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  • 1. Data Protection and Rapid Recovery From Attack With A Private File Server Abstract When a personal computer is attacked, the most difficult thing to recover is personal data. The operating system and applications can be reinstalled returning the machine to a functional state, usually eradicating the attacking malware in the process. Personal data, however, can only be restored from private backups – if they even exist. Once lost, personal data can only be recovered through repeated effort (e.g. rewriting a report) and in some case can never be recovered (e.g. digital photos of a one time event). To protect personal data, we house it in a file serv- er virtual machine running on the same physical host. Personal data is then exported to other virtual machines through specialized mount points with a richer set of permissions than the traditional read/write options. We imple- ment this private file server virtual machine using a modified version of NFS server installed in a virtual machine under various virtualization environments such as Xen and VMWare. We demonstrate how this architecture pro- vides protection of personal data as well as rapid recovery from attack. Specifically, we demonstrate how an intru- sion detection system can be used to stop a virtual machine in response to signs of compromise, checkpoint its cur- rent state and restart the virtual machine from a trusted checkpoint of an uncompromised state. We show how our architecture can be used to defend against 5 of the 9 new viruses posted on CERT since April 21, 2004. We also demonstrate that by placing the user’s applications in a virtual machine rather than directly on the base machine we can provide near instant recovery from even a successful attack. Finally, we quantify the overhead costs of this ar- chitecture by running a series of benchmarks on both Windows and Linux in the base machine as well as on an NFS partition mounted in a virtual machine. 1. Introduction users do not routinely backup their data. Once lost, per- sonal data can only be recovered through repeated ef- fort (e.g. rewriting a report) and in some case can never Worms and viruses have entered the consciousness of be recovered (e.g. digital photos of a one time event). the majority of personal computer users. Even novice users are aware of the attacks that can come in the form We propose the use of a specialized private file server of email from a friend or a pop-up ad from a web site. virtual machine to provide added protection for person- The goals of an attack can vary from using the compro- al data. This file server virtual machine is made acces- mised system to attack others, to allowing a remote at- sible only to other clients running on the same host by tacker to harvest data from the system, to outright cor- way of a local virtual network segment. Personal data ruption of the system. is housed in the private file server and exported through specialized mount points with a richer set of Fully restoring a compromised system is a painful pro- permissions than the traditional read/write options. cess often involving reinstalling the operating system This architecture provides a number of benefits includ- and user applications. This can take hours or days even ing 1) the opportunity to separate personal data into for trained professionals with all the proper materials multiple classes to which different finer grained per- readily on hand. For average users, even assembling missions can be applied, 2) the separation of personal the installation materials (e.g. CDs, manuals, configu- data from system data allowing each to be backed-up ration settings, etc.) may be an overwhelming task, not and restored appropriately, 3) the ability to rapidly in- to mention correctly installing and configuring each stall or restore virtual machines containing fully con- piece of software. figured applications and services, and 4) rapid recovery from attack by rolling back system data to a known To make matters worse, the process of restoring a com- good state without losing recent changes to personal promised system to a usable state can frequently result data. in the loss of any personal data stored on the system. From the user’s perspective, this is often the worst out- In Section 2, we describe our architecture and its bene- come of an attack. System data may be painful to re- fits in detail. In Section 3, we compare our architecture store, but it can be restored from public sources. Per- to other solutions with similar goals such as system sonal data, however, can be restored only from private backup utilities and network booting facilities. In Sec- backups and the vast majority of personal computer
  • 2. tion 4, we describe how it can be used to protect user Virtual machine appliances can have two network in- data against specific attacks. In Section 5, we quantify terfaces – one on the physical network bridged through the overheads associated with this architecture by run- the base machine and one on the local virtual network. ning a variety of benchmarks on a prototype imple- Depending on its function, a virtual machine appliance mented using a modified version of NFS in conjunction may not need one or both of these network interfaces. with virtual machines in both Xen and VMWare. We For example, you may choose to browse the web in a discuss related work in Section 6, future work in Sec- virtual machine appliance with a connection to the tion 7 and finally, conclusions in Section 8. physical network but with no interface on the local vir- tual network to prevent an attack from even reaching 2. Architecture the file server virtual machine. Similarly, you might choose to configure a virtual machine with only access Figure 1 illustrates the main components of our archi- to the local virtual network if it has no need to reach tecture. A single physical host is home to multiple logi- the outside world. cal machines. First, there is the base machine (labeled with a 1 in the diagram). This base machine contains a virtualization environment which can be implemented 2.1. Base Machine as a base operating system running a virtual machine We have implemented several prototypes of this archi- system such as VMWare or as a virtual machine moni- tecture using either Linux or Windows as the base op- tor such as Xen. Second, there is a virtual network that erating system and Xen or VMWare as the virtual ma- is accessible only to this base machine and any virtual chine monitor. There are several other excellent virtual machine running on this host. Third, there is a file sys- machine systems we could have used, but our purpose tem virtual machine which has only one network inter- was not a comparison of existing virtual machine sys- face on the local virtual network. This file system vir- tems. We chose VMWare for its robustness, ease of use tual machine is the permanent home for personal data and support of Windows guest operating systems. We and exports subsets of this personal data store via spe- chose Xen for its lower overhead [Xen03][CDD+04]. cialized mount points to local clients. Fourth, there are virtual machine appliances. These virtual machines Regardless of implementation, the base machine is house system data such as an operating system and user used to create the local virtual network, the file system applications. They can also house locally created data virtual machine and the virtual machine appliances. It temporarily. is used to assign resources to each these guests. It can also be used to save or restore checkpoints of virtual machine appliance images.
