Regional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) 2011 - Strengthening Civil-Military Coordination for conflict and disaster management - Summary Report
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Regional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) 2011 - Strengthening Civil-Military Coordination for conflict and disaster management - Summary Report



The Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (the Centre), in conjunction with the US Government’s Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE-DMHA), ...

The Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (the Centre), in conjunction with the US Government’s Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE-DMHA), co-hosted the Regional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) in Cairns, Australia, from 16-19 May 2011.1 The seminar - a civil-military coordination forum for emerging government and non-government leaders from the Asia Pacific region – was attended by 31 participants from ten countries and included representatives from the United Nations and a number of other relevant organisations.2 Participants considered contemporary civil-military challenges for conflict and disaster management. The subject of the three-day seminar was Strengthening Civil-Military Coordination for Conflict and Disaster Management. It focused on two predominant themes: 1) ‘civil-military coordination in Disaster Management – what progress has been made and where do we go from here?’; and 2) ‘Protection of Civilians in a multiagency environment in complex emergencies’. The final day included a session on ‘New Ideas - Working with hyperconnected information in conflicts and disasters’.



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Regional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) 2011 - Strengthening Civil-Military Coordination for conflict and disaster management - Summary Report Document Transcript

  • 1. SUMMARY REPORTRegional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) 2011 STRENGTHENING CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION FORCONFLICT AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT 16-19 May 2011, Pullman Reef Hotel, Cairns, Australia Compiled by Sarah Shteir, Research Project Officer, Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence July 2011
  • 2. Table of ContentsAcronyms................................................................................................................................... 3I. Executive Summary................................................................................................................ 4II. Background ........................................................................................................................... 6III. Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Management......................................................... 7i. Context.................................................................................................................................... 7ii. Progress Made ....................................................................................................................... 7iii. Challenges & Gaps ............................................................................................................... 9iv. Priorities & Solutions - Where do we go from here? ......................................................... 10IV. Protection of Civilians in a Multiagency Environment in ComplexEmergencies............................................................................................................................. 13i. Context.................................................................................................................................. 13ii. Progress Made ..................................................................................................................... 15iii. Challenges & Gaps ............................................................................................................. 17iv. Priorities & Solutions - Where do we go from here? ......................................................... 19V. Common Issues ................................................................................................................... 21VI. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 23VII. Key Readings, Resources & References .......................................................................... 25Annex A. RSLS 2011 Program................................................................................................ 29RSLS 2011 Summary Report 2
  • 3. AcronymsADF Australian Defence ForceASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsAusAID Australian Agency for International DevelopmentC-34 UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping OperationsCentre Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of ExcellenceCOE-DMHA Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian AssistanceCONOPS Concept of OperationsDFS Department of Field Support (UN)DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)DRC Democratic Republic of the CongoFPU Formed Police UnitICRC International Committee of the Red CrossISAF International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)MINUSTAH UN Stabilization Mission in HaitiMONUC UN Mission in the DRCMONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC (formerly MONUC)NDMO National Disaster Management OfficeNGO Non-Governmental OrganisationPOC Protection of CiviliansPOC Framework UN ‘Framework for Drafting Comprehensive POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’RSLS Regional Senior Leaders SeminarR2P Responsibility to ProtectT/PCC Troop/Police-Contributing CountriesUNAMID African Union/UN Hybrid operation in DarfurUNAMSIL UN Mission in Sierra LoneUNCT UN Country TeamUNDP UN Development ProgrammeUNFPA UN Population FundUNHCR Office of the UN High Commissioner for RefugeesUNHCHR Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human RightsUNICEF UN Children’s FundUNIFIL UN Interim Force in LebanonUNMIS UN Mission in SudanUN OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsUNOCI UN Operation in Côte d’IvoireWFP World Food Programme (UN)RSLS 2011 Summary Report 3
  • 4. I. Executive SummaryThe Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (the Centre), in conjunctionwith the US Government’s Center for Excellence in Disaster Management andHumanitarian Assistance (COE-DMHA), co-hosted the Regional Senior LeadersSeminar (RSLS) in Cairns, Australia, from 16-19 May 2011. 1 The seminar - acivil-military coordination forum for emerging government and non-governmentleaders from the Asia Pacific region – was attended by 31 participants from tencountries and included representatives from the United Nations and a number ofother relevant organisations. 2 Participants considered contemporary civil-militarychallenges for conflict and disaster management. The subject of the three-dayseminar was Strengthening Civil-Military Coordination for Conflict and DisasterManagement. It focused on two predominant themes: 1) ‘civil-militarycoordination in Disaster Management – what progress has been made and wheredo we go from here?’; and 2) ‘Protection of Civilians in a multiagencyenvironment in complex emergencies’. The final day included a session on ‘NewIdeas - Working with hyperconnected information in conflicts and disasters’.The two main seminar themes were chosen because they reflect contemporaryoperational challenges for civil-military actors. In the context of disasters, notonly is the Asia Pacific region the most disaster-prone in the world, but thenumber and complexity of disasters is increasing, as is the requirement forcoordinated civil-military responses. In the context of protection of civilians(POC) in complex emergencies, since 1999, the UN Security Council hasmandated POC in 10 UN peacekeeping missions. In these environments,protection actors continue to face significant challenges in achieving coherence,often with limited resources, insufficient guidance and under intense publicscrutiny. Often working in a contested post-conflict environment, protectionactors also may have to contend with armed groups, a hostile or incapable hoststate, and the lack of a coherent protection implementation plan.Despite these operational challenges, participants identified progress being made.In disaster contexts, the wealth of experience within the region is provingcritically important. Countries, such as those represented by the RSLSparticipants, are gaining experience in multiagency and whole-of-governmentdisaster management. These experiences have reinforced the importance of civil-military coordination, and helped to identify areas requiring attention andimprovement. The utility of a Pacific Disaster Management Map was seen as auseful mechanism to understand the basic interactions between domestic andinternational actors in disaster response. In complex emergency contexts, the highlevel of activity to improve POC by UN peacekeeping missions has resulted inconsiderable progress, including the development of the ‘UN Framework forDrafting Comprehensive POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’(hereafter ‘POC Framework’); the development of POC training modules for1 A Regional Senior Leaders Seminar was held in 2010 in Honolulu on ‘The Challenges ofMultinational U.N. Peace Support Operations after a Natural Disaster’.2 Participants represented the following countries: the Philippines, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia,Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and New Caledonia-France. Thenon-government organisations present were: Australia Aid International, Save the Children,Oxfam, ICRC, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.RSLS 2011 Summary Report 4
