Caribbean Human Development Report [UN HDR2012]
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Caribbean Human Development Report [UN HDR2012] Document Transcript

  • 1. Caribbean HumanDevelopment Report2012Human Developmentand the Shift to BetterCitizen Security
  • 2. Caribbean Human Development Report 2012Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen SecurityCopyright © 2012by the United Nations Development Programme1 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USAAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in anyform or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without prior permission.ISBN: 9789962688082Website: Robert Zimmermann, Carol Lawes and Nanette SvensonCover design: Timothy Bootan and Juan Manuel SalazarDesign and Layout: Miguel Nova y Vínculos GráficosPrinted in Panama by Inversiones Gumo, S.A.For a list of any errors or omissions found subsequent to printing please visit our website.No consultation has been carried out in Guyana.The data on Guyana have been obtained through public sources and the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.
  • 3. Caribbean Human Development Report 2012 Helen Clark Administrator United Nations Development Programme Rebeca Grynspan Associate Administrator United Nations Development ProgrammeHeraldo Muñoz Niky FabiancicAssistant Administrator and Director of the Deputy DirectorRegional Bureau for LAC Regional Bureau for LACUnited Nations Development Programme United Nations Development ProgrammeFreddy Justiniano Leida MercadoDirector a.i. Human Development AdvisorRegional Centre for LAC Coordinator Caribbean HDRUnited Nations Development Programme Regional Centre for LAC United Nations Development Programme Anthony Harriott Lead Author Caribbean HDR Executive BoardMarcia De Castro Luis Felipe Lopez CalvaUNDP Resident Representative Former Chief Economist and Practice LeaderTrinidad and Tobago and Suriname Poverty, MDGs and Human Development Regional Bureau for LACThomas GittensUNDP Country Director Alvaro PintoSuriname Former Practice Leader Democratic GovernanceMichelle Gyles-McDonnough Regional Bureau for LACUNDP Resident RepresentativeBarbados and OECS Pablo Ruiz Practice LeaderArun Kashyap Crisis Prevention and RecoveryUNDP Resident Representative Regional Centre for LACJamaicaKhadja MusaUNDP Resident RepresentativeGuyana
  • 4. ConsultantsRichard Bennett Marlyn JonesConsultant on Police Consultant on State Policies and Policy Orientation of the PopulationsTerri-Ann Gilbert-RobertsConsultant on Youth Violence and Youth Charles KatzResilience Consultant on Street Gangs and Organized Crime Edward Maguire Consultant on Criminal Justice Systems National ConsultantsApril Bernard Marlyn Jones Randy SeepersadBarbados Jamaica Trinidad and TobagoAnthony George Janielle MatthewsSaint Lucia Antigua and BarbudaMellissa Ifill Jack MenkeGuyana Suriname Survey and StatisticsUniversity of West Indies Quality Control ConsultantMark Kirton Helena RovnerMarlon AnatolRoy Russell Peer ReviewersEdward Greene Patricia MohammedPeer Reviewer on Human Development Peer Reviewer on GenderGabriel Kessler Trevor MunroePeer Reviewer on Youth Peer Reviewer on Policy
  • 5. ForewordThe increase in violence and crime in Latin America and the Caribbean is an undeniable factthat erodes the very foundation of the democratic processes in the region and imposes high so-cial, economic and cultural costs. Our region is home to 8.5 percent of the world’s population,yet it concentrates some 27 percent of the world’s homicides. Violence and crime are thereforeperceived by a majority of Latin American and Caribbean citizens as a top pressing challenge.The resulting alarm has often led to short-sighted, mano dura (iron fist) policies, which haveproven ineffective and, at times, detrimental to the rule of law.The situation varies much among and within countries. Broadly speaking, there are high- andlow-crime countries in the region, and differences exist even within each of the sub-regions(i.e., South America, Central America, and the Caribbean). However perceived insecurity andcitizens´ concern are independent of actual crime rates, so that mano dura policies are notexclusive of high-crime countries.In this context, we are confronted by a paradox: Why is it that, despite the democratizationprocess experienced in the region in the last 20 years, citizen security levels, as well as the justiceand security institutions in the region, are in crisis? Why is it that, despite the structural andinstitutional reforms promoted by countries in the region in order to construct governancemechanisms which are more transparent, horizontal and democratic, the justice and securityinstitutions are overwhelmed and confidence in them is shattered?To begin to resolve this paradox and deal effectively with crime and violence, we need accurateassessments that provide evidence for action. To this end, the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, in association with governments, civil societies and international agencies, is lead-ing numerous initiatives aimed at improving citizen security in Latin America and the Carib-bean. This report is a one of these efforts. Drafted by a team of outstanding scholars buildingupon previous research and practical experience, this report also reflects findings from theanalysis of extensive new survey data and sustained consultations involving over 450 experts,practitioners and stakeholders in seven Dutch- and English-speaking Caribbean countries.Of primary concern with citizen security is the issue of public confidence in state capacity toprotect citizens and ensure justice. If citizens lack confidence in the police, the judiciary andother public authorities, no amount of repression will restore security. The success of any lawenforcement system depends on the willingness of the people to participate and contribute.For the state to enjoy the trust and commitment of the people, it must strive to eradicate exclu-sion, improve transparency and create opportunities that encourage a sense of belongingfor all.A key message of the report is that Caribbean countries need to focus on a model of securitybased on the human development approach, whereby citizen security is paramount, ratherthan on the traditional state security model, whereby the protection of the state is the chiefaim. Indeed, the contrast between prevention on the one hand and repression and coercion C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 V
  • 6. on the other is ill conceived. Social inclusion to help prevent crime and violence and efficient and effective law enforcement are by no means incompatible or mutually exclusive. In a truly democratic society, broad based social inclusion and swift criminal justice–or “prevention” and “coercion”—serve to reinforce and complement each other. This is one of the most important lessons to be taken from this report – and not only for the Caribbean but for all of Latin America as well. An issue of common interest to Latin America and the Caribbean is security. Organized trans- national crime, mainly that which involves drug trafficking, looms large in the security crisis currently affecting an increasing number of countries in both sub-regions. Although this re- port concentrates on implications for the domestic dimensions of the problem in the Carib- bean, especially among youth, it is also important to note that the Caribbean is a critical transit route between drug producers and large-scale consumers. As a result of this geographical po- sitioning, it is necessary for the Caribbean to strengthen cooperation with its Latin American neighbours and project a larger voice in the global dialogue on existing policies and possible alternatives. An improved worldwide policy addressing the problem of addictive drugs could contribute considerably to reducing levels of violence and social disruption in the Caribbean. This belief is substantiated by an encouraging finding presented in the report: despite exceptionally high homicide rates, the overall incidence of crime in the Caribbean as measured by the victimiza- tion survey data “compares favourably at the lower end with countries such as Japan,” referring to nations that participated in the 2004-2005 International Crime Victimization Survey. This suggests that the spiral of violence generally associated with drug trafficking exists within the context of an otherwise durable social fabric that makes for lesser ordinary “street” crime. This is but one of the constructive insights readers of the Caribbean Human Development Report 2012 will find. With its fresh prospective, solid data and rigorous analysis, this publica- tion offers people from the Caribbean, along with those from Latin America and every other region, many valuable lessons to apply in the ongoing effort of confronting crime and fostering human development. Heraldo Muñoz Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme and Regional Director for Latin America and the CaribbeanVI C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 7. AcknowledgementsThis groundbreaking report, the first regional Caribbean Human Development Report, rep-resents an incredible collaboration across sectors of UNDP and non-UNDP experts, practi-tioners, academics and policy-makers whose combined insight and dedication have made thispublication possible. Thus, the list of credits and thanks extends far beyond these pages, butfirst and foremost goes to the UNDP Country Offices in the Caribbean and the UNDP Re-gional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean for both financial and technical supportof this process since its inception.Likewise, the UNDP Bureau for Development Policy contributed funding and expertise, andthe Human Development Report Office provided critical guidance and commentary. A spe-cial appreciation is also in order for the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery forits extensive and invaluable expert participation along with its financial backing.Several teams and individuals were essential to the success of this production as well. Amongthem are the technical committee that included Trevor Benn, Sandra Baptiste Caruth, AkikoFuji, Pablo Gago, Sonia Gill, Stein Hansen, Daniel Luz, Chisa Mikami, Paula Mohamed, EdoStork, and Alana Wheeler; the communications team comprised of Pablo Basz, Maria BlancoLora, Janine Chase, Franciois Coutu, Luke Paddington and Laura Raccio; the internal and ex-ternal readers Carmen de la Cruz, Alfredo Gonzalez, George Gray Molina, Natasha Leite, JairoMatallana, Gerardo Noto, Stefano Pettinato, Maria Tallarico, Hernando Gómez, Mitchell Selig-son and Oscar Yunowsky; the research and finance component with Danielle Brown, EstefaniaGrijalva, Norma Peña, Querube Mora, Raj Ramnath and Cheryle Tewarie. A special appreciationis also due to Minh Pham (Former UNDP Resident Representative Jamaica), Paula Hidalgo, andPedro Moreno who provided valuable inputs at onset of the preparation process.The statistical team from the University of the West Indies was indispensible for the designand implementation of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Another important institu-tional contributor was the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project (LA-POP) that facilitated access to Caribbean LAPOP survey data and commented instructivelyon methodology and results.With the support of UNDP Country Offices and the UNDP Democratic Dialogue RegionalProject, a widespread series of consultations was conducted that involved over 450 governmentofficials, policy-makers, opposition members, academic researchers, civil society representatives,and national and international development practitioners. A special effort was also made dur-ing these consultations to include representatives of typically underrepresented groups such asyouth, women, Maroon communities and other populations facing potential discrimination. Allof the participants in these consultations provided vital qualitative data as well as insightful refer-ences that were important for consolidating the findings and recommendations of the report. Wethank those who acted as chairs and repertoires of the working groups, Mobola Aguda-F, CharlesClayton, Beverly Chase, Gianluca Giuman, Itziar Gonzalez, Lebrechtta Oye Hesse-Bayne, Meri-am Hubard, Gaston Ian, Anna West, Rosemary Lall, Ruben Martoredjo Carol Narcisse, RachidaNorden, Howie Prince, Philip Thomas, Joan Seymour and Stacey Syne.We specially wish to acknowledge the contributions provided by the following governmentand non government representatives during the entire preparation process: C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 VII
  • 8. Barbados: Carson Browne, Permanent Secretary Economic Affairs and Team on the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs; George Belle, Dean, F.S.S and Corin Bailey, Research Fellow, University of the West Indies; Rodney Grant, CEO, Wildey Great House; Victor Roach, President National Committee for the Prevention of Alcohol; Cheryl Willoughby, Director, National Task Force on Crime Prevention. Jamaica: Dwight Nelson, Former Minister of National Security; Aubyn Bartlett, Minister of State, Ministry of National Security; Delroy Chuck, Former Minister for Justice; Peter Phillips, Minister of Finance, Planning and Public Services; Senator Oswald Gaskell Harding; Robert Rainford, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Justice; Vivian Brown, Chief Technical Director, Ministry of National Security; Richard Lumsden, Planning Institute of Jamaica; Dianne McIntosh, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Na- tional Security; Gladstone Hutchinson, Director General, PIOJ. Saint Lucia: Issac Anthony, Permanent Secretary, John Calixte, Deputy Permanent Secretary and Team on the Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and National Development; Mary Wilfred, Pro- gramme Officer UNDP-Government of Saint Lucia; Agnes Henry, Assistant Commissioner of Police and Dorian O’Brian, Police Inspector, Royal Saint Lucia Police Force; Hilary Herman, Director, Bordelais Correctional Facility. Suriname: Jennifer Geerlings-Simons, Speaker of the Parliament; Martin Misiedjan, Minister of Jus- tice and Police; Paul Abena, Minister of Youth and Sport Affairs; Robby Ramlakhan, Permanent Secre- tary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ewald Refos, National Champion; Krishna Mathoera, Commissioner of Police; Saskia Wip, Secretary and Raynel Fraser, Member, Suriname National Youth Parliament; Abigail Misdjan, CARICOM Ambassador for Suriname, Ratanlal Kalka, Advisor, Suriname Business Develop- ment Center; Lilian Ferrier, Chair, National Commission for Child Rights. Trinidad and Tobago: Timothy Hamel-Smith, President of the Senate; Bhoendradath Tewarie, Minis- ter of Planning and the Economy; John Sandy, Minister of National Security; Jennifer Boucaud-Blake, Per- manent Secretary, Ministry of National Security; Nizam Baksh, Minister of Community Development; Arlene Mc Comie, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government; Senator Surujrattan Rambachan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Communications; Gary Griffith, Security Adviser to the Prime Minister; Roy Augustus, Adviser to the Minister of National Security; Margaret Farray, Permanent Secretary, Min- istry of Community Development; Margaret Parillon, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Communications; Claire Exeter-De Bourg, Senior International Relations Officer, Multi Lateral Di- vision, MFAC; Petronella Sylvester, Asst. Director, Legal Affairs Unit, Ministry of Justice; Stephen Wil- liams, Deputy Commissioner of Police; Gillian Gellizeau-Gardner, National Security Council Secretariat; Mc Donald Jacob, Deputy Commissioner Police ASP, Crime and problem Analysis Unit (CAPA); Es- ther Best, Director, National Drug Council; Dave Clement and Sean O’Brien, Central Statistical Office (CSO); Wayne Chance, Vision on a Mission (VOM); Jessie-May Ventour, CNMG Television and Radio Producer and Journalist; Anselm Richards, Tobago CSP; Dana Seetahal, President of the T&T Law Asso- ciation; National Champions: Rhoda Reddock, Don La Foucade, Noble Khan, Winston Cooper, Folade Mutota, Richard Ramoutar, Renee Cummings, Robert Torry, and Ira Mathur. Regional organizations: Beverly Reynolds, Programme Manager Sustainable Development, CARI- COM Secretariat; Len Ishmael, Director General and Team on the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Secretariat; Regional Security System representatives: Grantley Watson, Coordinator; Leonard Cabral and Franklyn Daley, Antigua and Barbuda; Yvonne Alexander, Dominica; Franklyn Belgrove and Margaret Astona Browne, Saint Kitts; Jonathan Nicholls, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Brian Parkes, Grenada; Rhea Reid, Central Liaison Office. A more detailed presentation of the background research, which was commissioned across a broad range of topics and the complete list of participants attending the consultations, are available online in the Caribbean HDR website hdr-caribbean. Finally, we, the regional Caribbean HDR Team, would like to sincerely thank all of those who were involved directly or indirectly in the research and compilation of this report. We particularly want to express our gratitude to the survey respondents whose number reached more than 11,000 and who generously supplied the responses that serve as the basis for the prepara- tion of this report. The new regional insights provided in this publication are a reflection of the col- lective investigative effort, while any errors of commission or omission are the sole responsibility of the Report Team. We are all proud to have been instrumental in this pioneering endeavor and hope it will pave the way for many Caribbean Human Development Reports to follow.VIII C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 9. ContentsOverview 1Chapter 1 Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 13Introduction 15The Caribbean Context 15 Human Development in the Caribbean Community 16 Trends in the Three Basic Dimensions of Human Development 17 The Inequality-Adjusted HDI 17 The Gender Inequality Index 17Crime Trends since Independence 20Crime Victimization 27 Determinants of Victimization 27 Domestic Violence and the Victimization of Women 29 Trafficking in Persons 31 Identification of Groups Vulnerable to Victimization 33Fear of Crime 36 Perceptions of Security and Insecurity 36 Women’s Fear of Crime 39Conclusion 41Chapter 2 Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience 43Introduction 45Youth Violence and Caribbean Human Development 45 Youth Involvement in Violent Crime 46 The Impact of Youth Violence on Caribbean Human Development 49Risk and Vulnerability: Explaining the Patterns of Youth Violence 50 Societal Risks 52 Community and Interpersonal Risks 54 Individual Risks 56Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience 57 Reducing Risk and Vulnerability 57 Enhancing Youth Resilience 58 Factors Supporting Risk Reduction and Resilience-Building 59Conclusion 63 Chapter 3 Reducing the Contribution of Street Gangsand Organized Crime to Violence 65Introduction 67Scope and Nature of the Problem 68 Prevalence of the Problem 68 The Sex and Age Composition of Caribbean Street Gangs 71 The Organizational Characteristics of Street Gangs 72 C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 IX
  • 10. The Consequences of Street Gangs and Organized Crime 73 The Causes of Street Gangs and Organized Crime 79 Community-Level Explanations 79 Individual-Level Explanations 82 Responding to Street Gangs and Organized Crime 83 Suppression 84 The Consequences and Limitations of Suppression 85 The Need for Intervention and Prevention 87 Conclusion 88 Chapter 4 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 91 Introduction 93 Policing under Colonial Rule: State-Oriented Security 93 Modern-Day Policing: The Citizen Security Approach 94 The Police in the Caribbean 95 The Capability Challenges 95 The Integrity Imperative 96 The Rights-Respecting Imperative 96 Accountability 97 Changing the Relationship with Citizens: Community-Based Police 97 Developing Capacity: Advancing Police Training and Education 99 Regional Cooperation 100 Perceptions on the Police in the Caribbean Region 101 Perceived Police Legitimacy 103 Perceived Police Competence and Performance 105 Willingness of Citizens to Participate and Cooperate with the Police 108 Conclusion 114 Chapter 5 Criminal Justice Systems 115 Introduction 117 Criminal Justice Systems 117 Legal Systems 117 Prosecution and Defence 119 Correctional Systems 119 Statistical Infrastructure 122 Indicators of the Effectiveness of Criminal Justice Systems 122 Case Processing Delays and Backlogs 123 Low Conviction Rates 124 Prison Overcrowding 125 Insufficient Alternatives to Incarceration 126 Opinions on the Effectiveness of Justice Systems 129 Confidence in the Justice Systems 130 Mechanisms to Prevent and Control Crime 131 Accountability 133 Regulating Police Misconduct 133 Regulating Official Corruption 135 Regional Links 136 CARICOM 136 The Caribbean Court of Justice and the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court 137 Regional Bodies Focused on Police, Prosecution, and Corrections 137 Additional Regional Efforts 138 Conclusion 138X C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 11. Chapter 6 State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations 141Introduction 143The Policy Environment 144 Crime and Insecurity in the Caribbean: The Policy Factor 144 The Evolution of Policy, Deterring Social Violence, and the War on Narco-Trafficking 145 The Shift in Policy Reflected in Budgetary Allocations 146 Explaining the Policy Shift 148The Policy Orientation of the Population 152 The Policy Environment 152 Public Attitudes towards Crime and Punishment 153 The Salience of Crime in Public Opinion 153 Measure of Punitiveness 154 Social Tolerance and Ideals of Justice 155 Public Opinion on Mechanisms for Preventing and Controlling Crime 157 Balancing Crime Prevention and Crime Control 159 The Implications of Policy Responses 160State Capacity and Citizen Security 163 Institutional Capacity 163 Building the Human Capacity for Development 164 Youth Unemployment and Social Prevention 167Conclusion 170Chapter 7 Conclusions and Recommendations 171Introduction 173Conclusions 173 Existing Efforts 173 The Demand for Change 174 Directions for Future Efforts 175Recommendations 175 Reducing Victimization 176 Reducing Risk and Building Youth Resilience 178 Reducing Gang Violence 181 Transforming the Police 182 Reforming the Justice System 184 Building the Capacity for Evidence-Based Policy 185Notes 187References 201Technical Notes 225 C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 XI
  • 12. List of Boxes, Charts, Figures and Tables Boxes Box 2.1 A Promising Family Programme: Parental Education, Suriname 59 Box 2.2 A Promising Peer Programme: Peace Ambassadors, Barbados 60 Box 2.3 A Promising State-Community Programme: The Peace Management Initiative, Jamaica 60 Box 3.1 Why Do Caribbean Youth Join Street Gangs? 71 Box 3.2 Do Gangs Have an Impact on the Number of Homicides in Communities? 73 Box 3.3 Deportees, Street Gangs, and Organized Crime in the Caribbean 82 Box 3.4 When Responding to Gangs Makes the Problem Worse 83 Box 3.5 On the Horizon: Caribbean Anti-Gang Legislation 88 Box 4.1 The Example of the Royal Grenada Police Force 95 Box 4.2 Rio de Janeiro: Community Policing in a Context of High Crime Rates 98 Box 4.3 Problem-Solving Partnerships in Suriname 99 Box 4.4 The Co-Production of Security in Nicaragua 99 Box 4.5 Caribbean Regional Police Training Centres 101 Box 6.1 The Citizen Security Programme, Trinidad and Tobago 147 Box 6.2 The Control of Firearms Trafficking in Central America and Neighbouring Countries 151 Box 6.3 Manifesto of the Democratic Labour Party, Barbados, 2008 161 Box 6.4 Inner City Basic Services for the Poor, Jamaica 166 Box 6.5 Special Youth Employment and Training Project, Jamaica 168 Box 6.6 Anti-Corruption: The National Integrity Action Forum, Jamaica 169 Box 7.1 Strengthening the Capacity to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Firearms in the Caribbean 177 Box 7.2 Citizenship Culture in Bogotá 179 Box 7.3 The Juvenile Violence Prevention Unit of the National Police of Nicaragua 182 Box 7.4 The Juvenile Liaison Scheme, Barbados 183 Charts Chart 1.1 Human Development Index, Caribbean-7, 2011 17 Chart 1.2 Trends in HDI and HDI Components, Caribbean-7, 1980–2011 18 Chart 1.3 Sense of Security in the Caribbean-7, 2010 19 Chart 1.4 Homicide Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7,1990–2010 21 Chart 1.5 Firearm-Related Offences Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean Countries, 1990 - 2010 22 Chart 1.6 Robbery Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010 23 Chart 1.7 Burglary and Break-in Rates Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1990 - 2010 24 Chart 1.8 Rates of Rape Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1993–2010 26 Chart 1.9 Self-Reported Criminal Victimization, Caribbean-7, 2010 27 Chart 1.10 Self-Reported Victimization, by Demographic Group, Caribbean-7, 2010 28 Chart 1.11 Gender Differences in Victimization Rates for Specific Types of Crime, 2010 28 Chart 1.12 Self-Reported Victims of Domestic Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 29 Chart 1.13 Self-Reported Victims of Domestic Violence, byXII C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 13. Type and Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 30Chart 1.14 Fear of Burglary and Robbery, Caribbean-7, 2010 37Chart 1.15 Weapon-Related Self-Protective Behaviour, Caribbean-7, 2010 38Chart 1.16 Gender Differences in the Fear of Crime Victimization, by Type of Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010 39Chart 1.17 Fear of Sexual Assault and Partner Assault, Caribbean-7, 2010 40Chart 2.1 The Main Problem in the Country in the View of All Respondents, Caribbean-7, 2010 52Chart 3.1 Perceptions of the Street Gang Problem, Caribbean-7, 2010 68Chart 3.2 The First Appearance of the Gang Problem in Neighbourhoods, Caribbean-7, 2010 69Chart 3.3 Neighbourhood Experiences of Gang Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 74Chart 3.4 Respondents Who Believe Gangs Make Neighbourhoods Safer, Caribbean-7, 2010 76Chart 3.5 Perceived Confidence in the Ability of the Police to Control Gang Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 85Chart 4.1 Incidence of Key Topics in Police Training Curricula 100Chart 4.2 The Role of Perceptions of the Police in Achieving Citizen Security 102Chart 4.3 People Who Believe Police Treat Citizens with Courtesy, Equality, Fairness and Respect, Caribbean-7, 2010 103Chart 4.4 People Who Believe Police Respect Their Rights and the Rights of All Citizens, Caribbean-7, 2010 104Chart 4.5 Victims of Domestic Violence Who Believe Police Treated Them with Respect, Caribbean-7, 2010 105Chart 4.6 Perceived Confidence in the Police to Control Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010 106Chart 4.7 Perceived Performance of the Police in Controlling Robbery and Burglary, Caribbean-7, 2010 107Chart 4.8 Perceived Performance of the Police in Controlling Domestic Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 107Chart 4.9 Reporting Crimes to the Police, Caribbean-7, 2010 108Chart 4.10 Satisfaction with Police after Violent Crime Reports, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 109Chart 4.11 Satisfaction with Police after Property Crime Reports, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 110Chart 4.12 Respondents Who Believe the Police Are Competent and Deserve Support, Caribbean-7, 2010 111Chart 4.13 Respondents Who Believe the Police Need More Personnel and More Resources, Caribbean-7, 2010 112Chart 4.14 Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Violent Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010 113Chart 4.15 Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Age, Caribbean-7, 2010 113Chart 4.16 Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 114Chart 4.17 Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Socio-economic Status, Caribbean-7, 2010 114Chart 5.1 Respondents Who Rate the Capacity of the Criminal Justice System as Sufficient, Caribbean-7, 2010 129Chart 5.2 Perception of the Hopelessness of Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010 130Chart 6.1 Estimates of Government Expenditure on Security, Caribbean-7 148Chart 6.2 Problems of Insecurity, by Dimension, First Mention C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 XIII
  • 14. (Top of Mind), Caribbean-7, 2010 154 Chart 6.3 Crime as One of the Three Most Serious Problems, Caribbean-7, 2010 154 Chart 6.4 Respondents Who Agree the Military Should Control Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010 157 Chart 6.5 Citizen Support for Institution Building in Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010 159 Chart 6.6 Support for Social Interventions as a Means of Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010 160 Tables Table 2.1 Youth Population, by Country, Caribbean-7, 2004 46 Table 2.2 Youth Self-Reported Criminal Accusations and Arrests, Caribbean-7, 2010 47 Table 2.3 Youth Victimization, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010 49 Table 2.4 The Annual Cost of Youth Crime in Four Caribbean Countries 50 Table 2.5 Risk Antecedents and Risk Markers of Youth Violence in the Caribbean Region 51 Table 2.6 The Main Problem in the Country in the View of Youth, Caribbean-7, 2010 53 Table 2.7 How Should One Resist Violence in Communities? The Point of View of Youth 58 Table 2.8 Analysis of the Context of Youth Violence in the Caribbean 63 Table 3.1 Official Police Estimates of the Population of Street Gangs, Caribbean-7 70 Table 3.2 Victimization and Neighbourhood Gang Presence, Caribbean-7, 2010 75 Table 3.3 Perceptions of Corruption, Caribbean-7, 2010 78 Table 3.4 Mean Levels of Informal Social Control and Community Cohesion with and without Gangs, Caribbean-7, 2010 80 Table 3.5 Mean Levels of Social Cohesion in Communities with and without Gangs, Caribbean-7, 2010 81 Table 3.6 Confidence of Neighbourhood Residents in the Police, Caribbean-7, 2010 86 Table 3.7 Residents Who do Nothing about Crime Because Criminals are too Powerful, Caribbean-7, 2010 87 Table 4.1 Police Strength and Density, Caribbean-7, 2011 95 Table 4.2 Police Accountability Systems, Caribbean-7, 2007 97 Table 5.1 A Statistical Profile of Prison Systems, Caribbean-7 120 Table 5.2 Police Accountability Systems, Caribbean-7 134 Table 5.3 Corruption Perceptions Index, Rankings, Caribbean-7, 2009–2011 135 Table 6.1 The Distribution of Government Budgetary Expenditures on Security 149 Table 6.2 Youth Labour Force Participation Rates, by Gender, Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000–2015: History, Estimates and Projections 167XIV C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 15. OverviewHuman Development and theShift to Better Citizen Security“The advantage of economic growth is not that tremendous advances in reducing the levels ofwealth increases happiness, but that it increases poverty and improving the standard of livingthe range of human choice.”1 These words were of the majority. These advances are reflectedwritten in 1955 by Arthur Lewis, a Caribbean in the Human Development Index (HDI)scholar and Nobel laureate in economics who scores and rankings for these countries.made an important contribution to the devel- There have also been advances in politi-opment debate and development policy in the cal development and democratic governance.Caribbean and elsewhere. It is a profoundly Car-ibbean countries are, with some excep-people-centred approach to economic growth tions, stable democracies with high levels ofthat prefigured the later debates on human de- political participation and low and decliningvelopment. If people are generally regarded as levels of political violence, which is, in thethe centre of the development process in that main, associated with electoral cycles. Demo-their freedom of choice, standard of living and cratic stability is evidenced by the repeatedgeneral welfare are the purpose of development uneventful changes in the political adminis-and their participation, creativity and power trations in the countries of the region sincein society, the economy and polity are the independence (with interruptions in Grenadaprimary drivers of these outcomes, then these and Suriname).3 This stability in the electoraltruths are important in Caribbean countries, system has been accompanied by the progres-which are generally characterized by small size sive consolidation of the rule of law. The re-and limited natural resources.2 This meaning duction of undue and unlawful political influ-of human development, which emphasizes ences on law enforcement and the protectionfreedoms and human choice, is found in the of the independence of the courts have beenwork of the Indian development economist major achievements in political developmentAmartya Sen. Human development means since the end of the colonial era.the enlargement of people’s freedom to lead Despite these advances, several countrieslives they value. This revolves around expand- in the region are beset by high rates of violenting choices and capabilities. The history and crime and troubling levels of non-criminalizeddevelopmental aspirations of the Caribbean forms of social violence that are typically di-are truly connected with this approach. rected at the members of vulnerable groups Caribbean people now have a vastly wider that historically have been disfavoured andrange of choices than they had in the colonial discriminated against.4 If the purpose of devel-era when Arthur Lewis wrote the words quot- opment is to widen human choice, the elevateded above. There have been significant advanc- rates of violent crime in the Caribbean may bees in human development especially in health taken as evidence of problematic developmentcare and education. Since the 1960s, there paths that leave far too many behind because ofhave been marked increases in life expectancy rather limited choices and limited life chances.across most of the countries of the Caribbean Much of the crime that is evident in the regionand a similarly marked decline in infant mor- is, after all, the outcome of a limited range oftality. There has been a virtual revolution in human choice, that is, the inequalities of op-access to education. Secondary education is portunity that restrict these choices amongnearly universal, and there is much greater large sections of the populations of the region.access to tertiary education. There have been Within the region, crime may thus rightly be C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 1
  • 16. regarded as a problem that is profoundly de- World Bank (2007), have made invaluable velopmental. contributions to the better understanding of Consistent with this understanding of the the problem, improving policy-making and relationship between crime and development, potentially enhancing the effectiveness of Amartya Sen, in the introduction to the glob- planning and programming in crime preven- al Human Development Report of 2010, The tion and control at the national and regional Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human levels. This HDR attempts to build on these Development, makes the point that, while efforts and to promote an explicitly develop- much has been accomplished on a global scale mental approach to the security of people. since the first Human Development Report This HDR does not aim to replicate or in 1990, “the human development approach to improve on these efforts, but, rather, to is motivationally committed to concentrat- extend them. There are unavoidable overlaps ing on what remains undone—what demands between the HDR and these earlier reports, most attention in the contemporary world— but this HDR reflects a deliberate attempt from poverty and deprivation to inequality to minimize these overlaps. Therefore, this and insecurity.”5 Insecurity is one of the issues HDR does not attempt to explore every as- that demand greater attention in the human pect of the security situation in the region. development process. Insecurity restricts the Thus, for example, the discussion of drug capacity of people to exercise their freedom use and drug-trafficking is somewhat lim- of choice and their autonomy. It reinforces ited, and, related to this, the discussion of inequalities because it mainly affects vul- the transnational activity of organized crime nerable people. It has a negative impact on networks is also limited. Indeed, the discus- economic growth. If insecurity is related to sion of organized crime is largely restricted to elevated rates of violent crime, as it is in the national dimensions and activities and, par- case of the Caribbean, it reflects the limited ticularly, the violence that is generated. This range of choices open to significant sections approach calls greater attention to the inter- of society and the inequalities of opportunity nal roots of the problem and does so without that prevail. Given the strong relationship minimizing the importance of international among crime, insecurity and human develop- cooperation in tackling transnational organ- ment in this region of highly vulnerable small ized crime networks and drug-trafficking. and island micro-states and the importance Similarly, while the UNODC and World of this issue to the people of the region, it is Bank report (2007) focuses on organized most appropriate that the problems of crime crime, the HDR places greater emphasis on and insecurity should demand the attention street gangs and their role in generating vio- of the first Human Development Report on lence. Consistent with the intent to avoid re- the Caribbean. tracing the paths followed by earlier reports, A Time for Action, the report of the West the important issues of white-collar and cor- Indian Commission (1993), was an attempt porate crime, as well as deportee or involun- to address the challenges of Caribbean de- tarily returned migrants, are also excluded.6 velopment in a comprehensive way. Written The focus on violence and the responses or in 1993, the report only briefly discussed the incapacity to respond effectively to violence problem of insecurity, through a focus on ille- is a central concern of the report. gal drugs. The decade of the 1990s was, how- ever, a period in which the issue of insecu- The Caribbean rity became more problematic in the region. Subsequent regional reports, including the This is the first HDR on the Caribbean re- reports of the Task Force on Crime and Se- gion. The Caribbean is diverse. It consists of curity of the Caribbean Community (CARI- several subgroupings that may be categorized COM 2002) and of the United Nations Of- in different ways. It may be subdivided by fice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and geographical features into the mainland2 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 17. Caribbean and the insula (island) Caribbean significant—at 3 percent—and economicallyand by linguistic groups into the Dutch- powerful white racial minority. There are otherspeaking, English-speaking, Francophone, minority groups, including Amerindians, whoand Hispanic Caribbean. constitute 9 and 2 percent of the population in The Caribbean is largely made up of so- Guyana and Suriname, respectively.9 People ofcieties that are young in historical terms. Ex- Chinese origin are also present and have madecept for Haiti, the Dominican Republic and invaluable contributions to the development ofCuba, which became independent in 1804, the countries of the region.1821 and 1902, respectively, Caribbean so- Differences in levels of development arecieties have only emerged as independent captured in the distinction between thosenations in the last 50 years, and some still re- states that are classified as more developedmain dependencies of European powers.7 In countries (MDCs) and those that are clas-the case of the English-speaking Caribbean sified as less developed countries (LDCs).10countries that attained their independence This distinction is being erased by the higherbetween 1962 and 1983, the sense of national growth rates and HDI scores of the LDCsidentity that emerged during the latter part of and former LDCs. The MDCs are typicallythe colonial era has not yet become consoli- small states, while the LDCs are typically mi-dated into a source of social cohesion. cro-states. The size of the populations of the These countries are also characterized by micro-states falls within a range of less thanconsiderable variation in their basic demo- 40,000 in Saint Kitts and Nevis to almostgraphic features, levels of development and 173,000 in Saint Lucia. These states have lim-state capacities. Caribbean populations are ited capacities. Among them, regionalism isyoung, and, in several countries, most per- thus treated as a problem-solving device.sons now live in urban areas. In the seven Historically, the countries of the regioncountries selected as the research sites for this have been producers of primary products forreport (the Caribbean-7), the proportion of export. This pattern left legacies of inequal-persons below the age of 25 years ranges from ity that have since been eroded by changes ina high of 54 percent in Guyana to a low of economies, greater access to education and36 percent in Barbados, with the correspond- high rates of social mobility. But, in some Car-ing population proportion for this group of ibbean cities, particularly those in the largercountries is 46 percent.8 The populations of territories, there are substantial populationsthe region are diverse. Cultural differences of excluded poor. In contexts of rapid socialare expressed in the wide range of languages change and socially dislocating modernizingand religions. Christianity is the dominant processes, high levels of inequality and thereligion, but there are significant proportions multiple deprivations that are associated withof Hindus and Muslims in Suriname, Trini- social exclusion tend to be strongly correlateddad and Tobago, and Guyana. In Trinidad with criminal violence.and Tobago, 23 percent of the population are The countries of the region have triedHindus, and 6 percent are Muslims, and, in to increase their viability and reduce theirGuyana, the corresponding proportions are vulnerabilities via regional integration. The28 and 7 percent. Racial, colour and ethnic Caribbean Community (CARICOM), thediversity are variously configured within the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM), and theregion. For example, in Guyana and Trinidad Organization of Eastern Caribbean Statesand Tobago, no racial group enjoys majority (OECS) are expressions of these efforts.status. The major racial groups are persons of CARICOM has a membership of 15 states.East Indian origin, at 44 and 40 percent, respec- CARIFORUM is simply CARICOM, plustively, and persons of African origin, at 30 and the Dominican Republic. It was expected38 percent, respectively. Other societies such to be a bridge to the Dutch-, French-, andas Jamaica and Antigua are of predominantly Spanish-speaking countries of the Caribbean.African descent. Barbados has a numerically OECS is a subset of more closely integrated C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 3
  • 18. CARICOM states. Earlier attempts at po- have been selected as the research sites for this litical integration were not successful, and the report (the Caribbean-7). These countries are West Indies Federation, which was the archi- Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Ja- tecture for political integration, collapsed in maica, Saint Lucia, Suriname, and Trinidad 1961 before the first set of Caribbean coun- and Tobago. The report clearly focuses on the tries became independent. The movement for English-speaking group. These seven countries Caribbean integration now focuses on func- have been selected in a manner that accounts tional cooperation, economic integration, for geographical spread, population size, and the coordination of foreign policy, and, most the variations in the degree and character of recently, regional security cooperation and the problem of insecurity. They have been se- rationalization. These are the four pillars of lected with variation in mind. They represent the integration movement. CARICOM has a the geographical dispersion of the group in fairly elaborate structure. At the apex of this that they include countries in the northern structure is the Conference of Heads of Gov- Caribbean (Jamaica), the south Caribbean ernment. The regional security establishment (Trinidad and Tobago) and the east Caribbean includes the Council of National Security and (Saint Lucia). There are island territories (Bar- Law Enforcement (CONSLE). At the level of bados) and mainland territories (Guyana). the civil service, there are several committees There is variation in the size, including micro- consisting of heads of law enforcement and states (Saint Lucia and Antigua and Barbuda) military, customs and migration officials and and small states (Jamaica and Trinidad and other representatives of security and law en- Tobago). And there is variation in the levels forcement agencies. The operational arm of of development through the representation of the security establishment is the Implemen- LDCs and MDCs. The selected countries also tation Agency for Crime and Security (IM- represent the differences and range of varia- PACS), which, as its name suggests, coordi- tion in the level, structure and intensity of the nates the implementation of regional security crime and insecurity problems in the region. policies. IMPACS was established after the Barbados, for example, shows a high level of completion of the work of the CARICOM property crimes, but a relatively low level of Task Force on Crime and Security, which violent crimes. Jamaica is the opposite. Among identified a number of priorities and made the English-speaking countries, the countries several recommendations to the Conference selected approximate a maximum variation of Heads of Government, most of which re- sample. Suriname represents the Dutch-speak- main relevant.11 ing territories. It is the only unambiguously independent Dutch-speaking territory. In this The Selection of Countries sense, it is self-selecting. We emphasize varia- tion to capture the range of problems and ex- The scope of this report is limited to the Dutch- periences and thereby enrich the analysis and speaking and English-speaking countries. The the proposed solutions to the problems. This selection of these two subregions is based on approach, we hope, will make the report rel- the understanding that insecurity has become evant and useful for all. a serious problem in these two groupings, but As a regional HDR, the report and the particularly in the English-speaking Caribbean. process associated with it present an oppor- In addition, systematic work aimed at a better tunity for the people of the region to learn understanding of the issues on a truly regional more about each other and to learn from each scale has been somewhat limited. Moreover, other. Learning more about each other is im- there has not been a regional HDR for these perative given the CARICOM and CARI- groups of countries previously, and there have FORUM integration frameworks and the been only a few HDRs on the individual impact of the forces of globalization. There countries within these two subgroupings.12 is increasingly intensive contact among the Seven countries within these two groups peoples of the region. Because of increased4 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 19. integration, there is more interdependence, velopment is also a condition for lower ratesshared vulnerabilities and greater risks and of violent crime and more secure societies.opportunities. Learning about each other It is well known that growth is not equat-smashes ster-eotypes and reduces fear and ed with development. But the relationshipthe treatment of neighbouring citizens as between crime and growth may serve to illu-threats. Learning from each other involves minate the relationship of growth to develop-making accessible the positive and negative ment.experiences of the different countries of the The joint report of UNODC and theregion, thereby enhancing collective learn- World Bank, Crime, Violence and Develop-ing from this larger pool of experience. Given ment: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in thethe dynamism and complexity of the crime Caribbean, presents evidence in support ofand security problems and the importance the claim that, on average, increased economicof finding solutions to these problems for growth is associated with reduced crime rates.16the people of the region, this ought to be a Economic growth increases opportuni-focal point for shared learning. Thus, in this ties. It may, however, also intensify inequali-report, promising practices are drawn from ties and exclusionary trends, and, in theseveral countries. This approach is extended rapidly changing societies of the Caribbeanbeyond the region to draw on some of the ex- region, it may also trigger unrealistic expecta-periences of Central America and other parts tions and have strong mobilizing effects evenof the hemisphere. among the excluded. Exclusionary and jobless growth and, especially, high rates of youth un-Crime and Development in employment, coupled with unrealistic expec-the Caribbean tations and high levels of inequality, tend to result in high rates of crime, including violentThe negative impact of crime on develop- crime. Particular countries may thus deviatement in its various aspects is well docu- from the general pattern or average effect ofmented. Crime, particularly violent crime, the impact of growth rates on crime rates ortends to have a negative impact on vulnerable crime patterns. The relationship is policy andeconomies such as those of the Caribbean. It context sensitive. High rates of violent crimeerodes confidence in the future development and gender violence may be regarded as theof countries, reduces the competitiveness of outcome of a wrong approach to develop-existing industries and services by, for exam- ment that marginalizes large sections of theple, imposing burdensome security costs, and population.may negatively alter the investment climate. Where crime, particularly violent crime,Capital may take flight.13 Crime may gener- has become a major social problem, it has hadate insecurities among the general population feedback effects that retard the developmentthat lead to loss of human capital via migra- process in the economic, social and even po-tion, that is, the loss of skilled and educated litical dimensions.citizens. People may take flight. The qual- The effects of crime on some of the econo-ity of education and health care suffer be- mies of the region have been documented. Ascause of the diversion of scarce resources to suggested above, the effects extend beyondthe control of crime. Crime destroys social the economy. In the more socially fragmentedcapital and thereby retards the development societies of the region, the victimization ofprocess.14 This negative effect of crime on de- members of one group by members of an-velopment represents an argument for more other group may have the effect of deepeningeffective crime prevention and control and race, class and gender divisions. For example,improved citizen security as a condition for if crime becomes racially motivated or other-development.15 In the context of the Carib- wise associated with race, this may trigger racebean, effective crime prevention and control mobilization, which intensifies political con-may be a condition for development, but de- flicts, thereby generating even greater inse- C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 5
