Your SlideShare is downloading. ×
Administrative appellate jurisdiction in immigration matters
Administrative appellate jurisdiction in immigration matters
Administrative appellate jurisdiction in immigration matters
Administrative appellate jurisdiction in immigration matters
Administrative appellate jurisdiction in immigration matters
Administrative appellate jurisdiction in immigration matters
Administrative appellate jurisdiction in immigration matters
Administrative appellate jurisdiction in immigration matters
Administrative appellate jurisdiction in immigration matters
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×

Thanks for flagging this SlideShare!

Oops! An error has occurred.

×
Saving this for later? Get the SlideShare app to save on your phone or tablet. Read anywhere, anytime – even offline.
Text the download link to your phone
Standard text messaging rates apply

Administrative appellate jurisdiction in immigration matters

582

Published on

A case for AAo reform

A case for AAo reform

Published in: Education, Business
0 Comments
0 Likes
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Views
Total Views
582
On Slideshare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
0
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
1
Comments
0
Likes
0
Embeds 0
No embeds

Report content
Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
No notes for slide

Transcript

  • 1. Administrative Appellate Jurisdiction1 in Immigration MattersThe jurisdiction of the AAO is limited to that authority specifically granted to it by the Secretaryof the United States Department of Homeland Security. See DHS Delegation Number 0150.1(effective March 1, 2003). Delegations that pertain to the Secretary’s powers under the INA arecovered at least in part by 8 CFR Part 100, but gaps remain to be filled.General information as to the structure of DHS Delegations are found at:http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_instruction_112_03_001_issuing_delegations_of_authority.pdfThe AAO exercises appellate jurisdiction over the matters described in 8 CFR § 103.1(f)(3)(iii)(as in effect on February 28, 2003), with two exceptions: (1) petitions for approval of schoolsand the appeals of denials of such petitions are the responsibility of Immigration and CustomsEnforcement; and (2) applications for S nonimmigrant status are the responsibility of the Officeof Fraud Detection and National Security of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.8 CFR § 103.3 Denials, appeals, and precedent decisions.(a) Denials and appeals.(iv) Function of Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU). The AAU is the appellate body whichconsiders cases under the appellate jurisdiction of the Associate Commissioner, Examinations.8 CFR § 103.1(f)(3)(E)(iii) in its last incarnation indicated that the AAO had jurisdiction over: (iii) Appellate Authorities. In addition, the Associate Commissioner for Examinationsexercises appellate jurisdiction over decisions on; (A) Breaching of bonds under Sec. 103.6(e); (B) Petitions for immigrant visa classification based on employment or as a special immigrantor entrepreneur under Secs. 204.5 and 204.6 of this chapter except when the denial of the petitionis based upon lack of a certification by the Secretary of Labor under section 212(a)(5)(A) of theAct; (C) Indochinese refugee applications for adjustment of status under section 103 of the Act ofOctober 28, 1977; (D) Revoking approval of certain petitions under Sec. 205.2 of this chapter.; (E) Applications for permission to reapply for admission to the United States after deportationor removal under Sec. 212.2 of this chapter; (F) Applications for waiver of certain grounds of excludability under Sec. 212.7(a) of thischapter; (G) Applications for waiver of the two-year foreign residence requirement under Sec. 212.7(c)of this chapter; (H) Petitions for approval of schools under Sec. 214.3 of this chapter; [Now under ICE.]1 Department of Homeland Security Delegation Memos 0150 and 0150.1, Delegation to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services [nowUSCIS]. The specifics of these memos and any other subsequent delegations remain elusive. 1
  • 2. (I) Decisions of district directors regarding withdrawal of approval of schools for attendanceby foreign students under Sec. 214.4 of this chapter; [Now under ICE.] (J) Petitions for temporary workers or trainees and fiancees or fiances of U.S. citizens underSecs. 214.2 and 214.6 of this chapter; (K) Applications for issuance of reentry permits under 8 CFR part 223; (L) Applications for refugee travel documents under 8 CFR part 223; (M) Applications for benefits of section 13 of the Act of September 11, 1957, as amended,under Sec. 245.3 of this chapter; (N) Adjustment of status of certain resident aliens to nonimmigrants under Sec. 247.12(b) ofthis chapter; (O) Applications to preserve residence for naturalization purposes under Sec. 316a.21(c) ofthis chapter; (P) Applications for certificates of citizenship under Sec. 341.6 of this chapter; (Q) Administration cancellation of certificates, documents, and records under Sec. 342.8 ofthis chapter; (R) Applications for certificates of naturalization or repatriation under Sec. 343.1 of thischapter; (S) Applications for new naturalization or citizenship papers under Sec. 343a.1(c) of thischapter; (T) Applications for special certificates of naturalization under Sec. 343b.11(b) of this chapter; (U) [Reserved] (V) Petitions to classify Amerasians under Public Law 97-359 as the children of United Statescitizens; (W) Revoking approval of certain applications, as provided in Secs. 214.2, 214.6, and 214.11of