1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
April 6, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1. Iran and the P5+1 reached a framework agreement on Tehran’s nuclear program, limiting
uranium enrichment to Iran’s Natanz facility with 5,060 centrifuges.
2. AQAP seized control of al Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt governorate in Yemen.
3. Al Shabaab killed 147 people in an attack on a university in Garissa, Kenya.
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3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda may be looking to compete with the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) by encouraging low-level attacks by its
followers in the West. The emergence of ISIS cells outside of Iraq and Syria, particularly in Yemen, challenges al Qaeda’s
authority.
U.S. authorities arrested two American women who were plotting to conduct terrorist attacks in the U.S. One had close ties to
an AQAP operative. Additionally, Muhanad Mahmoud al Farekh, an American who trained with al Qaeda and was detained in
Pakistan, was recently transferred to U.S. custody to face terrorism charges.
A rumor persists that al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri has indicated he will absolve affiliates of their loyalty pledges to him
and allow them to operate independently. No official al Qaeda sources have given credence to the rumor.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to prioritize its fight in Syria, but will also take advantage of recent gains in Yemen. It will
continue to try to inspire low-scale attacks in the West.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
Pakistani Islamist groups, including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under TTP leader Mullah Fazlullah, the TTP’s Jamaat-
ul-Ahrar, and Lashkar-e-Islam announced they had merged to form a unified front against the Pakistan government and military.
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar had split from the TTP over Fazlullah’s selection as emir. There is a recent uptick in Balochistan violence.
The Pakistani military (PakMil) continues to target Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in ground operations and air strikes
in tribal and urban areas of Pakistan, especially in Khyber. The TTP’s leadership is under significant pressure as U.S. and
Pakistani airstrikes target TTP leaders on both sides of the Afghanistan and Pakistan border.
Outlook: PakMil operations, drone strikes continue in North/South Waziristan, Khyber/Orakzai Agencies, and across Afghan
border.
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AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm has lost support from Yemenis due to mounting civilian casualties. A reported Saudi
airstrike on al Mazraq refugee camp in Hajjah resulted in significant condemnation of the air campaign. Separately, Iran has
repeatedly called for a cessation to the violence in Yemen and indicated a willingness to work with Saudi Arabia to end the
conflict. The al Houthis continued to refuse to participate in talks, however.
Outlook: It does not appear that either Saudi Arabia or the al Houthis are ready to engage in political negotiations to end the
current crisis. The civilian toll will also continue to affect support for President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who remains in Saudi
Arabia.
Security
Saudi-led airstrikes continued to target al Houthi-controlled areas from March 28-April 3. The al Houthi movement expanded its
territorial presence despite the airstrikes, reportedly seizing the cities of Zinjibar and Shaqra, Abyan, and entering Shabwah
governorate on March 30. Control of Aden city remained highly contested between the al Houthis and opposing forces, with the
al Houthis seemingly consolidating control in Aden’s northern and central neighborhoods.
Outlook: Operation Decisive Storm has failed to halt al Houthi southward expansion. Aden and Abyan governorates will likely
see continued clashes between al Houthi militants and pro-Hadi forces.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State in Yemen (ISIS)
AQAP’s Ansar al Sharia militants seized control of al Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt governorate, on April 2 and reportedly
freed AQAP mid-level leader Khaled al Batarfi from the central prison. Ansar al Sharia militants stated that they seized al
Mukalla to protect it from al Houthi forces.
Outlook: Ansar al Sharia may try to take direct control of more areas in eastern Yemen and use al Houthi aggression to justify
its actions.
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN
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1) 28 MAR – 03 APR:
Coalition airstrikes
targeted al Houthi
sites throughout
Yemen.
2) 02 APR: AQAP’s
Ansar al Sharia
militants seized al
Mukalla, Hadramawt.
3) 29 MAR – 03 APR:
Al Houthi militants
battled pro-Hadi
forces for Aden city,
Aden.
4) 29 MAR: Al Houthi
militants and allied
forces seized control
of Zinjibar, Abyan.

