 6. 5/20/2009<br />unclassified<br />6<br />KMTC Mentor Group<br />CSTC-A<br />TF Phoenix<br />ANATC<br />CTAG<br />NCO<br />Training Bde<br />S3<br />S2<br />S1<br />TM LDR CS<br />S6<br />S5<br />S4<br />PSG CS<br />CJA<br />Sr SGT CS<br />Officer<br />Training Bde<br />Basic Warrior<br />Training Bde<br />Garrison<br />Adv Combat<br />Training Bde<br /> KCC<br /> CCC<br /> MIC<br /> OCS<br /> BOTC<br />1st Kandak<br />MP<br />Combat Arms<br />2nd Kandak<br />Facilities<br />Combat<br />Support<br />G Coy<br />1 Coy<br />3rd Kandak<br />K Coy<br />2 Coy<br />Medical<br />Combat<br />Service Support<br />4th Kandak<br />M Coy<br />3 Coy<br />DFAC<br />HVY WPNS<br />5th Kandak<br />X Coy<br />Transport<br />Maintenance<br />Logistics<br />Signal<br />Engineer<br />Artillery<br />Mortars<br />Infantry<br />Remote BWT<br />Y Coy<br />RECON<br />Remote BWT<br />Remote BWT<br />P Coy<br />Remote BWT<br />Remote BWT<br />
    7. 7. 5/20/2009<br />unclassified<br />7<br />KMTC Aerial<br />To Ranges<br />& Tng Areas<br />KMTC<br />Contonement Area<br />Camp Invicta<br />(ISAF)<br />Camp<br />Alamo<br />Camp Warehouse (ISAF)<br />
    8. 8. Mission<br />Early in the mission, we were given the task (project) to increase the capacity of training such that we could increase the ANA from a 80,000 man army to 134,000 strong by Oct 2010.<br />
    9. 9. Project Management Knowledge Areas Used<br /><ul><li>Quality Management
    10. 10. Human Resource Management
    11. 11. Communications Management
    12. 12. Manage Stakeholders
    13. 13. Risk Management
    14. 14. Procurement Management
    15. 15. Implementation
    16. 16. Project Charter
    17. 17. Scope Statement
    18. 18. WBS
    19. 19. Scope Control
    20. 20. Activity Resource Estimating
    21. 21. Schedule Development
    22. 22. Cost Management</li></li></ul><li>Project Charter<br />Operations order from Higher HQ (Combined Security Transition Command / NATO Training Mission - Army).<br />Similar to Project Charter as there are strategic dependencies.<br />Tasked to define resources and plan to achieve results<br />
    23. 23. Project Charter<br />“a document that formally authorizes a project.” <br />The project charter addresses important aspects of a project, and can be linked to all nine knowledge areas that are listed in the PMBOK<br />May 28 2009<br />UNCLASSIFIED-FOUO<br />11<br />
    24. 24. Project Charter<br />Operations order from Higher HQ (Combined Security Transition Command / NATO Training Mission - Army).<br />Similar to Project Charter as there are strategic dependencies.<br />Tasked to define resources and plan to achieve results<br />
    25. 25. Scope Statement<br />Inclusions:<br /><ul><li>Worked through various scenarios to solve the mission requirements. Found that with current or projected resources and base improvement schedules and current ANA recruiting numbers, and ANA retention %, that it was theoretically unattainable.
    26. 26. Identify base capacity growth requirements for KMTC, Herat, MeS, Khwost, and Darulaman Training Center to maximize training output
    27. 27. Identify Resources to include equipment
    28. 28. Identify ANA Leadership involvement to buy into the plan</li></li></ul><li>Horse Blanket<br />May 28 2009<br />UNCLASSIFIED-FOUO<br />14<br />
    29. 29. Scope Statement<br />Challenges:<br /><ul><li>Improve already bad living conditions for trainees
    30. 30. Improve already low ANA leadership numbers and performance
    31. 31. Improve training results in face of shortened schedule</li></li></ul><li>WBS Development<br /><ul><li>Generated a WBS in MS Project for a new base in Kandahar and also increasing the other 4 bases (Heart, MeS, Khowst, and Darulaman)</li></li></ul><li>RBWT Expansion WBS<br />
    32. 32. New Kandahar RBWT WBS<br />
    33. 33. WBS Development (cont.)<br /><ul><li>Reviewed with higher HQ and project team
    34. 34. Turned into a spreadsheet of tasks and responsibilities as the higher HQ staff could not understand the WBS</li></li></ul><li>Scope Control<br /><ul><li>Our main concern was to control when an increase of recruits would be pushed to what bases
    35. 35. Recruiting ballooned after the MoD increased the salary of ANA, and also after Ramazan</li></li></ul><li>Activity Resource Estimating<br /><ul><li>Estimating how quickly facilities could be built on the various bases with Afghan local contractors:
    36. 36. Quarters
    37. 37. Mess Halls
    38. 38. Ranges
    39. 39. Equipment
    40. 40. Uniforms and Initial issue equipment