  • 5. civilian, police and military personnel; and a focus on operationalising POC as acore strategic objective for (and within) UN peacekeeping missions.Despite advances in both these contexts, participants noted that considerable workstill lies ahead. Participants highlighted the challenges and gaps that presentedobstacles to improved civil-military effectiveness. In disaster contexts, theobstacles identified included a lack of practical operational mechanisms for civil-military coordination, and the need for clearer reporting lines. In the POC context,challenges included a lack of POC doctrine and training, personnel and resourceshortfalls, and the need for peacekeepers to act pre-emptively to protect civiliansunder imminent threat of violence, in the face of a helpless, unwilling or abusivehost state.Participants did not shy away from these challenges, suggesting solutions andpriorities to enhance civil-military collaboration in both disaster response andPOC. These suggestions ranged from the more philosophical to the pragmatic andconcrete. The central conclusion was that civil-military actors require knowledgeand a ‘common understanding’ of the actual situation and of each others’ rolesand responsibilities. In the context of disaster management, participants suggestedvarious solutions and priorities. These included recognising the importance ofprevention and preparation, the critical role of liaison officers, the critical need forrelationships and trust, and the importance of joint training, exercises anddoctrine. For POC, participants’ suggestions addressed the importance ofengagement between peacekeepers and communities and the need for communityliaison interpreters. They also prioritised the POC Framework and the POCstrategy consultation process, the importance of responsive patrols, benchmarks,and an improved attitude about intelligence gathering, among other issues.The presentations and discussions during the seminar highlighted a number ofcommon themes. These related to: the importance of achieving a commonunderstanding; understanding the context for civil-military engagement (thenature or ‘typology’ of the crisis and the nature of the response effort); themultiplicity of actors involved in crisis environments; the utility of social mediafor civil-military crisis management; the unavoidable presence of politicalrealities; and the importance of the ‘bigger picture’.The RSLS 2011 was an effective activity that drew upon the experiences ofagencies and individuals working to address civil-military challenges in conflictand disaster situations. The RSLS encouraged a strong sense of informationsharing and a strong focus on the need for common understanding, and directlyenhanced relationships across the civil-military community.RSLS 2011 Summary Report 5
  • 6. I. BackgroundThe Regional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) 2011 brought together 31participants representing ten countries in the Asia-Pacific region; expert speakersfrom government, the United Nations, the International Committee of the RedCross (ICRC), and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs); andstaff from the Centre and COE-DMHA. The three-day seminar focused on twopredominant themes: 1) ‘civil-military coordination in Disaster Management –what progress has been made and where do we go from here?’; and 2) ‘Protectionof Civilians in a multiagency environment in complex emergencies’. In addition,the final day included a session on ‘New Ideas - Working with hyperconnectedinformation in conflicts and disasters’. The seminar comprised keynotepresentations, panel discussions, significant working group activity, supported bycirculating mentors, and a conference dinner with a keynote address by LtGen(Ret) John Goodman, Executive Director of the COE-DMHA. Networking was akey objective and was prominent with working relationships developed andstrengthened among civilian, police and military practitioners from the region.The aim of RSLS 2011 was to provide an opportunity for senior government andnongovernment officials from the Asia Pacific region to come together toworkshop civil-military issues and challenges for conflict and disastermanagement. The seminar was framed by a series of background papers,circulated to participants in advance of the seminar (see section VII). The formatof the event provided an environment for participants to develop a sharedunderstanding of civil-military approaches to collaborating in multinationalresponses to conflict and disaster situations. The seminar was conducted underChatham House Rule to encourage openness and sharing of information andopinions.The objectives of RSLS 2011 were to: • Provide senior regional leaders the opportunity to share and improve their understanding of civil-military coordination in complex emergencies and disaster management; • Enhance communication and coordination between participating countries and organisations; and • Access senior experts in the fields of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and conflict management.This report summarises the two themes, examples of progress made, continuingchallenges and gaps, and solutions and priorities identified and highlighted duringthe three days of presentations and discussions. 3 This summary report alsoconsiders numerous common themes linking the distinct but related issues ofdisaster management and POC in multiagency complex emergencies. The reportconcludes with a list of the documents and resources that were referenced andcirculated during the seminar, as well as useful links.3 This report draws upon notes from Sarah Shteir, the RSLS rapporteur, PowerPoint presentationsand talking points shared by participants, notes from working group discussions and their plenaryfeedback, comments posted on a communal whiteboard, and notes shared by participants viafeedback sheets. The views expressed in this report do not represent Australian Governmentpolicy.RSLS 2011 Summary Report 6
  • 7. III. Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Managementi. ContextThe Asia Pacific is the most disaster-prone region in the world. 4 Those living inthe region are ‘four times more likely to be affected by natural disasters than thoseliving in Africa, and 25 times more likely than those living in Europe or NorthAmerica’. 5 As participants heard, the vulnerabilities of this region are exacerbatedby multiple factors including: limited resources; the remoteness of many locationsand isolation of many communities; increasing urbanisation; reliance on outsideassistance; and the loss of traditional coping mechanisms.Disasters can wipe out decades of • Over half of the 4 billiondevelopment and investment. According to the people living in Asia (60% ofUnited Nations, in 2010, disasters caused an the world’s population), live near the coasts, ‘making themestimated $109 billion in economic damage – directly vulnerable to sea-level‘three times more than in 2009’. 6 The rise’ (The Working Group onestimated cost of the disasters in Queensland Climate Change andalone was $9-10 billion. Disasters distract Development, 2007).governments from other critical priorities and • ‘In 2009, over 75 per cent ofactivities and can weaken them politically. people killed by naturalDue to the increasing use of social media, disasters worldwide were indisasters and the efforts to manage them now Asia and the Pacific’ (OCHAface increasing media scrutiny. Regional Office for Asia Pacific, ‘Briefing Kit’, 2011).While decreasing global fatality rates fromdisasters suggest that preparedness efforts are reaping some rewards, the reality isthat the number of catastrophes is increasing. These disasters are not onlyincreasing, they are also increasingly complex, as is the response effort,comprised of an increasingly diverse range of actors. This reality demandseffective civil-military coordination and engagement. While there is increasingacknowledgement and awareness of the importance of civil-military coordination,and significant advances in this area, considerable challenges and work remain.ii. Progress MadeAustralia’s Growing Experience of Civil-Military CoordinationAustralia has been developing strong skills and capabilities in civil-militarycoordination over the past two decades of its operations in disaster situations.These operations have shifted over time from arrangements in which the civilianand military efforts were run in parallel and in isolation from one another, tointegrated, co-led operations, demonstrated most recently with the AustralianGovernment’s contribution to the Pakistan Floods (2010) response. Under theunifying badge of the Australian Medical Task Force, a joint medical task force4 OCHA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, ‘Regional Trends and Implications for OCHAin Asia and the Pacific’, September 2010, viewed at UN ESCAP and UNISDR, Protecting Development Gains: Reducing Disaster Vulnerability andBuilding Resilience in Asia and the Pacific - The Asia-Pacific Disaster Report, 2010, p.vii, viewedat Laura MacInnis, ‘Cost of natural disasters $109 billion in 2010: U.N.’, Reuters, 24 January 2011,viewed at 2011 Summary Report 7
