Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The Libyan battle against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Sirte, a port city in the middle of the Libyan coastline, may give way to a larger civil conflict as rival militias grapple for control of Libya’s capital, Tripoli. Libyan forces allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) announced the defeat of ISIS in Sirte, its former stronghold, on December 5. ISIS militants still operate in one neighborhood in central Sirte, as well as in the city’s southern suburbs. ISIS retains its ability to conduct mass-casualty attacks targeting security forces and civilian returnees in Sirte. Libyan forces will likely be unable to counter ISIS’s changing tactics as militias focus on a tense Tripoli, where clashes between rival militias erupted over control of strategic sites on December 1. Salafi-jihadi groups with ties to al Qaeda may seek to establish a stronghold amidst Tripoli’s chaos to replace losses sustained in eastern Libya. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.] 2. Yemen’s internationally recognized government, led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, continues to pursue offensive operations against the al Houthi-Saleh alliance despite U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's recent comment that he had made headway with Hadi in jumpstarting peace talks. Hadi government and allied forces conducted shaping operations in northern Yemen, where they seized a second major border crossing in Sa’ada governorate. Hadi government reinforcements mobilized to Ma’rib governorate to support shaping operations. The Saudi-led coalition continues to support the Hadi government and seeks to set conditions that would compel the al Houthis and former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to concede influence in the consensus government. The al Houthi-Saleh faction is not close to military defeat. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report and an assessment of Yemen’s frontlines.] 3. Large-scale labor strikes in response to austerity measures risk instability in Tunisia. Thousands of lawyers rallied to protest new taxes on December 6. Teachers in Tunisia’s largest labor union plan to enact a schedule of strikes to protest austerity measures and reforms beginning on December 8. Regional states and international organizations pledged billions of dollars to support Tunisia in late November in an effort to stabilize Tunisia’s economy and prevent unrest. An agreement between a union leader and the Tunisian government may stave off protests in the near term, but the underlying grievances will remain. An escalation in protest activity would damage confidence in the fledgling unity government and provide an opportunity for Salafi-jihadi groups already based in Tunisia to conduct attacks. [Read an assessment of the dangers of instability in Tunisia from September 2016.]

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
December 6, 2016

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. The battle against ISIS in Sirte may give way to a larger civil conflict in Libya as
rival militias grapple for control of the capital, Tripoli.
2. Yemen’s internationally recognized government continues to favor military
offensives against al Houthi-Saleh forces to compel surrender over peace talks.
3. Large-scale labor strikes in response to austerity measures risk igniting
instability in Tunisia.
3
2
1

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
Pakistani and Indian security forces continue to crack down against Salafi-jihadi militants. Pakistani security forces arrested
members of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and al Qaeda in a series of raids in Karachi. Indian security
forces arrested members of the Base Movement, an al Qaeda-inspired Salafi-jihadi group.
Outlook: Pakistani and Indian security forces will continue to target Salafi-jihadi organizations and actors.
Security
Political and military tensions remained high between the Indian and Pakistani governments. Cross-border firing between
Indian and Pakistani security forces along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir has decreased since the escalation of
violence triggered by the September 18 attack on an Indian army base in Uri. Militant attacks in Jammu & Kashmir are
increasing, according to local reports.
Outlook: Cross-border firing along the Line of Control may return to prior levels. High-level officials will seek to de-escalate
the conflict between militants and state forces.
Political
General Qamar Javed Bajwa replaced Raheel Sharif as Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff. Bajwa immediately vowed to
address the situation in Kashmir and continue Pakistan’s “war on terror.” Bajwa is seen as a strong proponent of civil-
military relations who is less hostile towards India than his immediate predecessors.
Outlook: Bajwa’s appointment may herald a less hawkish stance toward India and increased civil-military cooperation in
targeting militant organizations.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
Political
The al Houthi-Saleh Supreme Political Council (SPC)’s formation of an independent government in Sana’a sparked
international condemnation and damaged prospects for peace talks. President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s advisor stated
that the only viable solution is a military one due to the rival government in Sana’a. Both the SPC and the Hadi government
are failing to pay salaries and provide basic government services.
Outlook: The Hadi government will use the al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s unilateral actions as a justification to pursue a military
victory in Yemen, further damaging the prospects for political reconciliation.
Security
Hadi government forces conducted shaping operations for an offensive on Sana’a city. They seized a second major Saudi-
Yemeni border crossing in Sa’ada governorate, a historical al Houthi stronghold. The Hadi government’s 37th Armored
Brigade mobilized from Hadramawt to Ma’rib governorate to assist with operations in northern Yemen. Hadi government
forces also claimed that al Houthi-Saleh fighters fled from fronts in northern Hajjah governorate.
Outlook: Hadi government forces may seek to consolidate recent gains in Sa’ada and al Jawf from which to launch a
follow-on offensive against al Houthi positions in Sa’ada.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP and ISIS continue to attack security forces despite ongoing counterterrorism operations intended to degrade their
safe havens in southern and central Yemen. AQAP seeks to increase its influence in southern and central Yemen by
disseminating propaganda and conducting attacks on security forces. Coalition-backed security forces raided an ISIS bomb-
making factory in Aden city and seized four tons of weapons from an AQAP stronghold in Hadramawt governorate between
December 2 and 5. ISIS and AQAP also concentrated their attacks targeting security forces in central Yemen.
Outlook: ISIS Wilayat al Bayda will increase the tempo of its counter-al Houthi-Saleh attacks in al Bayda to garner support.

