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Good Cop, Bad Cop - Analyzing The Copenhagen
What a dramatic sprint to the finish lime of
COP15! When all was said and done, what resulted in the form of the Copenhagen Accord
(available here) was a non-binding three-page agreement which the conference of parties “took note” of
rather than voted for or signed in order to get round the objections of a handful of petro-states such as
Bolivia, Venezuela, and Sudan, in addition to Cuba and Nicaragua (Jacob Werksmen of the World
Resources Institute provides a goodexplanation of the legal implication of this). I’m not sure any of
these states could ever be trusted as genuine international partners anyways.
The mainstream media was quick to dismiss the outcome as a failure, and very soon, new puns such as
“flopenhagen”, “brokenhagen” and “nopenhagen” were uttered. Is this surprising? No, of course
not. The mainstream media, at least in the Western world, likes headlines that shock and rouse up
negative feelings. Its much simpler to convey to the public the message that the Copenhagen climate
talks sputtered, than articulate the modest but important steps that the Copenhagen Accord yielded.
Well The Green Leap Forward is not the mainstream media. I will endeavor to provide a takeaway of
some positive outcomes of the accord, and also try in a subsequent post to reflect on how China came
out of this with respect to their negotiating position going in.
The Copenhagen Accord was not a breakthrough, but it wasn’t a complete failure either.
Those who were disappointed that COP15 did not produce a legally-binding outcome clearly were not
doing their homework. Going in to the metings in Denmark on December 7, that was never an expected
outcome. As I made clear in my “Copenhagen Kickoff” post, the goal of Copenhagen was to agree on a
political statement or accord. At the emergency meeting at the APEC in Singapore in mid-November,
leaders agreed that Copenhagen would be the first step of a two-step process, with the second step being
a fully-ratifiable, legally-binding treaty. In Beijing days later for the US-China presidential summit,
President Obama elaborated on this, expressing hope that what would come out from Copenhagen:
Our aim there, in support of what Prime Minister Rasmussen of Denmark is trying to achieve, is not a
partial accord or a political declaration, but rather an accord that covers all of the issues in the
negotiations, and one that has immediate operational effect.
So was this achieved? Let’s take a closer look (I’ll start with the bad stuff so that I can end on a high):
Two aspects of the Copenhagen Accord make it admittedly disappointing:
First, the emissions mitigation targets that the nations have tabled (but will as a technical matter only
submit formally by January 31, 2010) will not get us on the path to the accord’s stated objective of
avoiding a global temperature rise of more than 2 degrees Celsius, unless they are miraculously
strengthened over the next 5 weeks. Indeed, analysis by my colleague has shown that such
commitments only get us 65 percent of the reductions we need to meet the 2 degrees C goal, to say
nothing of the 1.5 degrees C goal that Tuvalu and other small island nation states have pushed for. Over
the course of the next months, governments must be challenged to commit to deeper cuts.
Second, the Copenhagen Accord does not set a deadline for the critical second step–the legally-binding
agreement. Most would have hoped for December 2010, where the 16th Conference of the Parties, or
COP16, convenes in Mexico City. Some like Nobel Prize-winning climate change advocate Al Gore has
even pushed for COP16 to be pushed up to July. The only consolation on this point is that UN General
Secretary Ban Ki-Moon has used leadership to urge governments to translate the Copenhagen Accord
into a fully ratifiable treaty in 2010. In my own assessment, the parallel use of non-UNFCCC
multilateral fora such as the Major Economies Forum, G8, G20, as well as bilateral interactions, will be
critical towards getting to Step Two.
Pictured right, Premier Wen Jiabao
and President Obama in a bilateral discussion at Copenhagen on December 18.
