Emerging China


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China As an Emerging Threat

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Emerging China

  1. 1. Presented to the The Intelligence Summit - 2006 By C. L. Staten CEO and Sr. National Security Analyst Emergency Response & Research Institute © Copyright, 2005-6, Emergency Response & Research Institute and the author. All rights reserved. This presentation contains military and law enforcement sensitive information and should not be distributed to the general public. Contact ERRI/EmergencyNet News for more information about any usage of this presentation.
  2. 2. Assessing the Future • In the coming decade: China could become our greatest economic opportunity…or our worst military nightmare. The management of the U.S. relationship with China is one of the most important issues that we face in the next ten years.
  3. 3. Why are we concerned? • “Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages… absent U.S. counter strategies” Source: The Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006
  4. 4. Emerging Peer Competitor? • The possibility of a strategic conflict between the United States and China is real. While it is not inevitable, its likelihood cannot be ruled out…
  5. 5. Found Wanting... How to Move Ahead • Although unintentional, the United States has influenced the direction taken by the modernization of China's defense establishment in two ways. The quick, decisive defeat of Iraq's armed forces in the 1991Gulf War first informed the PLA leadership how far their forces lagged behind a modern military. They learned that the PLA's operational concepts were as antiquated as their weapons. • When the operational concepts discussed in China's military journals over the past decade are linked with the acquisitions from Russia and the priorities suggested by China's indigenous military R&D programs, it is evident that a primary objective of the PLA is to exploit perceived U.S. vulnerabilities. Source: THE PLA'S LEAP INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US, By Paul H.b. Godwin, CHINA BRIEF, Volume 4, Issue 9 (April 29, 2004), The Jamestown Foundation
  6. 6. PLA Changing R & D Practices • The People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the defense industrial base and R&D infrastructure are significantly improved beyond where they were in the late 1970s. The number of military personnel has been significantly reduced, and the ground, air and naval forces have been reorganized to support the transition to the joint warfare operations sought by PLA doctrinal changes over the past decade.
  7. 7. Let the Numbers Tell Us A Tale • In 2000, the official budget figure was approximately 14.6 billion, or 121 billion yuan. China increased its defense spending for the year by 17.7 percent. • In early 2001, China's publicly-acknowledged defense budget of over $17 billion for 2001 was higher than the defense budgets of neighboring countries India, Taiwan, and South Korea. • In 2002, China increased military spending in 2002 by 17.6 percent, or $3 billion, bringing the publicly reported total to $20 billion. • China again increased its budget to $22 billion in 2003 (about 185.3 billion RMB ) . • China's defense budget continued to grow in 2004. Chinese Finance Minister Jin Renqing proposed an increase of 11.6 percent [$2.6 billion] in military expenditures. • In 2005, it was announced that China's military budget will rise 12.6 percent, to 247.7 billion yuan ($29.9 billion). China has announced double-digit increases in military spending nearly every year for more than a decade.
  8. 8. Graphic Representation of Chinese Military Budget 2000-2005 2000-2005 29.9 30 24.6 25 22.4 20 20 17 14.6 15 Chinese Military Budget 10 5 Numbers 0 represented 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 are in Billions of $U.S. Dollars Source: GlobalSecurity.org, 2005
  9. 9. What are The Chinese Spending their Money on? • The modernization of the PLA has placed priority on the development of: • · Battlefield communications • · Reconnaissance • · Space-based weapons • · Mobile nuclear weapons • · Attack submarines • · Fighter aircraft • · Precision-guided weapons • · Training rapid-reaction ground forces
  10. 10. Chinese Military Modernization • There is no question that China has achieved a remarkable leap in modernization of the forces needed for these missions and that it is urgently continuing on that path. There is question about how China is now proceeding to exercise these new assets so as to make them truly operational in a combat environment. There is considerable question about China’s capability to coordinate all these forces in two major simultaneous operations: (1) to bring Taiwan to its knees and; (2) cause the U.S. to be tardy, indecisive, or ineffective in responding to such an assault
  11. 11. The 16-Character Policy 16-Character • In 1997, the CCP formally codified the 16-Character Policy. The quot;16-Character Policyquot; is the CCP's overall direction that underlies the blurring of the lines between State and commercial entities, and military and commercial interests. The sixteen characters literally mean: • · Jun-min jiehe (Combine the military and civil) • · Ping-zhan jiehe (Combine peace and war) • · Jun-pin youxian (Give priority to military products) • · Yi min yan jun (Let the civil support the military) • This policy, a reaffirmation and codification of Deng Xiaoping's 1978 pronouncement, holds that military development is the object of general economic modernization, and that the CCP's main aim for the civilian economy is to support the building of modern military weapons and to support the aims of the PLA.
