FM 3-0
OPERATIONS
FEBRUARY 2008
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
HEADQUAR...
*Foreword
Change 1 of FM 3-0 reflects our intention to take advantage of a “Campaign of Learning” across our Army to
adapt...
FM 3-0, C1
Change No. 1 Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 22 February 2011
Operations
1. Change 1 to FM ...
PIN: 079091-001
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.
General, United St...
*FM 3-0, C1
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes...
Contents
ii FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011
Combined Arms .......................................................................
Contents
22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 iii
Figure 4-1. The elements of combat power............................................
Contents
iv FM 3-0, C1 23 February 2011
Tables
Table 1-1. Areas of joint interdependence.....................................
22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 v
Preface
FM 3-0 is one of the Army’s two capstone doctrinal publications; the other is FM 1, ...
Preface
vi FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011
of informed vision across the levels of war. Change 1 provides a new chapter 6 on t...
22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 vii
*Introduction to Change 1, FM 3-0
This is change 1 to the fifteenth edition of the Army’s ...
*Introduction to Change 1, FM 3-0
viii FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011
more thorough understanding of the operational environm...
22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 ix
Introduction
This is the fifteenth edition of the Army’s capstone operations manual. Its li...
Introduction
x FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011
defense—stability and civil support. The nature of the mission determines the a...
22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 1-1
Chapter 1
The Operational Environment
Military operations occur within a complex framework...
Chapter 1
1-2 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011
1-3. Globalization has enabled a greater diffusion of technology. Often, adversa...
The Operational Environment
22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 1-3
some nuclear nations now share technology as a means to earn m...
Chapter 1
1-4 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011
warfare. Preparing for and managing these threats requires employing all instrum...
The Operational Environment
22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 1-5
*THE EMERGENCE OF HYBRID THREATS
1-21. The term hybrid threat ...
Chapter 1
1-6 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011
Political
1-27. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibil...
The Operational Environment
22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 1-7
 Monetary policy and conditions.
 Institutional capabilities...
Chapter 1
1-8 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011
Information
1-37. Joint doctrine defines the information environment as the aggr...
The Operational Environment
22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 1-9
The enemy concentrates on surviving and inflicting friendly an...
Chapter 1
1-10 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011
involves the application of all instruments of national power, including action...
The Operational Environment
22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 1-11
Area Characteristic
Joint information
operations capabilities...
Chapter 1
1-12 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011
 Multinational agreements.
 Other applicable authorities and Federal regulati...
The Operational Environment
22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 1-13
Table 1-3. Definitions and examples of civilian organizations...
Chapter 1
1-14 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011
1-65. An Army officer assigned to command a multinational force faces many comp...
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  1. 1. FM 3-0 OPERATIONS FEBRUARY 2008 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
  2. 2. *Foreword Change 1 of FM 3-0 reflects our intention to take advantage of a “Campaign of Learning” across our Army to adapt our concepts, doctrine, and processes more frequently than in the past. Most of what was published in 2008 endures. Our emphasis remains on developing leaders and Soldiers for full-spectrum operations. We continue to highlight both defeat and stability mechanisms and to stress that we live in an era of persistent conflict. To these enduring themes, we add several new and important ideas:  The future operational environment will be characterized by hybrid threats: combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups who decentralize and syndicate against us and who possess capabilities previously monopolized by nation states. These hybrid threats create a more competitive security environment, and it is for these threats we must prepare.  We replace the command and control warfighting function with mission command. This change emphasizes both “art” and “science” but places emphasis on the role of commanders in their respon- sibilities in full-spectrum operations with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. Mission command highlights the trust, collaboration, initiative, and co-creation of context necessary among leaders in decentralized operations. It mandates that systems and processes must support and enable the leader’s responsibility to understand, visualize, decide, direct, lead, and assess.  Consistent with recent changes in FM 5-0, we add design as a leader’s cognitive tool to seek to understand complex problems before attempting to solve them. Design allows the leader to understand and visualize before deciding and directing.  We “unburden” the term information operations and regroup tasks under two headings: inform and influence activities (IIA) and cyber/electromagnetic activities. This change allows us to “see ourselves” better both now and into the future.  We delete the Tennessee chart. This chart portrayed the spectrum of conflict (stable peace to general war) and operational themes (peace operations to irregular war to major combat operations). For a time, it contributed to our understanding of full-spectrum operations. However, it inadvertantly established a false dichotomy regarding whether we must prepare for irregular warfare or for major combat operations. In the next revision of FM 3-0, we will sharpen our language regarding full-spectrum operations. We will emphasize our Army’s capability to conduct both combined arms maneuver and wide area security—the former necessary to gain the initiative and the latter necessary to consolidate gains and set conditions for stability operations, security force assistance, and reconstruction. We must be capable of both and often simultaneously. That’s what defines us as truly capable of full-spectrum operations. Moreover, in a competitive security environment, the kinds of threats we will confront in executing these two broad responsibilities are likely to be increasingly indistinguishable. For this document to mean anything, it must come alive in classrooms, training centers, and officer and noncommissioned officer professional developments. Learn from it, adhere to it, and continue to help us adapt it to the complex and competitive security environments in which we operate. Victory Starts Here! MARTIN E. DEMPSEY General, U.S. Army Commanding General U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
  3. 3. FM 3-0, C1 Change No. 1 Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 22 February 2011 Operations 1. Change 1 to FM 3-0, 27 February 2008, is updated to align with FM 2-0, FM 5-0, and FM 3-28. 2. This change modifies the Army operational concept to emphasize mission command, the civil support tasks, and the discussion of operational art. 3. This change replaces the command and control element of combat power and warfighting function with mission command. 4. This change eliminates chapter 7, Information Superiority, and relocates the discussion of information- related tasks; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and knowledge management to other chapters. Chapter 7 in this change is now titled Operational Art. 5. This change adds an addendum to appendix D summarizing the changes. 6. Significant changes are marked with an asterisk at the beginning of the discussion (*). Remove Old Pages Insert New Pages pages Foreword through 7-16 pages Foreword through 7-16 page 8-7 page 8-7 pages D-7 through D-9 Source Notes-1 through Index-16 Source Notes-1 through Index-7 7. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes. DISTRUBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
  4. 4. PIN: 079091-001 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011 By order of the Secretary of the Army: GEORGE W. CASEY, JR. General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official: JOYCE E. MORROW Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 1102004 DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 110512, requirements for FM 3-0.