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The moderate Sufi militant group Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) is opposed to regional elections in Galgudud region and is
boycotting the elections due to concerns over ASWJ’s representation in the new regional administration. ASWJ militants
prevented AMISOM troops from reaching Adado, Galgudud region on March 31. The AMISOM troops were deployed to secure
the town prior to regional elections being held there. The group has clashed with Somali government forces over the issue.
Outlook: ASWJ likely is attempting to influence the creation of a regional state that would join the federal Somali government.
The conflict with ASWJ could potentially distract from the fights against al Shabaab.
Security
Kenyan police arrested four terror suspects in Mombasa, Coast province, Kenya on April 3. The arrest coincided with an
increase in security across Kenya following the April 2 al Shabaab Garissa University attack. Mogadishu also saw an increased
presence of security forces on April 1 when Somali police and SNA troops shut down several roads throughout the city and
increased patrols.
Outlook: Both Kenyan and Somali security forces have struggled to prevent al Shabaab attacks. This is likely to continue
despite the increased presence of security forces since al Shabaab maintains its asymmetrical capabilities.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab carried out an attack at Garissa University College in Garissa, North Eastern province, Kenya on April 2 in a similar
style to its September 2013 Westgate Mall attack. At least 147 people were killed in Kenya’s deadliest attack since the 1998
embassy bombing. Four al Shabaab gunmen took Christian students hostage while releasing Muslims. The militants fought
security forces in a siege that lasted nearly 15 hours. Separately, former al Shabaab intelligence head Zakariya Ismail Ahmed
Hersi, who surrendered to the Somali government in December, stated in an April 1 interview that the ties between al Shabaab
and al Qaeda had weakened significantly. He stated that al Shabaab may join ISIS within the next two years.
Outlook: The Garissa University attack shows that al Shabaab maintains the ability to conduct high-casualty attacks inside of
Kenya. Al Shabaab will likely use the attack to attract media attention and additional recruits.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
1) 30 MAR: Gunmen
killed a Ugandan
lawyer prosecuting
suspected al Shabaab
members in Kampala,
Uganda.
2) 31 MAR: ASWJ
forces blocked
AMISOM troops in
Galgudud region.
3) 02 APR: Al
Shabaab attacked
Garissa University in
Garissa, North
Eastern province,
Kenya.
4) 03 APR: Kenyan
police arrested terror
suspects in
Mombasa, Coast
province, Kenya.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Omar al Hassi, the Prime Minister of the Tripoli-based General National Congress, has been removed by a vote of parliament
because of mismanagement of the Libyan economy and improper representation of government revenue. A former defense
minister close to al Hassi, Khalifa Ghwell, has been appointed interim prime minister. Ghwell’s credentials are nearly identical to
those of his predecessor, and he is considered a hardline Islamist.
Outlook: The real power in Tripoli lies with the militias and it is unlikely that this event will result in any appreciable change.
Security
Libyan National Army (LNA) forces have made significant gains around Tripoli, capturing Aziziya and areas south of Zawiya. In
response, Libya Dawn militias have withdrawn to defensible positions in Ajaylat, Zawiya, and Tripoli. Reports have emerged of
militias recruiting civilians to defend their neighborhoods in Zawiya and Tripoli. The status of a previously announced operation
to seize Tripoli is unclear. Abdullah al Thinni, the Prime Minister of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, announced that
the operation was stalled on April 1, yet forces made significant gains on April 3.
Outlook: It is unclear whether the LNA possesses the capability to recapture the capital. While LNA continues to advance, the
operation becomes increasingly difficult as forces enter Zintan.
Ansar al Sharia Libya and ISIS in Libya
ISIS is suspected of carrying out attacks in both Tripoli and Misrata, displaying a continued ability to project power into the
Western region despite pressure on Sirte.
Additionally, unconfirmed rumors emerged that Abu Abdullah al Libi, a prominent Ansar al Sharia jurist, defected to ISIS. No
official statement has been published by either organization and therefore this is reported with low confidence.
Outlook: Neither ISIS nor Ansar al Sharia attempted to exploit the withdrawal of Libya Dawn forces from the Oil Crescent on
March 27. Nor has the significant commitment of LNA forces to Western Libya resulted in any change in behavior. This
indicates that both organizations may be occupied with fighting in Benghazi, Sirte, and Derna.
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
French special forces freed Dutch hostage Sjaak Rijke on April 6 in northern Mali. Rijke was abducted in Timbuktu in 2011 and
most recently appeared in an AQIM video in November 2014.
Outlook: The French operation to free Rijke may elicit reactionary attacks from AQIM militants in Mali.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
Tunisian security forces continued counter-terrorism operations targeting militants linked to the March 18 Bardo Museum
attack. Tunisian forces killed the leader of the AQIM-linked Uqba Ibn Nafaa Bridage, Khaled Hamadi Chayeb, in a March 30 raid
in Gafsa, southwest Tunisia. A pro-ISIS group calling itself “Soldiers of the Caliphate in Tunisia” also formally released a claim
of responsibility for the Bardo Museum attack.
Outlook: North African militant and terrorist groups may continue to be drawn to ISIS over al Qaeda as ISIS solidifies its
footprint in both Libya and Tunisia.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
MUJAO claimed responsibility for an attack against an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) truck near Gao,
leaving one ICRC member dead and another injured. Unidentified militants attacked a Malian army base in Bouklessi, near the
border with Burkina Faso. During the firefight, the Malian army killed three militants and captured two others, and did not reveal
what group the attackers came from. Meanwhile, an IED was detonated close to Ansongo, about 1.5 kilometers from a
MINUSMA camp, killing one civilian and injuring another.
Outlook: Recent attacks against peacekeeping forces, humanitarian and aid workers, and government bases represent a
disturbing trend in increased militant activity. Islamist militants groups like MUJAO are likely to stage more attacks, and will
continue to benefit from northern Mali’s instability.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA
10101010101010
1) 30 – 31 MAR: Libya
Dawn militants in
Tripoli and Zawiya
allegedly rounded
up young men and
forced them to join
militias.
2) 01 APR: ISIS
militants attacked a
militia checkpoint at a
southern entrance to
Misrata.
3) 02 APR: ISIS
gunmen attacked a
checkpoint in the
Janzour district of
Tripoli.
4) 03 APR: LNA forces
made advances near
Tripoli, seizing
the cities of Aziziya
and Bir Hassan.
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11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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1
1) 30 MAR: MUJAO
militants attacked an
International
Committee of the
Red Cross truck near
Gao.
2) 01 APR:
Unidentified militants
attacked a Malian
army base in
Boulkessi.
3) 02 APR: An IED
exploded close to a
MINUSMA camp in
Ansongo.
WEST AFRICA
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SAHEL