  • 3. We also use the base machine as a platform for moni- work. Attacks cannot target the file system virtual ma- toring the behavior of each guest. For example, in our chine . prototype, we ran an intrusion detection system on the directly. They could only reach the file system virtual base machine. It can also be used as a firewall or NAT machine by first compromising a virtual machine appli- gateway further controlling access to even those virtual ance. This would require two successful exploits – one machine appliances with interfaces on the physical net- against an application running in a virtual machine ap- work. Note that the base machine can monitor both the pliance and one running against the NFS server run- incoming and outgoing network traffic from the virtual ning on the file server virtual machine. machine appliances. It can detect both attack signatures in incoming traffic and unexpected behavior in outgo- Personal data is housed in the file system virtual ma- ing traffic. For example, it could indicate that all outgo- chine and subsets of it are exported to virtual machine ing network traffic from a particular virtual machine appliances. This allows you to restrict both the amount appliance should be POP or SMTP. In such a configu- and access rights that a given virtual machine has to ration, unexpected traffic such as an outgoing ssh con- your personal data. For example, if you have a virtual nection that would normally not raise alarms could be a machine appliance running a web server, you may detected as signs of a possible attack. (Is this a good chose to only export the portion of the personal data example?) store that you wish to make available on the web. You can export portions of your user data store with differ- The security of base machine is key to the security of ent permissions in different virtual machine appliances. the rest of the system. Therefore, in our prototype, we For example, you may mount a picture collection as “hardened” the base machine by strictly limiting the read only in the virtual machine you use for most tasks types of applications running on the base machine. and then only mount it writeable in a virtual machine Normal user activity takes place in the virtual machine used for importing and editing images. This would pre- appliances. We also closed all network ports on the vent your collection of digital photos from being delet- base machine. It would also be possible to open a limit- ed by malware that compromises your normal working ed number of ports for remove administration, but environment. Similarly, you may choose to make your since each open port is a potential entry point for at- financial data accessible only within a virtual machine tack, it is important to carefully secure each open port. running only Quicken or you may choose to make old, rarely changing data read-only except in the rare case 2.2.File System Virtual Machine that you do really want to change it. We implemented the file system virtual machine using It is simple to have multiple mount points within the a modified version of Sun’s Network File System same virtual machine. You can mount some portions of (NFS) version 3 running in a Linux guest virtual ma- your personal data store read only and others read/write chine. Virtual machine appliances using both Linux into the same virtual machine appliance. and Windows as the guest OS mount personal data over NFS across a local file system. For Linux, there is We also implemented a richer set of mount point per- an open source NFS client. For Windows, we used a missions to allow “write-rarely” or “read-some” se- commercial NFS client from Labram [Labtam]. Note mantics. Specifically, we modified NFS to add read that our modifications are only to the NFS file server and write rate-limiting capability to each mount point code. Unmodifed NFSv3 clients can be used with our in addition to full read or write privileges. One can modified server. specify the amount of data that can be read or written per unit of time. For example, a mount point could be Much like the base machine, the file system virtual ma- classified as reading at most 1% of the data under the chine is hardened against attack by stripping away any mount point in 1 hour. Such a rule could prevent down- unnecessary applications and closing all unnecessary loaded code from rapidly scanning the user’s complete network ports. It is easier to secure a system with a data store. limited number of well-defined services than a general purpose machine. All the software in the file system Figure 2 shows an example of an /etc/exports file with virtual machine is focused on exporting personal data read and write limits. The first line indicates that the to local clients and to facilitating maintenance on that client at IP Address foo can read bar. data such as backup, the creation of particular exported volumes and the setting of permissions that each client This required …describe patch can have to the exported volumes. Still could allow malware that read very slowly The file system virtual machine is additionally protect- through your data store, but another good hurdle ed by only being reachable over the local virtual net-
  • 4. Read and write limits are one example of a richer set of a known-good checkpoint is restoring a compromised mount point permissions that can be used to help pro- virtual machine appliance from a trusted snapshot. tect against attack. Append only permissions could be Any changes made within the virtual machine appli- used to allow prevent removal or corruption of existing ance since the checkpoint would be lost, but changes to data. For example, a directory containing photos could personal data mounted from the file server machine be mounted append-only in one virtual machine appli- would be preserved. In this way, personal data does not ance allowing it to add photos, but not to delete exist- become an automatic casualty of the process of restor- ing photos. To delete photos, the same directory could ing a compromised system. either be temporarily mounted with expanded permis- sions or another virtual machine with expanded permis- The file system virtual machine is hardened against at- sions could be used. Another example would be re- tack by carefully controlling the software that is run stricting the size or file extension on files that are creat- within it. Virtual machine appliances, however, will ed (e.g. no “exe” files). We did not implement these continue to run an unpredictable mix of user applica- additional permission types, but they would each be a tions including some high-risk applications. As a result, relatively straightforward addition to what we have al- they may susceptible to attack through an open net- ready implemented. work port running a vulnerable service or through a user-initiated download such as email or web content. One benefit of the file server virtual machine is that it contains exactly that irreplaceable personal data that is Compromised virtual machine appliances can often be most important to back up regularly. In this way, our automatically detected by the intrusion detection sys- architecture helps facilitate efficient back-up of user tem running on the base machine. In our prototype, we data. have demonstrated that we can detect a attack with a failing rule in Snort and in response to the rule failure, we can stop and checkpoint the compromised virtual 2.3. Virtual Machine Appliances machine as well as restart a known good checkpoint of the same machine. This process