  5. 5. *FM 3-0, C1 Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. *This publication supersedes FM 3-0, 14 June 2001. 22 February 2011 i Field Manual No. 3-0 Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 27 February 2008 OPERATIONS Contents Page PREFACE...............................................................................................................v *INTRODUCTION TO CHANGE 1, FM 3-0 .........................................................vii INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................ix Chapter 1 THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ............................................................. 1-1 Instability and Persistent Conflict ....................................................................... 1-1 Influences on the Operational Environment ....................................................... 1-3 The Changing Nature of the Threat.................................................................... 1-3 *The Emergence of Hybrid Threats.................................................................... 1-5 Operational and Mission Variables..................................................................... 1-5 Unified Action ..................................................................................................... 1-9 The Nature of Land Operations........................................................................ 1-15 Soldiers............................................................................................................. 1-18 Summary .......................................................................................................... 1-20 Chapter 2 THE CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS .............................................................. 2-1 The Spectrum of Conflict.................................................................................... 2-1 Operational Themes........................................................................................... 2-3 Summary .......................................................................................................... 2-13 Chapter 3 FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS .................................................................... 3-1 The Operational Concept ................................................................................... 3-1 The Elements of Full Spectrum Operations ....................................................... 3-6 Combining the Elements of Full Spectrum Operations .................................... 3-19 Summary .......................................................................................................... 3-21 Chapter 4 COMBAT POWER ............................................................................................. 4-1 The Elements of Combat Power ........................................................................ 4-1 Leadership.......................................................................................................... 4-2 Information.......................................................................................................... 4-3 Warfighting Functions......................................................................................... 4-3
  6. 6. Contents ii FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011 Combined Arms ................................................................................................4-12 Summary...........................................................................................................4-15 Chapter 5 THE COMMANDER AND MISSION COMMAND ..............................................5-1 *Art of Command.................................................................................................5-1 Design.................................................................................................................5-1 The Role of the Commander in Mission Command............................................5-2 Summary...........................................................................................................5-12 Chapter 6 THE SCIENCE OF CONTROL...........................................................................6-1 *Section I – Control...........................................................................................6-1 Section II – The Staff Tasks .............................................................................6-1 Conduct the Operations Process........................................................................6-1 *Conduct Knowledge Management and Information Management..................6-12 *Conduct Inform and Influence and Cyber/Electromagnetic Activities .............6-15 Section III – Summary.....................................................................................6-23 Chapter 7 OPERATIONAL ART..........................................................................................7-1 *Understanding Operational Art..........................................................................7-1 The Levels of War...............................................................................................7-1 Applying Operational Art.....................................................................................7-4 *The Elements of Operational Art .......................................................................7-5 Summary...........................................................................................................7-16 Chapter 8 STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL REACH .....................................................8-1 Strategic Reach...................................................................................................8-1 Operational Reach ..............................................................................................8-5 Basing .................................................................................................................8-5 Summary.............................................................................................................8-7 Appendix A PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND OPERATIONS .................................................... A-1 Appendix B COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS .............................................. B-1 Appendix C THE ARMY MODULAR FORCE ....................................................................... C-1 Appendix D THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE AND SUMMARY OF CHANGES ......................... D-1 SOURCE NOTES ..........................................................................Source Notes-1 GLOSSARY.......................................................................................... Glossary-1 REFERENCES.................................................................................. References-1 INDEX ......................................................................................................... Index-1 Figures Figure 3-1. Full spectrum operations—the Army’s operational concept................................ 3-1 *Figure 3-2. The elements of full spectrum operations.......................................................... 3-6 Figure 3-3. Stability tasks and Department of State technical sectors ................................ 3-14 Figure 3-4. Example of combining the elements of full spectrum operations in a notional campaign ............................................................................................ 3-20
  7. 7. Contents 22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 iii Figure 4-1. The elements of combat power............................................................................4-1 *Figure 4-2. Why mission command? ....................................................................................4-4 *Figure 4-3. Mission command...............................................................................................4-5 Figure 4-4. Examples of supporting range and supporting distance....................................4-14 *Figure 5-1. Driving the operations process...........................................................................5-3 Figure 6-1. Operations process expanded.............................................................................6-6 Figure 6-2. Contiguous, noncontiguous, and unassigned areas..........................................6-11 *Figure 6-3. Two lines of effort for inform and influence activities........................................6-16 *Figure 6-4. Two lines of effort for cyber/electromagnetic activities.....................................6-20 Figure 7-1. Levels of war........................................................................................................7-2 Figure 7-2. Operational art .....................................................................................................7-4 Figure 7-3. Elements of operational art..................................................................................7-5 Figure 7-4. Example of a line of operations..........................................................................7-10 Figure 7-5. Example of lines of effort (stability)....................................................................7-11 Figure 8-1. Operational maneuver from strategic distance....................................................8-2 Figure B-1. Chain of command branches...............................................................................B-2 Figure B-2. Joint task force organization options ...................................................................B-4 Figure B-3. Example of a joint task force showing an Army corps as joint force land component commander with ARFOR responsibilities ........................................B-5 Figure B-4. Normal distribution of Army administrative control responsibilities .....................B-8 Figure C-1. Example of theater army acting as a land component command while continuing Army support .................................................................................... C-3 Figure C-2. Corps as an intermediate land force headquarters............................................ C-4 Figure C-3. Example of tailored divisions in offensive operations......................................... C-5 Figure C-4. Example of tailored divisions in defensive operations........................................ C-6 Figure C-5. Heavy brigade combat team .............................................................................. C-7 Figure C-6. Infantry brigade combat team............................................................................. C-7 Figure C-7. Stryker brigade combat team ............................................................................. C-7 Figure C-8. Battlefield surveillance brigade........................................................................... C-9 Figure C-9. Fires brigade....................................................................................................... C-9 Figure C-10. Combat aviation brigade ................................................................................ C-10 Figure C-11. Sustainment brigade ...................................................................................... C-11 Figure C-12. Maneuver enhancement brigade.................................................................... C-11 Figure C-13. Maneuver enhancement brigade OPCON to a Marine expeditionary force ................................................................................................................. C-13
  8. 8. Contents iv FM 3-0, C1 23 February 2011 Tables Table 1-1. Areas of joint interdependence........................................................................... 1-10 Table 1-2. Army capabilities that complement other Services............................................. 1-11 Table 1-3. Definitions and examples of civilian organizations ............................................. 1-13 Table 1-4. The Soldier’s Rules............................................................................................. 1-19 Table 2-1. Examples of joint military operations conducted within operational themes ........ 2-4 Table B-1. Joint support categories .......................................................................................B-6 Table B-2. Command relationships......................................................................................B-10 Table B-3. Army support relationships.................................................................................B-11 Table B-4. Other relationships .............................................................................................B-12 Table D-1. New Army terms...................................................................................................D-5 Table D-2. Modified Army definitions.....................................................................................D-5 Table D-3. Rescinded Army definitions..................................................................................D-6 *Table D-4. Army terms for change 1 ....................................................................................D-9 This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) (www.us.army.mil) and the Reimer Digital Library (RDL) at (www.adtdl.army.mil)
  9. 9. 22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 v Preface FM 3-0 is one of the Army’s two capstone doctrinal publications; the other is FM 1, The Army. FM 3-0 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting operations. The seven updated chapters that make up this edition of Operations constitute the Army’s view of how it conducts prompt and sustained operations on land and sets the foundation for developing the other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. FM 3-0 also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army Education System curricula:  Chapter 1 establishes the context of land operations in terms of a global environment of persistent conflict, the operational environment, and unified action. It discusses the Army’s expeditionary and campaign capabilities while emphasizing that it is Soldiers and leaders who remain the Army’s most important advantage. Change 1 adds a brief discussion of hybrid threats and implications for Army operations.  Chapter 2 describes a spectrum of conflict extending from stable peace to general war. From that spectrum, it establishes five operational themes into which various joint operations fit. This chapter helps Army leaders to understand and differentiate between the requirements of diverse joint operations such as peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. It shapes supporting doctrine for each operational theme. Change 1 eliminates some graphics used to illustrate the continuum of operations. It also expands and clarifies the discussion of major combat operations.  Chapter 3 is the most important chapter in the book; it describes the Army’s operational concept—full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operations seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results through combinations of four elements: offense, defense, and stability or civil support. It establishes mission command as the preferred method of exercising battle command. Change 1 moves the discussion of mission command from the section within the operational concept to chapters 4, 5, and 6 to consolidate and emphasize mission command. The discussion of stability operations now includes security force assistance. Change 1 also modifies the discussion of civil support tasks from three tasks to four to conform to the newly published Army field manual on civil support operations, FM 3-28.  Chapter 4 addresses combat power, the means by which Army forces conduct full spectrum operations. It replaces the older battlefield operating systems (“BOS”) with six warfighting functions, bound by leadership and employing information as the elements of combat power. Combined arms and mutual support are the payoff. Change 1 replaces the command and control element of combat power and warfighting function with mission command. The discussion of the intelligence warfighting function now includes sections moved from the old chapter 7. This chapter defines mission command warfighting function. The mission command warfighting function now includes a discussion of inform and influence and cyber/electromagnetic activities. These activities and others replace the previously discussed “information tasks” deleted from the old “information superiority” chapter.  Chapter 5 reviews the principles of command and control and their affects on the operations process—plan, prepare, execute, and assess. The emphasis is on commanders and the central role that they have in battle command. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and continually assess. Change 1 provides a rewritten chapter 5 that discusses the commander and defines mission command. Chapter 5 discusses the four commander’s tasks under mission command. It discusses how the commander drives the operations process and how the commander understands, visualizes, describes, directs, leads, and assesses operations. Chapter 5 describes how the commander builds teams, and how the commander leads inform and influence activities.  Chapter 6 discusses operational art, including operational design and the levels of war. Operational art represents the creative aspect of operational-level command. It is the expression
  10. 10. Preface vi FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011 of informed vision across the levels of war. Change 1 provides a new chapter 6 on the science of control. It discusses the three staff tasks under mission command, which are conducting the operations process, conducting knowledge management and information management, and conducting inform and influence and cyber/electromagnetic activities.  Chapter 7 is about information superiority, particularly the five Army information tasks, purpose, and staff responsibility. Change 1 eliminates the chapter on information superiority. It is now an updated discussion of the previous chapter 6. It provides an updated discussion of operational art to emphasize design (as discussed in FM 5-0).  Chapter 8 discusses the requirement for Army forces in joint campaigns conducted across intercontinental distances. It frames the challenges created by the requirement for Army forces in terms of strategic and operational reach. Change 1 retains chapter 8 without other substantial change. Four appendixes complement the body of the manual. The principles of war and operations are in appendix A. Command and support relationships are in appendix B. A brief description of modular force is in appendix C. A discussion of the purpose of doctrine in the Army is in appendix D. This appendix includes a chapter-by-chapter summary of the important changes, including those made in change 1, to FM 3-0. It also includes tables listing new, modified, and rescinded terms for which this manual is the proponent. Army doctrine is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine. FM 3-0 links landpower doctrine to joint operations doctrine as expressed in joint doctrinal publications, specifically, JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. FM 3-0 also uses text and concepts developed with North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners. The principal audience for FM 3-0 is the middle and senior leadership of the Army, officers in the rank of major and above who command Army forces in major operations and campaigns or serve on the staffs that support those commanders. It is also applicable to the civilian leadership of the Army. FM 3-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Most terms with joint or Army definitions are in both the glossary and the text. Glossary references: Terms for which FM 3-0 is the proponent publication (the authority) have an asterisk in the glossary. Text references: Definitions for which FM 3-0 is the proponent publication are in boldfaced text. These terms and their definitions will be in the next revision of FM 1-02. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. “Adversaries” refers to both enemies and adversaries when used in joint definitions. “Opponents” refers to enemies and adversaries. FM 3-0 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. This manual contains copyrighted material. Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL- MCK-D (FM 3-0), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to leav-cadd- web-cadd@conus.army.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. Acknowledgments The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works. Other sources of quotations are listed in the source notes. On War, by Carl von Clausewitz, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Reproduced with permission of Princeton University Press. Copyright © 1984.