12. ASSESSMENT:
Regional Developments
Iran’s response to the ongoing crisis in Yemen remained focused on rhetorical condemnation of the Saudi-led airstrikes, while
offering moral support for the Yemeni people. In an open letter to al Houthi leader Abdul Malik al Houthi, Expediency
Discernment Council (EDC) Secretary Mohsen Rezaei praised Ansar Allah, the political wing of the al Houthis, for participating
in a “real Islamic Awakening.” Senior regime officials also echoed warnings about the consequences of prolonged military
intervention in Yemen. EDC Chairman Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani stated, “If the invaders do not recognize their
mistakes soon, this raging fire will be fueled.” Parliamentarian Alaeddin Boroujerdi, meanwhile, reminded the Saudis that
Saddam Hussein was defeated by Iran despite all the support he received, implying that a similar fate would be in store if
Riyadh decides to invade Yemen.
Outlook: The regime will continue to promote inclusive dialogue amongst opposing groups to resolve the political crisis in
Yemen.
Nuclear Talks
After continuing talks two days past the March 31 deadline, Iran and the P5+1 reached a framework agreement on Tehran’s
nuclear program, entitled “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” [JCPOA]. One of the key tenets of the JCPOA is limitation of
uranium enrichment to Iran’s Natanz facility with 5,060 centrifuges. The U.S. has indicated that U.S. EU, and UN Security
Council nuclear-related sanctions will be removed in a phased fashion, although the exact schedule of removal is unclear.
Interim Tehran Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah Mohammad Emami Kashani highlighted the framework as “fundamental and
excellent,” while President Hassan Rouhani said it indicated the international community recognizes “enrichment in Iran is no
threat to anyone.” Negative regime reaction focused on the removal of sanctions; Parliamentarian Esmail Kowsari stated,
“Iran’s main demand for the complete cancellation of sanctions was not achieved.”
Outlook: Iran and the P5+1 will draft the statement on the JCPOA between now and June 30, which is the final deadline to
reach a deal.
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IRAN

13. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
1328 MAR – 03 APR 2015
28 MAR: Expediency Discernment Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei praised al Houthi leader, Abdul Malik al
Houthi, in an open letter.
29 MAR: Senior Iranian nuclear negotiator Abbas Araghchi said that U.S., EU, and UN Security Council
sanctions must be removed in the event of a nuclear deal.
29 MAR: Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani cancelled his trip to Riyadh in protest of Saudi strikes in
Yemen; Tehran summoned Ankara’s chargé d'affaires following Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s
March 26 accusation that Iran is pursuing hegemonic goals in the region.
30 MAR: IRGC Brig. Gen. Massoud Jazayeri reiterated that Iran’s defense capabilities are non-negotiable.
31 MAR: Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian suggested that Saudi Arabia and Iran could work
together to end the Yemeni conflict, while the Foreign Ministry denied allegations that Iran shipped
weapons to Yemen.
01 APR: Negotiations continued in Lausanne, Switzerland past the March 31 deadline.
01 APR: President Hassan Rouhani issued a message to Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al Abadi regarding
recent developments in Yemen.
02 APR: Iran and the P5+1 reached a political framework agreement for a final nuclear deal.
02 APR: IRGC Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan rebuked his American counterpart, Ashton Carter’s, contingency
plan for military strikes on Iran if an agreement is not reached.
02 APR: Senior Iranian clerics and members of the Supreme Council of the Ahl al Bayt World Assembly met
with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad.
03 APR: President Rouhani stated that “all sanctions resolutions against Iran will be canceled on the very
first day the deal is implemented” during a televised address on the nuclear negotiations.

14. ACRONYMS
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Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)
Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State (IS)
Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
North Waziristan (NWA)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
South Waziristan (SWA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

15. CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ANALYSTS
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Alexis Knutsen
al Qaeda analyst
alexis.knutsen@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project,
visit www.criticalthreats.org.
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