  • 8. was deployed to Kot Adu. It was led under a diarchy arrangement, with leadershipshared between a team leader from the Australian Agency for InternationalDevelopment (AusAID) and an Australian Defence Force (ADF) Commander. Asone participant reflected, this arrangement ‘ensured a unity in decision-making,promoted a united front and allowed both the ADF and AusAID to take therespective lead on their collective and individual areas of responsibility’.A Pacific Disaster Management Stakeholder MapAs was explained by one participant, the Pacific region provides a useful model ofdomestic arrangements for disaster response in the form of the Pacific DisasterManagement Stakeholder Map copied below. The core domestic components ofthe map are the national government, a National Disaster Management Office(NDMO), which can be civilian or military-led, a National Disaster Council,national societies of the Red Cross, and national NGOs and community-basedorganisations. These domestic components share the disaster management spacewith various international actors, including regional organisations andarrangements (Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEANRegional Forum [ARF], Pacific Islands Forum [PIF], FRANZ 7 etc), the UnitedNations and international NGOs and donor countries.Engagement between and among domestic and international actors is facilitatedby various layers of informal, and formal domestic and international networks.These include the UN cluster system, regional networks such as the South PacificApplied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC), the Pacific Humanitarian Team, andinformal networks. There are also strong informal networks in place. These mayinclude church networks, and links between Pacific communities and PacificIsland nationals living in New Zealand and Australia who often provide assistancethrough their remittances and other forms of support.7 FRANZ is an agreement between the three signatory states France, Australia and New Zealand,which facilitates cooperative emergency relief assistance to the South Pacific in situations ofnatural disasters. From Embassy of France in Canberra, ‘FRANZ meeting - Sydney (May18)’, 2011 Summary Report 8
  • 9. Tools for Civil-Military Coordination (see Section VII)There is a wealth of existing tools to facilitate and enhance civil-militarycoordination in disaster management. As one participant noted, there is no need toreinvent the wheel. These tools include: • The Sphere Handbook - Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response; • The Australian Council for International Development Code of Conduct, a ‘voluntary, self regulatory industry code’; 8 • ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief’; • International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, and Refugee Law; • Specific Terms of Reference and agreements (such as FRANZ); • Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations ‘Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in National Disaster Response Operations’; • ASEAN Standby Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures; and • Joint contingency planning and simulation exercises.These tools are especially important as disaster environments becomeincreasingly crowded with greater numbers of agencies with their own distinctmandates, approaches and capabilities. According to one participant, the keyquestion is how to engage with this multitude of tools.iii. Challenges & GapsPolicy and DoctrineWhile there is a substantial body of tools to help guide ‘We are only justcivil-military coordination and engagement, it was managing to get bynoted that there is a serious lack of explicit policy and now…we need all thedoctrine within the region. In Australia, for example, skills and coordinatedthere is no clear policy on the civil-military space. A effort we can get. ‘civil-military policy would enable the development and Participantproduction of effective civil-military doctrine. Suchpolicy and doctrine is fundamental for effective civil-military coordination andcohesion, and it was noted that progress will be difficult without it.Practical MechanismsAs one participant noted, while we have a good comprehensive set ofphilosophies, what we do not have are the practical mechanisms to allow for civil-military coordination to actually take place. This observation mirrors a commentmade by Australia’s Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd: If we have a huge event affecting a major capital city in the region or across the world with a large loss of life, the international effort required would be massive, and I am not confident that currently the international system of cooperation and coordination would be up to8 ACFID, viewed at 2011 Summary Report 9
  • 10. it…Our current arrangements are not sharp enough for that response to be as rapid and as large scale as it needs to be. 9As one participant remarked, ‘the first ten days we are not as good as we are onday 11…will the first ten days of the next disaster change and be improved or willwe still face the same challenges? ‘Same same, but different’ Every disaster is different; not only the nature of the disaster (the ‘typology’) but also the context in which it occurs (politics,‘Be wary of the model that worked culture, economics). For this reason, nolast time. It won’t necessarily worknext time’. single disaster response template is feasible, Participant regardless of the convenience of the idea.Reporting ChainsAs operations become increasingly coordinated and even integrated, a key factorthat requires consideration is the question of reporting lines. In the jointAustralian Medical Task Force in Pakistan, for example, the dual reporting chainsproved problematic, with the same information sometimes interpreted differentlyby civilian and military partners. This experience raises the question of whethersome form of a centralised reporting system or a shared information system isrequired in such situations.UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsParticipants acknowledged the critical civil-military coordination role played bythe UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 10 includingin ensuring that humanitarian principles are operationally applied in the civil-military space. They also acknowledged the pressing need for more OCHA civil-military coordination officers in the Asia-Pacific.iv. Priorities & Solutions - Where do we go from here?Participants identified the following key priorities and solutions during theseminar: 1. Preparation and Prevention: Participants noted that, in the civil-military disaster management space, the predominant focus tends to be on the response phase. However, the response should not be the endgame. Resources are needed to work with communities and NDMOs/Host Governments to enhance preparedness and disaster risk reduction - the prevention and mitigation aspects of disaster management, including the civil-military interface. After all, the preparatory and preventive efforts (training, preparedness, contingency planning, and exercises) play a critical role in determining and shaping the response effort.9 Excerpt from Transcript from Joint media conference with Pedro Villagra Delgado, Dean of theDiplomatic Corps on ‘Diplomatic Corps visit to Queensland, Climate Change, Qantas, Tourism,ASX merger decision’, Brisbane, 6 April 201110 UN OCHA was ultimately unable to attend RSLS for reasons of current operational overstretch.They are currently preparing a study to address the Office’s future civil-military roles andpriorities.RSLS 2011 Summary Report 10
  • 11. 2. Deployment of Liaison Officers: Professional and trained liaison officers are needed to facilitate civil-military coordination. These officers must be empowered to make decisions, have developed contacts and networks, and know what to look for, and who to talk to. If adequately resourced, OCHA could provide trained civil-military coordination officers for such roles. Given the limited capacity and capability issues for domestic disaster management structures, such as NDMOs, one participant cautioned that such personnel must be cognisant of the potential burden they place on national offices with their requests for information. 3. Credible Reference List of Coordination Arrangements: There are multiple regional, multilateral, and bilateral arrangements to support civil- military coordination in disaster management. OCHA plays a critical role in this effort, as does the UN Cluster system; ASEAN has a number of applicable arrangements, some theoretical and some operational; so too does the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. However, according to one participant, there is no credible list of these arrangements. Participants highlighted on a number of occasions the need for a clear and credible mapping of the full range of existing networks and arrangements. 4. Civil-Military Coordination Framework: Institutional processes or frameworks need to be established to guide civil-military coordination and ensure it is not ad hoc and based solely on individual personalities and relationships. This will ensure that such coordination does not vanish with personnel changes. 5. Relationships and Trust: Relationships alone are insufficient, as the above point highlights, but they are nonetheless critical for effective disaster response. Developing relationships prior to disasters – bilateral and multilateral relationships between countries and organisations, between civilian and military organisations, and between individuals - enables actors to know their counterparts (their approach, doctrine, sensibilities), can facilitate the development of a common understanding between diverse actors, and can facilitate improved coordination during the chaos and complexity of a disaster situation. 6. Joint Exercises and Training: Shared exercises and training increase interoperability. While there is limited activity in this area – with NGOs often excluded from joint exercises - it was acknowledged that momentum is building. However, it was also acknowledged that the varying capacities and capabilities of civilian, police and military personnel present a challenge for such initiatives. For example, NGOs often have such limited resources and time that they may not be able to participate in joint exercises, even if they were invited to and wanted to. 7. ‘Double Counting’ Skills: One participant proposed ‘double counting’ skills; in other words proactively utilising the multiple core skills that many individuals bring to a disaster response. The multi-skilled nature of team members, such as reservists who have both a military and civilianRSLS 2011 Summary Report 11