  11. 11. 22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 vii *Introduction to Change 1, FM 3-0 This is change 1 to the fifteenth edition of the Army’s capstone operations manual. FM 3-0, Operations, initiated a comprehensive change in Army doctrine by capturing the experience of Soldiers over 7 years of combat and using it to change the way the Army conceptualized operations. It established full spectrum operations—simultaneous offensive, defensive, stability, or civil support operations—as the central tenet of how the Army applies its capabilities. The Army’s operational concept of full spectrum operations remains valid. As in 2008, the Army continues to operate in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in other operations worldwide. The Army’s experience illustrates that the United States cannot accurately predict the nature, location, or duration of the next conflict. The operational environment remains extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and actors. It is unforgiving of leaders who are overly dependent on technology or are incapable of acting independently amid uncertainty and complexity. Change 1 to FM 3-0 reflects an evolving understanding of the impact of what is now 9 years of persistent conflict on how the Army operates. FM 3-0 emphasizes people over technology, focusing on initiative and responsibility at lower levels of command. Understanding the operational environment, as well as the problem to be solved, requires a methodology that expands beyond the military decisionmaking process. The emergence of hybrid threats has added to the uncertainty of the operational environment. Additionally, creating teams among modular forces to work closely with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational assets is critical to mission success. When working with host-nation partners, teamwork requires more personal cooperation than military command. Finally, the ability to convey clear and succinct messages to target audiences is often as important as the ability to deliver lethal combat power. As a result, the traditional framework of command and control that the Army relied on for many years is no longer adequate to ensure success in full spectrum operations. The traditional framework assumed—  Only higher echelons would work with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational agencies and assets.  A high level of understanding of the operational environment and the problems to be solved.  Relatively stable organizations with fixed structures that ensured teamwork and cohesion.  Informing and influencing various audiences were primarily a government, not a military, function.  Technological solutions were needed to solve complex problems.  Smaller, more capable forces would know enough about the enemy to apply combat power precisely and effectively.  The higher the echelon, the greater the understanding of the operational environment. More importantly, the traditional framework failed to stress that the commander is the most important actor in operations. Commanders, in their relationships with the population or with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners, drive mission accomplishment. Commanders must be capable of acting independently amid uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. The operational environment will place a premium on decentralization of authority and on the distribution of combined arms capabilities that enable leaders to develop the situation through action, consistent with their commander’s intent. It also requires commanders who are comfortable with risk and who can command effectively when their networks are degraded. To assist commanders and leaders, the Army recognizes that doctrine requires a change that better defines the art of command and the science of control in full spectrum operations. Change 1 to FM 3-0 recognizes the primacy of commanders and leaders in military operations. Thus, mission command replaces the command and control warfighting function as the means for leaders to integrate the other warfighting functions, while focusing on the command of people in operations instead of processes and technological solutions. Concurrently, mission command provides a methodology to create a
  12. 12. *Introduction to Change 1, FM 3-0 viii FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011 more thorough understanding of the operational environment and of the problems to be addressed. Within mission command, commanders build teams and establish themes and messages to drive processes and procedures. Mission command enables an operationally adaptive force that anticipates transitions; accepts risks to create opportunities; informs friendly and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners; and influences neutrals, adversaries, and enemies. The ultimate outcome results in successful full spectrum operations. In addition to replacing the command and control warfighting function with mission command, change 1 of FM 3-0 also accounts for changes in the operational environment. These changes include—  Updating the operational environment to address hybrid threats.  Adding security force assistance to the discussion of civil security under stability operations.  Restructuring the civil support tasks by adding chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) consequence management as the fourth civil support task.  Revising chapter 7, Operational Art, to match the discussion of design in FM 5-0.  Updating the continuum of operations to eliminate the intermediate points, adding the role and nature of deterrence, and eliminating figure 2-2, the spectrum of conflict and operational themes (known as the Tennessee chart), and figure 3-4, examples of combining the elements of full spectrum operations within operational themes.  Replacing the five information tasks with inform and influence and cyber/electromagnetic activities. The demands placed on leaders have expanded dramatically in an era of persistent conflict among populations. The need to empower them with skills, knowledge, resources, and freedom of action is critical to success. Mission command provides a means for both senior and junior leaders to create a more thorough understanding of the operational environment and of the problems to be addressed. It highlights the initiative necessary for success in today’s operational environment. Mission command emphasizes the commander in operations. It encourages collaboration and dialog among commanders and leaders as a means of developing an environment of mutual trust and understanding that enables agile and adaptive organizations to succeed in full spectrum operations.