is nearly instantaneous – requiring only sufficient time to move the failed sys- Virtual machine appliances isolate system state much tem image to a well-known location and move a copy like the file system virtual machines isolate personal of a trusted snapshot into place. Changes in the system data. Each virtual machine appliance contains a base configuration made after the trusted image was created OS and any number of user level applications from would be lost as would any information stored directly desktop productivity software to server. They can have in the corrupted guest. However, the checkpoint image network interfaces on the physical network allowing would provide an immediately functional computing communication with the outside world. They can also platform that would mount the user’s data store from have network interfaces on the local virtual network the file system virtual machine. over which they can mount subsets of personal data from the file server virtual machine. We do this with a combination of Snort, snort rules, shell scripts etc. details There can be multiple mount points from the file sys- tem virtual machine into a client. Each mount point can To prevent future attacks, the trusted image should also have different permissions to allow finer grain control be updated to patch the exploited vulnerability. Thus over the allowable access patterns. For example, in a the user is notified when an automatic restoration ac- single virtual machine you might mount your email tion takes place. Analysis of the corrupted image BLAH and your and/or secure logs collected by the virtual machine monitor [King03b ] could provide clues to what needs Like the file server virtual machine facilitates the back- to be modified. up of personal data, virtual machine appliances facili- tate the back-up of system data. System data however The corrupted image can be saved or shipped to a sys- changes at a different pace than personal data. Specifi- tem administrator for analysis and even possible recov- cally, changes to system data can be clearly identified ery of data stored inside. During this analysis and re- (e.g. when a new application, upgrade or patch is ap- covery process, the user would still have a functional plied). Also, since system data is recoverable from computing platform with access to the majority of their public sources, it can be less crucial that we capture all data. This is a significant improvement over the ex- the changes to system state. tended down time that is often required when restoring a compromised system today. In our prototype, we save known-good checkpoints of each virtual machine appliance. One important use of
  • 5. System restarted will still have vulnerability that was To quantify this benefit, Table 1 lists the time it took us originally attacked. Therefore, we limit the number of to install a variety of software. The measurements list- automatic restarts. For example, after three restarts of a ed reflect local experiments installing software when given image, any further compromise will result in with the user had already successfully installed the stopping the virtual machine and checkpointing, but software at least once before. The time it takes a new not in restarting the “trusted” snapshot. Another option user to install this software could be significantly high- would be to leave the virtual machine running but to er as they frequently run into problem that can delay pull its access to the physical network and the local vir- them for hours or even days (witness the the many in- tual network. This is similar to turning off or disabling stallation FAQs and installation questions posted to the network port for a machine demonstrating signs of newsgroups across the Internet). compromise until a system administrator can resolve the problem. The times in Table 1 can also be considered a measure of the time saved whenever a checkpoint of a virtual It is worth noting that users can also trigger the restora- machine appliance is used to recover from attack. Each tion process manually if they suspect a compromise. time a virtual machine appliance is recovered from a Users could also use the restoration process to rollback know good state, this is a lower bound on the time the start of a virtual machine appliance for any other saved in reinstallation. If it has been some time since reason (e.g. they installed a piece of software and sim- the user installed the software, the time savings are ply don’t want to keep it in the system likely to be even higher as they must spend time gath- ering the installation materials and possibly stumbling Similarly, the restoration process can be used to recov- into some of the same errors a new user would. er from accidental system corruption, e.g. from a rou- tine patch or upgrade the introduced instability into the We measured the times in Table 1 locally, but in retro- system. Many users are rightfully nervous about possi- spect, we would love to see average expert and novice ble system corruption from routine software updates. In install times routinely listed for all software. Such met- addition to the promise of safer and better operation, rics could be reported by both the software developers any update represents a non-negligible chance of sys- and/or by third party evaluators. tem corruption. Software Installation Time for an Checkpoints allow regular upgrades to a virtual ma- Experienced User chine appliances to be tested without risk. You can ap- (minutes) ply a patch or an upgrade to software in the system se- Base Windows Desktop cure in the knowledge that if it causes instability you Install can return to the last checkpoint. Many users do not Windows Desktop Install regularly apply patches and system upgrades because with an array of user level of the risk of instability. Stable checkpoints would en- software courage users to be compliant with upgrade requests by Base Linux Desktop In- allowing them to easily experiment with the upgraded stall (RedHat) image. Reducing the risk of regular upgrades and Base Linux Desktop In- patches is another subtle way in which virtual machine stall (Ubuntu) appliances enhance system security. Linux Base Installation with Apache Web Server Another crucial benefit of virtual machine appliances is Linux Base Installation that they not only provide rapid recovery from attack with mySql by restoring a known good snapshot, but they also pro- Linux Base Installation vide rapid first time installation of software systems. with sendmail Anyone who has struggled for hours to install and con- Checkpoints can also be used to transfer working sys- figure software that is already running on another ma- tems images from one physical host to another. For ex- chine will appreciate this benefit. Preconfigured virtual ample, users can move copies of a working virtual ma- machines with fully functional, preconfigured web chine appliance onto both their laptop and desktop ma- servers, database servers, etc. would save new users chines. As another example, a completely configured hours of headaches assembling and installing all the FTP server virtual machine appliance could be dupli- dependencies. This is similar to the benefits of cated and transferred to any other system – transferred LiveCDs that allow users to experiment with fully con- from one machine to another for the same user, trans- figured versions of software without the drawbacks of ferred from one user to another or even downloaded slow removable, unmodifiable media. from a web site.
