most common retail source of antimalarials Widespread over rural and urban Tz. Staffed usually by nurse assistant 1 year’s training Officially only allowed to stock OTC medicines, though often have POM
Districts roughly representative of the country and comparative with each other in terms of basic socioeconomic and malaria-related indicators
Special permission to stock ACT on OTC basis for drug shops in study districts only One day training of SKs range of BCC activities, including local radio advertisements, wall paintings, and cultural shows Kongwa SRP intended to inform consumers of the maximum amount they should pay (0.25, 0.50. 0.75. and 1 USD)
To control for seasonality.. (Am not presenting Mystery shopper data so have left out of methods)
Interested in whether intensity of competition affected stocking patterns and prices charged of shops – in particular in areas low competition, would prices be much higher. Find a way of measuring competition faced by each shop. Chose simple approach of measuring concentration through the ... None – local monopoly More than 5 – intense competition
Supply side CI 0 or 1 - N=76 CI 2 or more n=140
Consumers purchasing ACTs for children under 5 paid mean $0.35 and for adults $0.70 Most common alternative AM, AQ was significantly higher Importantly, controlling for the age of recipient & district, ACT price did not vary significantly by competition category of shop The SRP appears did not seem to have the intended effect for older age groups, stuck to the SRP of $1 for adults, but this actually artificially inflated prices in Kongwa above those determined by the market in Maswa.
What was impact of availability and prices on uptake? % AM consumers in intervention districts who purchased ACTs increased strikingly, from 1.0% in Aug ‘07 to 44% in Aug ‘08 (p<0.001). For children under 5 figure increased to 53%. At expense of SP & AQ, whereas these drugs sustained market share in control Increase in subsidised ACT not at the expense of public sector ACT – total ACTs distributed increased 62% between Nov ‘07 & Aug ’08 In Aug 08 75% of ACT consumers were purchasing a full dose, compared with 74% for AQ and 64% for SP
Wanted to know if this intervention would reach the poorest group.
Most people in the highest 2 quintiles. Very few in the poorest. But remember even those in Q3 and Q4 are still not that well off. In our sample: Electricity – 80% of least poor, but only 4% of Q4 and 0 of all lower Q [Tin roof – 99% of least poor, 86% of Q4, but 0 for all lower Q] [Good news – Given that you were shopping at the drug store, there was no correlation between the SES of the consumer and the likelihood of buying ACTs, and price paid did not vary by SES] (ACTs comprising 44.4% of purchases by consumers in the poorest two quintiles (n=45) compared to 42.4% by those in the least poor quintiles (n=328)).
no instances of “price gouging” But cautious on generalisability effects are likely to be different on a nationwide scale, reflecting greater reliance on the private sector distribution chain and greater potential to use mass media. In Cambodia, retail prices frequently exceeded recommended levels, and artemisinin monotherapy use remained high – but reflected stockouts of subsidised ACT were common, due to continued centralised ACT purchase – similar limitations to public sector supply based on a detailed understanding of wholesaler costs & pricing practices
e.g. providing a substantial rebate to wholesalers for achieving certain coverage levels in remote areas ACT Price lower (while still allowing sufficient incentive for businesses to carry it) Allow stocking in non-drug stores – general stores? Use alternative methods such as CHWs?
Piloting the Global Subsidy: The impact of subsidized distribution of ACT through private drug shops in rural Tanzania - Presentation Transcript
Piloting the Global Subsidy: The impact of subsidized distribution of ACT through private drug shops in rural Tanzania Oliver Sabot, Alex Mwita, Margareth Ndomondo-Sigonda, Justin Cohen, Megumi Gordon, David Bishop, Moses Odhiambo, Yahya Ipuge, Lorrayne Ward, Catherine Goodman Clinton Foundation, Government of Tanzania, HLSP, LSHTM & KEMRI/Wellcome Trust
The Tanzania Pilot
GoT & Clinton Foundation pilot in 2 rural districts, Oct 07-Nov 08
Clinton Foundation procured ACT (artemether-lumefantrine), PSI placed in specially designed packs (4 age groups)
The Tanzania Pilot
GoT & Clinton Foundation pilot in 2 rural districts, Oct 07-Nov 08
Clinton Foundation procured ACT (artemether-lumefantrine), PSI placed in specially designed packs (4 age groups)
Sold to national wholesaler at average $0.11 per dose
Wholesaler delivered drugs through own distribution networks to private drug shops called duka la dawa baridi
Dar es Salaam Intervention Control
Study Design Kongwa Maswa Social Marketing SRP Explores effects of a subsidy without SRP Explores effects of a subsidy with SRP Subsidy OTC Status Repackag-ing Supporting interventions SRP ranges from US$0.25 to $1.00 based on dose
Data collection methods
Data collected Aug 07 (baseline), Nov 07, March, Aug & Nov 08 – Focus on Aug 07 & 08 today
All drug stores and public/NGO facilities surveyed, including new entrants
Retail audits – estimate AM sales volumes over one month by visiting shop at start and end of month and recording stock levels, wholesale deliveries, and drugs disposed of (n=210 in ‘07, 216 in ‘08)
Exit interview – interview all AM or antipyretic drug store customers during one day (n=580 ’07; 573 in ‘08)
Public/NGO facility audits – review records on ACT dispensed and stockouts (n=105 ’07; 107 in ‘08)
Measuring Competition
Fixed radius approach for geographical market definition
Based on GPS coordinates, each drug store assigned a category depending on the number of other drug stores within a 1 km radius
Classified as:
none
one
two to three
four to five
more than five
Results
ACT stocking
Pronounced increase in % drug stores stocking ACT in intervention districts, from 0 in Aug 07 to 72% in Aug 08 (No change in control district (1% - 0))
Shops with two or more other shops in their competition radius were significantly more likely to stock ACTs (81.2%) than those with 0 or 1 competitor (54.0%) (Aug 08)
<5 year olds Kongwa Kongwa Maswa Maswa >15 year olds Legend outlier maximum price paid within 1.5x the interquartile range minimum price paid within 1.5x the interquartile range median mean 25 th percentile 75 th percentile ACT AQ ACT AQ ACT SP ACT SP n= 84 35 78 123 150 320 190 472 Price paid by exit interviewees (all intervention periods)
SP Amodiaquine Other 58% 37% 5% August ’07 (baseline) 36% 4% 44% August ’08 Control district (Aug ’08) 8% 56% 36% Subsidized ACT 16% Intervention districts (n= 118) (n= 417) (n= 455) % of all exit interviews Anti-malarials purchased
Assessing Equity
Collected information on household structure and assets from exit interviews using set of questions from nationwide HIV/AIDS Indicator Survey
Asset data from AIDS Indicator Survey analysed using principal components analysis to generate weights for each asset, and divide population into 5 quintiles
These weights applied to assets owned by exit interviewees, in order to classify them into nationwide quintiles
Socio-economic status of exit interviewees (Aug 08)
Implications for AMF-m - 1
Subsidies can lead to rapid and dramatic increases in ACT use
Subsidies were passed onto consumers, and prices were not significantly higher at more remote stores
Results may differ at scale:
greater reliance on the private sector distribution chain
greater potential to use mass media
Generalise with caution to other countries
In Cambodia, retail prices frequently exceeded recommended levels, and artemisinin monotherapy use remained high
Implications for AMF-m - 2
SRP should be used with caution, to avoid artificial price inflation
Additional interventions may be needed to increase ACT access among poorer individuals who are less likely to seek care from drug stores
Additional incentives should be considered to encourage distribution to remote outlets
0 comments
Post a comment