  • 20. curity. In such situations, it becomes exceed- cess and to development in the region. ingly difficult to achieve consensus policies The approach to crime control that re- for crime prevention and control that would gards it as a trade-off with freedom and rights permit greater community-level cooperation is but an expression of a broader attitude to- and avoid cross-pressures on law enforcement wards the place of the ordinary citizen in the and other state agencies that tend to make larger development process. Freedoms and these agencies ineffective in policy implemen- rights may be seen as threatening to the de- tation. Crime control and prevention policies velopment process, which, it is felt, requires thus become the policies of particular politi- a disciplined focus on economic growth and cal administrations rather than truly national capital accumulation. As in matters of crime policies. control and security, where freedom may be High levels of violent crime may have seen as an obstacle rather than as foundation- other negative political effects. These effects al to the security of citizens, so too in matters may include the amplification of already ex- of economic development: freedom may be isting authoritarian tendencies among citi- seen as an obstacle to development (at least zens that take the form of demands for greater in its early stages) rather than as constitutive punitiveness, support for laws that reduce the of development.18 rights of citizens and give greater power to the Given the effects described above, the police, and, more recently, significant support concern regarding the development strate- for military regimes as a means of managing gies of some countries of the region, partic- more effectively the problems of insecurity.17 ularly in the 1960s to 1980s, was that these These tendencies influence national policies, strategies were exclusionary and thus under- and it is the poor and the most vulnerable estimated the importance, in the develop- whose freedoms are most affected by crime ment process, of social integration and hu- and whose rights are most restricted by crime man creativity. The pattern of concentration control measures. At the national level, if of violent crimes in the communities of the crime is responded to or fought in ways that urban poor that is described in this report is reduce fundamental rights, then political de- evidence of the association of crime with ex- velopment may be arrested and notions of cit- clusionary processes that have long histories izenship may become problematic. Security and that have found much contemporary policies that unnecessarily restrict the rights reinforcement. In troubled countries, a vi- and freedoms of people tend to restrict politi- cious cycle has been set in motion, thereby cal development. making crime control and prevention more At the regional level, there is a reproduc- difficult. tion of this problem if citizens of the countries This vicious cycle of unbalanced develop- of the region who seek opportunities else- ment that generates high levels of crime and where or who, in various ways, conduct busi- insecurity that, in turn, impede development ness or simply wish to travel within the region may be avoided. Where this vicious cycle ex- are subjected to indignities and disrespectful ists, it may be transformed into a virtuous cir- treatment by border control agents. These cle. Balanced development reduces and pre- activities find their justification in narratives vents the emergence of crime as a major social that seek to tie links among freedom of move- problem. Sound crime reduction and preven- ment, the migration of poverty and a crime tion facilitate the achievement of develop- contagion. If crime and violent behaviour are ment goals. In the words of Helen Clark, the externalized in this way, then unwarranted Administrator of the UNDP, “If we fail to restriction on movement within the region is reduce [the] levels of armed violence in af- the likely outcome. Yet, given the small size of fected countries, our collective commitment the countries and the corresponding limited to MDG targets is not only under threat; but pools of human capital in any one country, indeed progress is likely to be reversed.”19 free movement is vital to the integration pro- There is considerable variation in the pop-6 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 21. ulation size, land area and natural resources of in thinking are most likely to first occur andthe countries of the Caribbean, but they are, take effect as policy if there is an inclusive andin the main, small island developing states deliberative approach to policy-making based(SIDSs). They rely on state institutions to on an active citizenry and open and account-respond to the security challenges they face. able government and if the welfare and rightsThese countries, however, cannot afford to of the citizen are at the centre of securityspend large proportions of their budgets to considerations and the citizen is regarded asstrengthen law enforcement machinery. They a critical actor in the co-production of secu-must invest in the prevention of crime, in the rity. This report hopes to make a contributioncapabilities of their people and in the creation to this process of change and innovation, notof opportunities. least by documenting and highlighting some The degree, intensity and character of the of the good practices that may be observed inproblems of crime and insecurity vary from the to country. The capacities of the stateinstitutions that are charged with the respon- Citizen Security: a Shift in Ideassibility to protect the populations they serveand to ensure justice are also quite different We believe that the required shift in thinkingwithin the region. Regardless of these differ- is reflected in the idea of citizen security. Citi-ences, however, crime and insecurity have be- zen security may be regarded as a dimensioncome more generalized Caribbean problems. of human security. The more overarching con-Crime, violence and insecurity demand our struct, human security, “is based on a funda-attention. mental understanding that Governments re- The problem is acute and in need of urgent tain the primary role for ensuring the survival,action. A sense of urgency usually inspires livelihood and dignity of their citizens.”20policies that are intended to yield short-term Human security articulates a core set of con-results and therefore are usually restricted to cerns, including safety for people from bothmore punitive measures, more robust law en- violent and non-violent threats and safetyforcement action, and assigning more power from both state and non-state actors. It refersto the police, typically without the commen- to “one of the means or conditions for humansurate systems of accountability. The chal- development, which in turn is defined as thelenge behind this report is to discover ways to process that opens up an individual’s optionsaddress crime as a fundamental development . . . [which] range from enjoying a long andissue without ignoring the pressing short- healthy life, access to the knowledge and re-term aspects of crime. The challenge is to sources needed to achieve a decent standardmeet the requirements of urgency, effective- of living, to enjoyment of political, economicness and justice without neglecting the root and social freedoms.”21 In this construct, citi-socio-economic causes of the problem. zen security is strictly a dimension of human It may reasonably be claimed that HDRs security because it is conceived as the socialhave helped shift the debate on development situation in which all persons are free to enjoyand that this shift has had some impact on their fundamental rights and in which publicpublic policy and, consequently, on the con- institutions have sufficient capacity, against aditions of the lives of people in the region. A backdrop of the rule of law, to guarantee thesimilar shift in thinking is needed in security exercise of those rights and respond efficientlyand crime control policy-making. Shifts in ways when those rights are violated. 22of thinking and acting on this scale are usu- Thus, the citizenry is the principal focus ofally the outcome of slow processes that may the state’s protection. It is a necessary, but nottake place in many different sites of innova- sufficient condition of human development.tion in crime reduction and prevention both Therefore, institutional interventions to pre-within the state and non-state sectors and at vent and control violence and crime (citizenthe national and regional levels. Such shifts security policies) can be regarded as an indi- C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 7
  • 22. rect, but, nonetheless, significant opportu- bility towards their fellow citizens. Security nity, first, to buttress sustainable economic and human progress entail a commitment to development and, second, to strengthen good citizenship. The capacity of responsible democratic governance and the observance of state institutions, however, remains central to human rights.23 the effective protection of the citizen. The concept of ‘citizen security’ is as- sociated with security against the threat of Institutions crime or violence and is used to refer to the Strong and legitimate institutions and inclusive paramount security of individuals and social systems of governance are crucial to providing groups. It does not stand in opposition to the citizen security and justice so as to break cycles preservation of the territorial integrity of the of violence.25 In the Caribbean, the law enforce- state. Citizen security includes institutional ment and justice systems tend to be weak and and social actions to protect and guarantee have a limited capacity to provide the effective effective liberties and the rights of people protection of citizens. Thus, while building the through the control and prevention of crime capacity of state institutions, it is necessary to and disorder. transform the relationship between these insti- In addition, the “concept of citizen securi- tutions and the people so that, in the case of the ty involves those rights to which all members provision of security services and the adminis- of a society are entitled, so that they are able tration of justice, this is done with the people, to live their daily lives with as little threat as not only for the people. This is the option of possible to their personal security, their civic transitioning to citizen security, that is, a pro- rights and their right to the use and enjoy- foundly democratic approach to security. This ment of their property.”24 This conceptual- approach is even more important for the endur- ization entails the idea that the state has an ing stability of weak and vulnerable states such obligation to protect the citizen and to do so as those in the region. In this context, the term in ways that respect rights. These ideas have citizen security is not used to carry the idea of universal appeal and are particularly relevant pushing back or pushing out the state. Rather, it in the Caribbean. involves democratizing the state so that it better Elements essential to increasing citizen serves and protects the people. In its most devel- security in the Caribbean context therefore oped expression, it entails the co-production of include the reform of state institutions to security by state and citizen. As a co-producer make them more effective and ensure they re- of security, the citizen has a duty to respect the spect rights, the creation of avenues for citizen rights, physical integrity and dignity of others. participation and the development of pro- Traditional approaches to security in situa- grammes geared towards decreasing poverty tions where the capacity of the state to pro- and inequality, including gender and race or tect and ensure adequate access to justice is ethnic inequality, thereby increasing social in- doubtful may lead to external dependency and tegration. a renunciation of democratic processes and The idea of citizen security also places re- practices. Just as there can be jobless, voice- sponsibilities on the citizens. They are expect- less and rootless growth, there can be voiceless ed to participate actively in the co-produc- security, that is, a paternalistic state security tion of their security in partnership with state system whereby the state is not accountable to agencies. This means citizens must actively its citizens and, worse, whereby authoritarian engage in problem-solving in their communi- tendencies are strengthened in the state secu- ties and in demanding greater accountability rity establishment, the political administration among state agencies, including the police and among sections of the population. There and courts. It means taking greater respon- can also be a rights-less security whereby popu- sibility for their own security and their own lations are told that they must constantly give behaviour, respecting the rights and integrity up their rights as a trade-off for the more effec- of others and acknowledging their responsi- tive provision of security by the state. Through8 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 23. The time to act these old patterns, security is set in opposition and accountable and are willing to integrateis now. The trajectory of to any notion of political development that is crime prevention into larger development grounded in democratic principles of voice, planning and if citizens are aware of their civic violence can be participation and accountability. duties and rights and are engaged in the co- interrupted, and production of their own security. insecurity can be Social Prevention A transition to citizen security means not only The Messages of the Report diminished. This institutional reform, but also a focus on the has been achieved reduction of social risks, that is, social crime The central message of this report is simple prevention. This assures a stable and sus- enough: the Caribbean countries need to elsewhere and can tained security that does not rest primarily on complete the shift from an approach to secu- be achieved in the police action and the imposition of discipline rity that is centrally concerned with regimecountries of the region. by the state and therefore does not constantly protection to the full adoption of a citizen se- seek to trade away the rights and freedoms curity approach that is consistently pursued in of security among citizens. Social crime pre- the context of human development. Caribbe- vention means ending marginalization and an countries have a long history of inequality more effectively integrating excluded sections and discrimination. The inequality includes of the population. The improved social inte- inequalities of social power that find expres- gration of society increases the potential for sion in the unbalanced distribution of state greater resilience and better state-society rela- protection and the inequitable treatment of tions, which may result in greater voluntary rights and freedoms. This historical pattern compliance with the law. This focus on social still affects the distribution of the protective crime prevention means paying attention to resources of the state and the way in which the the social conditions that are most associated rights of different groups, including the most with crime and creating greater opportunities vulnerable, are treated. Citizen security is cen- and choices for people, which does not neces- tred on profoundly changing this relationship sarily mean one must design expensive inter- between the state and the citizenry by making vention programmes in skills training and job institutions more responsive and accountable creation. The root causes of violent crimes, to the people they serve. Such a fundamen- especially youth crimes and delinquency, in- tal change entails greater social integration, clude less tangible factors that account for the which may be brought about by seeking to alienation and sense of exclusion among these resolve the problems of social exclusion and population groups. Paying attention to the marginalization among large sections of the root causes therefore also means treating peo- populations—including state security prac- ple with respect, positively protecting their tices that do not respect rights and unneces- rights, and promoting common integrative sarily stigmatize and criminalize—and by a identities that bridge race, colour, ethnicity, greater emphasis on human development. class, gender and other social divides, thereby These ideas may be simple, but they are hugely promoting a common sense of belonging and significant in the everyday lives of the people a common national and regional purpose. of the region. The survey which was conducted as a part of The main messages of this report are as follows: this project—the UNDP Citizen Security • First, with the right mix of policies, high Survey 2010—found majority support for levels of violence can be successfully turned this approach in every country. The adoption around. There are many useful and instruc- of programmes of social crime prevention is, tive cases of countries that have been able therefore, not a politically risky policy. to make considerable improvements in In summary, citizen security ought to have their security situations, while reducing the social prevention, citizen rights, and state in- levels of violence and insecurity. Some of stitutional reform dimensions. Citizen secu- these experiences are included in the vari- rity is most effective if states are responsive ous chapters of this report. There are also C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 9
  • 24. valuable and instructive Caribbean experi- tive. ences at the country and community levels. • Fifth, there is considerable popular sup- Barbados, for example, has avoided high port for social crime prevention. Carib- levels of criminal and political violence. bean populations, including in the most Targeted prevention programmes, espe- crime-affected countries, tend to have a cially those that are directed at youth, the strong sense of social justice that informs greater responsiveness and accountability their thinking about crime prevention and of state agencies, national unity, and high crime reduction policies. Public policies levels of citizen participation all contrib- that are oriented towards social justice are ute to effective outcomes. The practices therefore likely to be consensus policies. and lessons of some of these experiences Considerable evidence in support of this may be helpful for other countries and are conclusion is presented in this report. discussed in the report. • Sixth, empowering young people by invest- • Second, gender-based violence (GBV) can ing in their development should be a prior- be controlled and prevented by interventions ity. Most Caribbean countries have young that interrupt the cycle of violence. Some populations. There are large populations forms of GBV, particularly domestic vio- of youth at risk, some of whom may drift lence, tend to show histories and patterns into self-destructive anti-social behaviour. of abusive behaviour that may be disrupted It follows that investments in youth and, in their early stages before they degenerate more specifically, investments in youth at into life-threatening and life-taking physi- risk or detached youth are likely to yield cal violence. This requires investments significant returns in terms of reductions in aimed at developing the capabilities of the violence and crime and greater citizen secu- responsible institutions of the state. rity. Because violent crime is a drag on de- • Third, social cohesion is generally greater in velopment, investments in the prevention communities that have no street gangs and of youth violence may, in turn, yield good less in communities that have street gangs. results in human development. Street gangs are major contributors to the • Seventh, opportunities matter. This is why high rates of violence. This message should the importance of social crime prevention instruct policy. Social cohesion is promot- is underscored, but a sense of belonging, ed by socially integrative policies that give participating in political and community people, particularly young people, a sense life, being respected by others, and having of being valued and belonging to the com- one’s rights respected matter equally; in the munity and the country regardless of eth- case of young people, they may matter even nicity, gender, class, or other differences. more. Improving security therefore does not • Fourth, security efforts are more effective if involve only the design and implementation the rights of the people are respected and the of costly programmes. It requires adequate people are involved as active agents and co- regard for the intangibles associated with producers of their own security. If they are to how people are treated and with greater so- be effective, the policy-making and policy- cial integration and cohesion. implementation processes and the state • Eighth, crime and insecurity are costly to long- institutions that are responsible for pub- term development. Successfully meeting the lic safety and the security of citizens must security challenges of the moment requires have the confidence of the people. Confi- the consistent adoption of a citizen security dence rests on respect for rights and adher- approach. The time to act is now. The tra- ence to the principles of good governance, jectory of violence can be interrupted, and including accountability, transparency and insecurity can be diminished. This has been participation. Processes that are open and achieved elsewhere and can be achieved in participatory and institutions that are fair the countries of the region. and responsive are likely to be more effec-10 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 25. The Process of Producing the Report was developed. The objective of this sample design was to attain the highest level of rep-The HDR Process resentativeness and distribution among theThe process of producing the report may be selected sampling units and, in turn, the re-divided into two basic stages. During the first spondents of the survey.27stage, monographs on the situation in the The report also relies on secondary dataCaribbean-7 countries selected for participa- taken from official sources in the Caribbean-7.tion in the HDR process were prepared, al- It is well known that reported crime rates dobeit with considerable limitations in the not usually approximate true crime rates. Theavailability of comparable data. During the proximity of the reported crime rate to thesecond stage, an analysis of the regional situ- true crime rate usually varies with the serious-ation was conducted, and the regional HDR ness of the type of crime. Thus, for example,was produced. The national processes and the in most jurisdictions, the reported homicideseven national monographs fed into the sec- rate may be assumed to approximate closelyond stage of the process. the true homicide rate. For those types of crimes on which the reported rates are highMethodological Issues across jurisdictions, valid comparisons withinEvidence-based policy and programme design and across countries may be made. At therequires rigorous analysis of the problems to other end of the spectrum, the proportions ofbe addressed. This HDR relies heavily on property crimes that are reported will tend toprimary data gathered through the UNDP be much lower and will tend to vary consid-Citizen Security Survey 2010.26 Extensive use erably across jurisdictions. This makes cross-is also made of secondary sources, including national comparisons somewhat problematic.official statistics on reported crimes, although However, if within any given country, thethis was limited by the absence of comparable proportion of each crime that is reported isdata on all countries. For example, data on stable over time, then trend analyses may bethe caseloads of courts, the caseloads of police meaningful.investigators and other indicators of the ca- Some of the factors that may affectpacities and capabilities of institutions of the changes in the proportion of crimes that arecriminal justice systems of the countries of reported to police services include the levelthe region are not uniformly available across of confidence in the police and other institu-all countries. tions of the justice system and patterns of in- The UNDP Citizen Security Survey surance coverage. Under normal conditions,2010 was administered in the Caribbean-7, these factors tend to change rather slowly.which are named in the section on Selection Trends may thus be compared and contrastedof Countries. Some 11,155 resident citizens across countries even though the official sta-of the Caribbean-7 were randomly selected tistics may not represent true crime rates andand interviewed. The target population of the proportion of reported crimes may differthe survey was households with at least one across countries.person older than 18 years of age and residing Another obstacle to comparative analysespermanently in the household. of official crime statistics is the differences The sample for the survey was designed in legal definitions of various crimes. Theseto reflect the key demographic characteristics definitional differences may be found in theof the adult population of the participating Caribbean. This problem has been minimizedcountries based on the results of the most by selecting for comparative analysis onlyrecent population censuses. For each coun- those crimes that are legally defined in similartry, the sample was self-weighted by regional fashion across the Caribbean-7 jurisdictions,and gender distribution and configured to such as murder and homicide, and thosebe representative of the target population. A crimes that are amenable to reconstituted op-multi-stage, stratified area probability sample erational definitions, such as burglary. Where C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 11
  • 26. particular categories of crimes have been re- cross-check and flesh out the findings derived constituted to make them comparable, these from the data generated during the survey ac- changes are noted in the text. cording to the experiences of the participants in the consultative process. Consultations: Participation Matters Participation is an important principle. The process of producing the report has in- It ensures good recommendations that are volved extensive and intensive consultations grounded in the evidence generated by the with experts, practitioners and a variety of in- research process, as well as the experience of stitutional actors and interested parties across practitioners. Good recommendations are the region. There were three iterations of na- not simply bright new ideas. They are ideas tional consultations in Barbados, Jamaica, that are effective in the particular national Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago and few- environment and that sufficiently animate er, but similarly targeted consultations during people and motivate them to invest their time bilateral meetings in Antigua and Barbuda and energy in implementation. The best re- and in Saint Lucia. Some 194 persons, includ- sults are achieved if rigorous research is com- ing government officials and representatives of bined with efforts to tap into the experiences civil society, experts and practitioners, actively of practitioners and stakeholders. participated in this process. Five regional con- This requires the active participation of sultations were also held in Paramaribo, Suri- practitioners and stakeholders. The commit- name; Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago; ment to participation is grounded in con- Bridgetown, Barbados; Castries, Saint Lucia; fidence in the knowledge that people may and Kingstown, Jamaica between 1 and 20 contribute and the belief that people’s actions September, 2011 and involving 256 persons, make a difference in determining outcomes. including members of regional organizations For this HDR, the participatory process is ex- such as the Regional Security System and pected to be ongoing and may be even more CARICOM. The consultations were devel- fruitful after the report has been published. oped using the democratic dialogue method- The process initiated by the report will, hope- ology, and they provided the opportunity to fully, be more important than the report itself.12 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 27. Crime Trends1CHAPTER since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups
  • 28. Proactive, pre-emptivepolicies need to target at-riskgroups, eradicating violencebefore it startsIt’s not culture; it’s crime:no form of gender-basedviolence should be toleratedRejection by the mainstreambreeds mischief on themargins
  • 29. 1CHAPTER Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 1 Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups Introduction must bear some of the responsibility for these disappointing results. Better management of This chapter examines crime trends since in- the transition from independence might have dependence and locates these trends in the produced more positive outcomes among context of the development challenges faced populations. by Caribbean countries during this period. It For instance, governmental policy for eco- identifies aspects of citizen insecurity in the nomic development was based on direct for- region and shows how feelings of insecurity eign investment in key sectors of the region’s have shaped public attitudes about the effec- economies. When strains emerged soon after tiveness of Caribbean governments in fight- independence, evident in the resentment felt ing crime. about foreign ownership, enclave economic The chapter first reviews and describes im- growth, limited economic diversification, portant developments in crime in the region high unemployment and rising social discon- since independence. It then discusses the tent, these were not adequately addressed in victimization reported by the participants in creative and positive ways. Indeed, the current the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 for economic and social predicament facing the this Caribbean Human Development Report region demands innovative leadership and (HDR), followed by an examination of the sound long-term development strategies. fears about crime or the anxieties related to Thus, the region’s development and, by ex- the perceived risk of victimization that these tension, the peoples’ quality of life have been people experience and the protective steps affected by a range of negative factors. Eco- they have taken. At several points, the discus- nomically, except for Guyana’s agricultural sion focuses on the experiences and concerns sector and Trinidad and Tobago’s extractive of vulnerable groups. sector, the light industries and services that once sustained the region have struggled. The The Caribbean Context region now relies heavily on travel and tour- ism for economic wealth and job creation. Although the achievement of national inde- The World Travel and Tourism Council ranks pendence is supposed to signal a promising the Caribbean region first (among 12 re- moment in the path towards development, gions) in the relative contribution of tourism the optimism with which countries in the to the regional economy and the most tour- region engaged in their independence was ist-dependent area in the world. Tourism ac- soon challenged by economic, political and counts for 25 percent of the foreign exchange social factors that had foundations in the earnings, 20 percent of all jobs, and between colonial past. The legacy of deep social prob- 25 and 35 percent of the total economy of lems, such as high levels of income inequal- the Caribbean.1 The region’s heavy depend- ity and inequality of opportunity, including ence on tourism creates vulnerabilities, such gender inequality, high rates of unemploy- as the emergence of sex tourism, which ex- ment, high rates of rural and urban poverty, ploits young women and children. Tourism is and communities with histories of social ex- highly vulnerable to developments in source clusion, has continued to exert an influence countries such as tax regimes and changes in until today. Post-independence governments the business cycle in these countries, as well C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 15
  • 30. as the effects of climate change, including the estimated since 1990 for most countries in1 loss of shore-line and more extreme weather the world. However, a complete 1990–2011 conditions. It is also vulnerable to the effects HDI series has been calculated for only threeCrime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups of high rates of violence. Persistently high countries among the Dutch-speaking and rates of violence in a single country or group English-speaking countries in the Caribbean, of countries have the potential to damage the while, for many others, especially small island reputations of all the countries of a region. developing states (SIDSs), the HDI was esti- This is truly a regional issue and a regional mated for the first time only in 2010–2011.3 vulnerability. This represents a challenge in looking at HDI Politically, the region underwent dra- trends in the region. matic changes in response to powerful shifts The HDIs for the seven Caribbean coun- in global and local values that began in the tries selected as the research sites for this re- 1960s with the Black Power Movement and port (the Caribbean-7) are presented in chart continued into the 1970s with other social 1.1. The HDI for Barbados for 2011 is 0.793, movements that were inspired by grass-roots positioning the country in the very high hu- advocacy for social justice and social change. man development category and a rank of 47 The outcome was a shift to the left by some among 187 countries and territories. For the states, such as Guyana, which adopted co- rest of the countries, with the exception of operative socialism under Forbes Burnham, Suriname and Guyana, the HDI ranges be- and Jamaica, which turned to democratic tween 0.764 and 0.723, positioning these in socialism under Michael Manley. During the the high human development category. Suri- 1970s, the ideas associated with these social name and Guyana, with HDIs of 0.680 and movements became, for a time, part of the 0.633, respectively, are in the medium human political mainstream and profoundly influ- development category. Among the Carib- enced the development policies of govern- bean-7, only Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, ments in the region. and Trinidad and Tobago have HDIs higher In one of the outcomes, social sensibili- than the HDI for the Latin America and Car- ties and public attitudes towards restraining ibbean (LAC) region (0.731). moral values underwent dramatic changes To reflect more closely the specific charac- beginning in the early 1970s. As the growing teristics of the Dutch-speaking and English- population of young people became more as- speaking countries, we have estimated a 2011 sertive, claims for individual empowerment aggregated HDI that covers all CARICOM and more open opportunity structures, espe- countries for which data are available.4 This cially wider access to education, created great- represents the first attempt to estimate such er pressure for social reform. This is reflected an HDI. The 2011 CARICOM estimated in the comparatively better performance of HDI is 0.564, which is considerably lower the countries of the Caribbean Community than the 2011 LAC HDI. Since the HDI is (CARICOM) on international indicators a population-weighted index, the low value such as the Human Development Index of the CARICOM HDI may be explained by (HDI) and their ranking as middle-income the impact of Haiti, given the proportion of countries.2 the CARICOM population accounted for by Haiti (nearly 60 percent) in 2011. If the CAR- Human Development in ICOM HDI is estimated without including the Caribbean Community Haiti, the value shifts upwards (0.724), which Human development measures rely on the better approximates the reality of the Dutch- HDI, which is a summary measure for as- speaking and English-speaking countries and sessing long-term progress in three basic is closer to the LAC HDI (0.731). dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. The HDI has been 16 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 31. Chart 1.1 Human Development Index, Caribbean-7, 2011 1 Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 0.800 0.793 0.764 0.760 0.750 0.731 0.727 0.723 LAC HDI 0.700 0.680 0.650 0.633 0.600 0.564 0.550 CARICOM HDI 0.500 0.450 0.400 Barbados Antigua & Trinidad & Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Guyana (47) Barbuda Tobago (79) (82) (104) (117) (60) (62) Source: Calculations of the UNDP Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean based on International Human Development Indicators (database), UNDP, New York, in the Three Basic Dimensions introduced the inequality-adjusted HDIof Human Development (IHDI), which takes inequality into accountTrends in the HDI and in the three basic di- across all three dimensions of the HDI by dis-mensions of the HDI for the Caribbean-7 are counting the average value in each dimensionpresented in chart 1.2. All the countries show according to the relevant level of inequality inpositive average growth rates in the three a country.5 The human development poten-HDI components. Between 1980 and 2011, tial forgone because of inequality is indicatedthe increase in life expectancy ranged from by the difference between the HDI and the10.4 years in Guyana to 2.6 years in Jamaica. IHDI, which can be expressed as a percent-Barbados has the longest life expectancy, age. Due to a lack of relevant data, the IHDIat 76.8 years, and Guyana has the shortest, has only been calculated for Trinidad and To-at 69.9 years, followed by Suriname, at 70.6 bago (0.644 and an overall loss of 15.3 per-years. In education, the mean years of school- cent), Jamaica (0.610 and an overall loss ofing in 2011 varied from 7.2 years in Suriname 16.2 percent), Suriname (0.518 and an overallto 9.3 and 9.6 years in Barbados and Jamaica, loss of 23.8 percent), and Guyana (0.492 andrespectively. The increase in gross national in- an overall loss of 22.3 percent). In general, thecome since 1980 shows positive trends in all overall loss among these countries is lowerseven countries. than the overall loss among LAC countries (26 percent).The Inequality-Adjusted HDIThe HDI is an average measure of basic hu- The Gender Inequality Indexman development achievements. As an aver- The Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflectsage, it masks inequality in the distribution women’s disadvantage in three dimensions—of human development across a population reproductive health, empowerment and eco-at the country level. The 2010 global HDR nomic activity—for as many countries as data C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 17
  • 32. 1 Chart 1.2 Trends in HDI and HDI Components, Caribbean-7, 1980–2011Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups Human Development Education Index Health Index Income Index Index (HDI) value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1980 1990 2000 2011 1980 1990 2000 2011 1980 1990 2000 2011 1980 1990 2000 2011 Antigua & Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Barbuda (47) (117) (79) (82) (104) Tobago (60) (62) Source: Calculations of the UNDP Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean based on International Human Development Indicators (database), UNDP, New York, of reasonable quality allow.6 The GII shows some exceptions, countries in the region cur- the loss in human development caused by in- rently have high debt ratios, high unemploy- equality between the respective achievements ment rates and significant poverty rates. Gir- of men and women in the three GII dimen- van (2011, citing CARICOM 2010a) reports sions. The 2011 score on the GII has been that national poverty rates are 14.5 percent in estimated for Trinidad and Tobago (0.331), Jamaica, 15.9 percent in Nevis, 16.7 percent Barbados (0.364), Jamaica (0.450), and Guy- in Trinidad and Tobago, 18.4 percent in Anti- ana (0.551). The scores reflect a percentage gua and Barbuda, 27.0 percent in Saint Kitts, loss in achievement across the three dimen- 28.8 percent in Saint Lucia and 37.7 percent sions that arises because of gender inequality in Grenada.7 The majority of the region’s poor of 33.1, 36.4, 45.0 and 55.1 percent, respec- live in rural areas.8 UNDP (2004) finds that tively. Trinidad and Tobago, as well as Barba- there is considerable variation and uneven- dos, experienced the least loss, while Guyana ness in the poverty profile of countries in experienced the greatest loss. In the case of the region, as well as significant disparities in Jamaica and Guyana, the loss is higher than wealth distribution. the LAC average (44.5 percent). Women have made important advances in Advances in social policy that are rep- education, labour force participation, political resented in the HDI measurements noted participation and equality before the law, but above may be compromised by poor econom- gender inequalities persist.9 The economic sec- ic performance and high debt burden. With tors that have traditionally provided employ- 18 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 33. ment and contributed to the livelihoods of poor As the discussion above illustrates, thewomen and their families, such as agriculture growth of violent crime in the Caribbean 1and light industries, have experienced signifi- region is one manifestation of declines on Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groupscant decline. In addition, the global financial cri- many national and regional fronts. Here, assis has deepened the economic crisis in the Car- elsewhere in the world, crime is contextual-ibbean and undercut the well-being of women ized in an environment of high debt, highin the region. These economic factors, together rates of poverty and high unemployment, es-with other outcomes of gender inequality, such pecially youth unemployment. These occur inas the gender employment gap, the gender pay an environment of changes in crime patterns,gap, occupational segregation, and the burden changes in public attitudes, and weakeningof unpaid work, are contributing to the mar- institutions.ginality of Caribbean women. Indeed, the sig- It is important to understand the out-nificant rate of poverty among women, coupled come of all these factors and changes on thewith their dependent status within countries personal sense of security from crime amongand in the region, has had long-term negative the respondents to the Crime Security Surveyeffects, not the least of which is the intergenera- 2010 (chart 1.3). Regionwide, 46 percent oftional transmission of poverty and inequality.10 the respondents said that, overall, they felt se- The current high level of violent crime in cure or very secure living in their countries;the Caribbean region is a result of some of looked at the other way, more than half feltthese convergences. Increasing rates of violent insecure because of crime or uncertain aboutcrime and the public’s deepened sense of inse- crime and security. The sense of security wascurity have led governments in the region to strongest in Barbados (79 percent) and weak-undertake remedial measures. The crisis has est in Trinidad and Tobago (25 percent).also encouraged collaboration with interna-tional and regional agencies and institutions.Indeed, the involvement of these agencies hascontributed to a noticeable increase in schol- Chart 1.3 Sense of Security in the Caribbean-7, 2010arship on the region’s crime problems. Thescholarship has introduced a needed com- 90parative framework that goes beyond the ear- 78.7 80lier concern about high crime rates in specificcountries to focus on the whole region and ar- 70gue that anti-crime efforts require a response 60 57.6that is regionwide. Percent CARICOM agreed in 2001 to establish 50 45.9 45.5 42.7the Regional Task Force on Crime and Se- 40 37.7curity (RTFCS) to identify the major causes 35.7of crime in the Caribbean and to recom- 30 24.7mend approaches to deal with the interre- 20lated problems of crime. The task force reportidentified the main security threats in the 10region and highlighted the threats from ille- 0gal drugs, from the increasing involvement of Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7youth in crime and from the increased accessto and use of illegal firearms as major sourcesof insecurity in the region.11 The threats andchallenges identified in the RTFCS report Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.overlap with those identified by Harriott Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “How secure or insecure do you consider(2002), Deosaran (2007a) and UNODC (living in) your country to be?” The chart shows the share of respondents who answered “Secure” or “Very secure”.and the World Bank (2007). C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 19