  • 6. The number and type of applications in each virtual In many ways, we see checkpoints of virtual machine machine appliance can be tailored to the usage require- appliances as a new model for software distribution. ments and desired level of security. At one extreme, Often times installing and configuring server software there could be only one virtual machine appliance con- is difficult and time-consuming. A pre-configured vir- taining all the software normally installed on a users tual machine appliance could be delivered to a user base machine. At the other extreme, there could be with well-defined resource requirements and connec- many virtual machine appliances each with a subset of tions to the rest of the system including the characteris- the user’s software. tics of any mount points into the user’s data store. Multiple virtual machine appliances allow finer grained The term “appliance” implies a well-defined purpose, control over resources required, expected behavior and well-define connections to the rest of the world and a the subset of personal data accessed. For example, a minimum of unexpected side effects. Physical applica- web server virtual machine appliance may be given tions typically specify their resource requirements and read only access to the content it is serving and may be can be replaced with an equivalent model if they mal- prevented from establishing outgoing network connec- function. In the case of a virtual machine appliance, a tion. Thus even if the web server is attacked, the dam- user would load it on their system and plug in into their age done to the user’s system is minimized. The attack- data store by mapping its defined mount points to the er would also be prevented from harvesting informa- exports from the local file system virtual machine. If tion from the rest of the user’s data store and their abil- the virtual machine appliance is attacked or malfunc- ity to use the system as a launching pad for other at- tioned, it would be straight-forward to replace it with a tacks would be diminished. new functional equivalent without losing your personal data . When each virtual machine appliance has a small num- ber of applications, it is easier to characterize expected This would provide a new platform for value added behavior which of course makes it easier for intrusion services including configuration, testing and characteri- detection software running on the base machine to zation of virtual machine appliance. Those who pro- watch for signs of an compromised system. It is also duce virtual machine appliances could compete to pro- easier to configure the virtual machine appliance with duce appliances that have the right combinations of the smallest set of rights to personal data that is neces- features, that are easy to “plug in”, that have a good sary to accomplish the task. track record of being resistant to attacks, that use fewer system resources or that set and respect tight bounds on However, each additional virtual machine appliance re- their expect behaviour. Appliances that reliably provide quires additional memory when executing and addi- the advertised service without violating their resource tional diskspace to store the operating system and other requirements would have value to users. In fact, we ex- common files. Multiple virtual machine appliances also pect that most users would like to view computers as make it more difficult to share data between applica- appliances that reliably perform the advertised actions tions. For these reasons, it is best to group as many ap- without unanticipated side effects. Virtual machine ap- plications with similar requirements together as possi- pliances would be a good step in this direction. Valida- ble. tion of these virtual machine appliances may also be more straightforward because they would be designed Taken to the extreme however this could mean a seper- to run in isolation from other user level applications. ate virtual machine for each applications. We are not advocating this extreme. It is easier for users when they can exchange data between applications and many ap- Virtual machine appliances are particular attractive in plications with similar resource, data and security re- the context of open source software because any num- quirements can and should be grouped together. In our ber of applications could be distributed together in an experience with our prototype, we have found that a virtual machine appliance without concern for licens- good strategy is to isolate those applications with spe- ing requirements of each individual software package. cial security needs. For example, applications that are This could be a significant hurdle for commercial soft- commonly attacked (e.g. server software such as web ware however without new licensing models. Similar- servers or database servers) are good candidates for ly, developers of open source software could distribute their own virtual machine appliance. Similarly, appli- virtual machine appliances with a complete develop- cations requiring access to sensitive personal data such ment environment including source code with all the as financial data are also good candidates for their own proper libraries required for compilation and software virtual machine appliance. to support debugging and testing.