  12. 12. The Psychological Aspects of Chinese Strategy • Chinese statecraft is based on political warfare and psychological warfare; it aims at manipulating foes into compliance by means of the creation of an awesome aura of power, for which the military and military action are but an adjunct. This intended perception may not be true and the Chinese – relative to the the United States -- may not be as all powerful as some might believe
  13. 13. The Chinese believe that… All war is deception • “The development of modern military technology, the exposure to foreign military theories, and the repeated defeats in wars against the Western powers, have broken the monopoly of the ancient military theories but they are still highly respected and continually influence the thinking of Chinese military leaders,” writes Chinese military historian Chen-Ya Tien.” Source: U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, Sept. 15, 2005
  14. 14. Ancient Thinking Still Dominates Chinese Strategy • To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. • And Thus the highest form of generalship is to foil the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all Sun Tzu , the father of the is to besiege walled Chinese “art of war” cities.
  15. 15. The Chinese were ancient innovators in military strategies and tactics… tactics… Legendary innovators in military strategy and tactics, the potential of Chinese military power has waxed and waned over the past several hundred years. Additionally the Chinese adaptation of communism did not lead to the necessary modernization of their military forces. Instead, as we saw in the Korean war, the Chinese’s main advantage for the past several decades was their ability to undertake The Great Wall of China, “mass wave attacks” using ill-trained a major military and equipped foot soldiers. innovation of its time That is now changing…
  16. 16. Surprise and Asymmetric Means • …the concept of taking on a superior force and defeating it through surprise and with asymmetric means pervades Chinese military publications (and thinking). The U.S. is the only such force to be contemplated, but, equally significant in my view, is that these methods are contemplated only in the situation where China is faced with U.S. forces aimed specifically at thwarting its essential (in Beijing’s view) efforts with respect to Taiwan. Source: Rear Admiral (U.S. Navy, Retired) Eric A. McVadon Director of Asia-Pacific Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Consultant on East Asia Security Affairs, 15 September 2005
  17. 17. Hybrid Forms of Warfare • The nature of tomorrow's irregular wars is not completely clear. Most likely it will evolve into quot;War Beyond Limitsquot; as described by a pair of Chinese Colonels in a volume entitled quot;Unrestricted Warfare.quot; It certainly will not break out as described in the Pentagon's strategy, with enemies choosing discrete options between conventional, irregular, catastrophic or disruptive strategies. We will face hybrid forms purpose built to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. This would include states blending high- tech capabilities like anti-satellite weapons, with terrorism and cyber-warfare directed against financial targets or critical infrastructure. They will surely involve protracted and extremely lethal conflicts like the insurgency in Iraq. Such wars will be neither conventional nor low intensity. Above all, the enemy and his tactics will likely be “shapeless.”
  18. 18. Principals of Unrestricted War • The worth of these principles and tactics [of Chinese unrestricted warfare] will not be clear until they have been tested in an actual war. [pg. 223 - 225] Here they are: • Full Dimensional -- This is the starting point of unrestricted warfare thought. Its basic demand is that in looking at battlefields and potential battlefields all methods, plans and resources be brought into play. There is no distinction between on and off the battlefield. Politics, economics and culture are also battlefields. • Simultaneity -- Operate in many different battlespaces at the same time. Many kinds of tactics that were once down in stages can now be done simultaneously. Modern communications made it possible for one U.S. information warfare base to provide attack data for 4000 targets to 1200 aircraft within one minute. • Limited Objectives -- Make an action plan within the scope of available means. Always consider whether an objective is practically attainable. Do not seek objectives that are not limited in time and space. The mistake of General McArthur in the Korean War is the classic case of expanding a limited objective. The experience of the U.S. in Vietnam and of the USSR in Afghanistan prove the same point. Means must be adequate to the objective in view.
  19. 19. China…Friend or Foe?? China…Friend • ERRI’s current assessment would suggest that diplomatic, economic, logistical and other factors are likely to have significant influence and impact on the potential for a future U.S. conflict with China. • If we are able to successfully use America’s “soft power” and China continues to move towards a more “capitalist society,” a future confrontation with China may be able to be averted. • Otherwise, the United States must be prepared to engage in an undoubtedly bloody and asymmetric war with China’s 1.3 billion people.
  20. 20. ERRI/Emergency Net News We’ll help you better understand your world We’ll • More Information? EMERGENCY RESPONSE & RESEARCH INSTITUTE (ERRI) EmergencyNet News Service 6348 North Milwaukee Avenue - #312, Chicago, Illinois 60646, USA Voice/Voice Mail: 773-631-ERRI Fax: 773-631-4703 Internet E-Mail: sysop@mail.emergency.com Web Page: http://www.emergency.com © Copyright, 2005-6, Emergency Response & Research Institute and the author. All rights reserved. This presentation contains military and law enforcement sensitive information and should not be distributed to the general public. Contact ERRI/EmergencyNet News for more information about any usage of this presentation.