  • 34. Crime Trends Since Independence ficking and high-intensity political violence).1 The third and current stage is associated with The region consists of small, open societies that the activities of transnational organized crimeCrime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups have been subjected to globalization and fairly and gang conflicts. The third stage also evi- rapid modernization. These forces have also fos- dences an increase in violent crimes such as tered social instability and rising rates of violent homicide, more firearm-related offences and crime. As the literature on modernization and violence against women. This is not the inevi- development confirms, modernization has con- table trajectory of other Caribbean countries. tradictory effects. On the one hand, it enhances Indeed, several other Caribbean countries economic growth and living standards. On the have not followed this path, but they have other, it fosters social mobility that may widen been variously affected by the drug trade the gulf between rich and poor, thereby height- and gang violence, and, in several countries, ening the sense of relative deprivation among there was a clearly discernable turn towards marginalized groups. Indeed, a deep sense of higher rates of homicide and other categories relative deprivation may well have an impact of violent crime during the first decade of the on the crime rate precisely because it fosters, 2000s. During the consultations that were among marginalized groups, outrage and the part of the process of producing this report, search for remedies to injustice by any means.12 participants repeatedly expressed concern re- The increase in criminal violence across the re- garding the elevated levels of violence in their gion threatens the post-independence develop- countries and in the region. ment trajectory of most nations and will have In some Caribbean countries, aggregate consequences in the attainment of or the poor crime rates are falling. Prior to 1990, with performance in global indicators such as the some exceptions, the Caribbean was charac- Millennium Development Goals, as well as in terized by low rates of violent crime, and the national development plans. ratio of property crimes to violent crimes ap- The changes in post-independence environ- proximated the rates in developed countries. ments have coincided to impact the region’s For more than a decade, violent crimes have security landscape. This includes the economic been on a downward trend in most parts consequences of structural adjustment pro- of the world. Harrendorf, Heiskanen, and grammes in several countries. In addition, the Malby (2010) report that, in countries where region has been affected by the violence associ- trend data are available, the majority show de- ated with and emerging from political competi- creasing or stable homicide rates. In the Car- tion, growth in the drug trade and, more recent- ibbean, however, the trend in violent crime ly, gang-related violence. High levels of violence has been moving in the opposite direction; it represent a break from the colonial pattern of has been increasing. criminal offending, which was characterized Despite the rising rates of violent crime, by high rates of property crime and low rates of there are variations in the structure of crime violent crime. Jamaica was the first country to and the complexity of crime problems across break with this pattern and consistently exhibit the Caribbean countries. In some countries, high rates of violent crime. property crime rates continue to outstrip vio- In a discussion of crime trends in Jamaica, lent crime rates. A review of the current struc- Harriott (1996), identifies three discernable ture of crime throughout the region shows stages in the development of criminality in countries such as Barbados, Saint Lucia, and independent Jamaica. The first was a continu- Antigua and Barbuda with low violent crime ity with the colonial era in terms of the struc- rates, but high rates of property crime.13 Prop- ture of crime, that is, a continuation of a pat- erty crimes such as burglaries are often asso- tern that was dominated by property crime ciated with inequalities, especially relative rather than violent crime. The second stage poverty. was associated with a clear turn towards vio- Homicides: Homicide is one of the most lence (largely due to the growth in drug-traf- reliably and consistently recorded crimes.14 20 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 35. Chart 1.4 Homicide Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010 1 Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 70 60 50 40 Rate 30 20 10 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Guyana Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.The patterns exhibited in the associated crime rates were relatively low and stable in therates may therefore be discussed with consider- other five across the 1990–2000 period. Sinceable confidence. During the pre-independence then, the homicide rate has risen substantiallyperiod, Caribbean homicide rates were com- in Trinidad and Tobago and fluctuated, butparable with and, in some instances, lower trended mostly upward in Antigua and Bar-than the rates in other developing countries. buda, Guyana, and Saint Lucia. Barbados hasAfter independence and prior to the 1990s, experienced some fluctuation, but tended tohomicide rates within the region were below have a low and stable rate across the 20-yearthe global average.15 By 1990, however, Latin period of 1990–2010.America and the Caribbean had an average Some of the conditions that influencehomicide rate of 22.9 per 100,000 citizens, and homicide rates across the Caribbean regionthe region was ranked first in the homicide rate include, but are not limited to crime clearanceamong regions of the world.16 rates, levels of development, low rates of eco- As depicted in chart 1.4, there has been nomic growth, and the proportion of youngconsiderable variation in the homicide rates men in the population.17 Drug-trafficking (inacross time in the countries of the Carib- some concrete contexts) and weapons avail-bean-7 on which trend data are available. ability are also associated with high homicideJamaica has had particularly high per capita rates.homicide rates and is ranked among the most The RTFCS report identifies increased ac-violent countries worldwide. The homicide cess to firearms and the greater involvement of C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 21
  • 36. youth in crimes as conditions influencing the as Barbados, there has been a rise in firearm-1 commission of crimes in the region. Increased related offences. Between 1975 and 2010, the insecurity can be related to gun ownership. use of firearms increased in Barbados, and,Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups On the one hand, it can lead to a rise in the despite a decline in firearm-related offence number of legal registration applications for rates between 2000 and 2009, the rates have firearms. On the other hand, insecurity also remained above the levels of the 1990s. Since arises from the spread of legal and illegal fire- 1997, Trinidad and Tobago has seen a steady arms, a condition that is now manifest in the increase, which peaked in 2005 at 66 offences rise in firearm-related offences. per 100,000 population. All three jurisdic- Firearm-related offences: Across the Car- tions showed a reduction in rates in the last ibbean, deaths and injuries because of gun three years of the data period, but the rates in violence have been exacerbated by the ready all remain significantly above the 1990 rates. availability and misuse of firearms. The im- The LAC region is disproportionately af- pact is being witnessed predominantly in fected by small arms violence. This type of vio- nations such as Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, and lence accounted for 42 percent of all firearm- Trinidad and Tobago, but, regionwide, fire- related deaths worldwide. The Caribbean is, arms are being used more often in the com- however, not a major producer, exporter, or mission of crimes. consumer of legal firearms. Indeed, between Chart 1.5 shows the rate of firearm-relat- 2004 and 2006, only 3 percent of global arms ed offences in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trini- trade transfers involved the Caribbean.18 Gun dad and Tobago, the only nations on which violence is related to the ease of access to US data are available. The rates have consistently markets for firearms and to narcotics traffick- been highest in Jamaica. However, even in ing, as well as governmental inability to se- jurisdictions with low rates of violence, such cure the borders, which are issues intricately Chart 1.5 Firearm-Related Offences Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean Countries, 1990–2010 80 70 60 50 Rate 40 30 20 10 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Barbados Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. 22 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 37. related to organized crime activities and the ies, and, while Saint Lucia shows a gradualincapacity of states.19 increase, Antigua and Barbuda has shown 1 The ready availability of small arms and the most dramatic increase. The rates in Suri- Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groupslight weapons in the Caribbean region im- name, which has lower rates of violent crimepedes security, democratic processes and eco- than other Caribbean countries, posted annomic development. Several initiatives under increase from 107 to 386 per 100,000 peopleway regionwide aimed at reducing gun use between 2004 and 2006 and have declinedand availability may offer significant oppor- since then, though they have remained abovetunities for stemming the tide of gun-related 300.crime.20 Similar to homicide rates, robbery rates in Robberies: Data of the UNDP Citizen the Caribbean are higher in countries show-Security Survey 2010 indicate that robberies, ing low economic growth.22 The exception isburglaries and break-ins are the crimes that Jamaica, which has had low economic growth,induce the most fear among Caribbean resi- but also records low robbery rates. Francis etdents. Robbery, defined as the theft of prop- al. (2009) indicate that businesses in Jamaicaerty by relying on force or the fear of force, have experienced high rates of violent crimes,is traditionally classified as a violent crime. including robberies, but police records do notRobbery rates in the Caribbean-7 for the pe- distinguish between commercial and indi-riod 1990–2010 are shown in chart 1.6. They vidual victims.evidence an upward trend. While rates have Burglaries and break-ins are the unlawfulbeen relatively stable in Barbados and have entering of a home or other building.23 Bothdeclined in Jamaica and Guyana, the overall are discussed herein in the context of acquisi-rates have increased.21 Trinidad and Tobago tive crimes.24 Within the Caribbean region,currently shows the highest rates of robber- citizens are most likely to be victimized by Chart 1.6 Robbery Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010 600 500 400 Rate 300 200 100 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Guyana Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 23
  • 38. 1 Chart 1.7 Burglary and Break-in Rates Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1990–2010Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 4500 4000 3500 3000 Rate 2500 2000 1500 500 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago Saint Lucia Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. burglaries and robberies, crimes that involve groups. This is a general trend that does not high social, economic and personal costs apply to every country. Prenzler and Towns- among victims. As chart 1.7 shows, there has ley (1996) have reviewed the literature and been a long downward trend in burglaries. suggest that affluent homes often attract While Trinidad and Tobago saw low and sta- skilled professional burglars, while homes ble burglary rates, Barbados and Saint Lucia and businesses in poorer areas are vulnerable saw somewhat higher, but stable rates over to burglaries committed by individuals who 1990–2010. The burglary rate in Jamaica fell live nearby. Demographically, households significantly from a higher level, and the rate in lower socio-economic areas are the most in Antigua and Barbuda mirrored this behav- vulnerable, but burglary rates are also high in iour, but from an even higher initial rate. The communities that lack social cohesion. The low recent rates for Jamaica may be attributed number of people in a household, marital sta- to underreporting. tus, housing type, and time of day also impact Economists and criminologists have long the likelihood of a burglary.25 discussed the impact of economic condi- Another set of insecurity-generating tions on crime. Development affects crime, crimes worth examining is gender-based vio- but crimes of violence and theft are affected lence. Across the Caribbean, three specific differentially. Specifically, as development in- practices have become a significant concern creases, violent crimes decrease, while crimes primarily regarding women and the girl-child, of theft increase across all socio-economic although data generated by the Citizen Secu- 24 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 39. rity Survey 2010 suggest that smaller shares of Not every violent act that a woman maymen also fear becoming the victims of these experience encompasses gender-based vio- 1practices. These are sexual violence, domestic lence.28 Instead, the term ‘gender-based’ ac- Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groupsviolence and trafficking in persons. An in- knowledges that this sort of violence againstcrease in the incidence and brutality of some women is directly related to and shaped byof these crimes across the region has raised gender roles in society. Specifically, this is a “manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and dis- Gender-based violence also serves— crimination against women by men and to the by intention or effect—to perpetu- prevention of women’s full advancement.”29 ate men’s power and control. It is Gender-based violence has been reinforced sustained by a culture of silence by and in social, cultural, economic and his- and denial of the seriousness of the torical values, beliefs, norms and institutions. consequences of abuse. In addition Different forms of gender-based vio- to the harm they exact on the indi- lence may be experienced at different phases vidual level, these consequences also of the life cycle. Thus, the protection of exact a social toll and place a heavy women’s rights within the region is predi- and unnecessary burden on health cated on the existence of legal, cultural and services. social frameworks to empower and protect women. Across the region, there have been — ‘Gender Equality: Ending Wide- significant improvements in access to justice spread Violence against Women’, for women who are victims of gender-based United Nations Population Fund, violence. However, challenges remain. Thus, New York, this report supports the continuation of re- der/violence.htm gional programmes such as police training, the strengthening of service delivery through family courts, increased access to legal aid, and capacity-building to support legislation.30public awareness and spurred demands for The effects of rape are particularly devas-redress. tating and life-changing. Rape is non-con- Combating gender-based violence is of sensual sexual intercourse with a female.31 Inconsiderable importance if the Millennium some jurisdictions, police statistics on rapeDevelopment Goals are to be achieved. are often aggregated with statistics on otherViolence against women, as defined by the sexual offences, making it difficult to discernUnited Nations in Article 1 of the Declara- national trends in the crime.32 Nonetheless, intion on the Elimination of Violence against the five countries of the Caribbean-7 in whichWomen and reiterated in subsequent docu- police statistics can be disaggregated, the ratesments, refers to “any act of gender-based were low and stable in four in 1993–2010:violence that results in, or is likely to result Barbados, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidadin, physical, sexual or psychological harm and Tobago (chart 1.8). The rates in Antiguaor suffering to women, including threats and Barbuda were the highest among the fiveof such acts, coercion or arbitrary depriva- and doubled between 2006 and 2009, beforetion of liberty, whether occurring in public declining to a low level. De Albuquerque andor in private life.”26 The Convention on the McElroy (1999) also note this puzzling differ-Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination ence in rape rates between larger and smalleragainst Women expanded the enunciation jurisdictions; they attribute it to the fact that,of the rights of women to include protection in small countries, minor increases in occur-against discrimination in the family, com- rence produce dramatic increases in per cap-munity, employment, and political life.27 ita rates. In Antigua and Barbuda, the rate of C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 25
  • 40. 1 Chart 1.8 Rates of Rape Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1993–2010Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 120 100 80 Rate 60 40 20 0 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 Antigua & Barbados Jamaica Saint Lucia Trinidad & Barbuda Tobago Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statis- tics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. rapes and indecent assaults accounted for as UNODC and World Bank (2007), drawing much as 20 percent of the country’s violent on United Nations crime trend data for various crime rate. 33 years, state that 3 of the top 10 recorded rape Rape is one of the most underreported rates occur in the Caribbean. Among Caribbean crimes worldwide. The underreporting tran- countries on which there are available and com- scends age, race, class and geography. Accord- parable data, each showed a rape rate that was ing to worldwide estimates, 60 percent of all higher than the unweighted average of the full sexual crimes go unreported, and one in three set of 102 countries in the study. A comparison women will be raped, beaten, forced into sex, shows significant differences in incidence rates or otherwise assaulted in her lifetime.34 In across rape statistics as measured by reports to countries such as Guyana, Jamaica, and Trini- police, hospital records and surveys. In general, dad and Tobago, the risk of sexual victimiza- the number of self-reported rapes in victimiza- tion increases in specific geographical areas tion surveys is approximately 25 percent greater and among specific subpopulations.35 than the number known by or reported to the Across the Caribbean, rape rates are rela- police.37 It is even more difficult to estimate rates tively high, and clearance rates on cases are for some of the other sexual offences. low; so, by extension, conviction rates are also Regionwide, violence against women is low.36 For example, during the period 1970 to disproportionately borne by youth and sig- 2009, the average clearance rate for cases of nificantly impacts the girl-child. Amnesty In- rape and carnal abuse in Jamaica was 48 per- ternational (2008) finds that, in 2004, seventy cent. It declined from 62 percent in 1970, was percent of all reported sexual assaults in Ja- lowest, at 35 percent, in 1995, and then rose maica were committed against girls rather than to 50 percent in 2009. women. LAC is the region with the highest 26 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 41. proportion of adolescent females who claim spondents are important for understandingto have had their sexual debut before age 15, the risk of victimization. As chart 1.10 shows, 1at 22 percent; there are no equivalent figures three groups were significantly more likely to Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groupsfor young men in the region.38 The Caribbean report that they had been victimized in 2009:region has the earliest onset of sexual initiation men, people 18 to 34 years of age, and peoplein the world.39 The World Bank (2003) cites a unemployed or seasonally employed. A simi-study on nine countries conducted by the Pan lar pattern emerges if the distinction is drawnAmerican Health Organization that found the between victims of violent crimes and victimsmean age of first intercourse was 10 years or of property crimes. The predictors of violentyounger, and almost two-thirds of respondents crime victimization include gender (see chartreported sexual initiation before the age of 13. 1.11), age (18–30 years), class self-placementEarly sexual debut and sexual violence impact (lower), education (low) and employment sta-adolescent pregnancy and expose the girl-child tus (unemployed or seasonally employed). In-to HIV/AIDS through forced sexual inter- come and race are not significant predictors.41course with infected partners, increased sexual For property crimes, respondents whose in-risk-taking such as multiple partners or engag- come self-placement was high reported highering in transactional sex, and a lack of control levels of property crime victimization (12.8or negotiation skills to use condoms and seek percent) compared with respondents whopreventive health care services.40 placed themselves lower (10.8 percent). Age was also a significant predictor, as was educa-Crime Victimization tional attainment (lower levels).Crime and violence have created a disequilib-rium that now threatens human development, Chart 1.9 Self-Reported Criminal Victimization,national prosperity and regional stability. In- Caribbean-7, 2010securities emerge from many sources, such ascrime and natural disasters, and it is evident 12that the consequences of such events are not 11.2 10.9borne equally by all members of society. The 10.8 10.2 10 9.7Citizen Security Survey 2010 included ques- 9.3tions about crime victimization to assess thecharacteristics of individuals more likely and 8 7.8less likely to have been victimized in 2009, the Percentone-year recall period used in most of the sur- 6 5.6vey questions. 4Determinants of VictimizationThe risk factors associated with victimization aremultifaceted and vary based on the offence, the 2offender type, the victim and the context withinwhich the victimization occurs. Responses to 0the Citizen Security Survey 2010 show that Saint Lucia Antigua & Barbuda Suriname Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago Barbados Guyana Caribbean-7national context is important. The share of re-spondents who reported that they had been vic-tims of a crime in 2009, as recalled in the 2010survey, ranged from a high of 11 percent in An-tigua and Barbuda, Saint Lucia, and Barbados toa low of 6 percent in Jamaica; the average for the Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.Caribbean-7 was 9 percent (chart 1.9). Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “In the last year, were you the victim of a crime?” The chart shows the share of respondents who answered “yes”.The demographic characteristics of the re- C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 27
  • 42. 1 Chart 1.10 Self-Reported Victimization, by Demographic Group, Caribbean-7, 2010Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups Females 9.3 Males 12.0 18 to 34 Years of Age 12.2 35 Years of Age & Over 9.3 Employed 10.4 Unemployed/ 12.5 Seasonally Employed 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Percent Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “In the last year, were you the victim of a crime?” The chart shows the share of respondents who answered “Yes”. Chart 1.11 Gender Differences in Victimization Rates for Specific Types of Crime, 2010 Robbery with other 2.4 types of weapons 3.3 Domestic violence 2.3 involving a partner 1.0 Robbery at 2.2 gunpoint 3.4 1.6 Assault with a weapon 3.8 Sexual assault 1.5 and/or rape 0.4 1.4 Family violence 1.4 Female Male Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Within the last 10 years, have you been a victim of any of the following crimes/behaviour?” The chart shows the share of respondents who answered that they had been victims, for each type of crime. Differences are statistically significant at p<.01. 28 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 43. The overall self-reported victimization rate maltreatment and can be directed towards aof 9 percent among respondents can be com- person regardless of age, sex, sexual orienta- 1pared with the corresponding rates among 30 tion, social class and marital or other status.43 Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groupsnations that participated in the 2004–2005 Across the region, approximately 11 percentround of the International Crime Victimiza- of the survey respondents of both sexes re-tion Survey, which found that 16 percent of ported experience with domestic violencerespondents reported that they had been vic- (chart 1.12). The rates ranged from a low of 6tims of crime during the previous year.42 The percent of respondents in Jamaica to a high ofCaribbean rate compares most closely with 17 percent in Guyana. Gender-based violencethe rates in countries such as Japan that reg- has been a persistent problem in the region.istered at the lower end of the survey rate list. It is, however, now more well understood and can be controlled and prevented more effec-Domestic Violence and the tively by interventions that interrupt the cycleVictimization of Women of violence and the patterns of conflict thatDomestic violence, a major human rights are associated with it.violation, takes many forms, including sexual, The violence was most likely to be psycho-emotional, physical, psychological and eco- logical, that is, insults (reported by 21 percentnomic abuse. It is often accompanied by child of the respondents), and least likely to be Chart 1.12 Self-Reported Victims of Domestic Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 20 17.3 15.7 15 9.7 11.7 10.9 9.6 Percent 10 8.3 5.9 5 0 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “To what extent has any member of your household (age 16 or over) deliberately hit you with their fists or with a weapon of any sort, or kicked you or used violence on you in any way?” The chart shows the share of persons declaring that they had been victims of domestic violence. C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 29
  • 44. 1 Chart 1.13 Self-Reported Victims of Domestic Violence, by Type and Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 22.7 14.3 Female 13.2 10.7 19.0 8.8 Male 9.7 6.7 20.9 11.6 Caribbean-7 11.4 8.6 0 5 10 15 20 25 Percent Insulted Threat of Violence Violence Used Been Injured Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “To what extent have you been sworn at or insulted by a partner (ex-partner) or a boyfriend/girlfriend (or ex-boyfriend/girlfriend)?” “To what extent has your spouse (or ex-spouse) ever said things to you that frightened you, such as threatening to harm you or someone close to you?” “To what extent has any member of your household (age 16 or over) deliberately hit you with their fists or with a weapon of any sort, or kicked you or used violence on you in any way?” “To what extent have you been injured, even slightly, on any occasion when your spouse (or ex-spouse), or a partner (or ex-partner), or a boyfriend/girlfriend (or ex boyfriend/ girlfriend), used violence against you? By injuries we mean bruises, scratches and cuts of any kind”. The chart shows the percentage of persons who declared that they had been a victim at least once, by type of violence. physical injury (reported by 9 percent). Do- ical violence and psychological aggression. The mestic violence is experienced by both males Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys for Guyana and females, but, as chart 1.13 shows, females (2006-2007) and Suriname (2006), as well as experience all forms of violence at higher McDonald (2008), who presents findings of rates than males. the 2008 Reproductive Health Survey in Ja- Psychological abuse is often downplayed maica, indicate that there are entrenched at- by victims, policy makers and the media. How- titudes held by men and women according to ever, evidence exists that psychological abuse is which it is justified to use violence in response often a precursor to physical abuse and, in its to violations of expectations about gender myriad manifestations, can be as devastating roles.45 Thus, the progression from aggressive as physical abuse.44 Le Franc et al. (2008), in a abuses such as pushing and insults to more three-country Caribbean study, find high lev- serious physical violence is cause for concern, els of interpersonal violence, which they sug- and efforts need to be undertaken to disrupt gest may be indicative of an entrenched culture this progression. of violence and adversarial intimate relation- In response to this problem, CARICOM ships. They also report significant between- has developed model legislation on issues af- country differences in the overall level of phys- fecting women; three of these initiatives spe- 30 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 45. cifically address gender-based violence.46 The ods and the inability to disaggregate statisticsModel Legislation on Domestic Violence, by sex and age deter accurate assessments. 1also known as the Family (Protection against Nonetheless, regionwide research reports and Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable GroupsDomestic Violence) Act, seeks to address surveys by governmental organizations anddomestic violence and provide remedies to NGOs providing services to women reportmitigate the effects of such violence.47 CAR- increasing rates of violence against women.50ICOM has prepared the model legislation Statistics of these agencies indicate that sexualto assist member states in drafting national assault and domestic violence are prevalentlegislation and to assist non-governmental regionwide and create high levels of insecuri-organizations (NGOs) in research and advo- ty among women. The UN Women Regionalcacy. Office in Barbados, drawing on data from cri- Since the introduction of the model legis- sis centres, contends that there is significantlation, domestic violence legislation has been underreporting of all forms of sexual violence.enacted widely across the region, with some Among the reasons for low reporting are theexceptions. However, concerns have been lack of responsiveness among law enforce-raised about the replication of weaknesses ment authorities and within the adminis-in the model. Nonetheless, Trinidad and To- tration of justice. Although legal, social andbago’s Domestic Violence Act that mandate political reforms appear to have improved thepolice to respond and keep careful records of chances that a rape or attempted rape will beall reports, has emerged as a model that has reported to the police, most victims still doinfluenced nations such as Dominica, Grena- not report. Consequently, police data are anda and Suriname.48 Beyond legislation, some inadequate tool with which to assess the prev-police services have introduced domestic vio- alence of this sort of violence; victim surveyslence units, and others have rightly broadened are much more accurate.this to gender-based violence units. Other po- Despite the levels of violence and the diffi-lice forces and services should adopt similar culties described above, gender-based violencemeasures and ensure that the capabilities of can be more effectively controlled and pre-these units are extended. vented through interventions that interrupt Sexual violence creates high levels of inse- the cycle of violence. Some forms of gender-curity among women. Regionwide, 11 percent based violence, particularly domestic violence,of respondents to the Citizen Security Survey tend to have histories and show patterns of2010 reported that they had experienced vio- abusive behaviour that may be disrupted in thelent sexual victimization, including rape and early stages before they degenerate into life-sexual assault (see above). The results of the threatening and life-taking physical violence.survey indicate that the reported occurrence of This requires investments aimed at developingsexual assault in 2009 was 2.1 percent. When the capabilities of the responsible institutionsthe respondents who had experienced a sexual of the state.assault were asked about their relationship tothe offender, they were least likely to respond Trafficking in Personsthat this was a stranger. This is consistent with Trafficking in persons is a practice of grow-other research that has found that women are ing concern that creates insecurity among Car-more likely to be victimized by persons they ibbean women and children, though it doesknow.49 Women’s vulnerability to sexual assault not exclusively affect these groups.51 Men areand domestic violence is dramatically greater also victims, but the patterns of victimizationthan men’s, and sexual offences are a category vary according to the gender of the victims.of crime that reflects this differential risk. Globally, at any given time, as a result of traf- There is no regionwide survey using a ficking, 2.5 million people are estimated tocommon methodology to document levels be trapped in forced labour, including sexualof violence against women. Similarly, lack of exploitation, of which 10 percent are in Latinstandardized data and data collection meth- America and the Caribbean.52 Some countries C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 31
  • 46. in the Caribbean region serve as sources or ily affecting the most vulnerable members of1 suppliers of this traffic, as transit points for society, particularly women and children, are victims of trafficking moving towards North similar to those found in other regions of theCrime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups America and Europe, and as destination areas world, including poverty, lack of economic for both internal and intraregional flows.53 opportunities, marginalization, violence, il- The scale of the problem in the Caribbean literacy, gender discrimination, homeless- region has not been properly estimated, but ness, some distinctive vulnerability factors trafficking in persons appears to have become have been identified in Latin America and a particular problem in some countries in the the Caribbean. These include gang affiliation, region. While trafficking occurs in a variety persistent substance abuse and births among of exploitative forms, forced labour, domestic girls under the age of 18 years.59 With regard servitude and sex exploitation are believed to to children, who are often sexually exploited be the most common manifestations in the for the financial benefit of their families, lack Caribbean. Sex exploitation seems to be the of awareness of the risks, a history of sexual most predominant form. abuse of children and parental migration Most victims trafficked for the purposes of resulting in child abandonment have been sexual exploitation are women and girls, who found to be additional push-pull factors in are usually found eventually to be involved in some Caribbean countries.60 prostitution, exotic dancing, massages, por- In the Caribbean, the organization of the nography and other related activities. Evidence trafficking of persons and the main actors in- suggests that, while boys and young men are volved are not well understood, but, in the more at risk of becoming victims of traffick- larger Latin American and Caribbean region, ing for labour exploitation, especially in the organized crime groups have become signifi- agricultural, construction and mining sectors, cant actors. They use trafficking in persons to some are also trafficked for sexual exploita- fund other illicit activities. Increasingly, traf- tion and domestic servitude.54 Across the re- ficked victims are at risk of contracting HIV/ gion, the number of children that are sexually AIDS and other diseases. Migrant communi- exploited may be increasing, and the average ties are especially vulnerable to trafficking.61 It age may be decreasing. Women are typically has also been found that minority and indig- trafficked internationally, while children are enous populations face specific vulnerabilities most often trafficked within their own coun- to trafficking. tries. The trafficking of children and children UNODC and UN.GIFT (2008) have iden- vulnerable to commercial sexual exploitation tified lack of knowledge, an inadequate national are most common in popular tourist desti- legal framework, ineffective policy and capacity nations and centres of sex tourism.55 Indeed, to respond, limited protection of and assistance the growing demand for sex tourism is largely for victims, and poor international cooperation considered the primary factor contributing to as the primary challenges to efforts to eradicate sex trafficking in Latin America and the Carib- trafficking in persons. A number of Dutch- bean, particularly in relation to minors.56 With speaking and English-speaking Caribbean regard to the Caribbean countries, for most of countries have ratified the Protocol to Prevent, which tourism constitutes a major industry, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Es- research suggests that trafficking cases exist pecially Women and Children (2000), which within the sex tourism industry.57 is attached to the United Nations Convention In 2005, the International Organization on Transnational Organized Crime, includ- for Migration identified unsecured borders, ing Jamaica (2003), Guyana (2004), Suriname lax enforcement of rules on entertainment (2007), and Trinidad and Tobago (2007).62 All visas and work permits, legalized prostitution countries are also signatories of various anti-traf- and the tourism industry as contributors to ficking and forced labour–related conventions, the problem.58 While most of the push-pull such as the Convention on the Elimination of risk factors for trafficking in persons primar- all Forms of Discrimination against Women 32 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 47. and the CARICOM Declaration on the Vulnerable groups face threats arising fromRights of the Child 2008. However, the Le- discrimination, exploitation, or displacement. 1gal Review on Trafficking in Persons in the They are stigmatized relative to others mainly Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable GroupsCaribbean conducted by the International on account of their status, characteristics andOrganization for Migration (IOM 2010a) powerlessness. The stigma, in turn, limits theirshows that the translation of the obligations access to needed benefits and services. Factorsunder these instruments into national legisla- such as poverty, sexual orientation, or eth-tion and the associated implementation have nicity, as well as demographic characteristicsbeen rather limited.63 Until Caribbean coun- such as race, gender, language, and a myriad oftries are able to pass and effectively imple- other characteristics such as physical, mental,ment domestic counter-trafficking legislation, or health status (including HIV/AIDS) maythey may resort to existing legislation for the create vulnerabilities to of victims and the prevention and Two concepts help to make sense of theprosecution of trafficking activities, including cultural endorsement of violence against vul-the application of criminal legislation that ad- nerable groups. The first, from the victimologydresses some of the aspects of the trafficking literature, is embedded in what Nils Christieprocess, such as procurement, forced deten- (1986) labels the ideal victim. Christie notestion, prostitution, sexual offences, kidnap- that some victims are constructed as beingping, and abduction.64 Furthermore, given more deserving of victimization; this construc-the international nature of trafficking in per- tion of ‘legitimate’ victimization will deter-sons and the limited human, economic and mine an individual’s experience and treatmenttechnical resources of most Dutch-speaking in the criminal justice system. The second is theand English-speaking Caribbean countries notion of the hierarchy of victimization, mostfor tackling the issue, regional cooperation readily identifiable in the media constructionneeds to be enhanced to strengthen national and treatment of events. Singly or in tandem,and regional capacities to protect and assist these concepts operate to legitimize the de-trafficking victims, prevent trafficking activi- meaning treatment of the victim and to justifyties and prosecute traffickers. the politics associated with the victimization. The cultural endorsement of violence againstIdentification of Groups specific groups leads to net-widening and theVulnerable to Victimization condoning of ‘legitimate’ violence against spe-Vulnerability and power are intertwined. While cific groups.vulnerability is a relative concept that includes Women: Gender is the strongest predictornatural or physical factors, it is often a function of criminal behaviour and criminal victimiza-of inequitable resource allocation in a society, tion.65 In the Caribbean, as well as elsewhere,that is, of social disadvantage. Consequently, women commit fewer crimes than men andvulnerable groups are those groups that suffer are disproportionately the victims of somefrom an inequitable distribution of social, eco- types of crimes. They are more at risk andnomic and political power. Vulnerabilities place more vulnerable to some types of crime, par-people at risk and limit the resources that are ticularly gender-based violence. Crimino-available to them to manage and navigate these logical debate about the relationship betweenrisks. Vulnerable populations are often victim- crime and fear is in its fourth decade.66 Thisized in familial settings, as well as non-familial literature indicates that men are more likelysettings, are victims of human rights violations, to be victims of violent crimes, but womenor are powerless to defend their own rights. are consistently found to worry about theTheir concerns are not given priority by political threat of violence more than men. Amongelites and may be undermined by systemic and the reasons attributed to vulnerability is thatinstitutional discrimination. Mostly, they are de- women feel less physically able to defendnied the personal protection of the state or are themselves and consider the risk of somevictims of benign neglect. types of victimization greater for themselves C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 33
  • 48. and their social groups. Indeed, women and perpetrators of violence. In turn, this raises1 men’s vulnerability to victimization differ in the vulnerability of children to recruitment two fundamental ways: relationship with the and participation in gangs.Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups perpetrator and the type of victimization. Regionwide, children face increased vul- The United Nations Population Fund lists 16 nerability to sexual crimes, domestic violence, forms of gender-based violence. Worldwide, trafficking, child labour, commercial sexual patterns of violence indicate that women’s exploitation, sexually transmitted infections vulnerability to these forms of gender-based and early sexual initiation. Groups of children violence, especially intimate partner violence identified as especially vulnerable are abused and sexual violence by other perpetrators, children, children of absent parents, children is greater. Women and men are thus also af- in minority groups such as Guyana’s Amerin- fected differentially by crime. Women are dians and Suriname’s Maroon communities, more likely to be killed or sexually assaulted children in poor households, children living by someone they know. In addition, because in inner-city communities, disabled children, fear of victimization can be disempowering, and children of parents who are disabled, it has the potential to constrain the ability have mental health problems, or suffer from to participate fully in society. This is partly drug or alcohol abuse. why gendered vulnerabilities must be taken Across the region, there is concern for seriously by the state and why gender-based the safety of children in institutional care, in violence must be reduced. children’s homes and other custodial settings Approximately half of all households in the and in correctional institutions. In many of Caribbean are headed by women, who must these institutions, children are often placed therefore shoulder the responsibility for both alongside adult residents, which is a violation productive and reproductive work. Women of the Convention on the Rights of the Child also have longer life expectancies than men. because this exposes the child to physical and Together, these factors contribute to the femi- sexual violence.70 nization of poverty.67 Women who live in pov- Youth: Across the Caribbean, youth are erty experience additional vulnerabilities, such the primary victims and perpetrators of as higher infant mortality rates, higher likeli- crime. According to CARICOM (2010b), hood of early pregnancy, lower school enrol- crime and violence associated with poverty, ment, lower employment rates, and increased unemployment, and other political and social likelihood of experiencing violence. Poverty is inequities remain the number one concerns the typical condition of single mothers, elderly among adolescents and youth in the Carib- women and disabled women.68 bean Community. Levels of youth unemploy- Children: Within the Caribbean, chil- ment in the region are among the highest in dren are disproportionately affected by the world, and the education system does not crime and violence.69 Published by UNICEF prepare youth adequately for the regional and (2006), the United Nations Secretary-Gen- global labour market. Youth violence affects eral’s Study on Violence against Children victims, families, friends and communities. highlights a range of physical, emotional and In addition to death or injury, there are nega- social abuse children experience in homes tive psychological outcomes such as a poorer and families, communities, schools, institu- quality of life, reduced productivity and gen- tions, and work situations. They are witnesses erally disrupted lives. to and victims of violence across all the major Youth-related vulnerabilities and insecuri- social institutions and in the media: domestic ties have also emerged because of an upward violence, child abuse and neglect, and cor- trend in drug-trafficking, the spread of HIV/ poral punishment at home and in school. In AIDS, adolescent pregnancies, gang involve- some jurisdictions, there has been an increase ment, and access to and use of firearms. While in the number of children killed and a rise in crime is typically male-on-male and youth- the number of children who are victims and on-youth, young girls face the added burden 34 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 49. of forced or early sexual initiation. This has culturally insensitive health care delivery andconsequences for early pregnancy, health sta- encroachment on communal land. 1tus such as HIV/AIDS infection, exposure to Sexual minorities: While constitutions Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groupsintimate partner violence, intergenerational around the region bar discrimination on thetransmission of violence and poverty in later basis of race and gender, no such protectionlife. exists for sexual orientation or sexual minori- Minorities and indigenous populations: ties. Legally, homosexuality remains a crimeCrime trend data show geographical patterns in much of the region. Eleven CARICOMin victimization across the Caribbean based countries use laws against buggery to crimi-on minority or indigenous status. Examples nalize relationships between men who haveinclude the interior areas of Guyana and Suri- sex with men.73 The insecurities faced by andname that are populated largely by indigenous exacerbating the vulnerabilities of lesbian,people (Amerindians) and descendants of gay, bisexual, and transgender communitiesMaroon populations.71 These groups face vul- encompass problems in accessing health care,nerabilities that are inconsistent with their verbal and physical harassment, isolation andstatus as officially protected minorities. Their violence. This community also faces secondarycommunities are especially insecure because of victimization, including job loss, eviction fromtheir remoteness, the people’s lack of knowl- housing, denial of accommodation, and HIV/edge and inadequate access to criminal justice AIDS-related stigmatization. Despite the gen-institutions, and the expansion of extractive eral stigmatization of the entire community,economic enterprises in and around their com- there is a relative tolerance for lesbians com-munities that generate few benefits for them. pared to a more vociferous hatred of gay men,Within these communities, young girls are par- which can be explained by what Herek (1984)ticularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation and labels defensive coping attitudes.74 Many ofhuman trafficking, while indigenous women these issues are facilitated by the illegal statusare at risk of violence in both the public and of homosexuality in the English-speaking Car-private spheres, as well as within and outside ibbean.the indigenous communities. Sexual minorities are targeted for brutal Caribbean indigenous groups face discrimi- violence and even death; consequently, gaynation, systemic racism, inequity, and margin- men are an increasingly vulnerable group inalization that are related to colonialization, the region. Homosexuals are stigmatized anddispossession, and forced assimilation. Con- stereotyped and generally seen as the nega-sequently, in many communities, indigenous tion of masculinity. Their vulnerability arisespeople continue to suffer from infringements from the social construction of masculinityon cultural rights, loss of protection of property and the hatred for persons who challenge het-and inadequate access to justice. A major aspect erosexual notions of manliness. Thus, peopleof the marginalization is their exclusion from who are or who are perceived to be mem-the dominant culture; they are often denied citi- bers of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, orzenship. They frequently occupy areas that are queer communities live in an environment ofpoorly explored and that are underdeveloped, stigma, stereotype, and constant vulnerabilityand they are often exposed to land appropria- to violence (Norman, et. Al. 2006; White &tion and industries in their communities that Carr 2005). Violence towards sexual minori-erode their cultural and social habits.72 They face ties is tolerated and is, at times, even openlysocial exclusion if they reside in urban commu- advocated in the media, religious practice andnities. Historic inequities have also left many in- music in the Caribbean.digenous children, youth and families without Regionally, there are numerous agencies,support and services. Their exclusion is often in initiatives and programmes that have citizenresponse to their resistance to acculturation and security and the conditions of vulnerableexternal control and is exercised through the populations as their mandate or area of focus.mechanisms of education, language training, These include the CARICOM Implementa- C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 35
