Lessons for equitable REDD+ benefit sharing from community forestry practices in Indonesia and Nepal

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Presentation by Ani Nawir, Naya Puadel, Grace Wong and Cecelia Luttrell at the ASFN 6th Conference at Inle Lake in June 2015.

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Lessons for equitable REDD+ benefit sharing from community forestry practices in Indonesia and Nepal

  1. 1. Lessons for equitable REDD+ Benefit Sharing from Community Forestry practices in Indonesia and Nepal Ani A. Nawir, Naya S. Paudel, Grace Wong, Cecilia Luttrell ASFN 6th Annual Conference, Inle Lake, June 2015
  2. 2.  REDD+ incentive can be categorized as performance-based or input-based payments  A REDD+ incentive is only one of many drivers influencing behavioral patterns in land use and governance  Potentially effective if REDD+ monetary incentive > opportunity costs, or provides compensation ≥ input costs of implementing a REDD project or governance of policy  Other REDD+ non-monetary or indirect benefits can be significant  Benefit sharing = distribution of direct and indirect net gains from the implementation of REDD+ REDD+ as incentive for reducing emissions and deforestation
  3. 3. What lessons can Community Forestry (CF) bring to REDD+?  CF institutions have developed well established BSM that are legitimate, recognised by national law and incentivise forest conservation  Nepal’s CF scheme is regarded as a successful approach in forest conservation and therefore its lessons on BSM provide good basis  Indonesia has multiple variations of CF schemes with differing tenurial and rights arrangements  CF generates and distributes co-benefits beyond carbon therefore provides relevant lessons for REDD+
  4. 4. Management role Patterns of ownership Private Communal State Private Privately managed forests around households (e.g. farm forestry) Privately-managed on community lands (e.g. Customary land in Borneo: tembawang) Public land allocation scheme for individually managed (e.g. Community-Based Plantation) Communal Private land organised by community institutions Communal mgm on community lands (e.g. Village Forest in Indonesia) State land allocated for community management: (e.g. HKm and partnership schemes in Indonesia; CF and REDD+ pilots in Nepal) State Co- management Co-management on privately-owned lands (e.g. outgrower schemes) Co-management on communal lands (e.g. JFM in India) State lands allocated to community group (e.g. CFM in Philippines) Sources: Adapted from FAO (1985); Mayers (2000); Arnold (2001); Calderon and Nawir (2004); and Nawir (2012)
  5. 5.  There are three general approaches to benefit sharing: input-based, performance-based, & land allocation-based  The three approaches are differentiated in responding to:  Overarching policy framework underlying the exclusiveness of management right granted to community  Forest function classification and its associated tenurial arrangements,  An externally introduced initiative under a specific pilot project, such as REDD+ Project. 1. Benefit sharing is determined by the CF property right regimes
  6. 6.  In Nepal, shared-benefits are a compensation for local communities' active involvement in managing the National Forest entails that halting deforestation and degradation  In Indonesia, main activities being rewarded vary depending on types of right are granted and who is initiating the scheme for community involvement.  HKm scheme: enforcing permanent status of the forest as a state property  Partnership scheme: securing company access 2. Activities being “rewarded”: reducing deforestation and enforcing the status of forest as state property
  7. 7. There are at least four factors as the underlying reasons:  Community lands are usually scattered: high transportation costs for collecting and marketing  Limited economies of scale for commercialization, such as for NTFPs, that causes high harvesting costs per unit area.  The nature of tenurial arrangement, enforcing property rights involves significant transaction costs  Current policy and timber regulations at national and local levels are not in favour of smallholders that cause high transaction costs. 3. Operational and transaction costs are potentially high: Cost sharing is equally important as benefit sharing
  8. 8.  Nepal: low productive subsistence economy; people have volunteered their time to manage forests. REDD+ Pilot Project has not considered opportunity cost of CF management as there are no options to put these lands into alternative use  Indonesia: high opportunity costs; compensating such costs is important in maintaining long-term community’s commitment  There are different types of opportunity costs (i.e. the opportunity costs of revenues from behavior change of individual household versus the rent of alternative land uses in the area included in a REDD+ scheme) and these differences should be considered in the design. 4. Managing opportunity costs in situations with high land-use competition
  9. 9. Innovations in Nepal for equitable REDD+ BSM Procedural equity  Inclusive representation in decision making bodies  Social criteria for REDD+ payment  Conditions for CF fund/REDD fund use (e.g. 35% for pro-poor activities) Substantive equity  Wellbeing ranking within benefit sharing framework  Forest based employment to poor  Support during difficulty  Land allocation to poor households  Differential price of forest products
  10. 10. Key messages  Benefit sharing is closely linked with tenure arrangements  Procedural equity at all levels of environmental governance is critical  Managing forests for multiple benefits serves equity purpose better than focusing on single benefit  Allocation of rights as an indirect benefit can be a more sustainable incentive than performance or input based incentives the direct incentives do not reflect true transaction and opportunity costs
  11. 11. • Key publications:  Loft, L. et al. (2015) Taking stock of carbon rights in REDD+ candidate countries: Concept meets reality. Forests 6:1031-1060.  Börner et al. (2015) Mixing Carrots and Sticks to Conserve Forests in the Brazilian Amazon: A Spatial Probabilistic Modeling Approach. PLoS ONE 10(2): e0116846. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0116846  Luttrell et al. 2014 Who should benefit from REDD+? Rationales and realities. Ecology and Society 18(4): 52.  Pham et al. 2014. Local preferences and strategies for effective, efficient and equitable PES benefit distribution options in Vietnam: Lessons for REDD+. Human Ecology DOI: 10.1007/s10745-014-9703-3  Pham et al. 2013. “Approaches to benefit sharing: A preliminary comparative analysis of 13 REDD+ countries” CIFOR working paper.  Assembe, S. et al. 2013. Assessment of the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of benefit sharing schemes under large-scale agriculture: Lessons from land fees in Cameroon, European Journal of Development Research • Series of information briefs:  Arwida S. et al. 2015. Lessons for REDD+ benefit sharing from anti-corruption measures in Indonesia. CIFOR InfoBrief 120.  Tjajadi, J.S. et al. 2015. Lessons from environmental and social sustainability standards for equitable REDD+ benefit sharing. CIFOR Infobrief 119.  Myers, R. et al. 2015. Benefit sharing in context: Comparative analysis of 10 land use change case studies in Indonesia. CIFOR Infobrief 118.  Nawir A. et al. 2015. Lessons from community forestry in Nepal and Indonesia, CIFOR InfoBrief 112.  Gebara MF. et al. 2014. Lessons from local environmental funds for REDD+ benefit sharing with indigenous people in Brazil. CIFOR InfoBrief 98.  Kowler LF. et al. 2014. The legitimacy of multilevel governance structures for benefit sharing: REDD+ and other low emissions options in Peru. CIFOR InfoBrief 101.  Loft L. et al. 2014. Lessons from payments for ecosystem services for REDD+ benefit-sharing mechanisms. CIFOR InfoBrief 68. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR.  Myers, R. et al. (2014) Who holds power in land use decisions? Implications for REDD+ in Indonesia. CIFOR InfoBrief 100.  Wong G. (2014). The experience of conditional cash transfers: Lessons for REDD+ benefit sharing. CIFOR InfoBrief 97.
  12. 12. Thank you! www.cifor.org/redd-benefit-sharing/ www.cifor.org/asfcc/

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