  13. 13. 22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 ix Introduction This is the fifteenth edition of the Army’s capstone operations manual. Its lineage goes back to the first doctrine written for the new American Army, Baron von Steuben’s 1779 Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States. Today, as with each previous version of Operations, FM 3-0 shapes all of Army doctrine, while influencing the Army’s organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, and Soldier concerns. But its contents are not truly capstone doctrine until Army forces internalize it. This requires education and individual study by all Army leaders. And it requires more: Army leaders must examine and debate the doctrine, measuring it against their experience and strategic, operational, and tactical realities. They must also recognize that while FM 3-0 can inform them of how to think about operations, it cannot provide a recipe for what to do on the battlefield. Always dynamic, Army doctrine balances between the Army’s current capabilities and situation with its projected requirements for future operations. At the same time, Army doctrine forecasts the immediate future in terms of organizational, intellectual, and technological developments. This requirement is particularly challenging for this edition of FM 3-0. The Army is heavily committed in conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and to countering terrorism worldwide. How long this will remain the case remains unknown. Therefore, this edition promulgates doctrine for Army operations in those conflicts. However, America’s strategic requirements remain global. FM 3-0 does not focus exclusively on current operations, regardless of how pressing their requirements. The Army’s experience makes it clear that no one can accurately predict the nature, location, or duration of the next conflict. So this doctrine also addresses the needs of an Army responsible for deploying forces promptly at any time, in any environment, against any adversary. This is its expeditionary capability. Once deployed, the Army operates for extended periods across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace through general war. This is its campaign capability. This edition of FM 3-0 reflects Army thinking in a complex period of prolonged conflicts and opportunities. The doctrine recognizes that current conflicts defy solution by military means alone and that landpower, while critical, is only part of each campaign. Success in future conflicts will require the protracted application of all the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Because of this, Army doctrine now equally weights tasks dealing with the population—stability or civil support—with those related to offensive and defensive operations. This parity is critical; it recognizes that 21st century conflict involves more than combat between armed opponents. While defeating the enemy with offensive and defensive operations, Army forces simultaneously shape the broader situation through nonlethal actions to restore security and normalcy to the local populace. Soldiers operate among populations, not adjacent to them or above them. They often face the enemy among noncombatants, with little to distinguish one from the other until combat erupts. Killing or capturing the enemy in proximity to noncombatants complicates land operations exponentially. Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is not sufficient. Shaping the civil situation is just as important to success. Informing the public and influencing specific audiences are central to mission accomplishment. Within the context of current operations worldwide, stability operations are often as important as—or more important than—offensive and defensive operations. Department of Defense policy states: Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. The Department of Defense shall be prepared to: (1) Conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments. DODI 3000.05 Because of this, full spectrum operations—simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations—is the primary theme of this manual. This continues a major shift in Army doctrine that began with FM 3-0 (2001) and now is embedded in joint doctrine as well. Stability and civil support operations cannot be something that the Army conducts in “other than war” operations. Army forces must address the civil situation directly and continuously, combining tactical tasks directed at noncombatants with tactical tasks directed against the enemy. These tasks have evolved from specialized ancillary activities—civil- military operations—into a central element of operations equal in importance to the offense and
  14. 14. Introduction x FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011 defense—stability and civil support. The nature of the mission determines the appropriate weighting and combination of tasks. The emergence of full spectrum operations drives key changes in capstone doctrine. The Army established full spectrum operations in FM 3-0 (2001), shifting sharply from an “either-or” view of combat and other operations to an inclusive doctrine that emphasized the essentiality of nonlethal actions with combat actions. This edition of FM 3-0 continues that development. In FM 3-0 (2001), stability operations were “other” joint missions stated in an Army context. The current edition describes stability operations as tactical tasks applicable at all echelons of Army forces deployed outside the United States. In addition, civil support operations are also defined as tactical-level tasks, similar to stability tasks but conducted in the very different operational environment of the United States and its territories. The impact of the information environment on operations continues to increase. What Army forces do to achieve advantages across it—information superiority—significantly affects the outcome of operations. Consequently, FM 3-0 revises how the Army views information operations and staff responsibility for associated Army information tasks. Other changes include replacing the battlefield operating systems with the warfighting functions and adding the spectrum of conflict with related operational themes. Chaos, chance, and friction dominate land operations as much today as when Clausewitz wrote about them after the Napoleonic wars. In this environment, an offensive mindset—the predisposition to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to positively change the situation—makes combat power decisive. The high quality of Army leaders and Soldiers is best exploited by allowing subordinates maximum latitude to exercise individual and small-unit initiative. Tough, realistic training prepares leaders for this, and FM 3-0 prescribes giving them the maximum latitude to accomplish the mission successfully. This requires a climate of trust in the abilities of superior and subordinate alike. It also requires leaders at every level to think and act flexibly, constantly adapting to the situation. Subordinates’ actions are guided by the higher commander’s intent, but not circumscribed by excessive control. This is a continuing tension across the Army, aggravated by advanced information systems that can provide higher commanders with the details of lower echelon operations. The temptation for senior leaders to micromanage subordinates is great, but it must be resisted. Despite the vital importance of nonlethal action to change the civil situation, FM 3-0 recognizes that the Army’s primary purpose is deterrence, and should deterrence fail, decisively winning the Nation’s wars by fighting within an interdependent joint team. America is at war and should expect to remain fully engaged for the next several decades in a persistent conflict against an enemy dedicated to U.S. defeat as a nation and eradication as a society. This conflict will be waged in an environment that is complex, multidimensional, and rooted in the human dimension. This conflict cannot be won by military forces alone; it requires close cooperation and coordination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic efforts. Due to the human nature of the conflict, however, landpower will remain important to the military effort and essential to victory. FM 3-0 considers the nature of today’s enemies as well as a wide range of other potential threats. It contains doctrine that seeks nothing less than victory for the United States—now and in the future. As with all previous Army capstone doctrine, this doctrine provides direction for the Army and reflects its progress through the years. Like the manual that emerged from Valley Forge, it reflects the lessons learned from combat experience and addresses strategic, operational, and tactical realities. Baron von Steuben’s doctrine allowed for the creation of forces capable of standing against the British Army, the world’s best, by giving the Continental Army the skills necessary to win. Then, as now, success depended on the determination of well-trained Soldiers, the quality of their small-unit leadership, and the abilities of their commanders.
  15. 15. 22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 1-1 Chapter 1 The Operational Environment Military operations occur within a complex framework of environmental factors that shape their nature and affect their outcomes. These operations require commanders who understand the strategic and operational environments and their relevance to each mission. This understanding includes specific traits of the particular operational environment to each mission and how essential elements of the environment shape how Army forces conduct operations. This chapter discusses the operational environment as the basis for understanding the Army’s doctrine for the conduct of land operations. It addresses these operations, emphasizing the Army’s expeditionary and campaign qualities and the integral role of Army forces in unified actions—joint, interagency, and multinational undertakings that execute campaigns and major operations. INSTABILITY AND PERSISTENT CONFLICT 1-1. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). While they include all enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral systems across the spectrum of conflict, they also include an understanding of the physical environment, the state of governance, technology, local resources, and the culture of the local population. This doctrine pertains in an era of complex global, regional, and local change leading to both opportunities and risks. The risk component of this change manifests in certain trends that drive instability and a continuing state of persistent conflict. Persistent conflict is the protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. Some important trends that affect ground force operations in an era of persistent conflict include—  Globalization.  Technology.  Demographic changes.  Urbanization.  Resource demands.  Climate change and natural disasters.  Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their effects.  Failed or failing states. 1-2. Experts predict globalization will continue to support the exportation of terrorism worldwide. Interdependent economies have enabled great wealth. The benefits of this wealth remain concentrated in the hands of a few while many bear the risks of failure. This unequal distribution of wealth often creates have and have-not conditions that can spawn conflict. This dichotomy appears between developed nations in the northern hemisphere and developing nations to their south and in the southern hemisphere. By 2015, experts project that up to 2.8 billion people—almost exclusively in economic have-not areas in developing nations—will live below the poverty level. These people are more vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups. Globalization has also contributed to the rise of nonstate actors to economic, informational, and even military and diplomatic positions rivaling or exceeding those of states. The decline in state power and influence makes diplomatic interaction more difficult and complex. Globalization has already left several states behind, and more nations will lag in the increasing tempo of globalization. As a result, their populations will both suffer and become more apt to embrace radical ideologies to express their frustration and increase their desire, if not ability, to share in global prosperity.