this chapter; (X) Orphan petitions under 8 CFR 204.3; (Y) Applications for advance process of orphan petitions under 8 CFR 204.3; (Z) Invalidation of a temporary labor certification issued by the governor of Guam under Sec.214.2(h)(3)(v) of this chapter; (AA) Application for status as temporary or permanent resident under Secs. 245a.2 or 245a.3of this chapter; (BB) Application for status as temporary resident under Sec. 210.2 of this chapter; (CC) Termination of status as temporary resident under Sec. 210.4 of this chapter; (DD) Termination of status as temporary resident under Sec. 245a.2 of this chapter; (EE) Application for waiver of grounds of excludability under Parts 210, 210a, and 245a ofthis chapter; (FF) Application for status of certain Cuban and Haitian nationals under section 202 of theImmigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; (GG) A self-petition filed by a spouse or child based on the relationship to an abusive citizenor lawful permanent resident of the United States for classification under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i)of the Act or section 203(a)(2)(A) of the Act; (HH) Application for Temporary Protected Status under part 244 of this chapter; (II) Petitions for special immigrant juveniles under part 204 of this chapter; (JJ) Applications for adjustment of status under part 245 of this title when denied solelybecause the applicant failed to establish eligibility for the bona fide marriage exemptioncontained in section 245(e) of the Act; 2
  • 3. (KK) Petition for Armed Forces Special Immigrant under Sec. 204.9 of this chapter; (LL) Request for participation as a regional center under Sec. 204.6(m) of this chapter; (MM) Termination of participation of regional center under Sec. 204.6(m) of this chapter; (NN) Applications for certificates of citizenship under Secs. 320.5 and 322.5 of this chapter;and (OO) Applications for T nonimmigrant status under Sec. 214.11 of this chapter.AAO has its “current” appellate jurisdiction posted on the USCIS website at:http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=b2521eeaf28e6210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=dfe316685e1e6210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRDThe BIA currently has jurisdiction over those subjects listed in:8 CFR § 1003.1 Organization, jurisdiction, and powers of the Board of ImmigrationAppeals.(b) Appellate jurisdiction. Appeals may be filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals from thefollowing:(1) Decisions of Immigration Judges in exclusion cases, as provided in 8 CFR part 240, subpartD.(2) Decisions of Immigration Judges in deportation cases, as provided in 8 CFR part 1240,subpart E, except that no appeal shall lie seeking review of a length of a period of voluntarydeparture granted by an Immigration Judge under section 244E of the Act as it existed prior toApril 1, 1997.(3) Decisions of Immigration Judges in removal proceedings, as provided in 8 CFR part 1240,except that no appeal shall lie seeking review of the length of a period of voluntary departuregranted by an immigration judge under section 240B of the Act or part 240 of this chapter.(4) Decisions involving administrative fines and penalties, including mitigation thereof, asprovided in part 280 of this chapter.(5) Decisions on petitions filed in accordance with section 204 of the act (except petitions toaccord preference classifications under section 203(a)(3) or section 203(a)(6) of the act, or apetition on behalf of a child described in section 101(b)(1)(F) of the act), and decisions onrequests for revalidation and decisions revoking the approval of such petitions, in accordancewith section 205 of the act, as provided in parts 204 and 205, respectively, of 8 CFR chapter I orparts 1204 and 1205, respectively, of this chapter. [USCIS Decisions on, including revocationsof, family based petitions except, under VAWA or Orphans. Note: 8 CFR has not been updatedto reflect current statutory provisions as described under current law, as amended.](6) Decisions on applications for the exercise of the discretionary authority contained in section212(d)(3) of the act as provided in part 1212 of this chapter.(7) Determinations relating to bond, parole, or detention of an alien as provided in 8 CFR part1236, subpart A. [ICE detention and ICE or IJ bond decisions.] 3
  • 4. (8) Decisions of Immigration Judges in rescission of adjustment of status cases, as provided inpart 1246 of this chapter. [Prior to HSA 2002, the INS District Director could rescind anadjustment of status, now, in that rescission is not required prior to issuing an NTA, USCIS orICE can just refer the case to an IJ directly, so the issue of jurisdiction between the A.G. andDHS has not been addressed.](9) Decisions of Immigration Judges in asylum proceedings pursuant to §1208.2(b) of thischapter.(10) Decisions of Immigration Judges relating to Temporary Protected Status as provided in 8CFR part 1244. [AAO deals with USCIS denials of TPS but those same denials can also come upbefore an IJ and then the BIA if an NTA is issued.](11) Decisions on applications from organizations or attorneys requesting to be included on a listof free legal services providers and decisions on removals there from pursuant to §1003.65.