    41. 41. Transportation of recruits above current capabilities </li></li></ul><li>Schedule Development<br /><ul><li>Based on estimates of when facilities could be ready
    42. 42. Completed before contractors and building resources could be secured/identified
    43. 43. Afghan local contractors tell you what you want to hear; their culture is to never say no</li></li></ul><li>Cost Management<br />All new resources (ANA Leadership, Trainers and Drill SGTs) had to fit within previous budgeted amount before this mission was communicated <br />New Kandahar base had to fit within an estimate by the previous team that did not have the full mission requirements nor the foresight on what is needed <br />
    44. 44. Quality Management<br /><ul><li>Afghan local contractors
    45. 45. Lack of quality building supplies in theatre
    46. 46. Initial Issue Equipment vendors could not increase production in time
    47. 47. Higher HQ re-organized various ancillary teams in the same locations to oversee construction
    48. 48. BWT Mentors sent to Kandahar to oversee building of new training base
    49. 49. Army Corp of Engineers changed electrical standards mid-stream</li></li></ul><li>Human Resource Management<br /><ul><li>Define resources for:
    50. 50. the Afghan Army Trainers, Drill SGTs, Officer requirements
    51. 51. Coalition Mentors
    52. 52. Reporting Structure
    53. 53. Proposed Plan to Generate ANA Staff</li></li></ul><li>Aug 10 2009<br />BWT/RBWT<br />Increase ANA to 134K by Oct 2010<br />(updated 12 Aug 2009)<br />LTC Daniel Harmuth<br />UNCLASSIFIED-FOUO<br />26<br />
    54. 54. BWTShortages of Instructors to Taskiel 1389a<br />
    55. 55. BWTShortages of Drill SGTs to Taskiel 1389a<br />
    56. 56. RBWT/BWT Sync Matrix – Increase Instructors and Drill SGTs<br />Aug 10 2009<br />29<br />UNCLASSIFIED-FOUO<br />
    57. 57. RBWT/BWT Sync Matrix – ANA/Camp/Mentors<br />
    58. 58. Communications Management<br /><ul><li>Plan meetings and correspondence with Coalition partners
    59. 59. Plan to bring the ANA in to make it their plan
    60. 60. Translations to Dari
    61. 61. Briefing ANA General Staff
    62. 62. Get ANA MoD to issue Directive for mission
    63. 63. Working at ground level to get the ANA to turn it into “their plan”</li></li></ul><li>Manage Stakeholders<br /><ul><li>Coalition Partners
    64. 64. ANA Ministry of Defense
    65. 65. ANA Corp Commander
    66. 66. ANA General Staff at Training Commands
    67. 67. ANA Command Staff at KMTC
    68. 68. New RMTC Commanders & Staff</li></li></ul><li>Risk Management<br /><ul><li>Risk Identification
    69. 69. Lack of recruits to fill the capacity
    70. 70. Lack of facilities built on-time
    71. 71. Lack of ANA instructors and Cadre
    72. 72. Risk Response Planning
    73. 73. Pay raises
    74. 74. Alternate facilities, tents, contract food
    75. 75. U.S. Forces integrate with training</li></li></ul><li>Risk Management (cont.)<br /><ul><li>Risk Monitoring and Control
    76. 76. Weekly tracking of indicators (priority, impact)
    77. 77. Weekly tracking of contracted construction
    78. 78. Murphy’s Law
    79. 79. Supply convoys attacked
    80. 80. Construction supply convoys looted
    81. 81. Corp of Engineers changed electrical codes to NEC standards in middle of construction
    82. 82. Recruiting surged to the point where classes were overfilled to 150%
    83. 83. Cadre and Leadership fills were last minute at best</li></li></ul><li>Procurement Management<br /><ul><li>CJ4, CSTC-A
    84. 84. Local Afghan Contracting
    85. 85. Corp of Engineers
    86. 86. Coalition Supply channels
    87. 87. Contracts handled at J4, CTAG-A and CJ4, CSTC-A (NTM-A)
    88. 88. Drill SGT on ground in Kandahar monitoring contractors, and uncovering fraud</li></li></ul><li>Implementation<br /><ul><li>Phased expansion by base
    89. 89. Movement of new Cadre & Trainers to remote locations
    90. 90. Kandahar base construction delayed, so scheduled class was conducted at KMTC in Gym with leadership for KAH, but KMTC equipment
    91. 91. Recruits were shipped to bases even before we knew they were ready</li></li></ul><li>Post-Implementation<br />Weekly assessments<br />Corrective actions<br />May 28 2009<br />UNCLASSIFIED-FOUO<br />37<br />
    92. 92. May 28 2009<br />UNCLASSIFIED-FOUO<br />38<br />
    93. 93. Humanitarian Assistance Missions<br /><ul><li>Biggest satisfaction was on occasional HA missions to local villages </li></li></ul><li>Questions<br />May 28 2009<br />UNCLASSIFIED-FOUO<br />40<br />
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