  16. 16. Chapter 1 1-2 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011 1-3. Globalization has enabled a greater diffusion of technology. Often, adversaries use innovations—that improve the quality of life and livelihood—to destroy lives. It would seem that technology evolved with an asymmetric advantage of developed nations. They have greater access to research facilities to develop and innovate. Technology also gives nations access to the industrial base. These nations can then mass-produce advanced products and widely distribute them at relatively low costs. The low cost of products, their user-friendly design, and their availability in a global economy makes advanced technology accessible to unstable states as well as extremist organizations. The revolution and proliferation of benefits derived from integrating multidisciplinary nano- and bio-technologies and smart materials potentially promises to improve living conditions. However, nations will not always have these products available at the pace and in the quantities necessary to make them and their benefits as universally available as desired. Such disparity can create another source of friction between the haves and have-nots. Moreover, the proliferation, falling costs, and availability of technologically advanced products—especially expanded information technologies using mobile, wireless, and global fiber-optic networks—enable nonstate adversaries to acquire them. 1-4. Population growth in the developing world will increase opportunities for instability, radicalism, and extremism. Populations of some less-developed countries will almost double by 2020, most notably in Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. The youth bulge created by this growth will be vulnerable to antigovernment and radical ideologies, worsening governance challenges. Middle class populations will grow as well. They will demand improved quality-of-life benefits and more resources to go with their increased wealth. Inability or inequity to distribute wealth will intensify tensions between haves and have-nots. It will likely escalate calls for changes in how to share wealth globally. 1-5. By 2015, well over half the world’s population will live in urban centers, and by 2030, up to 60 percent will live in cities. Many cities are already huge; 15 have populations in excess of 10 million. Eight of these megacities lie near known geological fault lines that threaten natural disaster. These megacities increasingly assume the significance of nation-states, posing similar governance and security concerns. Their urban growth appears more pronounced in developing regions in which states are already more prone to failure. Organized crime and extremist ideological and cultural enclaves flourish in urban terrain, overwhelming and supplanting local governance apparatus. Chronic unemployment, overcrowding, pollution, uneven resource distribution, and poor basic services such as sanitation and health care add to population dissatisfaction and increase the destructive allure of radical ideologies. 1-6. Demand for energy, water, and food for growing populations will increase competition and, potentially, conflict. Resources—especially water, gas, and oil—are finite. By 2030, energy consumption will probably exceed production. Current sources, investment, and development of alternatives likely will not bridge the gap. A shift to cleaner fuels such as natural gas will find about 60 percent of known reserves concentrated in Russia, Iran, and Qatar. Demand for water doubles every 20 years. By 2015, 40 percent of the world’s population will live in water-stressed countries, increasing the potential for competition over a resource that has already led to conflict in the past. The demand for food will increase in direct proportion to the growth in population, but increases in food production will depend upon adequate energy and water resources. 1-7. Natural disasters will compound already difficult conditions in developing countries. They will cause humanitarian crises, driving regionally destabilizing population migrations and raising potential for epidemic diseases. Desertification occurs at nearly 50–70 thousand square miles per year. Increased consumption of resources, especially in densely populated areas, will increase air, water, and land pollution. Depletion reduces natural replenishment sources as well as intensifies the effects of natural disasters, having increasingly greater impacts on more densely populated areas. Over 15 million people die each year from communicable diseases; these numbers may grow exponentially as urban densities increase. 1-8. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their effects will increase the potential for catastrophic attacks. These attacks will destabilize and undercut the confidence that spurs global economic development. The threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction is as real as it is deadly. Over 1,100 identified terrorist organizations exist. Some of them, most notably Al Qaeda, actively seek weapons of mass destruction. Since 1993, 662 reported incidents of unauthorized activities surrounding nuclear and radioactive materials occurred. These incidents involved quantities of enriched uranium from military and civilian reactors exceeding 3,700 tons, enough to produce thousands of nuclear weapons. Additionally,
  17. 17. The Operational Environment 22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 1-3 some nuclear nations now share technology as a means to earn money and secure influence. For small countries and terrorist organizations, biological weapons convey a similar status as nuclear weapons. Laboratories can easily and cheaply produce many biological and chemical agents. Wider Internet access has made the technologies and processes of developing weapons of mass destruction and their effects readily available to potential adversaries. Further, some states may pursue these programs to ensure their security and prevent forced regime change. 1-9. Governments of nation-states face increasingly greater challenges in providing effective support to their growing populations. Security, economic prosperity, basic services, and access to resources strain systems designed in an industrial age. Additionally, these governments are unprepared to increase openness intellectually or culturally to address an information age. Compounding this inability to adapt, nation-state governments find themselves pitted against who have made the shift and are already exploiting it to gain support of local populaces. These adversaries can include criminal organizations, extremist networks, private corporate enterprises, and increasingly powerful megacities. Stability, not the form of governance, will be paramount. The problem of failed or failing states can result in new safe havens in which adversaries can thrive. INFLUENCES ON THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 1-10. The operational environment of the future will be complicated by globalization, population growth, inadequate resources, climate change, inadequate governance, and the spread of lethal weapons. The driving trends discussed in paragraphs 1-1 through 1-9 create a useable forecast of persistent conflict. The international nature of commercial and academic efforts could also have dramatic impacts. The complexity of the operational environment will push future operations to occur across the spectrum of conflict. 1-11. The operational environment of the future will be an arena in which operational goals are attained or lost by not only the use of highly lethal force but also by how quickly units can establish and maintain a state of stability. The operational environment will remain a dirty, frightening, physically and emotionally draining one. Death and destruction will result from environmental conditions creating humanitarian crisis as well as conflict itself. The high lethality and range of advanced weapons systems and tendency of enemies to operate among the population will increase the risk to combatants and noncombatants dramatically. All enemies, state or nonstate, regardless of technological or military capability, will likely use every political, economic, informational, and military measure at their disposal. In addition, the operational environment will expand to areas historically immune to battle, including the continental United States and the territory of multinational partners, especially urban areas. In fact, the operational environment will probably include areas not defined by geography, such as cyberspace. Computer network attacks will span borders, enabling antagonists to hit anywhere, anytime. With the exception of cyberspace, units will conduct all operations among the people and will measure outcomes in terms of effects on populations. 1-12. The operational environment will become extremely fluid. With continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and actors, interagency and joint operations will have to adjust to the intricate range of players occupying the environment. International news organizations using new information and communications technologies will no longer depend on states to access the area of operations and will more greatly sway how the public views operations. News organizations will have satellites or their own unmanned aerial reconnaissance platforms from which to monitor the scene. Secrecy will be difficult to maintain, making operations security more vital than ever. Finally, complex cultural, demographic, and physical environmental factors will be present, adding to the fog of war. Such factors include humanitarian crises, ethnic and religious differences, and complex and urban terrain, which often become major centers of gravity and a haven for potential threats. The operational environment will remain interconnected, dynamic, and extremely volatile. THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE THREAT 1-13. Threats are nation-states, organizations, people, groups, or conditions that can damage or destroy life, vital resources, or institutions. States, nations, transnational actors, and nonstate entities will continue to challenge and redefine the global distribution of power, the concept of sovereignty, and the nature of
  18. 18. Chapter 1 1-4 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011 warfare. Preparing for and managing these threats requires employing all instruments of national power— diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Threats fit a range of four major categories: traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. While helpful in describing threats the Army will most likely face, these categories or challenges do not define the nature of the adversary. In fact, adversaries may combine any and all of these challenges to achieve a desired effect against the United States. 1-14. Traditional threats emerge from states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in understood forms of military competition and conflict. In the past, the United States optimized its forces for this challenge. Currently the United States possesses the world’s preeminent conventional and nuclear forces, but this status is not guaranteed. Many nations maintain powerful conventional forces, and not all are friendly to the United States. Some potentially hostile adversaries possess weapons of mass destruction. Although these adversaries may not actively seek armed confrontation and will actively avoid U.S. military strength, their activities can provoke regional conflicts that threaten U.S. interests. Deterrence therefore remains the first aim of the joint force. Should deterrence fail, and some evidence shows that deterrence is less able to accomplish this goal, the United States strives to maintain capabilities to overmatch any combination of enemy conventional and unconventional forces. 1-15. Irregular threats are those posed by an opponent employing unconventional, asymmetric methods and means to counter traditional U.S. advantages. A weaker enemy often uses irregular warfare to exhaust the U.S. collective will through protracted conflict. Irregular warfare includes such means as terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare. Economic, political, informational, and cultural initiatives usually accompany and may even be the chief means of irregular attacks on U.S. influence. 1-16. Catastrophic threats involve the acquisition, possession, and use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, also called weapons of mass destruction, and their effects. Possession of these weapons gives an enemy the potential to inflict sudden and catastrophic effects. The proliferation of related technology has made this threat more likely than in the past. 1-17. Disruptive threats involve an enemy using new technologies that reduce U.S. advantages in key operational domains. For example, U.S. forces depend on battlefield networks to generate combined arms effects. An advanced cybernetic attack may degrade or usurp automated systems, leaving no means of identifying the problem and making countermeasures ineffective. Disruptive threats can employ such different methods and technology that the target fails to understand the nature of the threat. The allied exploitation of the German ENIGMA code machines provides an example. Because the Germans could not conceive that human intellect and computer technology could break their top codes, they enacted countermeasures to every possible threat except the one that occurred. 1-18. Adversaries seek to create an advantage over U.S. forces by combining traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive capabilities. These combined threats change the nature of the conflict, enabling adversaries to use capabilities for which the United States is least prepared. Adversaries seek to interdict U.S. forces attempting to enter any area of crisis. If U.S. forces successfully gain entry, adversaries often engage them in complex terrain and urban environments to offset U.S. advantages. Methods used by adversaries include dispersing their forces into small, mobile combat teams—combined only when required to strike a common objective—and becoming invisible by blending in with the local population. 1-19. U.S. forces expect threats to use the environment and rapidly adapt. Extremist organizations adopt state-like qualities using the media, technology, and their position within a state’s political, military, and social infrastructures to their advantage. Their operations grow more sophisticated, combining conventional, unconventional, irregular, and criminal tactics. They focus on creating conditions of instability, seek to alienate legitimate forces from the population, and employ global networks to expand local operations. Threats employ advanced information operations and use violence indiscriminately. 1-20. Future conflicts will much more likely to be fought among the people instead of around the people. This fundamentally alters how Soldiers can apply force to achieve success in a conflict. Enemies will increasingly seek populations within which to hide for protection, preparation, and refuge. They use populations as protection against the proven attack and detection means of U.S. forces, in preparation for attacks against communities, and as refuge from U.S. strikes against their bases. War remains a battle of wills—a contest for dominance over people. The essential struggle of the future conflict will occur where people live and will require U.S. security dominance to extend across the population.