  • 12. career (with knowledge of both ‘sides’), could have great utility in a multidimensional, multiagency environment. 11 8. Simplicity: As one participant reflected, there will always be tensions and friction between civilian and military actors. Even with training, awareness-raising and exercises, the civil-military dynamic will always prove complex and complicated. Observing that we tend to overcomplicate things, this participant noted that ‘It behoves us to keep things as simple as possible’. 9. End-state: One participant asked the questions - why do we want to do better? What is the desired end-state? It is critical that we remember we are there to save lives, reduce injury, and enable and support recovery. This is the driving need to enhance civil-military effectiveness.11 At the same time, it was noted that double counting can be a ‘double-edged sword’, as reservistsmay face multiple competing demands for their capabilities.RSLS 2011 Summary Report 12
  • 13. IV. Protection of Civilians in a Multiagency Environment inComplex Emergenciesi. ContextUN peacekeeping operations have been explicitly involved in the protection ofcivilians in 10 different missions over the past 12 years. Beginning with the 1999mandate for the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), this journey has beenchallenging and difficult. The role of peacekeeping in POC has been controversialand contested, as it is bound up in sensitive issues of sovereignty and host nationconsent. There have been differing levels of support and acceptance for POCamong key Member States, including Security Council members and Troop andPolice Contributing Countries (T/PCCs). Among the latter, concern and resistanceto a POC role has sometimes been reflected innational caveats limiting what their personnel are We need to remember whoallowed to do when faced with civilians under protection is about.imminent threat of violence. The controversial Participant (paraphrased)nature of POC is further compounded by its links tothe politically charged ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ norm. 12 Despite thechallenges and resistance, today, there are seven UN missions, out of a total of 16,with a POC mandate: Sudan (UNMIS); Sudan-Darfur (UNAMID); Lebanon(UNIFIL); Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI); Liberia (UNMIL); Haiti (MINUSTAH); andthe Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (MONUSCO). Across thesemissions, there are approximately 112, 000 personnel deployed under a POCmandate. 13There are multiple protection players and stakeholders in a multiagencypeacekeeping environment. The host state has primary responsibility for theprotection of (its) civilians. Communities themselves are a central actor in theirown protection, with often well-developed self-protection mechanisms andstrategies (eg. ‘run, hide, negotiate, fight-back’). There are explicit protection-mandated organisations, including the ICRC, and the Office of the UN HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). There is the UN peacekeeping missionitself (military, police and civilian personnel). There is the UN Country Team(UNCT), which may include UN OCHA, UNHCR, the Office of the UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the UN Children’s Fund(UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA),12 R2P is a norm (also described as a concept and principle) that addresses the responsibility toprotect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. R2Pwas embraced by UN General Assembly Member States at the 2005 World Summit in paragraphs138-139 of the Outcome Document. In 2009, the UN Secretary-General released the firstcomprehensive document outlining implementation of R2P. In this document he proposes a three-pillar approach for advancing the R2P agenda: ‘The protection responsibilities of the State’;‘International assistance and capacity-building’; and ‘Timely and decisive response’. FromInternational Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Core Documents: Understanding RtoP’,viewed at andUN General Assembly, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General’, A/63/677, 12 January 2009, p.2.13 It is important to note that non-UN operations also include protection tasks. For example, inAfghanistan, ‘population protection’ has become a central focus for the International SecurityAssistance Force (ISAF).RSLS 2011 Summary Report 13
  • 14. UN Women, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), as well asinternational NGOs. These organisations often coordinate among each other andwith the peacekeeping mission through the UN protection cluster system. Otherplayers and stakeholders include national NGOs and community-basedorganisations.These varied protection actors approach their protection efforts in diverse ways.Within the human rights and humanitarian field, there is a consensus-baseddefinition that has been used for many years by many organisations, based on theICRC definition and endorsed by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee: The concept of protection encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law… A protection activity is any activity – consistent with the above-mentioned purpose – aimed at creating an environment conducive to respect for human beings, preventing and/or alleviating the immediate effects of a specific pattern of abuse, and restoring dignified conditions of life through reparation, restitution and rehabilitation. 14Protection actors who use this rights-based definition, such as the ICRC, havedeveloped a conceptual reference known as the ‘protection egg’. The ‘protectionresponse egg’ identifies three levels of protection action: responsive action;remedial action; and environment building. 15More recently, the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) andField Support (DFS) developed a Concept of Operations for the application of Examples of Successful Protection POC in UN peacekeeping operations. by Peacekeepers: The 2009 Operational Concept on the • MONUSCO (DRC): Swift Protection of Civilians in UN intervention by peacekeepers led Peacekeeping Operations outlines a to the release of seven women on ‘three-tiered approach’ to protection for the same day they were abducted peacekeeping missions: protection by rebels. through political process; protection • MINUSTAH (Haiti): Peacekeeper from physical violence; and establishing patrols in an IDP camp helped a protective environment (promotion of reduce crime and improve security legal protection, facilitation of for camp residents. humanitarian assistance and advocacy, and support to national institutions). 16There has been considerable activity over the past three years to improve POC inUN peacekeeping operations. Much of this activity has been guided by requests14 ICVA, ‘What Is Protection?: A Definition by Consensus: A Background Note for the Workshopon the Development of Human Rights Training for Humanitarian Actors’, 2001, viewed at ICRC, Strengthening Protection in War: A Search for Professional Standards, 2001, viewed at DPKO/DFS, ‘Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in UnitedNations Peacekeeping Operations’, 2010, pp. 1, 9.RSLS 2011 Summary Report 14
  • 15. from Member States, in particular through the UN Special Committee onPeacekeeping Operations (the C-34). This flurry of activity also has been drivenby challenging and difficult environments faced by a number of the UN’s largermissions. The UN missions in Haiti, Sudan, Darfur, DRC and Côte d’Ivoire haveall had to grapple with difficult events and, as one participant explained, theirability to protect civilians ‘has been put to the test’. There have been highlypublicised failures, where peacekeepers were unable to reach civilians in time toprotect them, due, among other factors, to inaccessibility and lack of resources.There have also been many, less publicised, cases where peacekeepers havesuccessfully protected civilians in the mission area; participants heard successstories from DRC, Darfur and Haiti.ii. Progress MadeUN ‘Framework for Drafting Comprehensive POC Strategies in UNPeacekeeping Operations’The newest POC tool to be developed by DPKO isthe UN ‘Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Template for Comprehensive POC StrategiesPOC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’(hereafter the ‘POC Framework’). Developed A. Purpose and scope of thethrough extensive consultation, it is designed as an strategy‘umbrella’ to help missions build a mission-wide B. Analysis of POC risks andstrategy responsive to their context and situation, undertaking risk assessmentswhile ensuring they have all the necessary elements, C. POC activitiesand are consulting and coordinating with all the D. Information-gathering andright protection actors. A core component of the sharing systemPOC Framework template is a POC risk analysis, E. Early warning systems and‘in many ways the focus of the Framework’, crisis response F. Analysis of missionaccording to one participant. A POC risk analysis capacities, resources andmust be conducted jointly with other UN protection national caveatsactors, including the UNCT, ‘in order to ensure a G. Roles and responsibilities ofcommon understanding and prioritization of those mission components andrisks’. 17 Through this analysis, and a candid other protection actors H. Coordination mechanismsassessment of a mission’s capacities and I. Expectations Managementcapabilities, the mission can then prioritise their J. Monitoring and reporting onPOC tasks and activities, in coordination with other implementation of POCprotection actors. The POC Framework is now mandatesofficial guidance for the field, following its recentapproval by the C-34.Development of UN POC Training ModulesDPKO is developing a series of training modules for military, police and civilianpersonnel working in missions with POC mandates. The modules address theconceptual underpinnings of POC and are based on realistic scenarios. As oneparticipant outlined, the modules have been shared with Member States and willshortly be pilot tested with peacekeeping training institutes and missions, afterwhich they will be finalised and shared again with Member States in July 2011.17 DPKO/DFS, ‘Framework for Drafting POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’, 2011,p.8.RSLS 2011 Summary Report 15
