Managing and Surviving Disruptive Innovation

Loading...

Flash Player 9 (or above) is needed to view presentations.
We have detected that you do not have it on your computer. To install it, go here.

0 comments

Post a comment

    Post a comment
    Embed Video
    Edit your comment Cancel

    1 Favorite

    Managing and Surviving Disruptive Innovation - Presentation Transcript

    1. But Our Cameras Survived
    2. The shift from film-based photography to digital imaging has put many former camera giants in deep trouble…
    3. The explosion 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Number of film and digital cameras sold in the United States
    4. Kodak…
    5. … Polaroid…
    6. … Leica…
    7. Konica…
    8. … Agfa…
    9. … Hasselblad..
    10. But some old camera companies survived the shift.
    11. Canon…
    12. … Nikon…
    13. … Olympus.
    14. In other slideshows I have explained why so many camera companies encountered problems.
    15. Some companies like Kodak lost the value of their position and distribution network.
    16. Agfa made money on film and with the shift to digital imaging they lost their revenues.
    17. Another explanation is that cameras used to be all about precise mechanics and optics and that the…
    18. … the shift to electronics rendered all this competence obsolete.
    19. But Canon, Nikon and Olympus also encountered many of these challenges, and they not only survived but also prospered in this shift.
    20. So why did they succeed in this shift when so many other firms have suffered so greatly?
    21. By looking at how the Japanese camera firms handled the shift we can learn, and maybe avoid the destruction of huge companies.
    22. So let’s go back to the early days of digital imaging and look at how the Japanese companies handled the digital threat.
    23. In 1981, the industry was shaken when SONY launched their Mavica, a camera that used floppy discs instead of film.
    24. In Japan it was referred to as ’the Mavica shock’. They feared that something like this would happen.
    25. Therefore, many companies invested in and launched their own ’Mavicas’ during the 1980s.
    26. Canon formed a task force to develop a colour Mavica in 1981. It was launched in 1986. Fujifilm came up with something similar in 1988.
    27. None of them lead to any great success.
    28. The Mavica was simply not the way forward to digital imaging.
    29. But the Japanese companies had a high learn on investment.
    30. Some companies like Canon did a lot of internal development.
    31. Since the required competence was different, Canon recruited engineers and managers from electronic companies.
    32. They wanted to do things in-house since it was important to obtain knowledge and renew the resource base.
    33. Initially, Canon and the others targeted niche markets such as photo journalism, where digital imaging could be nurtured.
    34. Digital imaging was developed in a separate organization that was not subject to the daily internal competition for resources.
    35. Eventually, the dominant design emerged.
    36. In 1995 Casio launched the QV10.
    37. It had an image quality of 0,25 Megapixels and required 4 AA batteries.
    38. Not the greatest gadget mankind has invented.
    39. But the concept of having a LCD screen and this design turned out to be very attractive.
    40. Now the big Japanese dragons like Canon, Nikon and Olympus invested a lot in developing this concept.
    41. The Japanese firms worked jointly in an industry association to solve critical technical issues.
    42. Moreover, they made sure that the structure was modular, so that each individual component could be improved separately.
    43. Instead of fighting battles about standards, each company could instead focus on the product and reducing R&D costs. This created a healthy competition - each one differentiated within the defined settings.
    44. The modular, standardized structure also implied that consumer electronics companies could work on each component.
    45. Memory cards…
    46. Image sensors…
    47. LCD screens…
    48. … could be developed by companies like Sanyo.
    49. Sanyo provided the big camera firms with electronic components, and they could instead focus on optics, design and development.
    50. Each component was now subject to rapid improvement.
    51. Once the cameras were good enough and cheap enough…
    52. Products like Canon Ixus…
    53. … And Nikon Coolpix now flooded the market.
    54. Soon after, AgfaPhoto was in deep trouble…
    55. And Kodak was in deep trouble…
    56. The Nikon D1 from 1999 was the first true alternative for photographers who wanted digital cameras. It was mortal to many of the old camera firms…
    57. It put Hasselblad in deep trouble.
    58. And Leica was in trouble.
    59. The Japanese camera companies help us to understand how a firm can master a digital revolution:
    60. 1. Enter early and explore the technology.
    61. 2. Separate the development from your mainstream business.
    62. 3. Recruit people who have extensive experience of the technology.
    63. 4. Find a nursing market which can tolerate the high price and the low performance.
    64. 5. Collaborate with others and find a common standard.
    65. 6. Create a modular structure where other companies with expertise can make improvements on a component level.
    66. Image attributions
    67. Christian Sandström is a PhD student at Chalmers University of Technology in Gothenburg, Sweden. He writes and speaks about disruptive innovation and technological change. www.christiansandstrom.org christian.sandstrom@chalmers.se

    + Chris SandströmChris Sandström, 8 months ago

    custom

    1071 views, 1 favs, 2 embeds more stats

    How the Japanese camera companies survived the shif more

    More info about this document

    © All Rights Reserved

    Go to text version

    • Total Views 1071
      • 1022 on SlideShare
      • 49 from embeds
    • Comments 0
    • Favorites 1
    • Downloads 36
    Most viewed embeds
    • 47 views on http://www.christiansandstrom.org
    • 2 views on http://christiansandstrom.org

    more

    All embeds
    • 47 views on http://www.christiansandstrom.org
    • 2 views on http://christiansandstrom.org

    less

    Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
    Flag as inappropriate

    Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate. If needed, use the feedback form to let us know more details.

    Cancel
    File a copyright complaint
    Having problems? Go to our helpdesk?

    Categories