  • 7. (Doe we want to mention this? )One of the more diffi- virtual machine appliance onto the users system. Tools cult cases is applications such as web-browsing and that made the creation, inspection and validation of email access. These applications are common sources these contracts easier for users and developers would of attacks. However, they are also applications that be a helpful addition to such a system. users like to have tightly integrated with their personal data. For applications such as these, there is a range of solutions along a spectrum of security and ease-of-use. 3. Comparison to Other Solutions For example, we have found it effective to support web-browsing in multiple virtual machines – one with In this section, we compare our architecture to several rights to access the personal data store and one with no existing solutions such as regular full backups of a such rights. complete system, network booting combined with im- porting data from an independent physical file server The base machine creates a set of resource limits for and system reset facilities such as DeepFreeze or State- each virtual machine appliance in several ways. First, less Linux. the base machine can allocate a limited amount of sys- tem resources such as memory, disk space or even How to do full backup – various methods some more CPU time to each guest. Second, the base machine can focused on needs of personal data and some of system restrict access to the local virtual network and/or the data. For example burning data to DVD or other re- physical network connection. In either case, access can movable media is a protable backup for personal data be denied completely or simply restricted through fire- but is typically not bootable so it does not restore the wall rules. Third, the intrusion detection system run- system to a bootable state again quickly ning monitor the behavior of the guest for both attack signatures and otherwise “innocent” looking traffic that Making a ghost image is a good way to restore the sys- is simply unexpected given the purpose of the virtual tem to a fully bootable state but harder to do incre- machine appliance. For example, you might not expect mentabls and expensive to do full backup of old and to see any outgoing network connections from a web new personal data, system data everything on each server virtual machine. (Too many web server exam- backup ples – change some of these) Also ghost images often not portable across machines These limits can be thought of as a contract of sorts (what CPU platform, devices supported etc) - can re- with the virtual machine appliance. When a virtual ma- store to same physical machine –but hard to send com- chine appliance is loaded on the system, a contract is promised machine out dor recovery and/or analysis established that limits it to its expected set of behav- while restoring to another platform. Virtual machines iors. Virtual machine appliances for which their ex- abstract these underlying details so they are portable pected behaviour is well- characterized would make it access machines – we used same VMWware client easier to detect signs of attack or compromise and imags for both Linux base OS and Windows base OS would therefore be more valuable to users. Accom- systems plishing the required functionality under a more re- stricted contract would be another aspect of a high In the case of ghost images there is also the difficul of quality virtual machine appliance. verifying full backups withouth trashing the existing systems (or having a second duplicate system on Contracts fix a fundamental problem with running new hand!) applications. Applications typically run with a users full rights but there is no method for holding them ac- Can craft a Combination of full ghost images plus in- countable doing only what is advertised. This leads to crementable but each layer makes it more diffifult hard Trojan horse exploits in which a piece of software to manage claims to accomplish a particular desired task but really also has malicious unadvertised effects. Similar to run- Protecting data in a file system virtual machine does ning software with a reduced set of privileges like with not remove the need for regular back-ups to protect chroot or jail. agains hardware failure etc, but it does streamline the process by allowing backup efforts to focus on the irre- In our prototype, these contracts are expressed through placeable personal data rather than on the recoverable a combination of Snort rules and limits imposed by the system data. It also allows backup efforts to be cus- virtual machine monitor. In the future, we would love tomized to the differing needs of system data and per- to see an unified contract language that could be used sonal data. to express all aspects of the contract. Such a contract could be inspected by the user and then loaded with the
  • 8. Tailor backup strategy to the differing needs of person- tion of responsibilitis to people with just one computer al data versus system data. not a whole network System data changes more slowly and predictably – Net boot and mount from separate FS machine while user data is more dynamic and unpredictable in its rate of change . To be more clear, there may be new system data written every day – log files etc- but this is Versus DeepFreeze or other system reset facilities – not really use visible changes – changes that are impor- great for environments where you want a fresh start ev- tant to preserve in the case of a compromised machine erytime – here we want to be able to make changes – download new apps and have them stay there etc – but In addition, there is a mismatch between the overall isolate user data – if VM with a new app dies you can rate of change in system data and the user visible rate reinstall from last known base of change. A large percentage of the data written in the average computer system is not directly related to user TODO cOMPARE to DeepFreeze or other system reset data (e.g. logs of system activity or writes to the page facilities file). However, it is produced constantly even when the TODO stateless Linux clients (Red Hat Fedora system is otherwise idle. This activity is of no interest project)? network booting to most users as long as the system continues to func- tion. If a month’s worth of such activity were lost, users would be perfectly happy as long as the system was returned to an internally consistent and functioning 4. Protection Against Attacks state. User data is exactly the opposite. Overall, user data To assess how well our architecture prevents and helps changes at a slower, human driven pace. However, the recover from attacks, we began by examining recent rate of user-visible change is high. For example, a user CERTadvisorie. We found that there have been 9 adv- may only add 1 page of text to a report in an 8 hour sisories posted since April 21, 2004. These 9 attacks workday but the loss of that one day of data would be are described briefly in Table X. immediately visible. Fortunately, this means that ef- forts to protect user data can be effective even if target- CERT attacks – how we defend against them ed at a small percentage of overall data. In addition the CERT advisories, we also examined TODO quantitative data on backups - references for several well-known attacks including CodeRed, My- how few people do itor expense/time involved Doom and Blaster. These attacks are briefly described in Table Y. If the user does make routine backups of their personal data, the FS-VM can also make that process more effi- Other kinds of attacks we can defend against cient. The FS-VM contains exactly the data that should be backed-up. Even if the user does not make routine For example, these mount points can specify the allow- backups, this configuration prevents loss of user data able read or write rate or prevent files with certain simply because it is intermingled with high-risk system properties from being created. data. Action item would be to group these into categories of Why better than backup whole system – 1) ability to what fixes them catch attack with Snort (if catch with inbound virus scanner then can prevent) – if don’t then can look for write restriction lastest CERT restriction on exe- attack out behavior and restart from known good or just cutables email and file sharing (some versions of pull their network access outlook do not allow saving executables but many email clients and many people don't have set - also For system data, ease of checkpoint and restore. Appli- don't let you view HTML so many people turn off be- ances – ability to try out new appliances or roll back to cause to restrictive ) we are not preventing people old from saving and running executables - just not sav- ing them to the FS-VM - we let people try them and Much like bringing benefit of managed LAN to a per- if it goes wrong they can reset APP-VM to a known sonal computer – file server, net boot server, firewall, it good state – this is much safer/easier user experi- is bringing the benefits of network servers and sepera- ence safe "playpen"