  • 16. Regional training-of-trainer courses on the modules will be conducted from July2011 to July 2012, pending resources. Once finalised, the modules will bedelivered as part of pre-deployment training as well as in-mission training.UN Scenario-based Training Modules on Sexual ViolenceDPKO is working with UN Women and UN Action Against Sexual Violence inConflict on scenario-based training modules on sexual violence for militarypersonnel. These modules present military personnel, prior to deployment, with‘real-life sexual violence situations’ to teach them how to respond. 18Resource and Capability Requirements for POCUpon a request from Member States, DPKO has begun to outline the resource andcapability requirements for implementing POC mandates. A resource andcapability matrix has been drafted and shared with the C-34 and UN missions forfeedback. The matrix is intended to clarify requirements based on specific POCactivities. This tool is intended to provide insight into the planning for future POCmissions.Concept of OperationsDPKO has begun assessing existing mission Concept of Operations (CONOPS) todetermine their adequacy in achieving POC-mandated requirements. A review ofexisting police and military CONOPS for POC missions has revealedconsiderable variation: some make explicit mention of POC; and some indirectreference. According to one participant, an explicit statement on POC in theCONOPS is desired. An example of this is the police CONOPS for UNAMID, inwhich ‘contributing to the protection of civilians’ is cited as a strategic objective.South Sudan UN Mission PlanningAs one participant explained, POC is an integral part of the ongoing planning fora new mission in South Sudan. It has been defined as a core responsibility. Withthe recent release and finalisation of the POC Framework, and otherdevelopments on POC, the South Sudan mission represents a litmus test forassessing the impact and benefits of these new and ongoing reforms anddevelopments on the ground.UN PoliceAccording to one participant, through their varying roles, it can be said that policeengage in all three tiers of POC (as delineated in the Operational Conceptmentioned above). Based on this assessment, the increasing number of missionsinvolving police is a significant and promising trend. 19 So too is the increase in18 The training modules on sexual violence draw upon the resource Addressing Conflict-RelatedSexual Violence - An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice, a collaborative initiativebetween UNIFEM and DPKO, on behalf of UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict. TheInventory provides a detailed listing of concrete practices utilised by peacekeeping missions toaddress sexual violence.19 According to a 2010 report by the Stimson Center, ‘[A]s of spring 2010, there were over 13,000UNPOL officers (individuals and members of FPUs) deployed in 12 DPKO-led missionsworldwide…’This is compared to 1988 when there were only ‘35 UN police officers…servingworldwide, all in a single UN mission, in Cyprus’. From W.J. Durch and M.L. England, eds.,‘Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law’ (Revisedand Updated), Stimson Center Report No. 63, August 2010, p.17, viewed atRSLS 2011 Summary Report 16
  • 17. deployment of special police units, called Formed Police Units (FPUs). Police ‘are on the front-edge of the security apparatus of a ‘POC can be seen as the raison d’etre [of UN mission’; they may engage in criminal investigations, police]’. forensic analysis, counternarcotics, training and Participant capacity-building, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. These roles may be furtherdiversified in situations where there is a critical dearth of local policing capacity.Sphere Handbook 2011 EditionThe Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, alsoknown as the Sphere Handbook, sets out the ‘core principles that governhumanitarian action’ and compiles minimum standards and indicators in varioustechnical areas. 20 Building on the 2004 edition, the new 2011 edition integratesnew emerging issues including civil-military relations, disaster risk reduction,climate change, and urban settings 21 . It also includes a stronger focus onprotection, after the consultation process revealed ‘the need to address protectionmore substantially’. 22 iii. Challenges & GapsConceptual Dilemmas and Operative InconsistenciesAccording to one participant, the lack of clarity in a mandate’s POC languagecreates difficulties and burdens for a mission’s leadership. How should‘imminent’ be interpreted? How imminent is imminent? Where does ‘vicinity of abase’ start and end? A military commander (and other component heads) needs todefine these terms and turn this vague mandate language into operationallanguage for troops. The manner in which commanders (and component heads)define this language may differ considerably one from the other. Moreunderstanding and consistency is required at UN Secretariat and mission levels,cognisant that the language in UN Security Council mandates will always reflectpolitical realities and may sometimes be open to interpretation.Personnel and Resource Constraints Critical personnel and resource shortfalls are a‘300 troops with basic continuing constraint for POC efforts inequipment in charge of a peacekeeping missions. Reflecting on thesector of 80,000 square insufficient troop numbers in one mission, akilometres’. Participant (paraphrased) participant reflected that it was ‘unrealistic that they could accomplish anything’. To compound the situation, troops that are deployed often do notmeet the capability requirements of the mission. Troops may lack theexpeditionary capabilities required by the mandate, or at the most basic level, The Sphere Project, ‘About Us’, viewed at,english/.21 Ibid.22 The Sphere Project, ‘What is new in the 2011 edition of the Sphere Handbook’, viewed at,com_docman/task,doc_details/Itemid,203/gid,393/lang,english/.RSLS 2011 Summary Report 17
  • 18. arrive with substandard equipment (‘guns held together with duck tape’). As oneparticipant reflected, ‘troops are on one side of the world and assets are on theother side of the world’. In one mission with a POC mandate, many troops weredeployed without mobility assets, including night flying capability. Such assetshortfalls make critical protection activities, such as long-term patrols, next toimpossible.Complementarity versus CompetitionNo single protection intervention strategy will be sufficient. Yet, according to oneparticipant, it has proven to be a challenge for the multiple protection actorsworking in a multiagency environment torespect each others’ roles and try not to do ‘There is a need to be smarteach others’ jobs. The multiple protection about engaging with otherapproaches need to be complementary not actors’. Participantcompetitive. As one participant proposed,what is needed is a ‘reflex in our planning to measure whether our approach isdamaging or complementing other approaches’. This is especially important withregards to civilian roles in UN peacekeeping missions. Specifically, it has beenobserved that civilian peacekeeping personnel can be a source of confusion forlocal authorities and communities who have difficulty differentiating them fromother civilian protection actors. This can damage the long-term POC efforts ofother non-UN civilian actors. 23Independence of ActionWhat happens when peacekeepers find themselves face-to-face with a host nationthat is unable or unwilling to engage in POC, directly impeding peacekeepers’ POC tasks, or worse, perpetrating abuses against‘A lot of TCCs are at the their own citizens? These situations place T/PCCspointy end of POC’. in a very difficult situation, both from a safety Participant perspective and also a political perspective (uncertain about political backing if they chose toengage). Such challenging situations are receiving increasing focus andacknowledgement. Yet there is still ongoing disagreement among Member Statesabout the role of missions and their peacekeepers in this kind of scenario. Oneparticipant, while acknowledging the controversial nature of this issue,recommended that the UN recognise that policing and security is an issue formanagement on the ground, not at UN Headquarters in New York.23 In contrast, military and police personnel are much more easily distinguishable from other non-mission POC efforts.RSLS 2011 Summary Report 18
  • 19. UN PoliceAs one participant explained, highly-skilled police are rarely in surplus in anysociety. Taxpayers pay for police to be deployed in their own countries, not sentabroad. There are few countries where there are paid police roles dedicated todeployment; Australia is one example, through itsInternational Deployment Group within the Australian ‘The issue is aboutFederal Police. When police are deployed, except for having enough people in enough jobs, notFPUs, they are deployed individually. For peacekeeping about the right peoplemissions, this means that a timely deployment of skilled in the right jobs’.police personnel is very difficult to achieve. Often, police Participantthat are sent are minimally trained; some have beenknown to have fewer skills than those of the national police force they are there tosupport. To fill the capacity gap, personnel from FPUs have sometimes beenreassigned as police officers, though they are minimally trained for such work; thetraining they have received has little utility and applicability in a mission wherepolicing involves a broad range of activities.Non-UN Peace OperationsConsiderable advances have been made on POC in UN peacekeeping, but lessattention has been given to POC guidelines, doctrine and training for non-UNmissions. For example, while ‘population protection’ has been emphasised byISAF in Afghanistan there is no agreed doctrine on how this should be achieved.The same applies for other non-UN peace operations where protection is moreloosely interpreted under a ‘security’ banner, and primarily from a militaryperspective. More work is required to leverage the UN’s work on POC forapplication in non-UN peace operations.iv. Priorities & Solutions - Where do we go from here?Participants identified the following key priorities and solutions during theseminar:. 