  19. 19. The Operational Environment 22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 1-5 *THE EMERGENCE OF HYBRID THREATS 1-21. The term hybrid threat has recently evolved to capture the seemingly increased complexity of operations and the multiplicity of actors involved. While the existence of innovative enemies is not new, today’s hybrid threats demand that U.S. forces prepare for a range of possible threats simultaneously. The conditions associated with persistent conflict can form a very capable hybrid threat. In either case, close combat is as violent as major combat operations, even when the opponent is an irregular force. 1-22. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Hybrid threats combine regular forces governed by international law, military tradition, and custom with unregulated irregular forces that act with no restrictions on violence or their targets. These forces could include militias, terrorists, guerillas, and criminals. Such forces combine their abilities to use and transition between regular and irregular tactics and weapons. These abilities enable hybrid threats to capitalize on perceived vulnerabilities making them particularly effective. 1-23. These forces may cooperate in the context of pursuing their own organizational objectives. For example, criminal elements may steal parts for a profit while at the same time compromising the readiness of an adversary’s combat systems. Militia forces may defend their town with exceptional vigor as a part of a complex defensive network. Hybrid threats may use the media, technology, and their position within a state’s political, military, and social infrastructures to their advantage. Hybrid threats creatively adapt, combining sophisticated weapons, command and control, cyber activities, and combined arms tactics to engage U.S. forces when conditions are favorable. Their tactics will often shift. By using insurgent, criminal, and cyber activities, they create instability and hamper U.S. forces and allies. Additionally, hybrid threats use global networks to influence perceptions of the conflict and shape global opinion. OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES 1-24. The operational environment includes physical areas—the air, land, maritime, and space domains. It also includes the information that shapes the operational environment as well as enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral systems relevant to that joint operation. The operational environment for each campaign or major operation differs and evolves as each campaign or operation progresses. Army forces use operational variables to understand and analyze the broad environment in which they are conducting operations. They use mission variables to focus analysis on specific elements of the environment that apply to their mission. OPERATIONAL VARIABLES 1-25. Military planners describe the operational environment in terms of operational variables. Operational variables are those broad aspects of the environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect campaigns and major operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational environment but also the population’s influence on it. Joint planners analyze the operational environment in terms of six interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure. To these variables, Army doctrine adds two more: physical environment and time. As a set, Soldiers often abbreviate these operational variables as PMESII-PT. 1-26. The variables humanize the operational environment. Since land forces operate among populations, understanding human variables is crucial. They help describe each operation’s context for commanders and other leaders. Understanding these variables helps commanders appreciate how the military instrument complements the other instruments of national power. Comprehensive analysis of the variables usually occurs at the joint level; Army commanders continue analysis to improve their understanding of their environment. The utility of the operational variables improves with flexible application; complicated human societies defy precise categorization. Whenever possible, commanders and staffs employ specialists in each variable to improve analysis.
  20. 20. Chapter 1 1-6 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011 Political 1-27. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance. Political structures and processes enjoy varying degrees of legitimacy with populations from local through international levels. Formally constituted authorities and informal or covert political powers strongly influence events. Political leaders can use ideas, beliefs, actions, and violence to enhance their power and control over people, territory, and resources. Many sources of political motivation exist. These may include charismatic leadership; indigenous security institutions; and religious, ethnic, or economic communities. Political opposition groups or parties also affect the situation. Each may cooperate differently with U.S. or multinational forces. Understanding the political circumstances helps commanders and staffs recognize key organizations and determine their aims and capabilities. 1-28. Understanding political implications requires analyzing all relevant partnerships—political, economic, military, religious, and cultural. This analysis captures the presence and significance of external organizations and other groups, including groups united by a common cause. Examples include private security organizations, transnational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations that provide humanitarian assistance. 1-29. A political analysis also addresses the effect of will. Will is the primary intangible factor; it motivates participants to sacrifice to persevere against obstacles. Understanding what motivates key groups (for example, political, military, and insurgent) helps commanders understand the groups’ goals and willingness to sacrifice to achieve their ends. 1-30. The political variable includes the U.S. domestic political environment. Therefore, mission analysis and monitoring the situation includes an awareness of national policy and strategy. Military 1-31. The military variable includes the military capabilities of all armed forces in a given operational environment. For many states, an army is the military force primarily responsible for maintaining internal and external security. Paramilitary organizations and guerrilla forces may influence friendly and hostile military forces. Militaries of other states not directly involved in a conflict may also affect them. Therefore, analysis should include the relationship of regional land forces to the other variables. Military analysis examines the capabilities of enemy, adversary, host-nation, and multinational military organizations. Such capabilities include—  Equipment.  Manpower.  Doctrine.  Training levels.  Resource constraints.  Leadership.  Organizational culture.  History.  Nature of civil-military relations. Understanding these factors helps commanders estimate actual capabilities of each armed force. Analysis focuses on each organization’s ability to field and use capabilities domestically, regionally, and globally. Economic 1-32. The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources. Specific factors may include the influence of—  Industrial organizations.  Trade.  Development (including foreign aid).  Finance.
  21. 21. The Operational Environment 22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 1-7  Monetary policy and conditions.  Institutional capabilities.  Geography.  Legal constraints (or the lack of them) on the economy. 1-33. While the world economy continues to grow more interdependent, local economies differ. These differences significantly influence political choices, including individuals’ decisions to support or subvert the existing order. Many factors create incentives or disincentives for individuals and groups to change the economic status quo. These may include—  Technical knowledge.  Decentralized capital flows.  Investment.  Price fluctuations.  Debt.  Financial instruments.  Protection of property rights.  Existence of black market or underground economies. Thus, indicators measuring potential benefits or costs of changing the political-economic order may enhance how commanders understand the social and behavioral dynamics of friendly, adversary, and neutral entities. Social 1-34. The social variable describes societies within an operational environment. A society is a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture, and share a sense of identity. Societies are not monolithic. They include diverse social structures. Social structure refers to the relations among groups of persons within a system of groups. It includes institutions, organizations, networks, and similar groups. (FM 3-24 discusses socio-cultural factors analysis and social network analysis.) 1-35. Culture comprises shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that society members use to cope with their world and with one another. Societies usually have a dominant culture but may have many secondary cultures. Different societies may share similar cultures, but societal attributes change over time. Changes may occur in any of the following areas:  Demographics.  Religion.  Migration trends.  Urbanization.  Standards of living.  Literacy and nature of education.  Cohesiveness and activity of cultural, religious, or ethnic groups. Social networks, social status and related norms, and roles that support and enable individuals and leaders require analysis. This analysis should also address societies outside the operational area whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the mission. 1-36. People base their actions on perceptions, assumptions, customs, and values. Cultural awareness helps identify points of friction within populations, build rapport, and reduce misunderstandings. It can improve the commander’s insight into individual and group intentions and enhance the unit’s effectiveness. However, U.S. forces require training in cultural awareness before deploying to an unfamiliar operational environment and continuous updating while deployed. Commanders develop their knowledge of the societal aspects within their areas of operations to a higher level of cultural awareness. This level allows them to understand how their operations affect the population and prepares them to meet local leaders face-to-face.