  • 9. Start with Xen numbers on ITL – iozone read and write and freebench read restriction latest CERT restriction on read all snort rule/restart/pull network CodeRed (2/9/05) Compare that to Xen on versus planet lab Blaster Then examine VMWare numbers with Windows base Leslie - MyDoom (Bagle like this?) lots of versions on the ITL machines – iozone read and write and change registry to run itslef when the system restarts freebench; VMWAre with Linux base on the ITL ma- puts copies of itslef in shared directories what does it chines (relace all this with Jason’s machines numbers if do? mass emailing snort could catch and go back to known good that wouldn't have registry mods those are better), can't NFS mount the registry Teatime prevents registry changes? Spybot Dbench? MyDoom doesn;t do anything just mails copies of itself takes up network BW leaves a backdoor - Details of experiments – machine specs, Version num- allows later attacks to be run from this client over- bers of VMware and Xen, version numbers of iozone writes host file so users can't acccess antivirus or win- and parameters to iozone, version numbers of dows update site freebench, debench, versions of Linux and Windows Kevin CodeRed1 and CodeRed2 on base, in guests, What NFS server and clinet ver- CodeRed - a little defacing on main page of web sions, how many runs of each experiment pages (little writing) 1-19 of month generate list of Ips CodeRed1.0 static list of Ips CodeRed1.1 random What do we know from Xen paper and Freenix paper? generation of Ips IIS exploit - some kind of server attack 21-29 DOS attack on popular sites CodeRed1 Conslusions - does powerful vs less powerful matter? stays in memory CodeRed2 writes an exectutable - does base OS matter? does guest OS matter? does the could do blocking of executables limits on outside con- VM system matter - Xen vs VMWare (yes from other nections CodeRed1 reboot would kill it off and won't come back unless reinfected paper) does NFS vs AFS matter? break down base OS/local FS to guest OS/ NFS/AFS in FSVM with watch snort logs and if detect it - restart the VM only guest OS/ local FS restart N times and then alert the user that this snort rule constatnly fails restart it but without a bridged Conclusions – little to no overhead for freebench, over- connection ******** or possibly pause the VM? head of up to 30% for io intensive for VMWAre – equivalent of pulling a machines network connection overhead under Xen is much lower – however Win- dows is most attacked so VMWare is crucial – even at Patty – Blaster randomly picked an IP address and higher overheads still worth it for many users (prefer then exploited a RPC flaw (port 135) snort rule finds stable but slower appliance to constant worry about at- and pulls its network access automatically run the tack) patch on this system?? VMWare is robust and it supports Windows VMS; Xen suports XenoLinux today and plans for XenoWin- 5. Overhead of Private File Server and dows; For Windows VMs is VMWare the only choice? Virtual Machine Appliances Win4Lin, Win, Crossover Office whats wrong with VMWare? 1) we would prefer a Clearly, this is a tax on the system performance. Intro- base OS that is a simple hardened VM manager; duces overhead but given the power of modern PCS, VMWAre is not that VMWARE ESX - is it that? many users will have resource to spare (disk space, CPU speed, memory) and many users willing to pay Xen has lower overhead but does not support Win- for the protection of their personal data and rapid re- dows. Since the majority of high-impact worms and covery from attack. viruses target Windows systems, it especially important to support Windows guests. However, there is on-going work on XenoWindows, or the ability to support Win- Lots of VM monitors comparision of them all beyond dows guests on Xen. the scope of this– we experiemented with VMWare and Xen - why
  • 10. Ways to further reduce avoid overhead – spectrum of We propose the use of virtual machine technology to security and recoverability versus overhead isolate and protect user data from the rest of the system and to provide rapid restoration of system state. Virtual Another good strategy is to if we find that expensive machine technology has been available for over 30 togo to NFS/AFS server and cheaper to stay in a VM - years on mainframes [VM370, Goldberg74], but it is then we are better off the more things are to system relatively new for commodity personal computers [De- data (kept local) only pay the expense on mounted nali02, VMWare, Xen03]. Today, virtual machine technology on commodity hardware has many applica- "user data" tions including providing multiple operating systems platforms on the same physical machine, building effi- Some longer range plans include examining file traces cient honeypot machines and as a stable platform for to quantify the percentage of file system traffic directed OS development. As the computing power and storage to system data versus user data on a set of desktop sys- capacities of commodity platforms increase, virtual tems. The lower the percentage of traffic directed to machine technology is also being used to provide en- user data, the easier it will be to efficiently protect the hanced system services such as secure logging user data without significant overhead. [Chen01] and backtracking of intrusions [King03]. Also not all “unrecoverable” data needs to be classified We propose using virtual machine technology to pro- as personal data and stored in the file server virtual ma- vide rapid restoration of a compromised system. chine. For example, web server logs may be useful and Recently, virtual machine technology has been used to interesting but not worth preserving in case of attack. identify the specific vulnerabilities that allowed an at- tack to succeed so that similar attacks can be prevented in the recovered system. We apply virtual machine technology to a related problem – that of rapid recov- 6. Related Work ery from an attack. Virtual machine technology has been available for over 30 years on mainframes [VM370, Goldberg74], but it TODO on summary of other VM systems besides VM is relatively new for commodity personal computers ware [Denali02, VMWare, Xen03]. Today, virtual machine technology on commodity hardware has many applica- Qemu and Bochs tions including providing multiple operating systems platforms on the same physical machine, building effi- 7. Future Work cient honeypot machines and as a stable platform for Improvements to base systems – nice GUIs for easily OS development. As the computing power and storage manipulating VMs, unified system to express all ele- capacities of commodity platforms increase, additional ments of the contract between based machine and a applications of virtual machine technology are ex- VM and tools to help create, inspect and validate these plored. Several systems have used virtual machine technology contracts to enhance system security and fault tolerance. Bres- soud and Schneider developed fault-tolerant systems Right now not for the novice user but it could be - using virtual machine technology to replicate the state VMWware GUI is pretty easy to use integrate of a primary system to space back-up system [Bres- some of these configurations by degault right now they soud96]. Dunlap et al used virtual machines to provide don't give you a choice of VM with an interface on a secure logging and replay [Dunlap02]. King and Chen local virutalk network and the real network you have to used virtual machine technology and secure logging to configure that custom creates a market for easy to use determine the cause of an attack after it has occurred. appliance VMS sell your VM ot others if it is easy to Reed et al used virtual machine technology to bring un- use the "plugs" are well defined trusted code safely into a shared computing environ- More benchmarks especially Windows system bench- ment. marks We focus on the related problem of rapid system restoration and protection of user data. We are unaware We would also like to investigate logging data modifi- of another system that has seperated user data and sys- cations in the file system virtual on a per client basis. tem data in the way we are proposing and optimized Logging data modifications would allow the FS-VM to the handling of each to provide rapid system restora- roll back the changes of a compromised VM when sus- tion after an attack. picious behavior is detected.