  • 50. tion Agency for Crime and Security (IM- of the respondents there indicated they felt1 PACS), the Inter-American Observatory on secure from crime; in contrast, the violent Security, the Inter-American Commission crime rates in Jamaica and in Trinidad andCrime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups on Human Rights, and the Citizen Security Tobago are high, and respondents in these and Justice Programme of the Inter-American countries expressed more negative feelings Development Bank. Their work can strength- about security. en the knowledge base on citizen security and Caribbean citizens are sensitive to is- aid creative policy-making. sues of safety and security. The insecurity can be measured by the fear of crime, that Fear of Crime is, the feelings and subsequent behaviours of citizens in response to perceived criminal Citizen security refers to the freedom from threats. Chadee, Austen, and Ditton (2007) physical violence and to the freedom from characterize this as differential sensitivity fear of violence.75 It encompasses security at to risk. Insecurity is manifest in a feeling of home, in the workplace and in political, so- safety only in specific places, a willingness to cial, and economic interactions with the state engage in only specific activities and the tak- and other members of society. ing of protective actions based upon the fears generated. Perceptions of Security and Insecurity The affective aspects of fear are assessed Public opinion polls and surveys have gen- by asking people about the level of worry or erally provided means to assess the public’s fear they feel about the possibility they will perception of crime and insecurity. However, become victims of crime. Across all countries, while there are some national and regional 48 percent of respondents to the Citizen Se- surveys, there is no consistent regional assess- curity Survey 2010 had worried at some time ment in the Caribbean, nor is there system- about becoming victims of crime. House- atic participation throughout the Caribbean breaking (41.3 percent) and robbery (33.7 in international standardized surveys such percent) were the most frequent among eight as the International Crime Victims Survey. crimes possibly facing communities; so, it is Harrendorf, Heiskanen, and Malby (2010) not surprising that these two crimes created rank the Caribbean as the second most vio- the greatest level of insecurity. Chart 1.14 lent region of the world. Central America is shows the percentages of respondents in each the first. Violent crimes increase insecurity country who said they worried about each and create challenges for regional develop- crime all or most of the time. The data indi- ment. How secure do Caribbean citizens feel cate that the fear of victimization associated in the face of the crime profile documented with the two crimes was highest in Guyana in police records and the victimization data (47 percent) and lowest in Barbados (14 per- presented in this chapter? cent). The Citizen Security Survey 2010 con- Primary insecurities emerge from the ducted for this report asked respondents perception that burglary is highly likely to about their perception of security. As shown occur and, more importantly, that the crime in chart 1.3 nearly 46 percent of all respond- constitutes a violation of the home, a space ents reported that they felt secure or very se- considered private. In addition, there are cure. The sense of security ranged from a low psychological consequences of burglary that of 25 percent in Trinidad and Tobago to a relate to the fear that one will be victimized high of 79 percent in Barbados. The feelings again. Robbery at gunpoint is more terrifying of security were negatively correlated with to the victim because of the arbitrariness and the level of violent crime, especially homicide unpredictability of the situation. rates, in a country. For example, Barbados Across the surveyed countries, 73 per- and Suriname record low levels of officially cent of respondents felt safe walking in their reported violent crime, and high percentages neighbourhoods during the day; 65 percent 36 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 51. Chart 1.14 Fear of Burglary and Robbery, Caribbean-7, 2010 1 Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 30 24.5 25.0 25 22.4 22.6 22.8 20.9 20.5 20 19.3 19.1 17.9 18.2 16.6 15 14.2Percent 11.2 10 8.4 5.2 5 0 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 House Broken into at Night Robbed at Gunpoint Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “Thinking about each of the following things, please indicate how much you worry about having your house broken into at night.” “Thinking about each of the following things, please indicate how much you worry about being robbed by someone with a gun.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “All the time” or “Most times”.felt safe at home after dark; 61 percent felt Carrying a weapon is an extreme responsesafe at work; and 50 percent felt safe walking that could escalate the potential of victimiza-in their neighbourhoods at night. tion, that is, concern for safety may encour- Behavioural aspects of fear relate to the age weapon-carrying behaviour; however,extent to which people modify their behav- weapon-carrying may also reduce the concerniour in response to their level of fear. This for safety and thus increase both vulnerabilityincludes protective strategies such as changes and the likelihood of victimization. Weap-in routine to avoid activities and locations ons, especially gun ownership, may also bethat are perceived to increase the risk of being part of a self-help tradition that has devel-victimized or such as ‘target hardening’ (for oped because of a lack of access to the legalexample, carrying pepper spray or installing system.76 Thus, building institutional capacitysecurity devices in the home). The Citizen Se- to enhance the public’s sense of security maycurity Survey 2010 reveals that the major be- significantly reduce the fear of crime and, byhavioural changes included keeping a weapon extension, the reliance of citizens on weapon-at home (23 percent of all respondents) and carrying for protection.carrying a weapon at night (9 percent) (chart Jackson and Gray (2010) point out that1.15). insecurity need not be debilitating. Instead, C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 37
  • 52. 1 Chart 1.15 Weapon-Related Self-Protective Behaviour, Caribbean-7, 2010Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 35 31.4 30 26.8 25 23.0 22.3 21.1 21.1 20 19.6 16.0 8.4 Percent 15 12.5 10 8.9 8.9 8.6 7.8 7.2 6.6 5 0 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 Keep a Weapon at Home Travel with a Weapon at Night Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “Do you keep a weapon at home (when you are there)?” “Do you travel with a weapon at nights?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who responded “Yes”. it can motivate vigilance and routine pre- community decreases trust among peers and caution or problem-solving to increase per- neighbours. Distrust hinders social capital sonal and collective safety. For example, the and possible civic participation. Citizen per- results of the Citizen Security Survey 2010 ceptions of the government’s ability to ensure show that, across the region, 5 percent of re- freedom from crime are also an integral part spondents moved to a more secure location in of feeling secure. Across the Caribbean-7, 2009; 11 percent put in a security device; and there was general optimism on this point: 41 72 percent indicated that their communities percent of the respondents to the Citizen Se- had taken steps to address the crime problem. curity Survey 2010 expressed the belief that However, the extent to which they mobilize their country had sufficient capacity to solve to solve problems within their communities or manage the problem of insecurity. is affected by their perception of social sta- The levels and patterns of fear of crime bility, moral consensus and informal control documented through the survey indicate that processes. only a small percentage of the respondents Citizens are concerned about trouble were fearful of being killed, and fewer than in the neighbourhood and the physical en- one-fifth were seriously worried about hav- vironment. Perception of crime within the ing their homes broken into or being robbed 38 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 53. at gunpoint. Overwhelmingly, the survey of crime in the Caribbean. These findingsparticipants expressed feelings of safety at should, however, not be understood to indi- 1home, at work and in their neighbourhoods cate an essential or naturally occurring fearful- Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groupsand were unlikely to move or install security ness among women. Thus, while both men anddevices to reduce the perceived risk. More women were equally likely to say they felt veryimportantly, respondents were optimistic secure living in their countries, some genderthat their countries had the capacity to man- differences were apparent. Women indicatedage the crime problems, and, regionwide, a higher levels of fear of sexual assault (30.4 per-majority of respondents said their neighbour- cent compared with 11.1 percent among men),hoods were engaging in activities to address of being killed (35.4 to 32.8 percent), and ofcrime problems. being beaten by a spouse or partner (11.5 to 8.6 percent). Women were also more likely toWomen’s Fear of Crime report travelling in groups at night for securityPerceptions of the risk of victimization are not reasons (28 to 17.3 percent).necessarily based on official crime statistics. A Chart 1.13 above documents thatmajor influence on fear of crime is gender, as women self-report that they had experiencednoted by Ditton and Farrall (2000, xv), who each of four types of domestic violence atconclude that the “single demographic fac- higher rates than men. While women are lesstor positively related to fear” is gender. Over- likely than men to be victims of crimes gener-all, women demonstrate higher levels of fear. ally, they are more likely to be victims of rapeChadee (2003) and Brathwaite and Yeboah and sexual assault (chart 1.16). Nearly 10 per-(2004) also report gender differences in fear cent of both sexes across the Caribbean-7 fear Chart 1.16 Gender Differences in the Fear of Crime Victimization, by Type of Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010 Having your house 44.0 broken into at night? 39.7 Being robbed by 40.9 someone with a gun? 38.0 Having a close 38.2 relative killed? 35.7 35.3 Being killed? 32.7 Being sexually 30.4 assaulted? 11.1 Having your 22.2 vehicle stolen? 21.8 Being attacked by 21.1 someone that you know? 20.2 Being beaten-up by 11.5 your spouse/partner? 8.6 Female Male Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Thinking about each of the following things, please indicate how much you worry about them.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “All times”, plus “Most times” and “Sometimes”. C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 39
  • 54. 1 Chart 1.17 Fear of Sexual Assault and Partner Assault, Caribbean-7, 2010Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 25 20 19.1 15 Percent 12.2 10 9.4 9.4 9.6 6.7 7.4 5.0 5.7 5 4.5 3.5 3.0 3.8 2.5 2.8 1.6 0 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 Beaten-up by Spouse /Partner Sexually Assaulted Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “Thinking about each of the following things, please indicate how much you worry about being beaten up by your spouse or partner”. “Thinking about each of the following things, please indicate how much you worry about being sexually assaulted”. The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “All the time”, plus “Most times”. being sexually assaulted in some fashion; one- is matched by outrage about the victimization third of this subgroup also fear being beaten of women and girls. This paradox may partial- by a spouse or partner (chart 1.17). ly be explained by the highly individualistic The Citizen Security Survey 2010 asked and deeply religious cultures in the region. about the likelihood that members of one’s Concern for individual rights, a political community would intervene in a suspected culture of democracy, and widespread piety case of domestic violence. Of the respond- often lead to protection for victims and vul- ents, 45 percent said an intervention would nerable populations. This concern for rights be made. Implied in the question was that an is most notable among sections of the Carib- intervention would stop or prevent violence bean population, both working class and the against women. This finding highlights a wealthier class, that are law-abiding, church- contradictory aspect of Caribbean popular going and justice-seeking. In such cases, as the culture on matters pertaining to the status of data show, sizeable minorities can be counted women. Despite the general indifference to on not only to condemn, but also to inter- the plight of women in the region and broad vene against the victimization and demeaning complicity in what might be deemed a rape treatment of women, girls and other vulner- culture, the prevailing attitudes on the status able groups. of women, recognition of their victimization, Community activism is important in a and concern regarding their fears are far more context where the general perception of per- complicated. Hence, indifference to women formance and the confidence in the police’s 40 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 55. ability to control domestic violence and rape the capacity of their institutions to respondare not high. Among women who were physi- effectively to these problems. 1cally or sexually abused in 2009 and reported The increase in violent crimes has been Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groupsthe incidents to the police, the majority were accompanied by a decrease in crime clearancedissatisfied with the action taken by the po- and conviction rates. In some countries, thelice in response. Although the vast majority rapid rise in rates of violent crime has been ac-of respondents did not have this traumatic companied by a similarly precipitous declineexperience, their perception of police perfor- in arrest and conviction rates to low levels. In-mance was not much more favourable. equality and social exclusion are big contribu- Violence against women and women’s fear tors to the high rates of violence, but the nearof victimization are both manifestations of immunity to arrest also partly accounts forgender inequality, which leads to the mainte- the high rates of violent crime in some coun-nance of an unequal balance of power. Shef- tries. These issues will be examined in morefield (1989) uses the term ‘sexual terrorism’ to detail in chapters 3 and 6.describe the reality of such violence in wom- Changes in the post-independenceen’s lives. Sexual terrorism refers to systems crime environment have coincided to compli-that operate to frighten, control, subordinate, cate an understanding of the Caribbean crimeintimidate and punish women. This takes the situation and its impact on the sense of secu-form of actual or threatened violence, both of rity among residents.which tend to create a heightened level of fear Caribbean citizens are keenly aware ofamong potential victims. Underlying the con- the region’s crime problems. Despite the hightrol is a good woman–bad woman dichotomy rates of violent crime and, in particular, homi-that justifies women being ‘punished’ for ‘bad’ cide, general victimization rates remain fairlybehaviour, usually a violation of sexual norms. low by international standards, and majoritiesThese norms are contained in the images and in all countries in which the Citizen Securitymessages that society perpetuates and that Survey 2010 was conducted felt secure. Thiswomen and men receive during socialization. is true of both men and women. This senseThe norms provide legitimacy and social sup- of security is greatest where the level of con-port for the victimizers. Indeed, the fact that fidence in the institutions of law enforcementnearly half the respondents said members of and justice is highest.their community would disregard the norms New types of crimes have emergedand intervene in a domestic violence situation that may not now be prevalent, but that pro-is an important finding of the study. foundly affect the most vulnerable groups in Caribbean societies. Trafficking in persons isConclusion an example of this, especially if children are victimized. These crimes should receive great-The security situation in the Caribbean has er attention, and greater capacities should bechanged. In several countries, the rate of vio- developed to prevent them and to supportlent crime has escalated and has become high the victims.relative to rates in other regions of the world. Citizen security, human development and hu-The region has become more violent. This is man rights are interdependent. The transitionthe main challenge facing Caribbean coun- to a more secure environment will necessitatetries. The rate, level of intensity, and primary change to ensure more well integrated socie-form of violence, however, vary from country ties, the social, economic and political empow-to country. In those countries with the high- erment of excluded and vulnerable groups toest rates of violence, organized crime and counter the decades of deprivation caused bygang violence present the greatest challenge. poverty, social, cultural, political and institu-In others, gender-based violence is the main tional practices, respect for human rights, andconcern. Regardless of the primary forms, all more effective and responsive institutions.countries should be encouraged to improve C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 41
  • 56. 2CHAPTER Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience
  • 57. Don’t just react – pre-empt,prevent and protectSow the seeds of security –invest in youth developmentToday’s empowered youth aretomorrow’s responsible citizens
  • 58. 2CHAPTER Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience 2 Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience Introduction motion of human development in the region. In support of this argument, the chapter uses Youth violence has become an important de- primary and secondary data sources, includ- velopment challenge worldwide. Declining ing the results of the UNDP Citizen Security social and economic development conditions Survey 2010 conducted specifically for the have increased the risk that youth will become report, to discuss the phenomenon of youth violent offenders and victims of violence.1 In- violence. Although the chapter focuses pri- creased youth involvement in violence has marily on violence among 15–24-year-olds, contributed to popular perceptions of grow- the survey did not capture the views and be- ing insecurity in the Caribbean. At the same haviour of Caribbean citizens under 18 years time, the experiences of and involvement in of age. In this regard, all references to youth crime and violence among Caribbean youth responses in the survey provide the perspec- have become linked to other developmental tives and experiences of a smaller sample of issues, including high levels of youth unem- youth between the ages of 18 and 24 years. ployment, poor educational opportunities, Against this background, the next section un- and feelings of voicelessness and exclusion dertakes an overview of the current state of from national and regional governance pro- affairs with regard to youth violence and its cesses. In this context, youth violence is more impact on Caribbean human development. than a security concern. It is a major human The following section analyses the risk and development problem. The feelings of inse- vulnerability factors that predispose and ex- curity among Caribbean citizens on account pose youth to violence. The subsequent sec- of youth violence have stemmed from inad- tion explores the available approaches to risk equate attention to youth development and reduction and resilience-building that are youth empowerment, which has increased aimed at preventing youth violence. The final the risk of youth offences and victimization. section concludes the discussion by proposing In recognition of the public significance of the policy recommendations to prevent youth vi- issue, this chapter analyses the relationship be- olence by reducing risk and enhancing youth tween youth violence and human development resilience. in the Caribbean. In keeping with the overall view of the Caribbean Human Development Youth Violence and Caribbean Report that youth development and youth Human Development empowerment are important parts of the citi- zen security response, the chapter argues that The prominence of youth violence as a Carib- investments in reducing the risk factors associ- bean developmental concern is not surprising ated with violent offending and victimization, given the fact that 64 percent of the popula- coupled with strategies for boosting youth re- tion of the Caribbean Community (CARI- silience, can optimally reduce or even reverse COM) consists of young people under 30 the negative impact of youth violence on Car- years of age, while 30 percent of the popula- ibbean human development. In other words, tion is between 18 and 30 years of age.2 Even reducing risk factors and enhancing the resil- the specific youth category of 15–24-year- ience of Caribbean youth are imperative for olds represents significant proportions the prevention of youth violence and the pro- (around one fifth) of national populations of C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 45
  • 59. Table 2.1. Youth Population, Youth Involvement in Violent Crime2 by Country, Caribbean-7, 2004 Youth crime and violence in the Carib- percent bean have been characterized as a phenom-Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience enon pitting youth against youth and male Country Youth population against male and have been closely linked to the emergence of criminal gangs, a feature Antigua & 14.9 discussed more fully in chapter 3. Notwith- Barbuda standing the youth-on-youth profile of youth Barbados 18 .0 crime, youth who use violence are a minority of the youth population. Guyana 21.3 The country studies and the findings of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 Jamaica 18.7 highlight that, while young people are in- volved in serious crimes, most of the activities Saint Lucia 20.3 they undertake that violate the law or social norms are not serious or violent. Nonetheless, Suriname 18.6 it is also likely that episodes of youth violence may be underreported for a variety of reasons. Trinidad & 20.7 These include community tolerance and ac- Tobago ceptance of some non-criminal violent be- Source: World Bank (2011a). haviour, a desire to keep youth out of criminal Note: Youth are individuals 15–24 years of age. justice systems, and a lack of confidence that authorities will respond if crimes are reported. the countries selected as research sites for this It is also true that crime data hide other forms report (the Caribbean-7) (see table 2.1). of delinquent behaviour. However, there is Thus, there is a logical expectation that gains sufficient evidence in the country studies and in Caribbean human development will depend the survey to suggest that violent behaviour heavily on the well-being and contribution of is not prevalent or endemic among the youth the youth population. At the same time, any populations of the region. In the context of increase in violence among youth, however overall youth behaviour in the Caribbean, re- marginal, will have a significant impact on so- liance on violence is uncommon. ciety, including increased fear and insecurity In fact, most youth who come into contact among youth and other citizens. The preven- with the police and the justice system are not tion of youth violence is therefore an impera- involved in violent crimes, but have run away tive for human development. from home or are associated with behaviour Caribbean governments have pledged indicating a desperate need for care and pro- their commitment to preventing youth vio- tection following abuse, neglect, or abandon- lence through the World Plan of Action ment. Such ‘status offences’, which are not for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond.3 considered criminal if they are committed by However, the increase in reported youth adults, often bring children and youth into violence suggests that policy, planning and conflict with the law. In Jamaica, 52 percent programme responses to the problem have of the female juveniles who appeared in court failed to address adequately the fundamental in 2007 were found to be in need of care and social and economic development issues that protection. Only 23 percent of the male ju- have predisposed youth to violence. Against veniles who appeared in court fell into the this background, the following subsections same category. Although comparable data are outline, first, the current status of youth vio- not immediately available for the other six lence and victimization in the Caribbean and, countries of the Caribbean-7, national-level second, the impact of youth violence and vic- research suggests there is a similar gender timization on regional development. pattern in court appearances by juveniles for 46 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 60. Table 2.2. Youth Self-Reported Criminal Accusations and Arrests, Caribbean-7,2010 2percent Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience Country Violent Violent Property Ganja Other Other No Not crime crime crime use drug answer applicable with without use weapon weapon Antigua & 0.9 0.5 2.3 2.3 0.0 4.6 6.5 82.9 Barbuda Barbados 4.0 1.3 0.0 7.3 0.7 1.3 0.0 85.3 Guyana 1.4 4.2 1.1 2.0 0.0 2.8 0.6 87.9 Jamaica 0.0 1.9 0.6 3.8 0.0 1.3 1.6 90.9 Saint 2.7 4.3 1.1 3.7 0.0 2.1 2.7 83.4 Lucia Suriname 0.5 1.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 4.6 3.6 86.6 Trinidad 3.0 2.6 1.3 1.3 0.0 2.6 0.4 88.9 & TobagoSource: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.Note: Base: Respondents aged 18 to 24 years (N = 1,653). Question: “Have you ever been arrested by the police? If yes, for which ofthe following: 1. A violent crime involving the use of a weapon (blunt instruments excluded), 2. A violent crime not involving the useof a weapon, 3. A property crime, 4. Ganja use, 5. Use of other drugs, 6. Other.” The table shows the percentage of the respondentsanswering positively in each case.non-violent offences. Meanwhile, young men been accused or arrested for violent crimes wasare more likely than young women to be in low (0 percent with weapons, and 1.9 percentconflict with the law for violent offences. without). It should be noted, though, that, in In the context of the survey, only 1.6 per- absolute terms, the actual number of cases in allcent of youth between 18 and 24 years of age countries was small.had been accused or arrested for violent crimes Six key patterns associated with the in-involving the use of weapons, and only 2.5 per- cidence of youth violence were observedcent for violent crimes without weapons. The through the UNDP Citizen Security Surveyvariations across countries are highlighted in 2010. We now list these.table 2.2. The variations across countries are First, youth violence has a gender dimen-highlighted in table 2.2. The highest propor- sion. Across the region, the majority of ag-tions of reported youth violence occurred in gressors and victims are young men who useSaint Lucia (2.7 percent with weapons and 4.3 violence for protection against threats—realwithout), followed by Guyana (1.4 percent with or perceived—or who have been socializedweapons and 4.2 percent without), Trinidad into a male-dominated tradition of conflictand Tobago (3 percent with weapons, and 2.6 resolution through violence. At the same time,percent without) and Barbados (4 percent with young women are victims of verbal and physi-weapons, and 1.3 percent without), despite the cal violence, particularly in the interpersonalcountry´s reputation for low levels of violent and domestic spheres. Relative to men, almostcrime. Notwithstanding Jamaica’s regional and twice the proportion of women reported beinginternational reputation for relatively high levels threatened by spouses, partners, or ex-partnersof violence, the proportion of Jamaican youth (14 percent of young women compared withsurvey respondents who reported they had 7.5 percent of young men). This reinforces the C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 47
  • 61. “We feel more secure point that young men are predominantly the of victimization has contributed to the for-2 when we form gangs in violent aggressors among Caribbean youth. In mation of delinquent groups and gangs in addition, the majority of youth reporting fear schools, as students seek to defend themselvesYouth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience the schools; each member of sexual assault are young women. Young fe- from community violence that permeates the looks out for each other.” male respondents were over three times more educational environment.8 Gang formation is —Focus group, CARICOM likely to be fearful of sexual assault (37.7 per- most likely to occur at the secondary school cent of all young women surveyed compared level. Young people usually represent gang for- Commission on Youth with 11 percent of all young men surveyed). mation as a security response to the context of Development Second, violence among pre-adolescents is a the community, a way to protect themselves growing concern among citizens. Although rare, from students and others in the surrounding primary school children as young as 11 years community who prey on them because of on- of age have begun using violence at home or going gang conflict. School gangs are gener- at school. These early manifestations are con- ally represented as defensive even if they share tinued into adolescence and youth. (The po- some characteristics with street gangs. They tential for family and school environments to are not simply peer groups. Boys are more contribute to early violent behaviour is dis- likely to be involved in school gangs. cussed in the section on risk and vulnerability.) Fifth, youth violence is closely associated The gender dimension is apparent among the with community violence. The use of violence youngest offenders: mostly boys use violence, has often emerged from exposure to vari- although the incidence of female aggression ous forms of neighbourhood or community also appears to be increasing. Younger boys violence directly as a victim or indirectly as a tend to commit less serious offences than older witness.9 Over 7 percent of youth frequently boys, but at greater frequency.4 experience community violence. These expe- Third, school violence has escalated. Conse- riences and the subsequent use of violence are quent on the emergence of younger offenders, also linked to feelings of fear among youth. In violence in schools appears to have increased.5 their communities, Caribbean youth worry The reported cases of apparent escalation in about child abuse, rape, robbery, guns and youth violence have largely emerged from me- shoot-outs, police abuse, unemployment, dia debates given the fact that adequate data drugs, and lack of road safety. The UNDP on the phenomenon are not readily available Citizen Security Survey 2010 found that in the region. However, where school vio- almost half of youth (46.8 percent) express lence has been observed, there have been sug- fearfulness about the possibility of becom- gestions that the acts of violence have become ing a victim of a crime. Among these, many more brutal. There have been a few reported are worried all the time, most of the time, or cases of the use of guns in Guyana, Jamaica, sometimes about becoming victims of vio- and Trinidad and Tobago. Student sexual vio- lent crimes, including through murder (48.7 lence against other students has also been re- percent), the murder of a relative (24.4 per- ported across the region and was highlighted cent), assault by a spouse or other person as a special concern in Suriname.6 The resort (44.8 percent), robbery at gunpoint (28.2 to violence at school has been expressed as percent), or sexual assault (24.4 percent). “I hope to be alive given a function of the need for self-defence, self- They often experience psychological trauma all that is happening. The protection, or peer protection and, in rarer and grief, including fear, anxiety, aggression, crime and violence situ- instances, also for image profiling and to in- depression and physical trauma such as aches timidate others. It is believed that youth who and pains and racing heartbeat as a result of ation makes death in five have experienced verbal and physical abuse at exposure to community violence.10 This sug- years an imminent reality.” home often transfer this behaviour to school gests that youth may conceptualize their con- —Focus group, CARICOM through physical and psychological bullying cerns about violence in a different way other of classmates and teachers.7 than ‘insecurity’, but that their concerns with Commission on Youth Fourth, youth violence is often a response to personal safety are not unlike those of other Development the threat and fear of victimization. The fear members of society. 48 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 62. Sixth, youth victimization by peers and The Impact of Youth Violence onadults creates an environment for more violence. Caribbean Human Development 2Among youth respondents to the UNDP Cit- Notwithstanding its exceptional nature, youth Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilienceizen Security Survey 2010, 19.4 percent had violence poses a challenge for human develop-been victims of a crime within the last 10 years ment. Indeed, displays of violence among youth(table 2.3). The survey validates the assump- create a risk that patterns of persistent violenttions in the literature that much crime is peer- behaviour will emerge and, once entrenched, af-on-peer in that 28.6 percent of the youth who fect the future of society. The sheer number ofsaid they had been assaulted reported that the youth in the region has meant that youth crimeassaults were committed by acquaintances or and violence have already had several negativefriends, which can reasonably be assumed to influences on all sectors of society.14 The directbe peers. Meanwhile, adult abusers included monetary costs to governments and citizens ofpolice, teachers, and parents and guardians.11 corrective measures include budgetary expendi-Relative to the level of the fear of violence, ture on security, policing, judicial processing,the actual incidence of violent victimization is and incarceration, in addition to private securitylimited. While 9 percent of respondents had expenditure by businesses and individuals. Thebeen victims of crimes in 2009, only 3 percent indirect monetary and economic costs includehad been victims of violent crimes. Sexual as- loss of earnings of incarcerated youth, loss of lifesault affected 2.9 percent of all the respond- among young productive citizens, lower eco-ents; over half of these were female victims. nomic growth and reduced tourism revenues.The fear of victimization, however, resulted In a situation analysis for the CARICOMin changes in behaviour, which included self- Commission on Youth Development, Chaabanimposed curfews and decreased participation (2009, 15) highlights some of the economicin community activities.12 This fear also led to costs, as follows (see also table 2.4):increased use of weapons in and out of school. “Overall, youth crime is costing CARICOMThe survey indicates that as many as 359 countries . . . between 2.8% and 4% of GDP an-youth (21.7 percent of the youth surveyed) nually, in terms of direct expenditure on fight-carried weapons at night, 269 (16.2 percent) ing crimes and in lost revenues due to youth in-carried weapons during the day, and 538 (32.5 carceration and declines in tourism revenues.percent) kept weapons at home. Youth vio- . . . With the highest numbers of youth con-lence has therefore constrained youth choices, victed, Jamaica incurs more than 529 millionfreedom and opportunity, while creating an USD every year as direct public and privateenvironment conducive to more violence. The costs linked to fighting youth crime. Youthfear of victimization has left some youth feel- who are incarcerated in Saint Lucia every yearing hopeless about their prospects for long and could have contributed to increasing the coun-happy lives.13 try’s income by 1.9 million USD each year. InTable 2.3. Youth Victimization, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010percent Gender Once Twice Three times or Not applicable more Males 9.1 5.9 5.8 79.2 Females 9.7 3.8 4.3 82.0Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.Note: Base: respondents aged 18 to 24 years (N = 1,653). Question: “Within the last 10 years, how many times have you beena victim of a crime?” The table shows the percentage of respondents. C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 49
  • 63. Table 2.4. The Annual Cost of Youth Crime in Four Caribbean Countries2Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience Country Year Youth Direct Forgone Forgone Opportunity Total cost, Total 15–24 costs, earnings, tourism costs, US$ US$ cost, % convicted, US$ US$ revenue, GDP total US$ Guyana 2002 425 68,717,820 289,678 1,665,000 1,954,678 70,672,498 2.79 Jamaica 2005 1,959 529,098,000 4,262,815 91,125,000 95,387,815 624,485,815 3.21 Saint 2005 663 43,485,580 1,935,977 17,100,000 19,035,977 62,521,557 4.01 Lucia Trinidad 2005 786 616,983,450 2,792,403 35,415,000 38,207,403 655,190,853 2.88 & Tobago Source: Based on data in Chaaban (2009). Note: US$ figures are in purchasing power parity dollars. Trinidad and Tobago, decreasing youth crimes recognized internationally by the United Na- by 1% could increase tourism revenues by tions in the context of monitoring the imple- nearly 35 million USD yearly.” mentation of the World Programme of Ac- Linked with estimates of the costs of tion for Youth.16 In other areas of the world, low educational achievement and poor progress has been made towards analysing health status among youth, these fig- these relationships through the correlation of ures represent a good contribution to our a youth development index and the Human understanding of the youth crime and vio- Development Index.17 However, to date, no lence–human development nexus. However, Caribbean country has formulated a youth de- the estimates do not account for the non- velopment index. Such an instrument would monetary costs of youth violence. Thus, there certainly enhance the regional capacity to are certainly social costs of youth violence, in- measure the contribution of advances in youth cluding physical and psychological pain, suf- development to national and regional develop- fering and trauma, the erosion of social capital, ment, including reductions in youth crime and the intergenerational transmission of vio- violence. The lack of national and regional data lence, and lower quality of life.15 There are also management frameworks to support evidence- political costs associated with the labelling, based planning and programmes for youth is marginalization and exclusion of at-risk or addressed elsewhere below in our discussion problem youth from participation in govern- on approaches to building resilience. We turn ance, the economy and society. The general attention at this point to an examination of the labelling of youth holds potential for encour- contextual factors that have contributed to the aging negative stereotyping, which can be patterns of youth violence and victimization internalized by youth, causing frustration and outlined above. fuelling aggressive behaviour. There is still a lack of appropriate data in the Risk and Vulnerability: “Youth are assets in the Caribbean to permit rigorous analysis of the Explaining the Patterns of Youth Violence relationships among youth development, hu- development process but man development, and youth violence and An explanation of the patterns of youth vio- remain vulnerable to risk.” delinquency. The need for these data has been lence and its impact on human development 50 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 64. requires a discussion of the factors that give development context to predispose youth torise to the violence in light of the considera- violent behaviour and expose youth to victimi- 2tion that youth are inherently vulnerable as- zation. Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resiliencesets in the development process. Youth at risk are described as those young Although Caribbean youth aspire to lead people who “face environmental, social andhonourable and productive lives and to experi- family conditions that may hinder their per-ence a good standard of living, they are vulner- sonal development and successful integrationable to several factors that erode their capac- into society as productive citizens.”19 Youthity to achieve their personal, professional and become vulnerable if they are exposed to thesesocial goals and predispose them to significant hindrances, which are multidimensional andrisk of becoming perpetrators or victims of acts emerge from various levels of the social expe-of violence.18 This section discusses the prin- rience of the youth population. In the Carib-cipal factors that emerge from the Caribbean bean, some of the most vulnerable youth are living on the streets, in group homes or correc- tional facilities, or they are living on their ownTable 2.5. Risk Antecedents and Risk because they have been orphaned, neglected, orMarkers of Youth Violence in the Carib- left unsupervised by parents who have migrat-bean Region ed or been incarcerated. These young people are among those individuals likely to become Category Risk antecedents and involved in criminal or violent offending. risk markers In general, the risks that may increase the likelihood of youth involvement in violence Societal Limited socio-eco- may be grouped in three main categories: so- nomic opportunities cietal; community, including interpersonal; Increased criminal and individual. The factors are often inter- activity and access to related in a complex web of risk and vulner- drugs and firearms ability. They may include unemployment, Tolerance of violence societal or community tolerance of violence, illegal drug use and trafficking, gang activity, Community, Community and gang disconnection from or poor attitudes towards interpersonal volatility school and low educational attainment, and Exploitation and abuse lack of effective and caring parenting.20 It is by adults in the home useful to have a framework for identifying and at school risk and vulnerability by, for example, looking Loss of social cohesion out for risk antecedents and risk markers that, because of distrust and if addressed early in a young person’s life cycle, lack of support among could prevent later manifestations of high-risk neighbours behaviours and negative outcomes. Risk an- tecedents include environmental conditions Individual Poor health status, such as poverty, neighbourhood environment early sexual initiation, and family dysfunction. Risk markers include drug abuse and mental behaviours such as poor school performance. health problems Some researchers use these antecedents and Inherent youthful de- markers to predict youth violence. However, sire to take risks with we use the terms here without claim to mak- personal security and ing predictions. Rather, we argue that various safety combinations of risk antecedents and mark- ers may contribute to youth violence. TableSource: Adapted from Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999). 2.5 summarizes the principal risk antecedents and risk markers in the Caribbean context C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 51