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 01 DEC: AQAP
militants detonated an
IED targeting al Hizam
forces in Abyan.
2) 02 DEC: A reported
U.S. airstrike targeted
AQAP militants in
Ma’rib governorate.
3) 02 DEC: AQAP
militants attacked al
Houthi-Saleh forces in
southwestern Ibb.
4) 04 DEC: ISIS
militants attacked al
Houthi-Saleh forces in
western al Bayda.
5) 04 DEC: Hadi
government forces
seized Baqim, Sa’ada.
6) 05 DEC: Pro-Hadi
forces repelled al
Houthi-Saleh forces in
Hajjah.
2
3
5
4
1
6

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somali presidential contenders are maneuvering for advantages in the upcoming presidential election. Current Somali Prime
Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke is currently President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s greatest challenge to winning a
second term. Sharmarke and Mohamud are lobbying incoming MPs for support and attempting to move voting locations to
areas that favor their candidacies. The presidential contest will likely take place in early 2017.
Outlook: A dispute between Mohamud and Sharmarke supporters may lead to a crisis of legitimacy following the election.
Security
The ISIS-linked forces under command of Sheikh Abdiqadir Mumin, a defected al Shabaab shari’a official, remain weak and
isolated in the Qandala area of northern Somalia. A coalition of Puntland Security Forces (PSF) and local militia began a
clearing operation in Qandala on November 29. PSF killed seven ISIS-linked fighters in a village near Qandala on
December 3, and an additional three ISIS-linked fighters on December 5. The mountainous terrain has slowed the PSF
operation. Mumin’s contingent remains between 150 and 300 fighters. Al Shabaab internal security has been particularly
effective at silencing ISIS sympathy among its militants, Somalis, and the youth of northeast Kenya.
Outlook: Abdiqadir Mumin’s ISIS-linked forces are unlikely to establish a foothold in Somalia outside of Puntland.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab continues to attack Kenyan citizens and security personnel in the Somali-Kenyan border region. Al Shabaab
militants claimed to kill five Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) with an improvised explosive device (IED) attack in Garissa
County on November 30. The U.S. provided Six Huey II helicopters to assist Kenyans in the fight against al Shabaab, but
Kenyan officials remain committed to a border wall that will not fully prevent al Shabaab militants from entering Kenya.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to attack Kenyan civilians and security personnel in the lead-up to the August 2017
Kenyan elections.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
1) 01 DEC: Al
Shabaab attacked a
government convoy in
El Baraf, Middle
Shabelle.
2) 03-05 DEC:
Puntland Security
Forces (PSF) killed
ISIS-linked militants
near Qandala town.
3) 05 DEC: Al
Shabaab detonated an
IED targeting local
police in Burhakabo,
Bay region.
4) 06 DEC:
Aircraft struck an al
Shabaab training
camp near Torotoro,
Lower Shabelle
region. Western forces
raided the camp after
the strike.
4
2
3
1