[USCIS or ICE can instigate rescission of such an action if the conduct giving rise to discipline isbefore it.](12) Decisions of Immigration Judges on applications for adjustment of status referred on aNotice of Certification (Form I–290C) to the Immigration Court in accordance with§§1245.13(n)(2) and 1245.15(n)(3) of this chapter or remanded to the Immigration Court inaccordance with §§1245.13(d)(2) and 1245.15(e)(2) of this chapter. [The old INS form has beenreplaced by an EOIR form.](13) Decisions of adjudicating officials in practitioner disciplinary proceedings as provided insubpart G of this part. [USCIS or ICE can instigate such an action if the conduct giving rise tothe discipline is before it.](14) Decisions of immigration judges regarding custody of aliens subject to a final order ofremoval made pursuant to §1241.14 of this chapter. [ICE detention and bond matters.]Federal Court ReviewAdministrative Appellate Decisions are usually subject to further review by the Federal Courts.Some classes of cases have specific governing statutory provisions, while others are treatedunder general provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) [5 USC Title 7]. Somebenefits under the INA have mixed jurisdictional issues.For example, the Application for Certificate of Citizenship: An appeal to the AAO must be filed with the office that made the decision within 30 days of the date of the Denial Notice for personal service, 33 days if received by mail. If an appeal is not filed within the time allowed, a new N-600 may not be filed see 8 CFR 341.6. Instead, if at a later date you wish to pursue this citizenship claim anew, you may file, pursuant to 8 CFR 341.6, a form I-290B, with the current fee as of the date of that filing, for: 1.) a late Motion to Reopen with additional evidence and/or, 2.) a late Motion to Reconsider along with a brief identifying specifically any erroneous conclusion of law or statement of fact, along with legal references, and/or identifying the 4
  • 5. evidence that you believe was misinterpreted with an explanation of the facts as you interpret them. You must exhaust the administrative appeal process afforded under the law by first appealing to the AAO (USCIS Administrative Appeals Office) before you may seek judicial review of the agency decision in the case, which would be to file a lawsuit in a U.S. District Court under INA § 360(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1503(a)] and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The existence of concurrent Removal Proceedings would preclude U.S. District Court judicial review under this section and restrict review to a Petition for Review in a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals of any Removal Order following a BIA Dismissal of a Removal Order under 8 USC § 1252(b) [INA § 242(b)].Also the regulations governing the adjudication of Form N-565, Application for ReplacementNaturalization/Citizenship Document, need to be updated. They were written many years agoprior to not just one major statutory change but two major changes. The statutory naturalizationauthority was shifted from the U.S. Courts to the Attorney General and delegated to theImmigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 1990. After the terrorist attacks of September11, 2001, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) and this statutorynaturalization authority shifted to the Secretary of Homeland Security and delegated to U.S.Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).Court Criticism Of The Regulations:Hussain v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 541 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (D. Minn. 2008) wasdecided by United States District Judge Patrick J. Schiltz on March 27, 2008, in Minnesota. Heperformed a painstaking analysis on the topic and was rather critical of the regulations.In discussing 8 CFR § 334.16(b), the Judge said: “This regulation specifies certain procedural requirements, but it provides virtually no substantive guidance to a court that is asked to order USCIS to issue an amended certificate of naturalization. Indeed, the regulation does not even directly address certificates of naturalization, but instead discusses the process for amending petitions for naturalization, including those petitions that have already been granted. Because amending an already-granted petition for naturalization seems like an oddly indirect way to go about obtaining an amended certificate of naturalization, the Court asked the parties if they had been able to identify any reason for this procedure. Both parties admitted that they had not……”AAO Needs Its Own RegulationsIt is clear that the regulations pertaining to Appeals and Motions were created for a differentsituation than what now exists. The BIA is in a different forum than AAO. The BIA is theappellate body from an adversarial administrative proceeding which much more resembles a 5
  • 6. criminal trial while the AAO is the appellate body from an inquisitorial administrative paper-based and usually faceless adjudication. The BIA and AAO are qualitatively different innature. Since March 1, 2003, the AAO should have been forming a new self identity inaccordance with its new home in a customer service oriented agency. USCIS is charged with thefair and impartial evaluation of eligibility for benefits under the Immigration and NationalityAct. AAO needs to re-evaluate its place in the grand scheme of the current reality as a part of theU.