  22. 22. Chapter 1 1-8 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011 Information 1-37. Joint doctrine defines the information environment as the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13). The environment shaped by information includes leaders, decisionmakers, individuals, and organizations. The global community’s access and use of data, media, and knowledge systems occurs in the information shaped by the operational environment. Commanders use information activities to shape the operational environment as part of their operations. 1-38. Media representatives significantly influence the information that shapes the operational environment. Broadcast and Internet media sources can rapidly disseminate competing views of military operations worldwide. Media coverage influences U.S. political decisionmaking, U.S. popular opinion, and multinational sensitivities. Adversaries often use media coverage to further their aims by controlling and manipulating how audiences perceive a situation’s content and context. 1-39. Global telecommunications networks now provide immense amounts of information. Observers and adversaries have unprecedented access to multiple information sources, as the public disclosure of thousands of classified U.S. documents in 2010 demonstrated. They often attempt to influence and counter opinion by providing their own interpretation of events. Televised news and propaganda reach many people. However, in developing countries, information still flows by less sophisticated means such as messengers and graffiti. Commanders need to understand the nature of information flow within their area of operations and apply the best available methods to communicate with the local populace. Infrastructure 1-40. Infrastructure comprises the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for a society to function. Degrading infrastructure affects the entire operational environment. Infrastructure includes technological sophistication—the ability to conduct research and development and apply the results to civil and military purposes. 1-41. Not all segments of society view infrastructure in the same way. Improvements viewed by some as beneficial may be perceived as a threat by others. For example, introducing cellular networks can help a local economy but may offend influential and conservative local leaders who view it as permitting access to licentious material. Actions affecting infrastructure require a thorough analysis of possible effects. Physical Environment 1-42. The physical environment includes the geography and manmade structures in the operational area. The following factors affect the physical environment:  Manmade structures, particularly urban areas.  Climate and weather.  Topography.  Hydrology.  Natural resources.  Biological features and hazards.  Other environmental conditions. Enemies understand that less complex and open terrain often exposes their military weaknesses. Therefore, they may try to counteract U.S. military advantages by operating in urban or other complex terrain and during adverse weather conditions. Time 1-43. Time proves a significant consideration in military operations. Analyzing it as an operational variable focuses on how an operation’s duration might help or hinder each side. This has implications at every planning level. Enemies with a limited military capability usually view protracted conflict as advantageous to them. They avoid battles and only engage when conditions work overwhelmingly to their favor. This is a strategy of exhaustion. Such a strategy dominated the American Revolution and remains effective today.
  23. 23. The Operational Environment 22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 1-9 The enemy concentrates on surviving and inflicting friendly and civilian casualties over time. Although the military balance may not change, this creates opportunities to affect how domestic and international audiences view the conflict. Conversely, the enemy may attempt to mass effects and achieve decisive results in a short period. MISSION VARIABLES 1-44. The operational variables directly relate to campaign planning. That does not mean that they are not valuable at the tactical level; they are fundamental to understanding the operational environment to plan at any level, in any situation. The degree to which each operational variable provides useful information depends on the situation and echelon. For example, social and economic variables often receive close analysis as part of enemy and civil considerations at brigade and higher levels. They may affect the training and preparation of small units. However, they may not be relevant to a small-unit leader’s mission analysis. That leader may only be concerned with such questions as “Who is the tribal leader for this village?” “Is the electrical generator working?” “Does the enemy have antitank missiles?” 1-45. Upon receipt of a warning order or mission, Army tactical leaders narrow their focus to six mission variables. Mission variables are those aspects of the operational environment that directly affect a mission. They outline the situation as it applies a specific Army unit. The mission variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Army leaders use these categories of relevant information for mission analysis to synthesize operational variables and tactical-level information with local knowledge about conditions relevant to their mission. (Chapter 5 expands the discussion of the mission variables.) 1-46. Army forces interact with people at many levels. In general, anyone in any operational area can qualify as an enemy, an adversary, a supporter, or a neutral. One reason land operations are complex is that all four categories intermix, often with no easy means to distinguish one from another:  An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. An enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as such under the law of war.  An adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). Adversaries include members of the local populace who sympathize with the enemy.  A supporter is a party who sympathizes with friendly forces and who may or may not provide material assistance to them.  A neutral is a party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy forces. 1-47. Incorporating the analysis of the operational variables into METT-TC emphasizes the operational environment’s human aspects. This emphasis is most obvious in civil considerations, but it affects the other METT-TC variables as well. Incorporating human factors into mission analysis requires critical thinking, collaboration, continuous learning, and adaptation. It also requires analyzing local and regional perceptions. Many factors influence perceptions of the enemy, adversaries, supporters, and neutrals. These include—  Language.  Culture.  Geography.  History.  Education.  Beliefs.  Perceived objectives and motivation.  Media reporting and analysis.  Personal experience. UNIFIED ACTION 1-48. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). It
  24. 24. Chapter 1 1-10 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011 involves the application of all instruments of national power, including actions of other government agencies and multinational military and nonmilitary organizations. Combatant commanders play a pivotal role in unified actions; however, subordinate commanders also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in their area of operations. Department of Defense and other government agencies may refer to unified action as being joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, or a combination of these parts. 1-49. Unified action includes joint integration. Joint integration extends the principle of combined arms to operations conducted by two or more Service components. The combination of diverse joint force capabilities generates combat power more potent than the sum of its parts. Joint integration does not require joint command at all echelons. It does, however, require joint interoperability at all levels. Army mission accomplishment links to the national strategic end state through campaigns and major operations. CAMPAIGNS AND JOINT OPERATIONS 1-50. Joint planning integrates military power with other instruments of national power to achieve the desired military end state. (The end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives [JP 3-0].) This planning connects the strategic end state to campaign design and ultimately to tactical missions. Joint force commanders use campaigns and joint operations to translate their operational-level actions into strategic results. Campaigns are always joint operations. (See paragraph 7-12 for more on campaign.) 1-51. Campaigns exploit the advantages of interdependent Service capabilities through unified action. U.S. forces need coordinated, synchronized, and integrated action to reestablish civil authority after joint operations end, even when combat is not required. Effective joint and Army operations require all echelons to perform extensive collaborative planning and understand joint interdependence. JOINT INTERDEPENDENCE 1-52. Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service’s forces on another Service’s capabilities to maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of both. Army forces operate as part of an interdependent joint force. Joint capabilities make Army forces more effective than if they operated alone. Combinations of joint capabilities defeat enemy forces by shattering their ability to operate as a coherent, effective whole. Acting with other instruments of national power, joint forces also work to reduce the level of violence and establish security. (Table 1-1 lists areas of joint interdependence that directly enhance Army operations.) Table 1-1. Areas of joint interdependence Area Characteristic Joint command and control Integrated capabilities that— • Gain information superiority through improved, fully synchronized, integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; knowledge management; and information management. • Share a common operational picture. • Improve the ability of joint force and Service component commanders to conduct operations. Joint intelligence Integrated processes that— • Reduce unnecessary redundancies in collection asset tasking through integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. • Increase processing and analytic capability. • Facilitate collaborative analysis. • Provide global intelligence production and dissemination. • Provide intelligence products that enhance situational understanding by describing and assessing the operational environment.
  25. 25. The Operational Environment 22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 1-11 Area Characteristic Joint information operations capabilities Integrated capabilities, including— • Special technical operations. • Electronic warfare platforms and personnel. • Reachback to strategic assets. Joint fires Integrated fire control networks that allow joint forces to deliver coordinated fires from two or more Service components. Joint air operations Air and Naval forces able to— • Maneuver aircraft to positions of advantage over the enemy beyond the reach of land forces. • Gain and maintain air superiority that extends the joint force’s area of influence by providing freedom from attack as well as freedom to attack. • Support operational and tactical maneuver with lethal and nonlethal fires. Joint air and missile defense A comprehensive joint protection umbrella that— • Begins with security of ports of debarkation. • Enables uninterrupted force flow against diverse antiaccess threats. • Extends air and missile defense to multinational partners. Joint force projection Strategic and operational lift capabilities and automated planning processes that facilitate strategic responsiveness and operational agility. Joint sustainment Deliberate, mutual reliance by each Service component on the sustainment capabilities of two or more Service components. It can reduce redundancies or increase the robustness of operations without sacrificing effectiveness. Joint space operations Access to national imagery, communications, satellite, and navigation capabilities that enhance situational awareness and support understanding of the operational environment. 1-53. The other Services rely on Army forces to complement their capabilities. (Table 1-2 lists Army capabilities that enhance other Service component operations.) Table 1-2. Army capabilities that complement other Services Security and control of terrain, people, and resources, including— • Governance over an area or region. • Protection of key infrastructure and facilities from ground threats. Land-based ballistic missile defense, including defense against cruise missiles and counterrocket, counterartillery, and countermortar capabilities. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations. Support to interagency reconstruction efforts, including provision of essential services to an affected population. Denial of sanctuary through ground maneuver, enabling attack from the air. Discriminate force application within populated areas. Inland sustainment of bases and of forces operating from those bases. Land operations against enemy air and sea bases. Detainee and enemy prisoner of war operations. Intelligence support. 1-54. Joint forces also rely on Army forces for support and services as designated in—  Title 10, United States Code.  Other applicable U.S. laws.  Department of Defense directives and instructions.  Inter-Service agreements.