1. Peacekeepers’ Engagement with Communities: Participants emphasised the need for more regular engagement between peacekeepers (civilian and military) and local communities. After all, it was noted that ‘the beneficiaries of protection are often those least consulted’. Such engagement enables peacekeepers to gain better situational awareness, build on and support existing self-protection measures adopted by the communities, and also helps manage communities’ expectations of the peacekeeping mission. As one participant explained, regular communication with communities is the only way to achieve realistic expectations of the mission, as a two-way dialogue enables communities to ask questions and be given explanations. Women interpreters are essential for such engagement, though, in at least one mission, the few women interpreters that had been hired were based solely in the capitol. To implement protection effectively, UN missions require information and communications systems that enable information flows with communities. 2. Community Liaison Interpreters: Interpreters help bridge both the language and cultural divides that exist between peacekeeping personnel and communities; in this way they provide a community liaison functionRSLS 2011 Summary Report 19
  • 20. as well. As one participant explained, communities often appreciate and trust these interpreters. While these interpreters are often located on military bases to support peacekeeping troops, concern was voiced that military commanders tend to view them solely as interpreters and have a limited understanding of, and appreciation for, their cultural liaison skills. 3. Responsive Patrols: There was consensus that more work is needed by peacekeeping missions to make patrols more responsive to the protection needs of communities. Numerous good practices exist, including locating peacekeepers near checkpoints, organising firewood and market patrols, as well as patrols to help villagers access their fields. Responsive patrols are only possible with regular communication between peacekeepers and communities, including through such arrangements as firewood patrol committees in refugee/displaced persons camp settings. Differences were recognised between POC implementation requirements in rural and urban environments. 4. Timely Implementation of the Strategic Framework: There was widespread agreement among participants of the need to begin moving the POC Framework forward by ‘getting it out there’. Participants proposed numerous next steps including turning the POC Framework into doctrine; incorporating it in training; making sure there is clarity and consensus on the terminology used; and also facilitating a timely feedback process so the POC Framework can be improved and strengthened where needed. It was also recommended that a dedicated focal point be identified to coordinate and manage this important process. 24 There was also agreement that the POC Framework has utility for non-UN mission environments such as the Solomon Islands, Libya, and Afghanistan, and therefore should be shared as a potential tool for actors in those operations. 5. Cross-reference in POC Strategy Consultation Process: During the consultative process to develop a mission’s POC strategy, it is important to cross-reference with available experiences, initiatives, and documentation. Cross-referencing will help to ensure that lessons and good practices from previous POC efforts are integrated in the development of the new mission strategy. 6. POC Strategic Directive for Military Peacekeepers: It was noted that military personnel are not technically POC specialists, yet they are increasingly engaged directly in a mission’s POC efforts and activities. Given the inconsistent POC language in mandates, as noted above, there is a need for an ‘unambiguous orientation’ to POC specifically targeting military personnel. Though the Operational Concept and POC Framework are critical overarching guidance, a UN strategic directive on POC by military peacekeepers would help to ensure the military approach is consistent.24 A representative from DPKO pointed out that some of the comments made about the POCFramework by participants reinforce input they have already received from the field. It was notedthat participants’ comments on the POC Framework would be shared with DPKO HQ.RSLS 2011 Summary Report 20
  • 21. 7. Intelligence Gathering: Intelligence enables a mission to know what is going on in a community. Yet according to one participant, the ‘apparatus of intelligence has been a very difficult phenomenon’ to deal with, given the pervasive reality that intelligence has been used against civilian populations. For this reason, it has been a struggle to encourage people to see the benefits of intelligence and recognize its critical link to POC. 25 8. Capacity-Building: Some participants observed that there can be an unrealistic tendency to seek to build local capacity during a crisis, maintain it artificially, and then remove the support prematurely. If there is interest in building local long-term protection capacity, it is best to start before a crisis rather than at a time of peak crisis. It is also important to identify culturally appropriate capacity-building approaches. As participants heard, the right models are often those observed in the community. This approach strengthens the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. 9. POC Benchmarks: Developing benchmarks for POC is a highly analytical and challenging exercise. Benchmarks need to be context- specific. They also need to be linked to how the community perceives its own safety, and their own objectives and expectations. It was suggested that the UN may benefit from consulting with Member States on developing POC-specific benchmarks for mission drawdown and transition. 10. POC Training for Mission Leadership: POC training is necessary for all mission components. Beyond POC training for civilian and police personnel and military troops, targeted in the POC modules currently under development, commanders and senior leaders require more advanced training, and this should be conducted in a civil-military environment.V. Common IssuesThe two themes of disaster management and POC were addressed separatelyduring RSLS. Nonetheless, it was apparent that the civil-military interaction lensilluminated linkages and coherence between them. The presentations anddiscussions highlighted numerous common issues across these discrete but relatedfields, which are elaborated below.Achieving a Common UnderstandingIn both a multiagency disaster and for POC in complex emergencies, an effectiveand sustainable response is only possible when there is a common understandingamong the diverse actors. A common understanding is needed not only of thesituation, but also of the needs, of who is doing what to address those needs, of25 The Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) needs to be clearly directed to synthesiseinformation through a ‘protection lens’ to enable coordinated, proactive and pre-emptive action bymission components.RSLS 2011 Summary Report 21
  • 22. the progress being made, and how to assess that progress. There are numerousmechanisms and tools for facilitating a common understanding. These include regular communication and dialogue (‘Comms! ‘How do we create a Comms! Comms!’ was regularly reiterated by common understanding of participants), and joint training and education. In a the situation? Until you conflict environment, the POC Framework is a do, you are all solving potential unifying mechanism for helping to achieve different problems’. and implement a common understanding of POC Participant (paraphrased) among multiple protection actors with different protection approaches and activities. A commonunderstanding does NOT mean that all organisations and /or peacekeepingelements do the SAME thing, but rather that they understand how their specificefforts contribute to the overall effort.Understanding the Context for Civil-Military EngagementA clear understanding of the dynamics and context of a crisis will help todetermine the nature of civil-military engagement in that crisis. The ‘typology’and scale of a disaster, for example, – whether it is a single volcanic eruption, acascading disaster such as in Japan (earthquake, tsunami, nuclear meltdown), or anatural disaster in a conflict zone – will affect the range and type of civilian andmilitary actors deployed as well as the way in which they engage with oneanother. It is also necessary to understand the types of engagement involved. Arethe diverse civil-military actors engaging at an intergovernmental, international,and/or interdepartmental level? These different types of engagement will presentdifferent challenges for civil-military engagement. OCHA civil-militarycoordination officers can play a critical role facilitating these different forms ofengagement and linking this engagement to the host state.Multiplicity of PlayersIn both conflict and disaster management, it is often hard to identify who is the‘conductor’ and get all the instruments to play the same tune. The diverse rangeof actors that converge on a crisis come from different ‘doctrinal bases’, and bringtheir own organisational cultural approach, and capabilities. This can createsignificant friction. Yet, as was often reflected during the seminar, ‘no one willwin the effort alone’.The Utility of Social Media 26Increasingly, connected networks of volunteers and their use of social media areplaying a role in facilitating and supporting both disaster and conflictmanagement. Following disasters or in response to ‘The public [is a]growing unrest, connected communities such as the resource rather than aStandby Taskforce, Crisis Commons, and Crisis liability’.Mappers are activated and call upon volunteers to Craig Fugate, FEMAscan news media, and social technologies such as26 The boxed quote is from C Fugate, ‘Understanding the Power of Social Media as aCommunication Tool in the Aftermath of Disasters’, Statement before the Senate Committee onHomeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery andIntergovernmental Affairs, Washington, DC, 5 May 2011, p. 2, viewed at 2011 Summary Report 22