Despite its shortcomings, there are at least three reasons to be optimistic:
1. Mitigation. The accord starts to move away from the artificial distinction between developed versus
developing countries towards one of major emitters versus everyone else. It is not a complete shift,
since references to Annex I and non-Annex I countries still exist in the text and both are held to
different standards of mitigation actions. Yet, the Copenhagen Accord marks the first time where major
developing countries such as China and India promise to commit to mitigation actions. Governments
will have up to January 30, 2010 to submit their mitigation commitments. What is just as important is
that the governments explicitly agree to avoid global temperature rise of 2 degrees C, and the last clause
of the accord provides for an assessment on a more stringent 1.5 degrees C target to be completed by
2. Transparency. The accord contains important language on transparency. This has been an
especially divisive issue between China and the United States, or so the mainstream media would have
had you believe. However, as I wrote on Friday (December 18) morning, there seemed to be clear signs
that the gap between both countries on the transparency issue appeared to be closing. Apparently,
though, it would take another bilateral meeting between Premier Wen and President Obama, and a
multilateral meeting among Obama, Wen, Lula (Brazil), Singh (India) and Zuman (South Africa) to
hash out the final agreement on transparency.
The ends result appears to be a satisfactory compromise. Developing countries will have mitigation
actions that are supported by international financial/technological assistance to the full force of “MRV”
(measuring, reporting and verification), while unsupported actions would be subject to domestic MRV
processes, but also reported every two years through national communications and subject to
“international consultation and analysis,” but only in such away where “national soveriengty is
respected.” This is not only consistent with my prediction on the moring of December 18, but also with
the BASIC position going into the Copenhagen talks itself (see previous post “China in Copenhagen Day
4: Back to BASICS!). Whether this is something that the United States negotiators can take back to the
U.S. Congress to appease those who are skeptical of whether the developing countries can be trusted to
live up to their commitments remains to be seen, but President Obama, in his press briefing shortly
before leaving Copenhagen, seemed satisfied with the outcome on transparency.
3. Finance. The accord produced additional commitments for financial assistance from developed to
developing countries, especially the most vulnerable and poor countries. The US$30 billion quick-start
funding for 2010 to 2012, which eventually rises to a $100 billion per year global climate fund by 2020
may fall short of the $300 or $400 billion a year that some developing countries are calling for, but is
non-trivial. The United States, for its part, will pay its fair share of these global figures, including at
least $1 billion over the next three years for forest conservation, and another $350 million on four
specific technology assistance initiatives. These are real and new commitments that would not have
occurred but for Copenhagen.
As brief as it is (3 pages to be exact, or 5 pages if you count the Appendix), Copenhagen Accord is
comprehensive in that it covers all the major issues (including forestry-Article 6-as some media outlets
have incorrectly claimed was dropped) and is *somewhat* operational immediately–once the parties
declare their mitigation commitments by the end of January, they can proceed to implement them,
while the $30 billion quick-start fund commences next year as well; other aspects such as transparency
and the global climate fund will require further action from the Conference of Parties to proceed.
The Copenhagen Accord is, in the final analysis, a stepping stone that will require much hard work in
the months ahead.
For a more
thorough analysis, I leave it to people who are smarter than me. Rob Stavins of Harvard has the most
thorough yet concise analysis. My colleague Andrew Light at the Center for American Progress, Michael
Levi of Council for Foreign Relations, Jeremy Symons of National Wildlife Federation and Jake
Schmidt of NRDC provide useful commentary. (It strikes me that the optimists coming out of COP15
are those who actually know a thing or two about international climate policy.)
A MUST READ, though, is this entertaining piece by AP which provide much color on the chaotic but
central role that President Obama had in brokering the final deal, including a final frantic multilateral
with China, India, Brazil and South Africa (the four BASIC countries) as pictured right. One is left with
the strong impression that suggesting that we might have come away with nothing at all at Copenhagen
if not for President Obama’s intervention in the final hours.
In my next post, I will examine how the Copenhagen Accord measures up to China’s negotioating
position going into the summit.
Picture credits: Cartoon by About.com; photos by White House.