  • 11. In addition, the FS-VM could log modifications to the 9. References user’s data store. As in a log-structured file system, the data written would immediately be visible in the file [Bressoud96] T. Bressoud and F. Schneider. Hypervi- system; however, earlier versions of the file system could be recovered if garbage collection of old data is sor-based fault tolerance. ACM Transactions on Com- delayed. Such a delay in garbage collection would al- puter Systems, 14(1):80-107, February 1996. low the user or the intrusion detection system time to detect the attack. Once detected, the log could be trun- [Chen01] P. Chen and B. Noble. When virtual is better cated at a point before the attack began. The length of than real. Proceedings of the 2001 Workshop on Hot the log could be based on the amount of time required Topics in Operating Systems (HotOS), p. 133-138, to detect an attack. Such a delay would also provide an May 2001. undo facility to recover from accidental destruction of user data. The maintenance VM could be used to con- [CDD+04] B. Clark, T. Deshane, E. Dow, S. Evanchik, trol rollback of the FS-VM. M. Finlayson, J. Herne, J. Matthews. “Xen and the Art of Repeated Research”, 2004 USENIX Annual Techni- cal Conference FREENIX Track, June 2004. 8. Conclusions [Denali02] A. Whitaker, M. Shaw, S. Gribble. Scale List all the ways we help improve security – ability to and Performance in the Denali Isolation Kernel. Pro- characterize and hold virtual machine appliances to ceedings of the 5th Symposium on Operating Systems their resource limits, finer grain control of subsets of Design and Implementation (OSDI 2002), ACM Oper- personal data, reducing the risk of regular patches and ating Systems Review, Winter 2002 Special Issue, upgrades, collecting personal data together allows re- pages 195-210, Boston, MA, USA, December 2002. sources for regular backup to be focused on the unre- coverable user data, automatic restart of a compro- [Disco97] E. Bugnion, S. Devine, K. Govil, M. Rosen- mised appliance to a known good state, ability to send blum. Disco: Running Commodity Operating Systems checkpoints of compromised machines for analysis and on Scalable Multiprocessors. ACM Transactions on recovery in parallel with running at least temporarily Computer Systems, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1997, pp. 412-447. on the last known good snapshot, ability to hold per- sonal data in a virtual machine that is not even directly accessible from remote machines without at least two [Dunlap02] G. Dunlap, S. King, S. Cinar, M. Basrai, P. separated successful exploits one against the hardened Chen. ReVirt: Enabling Intrusion Detection Analysis file system virtual machine through Virtual Machine Logging and Replay. Pro- ceedings of the 2002 Symposium on Operating Sys- Other benefits – ability to share working virtual ma- tems Design and Implementation (OSDI), p.211-224, chine appliances across physical machines thus facili- December 2002. tating a new software distribution method with many advantages including saving users the headaches of ini- [Eust99] K.F. Eustice. A universal information appli- tial installation and configuration ance. IBM Systems Journal, Volume 38, Number 4, 1999. Recovering a compromised computer system can be a painful process often involving reinstalling the operat- [iozone] ing system and user applications. In addition, any per- sonal data stored on the machine is often lost unless a [King03a] S. King, G. Dunlap, P. Chen. Operating Sys- recent backup exists. We describe the fundamental dif- tem Support for Virtual Machines. Proceedings of the ferences between user data and system data which lead 2003 USENIX Technical Conference, June 2003. to different approaches to protecting and recovery each class of data after a attack. [King03b] S. King and P. Chen. Backtracking Intru- We have quantified overhead in a prototype system and sions. Proceedings of the 19th ACM Symposium on Op- described ways to further improve the prototype for erating Systems, p. 223-236, December 2003. both eas of use and further reductions in overhead [Labtram]
  • 12. [LKML03] K. Fraser. Post to Linux Kernel Mailing Technical Report UCAM-CL-TR-552, University of List, October 3 2003, URL Cambridge, Computer Laboratory, Jan. 2003. permail/linux/kernel/0310.0/0550.html accessed De- cember 2003. [Xen03c] S. Hand, T. Harris, E. Kotsovinos, and I. Pratt. Controlling the XenoServer Open Platform, April [Norm98] D. Norman. The Invisible Computer: Why 2003. Good Products Can Fail, the Personal Computer Is So Complex, and Information Appliances Are the Solu- tion. MIT Press, 1998. [ZPERF] S. Thoss, Linux on zSeries Performance Up- date Session 9390. URL [Dike00] J. Dike. A User-mode Port of the Linux Ker- ac- nel. Proceedings of the 4th Annual Linux Showcase & cessed December 2003. Conference (ALS 2000), page 63, 2000. [dbench] [Dike01] J. Dike. User-mode Linux. Proceedings of the 5th Annual Linux Showcase & Conference, Oak- [freebench] land CA (ALS 2001). pp 3-14, 2001. [Dike02] J. Dike. Making Linux Safe for Virtual Ma- chines. Proceedings of the 2002 Ottawa Linux Sympo- 10.OUTTAKES sium (OLS), June 2002. [Goldberg74] R. Goldberg. Survey of Virtual Ma- chine Research. IEEE Computer, p. 34-35, June 1974. Figure 1: First System Configuration [Spafford89] E. Spafford. Crisis and