  • 23. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, blogs, and SMS to collect, verify and analyseinformation rapidly in real or near-real-time. Once validated and fully ‘de-identified’, this information can then be used by UN, governmental, and NGOactors to enhance situational awareness and influence operational planning. Theseconnected communities have been activated in numerous disaster and conflictcrises, beginning with the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), and including the 2007-2008 post-election crisis in Kenya, the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, and mostrecently in response to conflicts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. These connectednetworks, and the tools they use (including FrontlineSMS, Medic Mobile, Sahana,SwiftRiver, and Ushahidi – see Section VII) can help civil-military actorsimprove their disaster and conflict response efforts. For this reason, as oneparticipant explained, civil-military actors ought to be engaging with thesevolunteer technical communities. However, low familiarity with these tools andthe value they provide, as well as an institutional penchant for state-based securitysystems, has created resistance to engaging with them. This resistance is visibleamong many communities including the military. Given the utility of thesecommunities and the tools they use, this field requires considerably moreattention, including in the areas of training, exercises, and doctrine.Unavoidable Political RealitiesPolitics plays a significant role in both disaster management and POC in amultiagency complex emergency. The domestic politicalarchitecture has to allow action in the first place, be it ‘You can’t keepinternational aid to a disaster (as the case of Cyclone Nargis politics out of theso clearly illustrated), or the deployment of a peacekeeping room’.mission. Politics also determines who and what is deployed Participantto participate in a response and what deployed personnelare willing (national caveats, for example) and able (capacity and capabilities) todo. Importance of the ‘Bigger Picture’ Various participants highlighted the importance of seeing the ‘bigger picture’. On Day 1, it was suggested ‘put yourself 100 years‘Is there a difference betweencivilians in danger in a UN from now…are we being ambitious enough abouttheatre and not a UN theatre?’ what we want in terms of better civil-military Participant (paraphrase) coordination?’ On Day 2, in the context of POC, one participant encouraged a broader, more proactive approach to POC. Recognising that poverty is a ‘pernicious’ root cause of violence, the participant encouraged greater support to impoverished fragile and failing states, regardless of whether they are on the Security Council agenda and ‘UN theatres’.VI. ConclusionRSLS 2011 provided a valuable opportunity to bring together senior government,military and non-government officials from the Asia Pacific region to workshopcivil-military issues and challenges. The seminar helped develop a commonunderstanding of civil-military approaches to improve collaboration (andrecognise separation) in conflict and disaster situations. The seminar generatedpartnerships and new and expanded networks among regional and globalRSLS 2011 Summary Report 23
  • 24. practitioners. RSLS 2011 enabled experts and practitioners to speak freely, andshare opinions and ideas about civil-military issues and challenges. It was aworking seminar; for three days, participants engaged in fruitful discussion, whichwas informed and stimulated by an outstanding array of speakers. As oneparticipant remarked, ‘this is not a conference where you sit back and observe’.Despite daunting operational environments, numerous examples of progress wereidentified and highlighted, including the growth of critical civil-militaryexperience, the establishment of arrangements to facilitate civil-militarycoordination, and the development of training modules. Nonetheless, considerablework remains to be done. Participants highlighted challenges and gaps toimproved civil-military effectiveness. Many of these challenges and gaps derivefrom the every-day reality of civil-military struggles on the ground, and reflect anexpanding wealth of experience in this multiagency field. Participants did not shyaway from these challenges and put forward solutions and priorities for enhancingcivil-military collaboration in both disaster environments and complexemergencies. These ranged from the more philosophical to the pragmatic andconcrete. The central conclusion was that civil-military actors requireknowledge and a ‘common understanding’ of the actual situation and of eachothers’ roles and responsibilities.To paraphrase one participant, ‘how we move communication and coordinationforward is a task for everyone’. It is no easy task; the chaos of a crisis situation,cultural tensions, and unavoidable political realities represent some of thechallenges that confront actors responding to a crisis, be it a natural disaster orcomplex emergency with civilians under imminent threat of violence. However, itis a necessary task that must be appreciated and applied from political andstrategic decision makers through to those implementing agencies on the ground.An effective and sustainable response is only possible when there is a commonunderstanding among civil-military actors, and a full appreciation of the needsand capabilities of local actors. And a common understanding begins withcommunication and coordination.COE-DMHA, in conjunction with the Centre, is currently planning to co-host the3rd Regional Senior Leaders Seminar in mid-2012. Details will be advised.RSLS 2011 Summary Report 24
  • 25. VII. Key Readings, Resources & References[Background reading] Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance toDisaster Relief Operations, ‘Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines For The Use OfForeign Military Assets In National Disaster Response Operations’, Draft version8.0, November 2010, Council for International Development, ‘ACFID Code of Conduct forNon Government Development Organisations’, 2010, effective January 2012, Collins, ‘Conflict and Disaster Management in a Hyperconnected World -Cooperative, Collaborative, Real Time’, May 2011, Durch and M.L. England, eds., ‘Enhancing United Nations Capacity toSupport Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law’ (Revised and Updated), StimsonCenter Report No. 63, August 2010, viewed at Fugate, ‘Understanding the Power of Social Media as a Communication Tool inthe Aftermath of Disasters’, Statement before the Senate Committee on HomelandSecurity and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery andIntergovernmental Affairs, Washington, DC, 5 May 2011, p. 2, viewed at Giffen, ‘Considerations for a New Peacekeeping Operation in South Sudan:Preventing Conflict and Protecting Civilians’, Working Paper, Stimson Center,April/May 2011,[Background reading] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘TheRelationship between the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civiliansin Armed Conflict’, Policy Brief , May 2011,[Background reading] Government of Pakistan National Disaster ManagementAuthority, Pakistan 2010 Flood Relief – Learning from Experience: Observationsand Opportunities, 2011, 2011 Summary Report 25
  • 26. [Background reading] ‘Hope For’ Initiative, ‘A Global Cooperative Framework toImprove the Effectiveness of Military and Civil Defence Assets in ReliefOperations’ (initiative of Qatar), 2011International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Code of Conduct for the InternationalRed Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations(NGOs) in Disaster Relief’, 1994,, Strengthening Protection in War: A Search for Professional Standards, 2001,, ‘What Is Protection?: A Definition by Consensus: A Background Note forthe Workshop on the Development of Human Rights Training for HumanitarianActors’, 2001, viewed at Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Core Documents:Understanding RtoP’, viewed at MacInnis, ‘Cost of natural disasters $109 billion in 2010: U.N.’, Reuters, 24January 2011, viewed at, ‘Engaging with Communities: The Next Challenge for Peacekeeping’,141 Oxfam Briefing Paper, November 2010, Rudd MP, Transcript from Joint media conference with Pedro VillagraDelgado, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps on ‘Diplomatic Corps visit toQueensland, Climate Change, Qantas, Tourism, ASX merger decision’,Brisbane, 6 April 2011, Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards inHumanitarian Response, 3rd edition, Practical Action Publishing, Rugby, UK,2011[Background reading] UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations/FieldSupport, ‘Framework for Drafting POC Strategies in UN PeacekeepingOperations’, 2011--, ‘Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in UNPeacekeeping Operations’, 2010UN DPKO, UNIFEM, UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict,Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence - An Analytical Inventory ofRSLS 2011 Summary Report 26