  • 65. that have potential to contribute to high-risk high levels of unemployment, particularly2 youth behaviour involving violence. They are among youth. Taking a telescopic view, one discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. may see that criminal activity has increased,Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience including narco-trafficking and the drug Societal Risks trade, while firearms have become more ac- Caribbean society presents significant risk to cessible to young people. In addition, society young people. The socio-economic develop- has sent subtle signals of tolerance and even ment context is challenging and marked by respect for violence through the political and community systems of governance. The three risk antecedents are as follows: Chart 2.1 The Main First, limited socio-economic opportunities Problem in are a push factor for violence. Unemployment the Country in and the high cost of living are not in them- the View of All selves predictors of ordinary criminal vio- Respondents, lence.21 Yet, they are constituents of a socio- Caribbean-7, economic context that increases vulnerability 2010 and the risk of violence. The youth respond- ents to the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 were concerned about four main socio- 27.7 30 economic issues: unemployment (27.7 per- cent), violent crime (20.0 percent), the cost 25.0 25 of food (13.2 percent), and the cost of living 20.3 (10.5 percent) (chart 2.1; table 2.6). 20.0 20 Unemployment is the number one prob- lem according to youth in five of the Caribbe- Percent 13.5 13.2 15 an-7; in Saint Lucia and in Trinidad and To- 12.7 10.5 bago, violent crime was the top concern of the 10 majority of youth respondents to the survey. In the Caribbean countries in 2004, the youth 5 unemployment rate (among 15–24-year- olds) was higher than the overall unemploy- 0 ment rate: 34.0 percent in Jamaica; 25.4 per- cent in Trinidad and Tobago; 44.0 percent in Cost of Living Violent crime Cost of food Unemployment Saint Lucia; and 21.8 percent in Barbados.22 Among the youth surveyed, 8.6 percent were unskilled labourers, while 18.8 percent had never been employed. Over 20 percent of the youth surveyed indicated that they did not 18-24 years old Total sample have enough income to live comfortably or to cover basic needs. The emotional frustration Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. arising from the social exclusion associated Note: Base: respondents aged 18 to 24 years (N = 1,653) with unemployment or low income has been and total survey sample (N = 11,155). Question: “From the list of problems mentioned above [listed hereafter], which linked to aggression among youth and may three are the most serious in your country?” The list of pro- blems: a. Level of unemployment, b. Inadequate housing, motivate violent crimes such as homicide.23 c. Inadequate schooling for children, d. Cost of food, e. Low levels of educational achievement Level of property crime, f. Level of violent crime, g. Level of insecurity, h. Cost of living, i. Level of poverty, j. Level of have also been identified as a socio-economic corruption, k. Level of migration, l. Inadequate sanitation, risk factor for the involvement in violence.24 m. Inadequate access to health care, n. Inadequate voice in governmental affairs. The chart shows the percentage Access to education at the primary level is of respondents who chose the problem either as their first, second, or third option as the most serious problem. close to universal in the Caribbean, and young people have good access to education at high- 52 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 66. Table 2.6. The Main Problem in the Country in the View of Youth, Caribbean-7,2010 2 Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience Country Main Second Third problem (N = 1653) problem (N = 1543) problem (N = 1523) Problem % Problem % Problem % Antigua & Unemployment 30 Cost of living 26 Corruption 16 Barbuda Barbados Unemployment 28 Cost of food 25 Cost of living 21 Guyana Unemployment 27 Cost of living 19 Poverty 10 Jamaica Unemployment 41 Cost of living 22 Corruption 17 Saint Lucia Violent crime 38 Unemployment 20 Cost of living 18 Suriname Unemployment 22 Corruption 13 Cost of living 11 Trinidad & Violent crime 39 Cost of living 19 Cost of food 14 TobagoSource: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.Note: Base: respondents 18 to 24 years old (N = 1,653). Question: “From the list of problems mentioned above [listed hereafter], whichthree are the most serious in your country?” The list of problems: a. Level of unemployment, b. Inadequate housing, c. Inadequateschooling for children, d. Cost of food, e. Level of property crime, f. Level of violent crime, g. Level of insecurity, h. Cost of living, i. Le-vel of poverty, j. Level of corruption, k. Level of migration, l. Inadequate sanitation, m. Inadequate access to health care, n. Inadequatevoice in governmental affairs. The chart shows the percentage of respondents who chose the problem either as their first, second, orthird option as the most serious levels. However, concerns remain about the cent for English). These outcomes are wor-increasing rates of school drop-outs and de- risome given the acknowledged correlationclining levels of educational attainment, par- between declining educational achievementticularly among boys. Data of the Caribbean and increasing levels of violence in society.27Examinations Council show that overall pass Departure from school without the requisiterates in the basic subjects of mathematics and skills and abilities increases the likelihood ofEnglish at the secondary school level have de- youth exposure to and experience of otherclined and declined more significantly among risk factors, including higher levels of unem-boys.25 On average between 1997 and 2009, ployment, teen pregnancy, risky sexual activ-the pass rate in mathematics fell by over 8.0 ity and substance abuse, which contributepercent among boys and by about 2.5 percent to other problem behaviours among youth.among girls, even though boys had higher The early departure of boys from school cer-pass rates.26 Over the same period, in English, tainly contributes to the male-on-male char-the pass rates declined by over 13.0 percent acter of violence in the Caribbean. On theamong boys and by 12.5 percent among girls one hand, school drop-out rates suggest that(girls had the higher pass rates). Overall, the educational institutions do not meet studentaverage pass rates among boys and girls in expectations. On the other hand, it is impor-2009 were low in both subjects (around 35 tant to acknowledge other factors that maypercent for mathematics and around 55 per- impinge on the capacity of students to con- C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 53
  • 67. tinue schooling. The lack of financial support munity environment include exposure to com-2 for studies, school closures due to violence, munity and gang volatility, exploitation and and inability to concentrate because of envi- abuse by adults, and loss of social cohesion.Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience ronmental conditions, including community Exposure to community volatility has a nega- violence, may all contribute to students drop- tive impact on youth development. The majority ping out, making them even more vulnerable of youth respondents to the UNDP Citizen to recruitment into violent activity. Security Survey 2010 live in neighbourhoods Second, access to drugs and firearms makes that are free of gang violence (67.7 percent); crime an alternative for youth. Because of the therefore, fewer youth thought that criminal lack of legitimate socio-economic opportuni- gangs were a big problem in their communi- ties, young people are vulnerable to recruit- ties. However, a significant proportion had ment into a vibrant illegitimate economy experienced some gang violence through the fuelled by gangs, including those involved presence of a criminal gang based in their in the drug trade. Through these channels, communities. Over 20 percent of youth re- youth gain access to firearms, which creep spondents were living in neighbourhoods in into the school environment. which murders had been committed in 2010; Third, the tolerance and acceptance of vio- 29.1 percent where shootings had occurred; lent crime influence the perspectives of youth. 16.4 percent, rapes; 44.2 percent, fights in the The acceptance of violence, particularly streets; and 16.1 percent, gang violence; while non-criminalized social forms of violence, 29.7 percent had witnessed community mem- has been a worrying trend, particularly in Ja- bers threaten other community members. The maica and in Trinidad and Tobago. In these highest proportion of youth who indicated contexts, youth model the behaviours of in- they had experienced significant levels of gang fluential others in their homes, at school, in violence was in Saint Lucia, though, in Jamaica their communities and in different spheres of and in Trinidad and Tobago, there is a wider national life. National figures in music and perception of gang problems. The lowest pro- politics, among other fields of activity, have portion was found in Barbados. The theme of signalled to young people that some forms of disturbance by gun violence and gang warfare violence may be acceptable and, in some in- was prevalent among the focus groups con- stances, may be worthy of respect. The highly ducted by the CARICOM Commission on visible role of violent criminals in the politics Youth Development. Recurring community of some countries provides the evidential shootouts disturbed school work, homework support for this claim. This reinforces illegiti- and sleep, raised fears of personal injury and mate structures (such as gangs) and reduces death, or family injury and death, and in- youth confidence in legitimate structures of creased the concern about freedom to move political representation. Young people may around the community, especially after dark.28 lose faith in formal governance processes and We note above in our discussion of the status seek to create subcultural systems of partici- of youth violence that gang and community pation through gangs, which become viable conflicts often spill over into the school envi- alternatives to legitimate employment. The ronment, as youth take up arms out of a sense value of legitimate structures and agents of of a need for protection. In the focus groups, socialization and their influence on youth be- youth lamented that “a lot of good, decent in- haviour are diminished. Although this con- nocent youth get killed; violence is no good to text of tolerance for violence is not general our communities.” to the region, it is plausible that intraregional Exploitation and abuse by adults have been cultural transfers through media and music linked to youth violence. There is no consensus may influence youth in other countries. among researchers that abuse by adults is a firm predictor of youth violence.29 However, Community and Interpersonal Risks there have been suggestions that youth may Risk antecedents that are manifest in the com- model the behaviours of their aggressors and 54 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 68. mimic the acts of violence they witness or ex- been injured by partners; 10.8 percent hadperience, and the pain and frustration they been threatened by partners; and 21.4 per- 2feel that arises from the victimization may cent had been sworn at or insulted by part- Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilienceevolve into aggression and rage.30 Further- ners. By country, only in Jamaica and in Trini-more, victims of abuse in the home, particu- dad and Tobago did fewer than 10 percent oflarly victims of sexual abuse, often run away the sample report themselves as victims (6.8from home and end up living on the streets. percent and 9.8 percent, respectively), whileStreet youth are at increased risk of resort- Saint Lucia had the highest proportion, ating to criminal activities, which may involve 51.2 percent; Guyana, at 43.3 percent; Suri-violence.31 Abuse by adults may be most nega- name, at 19.1 percent; Antigua and Barbuda,tively influential if it is meted out by a par- at 18.7 percent; and Barbados at 15.7 percent.ent. Several studies have highlighted the sig- The highest shares of respondents who re-nificant impact of parental relationships on ported experiencing domestic violence manyyouth behaviour, particularly in school and times—4.1 percent—were in Suriname andother institutional settings. Positive parental in Antigua and Barbuda.relationships characterized by care, discipline Despite the potential significance of vio-and encouragement are likely to promote lence in the household, others argue that itpositive youth behaviours. Negative parental is from their interactions outside the home,relationships characterized by neglect, abuse particularly among peers, that youth learnand violence are likely to lead to negative be- and adopt particular behaviours.33 Additionalhaviours.32 sources of abuse may emerge in school set- However, our survey data show that, of tings. For example, the use of corporal pun-the youth respondents who had been victims ishment in schools, which remains legal inof domestic violence (n = 238), only 4.1 per- Caribbean countries, has also been linked tocent had been charged with crimes. Further- youth violence. It has been suggested that “be-more, among the 73 youth who had ever been cause students were beaten but rarely praisedcharged with crimes, only 10 reported having or received kind words from their teachers,ever been victims of violence in the house- corporal punishment served mainly to alien-hold. These findings cast additional doubt on ate and cause resentment among students.”34the relationship between offending and vic- Although guidelines have been establishedtimization through abuse. Domestic violence for corporal punishment in many countries tomay not directly predispose youth to violence mitigate the potential for severe abuse, youthin other settings; however, if combined with may still experience other forms of abuse byother factors, violence may ensue in a variety teachers, usually of a verbal and psychologicalof contexts. In the meantime, we note that nature, which is more difficult to regulate.domestic violence, particularly sexual abuse Loss of social cohesion in communities sig-(which was not specifically probed in the nificantly affects the ability of youth to live pro-survey), may be underreported, particularly ductive lives. Certainly, many of the aforemen-among males. In addition, the survey’s focus tioned risk factors contribute to breakdownson criminal forms of violence may have hid- in social cohesion. In the context of periodsden other forms of social violence that may of socio-economic decline, people lose jobsbecome manifest as a result of abuse. Against and have limited access to educational andthis background, youth are under threat of health services, and the capacity of commu-abuse from several quarters: in the commu- nity members to support one another declines.nity (abduction and rape), at school (verbal This decline may lead to conflict and violence.and physical abuse) and in their homes (child At the same time, youth violence in itself mayabuse and domestic violence). Over 14 per- erode social capital by creating conditions thatcent of the respondents had been victims of are even more unsuitable for job creation anddomestic violence many times, a few times, the provision of services. Youth violence mayor on one occasion. Of these, 8.6 percent had also reduce the level of trust and cooperation C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 55
  • 69. “Living is a big risk in our among community members.35 This loss of their environment, the young people admit-2 society.” “It is easy to die social cohesion because of inadequate sociali- ted taking personal risks to their health, safety zation by parents and schools leads to social and security.Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience but hard to live.” exclusion among youth. Madden (2011) has Risks to sexual, mental and physical health —CARICOM (2009) argued that, if young males have no meaning- include promiscuity, unprotected sex, skin ful social status or ties (whether at home or bleaching (mostly in Jamaica) and substance in the community), they are more prone to abuse (including alcohol abuse). Youth health gang recruitment. One may therefore assume insecurity and health risk-taking have been as- a strong correlation among the strengthening sociated with exposure to new and potentially of social capital, increased youth participation, more deadly risks, including violence. Vio- inclusion in community activities, and the pre- lence against self in the form of attempts at vention of youth violence. Indeed, advocates suicide has been a subject of growing concern have called for a focus on youth populations as in the region and has been linked to commu- a whole rather than on problem youth.36 En- nity and interpersonal risk factors associated couraging youth from a variety of backgrounds with violence. For example, youth who have to work together helps build social capital. admitted that they have attempted suicide have often been victims of physical or sexual Individual Risks abuse, have had relatives who attempted sui- At the individual level, the choice to pursue cide, and have expressed feelings of rage con- the use of violence is often affected by peer in- nected to these experiences. Such histories of fluence, low self-esteem and employment sta- violence may fuel aggression against others tus. The CARICOM Commission on Youth and violence against oneself. Development engaged youth between 15 and In the Caribbean, the two principal con- 29 years of age in discussions on the mean- cerns in relation to the risk that youth will ing of risk and vulnerability in their own real- use violence against others have been related ity. Youth conceptualized risk as potentially to early sexual initiation and substance abuse. both positive and negative. Some responses Early sexual initiation has been a worrying fea- of youth are highlighted here that reflect this ture of Caribbean youth development. The age duality in the concept.37 of first sex is among the lowest in the world: On the one hand, risk was viewed in the as early as 12.5 years of age among males.39 In context of relative life-or-death situations. 2007, two thirds of youth who had reported On the other hand, risk-taking was viewed as they had had sex claimed to have done so be- a necessary part of a young person’s life that fore the age of 13 years.40 Early sex has put could lead to the achievement of personal young people at greater risk and made them goals. The negativity of risk seemed to over- more vulnerable to exposure to HIV and other whelm the potential for positive outcomes. sexually transmitted diseases, as well as teenage Risk-taking appeared to be more about sur- and unexpected pregnancy, which constrain vival and fitting in than about achievement. socio-economic potential. These outcomes The reasons for negative risk-taking included often lead to interpersonal conflict between the following:38 partners and to depression, frustration and ag- • Desire to belong to a group and to be cool, gression. The early sexual initiation of girls in popular, a trendsetter or an admired rebel some communities in Jamaica is also associated • Yielding to peer pressure with the use of coercion and appears to be re- • As a means to obtain money from older lated to the socialization of girls into depend- people who influence them ent relationships with men.41 Evidence shows • For mere survival or to better themselves that early sexual initiation is linked with child • To create a new space for self-expression abuse in many Caribbean countries.42 and to distinguish themselves from others Substance abuse is the second most wide- • To add excitement to their lives ly recognized risk in terms of youth violence In addition to battling the risks that arise in and has also been linked to early sexual ini- 56 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 70. tiation. Blum et al. (2003) find that 60 per- Reducing Risk and Vulnerability “Youth have to run riskscent of sexually active boys indicated they The concern about increasing levels of youth to achieve things, youth 2were using marijuana. Alcohol use is most violence has led to the mobilization of sup- Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience risk their lives to eat food,closely associated with increased aggression port and resources for many youth develop-and violence.43 ment programmes at various levels across the they have to leave from The context of youth risk and vulnerabil- region. These programmes are mounted by a one point to another andity is complex, but an understanding of these variety of actors, including governments, civil during this process youthfactors provides the foundation upon which society organizations, the private sector, com-effective approaches to preventing violence munity associations and faith-based organiza- end up getting killed.”may be built as a priority in human develop- tions. It is perhaps too early in many cases to “Youth hardly considerment. assess fully the success of various programmes risk: it’s something they implemented in the Caribbean, especially giv-Reducing Risk and en the lack of data.44 Nonetheless, the follow- don’t want to hear aboutEnhancing Resilience ing six themes are presented as the founda- because they view it as tions of good practice. However, stakeholderGiven the significance of youth in the Carib- being scolded for doing preparedness to engage with these principlesbean region, there is a need to develop effec- is likely to be hampered by the limited re- something wrong.”tive approaches to preventing youth violence. gional capacity for systematic data collection —CARICOM (2009)An understanding of the challenge of youth on youth to support evidence-based planningviolence in the Caribbean should lead to ac- and programme design.ceptance of the fact that strategies for reduc- First, the contextualization of programmes foring youth violence must tackle the context in violence prevention among youth as aspects ofwhich violence arises, while carving out a space a broader project of societal development is im-for youth to be equipped to take responsibility perative. Programmes must address communityfor resisting the recourse to violence. The pre- risk factors, as well as the national and regionalvention of youth violence therefore requires contexts for development, including unemploy-a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, ment, political corruption, gang violence andthere is a need to address the fundamental organized crime, government inefficiency, andstructural issues that predispose youth to act the low penetration of public services.violently and make them susceptible to vic- Second, the principle of inclusivity shouldtimization. This will require a reduction in the be applied in age- and gender-targeted in-societal and community or interpersonal risk terventions. Initiatives need to be tailored tofactors highlighted above. On the other hand, different stages of the life cycle by integratingthere is a need to equip youth with enhanced all levels and involving all categories of youth,agency so as to prevent and reverse trends to- including youth who are at risk, good youth,wards crime and violence in communities by offenders, and school drop-outs. Everyonebuilding youth resilience. Certainly, the reduc- deserves a second chance, and good youthtion of risk factors is also likely to contribute should not be neglected. In addition, becauseto the enhancement of youth resilience. For ex- the age of offenders is decreasing, the adop-ample, a reduction in the exposure to violence tion of the life cycle approach, which targetseliminates the stress, frustration and trauma children and adults, as well as youth, providesthat would otherwise prevent youth from cop- a pre-emptory avenue to address violence. Iting with periodic socio-economic stressors in does this through preventive interventionstheir environments. The reduction of risk and prior to the display of any forms of violentthe enhancement of youth resilience are there- behaviour among younger cohorts, in part-fore inextricably linked. The attention to one nership with parents and teachers who areto the detriment of the other is likely to reduce responsible for youth socialization.the effectiveness of policies and programmes Inclusive programmes acknowledge the gen-on violence prevention. dered dimension of the patterns of youth vio- lence and develop preventive steps that take into C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 57
  • 71. Over 80 percent of the account gender differences. However, male-fo- ships among social institutions may contribute2 youth surveyed indicated cused initiatives are not considered as effective to encouraging law-abiding behaviour. as more holistic gender-based approaches that Sixth, the provision of specific alternatives forYouth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience their willingness to work seek to address the causes of the differences be- offenders and second-chance programmes for towards the reduction of tween boys and girls in relation to violence and school drop-outs help lower youth risk and violence. Building their reinforce the factors that have contributed to reduce the funnelling of youth unnecessarily lower rates of female offending.45 into the criminal justice system. resilience will enable them Third, integrated planning and pro- to act as agents of change grammes are most effective. For example, Enhancing Youth Resilience and of greater human de- linking drug abuse counselling to anger man- While the context for development must agement, entrepreneurship and skills training change through the reduction of exogenous velopment in their homes, at the community level on a voluntary and risks, any violence prevention programme schools, communities, demand-driven basis helps address all levels must also acknowledge the role that youth countries and the region. of risk in a holistic, coordinated manner. themselves must play in the process. In the Fourth, coordination and partnership Caribbean, youth are willing to participate among intergovernmental, governmental and in enhancing citizen security. The youth re- civil society stakeholders is imperative and spondents to the UNDP Citizen Security must support youth-adult partnerships. There Survey 2010 displayed strong feelings about is a general perception that civil society pro- participation in community violence preven- grammes are more effective even though the tion programmes. Stakeholders need to en- majority of programmes are run by the state. able youth to play a role in violence reduction The effectiveness could be due to the fact that and prevention. civil society organizations are more likely to Resilience involves positive adaptation involve young people in the planning and im- under stress and the development of good plementation process so as to understand more outcomes despite serious threats to well- fully the context in which youth function. In being.46 It refers to the capacity of youth to addition, civil society organizations are more cope with challenges and resist risk factors. likely to employ social rather than punitive ju- It is about supporting youth agency—the dicial approaches to risk reduction. capacity of youth to resist the overwhelming Fifth, strengthened police-youth relations, in- influence of risk and to take responsibility for cluding police outreach in schools, are likely to their own development—through processes provide a good foundation for social violence that promote youth well-being and empow- prevention. These kinds of voluntary partner- erment. The situation analysis of the CARI- Table 2.7. How Should One Resist Violence in Communities? The Point of View of Youth Passive Active-destructive Active constructive Isolate oneself and stay Form gangs to protect Report violence to the police indoors each other (notwithstanding some distrust Try to stay neutral and do Face risk directly and of police in Jamaica and in Trin- not take sides in any conflict defend oneself using vio- idad and Tobago) Be polite to everyone lence Go to church and pray Focus on productive work, a job, or other activity Go to parties to relieve stress 58 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 72. COM Commission on Youth Development The family: Families, particularly parents,has revealed that young people have their play an important role in shielding youth 2own understandings of resilience and the ac- from some of the societal and community Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resiliencetions that contribute to the enhancement of risk factors they encounter.48 The socializa-resilience.47 The responses that youth have tion of the child away from violent conflict isexhibited in an attempt to resist violence in an important tool in promoting more sociallytheir communities can be placed into three positive behaviours at school and in the com-categories: passive, active destructive, and munity. Close, stable and positive family con-active-constructive (table 2.7). nections and positive, supportive and non-vi- olent relationships with parents who provideFactors Supporting Risk supervision and discipline are the linchpins ofReduction and Resilience-Building youth resilience, particularly among childrenIn addition to observance of the six planning under 16 years of age, although the provisionand programme principles outlined above, of basic needs in care and protection, includ-a contributory factor in achieving the two- ing food and shelter, is essential. Most pro-pronged approach to violence prevention is grammes in the Caribbean seek to strengthenthe mobilization of protective institutions the protective capacity of the family by offer-to achieve the interconnected objectives of ing training in parenting and family counsel-risk reduction and resilience-building. The ling, with a focus on young and teenage par-protective institutions that influence young ents (see box 2.1, for example). Practitionerspeople’s decision-making with respect to risk- have suggested that these kinds of interven-taking have been widely discussed in the lit- tions have only limited success unless they areerature. They may be distilled into four main linked to other activities that build the resil-spheres of influence: the family, peers, the ience of the wider family with respect to thecommunity (including schools), and state promotion of poverty reduction, increasedinstitutions. These spheres correspond and income generation and worthwhile employ-relate to several societal and community risk ment. These approaches should also providefactors. Therefore, the mobilization of each spaces for youth participation in family deci-of these spheres of influence into positive sion-making to begin the process of buildingaction is likely to contribute to both risk re- youth self-esteem and the capacity of youth toduction and resilience-building. The process make good decisions.of strengthening protective factors has been Peer support groups: Participation in clubs,achieved to a varying extent through a variety associations and other peer groups may helpof programmes and interventions for youth prevent youth violence. Positive influencesviolence prevention. have been as effective in persuading youth away Box 2.1. A Promising Family Programme: Parental Education, Suriname The Parental Education Programme has been offered for education, scarce family resources, abuse and violence, more than seven years by the Bureau for the Development impaired parental mental health and the presence of non- of Children, an NGO in Suriname. The programme of- biological parents. Parents and professional educators have fers combined socialization and educational services to collaborated on strategies to address risk factors, while also a low-income community in Sophia’s Lust, a slum in the acknowledging the context of discrimination against Ma- urban periphery of Paramaribo, where the majority of the roons. Healthy social networks, positive role models, the population is of Maroon descent. The risk factors that have existence of friends who are at low risk, and fair treatment been identified in the family setting include low parental have been indicated as positive protective factors. Source: Parental Education, Suriname. Bureau for the Development of Children, Suriname. C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 59
  • 73. 2 Box 2.2. A Promising Peer Programme: Peace Ambassadors, BarbadosYouth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience The Peace Ambassadors Programme was established in nities. The programme currently involves over 150 Peace 2006 to confront the rise of violence and conflict in sec- Ambassadors at seven secondary schools in Barbados. It ondary schools in Barbados and to influence positive encourages the establishment of zones of peace at each choices and decision-making among boys and girls. The school, supported by events and activities that promote an programme targets young people interested in living in atmosphere of harmony within the school environment. peace by promoting respect for themselves and others. It The Peace Ambassadors are easily identified by other stu- brings girls and boys together to speak out and take action dents through the pins that the ambassadors wear that are against violence by encouraging them to become involved inscribed with the word ‘Peace’. with others to solve problems in their schools and commu- Source: Peace Ambassadors, Barbados. Personal communication, Adisa (AJA) Andwele, Program Director. from violence as negative influences have been to their peers. A revival of structures for youth effective in pushing youth towards violence. participation is critical to building resilience. Several programmes have been developed The community: Schools, community across the region that seek to link youth perpe- groups and faith-based organizations also trators to their victims and to other youth who play a role in the protection of youth and in have been rehabilitated and reintegrated into building their resilience. Several successful society (box 2.2). These types of interventions violence prevention programmes have been are considered most effective in resilience- located across the region within such social building. The decline of youth movements institutions and are implemented by civil so- and capacity issues among youth organizations ciety groups, including NGOs, faith-based have affected the ability of youth to reach out organizations, universities and coalitions of Box 2.3. A Promising State-Community Programme: The Peace Management Initiative, Jamaica A programme of early intervention, the Peace Manage- contributed significantly in lowering the homicide rate; ment Initiative (PMI) seeks to stop conflict from escalat- during the first two years of its operations, the homicide ing into violence and strengthens civic organizations that rate dropped by 15 percent. Although Jamaica’s crime rate offer stability, sustainable development, security and self- escalated again thereafter, PMI is still seen as a worthwhile respect in inner-city communities. These objectives are initiative. There is a prevailing perception that, in the ab- achieved through a number of short- and long-term strat- sence of the programme, the homicide rate would have egies such as deploying mediators, providing support to been even higher. community organizations and developing economic liveli- Among the lessons learned through PMI, programme hoods. PMI has worked to control gang violence, negoti- members have highlighted the following: capacity build- ate peace agreements, provide counselling and treatment ing reduces the incidence of violence; there is a need to to individuals affected by violence, and cultivate relations distinguish between community and criminal violence in with community leaders. planning and programmes; understanding the role played Led by the Ministry of National Security, PMI involves by civil society is fundamental in supporting governmental several interest groups, such as churches, academia, politi- initiatives; and employable skills and training are crucial to cal parties, government agencies, and NGOs at the local preventing and reducing crime. and national levels. Established in January 2002, PMI has Source: The Peace Management Initiative, Jamaica. Personal communication, Rohan Perry. 60 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 74. organizations. The Peace Management Ini- the literature for integrated programmes andtiative, in Jamaica, is one such coalition (box planning that treat youth violence holistically 22.3). The initiative holds potential for build- by focusing on the development of youth com- Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilienceing collective effectiveness whereby commu- munities rather than targeting only problemnity members participate for the common youth.50 However, experience has shown thatgood of violence reduction.49 It helps young there are weaknesses associated with manypeople build good relationships with adults state violence prevention programmes that areother than their parents and model positive not unrelated to the failure to embrace the sixvalues and attitudes. principles for effective approaches outlined Data of the UNDP Citizen Security Sur- above.vey 2010 show that, even among those youth We highlight four main weaknesses. Thewho had been charged with crimes, most in- first relates to the extent to which responsesdicated that they appreciated the presence of that revolve exclusively around legislation andassociates and the feeling of belonging to and law enforcement have been able to contendbeing proud of their neighbourhoods. How- properly with the phenomenon of youth vio-ever, 30 percent did not participate in com- lence. In 2008, CARICOM mandated themunity activities, and 20.5 percent did not establishment of a Caribbean Communitytrust people in the community. Nonetheless, Social and Development Crime Preventionthe level of social inclusion among young peo- Action Plan, which is now in draft stage. Theple who had been charged with crimes was action plan aims to reduce violence, fostercomparatively high, even if isolation from the social inclusion, promote reintegration, em-community seems to affect more than 20 per- power victims, and protect the environmentcent of the youth among them. Overall, most and economic resources.51 It highlights youngof the youth felt that the people in their com- people as priority stakeholders. At the samemunities would intervene on their behalf if time, even though some of the Caribbean-7they fell victim to crimes. Even among victims have adopted national youth policies (Bar-of domestic violence, 34.7 percent felt that bados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago),community members were likely to intervene the majority of policies and frameworks thatin incidents of domestic violence, though deal with youth relate to children and the36.2 percent did not feel this way. This kind criminal justice system. Much of the availableof social cohesion is an important strategy in framework is couched within the context ofviolence prevention and has been employed defining unacceptable youth actions as delin-successfully in the Caribbean through neigh- quency, that is, actions in conflict with thebourhood watch groups and other collabora- law. This approach limits the responses of thetive efforts among citizens. state to youth issues to national security strat- State institutions: A significant share of the egies that address delinquency rather thaninitiatives aimed at reducing violence have been human development strategies to promotelaunched by state institutions, which also play the development of young people (includinga role in protection and resilience-building. by reducing risk factors) and youth empower-Typically, the police, criminal justice systems ment (including by enhancing resilience).and social departments and ministries have had The second issue within the state policythe greatest access to young people. There is a framework relates to the promotion of theplethora of programmes and approaches being institutionalization of problem youth, whichimplemented by the state, which suggests that has led, in many cases, to the incarceration ofthere is a need for greater coordination across young people who are in need of care and pro-agencies and for integrated programmes and tection from neglect and abuse and who haveplanning that contextualize youth violence come into contact with the justice system forprevention initiatives within other, broader offences variously defined as wandering, beinginitiatives so as to address community and so- out of control, or running away from home.52cietal risk factors. There is certainly support in The youth are often housed in penal facilities C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 61
  • 75. together with serious offenders, where they vide voluntary supervision for the youth, who2 are often victimized again. are placed in remedial programmes. A success These policy preferences for the institu- of the scheme has been the extent of policeYouth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience tionalization of youth in need of care and collaboration with other government depart- protection also harbour a gender bias. Data ments and civil society organizations in form- on Barbados reveal that the majority of youth ing an inter-agency management committee institutionalized for wandering are girls. It is for the programme. likely that the pattern is similar in other coun- While in contact with the criminal justice tries. system, youth have become victims of abuse Meanwhile, the majority of youth living or fail to receive adequate rehabilitative or re- on the streets are boys or young men. For ex- integration services. Over 50 percent of the ample, Cooke (2002, 6) notes that, among youth respondents to our survey believe that street children in Jamaica, “boys outnumber the justice systems in their countries are cor- girls by a proportion of 70:30.” These boys, rupt, and 47 percent believe that the police averaging about 13 years of age, become in- are incompetent. Of the youth who reported volved in various forms of child labour and that they had been victims of violent crimes, other forms of exploitation. That boys out- 64.1 percent had reported the crimes to the number girls on the streets is likely to be a police, while 34.5 percent had not. The rea- regional trend. These findings suggest that sons for non-reporting have not been deter- young men who leave their homes for various mined, but, of those youth who reported, reasons, including child abuse, are allowed to 18.6 percent were ‘dissatisfied’ with the police live on the streets, while young women who investigative processes, and 18.8 percent were leave their homes for similar reasons are more ‘very dissatisfied’. Nonetheless, the majority likely to be institutionalized. This distinction of the youth respondents felt that the police is in itself a sign of inequality; however, we deserved their support, and they indicated a argue that neither approach is appropriate. willingness to work towards violence preven- Both reflect neglect: a neglect of the responsi- tion. The strengthening of police-youth rela- bility to provide care and protection to youth. tions can become the foundation of strategies Neither young males living on the street, nor to reduce youth violence by adopting social young females in institutions receive the kind measures in policing and by preventing the of support, counselling, or encouragement immediate institutionalization of youth. This required to address the issues that lead them issue is discussed in more detail in chapter 5. to abandon their homes and families. The third weakness apparent in state re- There should be a shift away from insti- sponses is the failure to create effective links tutionalization as a first response for youth to build communities and strengthen social in conflict with the law. The focus of state capital and social cohesion while in pursuit of approaches should be on working with civil violence reduction. society to provide a protective environment The fourth weakness of the state frame- to prevent youth from coming into conflict work is the lack of the pursuit of youth-adult with the law. However, where conflict with partnerships by which youth and civil society the law has not been avoided, governments become acknowledged as joint stakeholders should encourage the use of alternative ap- in the process of violence prevention. Youth proaches to incarceration, including diver- have a role to play in violence reduction and sion and restorative justice. An example of a prevention. The majority of youth surveyed good practice originates in Barbados. The Ju- indicated that they currently contribute or venile Liaison Scheme, which was launched are willing to contribute to violence reduc- by the Royal Barbados Police Force in 1983, tion programmes and human development has helped over 3,000 young people and their programmes. They express hope that they families by diverting offenders away from the will be able to contribute. “We have the criminal justice system. Police officers pro- skills to make a contribution but have no 62 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 76. tools,” Joseph, Holder, and Alexis (2009) problem, particularly through anecdotes re-quote a youth from Belize saying during the ported in the media, may serve to stereotype 2consultations conducted by the CARICOM youth, particularly young males. Stereotyping Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing ResilienceCommission on Youth Development. If they contributes to the adoption of heavy-handedare provided with the opportunity to par- and rights-violating security responses thatticipate, youth become empowered and can foster youth exclusion and unnecessary insti-contribute to the enhancement of their own tutionalization through the criminal justiceresilience. system. Nonetheless, all instances of youth vio-Conclusion lence, however small in proportion to the in- cidence of violence generally, should be takenThe risk of violent offending and violent vic- seriously. Responses must address the struc-timization among young people has increased. tural, societal, community, and individualThis has occurred in a context of high levels of risk factors that account for youth violenceyouth unemployment, inadequate education- and victimization. These responses shouldal opportunities, and exposure to violence at take into consideration country-specific con-home, in schools, in communities and in the texts and gender differences in the patterns ofwider society. At the same time, youth con- offending and victimization.tinue to express feelings of exclusion from Interventions aimed at reducing vio-national and regional governance processes, lence must acknowledge youth agency andwhich helps predispose them to participate in the rights of youth to participate in the de-alternative structures, including gangs. sign, implementation and monitoring of While the problem of youth violence war- violence prevention processes. Significantrants urgent attention, exaggeration of the opportunities exist for youth participationTable 2.8. Analysis of the Context of Youth Violence in the Caribbean Strengths Weaknesses a. The majority of youth are not violent a. Youth are stigmatized as violent b. Some youth are already contributing to violence reduction b. Youth offenders do not receive adequate rehabilitation and human development and reintegration support c. Several promising programmes have been implemented to c. Lack of appropriate data to support planning and pro- reduce risk and build youth resilience; these now require grammes evaluation, assessment and replication as appropriate Opportunities Threats a. Youth are open to new experiences and pursuits, and, so, a. High levels of youth unemployment and inadequate edu- change is not as threatening to them cational opportunities b. Youth generally feel respected in their communities, b. Parents neglect and abuse their children which provides a foundation for building youth-adult c. Societal tolerance of violence threatens to erode progress partnerships in non-violent socialization among youth at home and c. Youth have strong feelings about participation and are school and in communities willing to contribute to violence prevention d. Most youth believe that the police deserve their support C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 63
  • 77. in a context in which the majority of Carib- The context in which policy makers, pro-bean youth surveyed have positive attitudes gramme implementers and youth respondto participation in community activities and to the phenomenon of youth violence offerssupporting law enforcement officers. These distinct strengths and opportunities for vio-young people have expressed the willingness lence reduction and the development of moreto contribute to violence reduction in their socially just societies. These issues are summa-countries. rized in table 2.8.