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.The AAO simply deals with totally different types of cases than the BIA and needs newregulations specific to its new role. The statutes and court decisions have shown that the BIA andissues arising in the federal courts from the BIA may deal with habeas review, matters ofesstoppel or res judicata and other legal concepts that have no place in AAO jurisdiction but mayhave relevance to BIA and IJ jurisdiction. The AAO seriously needs to update its controllingregulations or just dump them and start from scratch because the regulations were never theAAO’s regulations to begin with. They always belonged to the EOIR and BIA. AAO was anafterthought.The Board was created by the Attorney General in 1940, after a transfer of functions from theDepartment of Labor. Reorg. Plan V (May 22, 1940); 3 CFR Comp. 1940, Supp. tit.3, 336. TheBoard is not a statutory body; it was created wholly by the Attorney General from the functionstransferred. A.G. Order 3888, 5 FR 2454 (July 1, 1940); see Matter of L-, 1 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA;A.G. 1940).AAU became AAO on Nov. 22, 1994, 59 FR 60070. The prior history as to the creation of theAAU will require further research. That internal reorganization2 of the Immigration andNaturalization Service was approved by Attorney General Janet Reno on January 14, 1994. “The BIA is the creation of Attorney General regulations and has never been statutorily authorized. The Board traces its heritage to 1921 when the Secretary of Labor created a board to assist in performing quasi-judicial functions under the immigration and naturalization laws. In 1940, the Attorney General officially created the BIA, which for more than fifty years existed as part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and consisted of only a chairman and four members. The BIA separated from the INS in 1983 and became part of the independent Executive Office of Immigration Review. Within the Executive Office of Immigration Review, the BIA is under direct line of supervision by the Attorney General and has authority to act on the Attorney Generals behalf. Thus, when the immigration laws confer a decision to the discretion of the Attorney General, the BIA has authority to administer that discretion. The BIA has grown rapidly over the last decade to twenty-three members and more than one hundred staff attorneys in order to keep up with a heavy caseload and expanding functions.”32 See 59 FR 60070 of Nov. 22, 1994, search for “Immigration and Naturalization Service” and view the TIFF File of the Reorganization Chart at:http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/search.html3 Bradley J. Wyatt, Even Aliens are Entitled to Due Process: Extending Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing to Board of Immigration AppealsProcedural Reform, 12 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 605 (2004), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol12/iss2/10 6
  • 7. Following three blurbs from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathews_v._Eldridge Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that individuals have a statutorily granted property right in social security benefits, that the termination of those benefits implicates due process, but that the termination of Social Security benefits does not require a pre-termination hearing. The case is important in the development of American administrative law.Additional cases on administrative law: Londoner v. Denver (1908) • Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization (1915) • NLRB v. Hearst Publications (1944) • Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (1944) • Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB (1951) • Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) • Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971) • Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) • Vermont Yankee v. NRDC (1978) • Chevron v. NRDC (1984) • United States v. Mead Corp. (2001) • Whitman v. ATA (2001) • National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services (2005)Federal Statutes on administrative law: Administrative Procedure Act (1946) • Freedom of Information Act (1966) • Government in the Sunshine Act (1976) • Regulatory Flexibility Act (1980)Below from: http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_204 Facts of the Case: George Eldridge, who had originally been deemed disabled due to chronic anxiety and back strain, was informed by letter that his disability status was ending and that his benefits would be terminated. Social Security Administration procedures provided for ample notification and an evidentiary hearing before a final determination was made, but Eldridges benefits were cut off until that hearing could take place. Eldridge challenged the termination of his benefits without such a hearing. Question: Did the lack of an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of disability benefits violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion: No. In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court held that the initial termination of Eldridges benefits without a hearing did not violate due process. The Court noted that due process was "flexible" and called for "such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." The Court found that there were numerous safeguards to prevents errors in making decisions to terminate disability benefits and argued that "[a]t some point the benefit or an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society, in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost." 7