Aftermath, Com- 2.1 Identifying User Data and System Data munications of the ACM, 37(6):678-687, June 1989. User data housed in the FS-VM would typically in- [VM370] R. Creasy. The Origin of the VM/370 Time- clude a user’s home directory or documents directory. Sharing System. IBM Journal of Research and Devel- Many applications are already configured to store data opment. Vol. 25, Number 5. Page 483. Published 1981. in these locations. User data could also include other locations in which applications store user data (e.g. [VMWARE] Vmware, URL mailboxes, calendars, archives of scanned photos). accessed December 2003. Subsets of the user’s data store could be mounted into the PLATFORM-VM at different locations and with [Xen99] D. Reed, I. Pratt, P. Menage, S. Early, and N. different permissions. Stratford. Xenoservers: Accounted Execution of Un- trusted Code. Proceedings of the 7th Workshop on Hot System data would include the operating system image Topics in Operating Systems, 1999. and related files as well as all installed software. Sys- tem data would typically also include any information [Xen03] P. Barham, B. Dragovic, K. Fraser, S. Hand, written by the OS or user applications such as logs or T. Harris, A. Ho, R. Neugebauer, I. Pratt and A. paging files. Warfield. Xen and the Art of Virtualization. Proceed- Clearly, there is flexibility in this boundary between ings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating user and system data. For example, if a user runs a web systems principles, pp 164-177, Bolton Landing, NY, server, the content directory could be considered per- USA, 2003 sonal user data and mounted read-only from the FS- VM. However, if the user has a static copy of that data [Xen03a] P. Barham, B. Dragovic, K. Fraser, S. Hand, within the FS-VM, she might simply place a copy in T. Harris, A. Ho, E. Kotsovinos, A. Madhavapeddy, R. the PLATFORM-VM instead. Similarly, web server Neugebauer, I. Pratt and A. Warfield. Xen 2002. Tech- logs may be considered system data. However, if the nical Report UCAM-CL-TR-553, January 2003. user wanted to prevent the loss of these logs in case of attack, a mount point could be established into the FS- [Xen03b] K. Fraser, S. Hand, T. Harris, I. Leslie, and VM. I. Pratt. The Xenoserver Computing Infrastructure.
  • 13. 2.2 Key Differences Between System Data and User legal content or as the launching pad for additional at- Data tacks. This separation of user data from system data is moti- Once a system is compromised, attackers may be able vated by several key differences between system data to log in at will and search through user data in a less and user data. First, system data is more predictable automated fashion. In this way, attackers may locate and thus is easier to attack. Second, system data is of- valuable user data such as credit card numbers or other ten more valuable to an attacker and thus more attrac- financial data. However, the difficulty of automation tive to attack. Third, system data can be restored from has to-date limited the scope of such attacks. public sources and thus is less critical to protect. These differences lead to different approaches to data protec- User data is rarely the primary target of an attack. tion and restoration. However, it is often a casualty of attacks on system software. Isolating user data from system data makes it 2.2.1 System data is more predictable and thus is easier less likely that user data will be lost simply because to attack. malfunction ing system software makes it inaccessible. From the earliest worms [Spafford89], attackers have exploited the homogeneity or monoculture of system data. Attackers can target a small number of operating systems or commonly used pieces of user level soft- ware (e.g. web servers, email readers). The attackers themselves have easy access to the actual binaries and typical configurations. If they discover vulnerabilities when probing their own test system, the chances are excellent that the exact same vulnerabilities will exist on many other systems. Users data, on the other hand, is more unpredictable in its contents, name and location. There are exceptions to this rule. For example, some malware has exploited the homogeneity of address books in Microsoft Outlook. However, for the most part, user data is significantly less predication and thus harder to exploit in an auto- mated fashion than system data. Malicious code or data can still be introduced into the user’s data store. For example, a virus may be written to a user’s email log. However, a virus scan program could be run against the user’s data store to clean it without loss of data and if the PLATFORM-VM was compromised it could be restored. 2.2.2 System data is often more valuable to an attacker and thus more attractive to attack. As a general rule, user data is also less valuable to at- tackers. For example, a report may represent weeks or months of careful work for a user, but to an attacker it is of no value. Similarly, a video of a special event may be priceless to a user, but irrelevant to an attacker. System data on the other hand is valuable because once compromised it can provide the attacker with resource such as an idle CPU, free disk space or an under-uti- lized network connection. Attackers can use these re- sources for many purposes such as to store and serve il-