  26. 26. Chapter 1 1-12 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011  Multinational agreements.  Other applicable authorities and Federal regulations. This support and other support directed by combatant commanders are broadly defined as “Army support to other Services.” INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 1-55. Interagency coordination is inherent in unified action. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 3-0). In addition, unified action involves synchronizing joint or multinational military operations with activities of other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and contractors. During civil support operations, unified action includes state and local government agencies. It occurs at every level—tactical, operational, and strategic. Civilian Organizations 1-56. Commanders must understand the respective roles and capabilities of civilian organizations in unified action. Other agencies of the Federal government work with the military and are part of a national chain of command under the President of the United States. While this does not guarantee seamless integration, it does provide a legal basis for cooperation. Although experience and professional cultures differ widely, organizations need to recognize and capitalize on the inherent professionalism of each other to develop the teamwork necessary for the campaign. 1-57. Most civilian organizations are not under military control. Nor does the U.S. ambassador or a United Nations commissioner control them. Civilian organizations have different organizational cultures and norms. Some may be willing to work with Army forces; others may not. Thus, personal contact and trust building are essential. Command emphasis on immediate and continuous coordination encourages effective cooperation. Commanders should establish liaison with civilian organizations to integrate their efforts as much as possible with joint and Army operations. Civil affairs units typically establish this liaison. 1-58. Civilian organizations bring resources and capabilities that can help establish host-nation civil authority and capabilities. However, civilian organizations may arrive well after military operations have begun. Therefore, joint and Army forces prepare to establish and maintain order if host-nation authorities cannot do so. Successfully performing these tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. military forces. 1-59. Army forces provide sustainment and security for civilian organizations when directed, since many of these organizations lack these capabilities. Army forces often provide this support to state and local agencies during civil support operations. (Table 1-3 lists examples of civilian organizations.) Contractors 1-60. A contractor is a person or business that provides products or services for monetary compensation. A contractor furnishes supplies and services or performs work at a certain price or rate based on the terms of a contract (FM 3-100.21). Contracted support includes traditional goods and services support, but may also include interpreter communications, infrastructure, and other related support. In military operations, contractors often provide—  Life support.  Construction and engineering support.  Weapons systems support.  Security.  Other technical services. (FM 3-100.21 contains doctrine for contractors accompanying deployed forces.)
  27. 27. The Operational Environment 22 February 2011 FM 3-0, C1 1-13 Table 1-3. Definitions and examples of civilian organizations Category Definition Examples Other government agency Within the context of interagency coordi- nation, a non Department of Defense agency of the United States Government (JP 1). • Department of State • Central Intelligence Agency • Federal Bureau of Investigation • National Security Agency • U.S. Agency for International Development Intergovernmental organization An organization created by a formal agreement (for example, a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states (JP 3-08). • United Nations • European Union • North Atlantic Treaty Organization • Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe • African Union Nongovernmental organization A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08). See the United Nations Web site (www.un.org) to research accredited nongovernmental organizations. MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS 1-61. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). In multinational operations, all parties agree to the commitment of forces, even if the resources each invests differ. While each nation has its own interests, all nations bring value to the operation. Each national force has distinct capabilities, and each usually contributes to the operation’s legitimacy in terms of international or local acceptability. 1-62. An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement (for example, treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members (JP 3-0). Military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), allow partners to establish formal, standard agreements. For example, U.S. forces operate within a highly developed multinational command structure to maintain the armistice on the Korean peninsula. Alliance members strive for interoperability. They field compatible military systems, establish common procedures, and develop contingency plans to meet potential threats. 1-63. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action (JP 5-0). Nations usually form coalitions for focused, short-term purposes. A coalition action is a multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest (JP 5-0). Coalition actions may be conducted under the authority of a United Nations resolution. Since coalition actions are not structured around formal treaties, a preliminary understanding of the requirements for operating with a specific foreign military may occur through peacetime military engagement. (Paragraph 2-16 defines peacetime military engagement.) 1-64. Agreement among the multinational partners establishes the level of command authority vested in a multinational force commander. The President retains command authority over U.S. forces. Most nations have similar restrictions. However, in certain circumstances, it may be prudent or advantageous to place Army forces under the operational control of a multinational commander. Often, multinational forces have complex lines of command. To compensate for limited unity of command, multinational partners concentrate on achieving unity of effort. Consensus building, rather than direct command authority, is often the key element of successful multinational operations.
  28. 28. Chapter 1 1-14 FM 3-0, C1 22 February 2011 1-65. An Army officer assigned to command a multinational force faces many complex demands. These include dealing with cultural issues, different languages, interoperability challenges, national caveats on the use of respective forces, and sometimes underdeveloped command and control. Multinational force commanders must address different national procedures, restrictions, intelligence sharing, and theater sustainment functions. Another command challenge is the multinational commander’s limited ability to choose or replace subordinates. Nations assign their contingent leaders. They answer to their national chains of command as well as to the multinational force commander. Every multinational operation differs. Commanders analyze the mission’s peculiar requirements to exploit the multinational force’s advantages and compensate for its limitations. (FM 6-22 discusses leadership considerations for multinational operations.) 1-66. Multinational sustainment requires detailed planning and coordination. Each nation normally provides a national support element to sustain its deployed forces. However, integrated multinational sustainment may improve efficiency and effectiveness. When directed, an Army theater sustainment command can provide logistic and other support to a multinational force. Integrating the support requirements of several national forces, often spread over considerable distances and across international boundaries, is challenging. Nonetheless, multinational partners can provide additional resources to address the sustainment challenges. For example, a multinational partner may provide a secure intermediate staging base near the operational area. Commanders prefer deploying and employing forces from an intermediate staging base over making a forcible entry from a distant base. This is especially true when the staging base offers a mature infrastructure. 1-67. During multinational operations, U.S. forces establish liaison with assigned multinational forces as soon as possible. Army forces exchange specialized liaison personnel based on mission requirements. Fields requiring specialized liaison may include aviation, fire support, engineer, intelligence, and civil affairs. Exchanging liaison fosters a common understanding of missions and tactics, facilitates a transfer of information, and enhances mutual trust and confidence. 1-68. Missions assigned to multinational units should reflect the capabilities and limitations of each national contingent. Some significant factors include—  Relative size and mobility.  Intelligence collection assets.  Long-range fires capabilities.  Special operations forces capabilities.  Organic sustainment capabilities.  Ability to contribute to theater air and missile defense.  Training for operations in special environments.  Willingness and ability to cooperate directly with troops of other nationalities.  Preparation for defensive operations involving weapons of mass destruction. 1-69. When assigning missions, commanders consider the special skills, language, and rapport forces have with the local population as well as multinational partners’ national sensitivities. Multinational commanders may assign host-nation forces home defense or police missions, such as sustainment area and base security. They may entrust air defense, coastal defense, or a special operation to a single member of the multinational force based on that force’s capabilities. Commanders consider multinational force capabilities, such as mine clearance, that may exceed U.S. capabilities. (JP 3-16 and FM 3-16 contain doctrine for multinational operations.) 1-70. Since persistent conflict affects a diverse range of international interests, it requires coalitions of nations joined in common cause to defeat a universal foe. All leaders use their patience, understanding, and a willingness to subordinate self to the common good when working within a coalition. Each nation will bring distinct capabilities, strengths, and limitations to future coalitions, and Army forces must be able to operate within them. These coalitions will not always have the same partners, and even when they do, the relative commitments of the partners will vary—sometimes even over time within the same conflict.

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