  • 8. The BIA and the federal courts have an existing structure in place and the BIA is currently re-working its own regulations as ordered by the Attorney General.See: Matter of Compean, Bangaly & J-E-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009), which held: The Attorney General vacated the decision in Matter of Compean, Bangaly & J-E-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 710 (A.G. 2009), and pending the outcome of a rulemaking process, directed the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Immigration Judges to continue to apply the previously established standards for reviewing motions to reopen based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.The validity of the BIA’s regulatory procedural safeguards coupled with the statutory motion toreopen and the Petition for Review under INA § 242 has been born out as recently as March 3,2011, in the consolidated Opinion of the Second Circuit Luna v. Holder4 [Consolidating: 07-3796-ag Luna v. Holder and 08-4840-ag Thompson v. Holder]. “…The sole and exclusive means for challenging a final order of removal is to file a petition for review in a federal court of appeals. If a petition for review is filed more than 30 days after the order of removal, the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over the petition……. We hold that applying the 30-day filing deadline to Petitioners does not violate the Suspension Clause because the statutory motion to reopen process as described herein is an adequate and effective substitute for habeas review. We reach that conclusion based on our further holdings that (1) the statutory motion to reopen process cannot be unilaterally terminated by the Government and (2) agency denials are subject to meaningful judicial review. Accordingly, we dismiss as untimely Petitioners’ petitions for review.” [Emphasis added.] …….. “Before 1996, aliens involved in immigration proceedings could move to reopen their proceedings before the BIA. However, the authority for such motions derived solely from regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.”Rosendo Benito Rangel-Perez v. U.S. Att’y Gen. No. 10-12963 (11th Cir, March 10, 2011)5 : “…Rangel-Perez’s brief does not address the BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider6. We lack jurisdiction to review the underlying merits of the denial of cancellation of removal. Rangel-Perez’s June 29, 2010 petition for review was not filed within thirty days of the entry of the BIA’s July 22, 2009 order affirming the denial of cancellation of removal. See Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. §4 http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/fb2871ee-c2c1-43eb-b1b8-774c6900b6da/13/doc/07-3796%2008-4840_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/fb2871ee-c2c1-43eb-b1b8-774c6900b6da/13/hilite/5 http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/unpub/ops/201012963.pdf6 “We review de novo our own subject matter jurisdiction.” Avila v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 560 F.3d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 2009). “We review the BIA’sdenial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion.” Calle v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marksomitted). 8
  • 9. 1252(b)(1); Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1272 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the period for filing a petition for review “is mandatory and jurisdictional, [and] it is not subject to equitable tolling” (quotation marks omitted)); Jaggernauth v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 1346, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not affect the finality of a removal order and that the order resolving the motion for reconsideration is a separately appealable final order).7 Accordingly, the petition is dismissed to the extent Rangel-Perez seeks review of the BIA’s July 22, 2009 order. Rangel-Perez’s June 29, 2010 petition for review is timely as to the BIA’s June 1, 2010 denial of his motion for reconsideration. However, Rangel-Perez’s brief does not offer any argument as to why the BIA abused its discretion in denying this particular motion. For this reason, Rangel-Perez has abandoned any argument regarding the BIA’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (“When an appellant fails to offer argument on an issue, that issue is abandoned.”). Therefore, the petition is denied as to the BIA’s June 1, 2010 denial of Rangel-Perez’s motion for reconsideration.”There seems to be much more in the way of direct case-law and history behind the BIA than theAAO but it is not without case-law to guide its development. The AAO can greatly benefit fromall that has come before it. USCIS just needs to look around and find where it fits it and what itneeds to accomplish through AAO. “[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved, as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 367 U. S. 895 (1961). “…Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due. It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible, and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. ….. …………. ……To say that the concept of due process is flexible does not mean that judges are at large to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexibility is in its scope once it has been determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, (1972) 408 U. S. 481.7 In fact, in August 2009, Rangel-Perez timely filed a petition for review of the BIA’s July 22, 2009 order. On September 10, 2010, a panel of thisCourt dismissed Rangel-Perez’s petition for review, concluding that Rangel-Perez, although couching his argument in due process terms, hadeffectively presented an abuse-of-discretion argument regarding the discretionary decision to deny cancellation of removal, a claim this Courtdoes not have jurisdiction to review. See Rangel-Perez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 09-13934 (11th Cir. Sept. 10, 2010) (unpublished). In both hisearlier appeal and this appeal, Rangel-Perez’s arguments focus primarily on whether the IJ erred in finding that Rangel-Perez had not made theshowing of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship required for cancellation of removal. 9

×