Corruption in REDD schemes
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Corruption in REDD schemes



Presentation by Peter Larmour, ...

Presentation by Peter Larmour,
Crawford School
The Australian National University,
Corruption in REDD schemes: A Framework for Analysis
The 14th International Anti-Corruption Conference,
Thursday, 11 November 2010,
Queen Sirikit National Convention Center, Bangkok, Thailand



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Corruption in REDD schemes Corruption in REDD schemes Presentation Transcript

  • Peter Larmour Crawford SchoolThe Australian National University
  •  Corruption regular feature of forestry ◦ Hard to supervise remote areas (The Forest Ranger) ◦ Local political support for land clearance ◦ Windfall profits fund corruption Some REDD host countries have poor reputations for corruption ◦ TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index So do companies from some regional countries ◦ TI’s Bribe Payers Index How design a system to reduce corruption?
  •  multiple meanings of corruption several distinct types diagnoses imply cures (theory to practice) three broad types of theory about corruption ◦ behavioral/individual ◦ structural/organisational ◦ political View slide
  •  Standard ‘use of public office for private gain’, but ◦ private to private corruption? ◦ other family, party or regional gains? better use principal/agent framework ◦ ‘unauthorised receipt of benefits’ in Hong Kong ◦ in ‘secret commissions’ laws eg in Samoa ◦ in UK proposals to reform corruption legislation But popular conceptions suspicious of elites ◦ TI focus group research in PNG ◦ Mistrust and corruption accusations (Uslaner) View slide
  • Type Visible Legal Examplepetty YES NO Small payment to local forestry officialgrand NO NO Large payment to HQ officialpolicy NO YES Change law to suit political leaders’ business interests
  •  Expectancy ◦ rational choice to commit crimes ◦ motivation, opportunity, risk of detection Equity ◦ sense of unfairness justifies corrupt behaviour ◦ perceptions of corruption in unequal societies Social Acceptance ◦ power of norms/organisational culture ◦ culture of existing vs new institutions in REDD ◦ Source: Waldersee
  •  Firm Structure/Boundaries ◦ C= Monopoly + Discretion - Accountability (Klitgaard) ◦ impact of boundary changes in privatization ◦ Exit or Voice as response to corruption Internal Structures ◦ complexity and confusion creates opportunity ◦ informal system bypasses formal Process ◦ risks at each point in value chain ◦ US Sarbanes Oxley law sets audit requirements ◦ risks involved in cash payments ◦ Source: Waldersee
  •  Constitutional ◦ post hoc checks and balances ◦ ‘system better than individuals in it’ (Euben) ◦ guarding the guards (police, forestry inspectorate) ◦ capacity of existing ‘National integrity system’ (TI) Democratic ◦ perceptions independent of experience of corruption ◦ Norm of inclusion of those affected by decisions ◦ Corruption = ‘duplicitous exclusion’ (Warren) Government/Business relations ◦ dependence on private initiative in mixed economy ◦ government anticipation of business needs ◦ place of ‘politician-businessmen’ in REDD system
  •  Diagnoses imply cures (implicit or explicit) Risks of certain types of corruption seem high Popular definitions matter in democracies Three frameworks are ideal types ◦ actual policies combine and mix ◦ broad menu Some measures already in place/available ◦ Integrate REDD with national and international systems No single solution/discipline sufficient