  • 78. CHAPTER Reducing the3 Contribution of Street Gangs and Organized Crime to Violence
  • 79. More social cohesion, lesscrimeStronger bonds, safer societiesCaribbean governments mustmake security a policy priority
  • 80. 3CHAPTER Reducing the Contribution of Street Gangs and Organized Crime to Violence 3 Street Gangs and Organized Crime Introduction crime and neglected to differentiate organized crime and street gangs. Over the last several years, street gangs and or- In general terms, there is agreement that ganized criminal groups have become increas- street gangs are characterized as “any durable, ingly perceived in many regions of the world street oriented youth group whose involve- as a major problem contributing to violence ment in illegal activity is part of their group and crime and undermining local economies, identity”.2 Durability generally means that the rule of law, and human development. The the group has been around longer than a few Caribbean is no exception. Nations across the months. Street oriented refers to the group Caribbean region are struggling to determine spending substantial time on the streets and the scope, nature and causes of the problem of in parks, malls and other public places. Youth crime and the appropriate mix of programmes refers to those who are, on average, between and resources to be dedicated to suppression 13 and 25 years of age. Illegal activity refers and prevention to respond to street gangs and to criminal activity, not merely disorderly organized crime. This chapter focuses on street conduct or presenting a public nuisance. gangs and organized crime in seven Caribbean Identity refers to the sense of the group, not nations (the Caribbean-7). Its primary concern merely to an individual’s self-image.3 Organ- is the connection among street gangs, organ- ized crime, in contrast, “is characterized by ized crime and violence. It does not focus on the enterprise activity, the use of violence (ac- links to drug-trafficking and related issues such tual and/or threatened) and corruption as as money laundering, which have been covered typical means and exploitable relationships in prior reports.1 Following the definitions of with the upper-world.”4 In this regard, enter- street gangs and organized crime, the chapter prise activity involves the provision of illegal presents a cross-national approach to examining goods or services to individuals. Traditional the scope and nature of the problems, the causes examples have revolved around trafficking in of street gangs and organized crime, and the drugs, guns and people, as well as extortion. current responses throughout the region. Organized crime groups are also character- There is often substantial confusion and de- ized by their organizational sophistication. bate over the terms street gang and organized In general, their organizational structure can crime. The difference between the two is im- be observed in two forms: corporate and re- portant, however, not only for diagnosing the lational. Those groups that operate within related issues accurately, but also for the imple- the corporate model possess formal hierarchy mentation of effective and efficient responses. and clear lines of authority. Those groups that Street gangs and organized crime are different operate with a relational model are organized and require different responses. While organ- based on personal and social networks that ized crime can have greater consequences for often already exist in a community or area.5 nations, attention to street gangs is needed be- Street gangs are different from organized cause of the high risks associated with policies crime groups in several ways. For example, that are directed towards delinquent youth in street gangs typically lack organization and general and gangs in particular, but that are have limited centralized leadership, whereas poorly conceived and implemented. Other organized crime groups have clear lines of au- reports have focused primarily on organized thority. Street gangs are also more likely to be C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 67
  • 81. motivated by issues of status, while organized 2010, the key finding is to realize that youth3 crime groups are often economically moti- gangs are a complex, changing and differenti- vated. Whereas street gangs may be involved ated phenomenon.6 A comprehensive reviewStreet Gangs and Organized Crime in neighbourhood-level drug sales, organized of studies on this topic reveals the dangers of crime groups are involved in the wider distri- oversimplifications, especially the ones that bution and trafficking of drugs. picture gangs as out-and-out criminal groups or as innocent youth clubs. The lack of research Scope and Nature of the Problem in the Caribbean should not come as a surprise given that, as Caribbean scholars report, little Research on street gangs and organized crime attention has been given to citizen insecurity has a long and extensive history in the United until recently and even less attention has been States; in Europe, the topic has also received dedicated to gangs and problems related to or- increasing attention, but these phenomena ganized crime. Most of what is known comes have not been as systematically examined from the two largest Caribbean nations: Ja- in the Caribbean. According to the Central maica and Trinidad and Tobago. American Human Development Report 2009– Prevalence of the Problem Multiple data sources show that street gangs are Chart 3.1 Perceptions of the Street Gang active in much of the Caribbean region, albeit Problem, Caribbean-7, 2010 the magnitude of the problem in each nation varies substantially. Popular tools in the research 45 on the issues are resident perception data, offi- 40.7 cial police data and self-reporting data.7 39.7 38.0 40 Of the respondents to the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 across the Caribbean-7, 35 32.4 12.5 percent believe that gangs are in their 30.8 30 29.6 neighbourhoods (chart 3.1). However, per- 25.8 ceptions vary by nation. Almost 18 percent of 25 residents surveyed in Saint Lucia report the presence of gangs in their neighbourhoods, Percent 20 17.9 followed by Trinidad and Tobago (13.9 per- 13.9 cent), Guyana (13.2 percent) and Antigua 15 12.7 13.2 12.4 10.8 12.5 and Barbuda (12.4 percent). About 9 to 18 10.3 10 9.2 percent of the residents claim there are gangs in their neighbourhoods. Chart 3.1 also 5 shows that, among those who report a gang presence in their neighbourhoods, about 32.4 0 percent state that the problem is a big one. Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 These perceptions of the magnitude of the gang problem also vary by nation. Around 41 percent of residents in Jamaica, 40 percent in There are criminal gangs in (neighbourdhood) Saint Lucia, and 38 percent in Trinidad and Tobago state the problem is a big one because Criminal gangs are a big problem in your neighbourdhood (if there is a gang problem) of gangs in their neighbourhoods. Between 26 and 30 percent of residents in Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana, and Suriname report the Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents who answered that gangs were in their neighbourhoods (N = 1700). same. Meanwhile, only about 13 percent of Questions: “Is there a criminal gang (or gangs) in your neighbourhood?” “To what extent is there a criminal gang problem in your neighbourhood?” The chart shows, for the first question, the residents in Barbados so report. percentage of respondents who answered “Yes” and, for the second question, the percentage of Chart 3.2 examines when respondents in respondents who answered “A big problem”. *p<.05 each of the Caribbean-7 first observed the 68 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 82. Chart 3.2 The First Appearance of the Gang Problem 3 in Neighbourhoods, Caribbean-7, 2010 Street Gangs and Organized Crime 18.3 36.8 36.1 39.0 37.0 42.3 42.7 44.8 19.1 19.1 17.4 23.1 19.1 27.6 20.6 42.6 20.3 29.4 31.3 18.7 26.4 16.2 20.5 25.9 22.3 18.7 15.9 11.8 14.7 15.3 12.9 16.3 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 Within the last year More than 1, but less than 3 years ago More than 3, but less than 5 years ago More than 5 years ago Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents who answered that gangs were in their neighbourhoods (N = 1,700). Question: “If yes (if there is a criminal gang or gangs in your neighbourhood), since when has this become a problem?”gang problem. While a small proportion of Another method of measuring a nation’sCaribbean residents observed the gang prob- gang problem is through official police data.lem emerged over the previous year (16.3 Official police data capture information frompercent), most said it had emerged over the people who come into contact with the po-previous three to five years (20.6 percent) or lice, and this information therefore tends tofive or more years ago (37.0 percent). While refer to older individuals who are more heav-this pattern was similar across most Carib- ily involved in criminal activity.8 As shown inbean countries, Guyana was a notable excep- Table 3.1, the police in Jamaica have identi-tion. The data clearly show that respondents fied 268 gangs and approximately 3,900 gangin Guyana observed the emergence of gangs members. In Trinidad and Tobago, the policein that country much later than respondents have identified 95 gangs and approximatelyin most other Caribbean countries, with 1,269 gang members. Law enforcement of-about two thirds of the observers in Guyana ficials in Antigua and Barbuda have reportedreporting that gangs had emerged in their 15 gangs and estimated there are between 264neighbourhoods in the previous three years. and 570 gang members. Barbados has report-These findings suggest that, with the excep- ed 150 gangs and 4,000 gang members, buttion of Guyana, many Caribbean nations these figures may be inflated. Police estimateshave had a gang problem for five years or of the street gang problem in Guyana, Saintlonger. Lucia and Suriname are unavailable, which C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 69
  • 83. Table 3.1. Official Police Estimates of the Population of3 Street Gangs, Caribbean-7Street Gangs and Organized Crime Country Gangs, Gang Estimate Source number members, year number Antigua & 15 264-570 2008 OAS (2008a) Barbuda Barbados 150 4,000 2008 OAS (2008b) Guyana — — Jamaica 268 3,900 2010 Data of Ministry of National Security Saint Lucia — — Suriname — — Trinidad & 95 1,269 2006 Katz and Choate Tobago (2006) Note: The notation “— “ indicates unavailability of data. represents a challenge to policy makers in might have a relatively significant gang prob- these nations to have an accurate understand- lem. Similarly, Katz, Choate, and Fox (2010) ing of the problem. Some Caribbean police have examined a sample of 2,292 youth at- agencies do not have the capacity to diagnose tending schools in urban areas in Trinidad and the scope of local gang activities. Tobago. Their analysis indicates that 12.5 per- Possibly the most common strategy adopt- cent of school-aged youth self-report they have ed in examining the prevalence of gang-related been in gangs. In contrast, self-reported data phenomenon is the use of self-reporting. Self- obtained from school-aged youth in Jamaica reported data have proven to be a robust, valid indicate substantially lower rates of gang mem- and reliable method for collecting informa- bership. Wilks et al. (2007), utilizing a com- tion from gang members.9 Ohene, Ireland, munity-based sample of 1,185 youth, find that and Blum (2005) have conducted one of the only 6.4 percent self-report ever being in gangs; few studies that examine the prevalence of using a school-based methodology, Fox and gang membership across the Caribbean. They Gordon-Strachan (2007) find a like propor- have collected self-reported data from 15,695 tion (6 percent). Data collected through focus school-aged youth in Antigua and Barbuda, groups and survey-based convenience samples the Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, of school-aged youth in Antigua and Barbuda Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica and have confirmed the presence of gangs in neigh- Saint Lucia. They find that 17–24 percent of bourhoods and schools, although quantitative males and 11–16 percent of females (vary- estimates are unavailable.10 Self-reported data ing by age) report they have been involved in collected from adults on their participation gangs. Their research suggests that, compared in street gangs in the Caribbean are rarer. As with more developed nations, the Caribbean part of the 2009 Jamaican National Crime Vic- 70 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 84. timization Survey, over 3,100 residents were females in Jamaican street gangs. Police datasurveyed, of which fewer than 0.51 percent of suggest, however, that gang membership is 3those aged 16 years or older self-reported ever predominately male. A survey of experts with Street Gangs and Organized Crimebeing in a gang.11 Katz, Maguire, and Choate the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service found(2011) interviewed over 400 arrestees who had that there were no female-dominated gangs inbeen booked in Port of Spain, Trinidad. They the country.12 Similar findings were reportedfind that 5.1 percent of recently booked arres- in a study comprised of police experts in An-tees self-reported current street gang member- tigua and Barbuda.13 Together, these findingsship. might suggest that, while females are involved Measuring the prevalence of organized in street gangs in the Caribbean, their involve-crime is substantially more difficult. Organ- ment might not be sufficient to come fre-ized crime groups, in their many forms, have quently to the attention of police. Regardless,been found in Antigua and Barbuda, Bar-bados, Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad andTobago. However, the number of groups andthe number of individuals who identify with Box 3.1. Why Do Caribbean Youth Join Street Gangs?such groups are relatively unknown. The mostcomprehensive examination of organized There is almost no Caribbean-based empirical research examining whycrime in the Caribbean has been conducted in youth join street gangs. One of the few studies to examine the issue col-Jamaica by Anthony Harriott, Glaister Leslie, lected self-reported data from almost 2,300 school-aged youth in Trini-and Donna Moncrieffe. Moncrieffe (1998) es- dad and Tobago. The study found that most youth joined for reasons oftimates that there were seven organized crime friendship (42 percent) and protection or safety (29.4 percent) (chartgroups in Jamaica in 1998. A decade later, Les- a). The remaining joined because a family member was in a gang (5.9lie (2010) counted 12, and Harriott (2009) percent), to make money (8 percent), or for other reasons (14.7 percent).found 20. Harriott (2011) notes that organ- Chart a. The Reasons Given by Trinidadian Youth for Joining Gangsized crime in Jamaica is now more active, pow-erful and entrenched and perhaps more well 45tolerated by the people and some of their po- 42.0litical representatives than ever before. While 40there is anecdotal evidence of organized crimein the other six Caribbean-7 nations, there has 35been almost no systematic research examiningprevalence. As a consequence, the data and in- Percent 30 29.4formation required to understand the problemare lacking in the Caribbean basin. 25The Sex and Age Composition of 20Caribbean Street GangsWe know little about the socio-demographic 15 14.7characteristics of street gang members in theCaribbean. Preliminary evidence on Jamaica 10 8.0and on Trinidad and Tobago indicate that,among school-aged youth, the majority of 5 3.8street gang members are male; however, fe- 2.1male gang membership is also prevalent. For 0example, Katz, Choate, and Fox (2010) find Protection/ Friendship Parent(s) Sibling(s) Make Otherthat, among a national sample of Trinidadian Safety in a Gang in a Gang Moneyyouth in urban schools, 40.1 percent of self-reported gang members were females. Simi- Source: Katz, Choate, and Fox (2010).larly, Meeks (2009) notes a strong presence of C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 71
  • 85. these findings hint that increased focus needs members self-report delinquency. A report by3 to be placed on understanding how females an officer of the Royal Barbados Police Force impact gang structure, culture, and criminal- suggests that street gangs in that country useStreet Gangs and Organized Crime ity and the role females fulfil in gangs. symbols and initiation rituals.17 Street gangs This same body of research suggests in Jamaica, however, appear to be more well that individuals join street gangs at a young organized. According to Leslie (2010), gangs age (see box 3.1). In Trinidad and Tobago, there are characterized by an organizational school-aged youth who self-reported gang hierarchy and a division of labour, typically membership stated that, on average, they had including an all-powerful leader, an upper first become involved with their gangs when echelon, a middle echelon and bottom-level they were 12 years old.14 Surveys of school of- ‘workers’. Gangs in Jamaica exhibit several ty- ficials in Antigua and Barbuda have indicated pologies that range from small, loosely organ- that most gang members are between the ages ized gangs to large highly organized gangs. of 12 and 15 years.15 These preliminary find- Leslie (2010) also notes that these gangs lack ings together imply that the street gang prob- defined territories and do not use identifying lem is largely confined to young marginalized signs such as tattoos or gang colours. males. School-based gang prevention efforts Much less is known about organized crime should therefore begin early in life to inocu- groups in the region. In Jamaica, organized late youth from gang membership. crime groups are hierarchical and are led by ‘dons’. Dons typically have several ‘soldiers’ who The Organizational perform many functions. While some may be Characteristics of Street Gangs involved in a gang or criminal lifestyle; others Available research finds that the organiza- may be more involved in local politics. Soldiers tional characteristics of Caribbean street have access to the resources that are derived gangs vary by nation. Studies based on data from their activities.18 Dons play a leadership collected from law enforcement experts in role in politics, community affairs and the un- Antigua and Barbuda and in Trinidad and To- derground economy. For example, they have bago indicate that street gangs typically have veto power over political party decisions and an accepted name and that gang members regularly provide essential public services that refer to themselves as a gang or crew, spend the government cannot provide such as food, a lot of time in public places and claim turf. jobs and community safety.19 These organized While, in Trinidad and Tobago, according to crime groups have identifiable territories, re- police experts, most street gangs do not have ferred to as ‘garrisons’, that are considered safe symbols such as recognizable styles of cloth- havens from law enforcement. Harriott (2008b, ing, ways of speaking, or signs, police experts 24) notes that “entry into these areas by the po- in Antigua and Barbuda say that most street lice may precipitate armed battles that are costly gangs do make use of such symbols.16 Rely- in lives lost and may be politically costly for the ing on self-reported data from self-identified police and the political administration.” school-aged gang members in Trinidad and In Trinidad and Tobago, there have been Tobago, Pyrooz et al. (2012) indicate that, several drug-trafficking networks, some of while most gang members state that their which have evolved into organized crime gangs hold regular meetings (56 percent) groups. There are, however, alternate trajec- and have rules (52 percent), fewer than half tories to organized crime. Members and ex- state that their gangs have a leader (45 per- members of the Jamaat al Muslimeen consti- cent) or insignia (45 percent). While these tute a network that is involved in organized gangs exhibit relatively low levels of organiza- crime activities. The network is reportedly tion, Pyrooz et al. (2012) find that gang or- highly organized and prolific.20 International ganizational structure is positively related to attention turned to the group in 1990 when delinquency. In other words, the more struc- members attempted to overthrow the govern- turally organized a gang, the more the gang ment of Trinidad and Tobago.21 The structure 72 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 86. of organized crime groups in Guyana and to which countries are affected by gang-relatedSuriname is less well known, but is believed to crime and violence. For example, in Antigua 3be comprised of loosely organized networks and Barbuda, homicide data for 2006–2007 Street Gangs and Organized Crimethat support the drug and gun trade. show that only 1 of the 29 homicides reported in that country were gang related.22 In BarbadosThe Consequences of Street and Guyana, while the problem does not ap-Gangs and Organized Crime pear prevalent, there are periodic news reportsStreet gangs and organized crime groups are of gang homicides.23 However, the situation inmajor obstacles to meeting regional devel- these countries has not been systematically ex-opment goals. They affect the quality of life, amined. The number of gang homicides in Sainterode the development of human and social Lucia appears to be growing and contributingcapital and divert substantial resources away to a greater share of the nation’s homicides, butfrom more productive uses. Below, we illus- there is no systematic research. The number oftrate how street gangs and organized crime gang homicides in Jamaica and in Trinidad andhave contributed to violence and crime and Tobago, however, are substantial and increasing.undermine local economies, the rule of law In Jamaica, in 2006, there were 1,303 homi-and human development. cides, of which 32.5 percent (n = 423) were Crime and violence are perhaps the most classified as gang homicides, and, in 2009, thepublicly visible consequences of street gangs and country experienced 1,680 homicides, of whichorganized crime (box 3.2). Available data indi- 48.1 percent (n = 808) were classified as gangcate there is substantial variability in the degree related. Similarly, in Trinidad and Tobago, in Box 3.2. Do Gangs Have an Impact on the Number of Homicides in Communities? After controlling for social-structural factors, the authors of a recent study have found that there is a strong relationship between the presence of gangs and gang members and the incidence of homicide in communities. Thus, for every addi- tional gang member in a community, the number of homicides increased by 0.4 percent, and, for every additional gang in a community, the number of homicides increased by about 10 percent (table a). Table a. The Relationship between Gangs and Homicides Increase in gangs, number Increase in homicides, % Increase in gang members, number Increase in homicides, % 1 9.1 1 0.4 2 19.0 5 2.0 3 29.9 10 4.1 4 41.7 50 22.1 5 54.6 100 49.1 10 138.9 150 82.0 20 470.8 200 122.2 400 393.7 Source: Katz and Fox (2010). C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 73
  • 87. 2006, there were 371 homicides, of which 26.4 out the Caribbean, gang homicides may be3 percent (n = 98) were classified by the police more pronounced than official police statistics as gang related; in 2009, the country reported and news reports indicate.Street Gangs and Organized Crime 506 homicides, of which 34.8 percent (n = 176) Perhaps our greatest understanding of the were gang related. Accordingly, not only did the threat posed by Caribbean street gangs was proportion of gang-related homicides increase provided by research conducted in Trinidad in both countries, but the number of gang-relat- and Tobago. A national study diagnosing the ed homicides almost doubled in both countries issue of street gangs was funded by the Min- over the same period. istry of National Security. It examined several Research suggests that these figures may data sources, including official data, self-report- underreport the extent of the problem. Over ed data of school-aged youth, and self-reported the last several decades, a number of research- data of arrestees. All three data sources yielded ers have described the limitations of gang similar outcomes. The official data showed that homicide data and the under classification of gang members, relative to non–gang members, homicides as gang related.24 One such study were two times more likely to have been arrest- was conducted in Trinidad and Tobago. Katz ed for property crimes, three times more likely and Maguire (2006) examined the nature of to have been arrested for violent, gun, or drug the homicides in the Besson Street Station offenses, and five times more likely to have District, a station district with one of the worst been arrested for drug sales.25 Self-reported homicide rates in the nation. They determined data of school-aged youth showed that, com- that, while the police classified about 25 per- pared with non–gang members, gang members cent of the district’s homicides as gang related, were about 11 times more likely to be involved interviews and document reviews revealed that in drug sales, 7 times more likely to be involved at least 62.5 percent of the homicides were ac- in violence, 5 times more likely to be involved tually gang related. This suggests that, through- in property crimes, and three times more likely Chart 3.3 Neighbourhood Experiences of Gang Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 25 20.2 20 15 14.5 Percent 12.7 12.6 12.1 10 10.0 8.7 5.7 5 0 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “In the last year, did any of the following crimes/behaviours occur in your neighbourhood?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Gang violence”. 74 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 88. to have been arrested.26 While similar findings We also explored the impact of streetwere reported by adult arrestees, analysis indi- gangs by examining the personal experiences 3cated that many gang members in the nation of residents as victims during the year previ- Street Gangs and Organized Crimepossessed firearms (52.6 percent), which were ous to the survey. We compared the victimi-carried for self-defence.27 zation rates among residents who lived in Surveys of residents are another common neighbourhoods with gang problems and thestrategy for understanding the consequenc- rates among residents in gang-free neighbour-es of street gangs and organized crime. The hoods. Table 3.2 shows that, regardless ofUNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 reveals country, people who live in areas with gangsvarying levels of gang violence in the Carib- were about twice as likely to have been crimebean-7. Slightly more than 12.1 percent of victims during the year previous to the survey.the residents in these nations stated that gang While extortion has been strongly related toviolence takes place in their neighbourhoods the presence of gangs in neighbourhoods in(chart 3.3). Saint Lucian residents were the Central America, this does not appear to bemost likely to report such gang violence (20.2 the case in the Caribbean. Property crime,percent), followed by Trinidadians (14.5 per- however, is associated with the presence ofcent), Antiguans (12.7 percent), Jamaicans gangs in the Caribbean. In Antigua and Bar-(12.6 percent), Guyanese (10.0 percent), Suri- buda, Barbados, Guyana and Suriname, peo-namese (8.7 percent), and Barbadians (5.7 per- ple who live in neighbourhoods with gangscent). were more than twice as likely to have been theTable 3.2. Victimization and Neighbourhood Gang Presence, Caribbean-7, 2010percent Country Any Violent Property Extortion victimization victimization victimization victimization No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs gangs gangs gangs gangs Antigua & 9.3 23.3 3.1 12.7 4.8 12.7 0.1 0.0 Barbuda Barbados 10.1 26.1 4.3 14.1 4.0 11.5 0.1 0.0 Guyana 6.2 17.7 1.7 6.9 2.9 6.9 0.2 0.0 Jamaica 5.3 8.3 1.8 4.3 2.4 4.3 0.0 0.0 Saint Lucia 9.1 19.7 3.2 11.4 4.9 9.3 0.1 0.4 Suriname 8.7 18.1 2.0 7.1 6.7 13.8 0.0 0.0 Trinidad & 9.6 16.0 3.7 10.1 4.2 5.3 0.2 0.0 Tobago Caribbean-7 8.4 18.5 2.8 9.6 4.4 9.0 0.1 0.1Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “In the last year, were you victim of a crime, a violent crime, propertycrime, financial crime?” and “Is there a criminal gang in your neighbourhood?” The table shows, according to the presenceor absence of gangs, the percentage of respondents who answered “Yes” to the first question by type of crime. *p<.05 C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 75
  • 89. victims of property crimes. In Jamaica and in terms of the impact of gangs on neighbour-3 Trinidad and Tobago, there was not a signifi- hood safety. Specifically, we were interested cant relationship between gang presence and in determining if residents believed that theStreet Gangs and Organized Crime property crime victimization. With respect presence of street gangs made their neigh- to victimization through violence, the rela- bourhoods safer or less safe. While most re- tionship was particularly strong in the Car- spondents stated that gangs made their com- ibbean-7: almost 10 percent of the residents munities less safe, a surprisingly large share of of neighbourhoods with gangs had been vic- the respondents in Barbados (14.3 percent) tims of violent crimes, compared with about and Jamaica (14.9 percent) stated that gangs 3 percent of the residents of neighbourhoods made their neighbourhoods safer (chart 3.4). with no gang problems. The highest rates of This might reflect the concern of Barbadians victimization by violence in neighbourhoods about the high risk of victimization and their with gangs were found in Barbados, a coun- perception that gangs might provide citizen try in which the gang problem appears to be safety. In Jamaica, these findings may reflect fairly modest relative to the other countries; the view of resident that the state has failed in the lowest rates were in Jamaica, a country in its responsibilities to ensure citizen security, which the gang problem is fairly substantial and gangs have filled the void. relative to the other countries. These findings Organized crime groups are engaged in ac- may arise from the fact that neighbourhoods tivity that is often less visible to the public, but with emerging gang problems experience that can nonetheless have an equally or more greater conflict than neighbourhoods with damaging effect than the activity of street gangs. long-standing and chronic gang problems. Data are sparse; for most nations, we must rely We sought to understand these same issues on learning about the consequences of organ- by examining the perceptions of residents in ized crime through anecdotal evidence. For ex- ample, such evidence indicates that, in Guyana and Suriname, both South American nations Chart 3.4 Respondents Who Believe Gangs Make geographically, but Caribbean in culture, the Neighbourhoods Safer, Caribbean-7, 2010 consequences of organized crime are varied, but are often related to drug-trafficking. Local 16 officials note that “the people who are involved 14.3 14.9 in moving drugs are often the same people who 14 will use the same operation for many other il- 12 legal activities” such as money laundering and terrorism.28 Drug-trafficking perpetuated by 10 9.4 organized crime groups also often leads to lo- Percent 8 7.8 cal drug use problems because traffickers are 6.6 frequently not paid in cash, but in product and 6 are therefore required to sell in domestic mar- 5.8 4.4 4 kets, which then has consequential effects on 3.0 local criminality, including youth gangs, pros- 2 titution, and violent and property crime relat- 0 ed to drug markets.29 Drug-trafficking likewise leads to the proliferation of firearms, which are Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 frequently traded for drugs, and the presence of armed men to protect turf and other illegal property. Indeed, drug-trafficking has been linked to the rise in execution-type killings, Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents who said gangs were in their neighbourhoods (N = 1,700). Question: which account for around a third of homicides “Have the gangs made the neighbourhood safer or less safe?” The chart shows the percentage of in Guyana each year.30 Additionally, it fosters respondents who answered “Safer”. the corruption of public sector employees and 76 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 90. law enforcement personnel by drug traffickers, ca, and Saint Lucia were forced to serve as sexwho use their wealth to buy influence and pro- workers in nightclubs. The investigation deter- 3tection from prosecution. Finally, in Guyana, mined that organized crime groups obtained Street Gangs and Organized Crimedrug-trafficking distorts the local economy the cooperation of immigration officers andand undermines legitimate economic activity senior officials, who were frequently bribed tobecause the monies derived from drug sales are allow the women into the country.34 Similarly,laundered by pricing commodities and services Jamaica is a source of internally and externallymuch lower than the prevailing market rate.31 trafficked children and adults. A US State While all the Caribbean island nations Department (2010a) report indicates that Ja-experience problems associated with drug- maica serves as a transit country for illegal mi-trafficking, Jamaica continues to be the largest grants going to Canada and the United StatesCaribbean supplier of marijuana and serves as and that Jamaicans are trafficked into forceda major transit point for cocaine trafficked labour in the United States. Foreign victimsfrom Central and South America to North of this trafficking have also been identified inAmerica. Drug production and trafficking in Jamaica. These findings raise questions aboutJamaica are both enabled and accompanied the effectiveness of policies that constrain freeby organized crime and domestic and inter- movement throughout the Caribbean for thenational gang activity. Cases such as United purpose of suppressing human trafficking orStates vs. Knowles and the indictment of Ja- of policies that address organized crime issuesmaican drug lord Christopher Coke illustrate related to guns and drugs.the transnational nature of the drug-traffick- In Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago,ing component of organized crime.32 In Ja- business scams are becoming more sophisticat-maica, similar to Guyana, there is also a strong ed and more difficult to detect. For example,relationship between the illicit drug trade and Jamaican Lotto scams, which are concentratedthe illicit arms trade. The trade in guns in ex- primarily in Montego Bay, disproportionatelychange for illicit drugs exacerbates the crime target elderly people in the United States. Lot-problem because unregistered handguns flow to scammers email or phone individuals claim-freely into the country, contributing to the ing that the individuals have won large sumshigh rates of firearm-related crimes.33 In like of money and only need to wire small admin-fashion, but to a lesser extent, officials of the istrative fees to Jamaica to receive their win-Royal Barbados Police Force report that or- nings. The scams reportedly generate US$30ganized crime has been linked to drug-traf- million a year for organized crime groups, andficking and fighting over turf, primarily at sea, more than 100 killings have been linked towhere disputes over drug shipments have led the scams. The scammers have been found toto deadly violence. illicit the help of local police officers. In one While drug-trafficking has often domi- Jamaican police station, 10 officers were askednated public dialogue, trafficking in persons to retire because of their role in the scams.35has been identified as a new problem in the In Trinidad and Tobago, criminal groupsregion (see chapter 1). Criminal networks in commit high-level fraud through the Unem-Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, and Jamaica ployment Relief Programme (URP), which isare increasingly becoming involved in human designed to provide short-term employmenttrafficking. For example, investigative work in to the jobless. The criminal groups obtain con-Antigua and Barbuda and Barbados recently tracts to manage URP projects and fraudu-discovered that the majority of prostitutes in lently magnify the number of persons requiredthe country were immigrant women forced to complete particular jobs. For instance, ainto the sex trade. The investigation uncovered job requiring only one person is presented asat least 80 women who were told they would if it requires seven people. The ghost opera-be earning decent salaries as bartenders, mas- tions are staffed, on paper, by the seven indi-seuses, hotel workers, or dancers. Instead, the viduals, who eventually receive cheques fromwomen, who were mainly from Guyana, Jamai- the government for their supposed work and C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 77
  • 91. turn over part of the proceeds to the criminal tion of the judicial process.37 Even if an indi-3 group. URP contracts offer the crime groups vidual or group of individuals are arrested, the opportunities to provide resources not only to rule of law can be subverted through multipleStreet Gangs and Organized Crime those who support them (their soldiers), but avenues. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey also to community residents in need, such as 2010 suggested that judicial corruption is per- the elderly, children, or pregnant women, and vasive. For example, 53 percent of residents in this garners good will for the benefit of the the Caribbean-7 believe that politically con- criminal groups. Because URP contracts are nected criminals go free; about 50 percent administered through local community lead- believe that the justice system is corrupt; 47.3 ers, organized crime groups seek to increase percent believe powerful criminals go free; and their territory by pressuring community lead- 37.2 percent believe judges are corrupt (table ers to cooperate so that the groups may obtain 3.3). While organized crime appears to have more URP contracts. Disputes over territory undermined the faith of the public in the rule frequently arise. There are no official statistics, of law across the Caribbean, the problem ap- but one report indicates that, since 2002, over pears particularly acute in Trinidad and To- 100 URP supervisors, foremen, contractors, bago. Almost 70 percent of the residents there and workers have been killed because of the believe the judicial system is corrupt and po- schemes.36 litically connected criminals go free, and about Organized crime can also have a substantial 62 percent of respondents believe powerful impact on the rule of law through the corrup- criminals go free and 59 percent believe judges Table 3.3. Perceptions of Corruption, Caribbean-7, 2010 percent Country Judges are Justice system Powerful Politically corrupt is corrupt criminals go connected free criminals go free Antigua & 32.3 44.3 37.8 44.8 Barbuda Barbados 24.5 33.8 40.1 41.9 Guyana 39.0 47.7 46.9 51.8 Jamaica 36.3 57.3 52.7 57.8 Saint Lucia 33.7 48.1 47.7 51.3 Suriname 35.6 45.8 38.9 47.0 Trinidad & 58.7 69.8 61.6 70.2 Tobago Caribbean-7 37.2 49.6 47.0 52.5 Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “Using a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Don’t know, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree), indicate your assessment of the performance of the criminal justice system on the following (fairness, integrity, effectiveness): ‘The judges are not corrupt’, ‘The justice system is free of corruption’, ‘The justice system is unable to convict powerful criminals’, ‘Powerful criminals are likely to go free’, ’Politically connected crimi- nals are likely to go free’.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Strongly disagree” or “Disagree”. *p<.05 78 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 92. are corrupt. While the nation has invested con- The Causes of Street Gangs andsiderable resources in improving the police ser- Organized Crime 3vices, it appears that the judicial system is also Street Gangs and Organized Crimein dire need of improvement and reform. This section focuses on the causes and cor- Combined, these crime and social prob- relates of street gangs and organized crime inlems impact Caribbean nations in a number the Caribbean. The first part of the sectionof other, less visible ways. For example, gang focuses on the social structural conditionshomicides are much less likely to be solved or that give rise to and sustain street gangs andresult in a conviction compared with other organized crime. Specifically, it addressestypes of homicides. This undermines the such issues as community cohesion, socialrule of law in two main ways, as follows: (1) cohesion, and informal social control and theResidents lose faith in the government’s ca- relationship these may have with the rise andpacity to exact justice. General and specific spread of street gangs and organized crime indeterrence is weakened. The community at the Caribbean. The second part of the sectionlarge perceives fewer formal consequences focuses on the risk factors and the protectivefor criminal actions. Individuals who have factors associated with street gang member-committed crimes and who have not been ship. Our purpose is to understand why peo-punished view the benefits outweighing the ple in the Caribbean are becoming involvedconsequences, increasing the probability they in street gangs.will commit such crimes again. (2) The citi-zenry begins to seek justice through informal Community-Level Explanationsmechanisms. Victims and others may seek Community cohesion and social cohesion areretributive justice on their own or solicit oth- important because they allow for the develop-ers, such as a don or a gang leader, to execute ment of shared goals and provide the meansjustice on their behalf. for collective action. The willingness and The crimes and corruptive influence of ability to develop and achieve shared goals—gangs and organized crime also lead to de- labelled collective efficacy by Sampson,creased economic performance.38 Crime di- Raudenbush, and Earls (1997)—promote co-verts a country’s limited resources towards operative efforts to define, monitor and con-crime prevention and control initiatives and demn undesirable behaviours occurring with-away from sectors that can fuel economic in a community. Absent these social ties andgrowth and human development such as relationships, communities cannot exerciseeducation and the maintenance of physical informal social control over their neighbour-infrastructure. Corruption helps discour- hoods. As a result of this diminished capac-age positive corporate investment decisions, ity for control, these neighbourhoods beginforeign investment and private and public experiencing elevated levels of crime and de-loans from abroad. In the Caribbean region, linquency relative to the neighbourhoods ofin particular, crime and corruption dampen other communities.39tourism. Potential tourists are alienated by Analysis of the data obtained through theviolence and criminal activities and search UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 sug-for other locations where there is no threat to gests that informal social control, communitypersonal safety. Finally, crime and corruption cohesion and social cohesion are generallycause Caribbean citizens to divert substantial lower in communities with street gangs. Inresources away from more productive and en- the Caribbean-7, neighbourhoods with gangstrepreneurial uses. Finances are squandered exhibited less community cohesion thanon bribes, compensating for bureaucratic de- neighbourhoods that did not have gangs (ta-lays, and engagement with organized crime ble 3.4).40 In five of the Caribbean-7, informalrather than on personal savings and invest- social control was significantly less in neigh-ment and human and social capital develop- bourhoods with gangs than in communitiesment. that did not have gangs.41 These findings sug- C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 79
  • 93. Table 3.4. Mean Levels of Informal Social Control and Community Cohesion3 with and without Gangs, Caribbean-7, 2010Street Gangs and Organized Crime Country Informal social control Community cohesion No gangs Gangs No gangs Gangs Antigua & −0.06 −0.42 −0.13 −0.71 Barbuda Barbados −0.10 −0.12 −0.15 −0.63 Guyana 0.15 −0.17 0.15 −0.44 Jamaica 0.31 0.13 0.41 −0.14 Saint Lucia 0.20 −0.31 0.03 −0.57 Suriname −0.20 −0.28 0.01 −0.17 Trinidad & −0.02 −0.32 0.13 −0.39 Tobago Caribbean-7 0.03 −0.23 0.07 −0.44 Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). ‘Gangs’ and ‘No gangs’ refer to the presence or absence of gangs in the neigh- bourhoods of respondents. *p<.05 gest that community cohesion and informal a sense of belonging to their nation. Feelings of social control might be important factors in societal inclusion were also significantly associ- understanding the causes of street gang for- ated with the presence of gangs in the neigh- mation in the Caribbean. bourhoods of respondents. Inclusion is the We also examined various dimensions of extent to which respondents believe they are social cohesion and their relationship to the similar to others in the country.43 In Antigua presence of gangs in the neighbourhoods of and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad respondents. Our results indicate that some and Tobago, respondents who lived in neigh- dimensions of social cohesion are specific to bourhoods with gangs were significantly less nations and that policy makers cannot neces- likely to feel a sense of inclusion. Participation sarily generalize across the Caribbean (table was also significantly related to the presence of 3.5). Across the Caribbean-7, respondents re- gangs in the neighbourhoods of respondents. siding in neighbourhoods with gangs were sig- Participation was measured by the willingness nificantly less likely to feel a sense of belonging of respondents to work with others to reduce than respondents residing in neighbourhoods violence and improve the country.44 In Barba- without gangs. Belongingness is the sense of dos, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, resi- pride and loyalty that respondents feel towards dents of neighbourhoods with gangs were less their countries.42 In Antigua and Barbuda, likely to state that they were willing to partici- Barbados, Guyana, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad pate with others to reduce violence or improve and Tobago, respondents who lived in an area the country. We also examined the relationship with gangs were significantly less likely to feel between neighbourhood gang presence and 80 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 94. Table 3.5. Mean Levels of Social Cohesion in Communities with and without Gangs,Caribbean-7, 2010 3 Street Gangs and Organized Crime Country Belonging Inclusion Participation Legitimacy Respect No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs gangs gangs gangs gangs gangs Antigua & −0.25 −0.82 −0.11 −0.56 −0.06 −0.56 −0.04 −0.53 −0.18 −0.50 Barbuda Barbados 0.17 −0.14 −0.06 −0.32 −0.39 −0.60 0.23 −0.02 −0.04 −0.31 Guyana −0.25 −0.56 −0.04 −0.49 −0.06 −0.28 −0.23 −0.64 −0.15 −0.47 Jamaica 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.06 0.32 0.20 0.21 0.04 0.21 0.01 Saint Lucia 0.00 −0.19 0.01 −0.05 0.23 −0.05 0.20 −0.02 0.28 0.04 Suriname 0.07 0.05 0.03 −0.07 −0.04 0.05 −0.09 −0.14 −0.08 −0.11 Trinidad & 0.20 −0.08 0.20 −0.22 0.11 −0.17 0.02 −0.47 0.18 −0.22 Tobago Caribbean-7 0.03 −0.23 0.03 −0.23 0.01 −0.11 0.04 −0.26 0.03 −0.21Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “Is there a criminal gang (or gangs) in your neighbourhood?” “To what extent is there acriminal gang problem in your neighbourhood?”the perceptions of respondents about the le- As a consequence of the lack of social co-gitimacy of the criminal justice system and the hesion, community cohesion and informalperceptions of respondents about the respect social control, as well as the lack of effectivegranted to them within society. Legitimacy formal social control to respond to gangswas measured by the willingness of respond- and organized crime, criminal groups haveents to support institutions such as the police filled the void, empowering them and help-and the courts and the views of respondents ing them become engrained into the fabric ofon judicial fairness.45 Respect was measured by local communities (see below and chapters 5the perceptions of respondents about whether and 6). In Jamaica, formal and informal socialthey were respected by their fellow citizens, control and social and community cohesionpeople earning more than them, and people of have deteriorated to such an extent that somedifferent ethnic origins.46 With the exception communities have turned to dons and streetof Suriname, the respondents in all the Car- gangs for help. Mogensen (2005) reports that,ibbean-7 who were living in neighbourhoods in Jamaica, citizens do not believe that thewith gangs scored lower on the legitimacy and police can effectively address crime, and theyrespect scales than the respondents who were seek justice from local dons through kangarooliving in neighbourhoods without gangs. To- courts. “When crimes are carried out withingether, these findings suggest that people living the community, dons enforce discipline, in-in neighbourhoods with gangs feel isolated, cluding beatings or executions, to an extentdisenfranchised and apathetic and are less sup- considered commensurate with the level ofportive of formal mechanisms of social control. the crime.”47 Dons also provide housing, food, C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 81
  • 95. medical assistance, policing services, early through the risk factor prevention paradigm.3 childhood education and other assistance to Risk factors are those characteristics or symp- citizens who are loyal, as well as greater oppor- toms that, if present, increase the odds that anStreet Gangs and Organized Crime tunities for political advancement to people individual will be involved in problem behav- with political aspirations.48 Research in Trini- iour. Conversely, protective factors are those dad and Tobago yielded similar findings. One characteristics or symptoms that, if present, community leader, when asked about this is- decrease the odds that an individual will be sue, stated, “Gangs bring down crime. They in- involved in problem behaviour.50 The risk and stituted a community court that meets weekly protective model has been used extensively in where young males are punished and given public health since researchers first learned strokes. . . . One to two local councillors have that heart disease was associated with risk gone to the courts to observe their practice.” factors such as tobacco use, lack of exercise, Another stated, “Gangs are the first ones to and family history of heart disease and that respond to crime; the police are incompetent, individuals were less likely to experience heart they take too long and never finish the work. disease if protective factors such as exercise If you go to the gang leader you know they will and low-fat diets were present in the individu- take care of you.” Still another explained, “If als’ lives.51 Since then, the risk and protective you live in a community where there is gang factor approach has been used extensively to cohesion you are more safe because they [pro- understand and develop public health policy tect you]. . . . Gangs provide safety, create jobs surrounding cancer, mental health, and dis- . . . , give people food, give mother’s milk for ease. Most recently, it has been applied to their babies.”49 Harriott (2008b) notes that, as achieve greater understanding of the reasons a consequence, leaders of street gangs and or- people join gangs. ganized crime groups have served as role mod- There is almost no research on the risk and els and mentors in some communities, which protective factors associated with street gang necessarily perpetuates a culture that places membership. Anecdotal evidence hints that additional value on these criminal organiza- membership is related to risk factors such as tions and their positive role in communities. neighbourhood social disorganization, neigh- bourhood levels of crime and drug use, lack Individual-Level Explanations of attachment to school, poor school perfor- Another approach to explaining and under- mance, unemployment, poor family manage- standing delinquent and criminal groups is ment, attachment to antisocial peers, and an Box 3.3. Deportees, Street Gangs and Organized Crime in the Caribbean In the Caribbean, public policy makers and residents have and 15 percent of deportees to Trinidad and Tobago were made claims that deportees from Canada, the United King- later charged with a crime. There have been similar findings dom and the United States have contributed to the prob- in Jamaica. However, the UNODC and World Bank report lems of gangs and organized crime in the region. The claims noted that, while most deportees are not involved in crime, have largely focused on the belief that individuals learn a small number might be responsible for much violence. For about criminal behaviour in developed nations and, after instance, the report states that, between 2001 and 2004, they have been deported home, are responsible for much of 224 individuals were deported to Jamaica who had previ- the crime. While there has been little research on this issue, ously been convicted of murder. The report concludes that, preliminary evidence indicates that deportees are not a ma- given the relatively small population of Jamaica, such a large jor contributor to crime and violence in the Caribbean. number of deportees can have a significant impact on local A joint report by UNODC and the World Bank (2010), for crime rates. example, shows that 13 percent of deportees to Barbados Source: Katz and Fox (2010). 82 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 96. individual’s prior involvement in delinquency Responding to Streetand drug use. The only empirical study to date Gangs and Organized Crime 3is the one conducted by Katz and Fox (2010) Street Gangs and Organized Crimein their examination of school-aged youth in Responses to street gangs and organizedTrinidad and Tobago. The authors report that crime groups can be varied and multidimen-gang involvement is associated with youth who sional (box 3.4). Domestic responses fall into(1) have parents with attitudes that favour an- five broad strategies, as follows: (1) suppres-tisocial behaviour, (2) live in neighbourhoods sion; (2) the provision of academic, economicthat are characterized by high mobility, (3) and social opportunities; (3) social interven-live in neighbourhoods in which handguns are tion; (4) community mobilization; and (5)widely available, (4) have been involved in an- organizational change and development. In-tisocial behaviour from an early age, (5) have ternational responses tend to focus on trea-the intention to use drugs, (6) have antisocial ties, inter-agency cooperation, and capacity-peers, and (7) have peers who use drugs. Also building. In the sections below, we discuss theof interest was their finding that school-related responses that have been implemented in therisk factors were not, for the most part, signifi- Caribbean to address street gangs and organ-cantly associated with gang involvement.52 The ized crime, and we discuss the public’s percep-case of deportees is also revealing (box 3.3). tions of these responses. Box 3.4. When Responding to Gangs Makes the Problem Worse Malcolm Klein (1995), an eminent gang scholar, notes that, strategies finds that they are ineffective in reducing gang in Los Angeles, gang sweeps by the police are not an effec- membership or gang crime.b Indeed, some of the research tive means of generating gang arrests and do not appear to indicates that these programmes lead to an increase in gang justify the US$150,000 a day that they cost the local police membership and gang delinquency. Klein (1971) reports department. Klein claims that such tactics may actually have a that the assignment of caseworkers increases the local repu- negative impact on the community’s gang problem. He argues tation of particular gangs, which helps attract new members that, because the majority of the people arrested were imme- and leads to more gang activity in the areas employing de- diately released without having been charged, gang cohesive- tached caseworkers. Spergel (1995) reports similar findings ness may have been strengthened, and the deterrent impact on in his examination of a programme that was designed to pro- gang members may have been reduced. vide job training and job opportunities for gang members in Suppression efforts in Central America have yielded simi- Chicago. Project staff were primarily comprised of gang lead- lar results. Mano Dura, the gang-reform programme in El ers from two of the largest gangs in Chicago. The analyses Salvador, criminalized gang membership, and, as a conse- indicate that the project was a failure by almost all accounts. quence, youth, even if they were only remotely associated Job training and placement efforts were unsuccessful; gang with gangs, were arrested, incarcerated and then discrimi- structures became more sophisticated; and the number of nated against upon their return to their communities from gang-motivated homicides rose. As a consequence, many prison. The policy had the unintended impact of increasing policy makers no longer believe that prevention and social gang cohesion and the proliferation of gangs.a intervention approaches represent a successful method to A number of researchers have evaluated the impact of other deal with gangs. This has led to a general decrease in in- prevention and social intervention approaches on gang tervention efforts conducted by youth-oriented agencies, membership and gang crime. While a few studies report which have since undertaken more general prevention ini- some positive impacts, most of the research examining these tiatives aimed at younger at-risk youth.c a. USAID (2006). b. Short (1963); Spergel (1995). c. Spergel (1986). C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 83