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) has not taken control of Libya’s state institutions despite
international backing for the move. A power struggle between the Central Bank of Libya and the GNA is delaying the
delivery of an internationally-brokered economic plan intended to solve Libya’s liquidity crisis. An ongoing security
breakdown in Tripoli further undermines the GNA’s tenuous position in the capital. Some powerful militias in Tripoli
nominally support the GNA but prioritize their local objectives over submitting to GNA authority.
Outlook: Clashes over financial resources and strategic sites will resume in Tripoli.
Security
Salafi-jihadi groups may be opening a new front in Tripoli. Nominally GNA-allied Salafi militias launched an offensive
throughout the capital in an effort to seize strategic sites from hardline Salafi militias on December 1. Elements of the
Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC), an Islamist coalition with ties to al Qaeda associates, reportedly joined the
fight in Tripoli after fleeing the Libyan National Army (LNA)’s advance on its stronghold in Benghazi. The LNA is pushing to
seize the last remaining Salafi-jihadi bastions in Benghazi with intensified Emirati air support.
Outlook: The BRSC and affiliated Salafi-jihadi groups may attempt to establish a foothold in Tripoli.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
U.S.-backed forces announced the liberation of Sirte from ISIS. U.S.-backed forces will likely redirect their attention to the
security breakdown in Tripoli, making military positions and civilians vulnerable to attacks by ISIS forces now operating in
the desert south of Sirte. Misratan militias seeking to consolidate their influence in the Sirte basin may also direct forces to
LNA-held oil ports, risking clashes between rival forces over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources.
Outlook: ISIS militants will likely wage a campaign of explosive attacks to disrupt security operations in central Libya.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1) 01-02 DEC: Rival
militias clashed over
control of strategic
positions in Tripoli.
2) 02-03 DEC: The
U.S. conducted 22
airstrikes on ISIS in al
Jiza, Sirte.
3) 05 DEC: ISIS
conducted two SVEST
attacks and 30 ISIS
militants surrendered
to GNA-allied forces in
al Jiza, Sirte.
4) 05 DEC: The BRSC
and ISIS killed nine
LNA fighters during
clashes in Qanfouda,
Benghazi.
5) 01 DEC: Militants
detonated two IEDs at
the Benghazi Medical
Center.
3
1
4
2
5

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
AQIM is attempting to drive recruitment for its Tunisian affiliate. AQIM released a video titled, “Lions of Kairouan,” on
December 3 that glorified the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, which has a safe haven in Kairouan province. The video criticized
the Tunisian state’s economic failings and showed militants detonating an IED striking a Tunisian military vehicle.
Outlook: The Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade will continue to conduct small-scale attacks on military targets in western Tunisia.
Tunisia
Tunisia’s largest labor union is preparing for a series of strikes in December to protest austerity measures. Regional and
international organizations pledged investments and debt relief that aim to ameliorate Tunisia’s economic crisis.
Outlook: Organized protests will continue despite state and international efforts to moderate the effects of austerity.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
AQIM and its affiliates continued efforts to oust international forces from Mali. Al Murabitoun conducted a suicide vehicle-
borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on the UN-controlled Gao airport in central Mali on November 29. AQIM
fired rockets at a French airbase near Timbuktu on the same day. Meanwhile, tensions are rising after botched Malian
municipal elections. Pro-government GATIA forces attacked a Coordination for the Movement of Azawad (CMA) position
near Gao on December 5.
The Nigerian government altered its treatment of high-profile prisoners to avoid unrest. Nigeria’s highest court ordered the
Kaduna State government to release Ibrahim al Zakzaky, the leader of the Shia Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN). The
court cited the botched detainment and extra-judicial killing of Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf in its decision.
Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups may escalate attacks on international positions while peacekeeping forces attempt to de-
escalate tensions and preserve the peace accord in northern Mali.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 30 NOV: The
Algerian army arrested
two militants near
Timiaouine, Adrar
Province, Algeria.
2) 01 DEC: The
Tunisian National
Guard arrested a
Libya-trained militant
in Kairouan,Tunisia.
3) 01 DEC: The
Moroccan BCIJ
arrested eight ISIS
members in Fez and
Tangier, Morocco.
4) 05 DEC: The
Moroccan BCIJ
arrested two ISIS
supporters attempting
to acquire explosive
material in
Casablanca, Morocco.
1
23
4

12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
1) 29 NOV: Al
Murabitoun detonated
a SVBIED at Gao
airport in Mali.
2) 30 NOV: An ISIS
supporter shot at the
U.S. Embassy in
N’djamena, Chad.
3) 01 DEC: IMN
protesters called for
the release of leader
Ibrahim al Zakzaky in
Abuja, Nigeria.
4) 02 DEC: GATIA
militants attacked a
CMA position near
Gao city, Mali.
5) 04 DEC: ISIS
Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya
attacked a MNJTF
outpost near
Kangarwa, Borno
State, Nigeria.
2
3
1
4
5

13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)