  • 27. Peacekeeping Practice, 2010, ESCAP and UNISDR, Protecting Development Gains: Reducing DisasterVulnerability and Building Resilience in Asia and the Pacific - The Asia-PacificDisaster Report, 2010, p.vii, viewed at General Assembly, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect:Report of the Secretary-General’, A/63/677, 12 January 2009.UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United NationsFoundation, Vodafone Technology Partnership and Harvard HumanitarianInitiative, ‘Disaster Relief 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing inHumanitarian Emergencies, March 2011, OCHA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, ‘Regional Trends andImplications for OCHA in Asia and the Pacific’, September 2010, viewed at, ‘Briefing Kit’, p.4, viewed at States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs -Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs,Hearing on ‘Understanding the Power of Social Media as a Communications Toolin the Aftermath of Disasters’, May 2011, Group on Climate Change and Development, ‘Up in smoke? Asia andthe Pacific: The threat from climate change to human development and theenvironment’, The fifth report from the Working Group on Climate Change andDevelopment, 2007, viewed at Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security andDevelopment, 2011, Bank and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery(GFDRR), ‘Volunteer Technology Communities: Open Development’, 2011,‘Guidelines On The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In DisasterRelief - “Oslo Guidelines”’, Updated November 2006 (Revision 1.1 November2007), 2011 Summary Report 27
  • 28. Useful Links • Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence: • Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE-DMHA): • CrisisCommons: • CrisisMappers Net: • FrontlineSMS: • Global Disaster Assistance Coordination System (GDACS): • Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) (US Government): • Libya Crisis Map, OCHA: • Medic Mobile: • On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC), OCHA: • Sahana Software Foundation: • The Sphere Project: • SwiftRiver: • Ushahidi: 2011 Summary Report 28
  • 29. Annex A Regional Senior Leaders Seminar 2011 (RSLS 2011) STRENGTHENING CIVIL- MILITARY COORDINATION FOR CONFLICT AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT 16-19 May 2011 Pullman Reef Hotel 35-41 Wharf Street Cairns, Queensland, Australia RSLS 2011 Summary Report 29
  • 30. BackgroundThe Regional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) is an annual opportunity forthe Centre to co-host, in conjunction with the US Government’s Center forExcellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE-DMHA), a civil-military coordination forum for emerging leaders from theAsia Pacific region. RSLS 2011 will be held in Cairns, Australia from 16-19May 2011 with the Centre being the lead organisation.The RSLS uses specific case studies to provide platforms by which seniorleaders can consider civil-military coordination in both conflict anddisaster management and develop practical solutions in aworkshop/discussion environment to exchange ideas, enhance knowledgeand contribute to international engagement.AimThe aim of the RSLS is to provide an opportunity for senior governmentand non-government officials from the Asia Pacific region to cometogether to workshop civil-military issues and challenges for conflict anddisaster management. RSLS provides a secure space for participants todevelop a shared understanding of civil-military approaches tocollaborating in multinational responses to conflict and disaster situations.ObjectivesThe objectives of RSLS 2011 are to:• provide senior regional leaders the opportunity to share and improve their understanding of civil-military coordination in complex emergencies and disaster management;• enhance communication and coordination between participating countries and organisations; and• access senior experts in the fields of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and conflict management.The Conference will be conducted under the Chatham HouseRule to encourage openness and the sharing of information.A summary report of the proceedings will be published by theCentre.The Conference will be conducted in English.RSLS 2011 Summary Report 30
  • 31. MONDAY 16 MayFrom 1600 RegistrationVenue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay Pre-Function Area1800-2000 Welcome ReceptionVenue: Pullman Reef Hotel Pool Deck & Coral Lounge Welcome: GPCAPT Keith Brackenbury Hosts: MAJGEN (Ret) Michael G. Smith AO, Executive Director APCMCOE and LTGEN (Ret) John F. Goodman, Executive Director COE-DMHATUESDAY 17 MayVenue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay 108.30 Registration (tea and coffee available)Opening Session08.55 Welcome to Country09.00 Administrative Announcements GPCAPT Keith Brackenbury, APCMCOE09.10 Welcome remarks MAJGEN (Ret) Michael G. Smith AO, Executive Director APCMCOE and LTGEN (Ret) John F. Goodman, Executive Director COE-DMHA09.45 Official Photograph and Morning TeaRSLS 2011 Summary Report 31
  • 32. SESSION 1: Civil-Military Coordination in DisasterManagement –what progress has been made and where do we go from here?FOCUS: To consider the civil-military challenges and lessons learnt fromrecent regional natural disasters. Panel sessions followed by breakoutgroups that will report back to plenary.Chair: Stacey Greene, Disaster Management Manager, APCMCOE10.30 Keynote Address: The evolution of Civil-Military Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (through Australian eyes) Alan March Humanitarian Coordinator Assistant Director-General Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Branch, AusAID11.15 Civil-Military coordination during the Pakistan Floods Military Perspective on civil-military coordination in a disaster zone WGCDR Ross Wadsworth, Australian Defence Force Commanding Officer No1 Expeditionary Health Squadron11.40 NGO perspective on civil-military coordination in a disaster zone Jennifer Worthington Oxfam Australia12.00 Discussion and questions to Panel12.30 LunchRSLS 2011 Summary Report 32
  • 33. SESSION 2: Working Group ActivityQ1: What progress has been made in civil-military coordinationin disaster zones?Q2: What could be done to further enhance civil-militarycoordination in disaster zones?FOCUS: Working groups will examine both civil-military issues andprepare 15 min report back to plenary.Chair: Mr Greg Flick, Senior Disaster Management Analyst, COE- DMHA13.15 Working Groups considerationVenue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay 2 (Includes afternoon tea)15.15 Working Groups report backVenue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay 1 Discussion and comments by panel17.00 Summary/Close Day 1 Commander Darryl Watters, APCMCOE18.00-20.00 Networking ActivityVenue: Cairns Wildlife Dome (Located adjacent to Hotel)RSLS 2011 Summary Report 33
  • 34. WEDNESDAY 18 MayVenue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay 108.00 Tea and coffee availableSESSION 3: Protection of Civilians in a multi-agencyenvironment in complex emergenciesFOCUS: To consider the draft UN framework on protection of civiliansand its use in complex environments08.20 Administrative Announcements GPCAPT Keith Brackenbury, APCMCOEChair: Dr Tony Murney, APCMCOE (Australian Federal Police Secondee)08.30 Keynote Address: Draft United Nations Framework on the Protection of Civilians Ms Leanne Smith, UN DPKO Deputy Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices section, UN DPKO09.30 Morning Tea10.00 A Police perspective on POC Chief Superintendent (Ret) David Beer Former UN Police Commissioner in Haiti10.20 Enhanced protection of civilians: ICRC perspective Jeremy England Head of Office Australia, ICRC10.40 Grassroots protection: An NGO perspective Kirsten Hagon Head of Office Oxfam International, New York11.00 A military perspective on POC Major General Elhadji Mahamadou Kandji Former Force Commander MINURCAT (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad)11.20 Discussion and questions to panel12.00 LunchRSLS 2011 Summary Report 34
  • 35. SESSION 4: Working Group Activity – Consideration of theDraft UN framework on the protection of civiliansHow does the POC mandate affect the way each of the elements of themission approach its tasks?How can the draft POC framework be improved to assist the mission fulfilits POC mandate, and to capacitate the host state’s ability to protectcivilians?How might the draft framework be used to develop POC specificbenchmarks for mission drawdown and transition ofresponsibility/capability to the host state?Does the draft POC framework have utility for non-UN/AU missionswhere population protection is a key objective?FOCUS: Working groups will examine a civil-military issue and prepare15 min report back.Chair: Dr Tony Murney, APCMCOE (Australian Federal Police Secondee)13.00 Working Groups considerationVenue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay 2 (Includes afternoon tea)15.30 Working Groups report backVenue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay 1 Discussion and comments by panel17.00 Summary/Close Day 2 Commander Darryl Watters, APCMCOE18.15 CONFERENCE DINNERVenue: Pullman Reef Hotel Pre-dinner Drinks: Arlington Bar Dinner: Urchins 2&3 Co-Host: MAJGEN (Ret) Michael G. Smith AO, Executive Director APCMCOE Dinner Address: LTGEN (Ret) John F. Goodman, Executive Director COE-DMHARSLS 2011 Summary Report 35
  • 36. THURSDAY 19 MayVenue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay 108.30 Tea and coffee availableClosing Session: ‘New Ideas’ Presentation and Seminar wrap-up09.00 Administrative Announcements GPCAPT Keith Brackenbury, APCMCOEChair: SUPT Darren Rath, APCMCOE09.15 ‘New Ideas’ Presentation Working with hyperconnected information in conflicts and disasters Stephen Collins On-line Communications Co-ordinator APCMCOE09.45 Plenary Feedback/Key Issues Opportunity to explore further issues by plenary10.20 Rapporteur summary report Sarah Shteir/Dave Lavers APCMCOE10.40 Concluding Remarks MAJGEN (Ret) Michael G. Smith AO, Executive Director APCMCOE and LTGEN (Ret) John F. Goodman, Executive Director COE-DMHA11.00 Buses depart for Tjapukai Aboriginal Cultural Centre12.00-1630 Lunch and Cultural ActivityRSLS 2011 Summary Report 36