  • 97. Suppression demolish the gangs identified; and (3) open a3 Suppression is the main approach that is used Proceeds of Crime Act file on each person ar- by Caribbean nations to respond to street rested or charged with a serious gang or drug-Street Gangs and Organized Crime gangs and organized crime. The suppression related crime.55 Security officials report that strategies are typically reactive in nature and this crime-fighting strategy has resulted in a make use of criminal law to control behaviour. 44 percent reduction in killings in the first The objective of the strategies is not only to quarter of 2011 compared with the same pe- address immediate issues (to arrest individuals riod in 2010.56 Trinidad and Tobago was one for criminal activity, for example), but also to of the first nations in the Caribbean to estab- deter youth and adults from joining gangs and lish a specialized unit with trained personnel organized crime groups and discourage gang to respond to gangs. Trinidad and Tobago’s members from engaging in future crime. Typi- Gang/Repeat Offender Task Force—since cal tactics involve arrest, prosecution, interme- disbanded (see below)—was established in diate sanctions, and imprisonment by criminal May 2006 and staffed with approximately 40 justice officials. sworn officers.57 The unit was trained by gang While general law enforcement strate- specialists (sworn officers) from the United gies have been used to respond reactively to States, and the staff included a coach (a for- crimes perpetrated by gangs, no nation, with mer sworn officer from the United States) the exception of Jamaica and of Trinidad and who was responsible for mentoring the unit’s Tobago, have focused efforts on the gang leadership. The unit was responsible for ap- members or gangs that are disproportionately prehending wanted persons, collecting gang involved in gang crime. Most of these nations intelligence, disseminating information to lack sufficient intelligence services to iden- units across the police service, and conduct- tify accurately the members of gangs or the ing random patrols in areas with gang prob- main groups involved in violence. The police lems. response has generally lacked the adequate Much of the response to organized crime focus on persons and places that can lead to in the Caribbean has come through the enact- good results. ment of legislation and drug-related interna- Operation Kingfish was launched in Ja- tional treaties. These treaties support the op- maica in 2004 to restore community confi- erational work of the United Nations Office dence and reduce the fear of crime by target- on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and help ing dons and leaders of gangs and by breaking secure membership in regional and interna- up organized crime groups. The operation tional organizations that foster collaboration task force reportedly made a major dent in or- and cooperation to suppress drug-trafficking. ganized crime, effected the arrest of some of However, in many ways, the legislation and Jamaica’s most wanted men, smashed at least treaties have served more as symbolic re- two gangs, and disrupted six others.53 Jamai- sponses to the problem rather than as effec- can police stepped up their efforts in 2011, tive means to combat organized crime. Carib- targeting 47 groups, particularly those with bean nations have not had the law enforcement more sophisticated ties to local political par- capacity to implement many of the laws they ties. The new strategy appears to be focused have passed, and the result has been suppres- on local police commanders, who identify the sion strategies targeting end-users and street- three worst criminal groups in their jurisdic- level drug traffickers, rather than apprehending tions and undertake suppression efforts.54 Ad- those who profit most from drug-trafficking. ditionally, the Jamaica Constabulary Force, Some effort has been made to address other through an enhanced anti-gang strategy, has types of activity associated with organized recently identified the dismantling of gang ac- crime such as money laundering, bribery and tivities as a priority. It requires officers to (1) fraud; however, these efforts have been ham- focus on streets and public spaces; (2) iden- pered by lack of financial resources and person- tify, profile and act to disrupt or completely nel with the relevant investigative skills. 84 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 98. Recently, the Global Commission on Drug the past few years, the Jamaican ConstabularyPolicy, a group comprised of current and past Force has been accused of killing civilians in 3influential statesman from Brazil, Columbia, pursuit of gang members. One report indicat- Street Gangs and Organized CrimeGreece, Mexico, Switzerland, the United ed that, as part of its crackdown on gangs, 253States, and other nations, as well as influential civilians were killed by police in 2009, andleaders from the United Nations, proclaimed another 400 were killed in 2010. The increasethat, after 50 years of financing and repressive in 2010 was, in large part, a consequence ofmeasures, the global war on drugs has failed. police saturating Tivoli Gardens, a garrisonThey argued that suppressive strategies aimed neighbourhood controlled by gangs, to cap-at traffickers and consumers have not taken ture Christopher Coke, a drug lord.60 Third,into consideration that other traffickers too evaluations of the police response to gangs inrapidly replace those who have been appre- the Caribbean have shown that suppressivehended. The Global Commission on Drug efforts are generally ineffective. For example,Policy (2011, 2) also pointed out that these in Trinidad and Tobago, the Gang/Repeatsame suppressive efforts obstructed “public Offender Task Force made 495 arrests fromhealth measures to reduce HIV/AIDS, over- May 2006 through August 2007. Of those ar-dose fatalities and other harmful consequenc- rested, only 110 (22.2 percent) were charged;es of drug use” and that suppressive efforts the rest were released or transferred. Moreo-aimed at violence related to drug markets ver, the police capacity to collect, maintain(that is, gangs and organized crime groups and disseminate intelligence—a core func-fighting over turf ) resulted in higher homi- tion of the task force—was poor, unorganizedcide rates and decreased overall public safety. and unreliable.61The Consequences andLimitations of Suppression Chart 3.5 Perceived Confidence in the Ability ofIn the Caribbean, similar to early efforts in de- the Police to Control Gang Violence,veloped nations, the police response to gangs Caribbean-7, 2010has been limited and has experienced sub-stantial setbacks.58 First, while police policies 45that define the gang phenomenon have begun 39.0 40to emerge, the policies are not well knownamong the police services and are rarely fol- 35 29.7lowed. This has led to unreliable gang intel- 30ligence. Officers do not necessarily document 24.0 25 23.5 23.1 23.4individuals because of the behaviour of these Percent 19.1individuals. Instead, they document individu- 20als according to the ideas, beliefs and biases 15of the police. Second, specialized police units 9.9 10dedicated to responding to gangs are them-selves frequently the target of suspicions 5about serious misconduct and human rights 0violations. For example, in Trinidad and To- Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7bago, the Gang/Repeat Offender Task Forcehad to be disbanded after it was accused ofinvolvement in kidnappings, passing infor-mation to criminals about imminent policeraids, providing illegal extra security at night- Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Using a scale from 1 to 5, indicate howclubs, running ghost gangs to acquire public much confidence you have in the police to effectively control gang violence. Use ‘1’ for a low level of confidence and ‘5’ for a high level of confidence.” The chart shows the percentage ofmoney fraudulently, and participation in nu- respondents answering “High” and “Very high”..merous extrajudicial killings.59 Similarly, over C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 85
  • 99. Table 3.6. Confidence of Neighbourhood Residents in the Police, Caribbean-7, 20103 percentStreet Gangs and Organized Crime Country Murder Gang violence Drug- Powerful Crime in trafficking criminals general No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs gangs gangs gangs gangs gangs Antigua & 29.2 19.4 28.2 20.4 23.1 20.4 9.0 2.7 10.7 3.2 Barbuda Barbados 45.3 37.7 45.6 43.3 41.4 43.7 11.7 3.8 17.6 14.0 Guyana 23.9 17.8 17.9 9.6 17.8 10.1 5.8 3.4 6.9 3.4 Jamaica 22.7 21.4 22.8 22.0 20.5 17.9 9.1 5.8 11.7 6.9 Saint Lucia 20.2 21.1 19.8 23.3 18.5 19.9 6.2 9.1 7.2 6.6 Suriname 34.6 36.0 30.4 28.5 27.7 24.8 9.5 12.2 12.4 15.3 Trinidad & 9.5 4.1 11.4 4.5 10.6 4.5 3.5 1.8 3.7 0.9 Tobago Caribbean-7 26.7 21.3 25.4 20.5 23.0 19.2 7.9 5.7 10.2 6.8 Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “How much confidence do you have in the police to effectively control the crime problem in your country?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “A great deal of confidence”. ‘Gangs’ and ‘No gangs’ refer to the presence or absence of gangs in the neighbourhoods of respondents. *p<.05 According to analysis of the UNDP Citi- with gangs. Second, Barbados and Trinidad zen Security Survey 2010, only 24 percent of and Tobago were outliers in our measures. respondents in the Caribbean-7 had confidence Specifically, resident confidence in the po- in the police to control gang violence (chart lice to control crime was relatively high in 3.5). In Trinidad and Tobago, fewer than 10 Barbados, but, in Trinidad and Tobago, few percent of respondents were confident that the residents stated they had high confidence in police could perform this task. Respondents the police. Third, residents in all Caribbean-7 in Barbados showed the highest level of confi- nations had little confidence in the ability of dence, at only 39 percent. the police to control crime in general or the In the Caribbean-7, survey respondents criminal activity of powerful criminals. The in neighbourhoods with gangs have even less public appears to believe that the police and, confidence in the ability of the police to con- potentially, the judicial system are heavily in- trol gang crime (table 3.6). Relative to crimes fluenced by organized crime and that the re- in general, respondents expressed more con- sponse of the police to crimes of a less serious fidence in the ability of the police to solve nature, but experienced more frequently by crimes involving homicide, gang violence residents is rarely effective. and drug-trafficking. A few other findings are The problem, however, is more compli- also of particular interest. First, in Jamaica, cated than residents simply having little con- Saint Lucia and Suriname, confidence in the fidence in the police and believing that judges crime-fighting ability of the police did not and the justice system are corrupt. Because significantly vary even in neighbourhoods they believe criminals are too powerful, sur- 86 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 100. Table 3.7. Residents Who Do Nothing about Crime Because Criminals Are TooPowerful, Caribbean-7, 2010 3 Street Gangs and Organized Crimepercent Country No gangs Gangs Overall Antigua & Barbuda 4.2 2.8 4.0 Barbados 0.8 4.5 1.3 Guyana 9.4 8.4 8.9 Jamaica 8.3 21.8 10.4 Saint Lucia 4.2 12.1 6.5 Suriname 3.2 7.8 3.6 Trinidad & Tobago 5.4 11.9 6.6 Caribbean-7 4.8 10.4 5.7Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.Note: Base: respondents who answered that there was no neighbourhood response to crime (N = 4391). Questions: “Whathas been done about crimes in your neighbourhood?” “If nothing, why?” The chart shows the percentage of respondentswho answered “The people who are involved in the violence/crimes are too powerful”. ‘Gangs’ and ‘No gangs’ refer to thepresence or absence of gangs in the neighbourhoods of respondents. *p<.05vey respondents also do nothing about crime The Need for Intervention and Prevention(table 3.7). This finding was particularly If implemented properly, suppression can bepronounced in neighbourhoods with gangs. an important strategy in addressing streetAbout 4.5 percent of respondents in Barba- gangs and organized crime, but it is only partdos, 12.0 percent in Saint Lucia and in Trini- of the solution. Suppression strategies typi-dad and Tobago, and 22.0 percent in Jamaica cally address problems that already exist; theyreported that they did not respond to crime do little to prevent individuals from joiningbecause criminals were too powerful. gangs or organized crime groups, and they do While it is difficult to assess what re- not address the social conditions that give risespondents mean by ‘too powerful’, prior re- to these gangs and groups. Caribbean govern-search in Trinidad and Tobago suggests that ments have been slow to adopt such interven-this answer may be related to the perceived tion and prevention strategies (box 3.5).inability of the police to do something about It is necessary for Caribbean nations tothe problem and the perceived belief that implement mobilization tactics that focus ongang members will seek retribution. For ex- the development of community coalitions in-ample, through a community survey in the volving schools, churches and public healthneighbourhood of Gonzales in Trinidad and and criminal justice agencies for the purpose ofTobago, Johnson (2006a, 2006b) found that coordinating services and developing collabo-more than 85 percent of residents had heard rative responses to gangs and organized crime.gun-shots in the previous 30 days, but only 7 Collaborative efforts that have been undertak-percent had reported the gun-shots to police. en are often not focused solely on gang issues.At the same time, 86 percent of the respond- Likewise, Caribbean nations should imple-ents stated they believed gangs would retali- ment opportunity provision strategies aimedate against people who reported gang-related at addressing the root causes of gangs andcrimes to police. organized crime. This approach assumes that C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 87
  • 101. 3 Box 3.5. On the Horizon: Caribbean Anti-Gang LegislationStreet Gangs and Organized Crime As of late 2011, no Caribbean nation had enacted legisla- a second conviction. Likewise, individuals who aid gang tion that defines gangs, gang membership, or gang crime. members may be imprisoned for up to 25 years. Gang legislation can supply an opportunity for public dis- There are a number of troublesome aspects to these legis- course on the scope and nature of the problem and can of- lative initiatives. First, they do not define a gang or gang fer policy makers an opportunity to define concepts. Well- membership, nor do they place a check—a quality-control developed legislation provides guidelines and supports the review, for example—on the discretion of the police or the police in documenting gangs and gang membership. It can courts in labelling a group as a gang or a person as a gang also represent an opportunity for citizens to review gang- member. Second, the proposed legislation would have only related police records, the success or failure of anti-gang limited impact in suppressing gang membership, gangs, or initiatives, and decisions related to the identification of gang activity. Both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have gang status. low clearance and detection rates in gang-related crime. Two nations have begun the process of enacting gang leg- For example, Katz and Maguire (2006) report that, in 53 islation: Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Both nations homicide investigations associated with gang activity in are seeking to criminalize gang membership and individu- one Trinidadian community, there were only three arrests als who assist gang members. The legislation provides the and no convictions. While the legislation may have a mod- police in both nations with greater authority to search and est effect on arrest rates, it would likely have no impact on seize individuals involved in gangs. Thus, the proposed leg- the conversion of arrests to convictions. Instead, the leg- islation in Trinidad and Tobago—Act No. 10 of 2011— islation may have the undesirable effect of increasing the would allow the police, without a warrant, to enter and probability that gang members will threaten witnesses be- search any location where they believe gang members may cause of the severity of the potential sentences if they are be found. Furthermore, gang members would be sentenced convicted to 10 years in prison for a first conviction and 20 years for many individuals become involved in criminal and involvement with criminal groups. The groups to obtain goals and resources because programmes focus on the supply of services they do not have access to legitimate opportu- to an entire population or to populations in nities. These strategies focus on improving the high-risk communities. Primary prevention academic, economic and social opportunities services can be provided to youth, families, or of disadvantaged youth. They often rely on job communities by schools, NGOs, government training and job placement, educational initia- agencies and faith-based groups. Examples tives and the development of problem-solving of such programmes include school-based skills. The use of social intervention strategies instruction, individual- and family-based life is also lacking. Social intervention strategies skills training and public service opportuni- often rely on outreach workers to supply im- ties.63 There are few formal prevention efforts mediate services to gang members in moments aimed at dissuading youth in the Caribbean of need. For example, following a violent inci- from becoming involved in street gangs or or- dent, an outreach worker may provide counsel- ganized crime groups. ling, crisis intervention, or temporary shelter. Outreach workers also undertake inter-gang Conclusion mediation, group counselling and conflict res- olution among gangs.62 This chapter argues that street gangs and or- Primary prevention programmes are also ganized crime contribute significantly to the needed for youth in the Caribbean. The goal levels of criminal violence and other forms of such programmes is to change life trajec- of crime and undermine the rule of law in tories among youth by offering encourage- the region. Street gangs and organized crime ments for them to avoid gang membership should therefore be among the most impor- 88 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 102. tant concerns for Caribbean policy makers in trafficking and fraud. While less visible thantheir goal of improving human development street gangs, but perhaps more consequen- 3in the region. A key first step is to understand tial, organized crime has infiltrated state in- Street Gangs and Organized Crimethe scope and nature of the problem, the caus- stitutions in many Caribbean nations to thees of the problem, and contemporary respons- extent that the public believes the rule of lawes to the problem if we are to address street has been substantially compromised.gangs and organized crime in the Caribbean An examination of the causes and corre-effectively. This chapter highlights several ma- lates of criminal groups in the Caribbean re-jor findings with respect to these issues. These veals that informal social control, communitymajor findings are summarized below. cohesion and social cohesion are generally The scope and character of the problem lower in communities with street gangs. Ad-vary across nations in the Caribbean. Antigua ditionally, there is evidence that youth whoand Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Saint Lu- have parents with antisocial attitudes, whocia and Suriname appear to have street gang live in communities in which guns are avail-problems, but the extent and nature of these able, who have engaged in antisocial behav-problems are unclear because of the lack of iour at an early age, and who have peers whoavailable information. Data do suggest, how- have engaged in delinquency and drug use areever, that Guyana is experiencing problems more likely to be involved with street gangs.with organized crime. The problems are suf- Finally, Caribbean nations lack the infra-ficiently substantial to influence the national structure and capacity to respond effectivelyeconomy and have been associated with sig- to street gangs and organized crime. This isnificant corruption. The research findings in- illustrated by the fact that crimes associateddicate that street gangs and organized crime with street gangs and organized crime groupsare a serious major issue in Jamaica and in rarely lead to arrests and even more rarely leadTrinidad and Tobago. to convictions. This is also illustrated by the Despite the variations in scope, our find- fact that, in Jamaica and in Trinidad and To-ings suggest that there is some consistency in bago, where street gangs and organized crimethe characteristics of street gangs and organ- groups appear to be more well developed, theized crime groups across the Caribbean. For formal social control mechanisms in someexample, these gangs and groups are largely neighbourhoods have broken down to thecomprised of poor young men (or young point that criminal groups are now providingmen from poor backgrounds). While young many vital social services—such as policing,women are also involved in these groups, their welfare services and even education—thatinvolvement in violence and other crimes is state institutions can no longer adequatelysubstantially less than that of the young men. provide.Street gangs often lack formal leadership andstructure and are frequently bound togetherby symbols and turf; organized crime groupsare more sophisticated with respect to struc-ture and leadership. The incidence of homicide and otherforms of violence has risen sharply as a con-sequence of street gangs and organized crime.The association between street gangs andhigher rates of neighbourhood homicide issignificant, and, in neighbourhoods in whichstreet gangs are located, residents report muchhigher rates of victimization through violenceand property crimes. Organized crime groupsare associated with violence, high-level drug- C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 89
  • 103. 4CHAPTER The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security
  • 104. An open ear is more powerfulthan an iron fist – involve thecommunityEarn the confidence of thecommunity by being open, fairand accountable in safeguardingsecurityRespect citizens’ rights whileensuring security
  • 105. 4CHAPTER The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 4 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security Introduction accept the responsibility of helping to pro- duce their own security by becoming co-pro- Historically, in nations under colonial rule, ducers of safety and crime control alongside formal social control of the population was their police.5 undertaken by a security force that had the This chapter analyses the evolution of the mission of maintaining the status and prerog- security sector in the Caribbean, describes atives of the colonizers and their political and aspects of the historical background and con- social elites. Therefore, post-colonial nations text of the efforts to reform the police forces striving for full democracy, economic devel- of the region and explores the perceptions of opment, social stability and citizen security the performance of police forces by Caribbe- must find ways to evolve the role of security an citizens. The main focus is the seven Carib- personnel into one whereby the rights of bean countries (the Caribbean-7) in which we all people are protected and defended. This have conducted the UNDP Citizen Security means that the security agency must transi- Survey 2010. The chapter argues for a more tion from a state security–oriented force to thoroughgoing transformation of Caribbean a citizen-oriented force. This type of force police forces that is consistent with the no- should include professional managers, a per- tion of citizen security. sonnel system that makes the force represent- ative of the population it has sworn to serve Policing Under Colonial Rule: and a standardized method so that citizens State-Oriented Security can share their grievances with police, and it must include officers who see their first duty The police forces imposed by colonial powers as loyalty to their countrymen and the rule of in many countries during the last century or law, not the state or its political leaders.1 earlier had a number of common characteris- The other necessary change in the transi- tics, as follows:6 tion to an effective, democratic police force • Their primary role was to maintain the sta- must take place in the minds of citizens. Citi- tus and prerogatives of the colonial politi- zens must begin to perceive changes in the cal and social elites that ruled the country. police function and, more importantly, must • Police functioned as a paramilitary organi- experience for themselves treatment by po- zation. lice officers that is respectful of their rights, • Police stayed in station houses, only leaving courteous and fair.2 Citizens have to believe to enforce governmental crackdowns on that laws are enforced equally among all citi- demonstrations, riots and crimes against zens, regardless of social status, and that the the colonizers and, to a lesser extent, major police are responsive to their needs and will crimes against other people. use only appropriate force to ensure a safe so- • Authority and responsibility were held ciety.3 However, the citizenry must not view by top police officials only; officers lower the state as the sole provider of security from down the hierarchy had little discretion in crime and disorder.4 Citizens must resist the the performance of their duties. urge to allow or encourage the state to imple- • Interaction with local people was limited ment draconian laws that limit human and to treating them as suspects or accomplic- civil rights in a misguided attempt to control es, never as resources for solving crimes or a spiraling crime rate. Rather, citizens must as potential crime victims. C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 93
  • 106. The policing model deployed in the Eng- administrative staffs to address crime and dis-4 lish-speaking colonial Caribbean was based order in London proactively. They did this by on the Irish Constabulary, which was formally establishing street patrols and engaging withThe Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security established in 1822.7 This constabulary was citizens. The constables prided themselves on designed to quell governmental disruption in responding to citizen reports of victimization, Ireland and control political and social dissent. investigating reported crimes and capturing It was a well-armed paramilitary force that was and charging perpetrators. To accomplish primarily concerned with the protection of the this, they were assigned to geographical dis- state and not with the quality of life or human tricts with the mandate to get to know local rights among the citizenry. The model was im- families and community organizations for the plemented in the English-speaking Caribbean purpose of intervening early with individuals and other British colonies; the role of the po- or groups that might commit criminal acts lice as protector of the state was most poign- and building trust and respect so that com- antly exhibited during the labour unrest in the munity members would alert them whenever Caribbean in the late 1930s.8 interventions were needed.11 The independence gained by the British This focus on police-citizen relations and colonies in the Caribbean in the second half citizen cooperation with the police relies on of the 20th century did little to change the three principles, as follows: (1) citizens co-pro- role of the police. Rather than protecting the duce security in cooperation with the police, old colonial government, the police protect- (2) police function as problem solvers, and (3) ed the newly independent governments.9 The the police and the populace jointly seek organ- same was true in the nations of the Nether- izational changes in the police and in neigh- land Caribbean in which the police served to bourhoods that will improve crime prevention protect Netherland colonial interests to the and control. Community policing is a philoso- detriment of citizens. phy rather than a rigid set of requirements, and police agencies are expected and encouraged Modern-Day Policing: to apply the philosophy in ways that meet the The Citizen Security Approach specific, self-defined needs of the public.12 The underlying philosophy also implies a commit- One of the first steps in the modernization and ment on the part of the police to serve as a democratization of a police force was taken in catalyst for local change through outreach, or- London in 1829. The Peelian reforms, institut- ganizational initiatives and educational efforts ed by Sir Robert Peel, were based on the simple that reflect citizen input and concerns.13 Com- principle that police should be citizens pro- munity policing entails a commitment on the tecting citizens from crime and social disorder. part of the police to greater responsiveness and As a symbol of their citizen status, the police accessibility to citizens (see box 4.1). were dressed like the gentlemen of the time With the move towards community polic- and were not allowed to carry military-type ing, police officials began to realize that positive weapons. According to the premise underly- citizen perceptions of the legitimacy and com- ing the reform experiment, effective policing petence of the police were critical.14 Legitimacy required the confidence and the cooperation and competency are directly related to a police of the citizens of London. As Peel wrote in a force’s ability to control and prevent crime, as letter to the Duke of Wellington on 5 Novem- well as ensure citizen security from disorder, ber 1829: “I want to teach people that liberty victimization and insecurity.15 The role of the does not consist in having your house robbed populace is essential for excellent and effective by organised gangs of thieves, and in leaving policing because if citizens do not report crimes the principal streets of London in nightly pos- to the police, cooperate in police investigations session of drunken women and vagabonds.”10 and alert the police to potential crimes and The Peelian reforms required constables criminals, crimes are not solved and criminals of the London Metropolitan Police and their are not removed from the streets. Thus, citizen 94 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 107. Box 4.1. The Example of the Royal Grenada Police Force 4 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security The Royal Grenada Police Force provides a good example of innovation in community polic- ing. It has expanded the functions of patrol cars in some neighbourhoods to serve as substations where residents can file victimization reports and obtain information. The force conducted a competition among agency divisions that had to develop and carry out projects with members of neighbourhoods; the launch of the programme included a health fair, cultural displays and an open house to attract citizens. Source: Personal communication, James Clarkson, Commissioner, Royal Grenada Police Force, April 2010.participation and cooperation promote partner- integrity because corruption invariably com-ships with the police and the co-production of promises performance and weakens publiccrime prevention and control. Neighbourhoods confidence. This issue bridges both perfor-engaged in effective community policing yield mance and what may be called the problemnations in which citizens feel unthreatened by of values, authority and legitimacy. The thirdcrime and sufficiently secure to lead productive challenge is to reduce abuses of power and toand creative lives. become more rights-regarding.The Police in the Caribbean The Capability Challenges The responsiveness and effectiveness of po-This section provides a brief description of the lice services are related to capacities andmain challenges facing the police services of capabilities. Consistent with the size of thethe region. These include, first, the challenge populations in the region, Caribbean policeof improving effectiveness and responsiveness forces are small (see table 4.1). Still, policeto the security demands of citizens. We call density is greater in the Caribbean than inthis the problem of performance legitimacy. Latin America. There is a recurrent debateThe second is the challenge and imperative of among practitioners on the proper densityTable 4.1. Police Strength and Density, Caribbean-7, 2011number Country Strength Density Antigua & Barbuda 560 1:114 Barbados 1,415 1:190 Guyana 2,900 1:259 Jamaica 9,903 1:273 Saint Lucia 1,060 1:148 Trinidad & Tobago 6,302 1:201Sources: UNDP estimation based on data from Regional Security System, Christ Church, Barbados,; Jamaica Constabulary Force, The population estimates are taken from the most recent census and are therefore dated. Police reserves are ex-cluded for all countries except Jamaica, where the auxiliary, the Island Special Constabulary Force, is included becauseit consists of full-time, fully salaried officers. All part-time actual reserves are excluded. The data for Guyana are for 2007. C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 95
  • 108. of police officers per inhabitant. Despite the The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF)4 importance of this indicator, it depends on has a long and varied history in fighting cor- multiple factors, including the distribution ruption. Corruption within the JCF was aThe Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security of a population between rural and urban set- major reason behind the selection of individu- tings and the geography of the territory. als from outside the force as members of top The fairly high police densities across the management. For example, Trevor MacMillan, region suggest that, with the possible excep- a former military officer, was selected as com- tion of Guyana and Jamaica, coverage is not a missioner of police in 1993. In the following particularly acute problem. Perhaps the more two years, 572 allegations of misconduct were challenging issue is the effective use of these investigated. This represented approximately human resources. Adequate police strength 10 percent of the JCF at the time.17 After Mac- and density are conditions for effective ser- Millan’s tenure ended, the force sank back into vice delivery and the protection of the popu- a pattern of corruption. Currently, the JCF lation, but they are not sufficient conditions. is again making serious strides in combating The effectiveness and efficiency of even the internal corruption, and it is achieving fairly largest police services enjoying the best re- good results. Commissioner Ellington and the sources may be compromised by corruption. Ethics Committee have aggressively identified corrupt police officers and have terminated the The Integrity Imperative employment of these officers: 20 since the be- The performance and values dimensions of ginning of 2011, with 137 officers denied reen- legitimacy can be insidiously undermined by listment in 2010 because of allegations of cor- corruption. One of the major barriers to the ruption.18 The JCF is attempting to reform the adoption of more effective and efficient crime police culture from the acceptance of corrup- control methods and the meaningful inclu- tion to zero tolerance. The Jamaican example sion of citizens in police operations is corrup- demonstrates that the police can do something tion. Corruption is particularly devastating to to control corruption and thereby increase crime prevention and control efforts because their legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry. of the detrimental effect that it has on citizen perceptions and subsequent actions.16 Tankebe The Rights-Respecting Imperative (2009) notes that, in developing nations, the If corruption has the effect of weakening the relationships between the public and the po- values-based moral authority of the police, lice are fraught with distrust and alienation. abuses of power that take the form of a disre- In Suriname and in Trinidad and Tobago, 89 gard for the rights of citizens tend to have an percent of the respondents to the UNDP Citi- equal or even greater negative effect on this zen Security Survey 2010 believed that gov- dimension of the legitimacy of the police. In ernments should invest more in reducing cor- this area, there is considerable variation in the ruption so as to lower the incidence of crime. performance of Caribbean police forces. In the The respondents in Barbados were not as con- countries with high rates of violent crime, the cerned about corruption as those in the other abuses of citizen rights and, particularly, extra- six nations: only 71 percent agreed or strongly judicial killings tend to be more frequent than agreed that the government should invest in countries with lower homicide rates. This is more in reducing corruption. The Jamaican re- supported by data of the UNDP Citizen Se- spondents were the most concerned about this curity Survey 2010. Situational factors seem issue: 94 percent believed that corruption and to play an important role in determining these crime are linked and that government should outcomes. The governments and police ser- invest more in reducing corruption. Accord- vices of the region have tried to respond to the ingly, it is difficult to speak of the success of challenges by improving accountability and modern police reforms without simultane- capability and by introducing new methods of ously acknowledging the destabilizing role of policing that aim at greater responsiveness to corruption. needs and better relationships with citizens. 96 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 109. Accountability Based on the performance of these police ser-One of the challenges facing police forces in vices, these systems have not, however, proved 4the Caribbean, as elsewhere, is the necessity effective in ensuring a desirable level of crime The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Securityto improve accountability mechanisms. Ac- control or rights-respecting results. The expe-countability has the potential to enhance per- riences in the region indicate that the systemsformance, integrity and regard for the rights of accountability ought to be evaluated and,of citizens. perhaps, re-engineered so they may support To a greater or lesser extent, all the police the transformation of policing that is re-forces in the Caribbean suffer from the prob- quired.lems of unreformed police structures. The With the exception of Antigua and Bar-constitutions of the Caribbean countries that buda, the systems of internal accountabilityare members of the Commonwealth entrench include internal police investigative units thatconsiderable power in the hands of the prime investigate corruption and ensure profession-minister, including the power to appoint mem- al standards. These units have varying capa-bers of the police services commission after the bilities and, in some instances, are not robust.consent has been obtained from the governor Some capacity development may therefore begeneral or the president, as head of state. required. The police services commissions maketop-tier appointments to the police services, Changing the Relationship with Citizens:as well as senior promotions, and provide, in Community-Based Policethe main, retrospective oversight of the po- While these efforts to combat corruption arelice services. Table 4.2 describes the systems necessary, national leaders across the regionof accountability across the Caribbean. At have also sought to implement other initia-first look, most police services appear to have tives and programmes intended to increaseadequate external systems of accountability. the perceived legitimacy and competency ofTable 4.2. Police Accountability Systems, Caribbean-7, 2007 Country Police service Internal police Ombudsman Civilian over- commission investigative sight body division Antigua & Yes No No No Barbuda Barbados Yes Yes No Yes Guyana Yes Yes No Yes Jamaica Yes Yes Yes Yes Saint Lucia Yes Yes No Yes Suriname _ _ _ _ Trinidad & Yes Yes No Yes TobagoSource: Gomes (2007).Note: Jamaica relies on a police public complaints authority (a civilian body) and a police civilian oversight authority. Thenotation “— “ indicates unavailability of data. C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 97
  • 110. 4 Box 4.2. Rio de Janeiro: Community Policing in a Context of High Crime RatesThe Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security Throughout the 1990s, the police of Rio de Janeiro faced were problems. The small units had to confront powerful serious credibility issues because of severe human rights drug-trafficking networks, and many of the police volunteers abuses and the poor relations of the police with urban poor were not accustomed to these sorts of operations. Moreover, communities. In response to these problems, the police es- the resources were insufficient to realize an integrated, effec- tablished a unit, Grupamento de Aplicação Prático Escolar (lit- tive approach. erally, the group for Applied Practice), that was responsible Unidades de Policia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Units), for ensuring public security within communities. At the end the initiative currently being tried, represents quite a differ- of the 1990s, another initiative, Mutirão pela Paz (or Collec- ent approach. First, the units begin patrolling into the favelas, tive Effort for Peace), was undertaken by the police to deliver the poor shantytowns of Rio de Janeiro, where they confront social services to communities in an effort coordinated with and attempt to neutralize drug networks and suppress other labour, welfare and other governmental departments. criminal activities. Next, fresh graduates of the police academy In the 2000s, Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais who have received special training in community policing are (Police Unit for Special Areas) was created to patrol high-risk stationed in the favelas. However, they are not deployed in areas. Participating police officers had to be volunteers. The isolation. They are assisted through social services and other areas in which the units were active all had high homicide support programmes. This permits effective engagement with rates. Small police stations were opened in these areas. The community members and promotes a less repressive image of results were revealing; the units had an impressive effect in the police. These new units are larger and have more resources bringing together police and communities. However, there than the Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais. police forces. Many of these efforts have cen- mise with a change in administration and a tred on the adoption of community-oriented rapidly rising rate of violent crime. (See box policing. For example, Barbados made the 4.2 for an example of a similar context.) To- shift to a community-oriented approach be- day, Jamaica is trying again to reform the po- ginning in the 1970s. The establishment of lice. The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service the Office of Public Relations in the early has also adopted a community-oriented ap- 1980s was a crucial part of this transforma- proach, but, because of the high levels of vio- tion. The Community Policing Unit has been lent victimization among citizens that strain credited with reaching out to neighbour- police and the shortage of public resources, hoods through education and programmes these reforms have not been achieving pro- to help citizens protect themselves and their gress as quickly as desired. neighbours. The results of the UNDP Citi- The other Caribbean-7 nations have not zen Security Survey 2010 indicate that sup- achieved the same level of reform as Barba- port for police is greater in Barbados than in dos, but are not struggling as much as Jamaica the other Caribbean-7 nations; Barbadians or Trinidad and Tobago. For example, Suri- believe the police to be a legitimate force. name has also adopted a community policing Given these findings, it is not surprising that approach. Citizen involvement in crime pre- Barbados has been the most successful nation vention grew organically during the 1990s, in the region in instituting reforms that tran- when an increase in crime was coupled with sition the police force beyond older models of an economic downturn. Citizens formed policing. Jamaica made great strides towards their own neighbourhood watch groups be- reform beginning in the 1990s with the in- cause they were displeased with the effective- tent of increasing the transparency, effective- ness of the police. Such groups usually do not ness and legitimacy of the police. Communi- build a sense of general security because they ty policing was implemented along with these do not involve two-way communication and changes. However, the reform movement and coordination with the police. The formation community policing came to an untimely de- of these groups represented, however, an ef- 98 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 111. Box 4.3. Problem-Solving Partnerships in Suriname 4 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security The community police manager plays a fundamental role in solving conflicts and preventing violence at the community level. The manager is supervised by the police and, in 2006, involved the participation of commercial institutions, small businesses and individual citizens in the ac- tivities of 12 police subregions in the district of Paramaribo and in 3 rural districts. The manag- ers deal with problems such as the presence of informal street vendors or the need for parking spaces for private buses.fort by the citizenry to begin to take responsi- tween the 1950s and the 1980s.19 Chart 4.1bility for public safety. The police found ways summarizes the training programmes offered.of positively responding to this problem by It is based on information provided by theestablishing community police managers who security agencies of the respective countries.engaged with residents in problem-solving Investigative competence, use of force, human(box 4.3). rights, women’s rights, appropriate responses In 2009, Antigua and Barbuda imple- to gender-based violence and communitymented community policing based on the policing are curriculum topics in most of theprinciple of the co-production of security. training programmes.Police salaries were also increased. A formalcomplaint procedure for citizens was estab-lished, and other reforms were undertaken. Box 4.4. The Co-Production of Security in NicaraguaDespite the major changes, community-ori-ented policing has not been fully realized, In 2001, the national government established the Comprehensive Policy onand the police continue to behave in a largely the Police and the Community, which defined the concepts and strategies ofreactive manner by focusing on response a community policing model. Since 2004, the Proactive Community Polic-times. A recent initiative is intended to equip ing Model has brought together the government, NGOs and communitieslaw enforcement with the latest in computer to address the issues of violence and crime by sharing information and toand telecommunications technology, an ef- build trust, interaction and partnerships. The programme helps identify thefort that modernizes rather than reforms the security needs of citizens and address them through comprehensive initia-police and their relationship to the public. tives and planning.Although the modernization of equipment The Proactive Community Policing Model has four main components. Theis important in the Caribbean, it will not first is the operation of a police ‘total school’ that was established by the po-enhance feelings of security among citizens. lice academy and is used to train and develop officers throughout their ca-There must be reform aimed at improving reers. Police training and related programmes were also inaugurated in eachthe relationship between the police and the local police station. The second component involves fostering police-citizenpublic so that effective co-production of secu- partnerships to address local crime issues. The third is the commissioner forrity can occur. The Nicaraguan experience is women and children, a position created to address the prevention of domes-a good example of citizen-police partnership tic and sexual violence. The fourth component is the Adolescents and Youthfor the co-production of security (box 4.4). Affairs Department, which was created to address youth violence and rein- tegrate youth into their communities. The programme is being supported byDeveloping Capacity: the Youth Affairs Division of the National Police.Advancing Police Training and EducationAnother aspect that is important for the fu- Sources: UNDP (2009).ture of policing in the Caribbean is the modelof police training. All the Caribbean-7 coun-tries have police training academies. Theseinstitutions or units were all established be- C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 99
  • 112. 4 Chart 4.1 Incidence of Key Topics in Police Training Curricula percentThe Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security Women’s Rights 33 International Humanitarian Law 50 Gun Control 58 Intelligence 75 Fraud 83 Drug Control 83 Management 83 Gender Violence 83 Crowd Control 92 Community Policing 92 Use of Non-lethal Weapons 92 Suspect Interrogation Techniques 100 Traffic Control and Management 100 Investigation 100 Human Rights 100 Use of Lethal Weapons 100 Criminal Law 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Source: Data of CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, Note: Special thanks is owed to IMPACS for granting UNDP access to the report led by IMPACS and funded by the European Commission. Training in topics related to the treatment of Regional Cooperation people by the police are present across most The Conference of Heads of Government of or all of the programmes. These topics may be CARICOM, the Caribbean Community, at viewed as supportive of the transformation its 22nd Meeting, held in Nassau, the Bahamas process in the police forces of the Caribbean. in July 2001, expressed concern over the crime Likewise, skills training in topics such as drug and violence that continue to pose a threat to control, fraud investigation and intelligence regional security. This gave impetus to efforts to gathering and analysis are no less important. develop and intensify regional cooperation on The culture and structure of the institutions security matters. These efforts have been facili- also have to be considered to ensure the effec- tated by the establishment of the Regional Task tive application of positive principles and the Force on Crime and Security. improved performance of the police. More- At the regional level, significant training over, in the small countries of the region, the has been undertaken among senior-level po- rationalization of police training from a re- lice officials on specific issues such as drug- gional perspective would be of considerable trafficking, intelligence and management benefit to all. (box 4.5). The purpose is to foster a regional 100 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 113. Box 4.5. Caribbean Regional Police Training Centres 4 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security There are four regional training centres on security issues created in the 1980s to promote a collective response to se- in the Caribbean. curity threats among eastern Caribbean states. The current The Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Centre, member nations are Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Gre- located in Jamaica, trains officials in drug-related topics nada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vin- such as criminal law, management, intelligence, investiga- cent and the Grenadines. Trainees include police, military tion, drug control and suspect interrogation techniques. personnel and customs, prison and immigration officials. The courses address a wide range of law enforcement offi- Up to 30 trainees are accepted at a time, though none can cials, including military personnel, police, prison officials, be new recruits. Courses cover patrolling, investigation, immigration officers and customs officials. The institution crime forensics and diving. was established in 1996. It offers courses for 50 trainees at The Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre was created in a time. Trainees are full-standing staff, not recruits. 2007 to provide intelligence support to regional and in- The Caribbean Centre for Development Administration, ternational stakeholders and to serve as a mechanism of located in Barbados, trains immigration and customs of- intelligence integration in the region. Training is offered ficials and others. The overall aim is to enhance public gov- for police and military officials, as well as civilians involved ernance. The centre has only six instructors, all university in intelligence gathering. All course contents pertain to graduates, and 10 support staff. It was created in 1980 and intelligence gathering and analysis. Up to 25 trainees are offers courses for 30 trainees at a time. Trainees are recruits accepted. It does not train new recruits. and regular officers of all ranks. The Regional Security System, located in Barbados, was Source: Data of CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, Note: Special thanks is owed to IMPACS for granting UNDP access to the report led by IMPACS and funded by the European Commission.approach to common regional challenges and ceptions of respondents about the policeto establish a regional network of security op- in terms of the protection of the rights oferatives and officials. individuals and equitable treatment of all These various initiatives and programmes peoplehave advanced the process of change within • The performance and competence dimen-the police services of the region. This process sion of the legitimacy of the police, that is,should be intensified. The perceptions of the the perceptions of respondents about thepopulations of the region who are served by effectiveness of police in controlling spe-the police reveal the extent of concern about cific types of crimes in the community andthese issues and the extent of the demand for at the national levelchange. • The willingness of citizens to cooperate with the police in crime prevention and toPerceptions on the Police in the Carib- work with others in the community to re-bean Region duce violence. The public’s perceptions of the police areThis section presents analysis primarily of re- crucial in the transition to citizen security.sponses to questions on the UNDP Citizen The police must be viewed as possessing theSecurity Survey 2010 regarding experiences, legitimate authority to uphold and enforceopinions and perceptions about the police. the laws and the rights of citizens, as wellFour main topics are explored, as follows: as the competence to fulfil these duties in a• The effects of crime on the general sense of way that is fair, appropriate and respectful. If insecurity among citizens citizens view police in this light, they will be• Indicators of the values dimension of the more likely to cooperate with the police and legitimacy of the police, that is, the per- participate in crime prevention and control C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 101
  • 114. 4 Chart 4.2 The Role of Perceptions of the Police in Achieving Citizen SecurityThe Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security Perceive Police Legitimacy Citizen Co-production for Citizen Sense Participation and Crime Prevention of Security from Cooperation and Control Crime Perceive Police Competence efforts. As the role of citizens in crime preven- Violent crime was considered a more se- tion and control grows, citizens will begin to rious problem than property crime by the co-produce the positive outcomes along with respondents in almost all the Caribbean-7 the police, ultimately increasing the public’s countries. The fact that violent crime is per- sense of security from crime (chart 4.2). As ceived as more threatening is typical of most fear of crime lessens and the sense of security developed nations in the world, even though increases, citizens will become more able psy- the incidence of property crime is gener- chologically to pursue human development ally many times greater than the incidence of activities that enhance the quality of their violent crime.20 At the neighbourhood level, lives. robbery and day-time break-ins were rated as Crime is salient to citizens in the Carib- the first or second greatest crime problems in bean region. Less than half of the survey all the Caribbean-7 countries except Guyana respondents felt secure from crime (see and Jamaica. In Guyana, citizens worried the chapters 1 and 6). Given the high rates of most about robbery and night-time break-ins homicide, robbery, burglary, rape and domes- in their neighbourhoods; in Jamaica, murder tic violence documented in chapter 1, it is not was feared the most. surprising that insecurity is widespread. The In the rest of this section, we discuss the region is also facing economic challenges that two factors—shown in chart 4.2—that are are sometimes more immediate and threaten- predictive of a sense among citizens that they ing than the fear of becoming the victim of a are secure from crime: perceived police legiti- crime. It is therefore revealing that the survey macy and perceived police competence. If cit- found that nearly one fifth of the respondents izens see the police as credible agents of social said crime is the number one problem in their control operating under the rule of law and nations; a smaller percentage said crime was as competent in that role and worthy of assis- the first or second greatest problem in their tance and cooperation, then citizens are likely neighbourhoods. to feel secure from crime. Perceived legiti- 102 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 115. macy and perceived competence may both beeroded by the use by police of excessive force Chart 4.3 People Who Believe Police Treat Citizens 4 with Courtesy, Equality, Fairness andor by police corruption; so, it is important for The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security Respect, Caribbean-7, 2010police organizations to develop mechanisms percentand incentives that increase positive policeconduct and reduce misconduct. 19.3 17.6Perceived Police Legitimacy Antigua & 12.1If one perceives the police as a legitimate Barbuda 14.5agency for social control, then one believes 37.3that the policies and procedures of the police 31.2promote humane, equitable and consistently Barbados 27.2applied treatment among all citizens and that 32.1officers respect the rights of everyone.21 TheUNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 in- 17.2cluded eight questions concerning the perfor- 14.8 Guyanamance of the police with regard to their han- 12.4dling of civil rights, a key aspect of perceived 15.5legitimacy. To simplify the presentation of the 15.0results, we conducted a factor analysis to deter- 12.6mine the items that could be grouped together Jamaica 8.9in an empirical fashion.22 The analysis revealed 12.1that the way police deal with the civil rightsof citizens can be described according to three 24.0concept clusters: respect and fairness in deal- 20.2ing with citizens; the treatment of citizens Saint Lucia 14.8with courtesy; and on the basis of equality 21.4and respect for political rights. 11.1 The survey responses on the respect, fair-ness, equality and courtesy displayed by the po- 9.4 Surinamelice in their dealings with citizens are outlined 7.2in chart 4.3. The chart is based on respondent 10.0ratings on a five-point scale ranging from very 23.4poor to very good. The data displayed in the Trinidad & 21.2chart refer to the combined percentages of re- Tobago 15.1spondents who answered ‘good’ or ‘very good’. 16.0Across the three questions, an average of only 20.715 percent of the respondents gave ratings that 17.8indicated substantial perceived legitimacy. The Caribbean-7highest average percentage was associated with 13.7respect for the rights of citizens (20.7 percent), 17.1followed by fairness in dealing with people (18 Respect for Citizens’ Rights Treating People Equallypercent), courtesy towards citizens (17 per-cent), and equitable treatment of all people (14 Fairness in Dealing with People Courtesy to Ordinary Citizenspercent). The variation across the Caribbean-7is noteworthy. Among all respondents, the po-lice were perceived to be the most legitimate by Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “How do you rate the performance of therespondents in Barbados, while the police were police on the following items? Courtesy to ordinary citizens; respect for citizens rights; fairness in dealing with people; treating people equally.” The chart shows the percentage of respon-perceived to be the least legitimate by respond- dents who answered “Good” or “Very good”.ents in Trinidad and Tobago. These findings are C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 103
  • 116. 4 Chart 4.4 People Who Believe Police Respect Their Rights and the Rights of All Citizens, Caribbean-7, 2010The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 60 51.8 50 48.8 39.7 40 37.7 37.9 36.3 33.0 Percent 30.2 30 25.7 23.9 23.3 19.3 20.7 20 17.2 15.0 11.1 10 0 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 Respect for All Citizens’ Rights Respect for Your Rights Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Using a scale from 1 to 5, please rank the extent to which the po- lice have generally been respectful of your rights as a citizen. Use ‘1’ for very respectful and ‘5’ for very disrespectful.” A similar question associated with a different rating scale was asked about respect for the rights of others. The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “respectful” or “very respectful”. supported by a study that examined calls for po- lied on different five-point rating scales; the lice service assistance by citizens in three of the answers are thus not strictly comparable. The Caribbean-7.23 Using the proportion of calls results suggest, however, that the respondents related to non-criminal matters as an indicator tended to feel their own rights are respected of legitimacy, the study found that Barbadian more than those of their fellow citizens. Thus, citizens regard their police as more legitimate almost 49 percent of the respondents in Saint than the citizens in either Trinidad and To- Lucia felt that the police respected their bago or Jamaica. The police in Barbados have rights, but fewer than half of this 49 percent also achieved the greatest amount of reform, believed that their fellow citizens were treated while the police in Trinidad and Tobago are in a respectful manner. Agreement that the struggling to keep pace with the high levels of police showed respect for the rights of other criminal activity there. The other four coun- citizens averaged only 21 percent across the tries fall somewhere in between. Caribbean-7, while respect for the respond- Respondent perceptions of the respect ents’ own rights averaged 39 percent. Except shown by the police for citizen rights gener- in Barbados, neither set of answers seemed ally and for civil rights in particular are out- to indicate that the police in the region are lined in chart 4.4. The two relevant survey regarded as legitimate. This finding is likely questions probed police legitimacy through related to the perception that the police are the perceptions of respondents on the re- corrupt. In any case, it appears these countries spect displayed by police for the rights of face a significant challenge in seeking citizen the respondents, but also the rights of other cooperation with the police or citizen co-pro- citizens. The questions were asked at differ- duction in crime prevention and control. ent points in the survey interviews and re- 104 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 117. Chart 4.5 Victims of Domestic Violence Who Believe Police 4 Treated Them with Respect, Caribbean-7, 2010 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 50 42.2 38.2 Percent 40 38.9 34.5 32.2 31.0 30.0 32.9 30 29.9 29.9 27.5 24.3 25.3 24.1 22.5 20 16.0 10 0 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 Female Male Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents who declared they had reported an incident of domestic violence to the police (N = 1,192). Question: “Please rank the extent to which the police have generally been respectful of your rights as a citizen.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “respectful” or “very respectful”. The pattern is different among victims of the percentage of respondents in the Carib-domestic violence (chart 4.5). The level of bean-7 who chose the last two answers. Re-satisfaction of these people, both men and spondents in Barbados showed the greatestwomen, regarding their treatment by police is amount of confidence in the competence oflow. the police in this area: 16.7 percent respond- ed “a great deal”, and 65.4 percent respondedPerceived Police Competence and “some confidence”. As above, this is not sur-Performance prising given the transformation of the policeThe perception that police officers and police in Barbados. For example, the Royal Barbadosagencies are competent rests on the belief that Police Force has recently improved its alreadythe police can control crime through preven- well-regarded services by expanding outreachtion activities and by solving criminal cases, to rural areas. If we sum the two response op-as well as the perception that the police are tions within each country, the data show thateffective in carrying out their myriad other more than 55 percent of the respondents inresponsibilities.24 The UNDP Citizen Secu- each country felt some confidence or a greatrity Survey 2010 included three questions deal of confidence in the ability of the policethat measured perceived competence. The to control crime.first question asked respondents to gauge The survey findings show that the confi-how much confidence they had in the ability dence of respondents in the police also mir-of the police to control crime effectively: no rors the assessment by respondents of theconfidence, some amount of confidence, or performance of the police in controlling twoa great deal of confidence. Chart 4.6 displays major crimes: robbery and burglary (com- C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 105
  • 118. 4 Chart 4.6 Perceived Confidence in the Police to Control Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 70 65.4 62.5 62.1 60 59.4 59.1 57.3 53.9 52.7 50 Percent 40 30 20 16.7 14.3 14.3 15.5 11.6 11.9 10 6.7 4.6 0 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 Some Amount of Confidence A Great Deal of Confidence Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “How much confidence do you have in the police to effectively control the crime problem in your country?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “A great deal of confidence” or “Some amount of confidence”. pare charts 4.6 and 4.7). The respondents in the measures so far discussed, and this trend Barbados had the greatest confidence in the continued with regard to performance. In police: around 82 percent had a great deal contrast, the respondents in Trinidad and To- of confidence or some confidence in the po- bago had little confidence in the police and lice (chart 4.6). Their rating of police perfor- also rated the performance of the police the mance in controlling robbery and burglary lowest in controlling robbery and burglary. was also the highest relative to respondents Suriname was second to Barbados: 77.6 per- in the rest of the Caribbean-7: 40 percent of cent of the respondents there indicated they the respondents in Barbados rated the police had confidence in the police to address the good or very good in controlling both rob- crime problem, while 29.1 and 27.7 percent, bery and burglary (chart 4.7). Respondents in respectively, rated the police as good or very Trinidad and Tobago showed the least con- good in controlling robbery and burglary. fidence in the police: 58 percent had a great It is also evident in chart 4.7 that the per- deal of confidence or some confidence in the ceptions of the police control of robbery (that police (chart 4.6). They also rated police per- is, theft from a person) tracks closely with formance the poorest in controlling robbery perceptions of the police control of burglary and burglary: only 10 percent rated the po- (theft from a building, car, home, and so on), lice good or very good in these areas (chart even though the latter is a much more frequent 4.7). As seen in charts 4.3, 4.4 and 4.6, the crime in the Caribbean. Another conclusion respondents in Barbados rated the police as is that, although the respondents have more the most legitimate and most competent on or less confidence in the police to control the 106 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 119. Chart 4.7 Perceived Performance of the Police in Controlling 4 Robbery and Burglary, Caribbean-7, 2010 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 50 40 39.4 40.1 30 29.1 Percent 27.1 27.7 25.4 23.5 24.123.7 20.6 20.5 20 19.8 20.8 19.8 10.5 10.8 10 0 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 Burglary Robbery Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Using a scale from 1 to 5, indicate how much confidence you have in the police to effectively control the following crimes: robbery and burglary. Use ‘1’ for a low level of confidence and ‘5’ for a high level of confidence.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “High” or “Very high”. Chart 4.8 Perceived Performance of the Police in Controlling Domestic Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 40 31.9 30 28.9 27.4 27.1 22.9 23.3 23.9 25.6 23.0 22.9 21.7 20 19.6 20.7Percent 18.0 10.8 10 8.9 0 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 In country (Good + Very good) In community (Good + Very good) Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Using a scale from 1 to 5, indicate how much confidence you have in the police to effectively control domestic violence. Use ‘1’ for a low level of confidence and ‘5’ for a high level of confidence.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Good” or “Very Good”. C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 107
  • 120. crime problem, they do not feel that the police more on training officers in domestic violence4 are performing at an appropriate level. prevention and intervention and implement Chart 4.8 focuses on the perceived perfor- best practice in this area. Noteworthy also isThe Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security mance of the police in controlling domestic the fact that the respondents rate the perfor- violence in the communities and the coun- mance of police in their communities more tries of the respondents. The findings show favourably than the performance of police in that the rating by respondents of the ability their countries. This parallels research show- of the police to control domestic violence ing there is greater support for the police in mirrors the assessment by respondents of one’s own community than for police else- the performance of the police in controlling where, suggesting that familiarity has a some- robbery and burglary. Thus, Barbados ranks what positive effect on assessment. the highest, and Trinidad and Tobago ranks the lowest. However, even in Barbados, only Willingness of Citizens to Participate 29 percent of the respondents thought the and Cooperate with the Police performance of the police in the community was either good or very good; the majority If citizens perceive the police to be both legiti- perceived the performance of the police as mate in the use of social control mechanisms less effective. This indicates that police de- and competent in doing so, citizens are more partments in the Caribbean need to focus likely to participate in crime control activities with the police and to be generally supportive Chart 4.9 Reporting Crimes to the Police, of police efforts.25 The crime control activities Caribbean-7, 2010 include reporting crimes to the police, coop- erating in investigations, coming forward with information about future or past criminal inci- 80 dents, and donating time and money to police 73.4 programmes. The only relevant question on 70.8 70 67.1 65.3 65.9 participation in the UNDP Citizen Security 62.4 63.1 62.0 60.9 Survey 2010 came at the end of a question se- 60 quence: “In the last year, were you the victim 48.2 51.1 of any of the following 18 violent crimes, and, 50 46.8 47.6 43.9 if yes, did you report the violent incident to the 40 39.2 police?” A similar sequence of questions dealt Percent 33.9 with property crime. Research in developing na- 30 tions and in the United States suggests that the seriousness of an offense is the best predictor of 20 whether the crime will be reported to the police: as the seriousness increases, so does the report- 10 ing. However, factors other than seriousness play a role in decisions to report. Research has 0 shown that, especially in the developing world, Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 past victimization and socio-economic status affect a victim’s willingness to report a crime to the police.26 Thus, the rate of reporting crime victimization has frequently been treated as an Reported Violent Crime Reported Property Crime indicator of the public’s trust that the police will respond appropriately to such reports and Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents who were victims of violent crime (N=1060) and respondents who were neither ignore nor punish the citizens filing the victims of property crime (N=882). Questions: “Did you report the (violent) incident to the police?” “If you were the victim of a property (non-violent) crime, including fraud, did you report this crime reports. to the police?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who said they had been victimized Chart 4.9 displays the percentage of re- by crimes and who reported the crimes to the police. spondents to the UNDP Citizen Security 108 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 121. Survey 2010 who had been victimized and their satisfaction with the police reaction on asaid they reported the violence or the prop- five-point scale ranging from very dissatisfied 4erty crimes to the police. There is a fairly simi- to very satisfied. On average, across the Carib- The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Securitylar reporting rate of around 60–70 percent bean-7, the level of satisfaction with the policefor violent crimes across the Caribbean-7. response to reports of violent crimes (28.7 per-The likelihood of reporting property crimes cent satisfied) was surpassed by satisfaction withis consistently lower, around 40–50 percent the response to reports of property crimes (54.9except in Antigua and Barbuda (34 percent) percent satisfied). For comparison, the aver-and Suriname (65 percent). Comparable data age satisfaction level found by the 2004–2005on reporting in the United States and many International Crime Victimization Survey forEuropean nations have been available from property crimes was incrementally lower at 53the International Crime Victims Survey since percent.281989. The 2004–2005 surveys conducted in The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 201030 countries found that the reporting rate as- did not ask respondents about the reasons forsociated with five property crimes was 53 per- their assessment of their encounter with policecent.27 This comparison suggests that the level after they had reported crimes, but practicesof trust in the police found in five of the Car- that have been adopted in some countries mayibbean-7 is consistent with the correspond- help explain some of the variation. For exam-ing level in other developed and developing ple, Suriname has established informal neigh-countries. bourhood councils composed of community A frequent follow-up question among re- members. The councils serve as an alternatespondents who had been crime victims and means to encourage community involvementwho said they had reported the crimes gauged in evidence-based crime prevention and con- Chart 4.10 Satisfaction with Police after Violent Crime Reports, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 percent Caribbean-7 27.7 29.7 Antigua & 20.0 15.7 Barbuda Barbados 28.2 42.6 Guyana 35.0 23.3 Jamaica 28.9 26.1 Saint Lucia 35.7 48.8 Suriname 22.4 18.9 Trinidad & 25.5 34.1 Tobago Male Female Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents who were victims of violent crimes and reported the crimes to police (N = 643). Question: “How satisfied were you with the action taken by the police?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who declared they were “Very satisfied” or “Satisfied”. C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 109
  • 122. 4 Chart 4.11 Satisfaction with Police after Property Crime Reports, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security percent Caribbean-7 55.0 54.9 Antigua & 50.6 16.3 Barbuda Barbados 50.9 60.5 Guyana 79.0 82.3 Jamaica 56.2 17.6 Saint Lucia 35.7 59.6 Suriname 28.3 19.1 Trinidad & 20.7 26.4 Tobago Male Female Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents who were victims of property crimes and reported the crimes to police (N = 1,074). Question: “How satisfied were you with the action taken by the police?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who declared they were “Very satisfied” or “Satisfied”. trol. This informal mechanism may explain tigua and Jamaica. As measured by the survey, the low satisfaction of some citizens with the the lack of gender differences across the region police response to crime reports. In Guyana, indicates that the police do not systematically citizens say they do not believe the police will respond differently to crime reports filed by follow up on reports regarding non-violent women or men. This suggests that inputs by crimes and, so, often do not file such reports. women into discussions on the best way for Nonetheless, relative to respondents elsewhere, police forces to transition to a citizen security when citizens in Guyana do report property focus or inputs by women serving on police crimes, they are the most satisfied with the po- oversight bodies are not being discounted by lice reaction. police services. Charts 4.10 and 4.11 show that, across the Attitudes that support the police can be as Caribbean-7, there was no particular general important as participation with the police in gender pattern in the satisfaction of respond- crime prevention and control activities. The ents with the police reaction to reports of UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 included violent crimes or property crimes. There were, five items measuring supportive attitudes. Two however, marked differences across the seven items focused on the personal attitudes of re- nations. For example, significantly higher per- spondents about the competence of the police centages of women in Barbados, Saint Lucia, and whether the police deserve support (chart and Trinidad and Tobago were satisfied with 4.12). The first question allowed a simple yes the police response to their reports of violent or no. On average, 57 percent of the survey re- or property crimes. In contrast, significantly spondents said “yes” in answer to this question higher percentages of men were satisfied with about police competence. The share varied the police response to violent crime reports in widely across the Caribbean-7, from a low of Guyana and to property crime reports in An- 42 percent in Guyana to a high of 72 percent 110 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 123. Chart 4.12 Respondents Who Believe the Police Are Competent 4 and Deserve Support, Caribbean-7, 2010 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 80 72.0 70 68.5 67.3 64.8 65.5 60 56.7 57.7 55.9 53.6 54.8 52.9 50 49.1 49.9 41.640.1 43.0Percent 40 30 20 10 0 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 Police are Competent Police Deserve my Support Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Do you believe that the police are competent?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Yes”. Question: “Using a scale from 1 to 5 (1 weakest, 5 strongest), indicate how you rate the cohesiveness of your community on the following: ‘The police force deserves my support.’” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who gave the two most positive Barbados. Agreement with the statement have rated the effectiveness at a higher level.“The police force deserves my support” was Second, the respondents might not think themeasured on a five-point scale ranging from police are currently effective, but, because there“the weakest feeling” to “the strongest feel- is only one police force, they feel the policeing”. For this question, the two most positive deserve citizen support to help them becomeresponses were combined. The overall rate of more effective. Third, support is a fuzzy term,agreement with the statement was 54 percent, and some citizens may base their support onand the positive responses ranged from a low confidence in the ability of the police to pre-of 40 percent in Guyana to highs of 65 percent vent and solve crimes, while others base theirin Jamaica and 67 percent in Saint Lucia. Both support on the friendliness and fairness of themeasures showed considerable attitudinal sup- officers with whom they come into contact.29port for the police. Thus, these questions may be measuring quite It may not be inconsistent for citizens to be different aspects of the willingness to partici-dissatisfied with the police and unsure about pate and cooperate with the police. Fourth, thethe effectiveness of the police in respond- belief that police deserve support may reflecting to major crimes and, yet, also believe that the optimism and hope of respondents that thethe police deserve their support. First, the police will continue to reform and meet the de-respondents were only asked about effective- mands of modern policing.ness regarding specific major crimes and not Three other attitudinal measures in thea fuller range of crimes for which they might UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 gauged C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 111
  • 124. 4 Chart 4.13 Respondents Who Believe the Police Need More Personnel and More Resources, Caribbean-7, 2010The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 90 82.6 82.0 80 76.4 76.7 77.0 71.9 72.1 74.8 69.2 70.7 68.5 72.5 70 67.3 66.3 68.8 65.0 64.9 60.1 60 57.9 54.4 52.7 51.0 52.6 53.1 50 Percent 40 30 20 10 0 Antigua & Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Caribbean-7 Barbuda Tobago Increase Size of Police Invest More in Police More Police on the Street for Security Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “Do you think that increasing the size of the police force would be an effective means of reducing crime?” “In order to reduce the crime rate the government should invest more in the police force/service.” “Would putting more police on the streets make you feel more secure?“ For the first two questions, the chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Strongly agree“ or “Agree”. For the last question the chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Yes”. the support of respondents for governmental the rule of law and service of the citizenry. The action that would enhance police services by government and the police should not take ad- putting more police on the streets, investing vantage of this support only to modernize the more in the police force and increasing the force (for example, by obtaining better weap- size of the force. Together, all three actions ons, communications systems and transporta- garnered more than 55 percent agreement tion), but also genuinely to reform the force (chart 4.13). Across the Caribbean-7, an aver- by enhancing the organizational structure of age of 75 percent of the respondents supported the police, the incentive and reward structure investing more in the police; 69 percent fa- within the service and the relationship be- voured putting more police on the streets; and tween the police and the public. 58 percent favoured increasing the size of the The final measure of the likelihood of citi- police force. Together, the findings outlined in zen participation was the response to a survey charts 4.12 and 4.13 demonstrate considerable question on working together with others attitudinal support for the police in terms of to reduce violence. At least 45 percent of re- competence, reputation and the need for more spondents across the Caribbean-7 expressed resources from the government. These results their willingness to do this (chart 4.14). Ja- indicate that citizens are interested in support- maica showed the highest positive response ing the police. This support can be leveraged rate (65 percent), and Barbados the lowest to aid the police in realizing the transition to (46 percent). The latter finding is not surpris- an organization that is more well oriented to ing because the respondents in Barbados do 112 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 125. Chart 4.14 Respondents Chart 4.15 Respondents 4 Willing to Work Willing to Work The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security with Others to with Others to Reduce Violent Reduce Crime, Crime, by Age, Caribbean-7, Caribbean-7, 2010 2010 70 70 65.5 60 59.3 60 58.9 58.3 59.2 57.4 56.8 56.8 54.0 54.6 56.6 50 50 51.6 46.2 45.7 40 40Percent Percent 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 0 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Caribbean-7 Willingness to Work Together Police Force Deserves my Support 56+yrs 31-55 yrs 18-30 yrs Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “Using a scale from 1 to 5 (1 weakest, 5 strongest), indi- “How do you rate the cohesiveness of your commu- cate how you rate the cohesiveness of your community nity on the following: ‘To what extent would you be on the following: ‘To what extent would you be willing willing to work together with others to reduce violence to work together with others to reduce violence in this in this country?’ ‘The police force deserves my sup- country.’” The chart shows the percentage of respon- port.’?” The chart shows the percentage of respon- dents who answered “A great extent”, “A good extent” dents who answered “Strongly agree” and “Agree”. or “A fair extent”.not believe that the country has a major crime may not have the means, knowledge, or lead-problem warranting more widespread col- ership to do so effectively. For example, evenlaborative action. The Jamaican respondents though neighbourhood watch programmesrealized, in contrast, that they have a serious are common in Suriname, they do not nec-crime problem. essarily make citizens feel safer. Nonetheless, These data indicate that a crucial element the data indicate there is an untapped poolin citizen participation and cooperation in of respect for the police and a sense of socialsolving the crime problem exists across the connectedness that, if properly mobilized byCaribbean: the willingness of citizens to work an innovative police agency, could lead to thecollectively to reduce crime. However, the co-production of citizen security.willingness to work collectively is not identi- To assess the distribution of this willingnesscal with engaging in partnerships with the po- across populations, the answers of respondentslice.30 Although citizens may express a desire were broken down by demographic character-to engage in the co-production of safety, they istics. Charts 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17 show that the C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 113
  • 126. willingness is exhibited in all age categories, crease security. These findings differ from find-4 both genders and all but the lowest socio-eco- ings in the United States, where older citizens nomic category. Thus, the distribution is broad and women are more likely to participate andThe Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security throughout the populations of the Caribbe- cooperate with the police.31 an-7. Even among respondents who described While the survey data show that the citi- themselves as poor, almost 60 percent stated zens of the Caribbean-7 do not view the police that they are willing to work together to in- as legitimate in all dimensions, the respondents evaluate the police as competent, are willing to work together with others to reduce violence, and support increased public resources for the Chart 4.16 Respondents Willing to Work with police. The combination of these three factors Others to Reduce Crime, by Gender, can significantly help the transition of the police Caribbean-7, 2010 to a citizen-oriented organization and begin the co-production of national security from crime. Willingness to Work 55.2 Conclusion Together 58.1 Caribbean countries suffer from unreformed Police Force Deserves 55.5 police structures. Despite progress in some my Support 54.0 nations, the predominant policing model is still focused on state security, not citizen secu- Female Male rity. The transition to citizen security requires institutional reforms within police forces and changes in police work and attitudes so Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “How do you rate the cohesiveness of your that community-based policing becomes the community on the following: ‘To what extent would you be willing to work together with others norm. Improving mechanisms to promote to reduce violence in this country?’ ‘The police force deserves my support.’?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Strongly agree” and “Agree”. accountability in police performance that are independent of police agencies will con- Chart 4.17 Respondents Willing to Work with Others to tribute to the transformation process and Reduce Crime, by Socio-economic Status, enhance citizen security. The attitudes of citi- Caribbean-7, 2010 zens will then change, and people will become more willing to cooperate with the police in new and meaningful ways to prevent crime 55.1 and control criminality. Willingness to Work 57.7 The results of the UNDP Citizen Secu- Together 66.7 rity Survey 2010 offer grounds for optimism. 37.0 Even though the necessary organizational changes within police forces are far from complete, citizens across the Caribbean re- 47.7 gion already perceive the police as moderately 54.9 legitimate and competent. They are willing Police Force Deserves 55.7 to become co-producers of their own secu- my Support 68.6 rity, and, in each nation, they are supportive of government investment in more resources Poorest Lower Class Middle Class Upper Class for the police to transform the police services and enhance their effectiveness. If citizens Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. perceive the police as both legitimate and Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “How do you rate the cohesiveness of your community on the following: ‘To what extent would you be willing to work together with others to competent, they are more likely to participate reduce violence in this country?’ ‘The police force deserves my support.’?” The chart shows the in crime control activities and be generally percentage of respondents who answered “Strongly agree” and “Agree”. supportive of the other efforts of the police. 114 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 127. 5CHAPTER Criminal Justice Systems
  • 128. Security and justice areequal priorities for CaribbeanpeopleOpportunities for all, justicefor all, respect for all,security for all
  • 129. 5CHAPTER Criminal Justice Systems 5 Criminal Justice Systems Introduction nal justice systems such as public confidence and the relationship of national institutions This chapter examines the role of criminal to regional structures and governance. justice systems in addressing crime, violence and insecurity in the Caribbean. Chapter 4 Criminal Justice Systems analyses the important part the police play The long shadow of colonialism has exerted in promoting citizen security. The primary an indelible influence on the cultures and focus of this chapter is legal systems, includ- institutions of the Caribbean for centuries. ing prosecution, the courts and sentencing, Forms and structures of government, includ- correctional systems and the criminal justice ing the legal codes and criminal justice sys- system as a whole. The major issues of interest tems of interest in this chapter, continue to are as follows: exhibit characteristics of each nation’s coloni- • Institutional structures and operations al legacy. Despite post-independence efforts • The effectiveness of institutions, including to bring about change and to make national systems of accountability and the capacity institutions more responsive to the needs of to deliver the required services fairly and the people, understanding the criminal jus- efficiently tice systems in the Caribbean involves under- • The extent to which institutions are held ac- standing the history of colonialism and the countable ways colonialism still influences the nations • The relationship of national institutions to in the region. regional institutions and NGOs Throughout the chapter, special attention is paid to the treatment of juveniles and other Legal Systems vulnerable groups by the criminal justice The legal systems of six of the seven nations system, including their access to justice.1 Re- examined in this report (the Caribbean-7) are search has demonstrated that the behaviour based on British common law and national of criminal justice institutions can have a vital statutory laws. (The seventh is Suriname, impact on citizen security, especially with re- where the legal system is based on the sys- gard to vulnerable groups. This chapter also tem of the Netherlands.) Although the legal provides a critical evaluation of existing re- systems of the former British colonies share form projects and outlines a vision for crimi- many similarities, they also differ in some re- nal justice reform in the Caribbean region. spects. The legal systems of Guyana and Saint The chapter is organized according to the is- Lucia, for instance, are often described as hy- sues listed above. The discussion therefore brid or mixed. The legal code in Saint Lucia is begins with a description of criminal justice a hybrid of British common law and French systems in the region. Next, the chapter ex- civil law owing to Saint Lucia’s history as amines objective indicators of system ef- both a British and a French colony. Similarly, fectiveness, including problems such as case Guyana’s legal code is a hybrid of British com- processing delays, low conviction rates and mon law and Netherland civil law. In all six insufficient alternatives to incarceration. The nations, British common law was the primary chapter then explores the subjective assess- foundation of the legal systems at the time of ments of citizens of the effectiveness of crimi- independence, though there were hybrid ele- C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 117
  • 130. ments. Suriname once relied on the British da, as well as Saint Lucia.8 The ECSC serves5 common law system, but this was replaced by as a unified supreme court for these countries. Netherland civil law in the 1600s when the It consists of two divisions: the High CourtCriminal Justice Systems United Provinces (the Netherlands) defeated of Justice and the Court of Appeal.9 Both England in battle during the Second Anglo- are based in Saint Lucia. It acts as an itiner- Dutch War.2 ant court, travelling to member states at fixed In addition to the similarities in the foun- periods throughout the year to “hear appeals dations of their legal systems, the criminal from the decisions of the High Court and justice systems in the Caribbean-7 also share Magistrates Courts in Member States in both structural similarities. Each nation has a simi- civil and criminal matters”.10 Whereas other lar hierarchy of courts that handle both civil countries may operate their own independent and criminal matters, as well as appeals. With high court and court of appeals, the ECSC the exception of courts in Suriname, the offers these functions regionally for member courts in each country have a three-tier struc- states. However, the ECSC does not serve as a ture that includes magistrates courts, a high final appellate court. For Antigua and Barbu- court and a court of appeal.3 The terminology da and for Saint Lucia, final appellate jurisdic- used for these three entities is fairly consist- tion rests with the Judicial Committee of the ent, though there are variations.4 The magis- Privy Council, an entity located in London trates courts serve as the lowest level of the and formally tied to the United Kingdom and court system, hearing lesser judicial matters, to judicial systems in many Commonwealth including small claims civil actions and less countries. severe criminal matters.5 Typically non-jury The majority of the countries of the Carib- cases are handled in the magistrates courts, bean Community (CARICOM) use the Judi- while more serious civil and criminal matters cial Committee of the Privy Council as a last are handled through the high courts. Con- venue for appeals.11 As the only country of the sistent caseload statistics are not available for Caribbean-7 that does not have a predomi- each country, though it has been estimated nantly British legal foundation, Suriname uses that approximately 90 percent of the legal its own High Court of Justice as a final court proceedings in the judicial system in Guyana of appeals.12 Only Barbados and Guyana rely on emanate from the magistrates courts.6 the regional Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) The court structure in Suriname, the only na- as final appellate court.13 tion in the Caribbean-7 with a legal system The CCJ was established by a treaty that based on laws of the Netherlands, is some- was ratified in 2003. However, “although the what different. Suriname’s legal system is Agreement was signed by nearly all of the grounded on three cantonal or district courts, Member States of the Community, only three each of which is presided over by a single of those States (Barbados, Belize and Guyana) judge, whose decisions can be appealed to have enacted the required domestic legislation the Court of Justice. The First District Court to accord access to the Court by their nation- tries civil cases in specific regions of the coun- als.”14 The CCJ is modelled after the British try. The Second District Court tries criminal appellate system and replaces the Privy Coun- cases in specific regions of the country. The cil for those countries that choose to enact Third District Court hears civil and criminal the appellate jurisdiction of the agreement. cases in those regions not covered by the two The CCJ was established to “provide for the other courts. There is also a lower court, the Caribbean Community an accessible, fair, Martial Court, which has jurisdiction over efficient, innovative and impartial justice sys- cases involving military personnel.7 tem built on a jurisprudence reflective of Car- The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court ibbean history, values and traditions, while (ECSC) has jurisdiction in the member maintaining an inspirational, independent in- countries of the Organization of Eastern Car- stitution worthy of emulation by the courts of ibbean States, including Antigua and Barbu- the region and the trust and confidence of its 118 C A R I B B E A N H U MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 2
  • 131. people.”15 The court, located in Port of Spain, provides for court-assigned attorneys in bothcapital of Trinidad and Tobago, is intended to civil and criminal matters.19 5have both original and appellate jurisdiction Each of the Caribbean-7, with the excep- Criminal Justice Systemsamong all CARICOM member states. The tion of Suriname, has a functioning bail sys-original jurisdiction of the court is applicable tem. Most deny bail in cases involving moreto all CARICOM countries, including the serious crimes or if the offender has been pre-Caribbean-7, while the appellate jurisdiction viously convicted of a violent crime. There ismust be ratified by each country. The original some speculation that judges in some coun-jurisdiction allows the CCJ to “adjudicate tries may use high bail and distant remanddisputes among Member States pertaining to dates as leverage in trying to secure guilty[their] economic integration”.16 pleas, though the extent of this practice is unknown.20 In the wake of a serious outbreakProsecution and Defence of violent crime, including a 488 percentThe prosecutorial system within the Carib- increase in the homicide rate from 1999 tobean varies across countries. In each country, 2008, Trinidad and Tobago enacted a bail re-defendants are entitled to a fair trial, are pre- form that is intended to keep violent offend-sumed innocent until proven guilty and have ers behind bars. 21the right to appeal. With the exception of Suri-name, which has no jury system, all countries Correctional Systemsallow jury trials. Juries are typically relied on in With the exception of Suriname, Caribbeancases involving serious criminal offences. Trial correctional systems are housed within gov-by jury for civil cases is permissible in some ar- ernment ministries that are separate from theeas, though rare. Guyana and Saint Lucia do offices responsible for public prosecutions.not allow jury trials for civil cases.17 One indicator of transparency in correctional In each of the Caribbean-7, detained sus- practices is the extent to which nations per-pects are provided access to defence counsel mit access to prisons and jails by outside ob-upon request, though some countries provide servers, particularly NGOs that focus on hu-this access more promptly after arrest than man rights. Each of the Caribbean-7 allowsothers. In Suriname, for example, prosecu- for the possibility of access to prison facilitiestors may choose to deny access to counsel if by independent human rights observers.22they feel such access would harm an ongoing The number of prisons in the Caribbean-7investigation. The extent to which the state ranges from 1 (Antigua and Barbuda, Barba-provides defence counsel for indigent suspects dos and Saint Lucia) to 12 (Jamaica). Tablevaries. In Antigua and Barbuda, legal defence is 5.1 provides basic descriptive statistics aboutonly provided to indigent persons facing capi- prisons in each country. The existence of sepa-tal charges. Similarly, in Saint Lucia, defence rate facilities for women, men, juveniles andcounsel is provided only to people charged those awaiting trial varies across the region. Inwith serious criminal offences. Trinidad and Antigua and Barbuda, there are separate youthTobago provides counsel to indigent persons facilities for juvenile delinquents. However, incharged with murder and other serious offenc- 2010, a small number of juveniles were housedes. In Barbados, the government supports “free in the country’s prison alongside adult aid to the indigent in family matters, child In Barbados, women are housed in a separatesupport, serious criminal cases such as rape or wing in the adult prison facility, while a sepa-murder, and all cases involving minors.”18 In rate juvenile facility houses boys and girls. InGuyana, the right to counsel is only provided Guyana, there is a single women’s prison, andin capital murder cases that reach the High juveniles under the age of 16 years are housedCourt. For other offences, the Georgetown Le- in a separate detention facility, while those overgal Aid Clinic supplies legal advice. Legal aid the age of 16 are incarcerated in adult facilities.attorneys in Jamaica are available in cases that Jamaica’s prison facilities include four locationscan result in incarceration, while Suriname for juveniles, while adult men and women of- C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R EP O R T 2 0 1 2 119
  • 132. Table 5.1. A Statistical Profile of Prison Systems, Caribbean-75Criminal Justice Systems Country Prisons, Prison populationa Official Popula- number capa- tion Total Rate Pre-trial, Juveniles city densityb remand Antigua & 1 295 330 34.2 4.1 150 130.7 Barbuda (2010) (2010)c (2010)d (2007) (2007) (2007) (2007) Barbados 1 910 354 37.2 1.8 1,250 72.8 (2010) (2010)e (2010)f (2009) (2009) (2010) (2010) Guyana 5 2,122 284 41.0 0.0 1,580 134.3 (2010) (2010)e (2010)g (2010) (2010) (2010) (2010) Jamaica 12 4,709 174 15.0 9.2 4,247 110.9 (2009)h (2007)e (2007)i (2007) (2007) (2007) (2007) Saint 1 568 323 23.2 0.9 450 126.2 Lucia (2011) (2011)e (2010)j (2011) (2011) (2011) (2011) Suriname 6 915 175 55.0 5.7 1,233 162.7 (2009)k (2009)l (2009)m (2005) (2005) (2002) (1999) Trinidad 8 3,591 276 41.9 3.0 4,386 87.8 & Tobago (2010) (2010)e (2010)n (2008) (2006) (2006) (2006) Source: World Prison Brief (database), International Centre for Prison Studies, London, worldbrief/. Note: The data year is in parentheses. a. The total includes pre-trial detainees and remand prisoners. The rate is per 100,000 national population. The population of pre-trial detainees and remand prisoners and the population of juveniles are shown in percentages of the total prison population. Juveniles = under-18-year-olds. b. Prison population as a per